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Preface 
This book comprises a selection of the papers, now in a revised form, presented at a 
conference entitled ‘Another Transition. Politics and Culture in Central Europe, 1945-49’. 
In their title or their substance many chapters reflect that original title. The editor and 
publishers agreed on the present title since the term ‘transition’ (i) has become so redolent 
of the post-Communist era and (ii) has become a cultural historical cliche used particularly 
of the 1890s, but then of the 1920s, then the Second World War itself. The new title, The 
Phoney Peace, is intended to evoke the tensions that obtained in Central Europe between 
the defeat of Germany and its allies in 1945 and the fully-armed Cold War. The subtitle 
indicates what is different about this book from other recent volumes on the period: the 
emphasis on culture in its broadest sense — everything from law, theatre, fiction, to the 
attempts to maintain or re-establish a social culture. Many chapters concern the successful 
or failed coming to terms with the Shoah. 
The semantic compass of the term ‘Central Europe’ remains a subject of discussion. For 
this book, Central Europe in the period 1945—^49 was a denotative geographical concept 
Germany, Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Even in those days the term did 
not have a stable meaning. When, soon after the First World War, the Scottish historian of 
things central and south-east European, R. W. Seton-Watson, was appointed to a chair of 
Central European History at London University, a Moravian Slovak wrote to congratulate 
him on his appointment and express his relief that the term ‘Central European’ would at 
last keep the Hungarians in their place (in the Balkans). Slovenia is included in this book 
not because, since independence, it has generally come to be regarded as part of Central 
Europe (though Slovene is a South Slavonic, not a West Slavonic language), but because 
Slovenia was for many hundreds of years part of Austria. Even as part of ‘south-east 
Europe’ at the time, Slovenia’s problems were with Central or Western Europe. 
Most of the area that was in Central Europe in 1945 became ‘sovietoid’ at some time 
within the period this volume concerns. In 1949, most of Germany, the one-time 
American, British and (recent) French zones of occupation, began to emerge out of Central 
Europe to become part of Western Europe. Germany is, however, not the odd man out in 
this volume that it might appear to be. That place is clearly taken by Austria, whose future 
was not finally decided until it became a free state in 1955. In fact, all the countries the 
authors of the chapters here deal with were odd men out in some way or another. This 
book demonstrates that. 
The odd women and men out in this volume are those who gave papers at the conference 
which are for a variety of reasons not included here. I should like to thank them warmly for 
their contributions to the conference (some of their papers led to particularly lively debate). 
The conference began on Easter Day 1998, and many participants sacrificed more than 
chocolate eggs to be there. 
‘Another Transition’ was also the last large-scale multidisciplinary conference to be held 
at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies before it merged with University 
College London. It thus constituted something of a ‘rite of transition’ in itself. Many 
bodies were very generous in their support of this rite, and thus also of this book. Without 
Mercedes-Benz (UK) nothing could have happened at all, and I should like to express my 
sincerest gratitude to the board of directors for their confidence in the project. Without the 
British Academy, the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe, the British 
Council (Bratislava and Warsaw), and Malev Hungarian Airlines, the majority of the 
speakers at the conference would have not been able to come. I am extremely grateful for 
their generosity. 
xm 
XIV Preface 
I should like also to thank the many anonymous readers who dealt so constructively with 
the papers I sent them, and Laszlo Peter who acted arbiter elegentiae for the whole 
volume. Another of the contributors to this volume, Vladimir Macura, will be remembered 
particularly fondly by all participants. He came in full knowledge that he was seriously 
sick. More than any other, Macura strove to support and, indeed, create scholarly standards 
in literary studies in Husak’s Czechoslovakia. 
Finally, ‘and name it gratitude, the word is poor’, I thank Hayley Frapwell, who did 
everything. She ran the conference, performed all sorts of wonders with electronics and 
recast most chapters in this book.1 And still she smiled. 
Robert B. Pynsent 
London, May 2000 
Every Preface must have at least one footnote. I would exploit that convention to express my 
enormous gratitude to the copy-editor and general adviser to this volume, John Andrew, and to 
Mary Joyce, who picked up the pieces after Hayley Frapwell left the School and swept my 
incompetence with e-mail, computers and so forth under the carpet of her digitalization. 
Withouth Dessislava Dragneva s help with the index I should have been desperate. 
1 Introduction 
Robert B. Pynsent 
The Cold War was pretty hot for those bom on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, 
it was not very cold even for those living in western Germany, and particularly West Berlin, 
at least until the 1970s. And one does not forget the families divided by the Wall. Further¬ 
more, no one could take lightly what one so frequently heard on the wireless in 1989 from 
elderly GDR citizens, that they felt the Second World War had now ended at last. 
This book is concerned with a brief period in Central European history after the hot war 
which looked like a respite between two forms of totalitarianism: a respite but a phoney 
peace. Except for emigres who returned from Moscow or the West and except for 
resistance fighters, most people had somehow or other been implicated at least passively in 
the survival of occupation or of local Fascist regimes. Suspicion was the order of the day, 
and suspicion could be attached to anyone, even resistance fighters, except those men and 
women who had survived exile in the USSR. This book studies primarily the impact of the 
war on post-war politics and culture, and the manner in which the occupying or liberating 
powers together with indigenous forces determined cultural developments even before the 
final Communist victory in 1948 or 1949, and before the creation of Bizonia. The chapters 
analyse different aspects of the causes of unease or of the unease itself. What the book 
discovers is that, with the exception of western Germany and, to a degree, Austria (where, 
as Suppan points out in his chapter, the Communist Party was spectacularly unsuccessful), 
it was hardly a period of hope. Very few people indeed regretted the military defeat of 
Nazism, but soon after the inhabitants of most of Central Europe realized that they had 
fallen into the Soviet sphere of influence joy at liberation from Nazism or Fascism began 
to diminish. It very quickly became evident that the war had not changed Stalin: his more 
liberal attitude to the Church and the West had been simply a survival tactic. What did 
change was the geopolitical situation in Central Europe, to Stalin’s advantage. 
In most of Central Europe the transition from 1945 to 1948/49 began with a very brief 
period, a year or so, when culture seemed to be returning more or less to the state it had 
been in before the war. That is true even of Poland, where a civil war was being fought. 
Much literature consisted of war memoirs, testimonies to German brutality and, often, to 
local heroism. At the beginning these works were barely censored, and most of the praise 
of the Soviets was voluntary, indeed genuinely enthusiastic. At the latest by mid-1946, 
however, the intensity of the politicization of art began to increase rapidly. Most chapters 
in this book trace this politicization of culture; the rest provide insights into the political, 
military and social structures that encouraged or enforced this politicization. 
Many chapters look forward past 1948 or 1949, the imposition of fully sovietoid 
socialism, and many more look backwards to the war itself. Indeed, one may say that any 
book about Central Europe in the period of transition will also be a book about the Second 
World War. It will also, however, be a book about how that war, or a war-like atmosphere, 
was prolonged. However frail the pre-war democratic credentials of Central Europe (Peter 
discusses this in his chapter), Wandycz sums up what seems to be historical fact thus: ‘The 
Second World War, or rather its outcome, reversed the course of history of East Central 
Europe. Traditionally a borderland or a semi-periphery of the West, the region became a 
I am grateful to Laszlo Peter for acting as reader for this Introduction and for his useful suggestions. 
1 
2 The Phoney Peace 
westward extension of the Soviet East.’1 Nevertheless it was the war just as much as its 
outcome that actually changed the course, perhaps reversed it. The brutality of Stalinism 
had the soil tilled for it by the brutality of Nazism, and, except for Poland in our period and 
region, Stalinist brutality appeared less harsh. Even in Poland, where from the start the 
Soviets did their best to dominate the political, military and, to a degree, cultural elites, to 
finish off Hitler’s work, one cannot compare anything the Soviets did to what Hitler did. 
Hitler had removed by murder one of the most vital cultural and economic forces in the 
region, the Jews, and the Shoah is a major theme of this volume; Wistrich demonstrates 
how the Austrians have tended to avoid the issue, and Filipowicz, Michlic and Paton write 
about ambivalent Polish and Czech attitudes in the immediate post-war period. Of course, 
many thousands of non-Jewish Germans, Poles and Czechs (and somewhat fewer non- 
Jewish Slovaks and Hungarians) also died in the camps, but not millions. Indeed, a man 
who comes across as something of a naive villain in this book, President Benes, also lost 
relations and close associates in Auschwitz. My point is no doubt banal, but it still needs 
making: Hitler brutalized Central Europe. Without bearing that in mind, one cannot 
understand the political and cultural atmosphere of 1945^49 in the region, or the 
subsequent years, particularly in those parts of Central Europe that became people’s 
democracies. 
One of Benes’s relations who survived Auschwitz and an even worse imprisonment in 
the underground concentration camp of Nordhausen-Mittelbau, where V-2 rockets were 
built, was the journalist Jiff Benes. He was a great admirer of the courage shown by Jews 
in the camps as well as a compassionate observer. I quote two passages from Benes’s war 
memoir, both reports (with names and addresses of Czechoslovak witnesses) of events he 
did not see himself. No one perhaps needs to be reminded of German savagery; I quote 
these two passages because Benes’s more or less documentary work was widely read, and 
what people were reading constitutes a most important component of the cultural 
atmosphere of our period. The following concerns the death from typhoid of two of Edvard 
Benes’s relations, Marie Benesova and her daughter, Jarmila Krajcova, and of the wife and 
daughter, Vera, of the former Czechoslovak Minister of Social Security, Jaromir Necas: 
The first to die was Mrs Necasova. Actually on 28 October [that is, the anniversary of the 
founding of Czechoslovakia]. The others died later. The SS had their corpses thrown out with 
their blankets onto a pile in front of the hut. There were large numbers of rats there, and they 
gnawed away at the bodies. In the morning I could recognize Vera Necasova by her sweater; 
I had given it to her. She felt so cold as she was dying [...]. It was not possible to recognize 
any of the others.2 
The speaker here is a Jewish nurse. Probably the most horrific passage in the book 
concerns the way in which people were given a ‘wood anaesthetic’, that is, knocked on the 
head with a wooden club before being thrown into the Birkenau crematoria. The following 
is, however, more to my point. The setting is the small concentration camp of Ellrich near 
Nordhausen: 
It had been noticed that someone had been cutting off the testicles and what remained of 
calves, and cutting out the kidneys of the corpses that were stacked for cremation. The guards 
began keeping watch by the corpses and they caught one of the prisoners in the act. When 
interrogated the prisoner said that he was so hungry that he could not restrain himself from 
eating human flesh. After roll-call the Lagerfuhrer had him led out before the assembled 
prisoners; he then had a corpse brought along and forced the prisoner to show the others how 
1 Piotr S. Wandycz, The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle 
Ages to the Present, London and New York, 1992, p. 236. 
2 Jiri Benes, V nemeckem zajeti, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 107. 
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he carried out his cannibalism. [...] Mass hysteria overtook the watching prisoners and they 
tore the cannibal to pieces.3 
One of the two men Benes most admired in Auschwitz was Alexej Cepicka, who 
V 
managed to save hundreds of lives. Subsequently, Cepicka as Minister of Justice from 
1948 to 1950 sovietized the Czechoslovak judiciary, organized the purge of judges and 
lawyers and introduced penal servitude camps. After that he became minister of defence 
(1950-56), further sovietized the armed forces and introduced a penal servitude corps. 
After the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party he no longer held senior 
positions, and was eventually expelled from the Party, as possibly the most hated of all 
Czechoslovak Stalinists, in 1963. 
Paton mentions in his chapter the German method of torture by serving prisoners with 
over-seasoned food and subsequently denying them water. Paton mentions the British 
airman who suffered this torture and was then beaten to death. That same method was used 
when Cepicka was Minister of Justice on a parish priest who was accused of contriving a 
miracle in his church. Instead of subsequently beating the prisoner to death, like the 
Germans, the Czech torturer gave this priest, Josef Toufar, acid to drink.4 Toufar died on 
the second anniversary of the Communist coup; Cepicka died six weeks short of the first 
anniversary of the beginning of the ‘Velvet Revolution’. 
There was a difference between the Germans and the Czechs in that if a prisoner died 
under torture in the late 1940s or early 1950s, the interrogating officer was occasionally 
punished, usually by transfer to a less attractive job. Prisoners were sometimes driven off 
and killed many miles away from the prison; one such case concerned a man who was 
arrested on the grounds that he was planning to assassinate a prominent politician and an 
even more prominent general. His state security (StB) interrogators pretended to be from 
an American intelligence service. When, after extensive interrogation, the prisoner still 
would not admit his planned crime, he was driven away and shot, lest he reveal StB 
methods. When the methods used on prisoners in custody in Uherske Hradiste became 
known to the local population in March 1949, an enquiry was set up. A police doctor and 
an examining magistrate visited the victims in the local prison. I quote only two accounts, 
and not the more gruesome. First: 
Jan Dvorak, 43 years, grammar-school master. 
Interrogated three times. Beaten in the face, beaten on the soles of both feet. Consequent 
swelling of the feet and serious haematomas. Electric shocks used. Kicked in the back. At 
present being treated for inflammation of the kidneys. Treatment, diet. Apparently could not 
walk for fourteen days. Difficulties with walking. Paraesthesia of both legs, more in the 
right. Clear signs of trauma on legs. Physically weak, markedly pale, sickly. Uncertain gait, 
stumbles. Suffers from insomnia, constant fear. Nervous spasms of face muscles. Whole 
body trembling. Weepy. 
Second: 
Josef Pavelka, 34 years, labourer. 
Interrogated three times, two beatings across soles of feet with rubber tubing so that he could 
not walk for a week. On one occasion repeated use of electric shocks. Twice during 
interrogation released stool involuntarily.5 
3 
4 
5 
Ibid., p. 259. 
Frantisek Drasner, Cihost’sky zazrak ve svetle svedeckych vypovedi a dokumentu, Havlickuv 
Brod, 1990, p. 6. 
In these quotations, I change personal names, not only because not to do so could bring pain to 
surviving relations, but also because, although the documents I have used were distributed at a 
4 The Phoney Peace 
A special ward was set up at the main Prague mental hospital in Bohnice (Ward N5) for 
prisoners of the StB who broke down under interrogation. For some years the security 
guards would allow these prisoners visits or at least food parcels. A secret order (A- 
1081/01-51) was sent out by the commander of the StB on 27 February 1951 stating that 
such visits were against regulations and must cease forthwith. 
Naturally, it was not only the brutalization attending the war that affected the people and 
the politicians of Central Europe. The war represented, to use Schopflin’s phrase, a 
‘caesura’.* * * * * 6 No possibility of returning to some pre-war status quo existed, not only in 
Germany and Austria, but also in the other Central European states. Poland did, however, 
perhaps have the potential, in the remnants of the Home Army and the members of the 
elite who had spent the war in the West, to create a better version of the social status quo, 
in spite of the facts that it had suffered greater losses than any other population in our 
region apart from Germany, and that it had been wheeled westwards by the Great Powers. 
At least that is what the Soviets were clearly afraid of. Peter and Pok suggest in their 
chapters that avoiding a sovietoid society had been possible in Hungary as well, but the 
Soviets appear to have been confident that a people’s democracy was ineluctable in 
Hungary, too. By early 1942 Western diplomats were coming to the conclusion that 
Czechoslovakia was serving the interests of the Soviet government.7 The ‘caesura’ actually 
involved the Stunde Null (see Midgley’s chapter), a fresh start. In the interests of that fresh 
start much was spoken and written about coming to terms with the immediate past. In fact, 
however, for all the hunts for collaborators, the people’s courts and national courts (as 
Jordan points out in her chapter, one of the first things immediately after the war the 
British did in their zone of occupation was to abolish the people’s court; it will always be 
baffling that East-Central European politicians so readily employed similar or identical 
terminology and procedures to the Nazis’), for all the welcomings of heroes, the 
politicians, and that means predominantly the Communists, were practically only 
interested in the immediate past if it served their empire-building. Real and alleged 
collaborators with the Germans could be useful anyway, since they were blackmailable. If 
an alleged collaborator was a member of the old political elite, their collaboration could be 
conference on the Crimes of Communism in Prague in 1991 in a bound volume of photocopies, 
the volume is marked ‘for internal use only’. Most of the material in the volume, for example, 
the ministerial edict explaining why the corpses of those killed in detention should no longer be 
handed over to the next of kin for burial (because their funerals are exploited by enemies of the 
state) is, of course, no longer classified. [Editor not given] Staid mezinarodni konference o 
zlocinech komumismu. Sbornlk prednasek a dokumentu. 5.-6. Hjna 1991 Praha-Dlabacov, 
Prague, 1991, pp. 94-95. 
6 George Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992, Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1993, 
p. 60. Schopflin confuses pre-condition with process when he suggests that the impact of war 
was a fourth stage to Seton-Watson’s three stages in the creation of a people’s democracy. 
Peter accepts Seton-Watson’s clear and insurpassable analysis. For the reader of this 
Introduction, however, I mention that the three stages were, first, the formation of 'the genuine 
coalition’, friendly to the USSR; under this coalition ‘there was little political censorship except 
on one subject — the USSR. Not only might Soviet policy not be criticised, but it was hardly 
possible to write anything about any aspect of Russia which did not coincide with the official 
Soviet line’; the second stage is 'the bogus coalition', which in Poland was in place from the 
liberation’ onwards. Koloski’s chapter describes the efforts of Boleslaw Drobner not to accept 
this bogusness. The 'third stage is the ‘'monolithic" regime’, involving ‘the fusion of the well- 
purged social democrats with the communists’. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European 
Revolution, London, 1950, pp. 169-71. 
Vojtech Mastny, Russia s Road to the Cold War. Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of 
Communism, 1941-1945, New York, 1979, p. 59. 
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‘proved’ and the person involved disposed of on the gallows or behind bars. Nowhere in 
the emergent Eastern Bloc, with the exception, for a while, of eastern Germany (where 
there were about 45,000 trials of Nazis), was there anything comparable to the moral 
purging process that began with the Nuremberg Trials (though only 5,025 people were 
tried for war-crimes at Nuremberg). Nothing was done about the endemic antisemitism of 
the region, which had been dealt with in western Germany systematically in the end by the 
‘philosemitism’ Wistrich describes. The Poles, the Hungarians, the Slovaks, one could say, 
did not institute the death camps, but simply saying that overlooks the chief point, the need 
for a concentrated effort to eliminate the bacteria that allowed the camps to be conceived 
in the first place. When Jewish Communists had served their purpose during the second 
half of the 1940s, at least their more prominent representatives were disposed of in purges 
and show-trials in the 1950s. Eastern Bloc caricatures of Dean Acheson bore a striking 
resemblance to illustrations from the Nazi propaganda press. The Communists gave their 
antisemitic policy a new name, ‘anti-Zionism’. 
The fate of the approximately six million Jews murdered by the Germans by means of 
the combination of modem technology with the encouragement of savagery in would-be 
normal human beings — and the aid of hundreds of academics and private-sector scientists 
— had begun to have an impact on non-Jewish populations long before the end of the war. 
Local police and gendarme forces, of course, helped the Germans in, say, Poland and 
Bohemia, and in Poland large numbers of civilians helped hunt down Jews. In whatever 
the country, even those who found the killing and deportation of Jews repugnant witnessed 
it, saw Jews killed in front of them, heard and saw neighbours roughly removed from their 
flats, and saw the files of Jews with suitcases being marched to assembly points before 
they were put on trains; at railway stations people saw the cattle-trucks full of people (and, 
indeed, sometimes risked their lives trying to help them with food or water). They 
witnessed all this long before the ravages of defeat or liberation. Responses were, 
naturally, various. Many ‘did very well’ out of the ‘aryanization’ of businesses and 
factories, and out of looting the flats or houses of Jews. What is clear not only from 
records published in the aftermath of war, but also from belles-lettres published during the 
occupations, is that perhaps the commonest reaction was alarm. I quote Mazower: ‘In 
response to the horrors of occupation, most people living under Nazi control had retreated 
into a private world and tried to ignore everything that did not directly concern them. With 
traditional moral norms apparently thrown to the wind, the unusual cruelty of the Germans 
towards the Jews created a more general alarm among non-Jews.’8 Violence against the 
Jews, but also against other neighbours who had the wrong politics or were involved in 
underground resistance easily led to the struthiousness illiberal politicians find particularly 
useful. Certainly one agrees with Gross’s suggestion that ‘the unwelcome familiarity with 
the violence unleashed under World War II regimes of occupation made the methods of 
Communist Machtergreifung in the subsequent period more acceptable than they would 
have been otherwise’.9 On the other hand, one also agrees with Schopflin’s view, at least 
as far as the less struthious are concerned, that the population was ‘radicalized by war’, 
and ‘expected that a new political order, based on a more equal distribution of power, 
would be created’.10 
The loss of life and destruction of material was so immense before (and during) 
liberation (or defeat) that it appeared to large numbers, in the East and West, that 
8 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, Harmondsworth, 1998, p. 176. 
9 Jan Gross, ‘War as Revolution’ in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds). The 
Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, Boulder, CO, 1997, 
p. 24. 
10 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 60. 
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something radically new, optimistic, humane was necessary. The right wing had caused the 
war and so its pole, the left, had enormous appeal. (That in most of Central Europe they 
replaced one messianic utopianism with another did not appear egregious; the belief in 
sympathetic magic had deep roots in the European consciousness.) The numbers are 
approximate, and were even more approximate at the time, but the figure for the Soviet 
dead served to encourage faith in Stalin’s contention that the USSR had set out to be the 
saviour of Europe (a view supported by much older national mythologies of the ‘last 
bastion of Christianity’ standing against the Mongols or Tatars). As McCauley reminds us, 
Soviet losses represented roughly half of all fatalities during the war: approximately nine 
million military personnel and over twenty-seven million civilians died. On top of that the 
Soviets lost ‘70,000 villages, 65,000 kilometres of railway track, half of all the railway 
bridges in occupied territory and over half of urban living space’.11 Whatever the rules of 
censorship, it is then unremarkable that grateful, mysticizing paeans to the Red Army were 
sung in liberated territories even by those whose religious or political views were opposed 
to Communism (see Pynsent’s chapter). 
In May 1945, most German cities with any industry (and some with virtually none, like 
Dresden) were flat, but it was not this devastation, or the approximately 5.5 million dead, 
that made the greatest impression on Germany, but the millions of Germans moving from 
the former eastern provinces, now parts of the USSR or Poland, and from Central and East 
European countries from which the government had decreed the expulsion of German 
minorities. For many Germans coming west from the new Poland between 1944 and 1948, 
this was the second time they had to be moved over a few years. Following the German- 
Soviet Pact hundreds of thousands of Germans (Volks dents che) had been moved from the 
Baltic States, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and Soviet eastern Poland, mainly to 
German-occupied Poland.12 What these expelled and refugee Germans were called 
depended on which zone they were settled in. In the Soviet zone they were Umsiedler, ‘re¬ 
settlers’ (so too, the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia was labelled 
Umsiedlung); in the Western zones they were Heimatvertriebene, ‘people driven out of 
their homes’. The eastern term suggests the participants’ acquiescence and the German 
authorities’ approval, or at least agreement. The western term, however, sounds almost like 
a Nazi word, has nationalist connotations, and certainly implies injustice. I have written 
that the Nuremberg Trials began a process of purging, but that purging concerned attitudes 
towards Jews; it took much longer in West Germany to expunge the Nazi way of thinking. 
Everyone who survived German concentration camps knew the full meaning of the word 
Auslander, but well into the 1970s small-ads for flats in German newspapers normally 
included the statement ‘Keine Auslander’ (no foreigners), where the word really did mean 
anyone who was not German.13 The West German ‘economic miracle’ relied to a great 
degree on Heimatvertriebene, more so indeed than on the mythicized Gastarbeiter. 
Of all the non-German Central European countries, Poland suffered the greatest 
devastation and disruption. Even after post-war repatriations and expulsions, the February 
1946 census demonstrated that the population of Poland had depleted to about two-thirds 
of the 1939 population.14 Schopflin records that, thanks to the Soviets, as well as the 
Germans, ‘the whole of the interwar aristocracy was scattered; one-third of the 
intelligentsia perished; of the 1.2 million people living in Warsaw in 1939, 800,000 were 
11 Martin McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949, 2nd edn, Harlow and New York, 
1995, p.32. 
12 See, for example, Mazower, Dark Continent, pp. 164-65, 168, 220-22. 
13 I do not forget the sign commonly outside British lodging houses in the 1940s and 1950s, ‘No 
Irish Please’. 
14 Norman Davies, God’s Playground: A History of Poland, 2 vols, Oxford, 1981, II, p. 487. 
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killed in the fighting that year and the uprisings of 1943 and 1944’.15 International horror 
was roused by the razing of the Czech village Lidice — and one might cynically comment 
that this horror may have been roused because from the Allies’ viewpoint, Czech 
resistance to the Germans was at best sporadic. In Poland, however, the razing of Lidice or 
Lezaky was, in Norman Davies’s words, ‘repeated in hundreds of Polish villages. An 
incomplete post-war count put their number at 299.’ Among those included in Davies’s 
selection are villages like Lipniak-Majorat (370 dead) and Borow (232 dead).16 That is the 
background to the ‘re-evaluation of the intellectuals’ that Trepte considers in his chapter. 
Furthermore, at the end of the war, Poles moved en masse from the east again, but also 
from Warsaw and elsewhere in Central Poland, to colonize the ‘Recovered Territories’. 
The thorough and somewhat chaotic conversion of Breslau into Wroclaw constituted an 
extraordinary piece of demographic and party-political engineering;17 the colonizing of the 
Sudetenland was much more chaotic, and violent. Indeed, the behaviour of the 
Communists there, and the Communist attempts to make political mileage out of it, 
constituted a serious factor in the rapidly declining popularity of the Party in 1947. 
Economically, the position is not all what some might expect. The fact that, up to 1944, 
in general our region saw considerable economic advance played neatly into the hands of 
the Marxist-Leninists, who understood Fascism as a quintessentially capitalist 
phenomenon. Capitalist society was in decay as the Depression had demonstrated, and 
Fascism was part of the apocalypse converting decay into annihilation. This actually posed 
a serious ideological problem for the Czechoslovak Communists, for if any definable 
group in Protectorate society could be labelled collaborators with the Germans it was the 
industrial working class. And as Gross points out, although Poland had an almost 
fabulously extensive underground resistance network, it is important that the resistance had 
continually to admonish workers that they should not volunteer for work in German 
factories, chiefly in the Reich. Gross notes a 50 per cent increase in coal production in 
Poland and in the Protectorate between 1939 and 1944, a 60 per cent increase in oil 
production and a doubling of gas production in Poland. In Hungary the years 1938-44 
marked an industrial boom, with the two years 193 8—40 showing a larger growth in 
manufactured output than in the previous two decades. Similar figures, though not quite so 
dramatic, apply to Slovakia, where industrial growth was far faster than in the 
Protectorate.18 And indeed, the vision of the affluent world of the Slovak puppet state vied 
with the glory of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising in Slovak national mythology for at 
least three decades after the war. Attempts after 1989 to regenerate the myth of the affluent 
state, supported often by ex-Communists, ultimately failed, though the proponents’ 
rhetoric perhaps had some influence on the move towards the splitting of Czechoslovakia 
politically, not just orthographically. 
The Uprising and consequent German occupation put an end to industrial development 
in Slovakia and restarted the deportation of Jews. 1944 was even more disastrous for 
Hungary. Hungary had been a place of refuge, of reasonable security, for Jews from 
Slovakia and elsewhere, although Jews without Hungarian citizenship, not counting neutral 
countries’ citizens, were not protected. All Jews in the provinces were deported. Admiral 
Horthy had tried to sue for a separate peace with the West; Stalin would have nothing of it, 
and the particularly vicious Arrow Cross Fascist regime that replaced Horthy’s was 
zealously antisemitic. Normally, Hungarian Jews went straight from the deportation trains 
15 Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 60. 
16 Ibid., p. 455. 
17 See Padraic Kenney, ‘'Polish Workers and Stalinist Transformation’ in Naimark and Gibianskii 
(eds). The Establishment of Communist Regimes, pp. 136-66. 
18 Gross, ‘War as Revolution’, p. 20. 
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to the gas chambers or, indeed, the crematoria. Budapest Jews were put into a ghetto. 
During the devastating two-month siege of Buda by the Red Army, the Arrow Cross set 
about raiding the ghetto, taking Jews to the Danube and shooting them; the Arrow Cross 
massacres actually shocked the Wehrmacht.,9 As an Axis state Hungary had to pay 
reparations to the USSR. Soviet dismantling of industrial plant simply added to the 
destruction already incurred by land-battles with the Soviets and the Allied bombing. The 
Soviets were eventually persuaded not to levy reparations on Slovakia, but that did not 
mean that factories were not dismantled in Czechoslovakia, particularly in the Sudeten 
areas. Apart from arms factories and north Bohemian industrial plant, the Bohemian Lands 
suffered little from bombing.20 
Invasion and liberation by the Red Army initially brought more chaos and more 
destruction. In his chapter, McCauley writes of the dismantling of plant in eastern 
Germany, the subsequent setting up of the exploitative SAGs, Soviet limited companies, 
and touches on the export of German forced labour to the USSR. Both he and Pritchard 
write also of the mass raping of German women. Davai chasy (Give me your watch) 
became something like a nickname for Soviet soldiers all over Central Europe. This quasi¬ 
joke, however, actually represented the repressed (and suppressed) trauma of the 
uncontrolled raping and looting indulged in by both officers and men. The memory of this 
lasted long enough for many parents to try to protect their daughters from leaving their 
houses or flats during the first days of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In 
eastern Germany Soviet raping continued unchecked until mid-1946.21 General Patton 
apparently considered that ‘Soviet officers behaved like recently civilized Mongolian 
bandits’ and the British were equally shocked; British troops sometimes had ‘fracas’ with 
Soviet troops over the latter’s ‘maltreatment of German civilians, especially women’.22 
The German Communist Party (KPD), while it still existed in the Soviet zone, increased its 
unpopularity by propaganda that denied Soviet rape and pillage: ‘The scars left upon 
German civilians by their first encounter with Red Army soldiers simply could not be 
healed by the contention that Germans were eyewitnesses to the “chivalrous behaviour of 
the Red Army toward the peaceful population of the vanquished country.’”23 It is said that 
hardly a woman in Danzig was not raped by a Soviet soldier; that is also said of the small 
town of Modra near Bratislava. In eastern Germany more than elsewhere in the emergent 
19 Mazower, Dark Continent, p. 175. 
20 Prague was bombed by the Americans and the greatest damage was the destruction of the 
fourteenth-century Emaus Monastery. 
21 Wilfried Loth, 'Stalin’s Plans for Post-War Germany’ in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds), 
The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943-53, Basingstoke and London, 1996, p. 32. 
When an attempt was made by the SMAD to stop raping, and looting, the official report of the 
activities of the SMAD command notes that 'a total of 120,268 officers and enlisted men were 
apprehended and detained for disorderly conduct’ (in 1946). See Alexei Filitov, ‘The Soviet 
Administrators and Their German “Friends’” in Naimark and Gibianskii (eds). The 
Establishment of Communist Regimes, p. 121. 
22 McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War, p. 60. 
23 David Pike, The Politics of Culture in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945-1949, Stanford, CA, 
1992, p. 29. Martin Gilbert records one not untypical example: ‘Countess Maria von Maltzan, 
who had been active in the German resistance to Hitler, and had personally saved the lives of 
dozens of Jews during the war, later described how Soviet soldiers raped a fourteen-year-old 
Jewish girl whom the Countess herself had earlier saved from deportation and brought up as her 
own daughter. She screamed for weeks on end, every night. I had to give her the strongest 
sleeping pills I could find to try to calm her down.” Shortly afterwards, because the girl was 
Polish-bom, the Soviet authorities took her back to Poland.’ Gilbert, Descent into Barbarism: A 
History of the Twentieth Century, 1934-195 7, London, 1998, p. 638. 
Introduction 9 
Bloc, it was dangerous to report rape by a Soviet. The likely result of reporting it was a 
charge of anti-Soviet propaganda, which was punishable with a long prison sentence. By 
1948 or 1949, Soviet rape had become a subject only to be whispered about. 
The behaviour of the Red Army seemed to reinforce the moral decrepitude Nazism or 
German occupation had engendered. Respect for the individual human life and respect for 
property were both severely impaired in the broad masses by the German treatment chiefly 
of Jews, but also of enemies of the German state. At some time between 1933 and 1938 the 
rule of law had been eroded severely in all Central Europe (not that it had been particularly 
effective in Central Europe anywhere but in Weimar Germany and pre-Munich 
Czechoslovakia). German occupation (more even than Nazi power in Germany itself) had 
removed established moral and social hierarchies. As Schopflin emphasizes with acuity, 
the Germans had done most of the Communists’ work for them in destabilizing values. If 
1945^49 was an age of transition, that transition was from one ‘mere oppugnancy’ to 
another. Shakespeare’s political analyses have an eery quality: ‘O! when degree is 
shaked,/Which is the ladder to all high designs,/The enterprise is sick. How could 
communities,/Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods and cities,/Peaceful commerce from 
dividable shores,/The primogenitive and due of birth,/Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, 
laurels,/But by degree, stand in authentic place?/Take but degree away, untune that 
string/And, hark! What discord follows; each thing meets/in mere oppugnancy’ (Ulysses in 
Troilus and Cressida, I, iii). The populations of Central Europe could very soon see that 
the Gestapo had been replaced by the NKVD (particularly active in eastern Germany and 
Poland immediately after liberation/occupation) and soon by the local state security forces 
(secret police). Czechoslovakia was particularly well prepared, since its StB had been 
formed in 1938. The same word was used to describe the Party dailies as operatives of 
these security services, ‘organs.’ The changes in language, particularly the politicization of 
lexemes and phrases, are traced in detail by Dickins, Sherwood and Short in their chapters. 
The role of linguistic appropriation and expropriation in the imposition of totalitarian 
ideology is also essential to the themes of Chew’s and Beasley-Murray’s chapters. 
Stalin’s employment of Panslavism as a rallying call during the war, and for a period 
afterwards, constituted another form of appropriation. Papousek informs us in his chapter 
that the Slav idea had retained its potency at least among Czech immigrants in America. 
The cultural level of these immigrants was low and their Slavism reflected the Slavism that 
was actually still alive in Bohemia among minor poets and, to a degree, in Masaryk’s 
creation of the Slav Institute. The ideological usefulness of Panslavism to Stalin was 
twofold. First, it might serve as a nationalism containing a strong element of socialist 
internationalism which could be appealing not only to workers but also to the bourgeoisie. 
Secondly, it constituted a disguised form of imperialist Slavophilism that might be fruitful 
as a propaganda aid to support Soviet domination of East Central Europe. Two countries in 
the Soviet sphere of influence in Central Europe posed a problem. The Poles had never 
been keen Panslavs: the Poles were too anti-Russian for that. The second problem was the 
Hungarians, who not only were not Slavs, but for whom Russia’s intervention on the side 
of the Habsburgs during the Hungarian war of independence of 1848-49 had a mythic 
place in the national consciousness. The Hungarians, however, as an Axis power, 
represented an enemy of the Slavs as inveterate as the Germans (a point made by Edvard 
Benes repeatedly in his Paris propaganda during the First World War). In fact the 
Hungarians would be able to become honorary members of the Slav fold, like the Finns 
(still considered a potential people’s democracy at the 1947 Cominform assembly), who 
eventually became honorary members of the Scandinavian fold. On 23 and 24 February 
1944, the twenty-sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Red Army, the Panslav 
Committee in Moscow organized a militant Panslav military conference. A third country 
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was the problem of this conference: Bulgaria, not only an Axis power, but one that did not 
have even the smallest ‘national’ contingent in the Red Army. The conference was 
broadcast and so the Bulgarians could be urged to unblot their escutcheon. The Slovenes 
were represented by Ante Stomik, a Wehrmacht soldier who had gone over to the other 
side; the Slovak representative, Michal Petro, had also gone over to the other side in the 
Ukraine, where he had fought as a partisan before joining Ludvik Svoboda’s army in the 
USSR.24 Each of the three main Allied Armies are toasted; as well as the sequence of the 
toast the epithets manifest their degree of importance: ‘Long live the victorious Red Army 
— the pride and glory of all Slav nations!’; ‘Long live the glorious American soldiers!’; 
‘Long live the wonderful soldiers of Great Britain!’25 In the conference’s address to Stalin 
the anonymous author proclaims the Panslav nationalist foundations of the defensive war: 
‘The Germans, our ancient enemies, have been trying to humiliate the Slavs [...]. All 
German politics has always been directed at a single goal: to split the Slavs in order 
subsequently to humble and then destroy each Slav nation one after the other.’26 
Something of the hypocrisy of the conference is particularly evident in the address of the 
Sub-Carpathian Ruthene representative, Private Ivan Turjanica (or Turianitsa), whom 
Bombikova mentions in her chapter, a chapter that also touches on the ‘new’ Panslavism. 
At the end of his address, Turjanica calls ‘Long live free Czechoslovakia!’27 A few months 
later he was to lead his region’s secession from Czechoslovakia. General Zygmunt Berling, 
deputy commander in chief of the Polish Army in the USSR, a man Latawski deals with in 
his chapter, alludes to the Soviet Union’s Polish problem, indeed prefigures in his words 
the Polish civil war that ‘was imported from Russia’:28 ‘The London emigre government, 
led by its furious hatred of the Soviet Union, has the temerity to try to ruin the great 
liberation work that is coming into being inside Poland itself. Polish democracy has 
nothing in common with the invective of the London emigre government.’29 The Soviet 
denial of guilt for the Katyn massacre and the fact that Berling, who had himself 
previously served with Anders’s Army (he attacks Anders here), was leading an army 
whose officers were usually Russians or Soviet Poles and whose men were formerly 
POWs of the Soviets, once more indicates something of the brutalization that attended this 
war. Latawski’s chapter provides new evidence of the extent to which Soviet officers 
continued to run the ‘national’ army in the post-war years. 
Milovan Djilas reports on the link between Stalin’s Panslavism in 1944 and the 
imposition of sovietoid socialist systems in Central and South-East Europe. Stalin 
associates his determination with the old rule that whoever occupies a territory militarily 
imposes his own social system with his belief that if ‘the Slavs keep united and maintain 
solidarity, no one in the future will be able to move a finger. Not even a finger!’30 While 
24 Petro’s statement on the Slovaks as heirs of the bandit Juraj Janosik will be of interest to 
students of nationalism: 'Here on fraternal Ukrainian soil we fought in Janosik fashion against 
the German bandits and Hungarian brigands/ Slovansti vojaci vpred, k vitezstvi. Soubor 
projevu na shromazdeni slovanskych vojaku 23.-24. unora 1944, Moscow, 1944, pp. 44-45. 
25 Ibid., p. 14. 
26 Ibid., p. 11. 
Ibid., p. 54. Mastny considers that the change in Turjanica's behaviour resulted from ‘a sudden 
decision rather than premeditation’. On 26 October he was still praising the prospects of the 
Subcarpathian Ukraine within Czechoslovakia; he started being a separatist on 29 October. 
Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, p. 228. 
28 Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 169. 
29 Slovansti vojaci, vpred, pp. 22-23. 
30 Quoted by McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War, p. 119. Francois Fejto points out that the 
first expression of Stalinist Panslavism came just two months after the German invasion of the 
USSR when the Soviet Union of Writers assembled a meeting to demonstrate the 'fraternal 
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Stalin was guiding military Panslavism in Moscow, Edvard Benes, first in America and 
then in London, was also devising his Slav ideology; he, too, linked his Slavism with the 
notion of a post-war revolution that resulted in people’s democracies. The irony of this is 
only fully clear when one bears in mind that, whatever appearances were, Benes remained 
anti-Communist till the end. Igor Lukes’s compassionate assessment of Benes’s role in the 
circumstances surrounding the Munich Agreement considers the Soviet attitude to Munich. 
Although Benes had hoped to gain some support from Moscow, the Soviet legation in 
Prague showed little enthusiasm, and sent their telegram to Moscow too late. ‘The Munich 
affair’, writes Lukes, ‘proved to be a godsend also for the Communist Party. The 
Czechoslovak Party had during the crisis managed to persuade Czechoslovak citizens that 
their security and that of the Soviet Union were intimately linked. ‘During the crisis, 
Gottwald observed, anti-Communism had for the first time become unfashionable and 
unpatriotic.’31 It became an essential element in the Communist version of the Munich 
myth that the Soviet Union had been the only country to stand by Czechoslovakia in 
September 1938. The Czechs, and a large number of the Slovaks, were pleased to believe 
this, since their previous faith in the West had encountered only betrayal.32 
In 1939 the socialist Benes is already writing of the need ‘to transform the present 
political European democracy into a social and economic democracy’.33 He understands 
such a social and economic democracy, first, to constitute the result of this war that will 
complete the revolution started at the end of the First War, and, secondly, to be the only 
weapon Europe will have against Communism. He also constantly speaks of this as a 
‘new’ or ‘new type of democracy’, the terms often used by the Soviets and their supporters 
to mean ‘people’s democracy’. In his Uvahy o slovanstvi (Essays on Slavness, London, 
early 1945), he develops that, and appears sincerely to believe that the Slavs could unite in 
something like the British Commonwealth; his union will be based on ethnic affinity, not 
race, because all Slav nations are of mixed blood. To secure future peace, all Slav states 
must ensure that only Slavs inhabit them. The new Slavism will mean that there will be no 
minorities in Slav states, for since all Slav nations are and will be equal and united, the 
term ‘minority’ can have no meaning. Hitler had united the Slavs, ‘with the exception of 
Bulgaria and a small proportion of the Croatians and Slovaks.’ The Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia, while ‘following a people’s democratic anti-Nazi policy, have been 
simultaneously carrying out a Slav policy.’34 What had arisen was ‘a democratic form of 
Slav nations’,35 a spirit of ‘a new, people’s democratic Slavness’ that was an ‘anti-Fascist 
union of the Slav peoples against Fascism’. In connection with this and the enthusiasm with 
which especially Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks had taken up the Panslav idea, he writes ‘In 
1945 and 1946 the Czech, Slovak, Polish and Yugoslav Communists were the most nationalist 
of the nationalists.’ Fejto, Histoire des democracies popularies, Paris, 1952, p. 127. 
31 Igor Lukes, Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Benes in the 
1930s, New York and Oxford, 1996, p. 259. In his analysis Lukes is in fact arguing, 
persuasively, against Mastny’s view that, at the time of Munich, 'the Russians were very much 
the losers’ (Russia’s Road to the Cold War, p. 22). Altogether, Mastny is no friend of Benes; at 
one point, for example, he writes of Benes’s ‘obsequious protestation of good will’ to Stalin, 
ibid., p. 229. 
32 The Soviets and British acted equally dishonourably as far as one group of victims was 
concerned, the Social Democrat Germans of the Sudetenland. Lukes mentions only the Soviets, 
but both countries refused them visas. On the British, see Gilbert, Descent into Barbarism, 
p. 207. 
33 Eduard Benes, Democracy Today and Tomorrow, London, 1939, p. 16 and passim. 
34 Edvard Benes, Uvahy o slovanstvi. Hlavni problemy slovanske politiky, 2nd, unaltered, edn, 
Prague, 1947, p. 251. 
Ibid., p. 252. 35 
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and anti-Nazi, anti-Pangerman ideology’,36 which will ‘necessarily’ lead to ‘a new, 
people’s democratic and culturally entirely modem intercourse between all the Slav 
nations neighbouring’ the Soviet Union, to ‘cultural and political co-operation and the 
renewal [s/c] of a new, people’s democratic Slavness’.37 Benes combines this Communist¬ 
sounding lexis with statements of a Romantic (Palackyan) belief in the natural democracy 
of the Slavs, and in Slav Reciprocity, with the mytheme that foreigners’ attacks on the 
Slavs always began with an attack on Prague. He tries to persuade himself and his 
readership that ‘Russian messianism towards Europe was a great delusion; Slavophil 
romanticism has been definitively overcome’; ‘the new Communist messianism would 
certainly become an obstacle to any future Slavness and realist Slav politics’. He does 
wonder whether, after the war, the USSR might not return to its ‘purely Communist 
doctrine’, and whether ‘its wartime Slavness is only a mere tactic’. Since, however, all 
previous Slav messianisms had proved flawed (Kollar’s, the Poles’, the Slavophils’), 
evidently Communist messianism, that is ‘the Soviet Union swallowing up Slav states and 
communizing Slav nations in accordance with the Soviet model’, would also fail.38 
Clearly Benes understands ‘people’s democracy’ differently from the Soviets. Equally 
clearly, that explains how his niece, Hana Klenkova, can propagate the notion that the 
Communists’ concept was very much Benes’s. I have no evidence that anyone outside 
Czechoslovakia thought of it as his concept. No doubt, however, Benes’s use of the term 
(more frequently still after the war) helped delude some Czechs and Slovaks for a while. 
After all, during the war, they had, according to the nationalist Prague Uprising leader, 
Albert Prazak, had ‘a faith in Benes that resembled religious faith in the Saviour’.39 The 
term and concept seem to be associated in the West with the Bulgarian leader of the 
Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov.40 A Comintern pamphlet from October 1936 outlining the 
Soviet approach to Spain and the ‘anti-Fascist’ struggle altogether described this 
‘democracy of a new type’.41 The new type of democracy constituted essentially Seton- 
Watson’s first two stages, where, theoretically at least, a country could have its own form 
of socialism; the ‘people’s democracy’ was according to Di Biagio the third stage.42 
Gerhard Wettig, however, maintains that Stalin had invented the term ‘people’s 
democracy’ as a ‘socio-political order which allegedly provided a connecting link between 
Western and Soviet “forms of democracy’”.43 From the late summer of 1946 onwards, 
Ulbricht set up Czechoslovakia as a model for German political development, trying to 
convince his audience that the Czechoslovak ‘national, antifascist, and democratic’ 
resolution was not Soviet ‘democracy’ and that people’s democracies did not constitute 
dictatorships. The German party line was that a people’s democracy was ‘midway’ 
between the ‘bourgeois-capitalist’ and the ‘socialist’.44 For the east Germans the Sorbs (see 
Schurmann’s chapter) were essentially an irritant, but an irritant that could be put to good 
36 Ibid., p. 258. 
37 Ibid., pp. 264-65. 
38 Ibid., pp. 278, 282-83, 265, 268. 
39 Albert Prazak, Edvard Benes 1919 a 1945 in Josef Kuchynka (ed.), President Budovatel. 
Prirucka pro oslavy 28. kvetna narozenin Dr. Ed. Benese, Trebechovice, 1947, p. 5. 
40 See, for example, Brockhaus-Enzyklopadie, Mannheim, 1994, p. 413. 
41 See Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 London 
1994, pp. 162-63. 
42 See Anna Di Biagio, The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform, June—September 
1947’ in Gori and Pons (eds). The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, p. 211. 
43 Gerhard Wettig, ‘The Soviet Union and Germany in the Late Stalin Period 1950-3’ in ibid 
p. 357. 
44 Pike, The Politics of Culture, pp. 61—62. 
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use once it was certain that ‘popular democracy’ would win, at least in the Soviet zone of 
occupation. Settling the ‘Sorb question’ would constitute an anti-Fascist act, and could be 
seen as the east German contribution to Moscow’s temporarily official Panslav line. 
Biber’s chapter deals with another small Slav nation, though at least twenty times larger 
than the Sorbs, the Slovenes. British policy towards the Slovenes and particularly the 
Carinthian frontier question, Biber suggests, was duplicitous. Britain was exercised by the 
possibility of ‘Slav hegemony’ in South-East Europe,45 a Slav threat to their strategic 
interests in the Mediterranean. In this case, the Yugoslav influence in Greece worried the 
British, but Stalin had also to be persuaded that he could not have Libya, and for a time, he 
seems also to have been interested in Cyprus.46 Furthermore, the British soon had some 
knowledge of what happened to the Yugoslavs they ‘repatriated’ from their zone of 
occupation in Austria. Slovene and Croatian partisans earned few democratic credentials in 
the take-over of Venezia Giulia, which was, as Valdevit writes, ‘accompanied by acts of 
intimidation and persecution against the Italians and non-Communist political parties. 
Thousands were deported and some of these immediately executed and thrown into 
Carsian pits (foibe).’47 At the latest from 1943 onwards, Washington and London had few 
illusions about Communist methods; some politicians believed, or seemed to believe, like 
Benes, that the war was making Stalin change (even at the Panslav military conference, 
major addresses were made by a Serbian and a Polish priest). During the war, however, 
Communist brutality seemed infinitely more humane than German and, moreover, the 
western Allies needed the Soviets. 
That does not mean that the Cold War might not be said to have started before the end of 
the hot war. Conventional wisdom is that it started with Stalin’s refusal to allow the 
Central Europeans to participate in the Marshall Plan, with the setting up of Cominform or 
with the Berlin Blockade. Mastny sees ‘an air of the Cold War’ in Stalin’s ordering his 
troops to take Berlin.48 It could certainly be said to have begun immediately the Red Army 
began liberating eastern Europe in 1944. It must be remarked, however, that, at least at this 
stage, the USA and Britain were not particularly interested in Bulgaria and Romania. 
Gaddis’s view is simple and persuasive. Stalin had been suspicious of everything 
Roosevelt and Churchill said and did and ‘neither American nor British sources reveal 
anything approaching such deep and abiding suspicion on the Anglo-American side’. It is 
doubtful, Gaddis maintains, that the Cold War really did begin only with peace in Europe. 
‘For it was Stalin’s disposition to wage cold wars: he had done so in one form or another 
throughout his life.’ Asking whether or not Stalin sought the Cold War is, Gaddis writes ‘a 
little like asking: “does a fish seek water?” Suspicion, distrust, and an abiding cynicism 
were not only his preferred but his necessary environment.’49 
Except in western Germany and non-Soviet Austria, this suspicion and the concomitant 
fear of arousing suspicion pervaded Central European life ever more thoroughly between 
1945-^49. Suspicion, combined with the moral brutalization inspired by war (and often 
liberation) and with an often vicious hatred of the Germans. Benes and Stalin tried to take 
the two Germanies approach, Benes distinguishing between the Nazis and those who made 
the nation of Dichter und Denker, Stalin at least claiming that there was the bourgeoisie 
45 R. Craig Nation, ‘A Balkan Union? Southeastern Europe in Soviet Security Policy, 1944-8’ in 
Cori and Pons (eds), The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, pp. 129-30. 
46 Aleksei M. Filitov, ‘Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions 
during World War IF in ibid., p. 5. 
47 Giampaolo Valdevit, ‘The Search for Symmetry: A Tentative View of Trieste, the Soviet Union 
and the Cold War’ in ibid., p. 397. 
48 Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, p. 264. 
49 John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History\ Oxford, 1997, pp. 22-25. 
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who had fired Nazism but also the Germany of the workers. Aczel mentions in his chapter 
Thomas Mann’s rejection of the two Germanies notion, but in the end, in practice, so did 
Benes and Stalin. In the latter’s case, with, for example, his reparations demands (in the 
end knocked down by the Americans, but also by the British, who could not afford to feed 
and blanket their expensive zone of occupation), Benes with fulfilling his wartime 
determination to expel all Germans. (He also explicitly held all Germans responsible for 
the razing of Lidice.) Those who attempted to remain decent, mainly politicians, against 
the suspicion, brutality and anti-German racism that accompanied the new democracy 
either escaped (for example, Mikotajczyk from Poland or Kozeluhova from 
Czechoslovakia), or were confined like Cardinals Mindszenty and Beran, or soon killed 
like Horakova. 
In western Central Europe culture took on as important a role as in the east, except that 
in the West the Gruppe 47 or the Vienna Group (which could only surface publicly after 
the Soviet withdrawal of 1955) did, indeed, try to become a critical conscience of the 
nation (among the Germans more than the Austrians), and, in Germany, the writings of 
such as Goes and Borchert, before Grass and the others came on the scene, created 
something like a literature of expiation. Except in the case of the Shoah — and here one 
thinks of the Polish Nalkowska or the Czech Bor — in East-Central Europe one cannot 
speak of writers as representing conscience much before the 1960s, when, it was a matter 
of expiation for what was euphemistically called the ‘errors of the era of the cult of 
personality’. War novels, of course, abounded, but the heroes were a partisan or heroic 
young Red Army officer or a politruk. 
Still, 1945-^49 was the period which saw the introduction or imposition of Socialist 
Realism, although this was a complex matter. On the one hand, in the one country of our 
region, Czechoslovakia, where a sizeable Communist Party obtained almost unhindered 
throughout the inter-war period, there were attempts at socialist Realism (with a small 5, 
since Socialist Realism with a big S could only exist in a socialist society). In Poland, there 
were also novels which at least looked Socialist Realist from the late 1930s, too. Some 
labelled their works Socialist Realist in the immediate post-war years out of fear or 
obsequiousness; others botched up attempts at being Socialist Realist. Socialist Realism 
remained a literary bogeyman throughout the Communist period, but, so far as it existed at 
all, it was not a dominant trend in the literature of Central Europe for more than three to 
five years. Of course there were visible and derided attempts to re-impose Socialist 
Realism in the Brezhnev era. By the end of the 1950s a new or renovated term, ‘socialist 
art’, emerged, but that could soon be applied to anything, just to keep the cultural section 
of the Central Committee happy. 
The idea of Socialist Realism also, however, embodied the creation of new cultural or 
cultural political models. Szegedy-Maszak writes of that in his chapter. Bauer writes of the 
Fucik cult and of the conversion of the chiefly nineteenth-century ‘bourgeois’ Realist 
novelist Jirasek into a proponent of a Marxist nationalist interpretation of history. True 
people’s culture could only come into being once the Communist Party had taken over 
completely, for the word ‘people’s’ or ‘popular’, as in ‘people’s democracy’, means only 
‘of and for the working class/peasants’. And determining what working class meant lay in 
the hands of the Party, which demanded class consciousness; naturally, that in turn 
involved ardent affection for the Soviet Union. 
What Socialist Realism had to do was explain why it was right, humane, historically 
necessary for the Communist Party to rule, and to demonstrate to the readers how they 
could recognize in themselves, and thus rid themselves of, residual bourgeois values. 
Socialist Realism was not monolithic; sentimentalized lyric verse and historical novels 
could serve the cause as well. Nevertheless one may speak of two basic types. The first 
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type (Tatarka’s Prvy a druhy uder [First and Second Blow], mentioned by Hayes in her 
chapter, fits this category) has a stock pattern that more or less corresponds to that of a 
medieval legend of a saint. The vita tends to have a tripartite structure: (i) saint, pre¬ 
conversion often living a life of debauchery; (ii) converted, saint lives saintly life, working 
miracles or not, and then is martyred or dies naturally, giving her or his ghost up to God; 
(iii) miracles take place after the death of the saint. In the Socialist Realist novel: (i) a 
woman or man, usually working-class, is suffering from difficult residual bourgeois values 
(for example, does not understand solidarity and therefore thieves or clocks in late); (ii) 
converted by a fellow-worker to the faith of socialism; this person may die on a site as a 
result of the deeds of former collaborators with Germans or of some other class- 
unconscious villain, or may simply finish the job, as Stakhanovite, and became local Party 
secretary; (iii) the dam or iron-foundry, now completed, is an embodiment of the happy 
morrows of socialism, or, say, fields now produce because socialism has irrigated them, or 
peasants now have running water or tractors — materialist ‘posthumous’ miracles. 
The second basic type is a work of political explication centred on some would-be lively, 
would-be heroic tale. One of the novels Pribanova discusses, Rezac’s Nastup (Falling-in) 
constitutes an almost disturbing example of this. Except for the odd Communist who has 
returned from a concentration camp, all Germans are armed, and all either are or aid and 
abet WerwolfAike bandits. (Pritchard mentions the Wehrwolf mythology, and in his camp 
memoirs Jiff Benes explains the origins of the ‘organization’.) They are vicious to man and 
beast, and so when the Communist farm-labourer is given a small German farm, and the 
German family is justly (sic) evicted, the Germans poison his cattle. The whole little town 
rejoices — or rather the newly arrived Czechs rejoice — when the Soviets give them one 
of the factories there. This is to explain reparations and looting. All Czechs, even though 
they do not know Russian, instinctively understand it, for they recognize it as a version of 
their language. Czech women find Soviet soldiers frightfully attractive (an explanation of 
the raping), and Soviet lorries driven by Soviet soldiers take off the first German expellees. 
All those Czechs who turn out to have come to the Sudetenland just for material gain have 
bourgeois origins or connections. Only such Czechs ill-treat Germans (an explanation of 
appalling Czech behaviour towards the Germans). One such Czech had been released from 
Mauthausen early, the suspicion being that he had agreed to work for the Gestapo. As far 
as camps are concerned, the Communist functionary hero justifies the re-opening of 
German slave-labour camps for Czechoslovak use. True worker Communists are, of 
course, honest and brave, and know how to organize things, as well as how to convert a 
good nationalist petty bourgeois (in this case a postmaster). And so one could go on; it is a 
long novel. Nastup may be said to work as a justification for suspicion, brutality and hatred 
of the Germans. People’s culture justifies people’s democracy, more mere oppugnancy. 
The period of transition in Central Europe prepared the way for a new Communist 
nationalism. While attacking ‘bourgeois nationalism’ and the ‘nationalism’ of the Fascists, 
the regimes that gradually established themselves in the emergent Eastern Bloc after 1945 
re-invented ‘patriotism’. This ‘patriotism’ was normally based on a Marxist-Leninist 
interpretation of nineteenth-century nationalist movements. The common people had been 
the heroes of the National Revivals and those among the Revivalists who had not been 
common were redesignated as proto-socialists or were defamed as cosmopolitans (or 
disappeared from cultural history altogether). To be ill-disposed towards the Communist 
Party was to be unpatriotic. The Communists as the embodiment of all working-class 
ideals also embodied the patriotic ideals of the past. ‘National’ history became the history 
of the inevitable development of an ethnic group towards its complete realization in 
socialism. The effects of this Party-inspired encouragement of old nationalist prejudices 
are still evident today, even in apparently liberal politicians’ speeches. 
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Studying the relationship between power and culture in the 1945-48/49 period of 
transition helps us understand the post-1989 transition from socialism to the market 
economy. The preconditions for the present transition — or transformation, as it is 
normally labelled in former Eastern Bloc countries — were as different as the precon¬ 
ditions in 1945. In different ways and at different paces, Poland and Hungary had begun 
transforming before the collapse of Communism. The seeds of the ‘Velvet Divorce’ in 
Czechoslovakia were sown by the Third Prague Agreement (mentioned in Bombikova’s 
chapter) rather than by the wartime Slovak Fascist state. The lustrations in Czechoslovakia 
often resembled the national courts at the end of the war. Active collaboration with the 
Communists in general was often far more widely spread than collaboration in Nazi or 
Fascist times, most clearly so in the GDR. Passive implication in the regime was almost 
inevitable, unless one had covert privileges and could eat only Western food, use only 
Western paper and so forth. On the other hand, even in the GDR, by the 1980s resistance 
against the regime became ever stronger amongst young people. Among the resistance 
movements run by the not-so-young, the Poles had Solidamosc, the Czechs (with a small 
number of Slovaks) Charter 77. Whatever the impact of Western television, Western 
consumer luxury and so forth, the real spark for change came, as in 1945, from the Soviet 
Union, from Gorbachev’s perestroika. The flight of East Germans through Hungary to 
Austria or through the West German embassy in Prague provided the first impulse to the 
fall of the Berlin Wall that in turn marked the beginning of the rapid collapse of 
Communism in Central Europe. 
The Second World War brutalized Central Europe. Over the years brutality diminished 
until 1989; 1989 knocked down the Iron Curtain, finally destroyed ‘people’s culture’ — 
and gave the ex-Bloc certain knowledge of the imperfectibility of man. 
2 ‘East of the Elbe’: The Communist Take-over 
and the Past 
Laszlo Peter 
Introduction 
The spectacular collapse of Communism all over the eastern half of Europe between 1989 
and 1991 was probably the most rapid and least expected major event to take place on the 
continent in modem times. The full significance of this change for the whole of Europe is 
still indiscernible. How will it affect, for example, the future of the nation-state? The 
trends are contradictory: the collapse of Communism marked the dissolution of Russia’s 
two empires — the first, the East European, in 1989, then, in 1991, the Soviet Union itself. 
In the wake of these events former independent nation-states were restored and new states 
created. Disintegration in the East coincided with a revived attempt in the West, after years 
spent in the doldrums, at the economic and political integration of nation-states. In fact, the 
Soviet Union was dissolved and the Maastricht Treaty signed in the same year — indeed in 
the same month towards the end of 1991. 
Further, how should we understand the half-century from 1945 (or the seventy years 
from 1917) in which Europe was divided? Were these the years of dislocation after which 
Europe returned to its normal course? Moreover, is there a coherent explanation for the 
disjunction that isolated the two halves of Europe from each other after the Second World 
War? It is this last question that will be my concern. 
On 25 April 1945 an advance unit of the Red Army reached Torgau, on the Elbe, which 
had already been taken by soldiers from the American Ninth Army. It was purely a 
coincidence that Russian and American soldiers should come face to face for the first time 
by this river. Yet what appears to be a coincidental encounter may also have been 
emblematic of something significant: ever since the Enlightenment the Elbe has been 
regarded by historians as the border that culturally divides Europe into a ‘Western’ and an 
‘Eastern’ half.1 After Germany’s surrender the eastern half of the continent remained under 
permanent Soviet occupation and, as Winston Churchill predicted in his Fulton speech a 
year later, an iron curtain fell across Europe. Within a few years and with the support of 
the Soviet Union, Moscow-trained Communists seized power in most countries of the 
region. For over forty years Europe was divided between liberal democracies and 
Communist single-party states. 
The Soviet Presence 
At first sight it looks easy to explain why the Communists could achieve complete power 
in so many European countries so quickly. There were very few Communists in the 
countries liberated by the Red Army. With the exception of Yugoslavia and 
1 As Larry Wolff argued ‘it was the intellectual work of the Enlightenment to bring about that 
modem reorientation of the Continent which produced Western Europe and Eastern Europe.’ 
These are ‘complementary concepts, defining each other by opposition and adjacency’. The 
new ‘Philosophic Geography’, he notes, replaced the earlier conceptual division of Europe 
between the South and the North, Inventing Eastern Europe, Stanford, 1994, pp. 4—6. As the 
author did not set out to review the historiography of the modem periods, the Elbe does not 
figure in his colourful account of the concept’s genesis. 
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Czechoslovakia they were tiny illegal groups joined by emigre leaders from Moscow after 
liberation. At that time France alone may have had more Communists than all the east 
European countries taken together. Yet the latter went Communist and France did not: in 
France and elsewhere in the West support for the Communist Party gradually declined 
while in the eastern half of Europe it rose spectacularly. Take for instance Poland. Tn 
1942-3, membership of the PPR [the Polish Workers’ Party] could be counted in 
hundreds’, writes Norman Davies; ‘in 1944 to 1948, it rose from 8,000 to 1 million’.* 2 
Maty/as Rakosi, Hungary’s Communist leader, admitted that back in November 1944 he 
had started with only 800 men.3 But Communist Party membership swelled to 30,000 in 
February 1945, then to 150,000 by May and half a million by the time of the elections held 
in November. Conversion to the Communist social ideal on such a scale could not explain 
this incredible growth. It is plausible to assume that the Communists, with Soviet backing, 
coerced the population into submission. From this one can infer, and common sense 
strongly suggests, that the Soviet presence explains not just the rapid rise of Communist 
support in a hitherto largely anti-Communist population, but even the take-overs 
themselves. 
The Communists did not merely take power: they destroyed established European 
institutions like the market system, private property, the rule of law; they undermined their 
countries’ independence, abolished personal, civil and political rights, destroyed the 
autonomy of Churches and cultural values and imposed on the population the unwanted 
socialist police state. Is it not obvious that they could carry off all this only with 
unremitting Soviet support? Occam’s razor, the principle that the fewest possible 
assumptions should be made in explaining a thing, also suggests that it would be a mistake 
to look for further causes when we already have one in hand. Or, as a political theorist 
reading an essay of mine some years ago observed: ‘Soviet occupation was the first-order 
reason, everything else is at best second-order.’4 Counterfactual arguments also seem to 
support this view. Few people would doubt that, had the Western powers’ and the Soviet 
armies met at the Vistula and the Dniester rather than at the Elbe, the post-war European 
political settlement would have looked very different from what it turned out to be.5 
History is, unavoidably, written backwards. We know the outcome of events, in our case 
the introduction of the Communist system east of the Elbe which, because we can explain 
it by Soviet pressure, begins to seem inevitable. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders, notably 
Stalin, prepared and carried out a plan to convert the independent countries of Eastern 
Martin McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe 1944-1949, London, 1977, p. 47; see also 
Susanne S. Lotarski’s figures in ‘The Communist Takeover in Poland’ in Thomas T. Hammond 
(ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, New Haven, CT, 1975, p. 347. 
3 Others estimate that there might have been about 3,000 Communists, most of them inactive. 
The largest active group led by Pal Demeny was, however, arrested by Peter Gabor’s secret 
police (the AVO, later AVH) on Rakosi’s orders in February 1945. Pal Demeny and Ervin 
Gyertyan, Az elso koncepcios per, Budapest, 1989, pp. 133ff. 
4 Anthony Jasay’s comment in a letter on my ‘Miert eppen az Elbanal hasadt szet Europa?’, in 
MiklosToth (ed.), Onarckepunk sorsunk tukreben 1945-1949, Munich, 1984. 
General Patton s Third Army reached Bohemia but the Russians liberated Prague. See Vojtech 
Mastny’s account, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, New York, 1979, pp. 273f. Exceptionally, 
the Soviet army did not stay in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless the Soviet had reminded the 
Czech politicians in May 1946, just before general elections were held, of its military presence 
in the region. On the incidence see Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza (eds), A History of 
the Czechoslovak Republic 1918—1948, Princeton, NJ, 1973, p. 403. And see also Malcolm 
Mackintosh s (unconvincing) denial that even if the Western powers’ armies had pushed 
further east Eastern Europe could have been saved’, in Hammond, (ed.). The Anatomy of 
Communist Takeovers, p. 242. 
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Europe into Communist satellite states. This is, however, an unjustified procedure. What, 
in fact, we have so far established is only that Soviet presence was a necessary condition of 
the outcome. We have not demonstrated that it was, on its own, a sufficient cause of what 
happened. We have not enquired whether other conditions existed that were likewise 
necessary to bring about the same outcome. Yet on what grounds should we rule out in 
advance the idea that had some other conditions obtained the post-war history of Europe 
might easily have been different? In most cases in history it is impossible to account for all 
the causes that are sufficient together to explain an outcome. Moreover, fashionable 
literary theorists counsel historians (and some practitioners accept their advice) that they 
should abandon the search for causes altogether. Perhaps they should not be much 
occupied with causes of discrete events and should rather place their accounts in wider 
social and cultural settings. Yet an historian cannot entirely dispense with the search for 
causes as the siren voice of ‘postmodernist’ celebrities would entice him to do. If 
historians are to explain events at all, they have to face the question ‘why?’. 
It is unlikely that we shall ever have a satisfactory explanation for the Communists’ easy 
victory in attaining complete power after 1945. When we reflect on the matter it becomes 
clear, however, that Soviet pressure is not sufficient to explain the take-overs. This is not 
just because historians eschew monocausal explanations but because it would amount to 
reductionism if an account of the take-overs neglected a variety of other conditions that 
patently had a strong bearing on the Communists’ success. 
Western Diplomacy 
The behaviour of the Western powers is an obvious component. WTiy should we leave out 
from the account of the Communist take-overs the failure of Western diplomacy to 
translate its strategic superiority into political results? It appears, as Rieber has argued, that 
in 1944 neither the Western powers nor Russia had clear policy aims as regards the 
internal arrangements of the liberated countries.6 Even a year later the Russians behaved in 
occupied territories as if they assumed their time was limited.7 The ‘percentage agree¬ 
ments’ about spheres of influence were ‘dangerously indefinite and elastic’.8 Their context 
was security rather than the countries’ internal social systems. The Yalta Conference in 
February 1945 has become the historic symbol of Europe’s post-war division, but it is 
simply not true that the Big Three ‘carved up’ Europe at Yalta, as is popularly held.9 What 
is true, however, is that the American and British leaders agreed to policies at Yalta (for 
instance, about holding general elections) that depended merely on promises by Stalin 
which he was afterwards allowed to ignore. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill was at his 
best at the Conference. After the war, in every conflict with his Western partners Stalin 
went as far as he could without antagonizing them. He was a cautious opportunist rather 
than a reckless gambler. His appetite grew only when he saw what the Western powers 
6 Alfred Rieber, ‘Soviet Plans for Post-War East-Central Europe’ in Eszter Andor et al. (eds), 
CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998, Budapest, 1999, pp. 75—76 and 86—88; 
Norman Davies quotes Stalin’s dictum in 1944 that 'introducing Communism to Poland was 
like putting a saddle on a cow’, God's Playground, A History of Poland, 2 vols, Oxford, 1981, 
II, pp. 574 and 553. 
7 Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, 2nd edn., London, 1952, pp. 231—32; 
Martin McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, p. 42; Vojtech Mastny, Russia ’s Road to 
the Cold War, p. 217. 
8 Ibid., pp. 211-12. On American opposition to a system based on ‘sphere of influence’ and 
conflicts over this with Britain, see Lloyd C. Gardner, Spheres of Influence. The Partition of 
Europe, from Munich to Yalta, London, 1993, esp. ch. 7. 
See V. Mastny, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, pp. 244-53. 9 
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were prepared to tolerate and when his prospects improved.10 Undoubtedly, the continued 
American military presence in Western Europe and the exclusion of the Communists from 
the governments in France and Italy in the spring of 1947, both feeding on Russian 
suspicion and insecurity, also affected Stalin’s calculations. At any rate, Western 
politicians’ hands had been tied by public opinion, woken up to the facts of Soviet 
expansion only by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948. 
Local Conditions 
The transition to Communist rule was shaped by local conditions in 1945. In general, the 
population in most places saw the Russians as conquerors rather than liberators.* 11 The 
looting, pillage, murder and the gang-rapes by the Red Army aroused fear and foreboding. 
The bulk of the population remained anti-Communist and afraid that an ‘alien system’ 
would be imposed on it, and, where it could, resisted the growing power of the Communist 
parties.12 Politicians who actively opposed the Communists were brutally persecuted and 
the rest were intimidated into silence. Also, the brutalities, the devastations and the general 
misery inflicted on the population by the protracted war, the destruction of the pre-war 
elites and the pauperization of the middle classes engendered lethargy. This undoubtedly 
had a strong bearing on events. But so did the fresh post-war optimism and aggressive, 
radical currents within the intelligentsia. The revulsion at Fascist barbarism and the horrors 
of war turned many educated young people to the utopian ideal of a classless society based 
on social justice rather than ‘class exploitation’. They repudiated the pre-war social order, 
felt that the ‘age of private property’ was over and flocked to left-wing populist and 
socialist parties in order to build a ‘people’s democracy’ which promised 
‘nationalizations’, the ‘raising of the common people’, general welfare and a bright 
future.13 It should not be forgotten that, strictly speaking, ‘people’s democracy’ was not a 
Russian import and was not even invented by a Communist.14 Nevertheless, it was all grist 
to the Communist mill. This misnomer with its uncertain and periodically shifting uses 
turned out to be one of the most successful confidence-tricks of the century.15 It lured 
10 Ibid.; Elisabeth Barker, in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, pp. 212-17; Gardner, 
Spheres of Influence, pp. 227-37 and ch. 9. 
11 Although in Czechoslovakia the non-Communist political elite was pro-Russian. 
12 Resistance was strong in Poland, a unique case, where in the countryside civil war broke out 
and lasted for the best part of three years, Davies, God’s Playground, II. pp. 560-61. 
13 There is general agreement in the literature on the ascendency of left-wing, socialist ideas 
throughout the region in 1945. See Hugh Seton-Watson in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power 
in Europe, p. 225; on 'popular radicalism’ after the War see George Schopflin, Politics in 
Eastern Europe 1945—1992, Oxford, 1993, pp. 68—70; Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe, 
Oxford, 1996, p. 237. The Hungarian CP launched its first recruitment drive only in September 
1945, by which time without any particular effort membership had already reached 350,000 to 
400,000, to overtake the Social Democrats particularly in the share of support among civil 
servants. Gyorgy Gyarmati, ‘A kozigazgatas ujjaszervezese az “ideiglenesseg” korszakaban’, 
Tortenelmi Szemle, 1996, 1, pp. 88-90. 
14 ‘People’s democracy’ was probably coined by Edvard Benes (see Robert Pynsent’s 
Introduction). Hugh Seton-Watson’s ‘Popular Democracy’ may be a better translation but that 
form did not gain general currency: Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 167. He 
pointed out that the term was a tautology; any West European liberal would agree. In Eastern 
Europe the people were, however, not meant to include aristocrats, Jewish bankers, German 
farmers, kulaks or even plain ‘reactionaries’. 
15 People s democracy sometimes meant the combination of democracy and socialism, or the 
rule of the workers and the peasants, or the transition from capitalism to socialism, or the 
dictatorship of the proletariat without the Soviet form. See comments by Doreen Warriner, 
East of the Elbe: The Communist Take-over and the Past 21 
idealists and the merely gullible into supporting or at least being sympathetic to the 
confiscatory policies of the new provisional governments set up by Communists and non- 
Communists in the wake of Red Army victories. All in all, there were intimidators and 
intimidated. The silent majority was intimidated and the active anti-Communists 
persecuted not by Soviet outsiders or the Red Army but by a substantial minority, the 
indigenous Left, throughout the region. 
The Presence of the Past 
Social behaviour changes slowly in all times. It is not a rhetorical question to ask to what 
extent the past, the inherited institutions, social conflicts and transmitted attitudes and 
expectations affected the process of the Communist take-overs east of the Elbe. Partly 
perhaps because one is looking for it, one finds much that sheds light on why the 
Communists, aided by a substantial number of non-Communists, could attain full power 
swiftly. Only a select number of inherited social characteristics that, arguably, had some 
bearing on the outcome can be summarized here.16 It is not easy, however, to describe 
these characteristics in a general form. Whereas the take-overs produced by and large a 
uniform social order east of the Elbe,17 in the past the social arrangements among the 
countries of Russia’s new East European empire had been considerably diverse. Nor is it 
helpful to treat ‘Central Europe’ and the ‘Balkans’ as separate regions or sub-regions, 
because the distinguishable structural features of social life overlap to such a great extent 
in most parts of Europe that any clear regional division hinders nearly as much as helps 
analysis.18 
National Conflicts 
When we list the characteristics that assisted the Communist take-overs, we may find that 
the national conflicts, normally intractable anywhere, were a prominent factor that 
contributed to the outcome. Ever since the birth of modem nationalism the countries east 
of the Elbe have been the hottest zone in Europe. While in Western Europe nationalism 
was by and large confined to the periphery of politics,19 further east rival national 
movements competed for territory and power, and national issues dominated politics. As is 
well known, political parties were formed to a large extent by reference to national rather 
than social questions in the Habsburg Monarchy, in inter-war Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania and elsewhere. It is a commonplace that the two great wars of the 
twentieth century originated in this part of Europe. And nationalism is still a powerful 
force; it played a major part as much in the terminal decline and collapse of the 
Communist system as in the take-overs after the Second World War. 
Revolution in Eastern Europe, London, 1950, pp. 38^46 and 54; and by Hammond in his The 
Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, pp. 24-25. The shifting conceptions of people’s democracy 
have been analysed by Paul G. Lewis, Central Europe since 1945, London, 1994, pp. 68-75. 
16 Norman Davies on an ingenious map set out a large number of east-west fault lines in Europe, 
Europe: A History, Oxford, 1996, p. 18. 
17 Stalinist uniformity imposed by coercion was never complete and after the dictator’s death 
diversity among Russia’s satellites became increasingly apparent, see, for instance, J. F. Brown, 
The New Eastern Europe, New York, 1966, esp. eh. 8. 
18 See Laszlo Peter, ‘Central Europe and its Reading into the Past’, European Review of History, 
6, 1999, 1, pp. 101-11. 
19 See John Plamenatz, ‘Two Types of Nationalism’ in E. Kamenka (ed.) Nationalism, London, 
1976, pp. 22-36 and cf. Laszlo Peter, ‘Uses of “States”, “Nation” and “National Minority’” in 
Peter Tusor (ed.), R. Varkonyi Agnes Emlekkonyv, Budapest, 1998, p. 576. 
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The states occupied by the Red Army were, without exception, young; they were created 
either in the late nineteenth century or in the twentieth, and territorial conflicts among 
them were endemic. They all had border disputes with their neighbours and were bleeding 
in 1945 from the loss of territories, temporary or otherwise, severed either during the war 
or after.20 As we all know, the largest, most important of these countries, Poland, was 
actually, so to speak, put on wheels and moved hundreds of kilometres westwards.21 
Because of their conflicts there was little chance for the occupied countries’ politicians to 
co-operate with each other to escape their fates; rather they were vying with each other for 
Russian favours, which made them still more dependent on Stalin’s good-will.22 
All the new states contained (mostly large) national minorities, and governments 
habitually did much to reduce their size even in the best of times. The war provided the 
opportunity, however, for carrying out ethnic cleansing. In divided Poland both the 
German and the Soviet authorities instituted brutal policies of the mass murder of Poles.23 
In the Shoah the Nazis systematically murdered six million Jews. After the defeat of 
Hitler’s army Soviet policy aimed to expel all Germans from Eastern Europe. The 
deportation of some eleven million ethnic Germans mostly to what became West 
Germany24 was a popular measure among all the politicians of Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary. Indeed, non-Communists frequently showed more zeal in getting rid of their 
German minorities than Communists.25 The expulsion of German farmers, who were 
forced to leave their well-equipped farmsteads without compensation, however, 
enormously increased the patronage power of the Communists. The Polish CP 
consolidated its position by distributing German property from the acquired new western 
territories,26 the Czechoslovak Communists by handing out the property of the expelled 
20 See C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, London, 1934, also his 
unexceptionable summary of border conflicts in Problems of the Danube Basin, Cambridge, 
1942, esp. pp. 1—8; C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer’s Independent Eastern Europe, London, 
1962, esp. pp. 450-52 ("Conclusion’). For a full account of the national movements in the 
modem world and their conflicts see the works of G. H. N. Seton-Watson, esp. Nations and 
States (London, 1977), also Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (London, 1962 esp. 
chs. 7 and 8), The ‘Sick Heart ’ of Modern Europe, Seattle, WA, 1975 (three lectures forming a 
thoughtful essay on the subject). 
21 Davies, God’s Playground, II, pp. 489-91, and in McCauley (ed.), Communist Power in 
Europe, pp. 39-40. 
22 For example, Stalin skilfully used the Hungarian-Romanian conflict over Transylvania to put 
pressure on the political leaders of both countries. Soviet endorsement of all Polish claims to 
the western territories (which the Western powers refused to do) made any post-war Polish 
government dependent on Soviet good-will; see Susanne S. Lotarski, 'The Communist 
Takeover in Poland’, pp. 342—45. Polish—Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius paved the way to the 
Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940; see Davies, God’s Playground, u. pp. 518-19, 443. 
23 Ibid., pp. 444-63. 
24 Estimates vary between ten and thirteen million Germans who escaped or were expelled from 
the countries of Eastern Europe; see Hans W. Schoenberg’s article in Hammond (ed.), The 
Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, pp. 370-74; Johnson, Central Europe, pp. 233-34. 
25 Ludvik Nemec argued that in the spring of 1945 'the mood of the country’ was more radical as 
regards the expulsion of the Germans and Hungarians than the Communists’ plans, Mamatey 
and Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 418 and 397-98. In Hungary the 
National Peasant Party, supported by most of the Smallholders’, headed the campaign to expel 
the bngarndeutschz, Mihaly Korom, 'Az Atlanti Chartatol a potsdami kollektiv biintetesig’ 
Szazadok, 1998, 3, pp. 563-64 and 570. 
26 Davies, God s Playground, II, pp. 562-68; Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland’, 
p. 363. 
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Sudeten Germans,27 and the Hungarian CP used the deported Germans’ property in like 
manner.28 But Hungary was also at the receiving end: it had to absorb co-nationals 
expelled from the Voivodina by Yugoslavia and, more significantly, from Romania and 
Czechoslovakia.29 President Benes planned to transfer over 700,000 Hungarians from 
southern and eastern Slovakia, partly as an exchange for Hungary’s Slovak minority and, 
as few Slovaks lived there, partly to settle them in place of expelled Germans.30 In the end 
only 74,000 Hungarians (mostly farmers) were forced to leave Slovakia.31 They were 
replaced by 73,000 (landless and mostly Hungarian-speaking, but willing) Slovaks from 
Hungary.32 
‘At the end of the eighteenth century’, observes Johnson, ‘three-fourths of Europe’s 1.5 
million Jews lived east of the Elbe River’.33 Their social integration was unaccomplished 
in most East European countries during the nineteenth century. Antisemitism remained 
widespread in the whole region. The annihilation of most of the Jews in the Shoah34 had a 
shattering effect on those who survived it. Yet some of them, rather than moving to the 
West or to Israel, returned to their homelands.35 Those who returned expected to live in a 
tolerant people’s democracy and were mostly sympathetic to the post-war regime. Some 
enrolled into the police to seek out their persecutors for punishment. The natural political 
home of a young educated Jew (unless he came from a well-known, rich family) was the 
Communist Party, whose egalitarian socialist ideology, which emphatically rejected all 
religious discrimination, seemed to offer the best available remedy against racial 
barbarism. Socialism held out the promise of integration into the national society.36 In 
general, national (religious) minorities were heavily over-represented in the Communist 
27 See Seton-Watson in McCauley (ed.), Communist Power in Europe, p. 229; Ludvik Nemec’s 
article in Mamatey and Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 416—27. 
28 The Soviet government, through the Allied Control Commission put pressure on the Hungarian 
government to expel 450,000-500,000 Germans. In the end 163,000 Germans were deported to 
Germany by the authorities; many also escaped from Hungary and yet others were taken by the 
Red Army as POWs to the Soviet Union. See Korom, ‘Az Atlanti Chartatol...’, pp. 553-83; 
Lorant Tilkovszky, Nemzetisegi politika Magyarorszagon a 20. szazadban, Budapest, 1998, 
pp. 126-41. 
29 See Tamas Stark, Magyarorszag masodik vilaghaborus embervesztesege, Budapest, 1989, 
pp. 63-78. 
30 President Benes insisted that Hungarians should be treated like the Germans and, in order to 
make room for the Hungarians of Slovakia in Hungary, he received help from the Soviets, 
which put pressure on the Hungarian government to expel nearly half a million Germans (over 
double the number the Hungarians wanted). 
31 In addition to the 31,000 Hungarians who were expelled and the 44,000 who were deported to 
Bohemia. 
32 Korom, ‘Az Atlanti Chartatol...’, pp. 561-62, 568-571; Karoly Kocsis, ‘Telepites es etnikum’, 
Historia, 1998, 2. pp. 19-22; see Mamatey and Luza, (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak 
Republic, pp. 422-25. 
33 Johnson, Central Europe, p. 143. 
34 Randolph L. Braham, the leading scholar on the subject, estimated the total loss of Hungarian 
Jewry, predicated on the country’s 1944 borders, as over 564,000, The Politics of Genocide: 
The Holocaust in Hungary, 2 vols. New York, 1981, II, p. 1144. Stark, by using an improved 
method, estimated that around 390,000 Jews died during the war, Magyarorszag masodik 
vilaghaborus..., pp. 23-46. 
35 'At the end of 1945’, wrote Braham, ‘there were 255,500 Jews in the territories controlled by 
Hungary in 1944, of whom 190,000 lived in the Trianon part of the country — including 
144,000 in Budapest, still by far the largest Jewish community in postwar Europe (excluding 
the USSR)’, The Politics of Genocide, II, p. 1143. 
36 See Peter Hanak’s autobiography, Ragaszkodas az utopiahoz, Budapest, 1993, pp. 30f. 
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parties before and even after their taking power. In Transylvania in 1945 the Communists 
were largely Hungarian.37 In Hungary a disproportionately high number of Slovaks 
worked in the Party and the leadership in Stalin’s years was largely of Jewish origin in 
Poland and Hungary.38 
The Land Question 
The land question was another factor that induced the swift Communist take-overs. 
Nowhere did the land question exist west of the Elbe. On its eastern side society remained 
overwhelmingly rural. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the bulk of the 
population worked as serfs tied to the land.39 Leibeigenschaft showed a great variety: in 
Brandenburg, Prussia, Austria and Bohemia the position of the serfs was well regulated 
and became contractual. In Poland and Hungary, serfdom was harsher and less regulated. 
Prussia emancipated its serfs after 1806; the Austrian Empire followed in 1848. In contrast 
to Russia, peasant ownership of land and the market economy were firmly established in 
East Central Europe. In contrast to Western Europe, however, the rural economy was 
largely based on subsistence farming. Land was undercapitalized, extensively cultivated, 
‘overpopulated’ and, handicapped by the system of partible inheritance, poverty-stricken.40 
Land hunger created the demand to distribute the large estates of the aristocracy and others 
among poor peasants. Generations of Polish, Hungarian, Romanian and Croat writers, the 
‘Populists’, and politicians espoused the idea of land reform. In the inter-war years they 
were successful in some countries, but this did not (and could not) abate the land 
question.41 
In 1945 all the occupied countries were still either predominantly rural or faced a land 
question and carried out land reforms.42 The Communists, nationalists and populists, 
happily marching abreast, energetically confiscated the land from the ‘rich’ and parcelled 
it out among the poor. In so doing the Communists killed many birds with one stone. They 
carried out a popular measure; they dispossessed the landowners — an independent social 
force; they confiscated the property of unwanted ‘aliens’, as we have already seen; and 
they set limits to the private holdings of agricultural land. Above all, the Communists 
acquired a power of patronage of enormous size43 and created a new class of dependent 
tenants (rather than independent farmers) who were later easily pushed into the 
37 See on this point Schopflin, Politics in Eastern Europe, p. 68. 
38 Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 317. 
39 Martyn Rady found the absence of the institutions of local self-government for the ‘East Elbian 
peasantry' the critical factor that distinguished serfdom from the farming communities of 
western Europe: see Rady, ‘Core and Periphery: Eastern Europe’ in Mary Fulbrook (ed.). 
National Histories and European History, London, 1993, pp. 168-72. 
40 See Doreen Warriner, Economics of Peasant Harming, London, 1964, esp. the introduction to 
the second edition, pp. xi—xii; idem. Contrasts in Emerging Societies, London, 1965. 
41 See, for example, Davies on Poland, God's Playground, II, pp. 41 Iff. 
42 Warriner, Revolution in Eastern Europe, a sympathetic account of the land reforms, see esp. 
ch. 7, and statistics on p. 136. Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, pp. 265—67. 
In Poland 216,000 landless tamilies were given land and 572,000 families were given 
additional plots. In Hungary 642,000 families and in Czechoslovakia 122,000 families received 
land, Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki, Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 
19th and 20th Centuries, New York, 1974, pp. 343-44. 
43 The Czechoslovak election results revealed that the distribution of the Sudeten Germans’ 
superbly equipped farms and of the dispossessed Hungarian landowners property enhanced the 
position of the CP; on Poland see Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland’, pp. 344 and 
363ff., and Davies, God's Playground, II, p. 559. 
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collectives.44 The distribution of land was a most popular measure particularly on the non- 
Communist left, which through this ‘common cause’ was tied closely to the Communist 
Party.45 
Economy and the State 
In modem times the state east of the Elbe was an active, and frequently the dominant, 
player in the economy. The government did not merely, as elsewhere, regulate the 
economy, build its infrastructure and redistribute wealth through taxation; it was a 
principal entrepreneur. Take, for example, Poland, where the large banks and nearly half of 
industry was in state ownership in the inter-war years. In Hungary at the end of the 
nineteenth century the state itself was the richest landowner46 and miner, the largest 
creditor, debtor, industrialist, customer and consumer. It possessed monopolies (tobacco, 
alcohol distilling); ministers set up factories which produced steel, machinery and sugar, 
and they ran wine cellars, poultry-, bee- and silk-farms, experimental stations, credit banks 
and co-operatives. 
The weakness of urban life and of the independent middle-classes was probably at the 
root of this development. Towns appeared late, and were fewer and smaller to the east of 
the Elbe than to the west. The burghers were socially isolated, ethnically frequently 
different47 and politically ineffective in societies where the ascendancy of the landowning 
nobility was the norm. Modem industry, which appeared east of the Elbe in the nineteenth 
century, did not create politically strong social groups. The pattern of industrialization was 
varied in Europe. In the West the growth of the factory system accompanied the 
emergence of an independent industrial bourgeoisie. In Eastern Europe cottage industry 
dominated and, apart from in a few areas, for example, in north Bohemia, only a handful of 
artisans became factory-owners in East Central Europe. In Russia trade and manufacture 
were controlled by the Muscovite state. Gerschenkron convincingly argues that in the 
advanced West European countries the factory provided the sources of capital supply. In 
Germany, Austria and Bohemia it was primarily the banks which produced the capital; the 
factories played second fiddle. In Hungary, in the Polish territories, in Russia and in the 
Balkans, the primary driving force was the state, followed by the banks, the factories 
coming a poor third.48 By and large east of the Elbe industry, where it developed, was lop¬ 
sided: a sea of artisans produced a small part of the industrial output while a few very large 
firms manufactured the bulk. Many of these firms were an early variety of managerial 
enterprise, financed by foreign capital, controlled by banks and dependent on the 
government.49 The few factory-owners were frequently social outsiders. Nowhere east of 
44 As regards Czechoslovakia, see Jan M. Michal’s comments in Mamatey and Luza (eds), A 
History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 441-42. 
45 In Hungary the big push by the Communists against their political opponents was launched in 
1946 with the slogan: ‘We are not giving back land!’ 
46 This had been so for centuries: The Crown, not the Esterhazy family, was by far the largest 
landlord in Hungary’, writes P. G. M. Dickson, Finance and Government under Maria 
Theresia 1740-1780, 2 vols, Oxford, 1987,1, pp. 109-10. 
47 For instance, in Bohemia, Moravia, Poland and Hungary most of the towns were established by 
German settlers in the Middle Ages. 
48 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Cambridge, MA, 1966, 
pp. 5-30 and 353-56; and see critical comments on Gerschenkron’s model by Ivan T. Berend 
and Gyorgy Ranki in their Economic Development in East-Central Europe, pp. 81-92. 
49 See I. T. Berend, ‘Ways and Peculiarities of Enterprise Development in Twentieth-Century 
Hungarian Industry’ in Acta Historica (Budapest), 20, 1974, esp. pp. 364, 369-73. 
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the Elbe did the industrial and business classes acquire the political muscle they 
undoubtedly possessed in the West.50 
The overbearing presence of the state in the economy and society had its antecedents in 
the autocratic political system of earlier times. The monarchs possessed energetic revenue¬ 
collecting machineries, required for military efficiency, without many constitutional 
constraints. The nobility possessed entrenched rights but exercised power, if at all, only 
locally. The Austrian, Prussian and Russian monarchs, interlocked in rivalry, pursued 
cameralist policies to strengthen the state in order to maintain, nay, augment Great Power 
status as well as promoting the ‘general good’.51 The intelligentsia, smitten by the French 
Enlightenment, yet sceptical of the capacity of social forces to generate the requisite 
change, placed their hopes in the state: the state itself ought to accomplish all that was 
accomplished in Western Europe largely by social forces. Christian Wolff and other 
popularizers of English and French ideas converted the philosophes’ concept of civil 
society to the theory of a fully rational absolute state.52 The liberals in the nineteenth 
century rejected that theory: they were constitutionalists. Yet again, they believed that 
reforms ought to be imposed on an unwilling, unenlightened population; society was 
reactionary and the state was progressive. These ideas of the intelligentsia gradually 
permeated officialdom and transformed the state machinery into an active instrument of 
economic and social change. 
r 
Etatisme and Authoritarianism 
Through a meteoric rise of the state bureaucracy in the eastern half of the continent, an 
ever larger part of the middle classes became dependent for their livelihood on 
governments that possessed wide discretionary powers. The etatiste machinery operated 
increasingly through ministerial decrees rather than through statute laws. Not only 
socialists and nationalists, but even most of the liberals, idolized the state, believed in 
social progress attained by regulation ‘from above’.53 Even in the German Empire, where 
economic etatisme did not make much headway and where strong independent urban 
business classes developed, the population preserved deferential attitudes towards the 
Obrigkeitsstaat. Hans-Ulrich Wehler calls the subservience of the Untertan in Wilhelmine 
50 For Hungary see Laszlo Peter, ‘The Aristocracy, the Gentry and their Parliamentary Tradition 
in Nineteenth-Century Hungary’, Slavonic and East European Review, 70, 1992, 1, esp. 
PP- 77-78. Industry was strong in Bohemia but Slovakia remained rural before 1945; see 
Mamatey and Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 21 Of. 
51 See William H. McNeill, Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500-1800, Chicago, IL, 1964, chs. 4 and 
5; H. M. Scott (ed.). Enlightened Absolutism, pp. 1-35, 147f and R. J. W. Evans, in ibid., 
pp. 190ff. 
52 Hanns-Martin Bachmann, Die naturrechtliche Staatslehre Christian Wolffs, Berlin, 1977, ch 5; 
Christoph Link, ‘Die Staatstheorie Christian Wolffs’ in Wemer Schneiders, Christian Wolff 
1679-1754, Hamburg, 1983, pp. 171-92. On the tarnished concept of‘Enlightened absolutism’ 
see Peter Gay s comments in his The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, 2 vols. London, 1973, 
II, pp. 452, 483-501 and 682-83. The ideas of the philosophes and of the Austrian Aufklarung 
are contrasted by Derek Beales, Christians and "philosophes The Case of the Austrian 
Enlightenment in Beales et al. (eds). History, Society and the Churches: Essays in Honour of 
Owen Chadwick, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 169-94; Scott (ed.). Enlightened Absolutism, pp. 19, 
147 and 226. 
In the nineteenth century liberals east of the Elbe argued that because society was ‘inactive’ the 
state had to intervene more than in more advanced countries. Intervention was, however, to be 
only temporary. In fact, what the government once took over it hardly ever handed back to the 
private sector. (The pendulum started to move back only in the last two decades of the 
twentieth century.) 
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Germany the ostelbische Mentalitat, inherited from the old Prussia, a mentality 
uncharacteristic of the population in the empire’s western parts.54 
Elsewhere in the region, where the swelling of the etatiste state was combined with the 
lack of liberal safeguards based on the institutions of the Rechtsstaat, the emergence of 
over-sized government meant that the livelihood of a large part of the middle classes 
became dependent on the administrative state machinery. The chances of independent 
social centres of power to provide effective countervailing forces to the government were 
reduced; the political influence of the nobility declined faster than the independent urban 
middle classes developed political muscle. 
The First World War and the Depression further strengthened etatiste attitudes and 
expectations. Now the hypertrophy of the state machinery eroded the great achievement of 
the nineteenth century, the transition to the competitive market system in the countries of 
East Central Europe. Control over the population increased under the influence of state 
corporatism. Social groups were boxed into organizations under ministerial tutelage. The 
(arbitrary) government began to manage the economy. The state that had succeeded to an 
increasing extent in cutting loose from social control acquired its own momentum for 
further unchecked growth. 
The governments’ control of the economy once more expanded during the Second World 
War.55 By 1945, massive state intervention in social relations (and even the public 
ownership of enterprises) had a long, respectable tradition in the region. Moreover, radical 
ideas within the intelligentsia gained ground during the war. Not surprisingly, 
nationalization of the banks and industry was popular in 1945. A part of industry was 
already under government management: the property of Jews who had perished in the 
Shoah was taken over by the state and former German property was confiscated. In the 
defeated countries it became Soviet property. Significantly, the nationalization of banks 
and industries still in private hands in 1945 had largely gone through well before the 
Communists attained full power.56 For socialism was the buzzword on the left, and even in 
the centre, in most countries after the war, on both sides of the Elbe. In Western Europe 
state intervention extended because of the emergence of the social question in politics and 
also because of the two World Wars. After 1945, nationalization was carried out where 
private ownership was not thought to be viable; the owners were compensated, after proper 
public debate, and by parliament-made law. East of the Elbe the motives were political; 
compensation was not paid; property was confiscated at short notice by government decree 
rather than by parliament-made law and without any public debate. Ail in all, state 
intervention expanded in Western Europe after liberal legal safeguards against the abuse of 
54 The author emphasizes that the servility of the Untertan, the product of repressive measures, 
combined with systems of reward, was a leftover from Prussia, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Das 
Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918, Gottingen, 1973, pp. 133-35. 
55 See E. A. Radice, ‘Economic Developments in Eastern Europe under German Hegemony’ in 
McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, pp. 3-21; Gyorgy Lengyel (ed.), Hungarian 
Economy and Society during World War II, New York, 1993. The number of people in public 
employment nearly doubled in Hungary between 1938 and 1945, Maria M. Kovacs, 
‘Kozalkalmazottak, 1938-1949’, Valosag (Budapest), 1982, 9, p. 45. 
56 Luza in Mamatey and Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, p. 402; Michal in 
ibid, pp. 438-45; E. A. Radice in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, pp. 19-20; 
Lotarski, ‘The Communist Takeover in Poland’, p. 366; Davies, God's Playground, II, p. 570. 
A survey, carried out at Columbia University in 1957 among Hungarians who had fled their 
country after the 1956 revolution, revealed that most interviewees wished to preserve the land 
reform and the nationalization of the banks and large-scale industry, Gyorgy Csepeli et al. in 
Gyorgy Litvan (ed.), 1956-os Intezet, Evkonyv VI. 1998, Budapest, 1998, p. 271. 
28 The Phoney Peace 
government power had been put firmly in place. In sharp contrast, the domineering state- 
machinery east of the Elbe largely lacked such safeguards. 
Rule by Decree 
Public power was predicated on different principles in different parts of Europe. In the 
legal systems east of the Rhine wherever statute law did not expressly protect the 
individual or the social group the state authorities could act at their own discretion (freie 
Verwaltung) and the government had the right to issue orders, nay more, enact decrees on 
its own authority in matters that interfered with the subject.57 This was the autocratic 
principle of law which did not characterize either the English or the French legal systems, 
in which the presumption of the law was on the side of the individual rather than the state 
authorities.58 In conflicts with the state authorities, the onus rested on the official to 
demonstrate that his action was authorized by parliament-made law. 
German and Austrian liberals mitigated the effects of the autocratic principle through the 
institutions of the Rechtsstaat: detailed statutory provisions, which were regularly enforced 
by administrative courts, restricted the orbit within which the executive branch of 
government could enact decrees. Rechtsstaat principles, however, obtained only to a 
limited degree east of the Elbe. In Hungary, for instance, the liberal principles of equality 
before the law, private property, contract and personal rights were secure. On the other 
hand, the law did not protect civil rights and the discretionary powers of the police 
authorities remained wide in matters of association, public assembly, the right to strike and 
in a host of other civil matters in which the law-courts had no competence.59 Further east, 
however, in Russia and in large parts of the Balkans, the principle of the rule of law itself 
was wanting in a society hardly touched by Western liberalism (lawlessness in Russia was 
acute). 
In twentieth-century East Central Europe the government’s free hand to rule by decree, 
largely bypassing parliament, increased spectacularly. The discretionary powers of 
officialdom widened. The overriding duty of the subordinate official, unprotected by civil- 
service regulations, was to carry out the instructions of his superiors. The form of 
‘democracy’, established in 1944-45 everywhere in the wake of Red Army victories, was 
rule by decree. Some decrees were, well after their implementation, rubber-stamped by 
appointed or elected assemblies. ‘Provisional’ coalition governments, in a great hurry, 
remoulded society by ordinance on the basis of agreements between Communist and non- 
Communist champions of social reform.60 Poland had rule by decree in its pure form from 
the days of the ‘Lublin Committee’, set up in July 1944, until January 1947 (through two 
57 See Georg Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung, Freiburg, 1887, pp. 255-56. Jellinek discusses the 
right in the context of the distinction between formal and substantive law: ibid., part 2, section 
2, eh. 1, pp. 226ff. 
58 This was common ground among West European natural-law school philosophers. Locke’s 
individuals, by putting themselves under government, gave up only some specific rights. The 
eighteenth-century French philosophes followed Locke. The principle went into the 1789 
Declaration ot the Rights of Man and Citizen: 'All that is not forbidden by law cannot be 
prevented, and no one can be forced to do what the law does not prescribe’; see E. K. 
Bramstead and K. J. Melhuish (eds). Western Liberalism, London, 1978, p. 228. This was the 
presumption of the law on which justice was administered in the liberal states of Western 
Europe in the nineteenth century. 
See Laszlo Peter, The Autocratic Principle ot the Law and Civil Rights in Nineteenth-Century 
Hungary' in Andor et al. (eds), CEU History Department Yearbook 1997-1998, pp. 11-34. 
60 The wholesale reorganization ot the structure of economy is summarized by Berend and Ranki, 
Economic Development in East-Central Europe, ch. 14. 
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successive reorganizations of the government), when after several postponements general 
elections were finally held.61 The ‘provisional’ coalition government carried out ‘a series 
of popularly supported reform programs’.62 The government seized and distributed the 
land of the aristocracy, expelled millions of Germans, nationalized the banks, commerce 
and industry63 and severely restricted individual rights, all by ordinance and well before 
the Communists had attained monopoly of power.64 
The Czechoslovak government, formed in April 1945 with a non-Communist majority, 
ruled by presidential decree; Benes began issuing presidential decrees from exile in 
London. The Provisional National Assembly, which itself was set up by presidential decree 
with members delegated by the parties, approved in February 1946 ‘unanimously and 
without discussion, the ninety-eight presidential decrees issued from May to October 1945, 
many of which affected the fundamental structure of the Czechoslovak state and society’.65 
As in Poland, the provisional government expelled Germans (also some Hungarians), 
redistributed land, nationalized the banks and large-scale industry,66 without public debate, 
by ordinance. And, even more than in Poland, the policy was popular. 
Wholesale social reform was also popular in Hungary, where the tenacity of the 
autocratic principle of law, combined with the rapid erosion of the Rechtsstaat principles, 
likewise produced a system of rule by decree. The provisional government took the land of 
the aristocracy and the Churches and parcelled it out among the poor.67 As ‘peasants’ were 
allowed to own more land than the ‘gentry’, the officials decided who did, or did not, 
belong to the ‘gentry’ and paid little attention to the limits set to expropriation by the 
decree. As in Czechoslovakia, the government set up People’s Courts to punish war 
criminals and the ‘enemies of the people’, and tribunals for the political screening 
(extensive purges) of civil servants.68 The government continued issuing decrees without 
statutory authorization until the general elections, held in November 1945, produced a 
parliament with not more than 17 per cent Communists.69 The new coalition government, 
with a robust non-Communist majority in parliament, however, doubled up on the 
ministry’s already bloated discretionary powers (by breaking a fundamental Central 
European legal taboo) in passing Law XI 1945 on the provisional regulation of state 
61 Davies, God’s Playground, II, p. 559-69; Lotarski, The Communist Takeover in Poland’, esp. 
pp. 364-67 
62 Ibid., p. 364; Seton-Watson pointed out that Stanislaw Mikotajczyk and his associates also 
‘stood for radical reforms’. The East European Revolution, p. 177. 
63 By the end of 1946, 91.2 per cent of industrial production was in the state sector, Lotarski, ‘The 
Communist Takeover in Poland’, p. 366. 
64 Lotarski observed: ‘The bitter resistance to the Communist regime was essentially nationalist 
rather than anti-socialist in nature’, ibid., p. 366-67. 
65 Luza in Mamatey and Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, p. 397. 
66 As Radomir Luza observes, ‘Czechoslovakia was the second state after the USSR to nationalize 
its industry and banks’, ibid., p. 402, n. 38. 
67 600/1945 Minister President’s decree of 18 March 1945, re-enacted by the (unelected) 
Provisional National Assembly as Law VI 1945 only six months later. In general, measures 
were introduced by ordinance, some of which were approved after the fact by the Assembly. 
68 The decrees that set up the People’s Courts and the tribunals to ‘verify’ civil servants were 
issued in January and February 1945. A much larger number of officials lost their jobs in 1946 
through the system of ‘B lists’ than through ‘verification’; compare Seton-Watson, The East 
European Revolution, p. 194. The system of ‘B lists’ and the ‘verification’ procedures of state 
employees were not new institutions. The Horthy regime introduced them to get rid of 
politically unreliable officials in the 1920s; see Tibor Hajdu, ‘Az ertelmiseg szamszeru 
gyarapodasanak kovetkezmenyei...’, Valosag, 1980, 7, p. 31. 
69 Seventy seats out of the 409-member house. 
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power. Article 15 of the Law gave blanket authorization to the government to enact 
decrees that contravened statute law.70 State ownership of the economy was extended at a 
steady pace by decree. First the mines (in December 1945), then the largest industrial 
factories and the banks were taken into state management, followed by the rest of industry, 
commerce and services.71 The decree enacted by the anti-Communist Smallholder Minister 
President Ferenc Nagy on the punishment of profiteering72 was so loosely framed that 
after the take-over the Communists could use it for years in ‘liquidating’ kulaks. 
Political Scuffles 
Not surprisingly the political divide in the people’s democracies before the take-over did 
not develop around social reforms (on which Communists and non-Communists were not 
sharply divided), but on questions concerning the distribution of the levers of power. 
Political tension, fed on insecurity, fear and suspicion between Communists and their 
opponents, was palpable throughout the region after the war. The issues concerned 
permission to form parties; exclusion from the (self-appointed) ruling coalition; the 
distribution of ministerial, judicial and other posts (also perks and assets like the 
possession of cinemas) among the parties. They were a matter of driving the ‘Fascists’, the 
‘enemies of the people’ or just plain ‘reactionaries’ out of public life. The political 
screening (and purge) of the civil service fuelled the tension. 
A major source of conflict between the parties was the behaviour of the Communist- 
controlled police. Not subject to the safeguards of the Rechtsstaat, the security police 
roamed freely in the service of the Communist cause (the apogee of the growth of arbitrary 
state authority east of the Elbe). The police detained, deported and sometimes murdered 
political rivals of the Communists, exposed conspiracies based on trumped-up charges, 
disrupted political meetings, beat up people for ‘swearing at democracy’.73 Intimidation 
was systematic. ‘In a democracy’, observed the Social Democrat Anna Kethly, in an 
encounter with Rakosi, ‘if the bell rings early in the morning, you are certain that it could 
only be the milkman’.74 She was not quite sure, since, in the past, democracy in her 
country had been only a minority taste, an aspiration at best. Clearly, representative 
government, where it existed east of the Elbe, worked differently from the way it did in 
West European parliamentary democracies. 
Representative Government 
The point about representative democracy is that at general elections the citizen can throw 
out the rascals and put in a new government (as he or she can on both sides of the Elbe 
today). The fundamental tenet of the parliamentary system is that parliament is supreme. In 
70 The government was empowered by statute to exercise this autocratic power from 14 December 
to 1 March 1946 (earlier decrees had been issued on the strength of authorization by the 
unelected Provisional National Assembly). Parliament, however, obligingly regularly renewed 
the licence (see Laws XVI, XXVIII 1946 and XVI, XXVI 1947 and so on) which excluded the 
only sixteen new laws and constitutional laws. The government had to present the decrees to 
parliament (in the first instance the government submitted a list of 142 decrees on 26 February 
1946). 
71 The Minister President’s decree established state control over the largest industrial plants in 
November 1946 and over the banks in May 1947. 
72 8800/1946 ME rendelet, Magyar Kozlony, 28 July 1946. 
73 For police brutality in the immediately post-war period, see Seton-Watson, The East European 
Revolution, pp. 172f, 187—88, 192—98, etpassim', Davies, God’s Playground, II, pp. 560f. 
74 Maty as Rakosi, A nepi demokracia, Budapest, 1946, p. 24. 
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nineteenth-century Western Europe, government became parliamentary: the ‘ultimate 
controlling power’75 could be said to have resided in the electorate which determined the 
political colour of parliament to which the government was politically (primarily) 
responsible. About half a dozen countries gained a parliamentary system before 1918.76 In 
the eastern half of the continent political institutions developed differently. In the 
nineteenth century governments were appointed first; elections were held afterwards. 
Some countries, such as Poland and Hungary, had a long parliamentary tradition, but the 
monarch (later the president), the ministry and sometimes the army counterbalanced 
parliament’s rights. Parties did not alternate in office and the majority principle did not 
prevail east of the Elbe. Governments in power invariably returned to office after 
elections. In 1905, in what was probably a unique event in the region’s history, a 
government in Hungary lost the election. This led to a major constitutional crisis between 
parliament and Emperor-King Francis Joseph, from which the monarch emerged the 
winner. He appointed the new ministers largely on his own terms and forced them into 
resignation at the first opportunity. In 1918 Czechoslovakia was established on liberal 
democratic principles and civil rights were more secure there than anywhere else in the 
region. Yet the system could not become parliamentary because the German, Hungarian 
and even some of the Slovak politicans’ loyalty to the new state was doubtful. 
Parliamentary democracy is based on the majority principle, which could not obtain 
because the Czechs formed a minority within the state. The permanent committee of the 
Czech parties, the Petka, appropriated many of the political functions of parliament and the 
opposition never attained office.77 
Parliaments did not fare better in 1945 east of the Elbe. After liberation, free elections 
were not held in Poland. Elections were repeatedly postponed until well after the CP had 
consolidated its position as the dominant force in the country. The general election of 
January 1947 was sham.78 In contrast, the Czechoslovak elections held in May 1946 were 
free and orderly (although only parties of the National Front were permitted to run). These 
were held, however, only after the Communists, exploiting presidential decrees, had 
fattened their ranks and popular support by the confiscation of lands and nationalizations 
on a massive scale. The Communist Party became the largest party in parliament, with 38 
per cent of the vote. And yet power did not, as elsewhere, gradually slide into Communist 
hands; it had to be grabbed in a coup d’etat. Paradoxically, perhaps, the Rechtsstaat 
tradition, stronger in Bohemia than elsewhere in the region, made the break in institutional 
75 John Stuart Mill, Representative Government [1861], ch. 5. He insisted that an ultimate source 
of authority had to exist in any political system. For there was a balance in every constitution 
but there was no balanced constitution as a stable form of government. 
76 Britain was the pace-setter. The Crown lost the power to determine the composition of 
Melbourne's second cabinet in 1835. See Norman Gash, Reaction and Reconstruction in 
English Politics 1832-1852, Oxford, 1965, pp. 13-15. From this time onwards the cabinet’s 
responsibility towards the Commons was decisive. Belgium was the first country on the 
continent that emulated Britain in 1847, followed by Switzerland with its sui generis federal 
constitution in the same year. Parliamentary government was established in Holland in 1868, in 
France in 1876, in Norway in 1884, Denmark in 1901 and Sweden in 1905 (or 1917?). In the 
inter-war years two newly independent countries, Ireland and Finland, joined the group; the 
system expanded more rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century. 
77 Mamatey and Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, particularly Vaclav L. 
Benes, ‘Czechoslovak Democracy...’ in ibid., pp. 97-98 and V. S. Mamatey, ‘The 
Development...’ in ibid., pp. 108-10 and passim. 
78 Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, pp. 176-78; Lotarski, ‘The Communist 
Takeover in Poland’, pp. 350-54; Davies, God’s Playground, II, p. 568f. 
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continuity in Prague unavoidable.79 Although the opposite is frequently argued, the 
Hungarian elections of November 1945, in which the Communists received 17 per cent of 
the vote, were not free. The voting itself was free but only ‘democratic’ parties were 
allowed to participate. Moreover, Marshal Voroshilov, Chairman of the Allied Control 
Commission, permitted the holding of the elections on the strict condition that irrespective 
of the results the four-party coalition government was to be maintained. And so it was, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Smallholders’ Party, with 57 per cent of the aggregate 
vote, gained an absolute majority.80 
In sum, parliamentary government was not established in the eastern half of the 
continent before 1945. The single exception was Finland, where an insecure liberal 
democracy emerged in the inter-war years. Some of the countries east of the Elbe, but for 
the Soviet presence, would have made the transition after the Second World War. There 
was again a single exception: Austria. In the rest of the region Soviet obstruction towards 
the transition turned out to be a walk-over, partly because of the overwhelming dominance 
of the executive branch over the legislative and the judiciary everywhere. It would amount 
to an absurd denial of continuity in history to blame primarily the Communists for this 
imbalance. Past and present at every turn in history form an uncomfortable fusion, which a 
further point may illustrate. 
It is generally taken for granted that behind the advancing Soviet army everywhere new 
states were established. Indeed, with the exception of Romania (and perhaps Bulgaria), 
institutional continuity was ruptured when the governments under German occupation 
were replaced by the ‘provisional’ national governments formed on liberated territories. 
The change of legitimacy was by reference to the ‘democratic’ or national will of the 
people (rather than to Soviet recognition). Central government was everywhere 
supplemented by local national councils, which carried into effect the first measures. 
Interestingly, however, the existence of the ‘national committees’ or ‘national councils’ 
was in most countries short-lived.81 The old administrative system was restored with a few 
changes. And central governments likewise began to work through the old ministries. The 
avowed aim of the party leaders was not the creation of a new but the ‘democratization’ of 
the old state machinery. By that they did not even mean democratic reform of one kind or 
another. Democratization meant the purging of the civil service and its replenishment with 
new officials nominated by the ‘democratic’ parties.82 That was why the sharing-out of 
civil service posts among the parties became an all-important political issue. 
The Take-over 
In the preceding sections of this chapter some of the social characteristics have been 
considered that helped the Communists to achieve a monopoly of power largely through a 
79 Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, pp. 182-83; Mamatey and Luza (eds), A History 
of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 403-15. 
80 Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, p. 193; George Schopflin, ‘Hungary’ in 
McCauley (ed.), Communist Power in Europe, pp. 98-99. 
81 Lotarski argues that in Poland ‘the councils played an important role in the struggle for power’, 
‘The Communist Takeover in Poland’, p. 363. Mastny, on the other hand, argues that the 
Lublin regime 'soon decided to run Poland by using the old system of administration rather 
than the newly established local councils’, Russia’s Road to the Cold War, p. 217. 
82 The Hungarian Communist leaders had very clear ideas on ‘democratization’ by February 
1945, see Gyorgy Gyarmati, ‘A kozigazgatas ujjaszervezese az “ideiglenesseg” korszakaban’, 
Tortenelmi Szemle, 1996, 1, pp. 76-88 esp. 84, n. 62. Rakosi declared in January 1946: ‘We 
have inherited the existing apparatus of state from the reactionaries’, Rakosi, A nepi 
demokracia, p. 11. 
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political process. This is not to deny that institutions and attitudes could also be found in 
the region which hampered the Communists’ objectives, such as the rule of law, the 
market, liberal tolerance, the value of individual freedom, or parliamentary and even 
democratic traditions. (This was why, once Soviet power collapsed, at least some of these 
countries could, in a very short time, establish liberal democracies.) Also, the 
characteristics that helped the take-overs could be found elsewhere in Europe (in countries 
that were spared Communism). Again, the characteristics that have been listed did not all 
appear in all the countries that turned Communist. But a sufficient number could be found 
in all of them to have a multiplying effect. In feeding on each other they helped the process 
towards the one-party state. Some of the characteristics, such as the authoritarian tradition, 
the discretionary authority of state officials, the weakness of civic culture, were 
instrumental in the take-over as well as in the maintenance of the new order. Other 
features, such as land reform, national conflicts, border disputes, the deportation of the 
Germans and the consequences of the Shoah (attitudes to property and to politics) were 
circumstances that paved the way for the take-overs. 
The take-over scenario was far from uniform in the region; nevertheless there was a 
pattern in the Communist seizure of power. Hugh Seton-Watson’s classic account — 
written half a century ago — distinguished three phases.83 First, the Communists formed 
genuine coalitions with the other democratic parties in a ‘Patriotic’ or ‘National Front’ in 
which they held a minority of the ministerial posts and seats in parliament. They insisted, 
however, with Soviet help, on holding the Ministry of the Interior and controlling much of 
the police. In the second phase, which Seton-Watson termed ‘bogus coalition’, the 
Communists attained a dominant position not by winning at elections but by forcing co¬ 
operation and merger on other ‘left-wing’ (socialist and peasant) parties which they had 
successfully infiltrated. Also, they engineered crises by fiercely attacking some of their 
‘right-wing’, that is, more independent-minded, partners by staging ‘mass demonstrations’ 
and public disorder combined with massive police action and conspiracy trials on trumped- 
up charges in order to eliminate one group after another (‘salami tactics’).84 Non- 
Communist leaders were imprisoned or forced into exile. Notably, Moscow-trained 
Communists had always had the upper hand over the ‘home-grown’ variety on whom at 
some stage brutal show-downs were inflicted to keep them in their place. At every turn in 
the transformation, Stalin’s local disciples received help from the Soviet legation or the 
Allied Control Commission, or even directly from the Red Army.85 In the last phase the 
83 Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, pp. 169-71; Hammond (ed.). The Anatomy of 
Communist Takeovers, pp. 22-29, and Mackintosh in ibid., pp. 237-43. Geoffrey Swain and 
Nigel Swain ‘challenged’ Seton-Watson’s three-phase thesis which they largely misunderstood. 
Eastern Europe since 1945, London 1993, pp. 7-8. 
84 Rakosi’s admission in 1952, see William Juhasz, Hungarian Social Science Reader, 1945- 
1963, New York, 1965, pp. 150-51; Schopflin in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in 
Europe, p. 98. On the combination of mass demonstrations and police terror see Mamatey and 
Luza (eds), A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, pp. 411, 473; Peter Kende in Litvan (ed.), 
1956 Intezet, Evkonyv VI. 1998, p. 190. The memoirs of a leading ‘people’s judge’ well illumi¬ 
nates the farcical procedures of the People’s Courts in Hungary: Akos Major, Nepbiraskodas, 
forradalmi torvenyesseg, Budapest, 1988. Rakosi destroyed the Smallholder leadership by 
staging a ‘conspiracy against the Republic’ show-trial, see Istvan Csicsery-Ronay and Geza 
Cserenyey, Koncepcios per a Fuggetlen Kisgazdapart szetzuzasara 1947, Budapest, 1998. 
85 See Mackintosh in Hammond (ed.), The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers, pp. 239f; the author 
draws deterministic conclusions from the (indisputable) premise that Stalin controlled the local 
Communist Parties, pp. 242-43; Davies, God’s Playground, II, pp. 558f; Margit Foldes, A 
szovetseges ellenorzo bizottsag Magyarorszagon, Budapest, 1995, pp. 94—6. Peter Kende 
compared the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian transition toward one-party rule. The time- 
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transition to one-party rule was completed by the abandonment of the bogus coalition, after 
which only non-competitive acclamatory elections were held. 
The three-phase pattern did not apply to Yugoslavia and Albania, countries where 
Communist rule grew out of the barrel of the gun, so to speak (nor to Greece, where an 
anti-Communist regime suppressed the Communist guerillas). Also, as Seton-Watson 
points out, the first phase was missing from the Polish and the second phase (largely) from 
the Czechoslovak transition. Because in Poland the government was controlled from the 
start by the Soviets, Norman Davies thinks it quite out of place to talk of a Communist 
take-over.86 
If that is so, the point applies even more to the territory of what later became East 
Germany, where for some time the military ruled directly. The leaping of Czechoslovakia 
from the first phase to the third throws some light on why that transition has been widely 
regarded as a coup.87 In Hungary the transition from genuine to bogus coalition (the slicing 
of the salami) created protracted tension. In 1946 politics polarized: the right-wing of the 
Smallholders and the ‘reactionaries’ vested all their hopes in the coming of the 
Americans88 while the Communists brought forward their timetable.89 A vital, yet 
generally neglected, ingredient of the salami tactics was the firm support that the 
Communists secured, whenever they attacked the Smallholders, from both wings of the 
reformist intelligentsia, the Populists and the (‘bourgeois’) Radicals, as well as from the 
Social Democrats. In Romania and Bulgaria the time-span of the first two phases was 
shorter than in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. By the end of 1948, however, every country 
considered so far had completed the transformation. All in all, underneath the considerable 
diversity in detail it is not difficult to detect the common pattern in the transition to the 
Communist one-party state. 
The Exceptions 
Exceptions frequently shed light on the nature of the cases that do not deviate from the 
common pattern. Apart from Greece, where the Communists were suppressed by force, in 
two other countries Communist power was successfully resisted politically. We must ask 
why neither Austria nor Finland ended up in the Communist camp. They had a start in 
early 1945 rather similar to those countries that did turn Communist. Both Austria and 
Finland were defeated countries, partly occupied by the Red Army.90 They were both 
placed under the authority of Soviet-dominated Allied Control Commissions and had to 
pay war reparations which gave economic leverage to the Soviets.91 In one of them, 
Austria, the Provisional Government was picked by the occupiers themselves; there was 
initially a substantial Communist presence in the government of both countries and the 
table, he argued, was largely set by local Communist leaders, in Litvan (ed.), 1956 Intezet 
Evkonyv VI. 1998, p. 189. 
86 See Davies in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, p. 53 and Davies, God's 
Playground, II, p. 575. 
87 ‘A bloodless coup’ concluded Mamatey, p. 473 and Luza, p. 409, in their A History of the 
Czechoslovak Republic. 
88 Imre Kovacs, leader ol the National Peasant Party, ruefully recalled years later that politicians 
had been immature and failed to understand that a position for Hungary comparable to 
Finland s should have been the realistic objective, Miklos Toth (ed.), Onarckepiink sorsunk..., 
p. 54. 
89 Kende in Litvan (ed.), Evkonyv VI. 1998, p. 189. 
90 The Red Army was raping and looting in Austria, as elsewhere. 
91 Formally Austria was, after haggling among the Powers, exempted from war reparations. But 
‘German property' was seized in the Soviet zone of occupation. 
East of the Elbe: The Communist Take-over and the Past 35 
Communists, as elsewhere, did their best to increase their power. Yet they failed abysmally 
against their opponents. Austrian and Finnish resistance was assisted by good luck: their 
countries were under only partial Russian occupation. But that fact on its own cannot 
explain the outcome. Czechoslovakia, which had been spared entirely of the presence of 
Soviet troops on its territory since November 1945, nevertheless turned Communist. It 
would be absurd to regard it as quite an unrelated coincidence that neither Austria nor 
Finland bore in 1945 the structural weaknesses with which the countries that were about to 
turn Communist were afflicted. 
Austria did not have serious national conflict with any of her neighbours: her borders 
were securely established.92 Nor did the country have unwanted national minorities to 
expel; the Slovenes in the south were not keen on going. Nor were there rural paupers 
hungry for the redistribution of land. After the Nazi barbarities very few Jews returned to 
Vienna.93 Highly industrialized Austria had a well-disciplined SDP that firmly held the 
allegiance of the working classes. Although Austria in the past never had a parliamentary 
system of government, the authoritarian political background was mitigated by a brisk 
tradition of Rechtsstaat principles which both the Left and the Right respected. The 
political veteran Karl Renner was asked by the Russians to form the Provisional 
Government in the Soviet zone, a government which included Communists who now 
acquired the Ministry of the Interior ‘with all its control of the internal security forces’.94 
Not unexpectedly, the Western powers were suspicious of the intentions of the Provisional 
Government, whose authority, on Soviet insistence, was then extended to the whole 
territory of the country.95 
Yet after all these antecedents a proper parliamentary system was established in Austria. 
At the elections, held in November 1945, the Communists received 5.5 per cent of the 
vote.96 They stayed in the reorganized coalition government but lost the Interior Ministry. 
The Communists became politically isolated. Their mass demonstrations could not break 
the phalanxes of the strong, well-organized and united Social Democrats. After the 1949 
elections, in which the Communists did not improve on their support, with Soviet 
assistance, they provoked mass strikes and riots in 1950 which failed and ended 
Communist influence altogether.97 Yet the Red Army still occupied a large part of Austria. 
Finally, the Soviets, more interested in security than in spreading Communism, accepted 
what had been all along on offer by the moderate Austrian politicians: neutrality between 
East and West. In 1955 the State Treaty was signed; the Red Army withdrew from the 
country and Austria kept the bargain. One may ask how long a Hungarian government 
could have staved off public pressure to move Hungary into the Western alliance once the 
Red Army had departed.98 
The example of Finland, formerly a part of the Russian Empire, is even more instructive 
than that of Austria. After a short civil war between Reds and Whites in 1918, Finland 
established stable government, based firmly on the rule of law, under which it developed a 
92 The South Tyrol question was partly a border conflict but Austria and Italy found a modus 
vivendi and after protracted negotiations reached an agreement in September 1946. See 
Anthony Evelin Alcock, The History of the South Tyrol Question, Geneva, 1970, pp. 110-47. 
93 See Robert S. Wistrich’s chapter in this volume. 
94 William B. Bader, Austria Between East and West 1945-1955, Stanford, CA, 1966, p. 23. 
95 Ibid., pp. 25, 38, 58. 
96 Ibid., pp. 45f; Schoenberg, ‘The Partition of Germany...’, in Hammond (ed.). The Anatomy of 
Communist Takeovers, pp. 379-81. 
97 Bader, Austria between East and West, eh. 8. 
98 See note 88 above and compare Elisabeth Barker’s view that the Russians were inclined to treat 
Hungary like Austria: McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, p. 216. 
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liberal democratic regime that resisted right-wing coups." The Finns lost the Winter War 
with the USSR in 1940 and were forced to cede Karelia and Vyborg, after which they 
joined the Axis and were defeated once more in 1944. Now the Red Army was stationed in 
Porkkala near Helsinki, the country was burdened with heavy war reparations100 and its 
government was placed under the authority of the Allied Control Commission. It showed 
Finland’s importance to the Soviets that a leading Stalinist, Andrei Zhdanov, was sent to 
chair the ACC. Under his pressure the Communists were edging towards power by holding 
six government posts, including that of minister of the interior. That position was the 
outcome of the general elections of March 1945 in which the Communists, by holding 25 
per cent of the seats, became the strongest force in parliament.101 
Yet they did not make it. Finland accepted the loss of territory to Russia and, like 
Austria, it had neither national conflicts with neighbours nor unwanted minorities to get rid 
of. There was no Jewish question. Nor were there rural paupers, although huge numbers of 
refugees from Karelia had to be resettled.102 The critical factor was the ability of the 
political elite to preserve continuity of the government at the end of the war. The ACC and 
the Finnish Communists faced the rule of law and the democratic process. When Zhdanov 
demanded energetic measures to punish war criminals, the government did not issue 
ordinances. Instead of using discretionary powers, as the Hungarian or the Czechoslovak 
government did, the Finnish government turned to parliament, which after proper debate 
passed laws that were administered by independent (rather than party-appointed) judges. 
The issue of war criminals could not be used for intimidation.103 Nor could the interior 
ministry be used for party purposes to great effect. The Communist Yrjo Leino became 
rather isolated in his own ministry when he started to tinker with police appointments and 
he received a bad press.104 When the Finnish Communists began to use the methods of 
mass demonstrations combined with police intimidation, which were so effective 
elsewhere, they soon collided with institutional obstacles like the rule of law, civil service 
regulations, the free press and so on; their popularity began to ebb and they soon found 
themselves out of government. On the other hand Finnish politicians lent over backwards 
to meet Soviet security needs. They signed a friendship treaty with Russia which was 
similar to what Hungary and Romania had to sign.105 Finland’s lucky escape heavily 
underlines the point that whether or not a particular country became a people’s democracy 
after 1945 depended as much on inherited institutions and attitudes as on a Soviet 
presence. 
99 D. G. Kirby, Finland in the Twentieth Century, London, 1979, p. 97. 
100 Ibid., pp. 148—149, Anthony Upton in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, p. 133. 
101 Kirby, Finland in the Twentieth Century, p. 164; Upton, ‘Finland’, in McCauley (ed.), 
Communist Power in Europe, pp. 136-37. 
102 Alfred J. Rieber, concluding his study, based on Soviet sources, writes, 'The isolation of the 
Finnish Communist Party by 1948 was largely the result of its internal weakness and of the 
resilience of its opponents rather than the exigencies of international politics or the political 
errors of Soviet foreign policy.’ Zhdanov in Finland, Pittsburgh, PA, 1995, pp. 66 and 23 f.; see 
also Kirby, Finland in the Twentieth Century, p. 170. 
103 Ibid., p. 156; Upton in McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe, p. 138. 
104 He was eventually brought down by a parliamentary vote of no confidence in 1948 for an 
illegal measure he had been responsible for in 1945, ibid., pp. 146-47. 
105 Ibid., pp. 144-46. Finland, not unlike Austria, was prepared to renounce the possibility of 
joining a Western Bloc. See also Kevin Devlin in Hammond (ed.). The Anatomy of Communist 
Takeovers, pp. 438-40. 
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Quisling Regimes and Satellites 
Undoubtedly the Soviets, by using brute force, might have imposed their social system on 
Austria or Finland. That course, however, would have produced a Quisling regime rather 
than a people’s democracy. The distinction is real: it is between a puppet regime and a 
satellite. During the war in Nazi-occupied Europe there were other regimes similar to that 
of Norway, which provided the name.106 Emil Hacha’s presidency of the Protectorate of 
Bohemia and Moravia after March 1939, Ferenc Szalasi’s in Hungary, Marshal Petain’s 
Vichy regime (perhaps) and Karmal’s government, following the 1979 Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, could be regarded, although not to the same degree, as examples of Quisling 
types. They were puppet governments with native personnel acting under continuous direct 
control by an occupying power. Satellites, in contrast, move in their own orbit, so to speak. 
Their subordination to the larger dominant power is political rather than military (like 
Jozef Tiso’s wartime ‘Slovak Republic’). 
What has been argued as regards Austria and Finland applies a fortiori to the liberal 
democracies of Western Europe, and beyond. Had the Red Army occupied a country like 
Holland, which did not have the conflicts and mentalities that we find in countries further 
east, it is difficult to see how the Dutch Communists could have imposed on Dutch society 
a one-party state (even if that was what they had wanted). A Quisling regime, based solely 
on tanks, could, of course, be implanted and maintained for a while anywhere, but not a 
Soviet satellite, which required a political process. Military might on its own could not 
have generated a political process to create a people’s democracy. We can now affirm 
what has earlier been only conjecture: the presence of the Red Army in the region was a 
necessary but not sufficient condition of the outcome. That required an internal course for 
which the inherited institutions and attitudes, presently set out, were indispensable. There 
is a strong case for suggesting that some deeply rooted differences of social structure 
between the two sides of the Elbe sustained a (partly) hidden fault-line along which Stalin 
could rip Europe apart.107 
The Transition and Culture 
The people’s democracies were satellites in which the Communists took power through a 
political discourse in which they claimed the intellectual high ground. Indeed, after the 
Second World War, the explanatory powers of Marxist teleology overwhelmed the 
intelligentsia almost everywhere. And educated people on a pathetically massive scale fell 
for the ruse. Culture played a critical role in the transition and it is easy to see why this had 
to be so. The Communist take-over was legitimized by Marxist historicism: social 
progress, predetermined, driven by history’s inexorable tides. An ever-growing number of 
educated people, mesmerized by the crude axiology of human progress from feudalism 
through capitalism into socialism, accepted the inevitable triumph of a Marxist ‘classless 
society’ through revolution. And their conviction was reinforced by their dim perception 
that even in Western Europe fear (or hope) pervaded the intelligentsia that a similar fate 
would eventually befall their societies. Indeed, only 1956 in Poland and Hungary finally 
shattered this Orwellian nightmare in the West. 
106 On 1 February, 1942 the German Commisar appointed Vidkun Quisling Minister President of 
Norway. His regime lacked political support and was disowned by the Norwegian government 
in London. 
107 An appropriate metaphor for the Elbe border, ‘fault-line’, is defined by Matthew Parris as ‘a 
subterranean weakness or crack in the rock foundation, which, though hidden by the soft terrain 
above, is likely to prove the line along which the whole thing breaks or folds under stress’. The 
Times, 12 June 1999. 
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The claim, however, that a socialist revolution took place after the war was in conflict 
with what most people actually experienced at the time. Substitutes were at a premium; the 
most obvious being culture which, like any other form of private property, had to be taken 
into state ownership.108 The Communist monopoly of political power was complemented 
by the monopoly of thought, art and learning. The media, education and culture focused on 
the class struggles of the past — clearly a substitute for the absent social revolution in the 
present. Moreover, as class conflicts rarely produced spectacular events and largely lacked 
mass appeal, they, in turn, were substituted by what could be dressed up as ‘national 
uprisings’ (which the cultural gurus of the regimes could find in abundance). The two 
kinds of substitutes, lumped together, formed the ‘revolutionary progressive 
inheritance’.109 The ministries of education and culture in the satellites set up a large 
literary establishment and film industry whose task was to cultivate the progressive 
inheritance. In Hungary the Rakoczi rebellion (against Habsburg rule) was presented as a 
progressive movement towards ‘bourgeois’ society, Kossuth’s 1848^19 war of indepen¬ 
dence as a ‘bourgeois revolution’ and the collapse in 1918 as a ‘bourgeois democratic’ 
revolution. In the Bohemian Lands, the fifteenth-century Hussite Wars became the 
forerunner of the ‘socialist revolution’. In Slovak literary works, at least by the 1960s, as 
Robert Pynsent has noted, the anti-German Slovak National Uprising of September 1944 
‘legitimized the Communist regime [...] not only in Slovakia but in the whole of 
Czechoslovakia’.110 Very similar cultural substitutes were deployed by the regimes 
elsewhere in the region. The Communists inherited and used for their own purposes the 
attitudes associated with ‘national literature’ which were didactic, insular and implicitly 
authoritarian. How the sudden influx of the Marxist code of the new culture was 
naturalized and mixed with the vocabulary of the traditional national culture in the 
people’s democracies is one of the themes that the contributors to this volume explore. 
108 See Lorant Czigany, ‘Lepeskenyszer: az irodalom allamositasa...’ in Toth (ed.), 
Onar eke punk..., pp. 131-84. 
109 The Czech, Polish and Hungarian official ideology had abandoned the most anachronistic parts 
of this outlook after the first major crisis of the satellites in the mid-1950s. In Hungary the 
ideologue Erik Molnar rejected Rakosi’s ‘nationalism’, see L. Peter, “New Approaches to 
Modem Hungarian History’, Ungarn Jahrbuch, 1972, pp. 161-71. 
110 See Robert B. Pynsent, Conceptions of Enemy, Cambridge, 1988, p. 69. 
3 Austria and the ‘Jewish Question’, 1945-50 
Robert S. Wistrich 
The immediate aftermath of the Shoah was to prove a decisive formative period in shaping 
the troubled relations between Austrians and Jews for the next fifty years. The deportations 
and the mass murder of Austrian Jewry during the Second World War had reduced to ruin 
one of the richest, most vibrant and culturally creative Jewish communities on the 
European continent. Despite the massive scale of the destruction, the Shoah did not, 
however, bring antisemitism to an end in Austria, nor did it eliminate the ‘Jewish 
Question’. 
True, Austria was spared the kind of pogroms that disfigured Poland between 1945 and 
1947, when approximately 1,500 Jews were murdered. But levels of hostility to Jews 
remained remarkably high and were reflected in a public discourse and praxis that (with 
regard to Jews) belied the self-proclaimed democratic norms of the new Austria that had 
emerged after 1945. 
The Jews of post-Shoah Austria were no more than a pale shadow of the great Jewish 
community numbering 2.25 million which had still inhabited the multi-national Austro- 
Hungarian Empire on the eve of the First World War. At that time 175,000 Jews had been 
living in the imperial capital of Vienna (9 per cent of the total population) and they were a 
driving force both of modem capitalism and Austrian social democracy. The Jews of 
Vienna dominated cultural life in the city, providing a brilliant galaxy of talent in the arts 
and sciences, which would help to shape the contours of twentieth-century culture.1 
The Jewish presence was also heavily felt in the professions. Most city lawyers and 
doctors were Jews and this situation would continue until the Anschlufi in 1938. Jews also 
dominated journalism (especially the liberal and socialist press) and were 
disproportionately represented in commerce, banking and entrepreneurial capitalism.2 This 
preponderance had not even been changed (let alone reversed) by the antisemitic Christian- 
Social administration of the city of Vienna after 1897.3 Antisemitism in Vienna was indeed 
stronger than in any other Central or West European city, but as the city’s moderately 
antisemitic mayor, Karl Lueger, fully realized, Jews were also an indispensable element in 
the life of the metropolis.4 
Following the collapse of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the 
post-war peace treaties, Austria suffered a massive loss of territory, population and 
‘national’ self-confidence. The Jewish community was reduced to a tenth of its former size 
and overwhelmingly concentrated in Vienna. In 1923 the Jewish population peaked there 
at 201,513 (10.8 per cent of the total population), which made Vienna the third largest 
Jewish city in Europe — after Warsaw and Budapest. Antisemitism had been exacerbated 
by a massive influx of Galician Jewish refugees during the First World War and in the 
1 See Robert S. Wistrich, The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph, Oxford, 1989; William 
O. McCagg, A History of Habsburg Jews, 1670-1918, Bloomington, IN, 1989; and Steven 
Beller, Vienna and the Jews, 1867-1938: A Cultural History, Cambridge, 1989. 
2 See Robert S. Wistrich, Socialism and the Jews. The Dilemmas of Assimilation in Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, London and Toronto, 1982. 
3 Wistrich, The Jews of Vienna, pp. 220-37. 
4 On Lueger, see John Boyer, Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the 
Christian Social Movement, 1848-1897, Chicago, IL and London, 1981, and Richard S Geehr, 
Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siecle Vienna, Detroit, MI, 1990. 
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early 1920s, by the loss of empire, post-war inflation, high unemployment and the endemic 
status-anxiety of the Viennese ‘little man’ (kleiner Mann). It could be found in virtually all 
social classes, age-groups and political parties5 — especially in the ruling Catholic- 
conservative Christian Social Party and the more virulently racist Greater German People’s 
Party (Grossdeutsche Volkspartei) which favoured union with Germany.6 Its strongest 
single constituency was among German nationalist university students who by the late 
1920s had also become the avant-garde of the growing Nazi movement in Austria. The 
‘inviolable territory’ of the universities (where police could not enter) transformed them 
into ‘Brown Houses’ with open season on Jewish students, long before the Anschlufi.7 In 
the Austrian countryside, too, antisemitism was strong — fuelled by time-honoured 
religious prejudice, hide-bound provincialism and resentment against ‘Red Vienna’ 
(identified with Jews) as well as by German nationalist propaganda.8 
The brief interlude of ‘clerico-Fascist’ dictatorship in Austria under the Christian Social 
Chancellors DollfuB and Schuschnigg (between 1934 and 1938) had mixed results for the 
Jews. In comparison with Nazi Germany, Jews were protected from physical assaults, from 
open slander and insult or efforts systematically to impoverish them. Neither DollfuB (who 
was assassinated by Austrian Nazis in July 1934) nor Schuschnigg had any sympathy for 
National Socialism. Both sought to preserve Austrian independence and to this end they 
imprisoned Nazis as well as Social Democrats and Communists. But their authoritarian 
Christian state ideology did bring with it a quiet discrimination against Jews and the first 
erosion of Jewish emancipation in seventy years for the 191,000 Jews still living in Austria 
in 1934. 
With the Anschlufi of March 1938, the destruction of Austrian Jewry began in earnest as 
the accumulated social and political discontent of the indigenous population exploded with 
elemental force. As the historian Gerhard Botz has put it, ‘The attacks consisted mostly of 
symbolic acts and historic rituals aimed at the destruction of a sense of identity — 
humiliations, abuse and arrests — but there were also physical attacks, beatings, murders 
and also robberies on a mass scale. It was as if medieval pogroms had reappeared in 
modem dress.’9 
5 On inter-war Austrian antisemitism, see Bruce Pauley, From Prejudice to Destruction. A 
History of Austrian Antisemitism, Chapel Hill, NC and London, 1992. 
6 The goal of Anschlufi with Germany had been blocked by the Western Allies in 1918 despite its 
popularity in Austria, especially among Social Democrats - including the Chancellor Karl 
Renner and his (Jewish-bom) Foreign Minister, Otto Bauer. The first Austrian Republic, 
founded in 1918, was originally called Deutsch-Osterreich (German Austria). The 
Grossdeutsche Volkspartei favoured Anschlufi for racist, imperialist and Slavophobic reasons, 
in accordance with the Austrian pan-German tradition of Georg von Schoenerer before 1918. 
Schoenerer had also been Austria’s most virulent political and ideologist antisemite since the 
early 1880s. 
See Bruce F. Pauley, ‘Political Antisemitism in the Interwar Period’ in I. Oxaal, M. Poliak and 
G. Botz (eds), Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna, London and New York, 1987. 
8 Benno Weiser Varon, Professions of a Lucky Jew, New York, 1992, p. 30: ‘The Austrian 
peasant, the Styrian mountaineer, the yodelling Tyrolean were hopelessly prejudiced.’ The 
author, a native of Austria, notes that in places like Salzburg, the more money they made from 
Jewish tourists, the more antisemitic the hotel owners, restaurateurs, waiters, porters, bellboys 
and chambermaids seemed to become. 'Your servant, Mr Cohen’, in season, became ‘Hei 1 
Hitler!’ off season. 
9 Gerhard Botz 'The Dynamics of Persecution in Austria, 1938-45’ in Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), 
Austrians and Jews in the Twentieth Century. From Franz Joseph to Waldheim, London 1992 
p. 202. 
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The pogrom-like atmosphere was accompanied by a swift, large-scale ‘aryanization’ of 
Jewish property (that is, the economic expropriation of Viennese Jews, mostly without 
compensation) including well-known Jewish businesses and large department stores.10 
Nearly 70,000 Jewish dwellings were seized, partly as a way to alleviate the housing 
shortage in Vienna and partly to reward ‘citizens’ and party comrades who had served the 
Nazi movement in deserving ways.* 11 The enforced exodus of Jews proceeded apace and by 
November 1939, 126,445 Jews had ‘emigrated’ from Austria (to the United Kingdom, the 
USA, Shanghai, Palestine and other destinations) — altogether about two-thirds of 
Austrian Jewry. This was a ‘tribute’ to the brutality of Viennese antisemitism — far more 
radical than anything hitherto seen in the ‘Old Reich’, that is, Nazi Germany before the 
Anschlufi.12 During the war years, the remaining third of Austrian Jews would be deported 
to death camps in Poland, where approximately 65,000 would meet their deaths. 
The Austrian ‘contribution’ to the Shoah was, however, far greater than these figures 
might suggest. Not only was indigenous Jew-hatred in pre-1939 Austria greater than in 
Germany, but Austrians were disproportionately involved in planning and implementing 
the ‘Final Solution’.13 Apart from Adolf Hitler himself (the Austrian-born architect of the 
Shoah) there was Adolf Eichmann, who was in charge of Jewish deportations from the 
Reich and most of occupied Europe; there was Odilo Globocnik (formerly Gauleiter of 
Vienna) who supervised all the death camps in Poland; Ernst Kaltenbrunner from Linz, 
who succeeded Heydrich as head of the Reich Head Security Office and effectively co¬ 
ordinated the bureaucracy of the ‘Final Solution’; Seyss-Inquart, Reich Commissioner of 
the Netherlands and responsible for the deportations of Dutch Jews;14 not to mention the 
fact that 40 per cent of the personnel and most of the commandants of the death camps at 
Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka were Austrians or that 80 per cent of Eichmann’s staff were 
recruited from among his Austrian compatriots.15 Simon Wiesenthal was not greatly 
exaggerating when in a memorandum of 12 October 1966 sent to the Conservative 
Austrian Chancellor, Josef Klaus, he asserted: ‘The Austrians who were participants in the 
crimes of National Socialism bear the responsibility for at least three million murdered 
10 Ibid, pp 202-06. See also Kurt Schmid and Robert Streibel, Der Pogrom 1938, Vienna, 1990, 
and especially Herbert Rosenkranz, Verfolgung and Selbstbehauptung: Die Juden in Osterreich 
1938-1945, Vienna, 1978, for the most detailed account. 
11 Gerhard Botz, 'National Socialist Vienna: Anti-Semitism as a Housing Policy’ in Robert S. 
Wistrich (ed.), European Antisemitism, 1890-1945, The Wiener Library Bulletin, 29, 1976, 39— 
40, pp. 47-55 
12 See Botz, ‘The Dynamics of Persecution in Austria’, p. 215, who stresses that ‘from 1938 
onwards Austria and Vienna were often a step ahead of Germany in the persecution of the 
Jews. In Vienna, in particular, comparable measures were applied earlier than in Germany, and 
they could also count on broader support among the non-Jewish population. Here the 
organisational instruments and procedures could be developed which would later be applied by 
Eichmann in the Final Solution’. 
13 Pauley, From Prejudice to Destruction, p. 491. See also Joachim Riedl, ‘Geht doch in die 
Donau. Uber den Osterreichischen Anted am Holocaust’ in J. Riedl (ed.), Versunkene Welt, 
Vienna, 1984, pp. 165-70. 
14 For more information on these and other individuals see Robert Wistrich, Who’s Who in Nazi 
Germany, 2nd edn, London, 1995. 
15 See Gitta Sereny, Into That Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder [1974], London, 
1991, for a revealing portrait of the Austrian-born Franz Stangl, who commanded Treblinka 
where at least 900,000 Jews were murdered. 
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Jews.’16 Austrian Jews, it must be remembered, unlike their German co-religionists, had 
suffered the devastating consequences of Nazi rule in one fell swoop, leaving them in total 
disarray after 1938. Nevertheless, despite the rapidly shrinking Jewish population they 
participated on a quite remarkable scale in the Austrian resistance, especially in the 
clandestine activities of the outlawed Socialist and Communist parties. They were also 
active in the Allied armies fighting the Germans and played a conspicuous role in the 
Belgian and French resistance.17 
However, at the end of 1945 there were at most some 4,000 members of the Jewish 
religious community who had somehow survived and were scratching out a living in a 
ruined Austria — itself hungry, despondent, confused and now under Allied occupation. 
(The figure 4,000 relates to those registeres to the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde [IKG]; 
clearly there were non-affiliated Jews [who did not pay the Steuer] outside the 
Kultusgemeinde — we do not know how many.) The British Labour MP Richard 
Crossman, who visited Austria in February 1946 as a member of the Anglo-American 
Commission for Palestine, was profoundly depressed by what he observed. He described 
the Jewish communal leaders whom he met as ‘shrill and pathetic, self-assertive and 
broken’; he noted their conviction that there was no future for Jews in Austria and that 
emigration to Palestine was the only solution for Jewry. They told him that antisemitism 
(despite the Shoah) was as strong as ever; hence they advised against encouraging any 
Jews who had been driven out in 1938 to consider a return to Austria. 
This pessimistic assessment was confirmed for Crossmann by what he heard from 
Austria’s first post-war President, the veteran Socialist leader Karl Renner (who would 
remain in office until his death in 1950). Renner emphasized that there was no room for 
Jewish businessmen in Austria and he did not think that ‘Austria in its present mood would 
allow Jews once again to build up these family monopolies. Certainly we would not allow 
a new Jewish community to come in from Eastern Europe and establish itself here when 
our own people need work.’18 Renner’s manifest lack of sympathy for Jews was echoed by 
his fellow Social Democrat and Minister of the Interior (he held the position until 1959), 
Oskar Helmer, who complained to Crossman about the American policy of giving special 
accommodation and rations to unemployed Ostjuden in the American zone of occupation 
‘while hard-working Austrians starved’, a policy, he insisted, that caused justified Austrian 
resentment and antisemitism.19 The comments that Crossman heard from the aged Bishop 
of Vienna were scarcely more encouraging. He apparently blamed antisemitism on the 
behaviour of the Jewish community and on an alleged Jewish collaboration with the 
Gestapo.20 He assured his British visitor that the Roman Catholic Church did not fight 
Jews per se but only the ‘Jewish spirit of materialism’; he conceded that to drive out the 
16 A copy of the memorandum can be found in the Documentation Centre of the Bund Judischer 
Verfolgter des Naziregimes, Vienna. Quoted by Botz, ‘The Dynamics of Persecution in 
Austria’, p. 213. 
17 See Jonny Moser, ‘Die Juden Osterreichs und der Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime’, DOW 
Jahrbuch, 1993, p. 103 (DOW = Dokumentation des Osterreichischen Widerstandes). Also 
Tilly Spiegel, Osterreicher in der be/gischen undfranzosischen Resistance, Vienna, 1969. 
18 Richard Crossman, Palestine Mission: A Personal Record [1947], New York, 1977, p. 92. 
19 Ibid., p. 91. Helmer’s crass insensitivity to Jewish suffering between 1938 and 1945 came out 
in many of his comments in cabinet meetings that had a bearing on the ‘Jewish Question’. See 
Robert Knight (ed.), Ich bin dafiir, die Sache in die Lange zu ziehen: Die Wortprotokolle der 
osterreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945 bis 1952 iiber die Entschadigung der Juden, 
Vienna, 1988. Knight chose as the title of his collection of Austrian cabinet documents a 
statement made by Helmer in 1948 proposing that the government drag out for as long as 
possible negotiations with Jewish organizations about restitution. 
20 Crossman, Palestine Mission, p. 93. 
Austria and the ‘Jewish Question’ 43 
Jews would be ‘un-Christian’, but stressed that Austrian Catholicism would neither lift a 
hand to destroy nor to assist the Jewish community. The Church could aid only Jews who 
acknowledged Christianity. 
On the basis of such unsympathetic testimony, Crossman concluded in 1947 that the 
shrunken Jewish community of Vienna would have either to assimilate totally (as urged by 
the Conservative Chancellor Figl) or to leave. There could be no room for Jewish com¬ 
munities with their own schools or separate organizations, let alone a thriving Jewish 
culture (in Yiddish) or a distinctively Jewish way of life. Nor was there any demographic 
prospect for a revival of Jewry as had occurred after 1918, for the surviving remnants were 
old people whose relatives had either permanently emigrated or been killed. Indeed, in 
1945, Vienna seemed to resemble a phantom city or house of the dead (Totenhaus) for the 
2,000 Jews who had survived as ‘U-Boote’ (that is, in hiding) in ‘protected’ mixed 
marriages or as Mischlinge (offspring of mixed parentage); another 1,727 Jews had 
returned as concentration-camp or death-camp survivors and a much smaller number had 
trickled back from abroad. By the end of 1949 the numbers had risen to 8,038 Austrian 
Jews officially registered with the I KG (to which one can add a few thousand who may 
have returned without registering) — split between a growing number of returnees and 
approximately one quarter who had survived the Third Reich.21 During the past fifty years, 
however, this number has scarcely increased, amounting to today about 12,000 Jews, still 
overwhelmingly concentrated in Vienna. This is indeed the single most important legacy of 
the Shoah, for it fulfilled in the most macabre fashion the prophecy of the Austrian writer 
Hugo Bettauer, who in 1922 had written a Futurist novel about the ‘city without Jews’.22 
The Shoah destroyed the historic continuity of Austrian Jewry which, though predom¬ 
inantly German in language and culture, had fused together Bohemian, Moravian, 
Hungarian and Galician Jews with their Viennese-born co-religionists in a uniquely 
colourful and innovative multi-cultural ‘melting-pot’.23 This diversified Austrian Jewry 
had been significantly different from its German co-religionists — more pluralistic, loyal 
to a supra-national concept of ‘Austrianness’ (Osterreichertum) and more willing to 
embrace a sense of Jewish peoplehood. Large sections of pre-1918 Austrian Jewry had 
been primarily Jewish in their self-definition rather than German, Czech, Austrian or 
anything else.24 Religious traditionalism was stronger than in Germany (as was support for 
Zionism) and Reform Judaism in Austria did not strike any deep roots. However, under the 
first Austrian Republic (1918-1938), the similarities with German Jewry became more 
apparent as both communities had to face the same problems of inflation, depression, rising 
antisemitism and Nazism in the framework of what had now become a decaying nation¬ 
state. Moreover, after 1918 Galician Jews in Austria were perceived for the first time as 
‘foreigners’ and tensions between them and the assimilated Viennese Jews had increased. 
21 ‘Statistik der bei der IKG Wien registrierten Glaubensjuden’, Archive of the Israelitsche 
Kultusgemeinde, Vienna, file Berichte und Protokolle, 1948-1956. See also Friederike Wilder- 
Okladek, The Return Movement of Jews to Austria after the Second World War, The Hague, 
1969. Over 1,000 Jews returned from Shanghai (not without considerable obstruction from the 
Austrian authorities), over 700 from Palestine and 600 from Britain. 
22 Hugo Bettauer, Die Stadt ohne Juden, Vienna, 1922. Bettauer had imagined a future expulsion 
of the Jews after an antisemitic victory in Vienna but also assumed that they would be invited 
back, following what he believed would be an inevitable economic breakdown and collapse. 
Bettauer was assassinated by fanatical antisemites a few years later. 
23 Robert S. Wistrich, ‘The Modernisation of Viennese Jewry: The Impact of German Culture in a 
Multi-Ethnic State’ in Jacob Katz (ed.). Toward Modernity: The European Model, New 
Brunswick, NJ, 1987, pp. 43-70; Marsha L. Rozenblit, ‘The Jews of Germany and Austria: A 
Comparative Perspective’ in Wistrich (ed.), Austrians and Jews, pp. 1-18. 
24 Rozenblit, ibid., p. 7. 
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This tension did not altogether disappear after 1945 but the context had once again 
changed. In the immediate post-war years, the leadership of the ageing and decimated IKG 
had passed to very assimilated, secular left-wing Jews who had little interest in the 
religious needs of the community. They were ‘Austrian patriots’ ready to work to 
reconstruct a ‘new Austria’, looking in particular to the Communists (KPO) and the Social 
Democrats (SPO) to protect their rights as survivors and to fight against any resurgence of 
neo-Fascism or antisemitism. In the first democratic elections after the war, a Communist 
journalist, David Brill, was appointed as president of the IKG and the Communist list 
Jtidische Einigkeit won 65 per cent of the vote — a result that would have been 
unthinkable in the 1920s or 1930s. Until its dissolution by the Nazis, Kultusgemeinde 
politics had been dominated by the struggle between the liberal, ‘integrationist’ Union 
(originally the Austrian Israelite Union) and the Zionists, with the latter finally emerging 
victorious in 193 2.25 At that time the Socialist list was weak and the Communists played 
no role in communal elections. (In municipal and national elections during the First 
Republic, a majority of Viennese Jews voted for the SPO but the Kultusgemeinde elections 
were not at all representative of the general political orientation of Jews in Vienna.) 
After 1945 this had changed dramatically. The Union had been obliterated by the Shoah 
along with the emancipated, liberal-assimilationist aspirations and hopes of Viennese 
bourgeois Jews that it had once embodied. It was now the Communists and above all the 
Social Democrats who held high the banner of assimilation.26 But Communist influence 
waned as a result of the Cold War, the negative impact of the Soviet occupation of Austria 
and the pressures of the American Jewish Distribution Committee (AJDC), on whom the 
Vienna Kultusgemeinde was at first financially dependent for more than half its budget. 
The Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) and occupation of Czechoslovakia (1968) 
destroyed any remaining credibility of the Communists in the community. Between 1952 
and 1981, the Bund Werktatiger Juden (Alliance of Working Jews), closely connected with 
the SPO, came to dominate Jewish communal elections. Among the various opposition 
factions, the Zionists were prominent until the early 1970s but never achieved anything 
approaching their high-water mark in the 1930s during the rise of Nazism. There had, 
however, been intensive Zionist activity in Austria between 1945 and 1948 among the 
more than 100,000 East European Jews who passed through the country on their way to 
Palestine, the USA and other destinations. Many were concentration-camp or death-camp 
survivors, while some had lived in hiding or fought with the partisans against the Germans. 
These foreign Jews did not participate in communal life and Austria was for them 
essentially a Transitland. They despised the ‘Yekkes’ (German-speaking Jews) as much 
the latter looked down on them as uncouth, Yiddish-speaking and saw them as provoking 
antisemitism among non-Jews. As had happened in Austria after the First World War, the 
divisions between Westernized Jews and the Ostjuden continued, though they were 
probably less acute than similar divisions in Germany after 1945.27 
The East European Jews, four-fifths of them from Poland (but others from Hungary, 
Romania and the Bohemian Lands), who crossed the Austrian border after 1945 were 
fleeing pogroms, impoverishment and the imminent Communist take-over in their 
25 See Harriet Pass Freidenreich, Jewish Politics in Vienna, 1918-1938, Bloomington, IN, 1991, 
who provides a detailed analysis of the communal election results. For her account of the 
Jewish Liberals in the inter-war period, see pp. 23^t7. 
26 The Israeli newspaper Davar, 24 January 1955, complained that "the assimilation in Austria is 
redder and redder . Traditionally, the Socialist orientation in Austria had tended to be anti- 
Zionist. 
See Michael Brenner, After the Holocaust. Rebuilding Jewish Lives in Post-war Germany, 
Princeton, NJ, 1998. 
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countries. The DP camps in Austria (as in Germany) soon turned into recruiting grounds 
for smuggling Jews illegally into what was then still a British-controlled Palestine. The 
American zone of occupation in Austria (as in Germany) was noticeably more favourable 
for this activity than the DP camps under British jurisdiction and American military 
authorities generally turned a blind eye to the East European Jewish Bricha (flight). The 
problem of Jewish DPs played a significant role in reviving Austrian antisemitism after the 
war and certainly contributed something to blurring any residual Austrian sense of sharing 
in Nazi guilt for the Shoah. There was, for example, resentment that Jewish refugees in the 
American zone were receiving special accommodation and better rations (at a time of food 
shortages) than many Austrians.28 Jews, it was claimed, engaged in black-market activities 
0Schleichhandet) and were responsible for spreading venereal disease.29 The Socialist 
Arbeiterzeitung deplored the influx of ‘hordes of illicit foreign traders and desperadoes’, a 
motley crowd of‘unwelcome guests’ and ‘wretched, unemployed and over-excitable Jews 
whose presence inevitably promoted antisemitic whisperings’ and if unchecked would 
provoke a Fascist backlash.30 Both Austrian press reports and archival sources reveal that 
Jewish DPs were all too often considered cheeky, provocative, undisciplined and they were 
frequently accused of petty crime such as stealing milk, fruit and vegetables. There were 
growing calls to expel these foreigners, ‘parasites’ and Volksschadlinge (a Nazi term: 
‘nation-pests’) from the Tyrol and Vorarlberg. In these Alpine areas the Jews represented 
only about 1 per cent of the 65,000 DPs after the war, but they were singled out by 
Marincovic, an antisemitic deputy, for allegedly causing the bad food and housing 
situation. In the years between 1945 and 1948, though the Jewish DPs averaged at any one 
time no more than 10 per cent of the more than 500,000 displaced persons, the focus was 
on them and their numbers were often grossly exaggerated. 
In Salzburg, Bad Ischl and Badgastein the presence of Jewish DPs was blamed for the 
decline of tourism. It was also said that they were a burden on taxpayers, though their 
upkeep was in fact paid for by the US military government and American Jewish 
organizations, not the Austrian authorities. Popular hostility was rife, leading to clashes in 
Trofaiach, Judenberg, Kapferburg, Admont and Gnadenwald. Austrian police had to put 
down a riot outside a hostel for Jewish refugees at Bad Ischl.31 There were synagogue 
daubings in Graz and an outcry against the black-market dealings of Jewish DPs in the 
Salzburg region. 
American surveys taken in 1947^18 of the state of opinion in Vienna, Salzburg and Linz 
provide a grim picture of Austrian opinion, no doubt exacerbated by the DP question. 
Nearly a quarter of the Viennese thought Jews had got what they deserved under the Nazis, 
about 40 per cent of the population in all three cities thought the Jewish character was 
responsible for antisemitism; 43 per cent of Salzburgers, 34 per cent of the Viennese and 
28 Thomas Albrich, Exodus durch Osterreich. Die jiidischen Fluchtlinge 1945-1948, Innsbruck, 
1987, p. 93. Albrich observes that the British military authorities often sympathized more with 
the Austrian population than with the Jews. The British war against ‘illegal’ Jewish 
immigration from Europe to Palestine probably contributed to such a bias. 
29 Salzburger Nachrichten, 10 July 1946. 
30 Arbeiterzeitung, 21 August 1946. 
31 For these and similar incidents, see Thomas Albrich, “‘Es gibt keine judische Frage”. Zur 
Aufrechterhaltung des osterreichischen Opfermysthos’ in Rolf Steiniger (ed.), Der Umgang mit 
dem Holocaust. Europa-USA-Israel, Vienna, 1994, pp. 147-66. Also Jonny Moser, ‘Via 
Osterreich in die Freiheit. Der Transit jiidischer Fluchtlinge seit 1945’. Das judische Echo, 39, 
1990, 1 (October), pp 69-73. At Bad Ischl (in the American zone) the slogan of the 
demonstrators, led by Communist agitators, was that ‘the Jews are getting fat’. The American 
military authorities arrested the ringleaders but had to reduce their sentences as a result of 
protests across the political spectrum in Austria. 
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47 per cent of the Linzers believed Jews had it too good in the DP camps and that they 
were ‘profiteers’ (Nutzniefier) living at the expense of the indigenous population. A year 
earlier, another American survey had shown that about 50 per cent of the inhabitants 
polled in Linz, Salzburg and Vienna thought the Nazis had gone too far with the Jews but 
‘something had to be done to place limits on them’. A similar percentage opposed the 
return of Jews to Austria against only 28 per cent who favoured it. These Austrian 
responses are not notably different from those recorded in Bavaria, Hesse and Baden- 
Wurttemberg, where antisemitic sentiments in 1947 appear if anything to have been even 
higher.32 Indeed, Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Jewish adviser to the American military 
government in Germany, stated in May 1947 that if the Americans were to withdraw, there 
would be a pogrom. As in Austria, there was a powerful resentment against the alien influx 
(Uberfremdung). It should be remembered that there were over 200,000 Jewish DPs in 
Germany at the end of 1946, mainly from Poland. Moreover, there was in Germany the 
same identification of Jews with illicit black marketeering, parasitism and criminality as 
existed in post-war Austria. 
The backlash among Germans and Austrians was particularly strong in rural areas where 
there had traditionally been very few Jews.33 The local population in Bavaria (where 93 
per cent of the Jewish population were DPs) or in the Alpine regions of Austria could not 
fathom why they should host foreign Jews for whom the American military government 
demanded special treatment.34 In the Salzburg region (also in the American zone) in 1947 
there were some 30,000 foreigners from over forty nations, including about 14,000 Jews. 
This was an unprecedently high figure for an area that had fewer than 300 Jewish 
inhabitants at any given time between 1867 and 1934. True, this had not prevented 
Salzburg from being a hotbed of pan-German racism and antisemitism long before the 
Nazi period. But precisely this deutschnational tradition sharpened the backlash against the 
Jewish DPs, who were allegedly exploiting the misery of the local population.35 At the 
same time it is important to note that the immediately post-war antisemitism in Austria 
(and Germany) was not as lethal as in neighbouring Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or 
Romania. There were some antisemitic incidents but no pogroms. Of course, had there 
been no Allied occupation, the story might well have been very different. Prejudice was 
high, with half of all Germans polled in 1952 disclaiming any responsibility for the wrongs 
done to Jews, opposing restitution and blaming Jewish characteristics for antisemitism. At 
the level of popular prejudice no major difference was discernible between Germany and 
Austria in the early post-war years. 
But Allied attitudes to the two countries were significantly different and played a 
formative role in shaping the respective positions of Germans and Austrians towards the 
legacy of the Shoah. The Germans knew that their behaviour towards the Jews was seen as 
a test of their maturity and their democratic credentials by the Western Allies. They had 
32 Constantin Goschler, 'The Attitude Towards Jews in Bavaria after the Second World War’, Leo 
Baeck Institute Yearbook (hereafter LBIYB), 26, 1991, pp. 443-60. 
33 Wilder-Okladek, The Return Movement, pp. 40—41. 
34 See Frank Stem, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge. Antisemitism and Philosemitism in 
Postwar Germany Oxford and New York, 1992, p. 61. See also his article 'The Historic 
Triangle. Occupiers, Germans and Jews in Postwar Germany’, Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur 
deutsche Geschichte, 19, 1990, pp. 47-76. 
Fven in 1948, there were still 4,473 Jewish DPs in the Salzburg region and another 4,500 
registered in the city itself, though the numbers rapidly diminished with the foundation of 
Israel. See Marko Feingold (ed.), Em ewiges Dennoch. 125 Jahre Juden in Salzburg, Vienna, 
1993, and especially the contribution of Helga Embacher, 'Neubeginn ohne Illusionen’, 
pp. 285-336. 
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experienced pressure from Washington and from American Jewish organizations which 
made clear the link between German-Jewish relations and the moral legitimacy of the new 
Germany in the post-war world. Some degree of ‘philosemitism’ was required if Germany 
were to regain its political sovereignty and that undoubtedly played a part in the positive 
German decision on restitution (Wiedergutmachung) to Israel and world Jewry. A 
combination of political prudence, moral scruples and a healthy respect for Jewish 
influence in America marked Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s attitude on these issues and 
this proved decisively important. So, too, was the principled position of the Chairman of 
the SPD (German Social Democratic Party), Kurt Schumacher, who demanded the 
payment of restitution to the Jews as early as 1946. He repeatedly referred in speeches and 
interviews to Nazi guilt with regard to the Jews.36 Without the firm support of the Socialist 
opposition for Wiedergutmachung, Adenauer could never have pushed through the historic 
legislation in 1952 against the resistance in his own Christian Democrat Party and among a 
majority of the German population. 
In Austria, however, there was no political parallel to the efforts of Adenauer and 
Schumacher, nor was any comparable Allied pressure insisting that its attitude to the Jews 
be a ‘touchstone’ of progress toward democracy. Philosemitism never became integrated 
into Austrian domestic and foreign policy (as it did in Germany) as part of its effort to 
achieve sovereignty and integration into the West.37 Thus the gulf between Germany and 
Austria was visible more at the level of political elites than it was in public opinion. In 
Germany as much as Austria, there was a strong desire to forget Nazism, to deny any guilt 
for the Shoah, to reject the premisses of de-Nazification and even to believe in the myth of 
‘Jewish power’.38 But for West German political culture after 1949, a positive attitude to 
Jews had become an essential element of international respectability, a kind of collective 
Persilschein (clean bill of health) for the new German state.39 This official, state-ordained 
philosemitism did not prevent many Germans (like the Austrians) from brushing over 
Jewish concerns and sensitivities, disclaiming personal responsibility and limiting their 
empathy to their own POWs, refugees and deportees. In Austria, however, there were no 
countervailing pressures (internal or external) either for restitution or for developing a 
more positive image of Jews after 1945. 
The consequences of this situation were manifold and often contradictory. After 1945, 
antisemitism in Austria, as in Germany, could no longer be expressed too publicly or 
openly. Cabinet ministers understood that displays of anti-Jewish prejudice would be 
negatively perceived by international public opinion after the Shoah and adversely affect 
their standing with the occupying Allied powers. Though Austria did not (in contrast to 
Germany) have to prove its democratic fitness by developing special relations with the 
Jews or Israel, it did out of self-interest vehemently deny the existence of Austrian 
antisemitism or else downplay its importance.40 Thus, the Socialist mayor of Vienna, 
Theodor Komer, ridiculed in February 1947 ‘the fairy-tale of antisemitism’ in his city, 
36 See Shlomo Shafir, 'Kurt Schumacher und die Juden: Als erster deutscher Politiker bekannte er 
sich zur Wiedergutmachung’, Tribun, 112, 1989, pp. 128-38. On the seminal importance of 
Schumacher’s role on these issues, see the important study by Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: 
The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp. 239-60. 
37 Stem, The Whitewashing, p. xxi 
38 Ibid., pp. 121-25. A survey of opinion in the American zone of Germany in 1945-46 showed 
that 44 per cent of Germans felt no responsibility for Nazi war crimes and a similar percentage 
felt that National Socialism was a good idea, if poorly implemented. 
39 Ibid., p. 385. 
40 Helga Embacher, Neubeginn ohne Illusionen. Juden in Osterreich, Vienna, 1995, p. 77. 
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calling it ‘totally alien to the Viennese.41 Sharply criticizing unfriendly reports in the 
foreign (especially the American) press, he claimed (in opposition to known historical 
facts), that ‘Vienna had never witnessed antisemitic outrages of the kind found in other 
countries [...], for the Viennese is a cosmopolitan and thus from the word go not an 
antisemite’.42 In a letter to the World Jewish Congress in April 1947 Komer stressed that 
the Austrian Socialist Party in particular stood up firmly as the best guarantee against the 
revival of antisemitism in the future. He evoked its former leaders Victor Adler and Otto 
Bauer and other prominent Jewish names in the pre-war Socialist leadership like Robert 
Danneberg, Wilhelm Ellenbogen, Julius Tandler, Hugo Breitner and Julius Deutsch.43 He 
did not however mention that the post-1945 Socialist leadership was not at all interested in 
in\ iting veteran Austro-Marxist Jews in emigration to return to Austria. 
The conservative Austrian Chancellor, Leopold Figl, like Komer, also categorically 
denied that Austrians were antisemitic and in June 1947 he prematurely and naively 
suggested that sympathy with the persecuted Jews had eradicated antisemitism in Austria. 
‘I don't think this question will ever acquire even the slightest significance.’44 Figl (who 
was himself in a concentration camp for several years) evidently believed that there was a 
simple answer to Nazism and the Shoah, namely to restore all Austrians to ‘their former 
rights without distinction'. Figl’s refrain was that since all Austrians had suffered, there 
could be no grounds for differentiation on the basis of race or religion. The law should be 
applied ‘even-handedly to everyone who returns from the camps and prisons’. In one of 
the rare public statements ever made in welcoming back returnees to Austria, Figl had 
declared: ‘They are Austrians like all of us. The Jews, too, of course. If the Jews who 
emigrated return, they will be just as welcome as all other Austrians. They have the same 
right to be reinstated to their former rights as all the others.’ Superficially, this statement 
strikes an unimpeachable universalist note.45 Figl spoke in the name of equality before the 
law but at the same time he was also rejecting any notion of ‘special treatment’ for the 
Jews after the Shoah. This was depicted as ‘racism in reverse’ by Figl and other members 
of the government. It was to be an argument widely used by all political parties in Austria 
in resisting Jew ish demands for moral and material restitution after 1945. 
As w e have already seen, in the cabinet discussions over Jewish DPs in Austria the fact 
that Jews were being given ‘privileged status’ by the American authorities with regard to 
food and accommodation was blamed for fuelling popular antisemitism. Austrian 
politicians, of the Right and Left, did not, however, see it as their task to influence or 
counteract the antisemitic opinions of the population. Nor did they see fit to express any 
remorse about the fate of the Jews or choose to confront unpalatable facts about the 
Austrian role in the Shoah.46 Significantly, when a prominent politician like Leopold 
Kunschak (a leading figure in the pre-war Christian Social party) made antisemitic 
41 Ji iener Zeitung. 9 February 1947. p. 3. Korner even asserted that ‘not one of the horror stories 
is true'. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Embaeher. Xeubeginn ohne Illusionen, p. 144. 
44 See Robert Knight. 'Restitution and Legitimacy in Postwar Austria 1945-1953’, LBIYB. 36, 
1991. pp. 413—12. and the original German-language protocols of cabinet meetings, Ich bin 
dafiir. p. 58. In one such meeting on 8 January 1952, Figl showed a breathtaking ignorance and 
casual callousness about the tate ot Austrian Jews, remarking that relatively few were killed 
and ‘most of them really did get over the border’. 
45 Quoted from Wiener Zeitung, 20 February 1946. See also Robert Knight. ‘“Neutrality” Not 
S> mpath\: Jews in Post-war Austria in Wistrich (ed.), Austrians and Jews, p. 223. 
See Oliver Rathkolb, Zur Kontinuitat antisemitischer und rassistischer Vorurteile in Osterreich 
1945 1950'. Zeitgeschichte, 16, 1989, 5 (February), pp. 167-79. 
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speeches against the acceptance of Polish-Jewish refugees in Austria, it did not adversely 
affect his political career. In a speech on 16 April 1946 he had declared: ‘The Polish Jews 
should not come to Austria; we Austrians don’t need the others either! [...] Austrian 
industry should not fall into Jewish hands.’47 Kunschak had been a radical Catholic 
populist and antisemite long before 1938 and he had also been interned for seven years in a 
concentration camp as an anti-Nazi. He was, indeed, one of the founders of the Second 
Republic in 1945 and was even elected president of its National Assembly. Chancellor Figl 
excused him by saying that Kunschak was an economic, not a racial, antisemite, as if this 
somehow made his remarks acceptable. 
In the 1945-50 period it was already becoming evident that despite official lip-service to 
democratic ideals, there was no real Austrian willingness to confront the antisemitism of 
the man in the street, to acknowledge Austria’s own share in Nazi guilt or to encourage the 
Jews to return, let alone to pay restitution. On the contrary, the Austrian authorities often 
obstructed the return of Austrian Jews from abroad and refused them the status accorded to 
political victims of the Nazis. Moreover, they resisted Jewish claims to restore to their 
original owners property, homes and businesses which had been ‘aryanized’. Survivors 
often found themselves greeted with indifference, hostility and bureaucratic obtuseness.48 
By contrast, great efforts were made to integrate the former Nazis, the bulk of whom were 
amnestied in 1948 and who represented hundreds of thousands of potential voters for the 
major political parties. The Austrian Socialist Party (no less than its conservative rivals) 
was corrupted by this ‘eiectoralism’, renouncing any ethical principle in its bid for ex-Nazi 
votes. After 1949 they represented a sizeable part of the electorate — about one million 
voters in a population of seven million. 
The SPO had itself moved to the right after 1945, having decisively broken with its pre¬ 
war Austro-Marxist legacy. Its dominant figures were the Party Chairman, Adolf Scharf, 
the Minister of the Interior, Oskar Helmer and the President of the Republic, Karl Renner. 
When it came to matters concerning the ‘Jewish Question’, Helmer was the most 
influential of all the Socialist ministers. He blamed the old party leadership under Otto 
Bauer for the fiasco of the February 1934 workers’ rising and the resulting collapse of 
democracy in the First Republic. The radical line of Austro-Marxism, which he attributed 
to the preponderant role of Jewish intellectuals in the pre-war party, had in his opinion 
provoked the class enemy and dangerously strengthened Fascist tendencies in the Austrian 
middle classes. According to Helmer, the SPO before 1934 had been burdened by Jews 
(judisch belastet), who had simply been too numerous in the party leadership.49 This 
explains why (together with Scharf) he sought to dissuade Socialist functionaries of Jewish 
origin, like Deutsch, Ellenbogen, Breitner, Julius Braunthal or Otto Leichter, from 
returning after 194 5.50 The post-war Socialist leaders did not want to be saddled with a 
new ‘Jewish Question’.51 They were well aware that ever since the defeat of 1934 anti¬ 
intellectual and antisemitic sentiments had made headway in the rank and file of the 
47 Ibid., p. 168. See also Richard Mitten, ‘Die "Judenfrage” in Nachkriegsosterreich: Probleme 
der Forschung’, Zeitgeschichte, 19, 1992, 11-12 (November-December), pp. 356-67. 
48 See Ruth Beckermann, Unzugehorig: Osterreicher und Juden nach 1945, Vienna, 1989, for an 
account of this antisemitic atmosphere and the experience of growing up as a Jew or Jewess in 
post-war Vienna confronted by hostility and social isolation. 
49 Wilhelm Svoboda, ‘Politiker, Antisemit, Populist. Oskar Helmer und die Zweite Republik’, 
Das judische Echo, 39, 1990, 1 (October), pp. 42-51. 
50 Ibid., p. 43. See also J. Braunthal, The Tragedy of Austria, London, 1948, pp. 60. 
51 Robert Schwartz, “Antisemitism and Socialism in Austria 1918-62’ in Josef Fraenkel (ed.), The 
Jews of Austria, London, 1967, pp. 445—66. 
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socialist workers’ movement.52 Rather than fight against these trends, populists like 
Helmer nurtured or played on them, making antisemitically tinged remarks whenever it 
seemed expedient.53 In a cabinet meeting on 9 November 1948, Helmer echoed the 
common prejudice of many Austrians that Jews had too much influence in business and 
finance, that they engaged in dishonest practices and were ‘allergic’ to manual labour. 
Though there were only a few thousand native-born Jews left in Austria after the Shoah, he 
declared that ‘everywhere I can see only Jewish expansion, among the doctors and in 
commerce — especially in Vienna’.54 He pointedly stated that the Jews, too, would have 
‘to earn their living like everyone else in Austria’.55 Moreover, he added, since the English 
began fighting the Jews, the ‘atrocities of the Jews in the Palestine war have had an effect’ 
— one that would help the Austrian government, so he believed, further procrastinate in 
the negotiations over restitution. The Jews, Helmer concluded, would understand, when 
they ‘realize that a lot of people are opposed to them’.56 At the same time he echoed the 
views of conservative ministers that there could be no ‘special treatment’ for Jews; the 
Nazis, too, he reminded his colleagues, had everything taken away from them in 1945. 
After all, he observed, Nazi academics now found themselves working on building sites. 
Karl Renner also seemed to show considerably more sympathy for the Nazis than for the 
suffering Jewish victims of the Shoah — especially for the smaller fry who were ready to 
declare loyalty to the Austrian state. Even before de-Nazification had begun, he warned his 
cabinet colleagues against ‘doing the same as the Nazis did’ — namely taking revenge on 
those who had simply followed orders, with no idea that they were supporting a war of 
aggression. In a speech before officials of the new Austrian Administration on 30 April 
1945, he expressed the hope that the little Nazis ‘can all go peacefully back to their normal 
life and that they will be able to carry on quietly in their jobs’.57 It was not right, so Renner 
believed, to confiscate their property. At the same time Renner, with the help of a vague, 
generalized definition of ‘victims’, effectively played down Jewish persecution and 
opposed making a special law for the Jews which would neglect almost half the population 
— namely the Socialists whose property and assets as an organization had been 
confiscated by the ‘clerico-Fascist’ state in 1934. Renner’s comparison implied that the 
repression of the labour movement by ‘Austro-Fascism’ was somehow analogous to the 
mass murder of Jews by the Nazis. Worse still, it suggested that those who had been 
persecuted for ‘political’ reasons deserved priority over those who had suffered for merely 
‘racial’ reasons. Both these assumptions survived intact among most Social Democrats 
well into the Kreisky era. 
Renner’s indifference to Jewish suffering between 1938 and 1945 probably reflected his 
opportunism and latent German nationalism (he had welcomed Hitler’s Anschlufi) more 
than antisemitism per se,58 This was not the case with Helmer, who showed extreme 
coldness to Otto Leichter on his return to Vienna, never bothering to express condolences 
about his wife Kathe (a militant Jewish Socialist leader in her own right) who had been 
murdered in a concentration camp. Helmer made it plain to Leichter that emigre Jews 
would not be made welcome in Vienna. He also told Rosa Jochmann, a Socialist leader 
52 Ibid., pp. 450-53. 
53 Wilhelm Svoboda, Die Partei, Die Republik und der Mann mit den vielen Gesichtern: Oskar 
Helmer und Osterreich II. Eine Korrektur, Vienna, 1993. 
54 Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy’ (see note 44 above), p. 435. 
55 Ibid., p. 437. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Knight, leh bin dafiir (see note 19 above), p. 80. 
58 Anton Pelinka, 'Karl Renner - A Man for All Seasons’, Austrian History Yearbook., 23, 1992, 
pp. 111-19. 
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who had been in Ravensbriick, to stop talking about her experiences in the concentration 
camps as this would put voters off.59 Helmer’s desire to win over the anti-clerical pro-Nazi 
voters in the bourgeois camp and thereby to weaken the Austrian People’s Party (OVP — 
the post-war successor to the pre-war Christian Socials) was clearly a factor in his attitude. 
He made a point of cultivating the war veterans and behind the scenes he also contributed 
to the establishment of a third party in 1949, the League of Independents (Verband der 
Unabhangigen, VdU) which represented the ex-Nazis, German nationalists and some 
liberal malcontents. Its top officials had for the most part been members of the NSDAP 
and a few of them had even served short prison sentences after 1945. The chairman of this 
newly established political grouping, Herbert Kraus, called for compensation for the ex- 
Nazis, the abolition of de-Nazification laws and the rapid integration of the ‘ehemalige’ 
(that is, former members of the NSDAP) in Austrian society.60 He vigorously defended the 
rights of the ‘aryanizers’, of fallen and wounded Wehrmacht soldiers and even members of 
the SS who had ‘heroically’ defended Austria in what was allegedly a preventive and 
defensive war. The VdU stigmatized the de-Nazification law as if it were comparable to 
Nazi terror and injustice between 1938 and 1945.61 Allied internment camps were depicted 
(grotesquely) as if they were concentration camps. In other words the ex-Nazis were being 
martyred. In the March 1949 elections the VdU won fifteen seats in the Austrian 
parliament and, shortly after, pension rights for ex-Nazi civil servants were restored. 
Incredibly enough, influential voices were heard that echoed the views of the VdU, 
calling for the amnesty of war criminals. The Archbishop of Salzburg, Andreas Rohracher, 
warned that the anti-Nazi legislation was too harsh and would only create martyrs.62 Since 
1945, Karl Renner had spoken out against ostracizing the Nazis and in 1948 Helmer had 
argued that they had indeed suffered enough — a position endorsed by Chancellor Figl.63 
Conservatives and Socialists were already competing to win votes from the German 
national camp and former Nazis. This was a domestic situation that did not exist in post¬ 
war Germany. Moreover, it was one that was tacitly accepted by the Western Allies once 
the onset of the Cold War and fear of Soviet intentions in Austria became paramount, 
freezing any pressure for further de-Nazification. The Jewish community was far too 
small, fractured, lacking in leadership and devoid of economic, political or cultural 
influence to affect the new balance of forces. By the early 1950s they found themselves 
cold-shouldered as the ehemalige were integrated into positions of administrative, judicial, 
economic and executive power. In contrast to Germany, there was no countervailing 
‘philosemitic’ discourse, no official vocabulary of ‘reconciliation’ or ‘restitution’, no 
concept, as Adenauer once put it, that ‘there had to be recompense if we wished once more 
to gain respect and standing among the world’s nations’.64 What were the deeper reasons 
59 Svoboda, ‘Politiker, Antisemit, Populist’, pp. 47ff. 
60 See Feingold (ed.), Ein ewiges Dennoch, pp. 344-49. Kraus targeted the so-called 4NS-Gesetz’, 
the ostensibly draconian de-Nazification law which ‘ostracized’ the Nazis and could take away 
their property or apartments. Originally, the law distinguished between 42,000 incriminated 
Nazis (belasteten) and about 500,000 ‘less incriminated’ (minderbelasteten) persons, who were 
amnestied and re-enfranchized after 1948. See also Brigitte Bailer, ‘Gleiches Recht fur alle? 
Die Behandlung von Opfem und Tatem des Nationalsozialismus durch die Republik 
Osterreich’ in Steiniger (ed.), Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust, pp. 183-97. 
61 Knight, Ich bin dafiir, pp. 50ff. 
62 See the chapter by Gert Kerschbaumer in Feingold (ed.), Ein ewiges Dennoch, p. 339. 
63 Knight, Ich bin dafur, p. 197. 
64 Deutschland-Berichte, 1/2, January 1966. On the German case, see Frank Stem, 
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for this Austrian intransigence over the issue of Wiedergutmachung and compensation for 
Jewish survivors and victims of the Shoah? Why were the negotiations so protracted, the 
results so paltry and the bad feeling so persistent? Furthermore, what was the connection 
between these material issues and the legacy of the Shoah in Austria? 
The history of the restitution negotiation cannot be recounted here except in so far as it 
directly affected post-war Austria’s attitude to the Jews and its own Nazi past.65 But at the 
root of Austria’s official post-1945 position on compensation for Jews lay the assumption 
that it had been the ‘first victim’ of Nazism — a claim that had been enshrined in the 1943 
Moscow declaration of the Allies. This was something like a founding document in 
Austrian eyes for its post-war juridical independence and a powerful incentive for its 
forswearing of all political and ideological ties to Germany. A revealing personal account 
of this Austrian distancing from Germany can be found in the reminiscences of George 
Clare, bom into a Viennese Jewish family (that had fled from Austria in 1938), who was a 
British officer stationed in Berlin in 1947. He visited Vienna in that year and was struck by 
Austrians’ determination to differentiate themselves from the Germans at all costs. The 
Hitler years had suddenly disappeared as if into a black hole. Tyrolean and Styrian peasant 
hats now sprouted everywhere in place of the brown or black caps of the SA and SS. 
Instead of Hochdeutsch one heard only the inimitable Viennese dialect. Weg vom Reich 
(Away from the Reich!) had replaced the old Nazi cry of Heim ins Reich (Back home into 
the Reich!), so popular at the time of the Anschlufi. Clare detested the ‘inexhaustible self- 
pity in defeat’ of both the Germans and Austrians now posing as a nation of victims rather 
than executioners bearing the mark of Cain. But he acknowledged that the Germans were 
slowly becoming aware of their responsibility for their national past. Not so the Austrians, 
who were busy filling the hollow void of 1945 with an inflated local patriotism that 
disclaimed all connection with things German and pretended to a lamb-like innocence 
concerning the Third Reich.66 Clare also noted that in Austria (unlike Germany) the Allies 
restricted themselves to a purely supervisory role and de-Nazification did not figure so 
prominently in their policy.67 
The Western Allies not only tended to accept the proposition that the Austrians had been 
raped by Hitler but by early 1947 they were rapidly losing interest in de-Nazification as a 
policy goal.68 The onset of the Cold War and its accompanying viscerally anti-Communist 
Adenauer’s record on restitution was very creditable, this was not the case with the pursuit of 
Nazi criminals in the post-war German law courts during the years of his holding office. 
65 The subject was covered in 1967 by Gustav Jelinek, ‘Die Geschichte der osterreichischen 
Wiedergutmachung’ in Fraenkel (ed.). The Jews of Austria, pp. 395—426, and more recently by 
Albert Stemfeld, Betrifft: Osterreich, Vienna, 1990, and Knight, ‘Restitution and Legitimacy’, 
pp. 413 42. See also Brigitte Bailer, Wiedergutmachung Kein Thema. Osterreich und die Opfer 
des Nationalsoziahsmus, Vienna, 1993. After nine years of negotiation, the Austrian 
government settled in 1962 on $22 million for Jewish survivors. This did not cover loss of 
income, promotion prospects, educational opportunities, or illnesses induced by the persecutors 
let alone compensation for the 65,000 Jewish lives that were extinguished. It compares 
unfavourably with the $822 million agreed to by the West Germans, not counting the $52 
billion Bonn had given to Israel by 1990. See Bruce Pauley, ‘Austria’ in D. Wyman (ed.), The 
World Reacts to the Holocaust, Baltimore, MD and London, 1996, pp. 496-97. 
66 George Clare, Berlin Days 1946—1947, London, 1989, p. 210, and his contribution ‘Last Waltz 
in Vienna. A Postscript in Oxaal, Poliak and Botz (eds), Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in 
Vienna, p. 235. 
67 On de-Nazification in Austria, see Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley and Oliver Rathkolb 
(eds), Verdrangte Schuld, Verfehlte Siihne. Entnazifizierung in Osterreich 1945-1955, Vienna, 
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ideology meant, too, that the issue of compensation for Jewish victims began to be pushed 
into the background. The Allies believed it would be counterproductive to dwell on 
Austria’s Nazi and antisemitic past at a time when Soviet Communism was rapidly 
engulfing neighbouring countries in East Central Europe. This in turn enabled the 
Austrians to use their geopolitical position as a Western bulwark against the USSR to 
reject any claims arising from their complicity in Nazi policy.69 Moreover, in order to 
resist Soviet claims on German property in Austria, it was vital to the Austrians to 
emphasize the general coercion of the Anschlufl.10 Since neither America nor Great Britain 
wanted to offer ammunition to the Soviets on this issue they went along with Austrian 
arguments. Some Austrian foreign ministry bureaucrats were none the less concerned that 
the Jews might mobilize international opinion against Austria. A memo from the State 
Chancellery for Foreign Affairs, in 1945, commented: 
The Jews play a big role in world foreign policy, firstly because they control a large part of 
the press through which they exert their influence on world public opinion, and secondly 
because they have managed to induce the governments of other countries to champion their 
claims. In this the Jews have succeeded more easily as international finance capital is largely 
in Jewish hands. Among pro-Jewish governments are, above all, the British and American 
governments [...]. It is not for nothing that Jewry has been described as the fifth world power 
against whose opposition Hitlerite Germany was destroyed.71 
Since the Austrian government required Allied support for the State Treaty, these officials 
advised that Jewry be formally placated on the international front. At the same time 
government ministers in private discussions clearly resented any American or Jewish 
pressures on restitution matters as an ‘outrageous’ intervention in internal Austrian affairs 
and an unacceptable Diktat from abroad. 
From the late 1940s, negotiations with the Austrian government had in practice been 
conducted by international Jewish organizations (particularly the World Jewish Congress, 
WJC) on behalf of Austrian Jewry. Since the protracted dealings revolved around such 
emotive issues as money and blood, the revival of antisemitic stereotypes about greedy 
(and vengeful) Jews were not slow to emerge. Complaints by WJC officials about the 
delays over Wiedergutmachung were responded to in Austria with warnings about the 
dangers of reviving ‘open antisemitism and anti-Americanism’.72 On the American Jewish 
side there were some calls at the end of 1953 for an economic boycott of Austria; at the 
same time the press and some politicians in Austria began to raise the bogey of das 
Weltjudentum. These recriminations coincided with the beginning of negotiations in June 
1953 over the issue of ‘heirless property’ (das erblose Vermogen) — a process into which 
Austria had only grudgingly entered under British and American pressure. The Austrians 
made it plain, however, throughout these and later negotiations that they were not engaged 
in Wiedergutmachung but only in ‘aid for the politically persecuted’, in humanitarian 
‘relief’ or ‘donations of honour’ of a charitable character.73 They were discharging a 
‘moral’ but not a legal responsibility to aid those who had suffered. There was no question 
69 Knight, ‘Restitution and Legitimacy’, p. 427. 
70 Ibid., p. 424. 
71 Quoted in ibid., pp. 421-22. 
72 Embacher, Neubeginn ohne Illusionen (see note 40 above), p. 148. One is struck by the 
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of admitting Austrian responsibility for crimes that they persisted in claiming they had not 
committed.74 
The post-war Austrians in their great majority clearly defined themselves as the victims 
of German Nazi rule between 1938 and 194 5.75 Had they not suffered bombing raids, 
hunger, destruction of life, POWs in Russian captivity, numerous war-widows and all the 
other ravages of war? Even though they honoured the fallen Austrian soldiers of the 
Wehrmacht with war memorials as ‘defenders of the fatherland’ who had ‘fulfilled their 
duty’ and still spoke of the Tost war’, most Austrians clung to their constructed image as 
victims of Nazi Germany, without even perceiving the anomaly. 
Between 1945 and 1966, Austria was governed by a Grand Coalition of the OVP and the 
Socialists — a situation which had no parallel in Germany and contributed much both to 
national and political stability. But with regard to the ‘Jewish Question’ one can also 
clearly see the deadening effect of the Grand Coalition in encouraging a cosy, expedient 
consensus based on the Lebensluge (life-lie) of Austrian victimhood. Both main parties 
had developed a vested interest in repressing the history of antisemitism in Austria, the 
Austrian role in Nazism and the fate of the Jews, whose presence whether as DPs, 
survivors or returning refugees remained a potential embarrassment. Under the mantle of 
‘equal treatment’ and opposition to ‘privilege’, conservative and Socialist ministers in 
effect equated the victims with their persecutors. Thus the interior minister, Oskar Helmer, 
rejected, for example, giving even a modest financial advance to the needy Vienna 
Kultusgemeinde because in his view a separate Jewish community would perpetuate 
‘distinctions’ that had to be avoided. After disturbances at a concentration-camp ceremony, 
the same Socialist interior minister declared in May 1949 that ‘a concentration camp 
survivor should not be treated with kid gloves if he breaks the law’.76 Such examples can 
be multiplied in post-war Austria. It now appeared that returning Wehrmacht soldiers and 
‘homecomers’ (Heimkehrer) from the Soviet Union were genuine martyrs but Jews who 
survived the Shoah had to step to the back of the queue. As Robert Knight has acutely put 
it, Jews were potentially subversive for the new Austria because they were ‘rivals’ who 
had ‘a better claim to victimhood, and [were] furthermore victims of the non-Jewish 
Austrian population itself’.77 
Jewish claims for compensation and restitution were often portrayed in the Austrian 
press as threatening and fraudulent. Their experiences during the Shoah were trivialized by 
being presented as similar to those of non-Jews under the so-called Austro-Fascist regime 
or even compared to the tribulations of ex-Nazis after the war. The deep-seated, genuine 
resentment of Socialists at their repression under the authoritarian Standestaat and the 
legacy of Catholic antisemitism among Austrian conservatives seem to have exhausted the 
capacity of either political camp to feel any compassion for the Jewish victims of the 
Nazis. 
Regular acquittals at war crimes trials and the hostile atmosphere in which they were 
enveloped was another important consequence of the Austrian political and educational 
failure to fight Jew-hatred without compromise.78 The prosecutions of war criminals 
74 Ernst Kolb (later OVP Minister of Trade) explained as early as 1946: ‘Osterreich habe nichts 
gutzumachen, weil es nichts verbrochen habe' (Austria has nothing to recompense because it 
has committed no crime). See Knight, Ich bin dafiir, p. 44. 
75 A. Pelinka, Windstille. Klagen iiber Osterreich, Vienna and Munich, 1985, p. 36. 
76 Knight ‘“Neutrality” not Sympathy’ (see note 45 above), pp. 222-23 
77 Ibid., p. 226. 
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(unlike in Germany) were woefully understaffed; the judicial system was unable to cope 
and the presence of so many former Nazis on juries hardly ensured justice. But most 
Austrians in any case wanted an end to these court cases. There was a general desire to 
play down the magnitude of Nazi crimes, to heal old wounds and to wipe the slate clean. 
Hence the single-minded pursuit of Nazi war-criminals by Simon Wiesenthal, working in 
almost complete isolation out of a small office in Vienna, was almost bound to arouse 
intense antagonism in Austria during the 1960s and 1970s. At that time he reminded 
Austrians of everything they wanted to forget.79 
For Jews in Austria, lacking representation in parliament, in the state or in municipal 
bodies, let alone in the political parties or government, the struggle for legitimacy and 
acceptance was inevitably an uphill endeavour.80 Attempts to recover their ‘aryanized’ 
apartments, houses and businesses were usually rebuffed, since the authorities felt that any 
concessions might undermine their own official claim that Austria was the ‘first victim’ of 
the Nazis. Nor was the Jewish community aided by the fact that Israel, driven by its own 
reasons of state, did not pressure Austria for Wiedergutmachung or contest the official 
Austrian position in the 1950s and 1960s.81 
Jewish communal leaders were therefore caught in a bind, since their own well-being 
essentially depended on good connections with the authorities. Yet successive chancellors 
like Figl and Julius Raab or the foreign minister, Karl Gruber (who had all been ‘politically 
persecuted’ before 1945), invariably trivialized the Shoah by comparing it to their own 
relatively benign experiences under detention.82 
In the 1960s, a similar insensitivity was shown by other leading Austrian politicians such 
as Alfons Gorbach (who was also elected Federal Chancellor) and labour leader Franz 
Olah (who slid into openly antisemitic statements in the 1966 electoral campaign); and it 
would be repeated by Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s as well as by Kurt Waldheim in the 
1980s.83 The members of the Kultusgemeinde were well aware that they were being cold- 
shouldered and regarded with suspicion, whether they were survivors or returning emigres. 
They had long since discovered that in post-war Austria ‘nur rassisch verfolgf (persecuted 
only for racial reasons) was a category that excluded one from important networks like the 
KZ Verband (the Concentration Camp Association); for example, there was no memorial 
in the Mauthausen concentration camp for Jewish victims, although they were the largest 
single group.84 Similarly, when Jews returned from Soviet captivity they were either 
ignored or told they had no right to special treatment, while Austrian soldiers who had 
served in the Wehrmacht on the Russian Front were received back home with music, 
flowers and speeches which honoured their ‘sacrifice’ in the fight against Bolshevism. 
It was as part of this same pattern of discrimination under the cover of ‘equal treatment’ 
that the Austrian government permitted some ‘aryanizers’ to regain their property (lost 
under de-Nazification) before Austrian Jews were compensated. Similarly, the government 
restricted Jewish rights of inheritance from ‘heirless property’, but used the hinds raised 
from the sale of such property, which had been overwhelmingly Jewish, to compensate 
of the murder of Jews in Stanislawow. On this topic, see Simon Wiesenthal, Justice Not 
Vengeance, London, 1989. 
79 Hella Pick, Simon Wiesenthal. A Life in Search of Justice, London, 1996, p. 61. 
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political victims of National Socialism.85 At the same time the authorities did not properly 
ensure that sequestered Jewish wealth was returned to its original owners or that former 
‘aryanizers’ would be obliged to restore buildings, apartments, businesses and valuables to 
their lawful proprietors. Above all, the Austrian government saw no need to express any 
feelings of guilt or contrition in any of its discussions with Jewish leaders over 
restitution.86 True, in the 1960s there were some further modest payments and settlement 
of claims, mainly over real estate, but the haggling had been drawn out for so long and the 
final results were so meagre that there was little if any cathartic or educational value in the 
exercise. 
Worse still, repression of the Nazi past had made the struggle against antisemitic 
prejudice more difficult. Although after 1945 antisemitism was officially taboo in Austria 
(as in Germany), it had never, as we have seen, actually disappeared. Though it was no 
longer a state doctrine, a party political programme or a plausible response to social and 
economic competition with Jews (in 1945 Viennese Jews were after all a mere 0.1 per cent 
of the population), its grip on the popular imagination remained alive. Compared to the 
inter-war period, when Jews represented 10 per cent of Vienna’s population, this was 
almost an ‘antisemitism without Jews’.87 With the loss of its political function as a 
demagogic weapon in social struggles (as a result of the Shoah) it had also become — 
according to Bemd Marin — an ‘antisemitism without antisemites’.88 This theory has its 
weaknesses, especially in the light of the Waldheim Affair (which emerged just after it had 
been formulated) but it does highlight a striking ambiguity in most varieties of post-Shoah 
antisemitism, namely the refusal of so many contemporary antisemites to acknowledge 
their secret vice. In the case of Austria, this masquerade is connected with the deeper 
problem that its new post-war national identity was partly constructed around the denial of 
any complicity in the Shoah. This collective amnesia that had marked the first twenty-five 
years of the Second Republic was the Lebensluge that was deemed necessary to achieve 
legitimacy in their own eyes.89 
The Jews had to be blacked out from the Austrian myth of victimhood which focused on 
what ‘others’ had done to ‘us Austrians’ (for example, the Germans, the Russians, the 
Western Allies and World Jewry) and not on what ‘we Austrians’ did to ‘others’ — 
particularly (though not exclusively) Jews. This collective repression was transparent in 
the encounter with the DPs between 1945 and 1950. The prevailing image of the Jewish 
DP did not arouse compassion for the survivors of the Shoah but was instead elided into 
older xenophobic stereotypes of the ‘parasitic’, ‘criminal’, ‘provocative’ and ‘greasy’ 
foreign Jew feeding off the fat of the land.90 Then, in the 1950s the issue of restitution 
raised the spectre of a powerful, international Jewry threatening Austria, particularly in an 
alliance with the United States — an image that would revive with even greater force 
85 Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy’, p. 435. 
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during the Waldheim Affair.91 During the first decade in post-Shoah Austria the roles of 
perpetrator and victim were already being equalized and in subsequent years they would 
even be reversed. 
91 See Richard Mitten, The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice. The Waldheim Phenomenon in 
Austria, Boulder, CO, 1992, pp. 208ff, on the World Jewish Congress as the focus of an 
antisemitic Feindbild (image of the enemy), standing at the head of an international campaign 
against Waldheim and Austria. 
4 Jews and Poles on the Barricades of Warsaw: 
Two Polish Plays on the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising 
Halina Filipowicz 
I 
‘There are two topics that one still cannot discuss without becoming caught up in 
complications: Polish-Jewish relations and the 1944 Warsaw uprising’, remarked Andrzej 
Krzysztof Kunert during a discussion held on 13 March 1997 at the Maly Theatre in 
Warsaw.1 The discussion, which took place during the launch of an expanded edition of 
Tomasz Lubienski’s Bic si% czy nie bic (To Fight or Not to Fight, 1996), raised 
fundamental questions about cultural mechanisms that generate mistaken assumptions and 
reinforce misrepresentation. It promoted an exploration of the relation of cultural 
mythology to national identity and patriotic morality. Above all, it made clear that the 
Warsaw uprising of 1944 continues to be a focus of lively debate. 
The discussion, however, revealed predictable blind spots.2 Except for a brief comment 
by Malgorzata Szpakowska, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943 went virtually 
unmentioned. The participants spoke only of ‘our uprisings’,3 even though the dilemma 
embodied in the title of Lubienski’s book resonates also in the writing about the ghetto 
uprising. The omission of this uprising from the discussion of culturally dominant 
assumptions about tragic heroism reinforced the stereotype — ‘everyone knows that Jews 
didn’t fight’ — and thus promoted the othering of the Shoah. It also revealed 
contradictions in the cultural construct of the Polish experience of history. In this chapter, 
my primary conceptual concern is the extent to which culture gives shelter to naive 
illusions of acceptance that translate into repressive social practices. 
I examine here the cultural contradictions that place extraordinary pressures on attempts 
to represent the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in Polish drama. In discussing Stefania 
Zahorska’s Smocza 13 (13 Smocza Street, 1944) and Stefan Otwinowski’s Wielkanoc 
(Easter, 1946),4 I consider representations of the ghetto uprising of 1943 as the site where 
the vexed problem of Polish-Jewish relations and the tropes of the Polish insurgent 
tradition intersect, and thus compound their attendant complications. I analyse the slippage 
I am grateful to Jadwiga Maurer for encouragement and advice, and to Alvin Goldfarb, Anna 
Malecka, Robert Skloot and Anna Zacharska for generous help in my research for this chapter. 
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of cultural spaces, of ‘insides’ and ‘outsides’, in Zahorska’s and Otwinowski’s plays. In 
pursuing these concerns, I focus on the ghetto wall as a paradigm of liminality. ‘And what 
is liminality’ — ‘the space that both separates and joins spaces: the essence of in¬ 
betweenness?’5 In this chapter, then, I take into account an elaborately interlocking system 
of ambiguities that is built into the concepts of ‘inside’, ‘outside’ and ‘becoming one’ as 
they are negotiated in Smocza 13 and Wielkanoc. 
The two plays are among the earliest attempts in any language to represent the Shoah on 
stage.6 Ready in draft by the autumn of 1943, they can be seen as endeavours to enact a 
theatrical rite of remembrance only months after the ghetto uprising (19 April-10 May) 
had been crushed.7 This immediately raises the issue of historical accuracy in Shoah 
writing. Zahorska and Otwinowski do not falsify, sensationalize or trivialize historical 
record, but they do put the past to their own purposes. They draw on a concept of history 
not only as fact but also as time and as myth. Does this diminish the ‘intellectual validity’ 
of Smocza 13 and Wielkanoc as Shoah drama?8 In more general terms, does a play which 
fails the test of historical accuracy somehow betray the Shoah? 
No other historical event of the twentieth century has forced upon artists a moral 
obligation of the kind that the Shoah has. Critics like Lawrence L. Langer have provided a 
theoretical foundation for the radical questioning of the adequacy of art in the face of the 
Shoah. As Langer puts it, ‘How should art — how can art — represent the inexpressibly 
inhuman suffering of the victims, without doing an injustice to that suffering?’9 Historical 
accuracy seems to be at odds with aesthetic pleasure. But what is the ‘authentic’ historical 
record of the Shoah? ‘Does history lie in the details of train schedules and the calorie count 
of the ghetto diet? Or is it the shape of the Holocaust experience, brimming with atrocity 
and unexplainable mystery?’10 Our knowledge and understanding of facts, moreover, 
depend on their representation — by participants, by witnesses, and ultimately by 
historians.* 11 
5 Richard Schechner, Between Theater and Anthropology, Philadelphia, PA, 1985, p. 295. 
6 Between 1943 and 1949 approximately a dozen plays were written about the systematic mass 
murder of the Jews (see Alvin Goldfarb, 'Select Bibliography of Holocaust Plays, 1933-1997’ 
in Claude Schumacher [ed.]. Staging the Holocaust: The Shoah in Drama and Performance, 
Cambridge, 1998, pp. 298-334). Four deal with the Warsaw ghetto uprising: Morton 
Wishengrad’s The Battle of the Warsaw Ghetto (1943), H. Leivick’s Miracle of the Warsaw 
Ghetto (1944), and Zahorska’s and Otwinowski’s plays. A discussion of Wishengrad’s play can 
be found in Alvin Goldfarb, ‘The Holocaust on the Air: The Radio Plays of the Writers’ War 
Board’, The Journal of American Drama and Theatre, 2, 1996, pp. 48-58. 
7 For accounts of the ghetto uprising, see especially Reuben Ainsztein, The Warsaw Ghetto 
Revolt, New York, 1979, and Israel Gutman, Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, Boston, 
MA, 1994. 
8 See Edward R. Isser, Stages of Annihilation: Theatrical Representations of the Holocaust, 
Madison, NJ, 1997, p. 14. 
9 Lawrence L. Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination, New Haven, CT, 1975, p. 1; 
Langer’s italics. 
10 Robert Skloot’s review of Isser’s Stages of Annihilation (see note 8), in Shofar: An 
Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies, 4, 1999, p. 141. 
11 This idea underlies the conceptual framework of James E. Young’s Writing and Rewriting the 
Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation, Bloomington, IN, 1990. Michael 
Andre Bernstein pushes this argument further, pointing out that ‘one of the most pervasive 
myths of our era, a myth perhaps even partially arising out of our collective response to the 
horrors of the concentration camps, is the absolute authority given to first-person testimony. 
Such narratives [...] are habitually regarded as though they were completely unmediated, as 
though language, gesture, and imagery could become transparent if the experience being 
expressed is sufficiently horrific’. Michael Andre Bernstein, Foregone Conclusions: Against 
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Representing the Shoah on stage is fraught with additional problems which are different 
from those presented by fiction, poetry, or film because theatre has an immediacy which 
the other forms lack. No other representation of the Shoah raises the issue of aestheticized 
violence more persistently than the dramatic. Performative enactments of the Shoah can be 
seen as opening the question of the relation between disinterested contemplation and what 
Barbara Johnson calls ‘the dynamics of connectedness’.12 They present us, directly, with 
‘horrible images, painful truths, excruciating losses. Do we just sit back and watch? What 
is the nature of our pleasure in contemplating trauma?’13 
On the one hand, there is something ethically disturbing about putting the Shoah on 
theatrical display.14 On the other hand, if the reality of Shoah suffering constitutes 
something like an ‘ultimate limit’, where words fail to do justice to that suffering, then 
theatre, which can ‘show’ silence, is uniquely qualified to give ‘voice’ to the ineffability of 
the Shoah and thus to transmit historical memory. As Heiner Muller has observed, ‘the 
basic thing in theatre is silence. Theater can work without words, but it cannot work 
without silence’.15 Thus, while the corporeality of theatre may weigh drama down and 
eventually lock its potential in the minute details of everyday reality, it is also possible that 
in performative enactments one can say ‘in things’ what cannot be said in words. While the 
other art forms allow a stable distance between object and audience and hence a greater 
possibility for emotional detachment, in theatre everything conspires, so to speak, to resist 
withdrawal from involvement. A performance, like a ritual, makes the past come alive, 
again and again. And like a ritual, it turns the past into a palpable part of the present, of the 
here and now in which we live. 
II 
Though the Shoah has been an enduring theme of Polish fiction and poetry,16 it has only 
sporadically been a theme of Polish drama. In the cultural territory defined by the events 
of 1944^19 in Poland, Smocza 13 and Wielkanoc stand out as the only plays on the 
annihilation of the Jews.17 In dealing with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, both treat a topic 
which subsequent Polish playwrights have rarely addressed.18 Critics have written little 
about Smocza 13 and Wielkanoc, ostensibly on the grounds that they are concerned only 
Apocalyptic History, Berkeley, CA, 1994, p. 47. For a different view, see Henryk Grynberg, 
'Holocaust w literaturze polskiej' in his Prawda nieartystyczna, Warsaw, 1994, pp. 139-79. 
12 Barbara Johnson, ‘“Aesthetic” and “Rapport” in Toni Morrison’s Sula\ Textual Practice, 7, 
1993, p. 170. 
13 Ibid., p. 171. 
14 On this issue, see Vivian M. Patraka, Spectacular Suffering: Theatre, Fascism, and the 
Holocaust, Bloomington, IN, 1999. 
15 Arthur Holmberg, ‘A Conversation with Robert Wilson and Heiner Muller’, Modern Drama, 
31, 1988, p. 458. 
16 For critical surveys, see Natan Gross, Poeci i Szoa: Obraz Zaglady Zydow w poezji polskiej, 
Sosnowiec, 1993; Irena Maciejewska’s Introduction to the volume edited by her, M^czehstwo i 
zaglada Zydow w zapisach literatury polskiej, Warsaw, 1988, pp. 5-33; Jozef Wrobel, Tematy 
zydowskie w prozie polskiej 1939-1987, Cracow, 1991. 
17 Jerzy Zawieyski’s Mqz doskonafy (1945), which draws on the story of Job, has been said to 
concern the Shoah (see Maciejewska, Introduction to Mgczehstwo i zaglada Zydow, p. 33). 
Because the play is allegorical, however; one cannot be certain whether it represents the Shoah 
or the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. 
18 Hanna Krall’s Zdqzyc przed Panem Bogiem (1980) and Jacek S. Buras’s Gwiazda za murem 
(1988) are the only other plays on the topic. Krall’s drama was based on her interviews with 
one ol the leaders ot the ghetto uprising, Marek Edelman. It was translated into English as To 
Steal a March on God by Jadwiga Kosicka (Amsterdam, 1996). 
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with literary excellence.19 They have taken little account of the extent to which these plays 
perform a crucial intervention in Polish discourse about the Shoah.20 
Smocza 13 was written and published in London, Wielkanoc in Poland. They offer two 
perspectives on the ghetto uprising: one by a Polish-Jewish female writer who had arrived 
in England in 1940 as a refugee, the other by a non-Jewish male writer who spent the war 
in Poland. Whereas Otwinowski writes as an ‘insider’, Zahorska is doubly removed from 
her subject matter, both as a refugee and as an assimilated Jewess. To be sure, the role of 
the ‘wailing woman’, a strongly inscribed cultural position, is available to her.21 At the 
same time, precisely because of her ‘outsideness’, Zahorska’s rendering of the story of the 
ghetto uprising might seem less ‘accurate’ and hence less reliable. While Wielkanoc is 
explicitly based on eye-witness testimony, Smocza 13 is not.22 
Wielkanoc and Smocza 13 cover much common ground: the ambivalent and often uneasy 
relations between Jews and Poles; the determination of the ghetto insurgents. Both fail to 
portray Germans, who are thus rendered invisible.23 Both succeed in capturing a mood of 
feverish expectation and heightened awareness as the Nazi terror intensifies. Wielkanoc is 
strongest in its depiction of a variety of character types, including philosemitic and 
antisemitic Poles. It leaves us with an image of compassionate behaviour and positive 
action under abominable circumstances, but it does so through a cliched love plot, 
colourful simplifications and verbose explanations. While Wielkanoc relies on possibly 
over-conventional dramatic devices, Zahorska’s austere play dispenses almost entirely 
with a sequential plot. The effectiveness of Smocza 13 depends as much on the abrupt 
shifts of action as on the sparing use of language. Zahorska creates a seemingly random 
dialogue of truncated sentences and contradictory phrases which anticipates experimental 
drama of the 1950s and 1960s. In short, her play breaks out of the established mould. Even 
on the stylistic level, Zahorska’s play forces the audience out of comfortable assumptions 
that they can understand. This play undermines such arrogance. 
Smocza 13 tells the Jewish side of the story of the ghetto uprising, Wielkanoc, the non- 
Jewish side. Smocza 13 focuses on the common people; Wielkanoc presents characters 
drawn from the intellectual elite. In Smocza 13, the suffering and violence are so 
thoroughly woven into the fabric of the text that they mark even the quietest moments; in 
Wielkanoc, in spite of some inconvenience, characters seem to go about their daily 
business unaffected by the war. Smocza 13 allows the audience to become involved in the 
precarious routine of the struggle for survival in the Warsaw ghetto; the underground 
resistance seems peripheral to the action. In contrast, Wielkanoc brings into focus the 
resistance that took place in provincial ghettos. It does so from outside: the non-Jewish 
Polish community in a small town near Warsaw. Though the entire action takes place 
19 See, for example, Maciejewska’s Introduction to Mgczehstwo i zaglada Zydow, p. 33, and 
Andrzej Wanat, “'Czy pieklo nadaje si$ do eksploatacji?’”, Teatr, 3, 1990, p. 10. Wanat claims 
that neither play can be called even artistically competent. 
20 Wielkanoc was briefly discussed in a debate on Polish antisemitism, published in the weekly 
Odrodzenie over several months in 1945 and 1946. See Tadeusz Breza, 4 Wielkanoc Stefana 
Otwinowskiego’, Odrodzenie, 19, 1946, p. 10. 
21 According to Lidia Ciotkosz, Zahorska wrote Smocza 13 as an expression of her pain at Samuel 
Zygelboim’s suicide in London on 12 May 1943. By his suicide he sought to draw the Western 
public’s attention to the plight of the Jews. See Maja Elzbieta Cybulska, Potwierdzone 
istnienie: Archiwum Stefanii Zahorskiej, London, 1988, p. 124. 
22 In his Preface, Otwinowski explains: The liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto was my most 
devastating experience during the war’. Stefan Otwinowski, Wielkanoc: Dramat w trzech 
aktach z prologiem, Cracow, 1946, p. 17. 
23 The only exception is the brief appearance of unindividualized German soldiers in the Prologue 
to Smocza 13. 
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outside ghetto walls, it repeatedly points us towards an off-stage reality, towards events in 
the local ghetto and in the Warsaw ghetto. These events are withheld from our eyes but not 
from our awareness. Through the conventional devices of eye-witness accounts, second¬ 
hand reports, and stage effects, a continuous flow of information comes from both ghettos. 
The essential difference between Otwinowski’s and Zahorska’s plays is evident in their 
titles. Otwinowski highlights the date of a Christian feast, Zahorska, a street in the Warsaw 
ghetto. In April 1943, the celebration of Holy Week did indeed coincide with the outbreak 
of the ghetto uprising.24 Otwinowski seizes the liminal moment of the Resurrection to 
draw on metaphors of awakening and rebirth and thus to imagine a new world order in an 
unspecified future. While Otwinowski emphasizes time, Zahorska focuses on place. The 
block of flats at 13 Smocza Street serves as a centre of political activity in the ghetto. 
However, we become only gradually aware that the daily routine we see on stage is a 
palimpsest of the underground resistance. In Act 1, for example, we wonder why Basia 
seems to steal Mrs Rotman’s coal hod only to return it a few scenes later. One might even 
conclude that Zahorska’s drama of vague premonitions and fearful expectation is not about 
the ghetto resistance at all, but about psychological responses to impending doom. In Act 
2, we discover that Basia is involved in a clandestine organization and that she uses the 
hod to transport an illegal radio. By Act 3, we realize that while we have focused our 
attention on the prosaic, ‘unheroic’ details of daily life in an overcrowded flat, we have 
been witnesses to preparations for the uprising. 
As the scenes with the coal hod suggest, Zahorska’s play disturbs any schematic 
opposition of fighters and non-fighters, militancy and everyday life. On the one hand, the 
underground activities are not represented as inherently heroic and hence superior to the 
struggle for survival; they are inseparable from the everyday. On the other hand, everyone, 
even those who do not have the courage to take up arms, is implicated in the resistance by 
the very fact of living in a building that houses an illegal printing press. Is it possible, then, 
that heroism is neither romantic nor particularly manly, and that it is simply banal, 
unpredictable, and unconnected to ideology? 
In the public discussion of Lubienski’s Bic siq czy nie bic, Szpakowska insisted that ‘a 
decision to start an insurrection can be justified only in two situations’. First, when there is 
at least a reasonable chance of winning, and all the risks have been carefully weighed up. 
That is, when ‘an insurrection may fail, but is not doomed from the beginning’. Secondly, 
when ‘everything has been lost, and it does not matter one way or the other; then one can 
afford to make a tragic gesture’.25 For Szpakowska, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was just 
such a gesture. It is evident, however, that she meant the word ‘tragic’ in its colloquial 
sense. Indeed, from the perspective of ‘normal’ times, the ghetto uprising might seem to 
have been an action of suicidal despair. For Zahorska and Otwinowski, however, the 
uprising is not an act of self-destruction whose terms are dictated by the victimizes but the 
only way for the victims to control what is still theirs: the terms of their death.26 To the 
ghetto insurgents, pace Szpakowska, it does ‘matter one way or the other’. It matters how 
24 Moreover, Holy Week coincided with Passover. The fact that the play refers only to Easter, and 
not to Passover, emphasizes that its perspective is Christian. 
25 Malgorzata Szpakowska, ‘Rozmowy: Bitwy i koszty’, Dialog, 8, 1997, p. 88. 
26 One remembers Przybos s statement that the Nazis attempted ‘to erase not only ethics, reason, 
and law, but also the last vestiges of humanness [...]. They sought to render the death of the 
murdered Jews meaningless. They sought to deny its proper name’. Julian Przybos, untitled 
piece reprinted in Maciejewska’s anthology, Mqczenstwo i zagiada Zydow. p. 38. 
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they will die. In emphasizing the choice the characters can make, Smocza 13 and 
Wielkanoc foreground the tragic heroism of ghetto resistance.27 
In both plays, characters are caught in a moment when they must perform deeds with 
enormous ethical implications. The seemingly straightforward action of Smocza 13 
advances through a series of discontinuous scenes in which the ghetto-dwellers have to 
deal with the intimation of impending annihilation. They respond with conflicting 
emotions: denial, hope, fear, despair, resignation. Some cling to an illusion that they might 
purchase a deferral of doom and thus preserve their lives if they sacrifice one of their own. 
Others attempt to transcend suffering and to summon Jewish messianic hope as a source of 
strength. Birenzweig articulates the passive submission of most when he insists that ‘Jews 
have to accept everything’.28 Basia contradicts him: ‘That’s not true! One can die without 
being debased’.29 Later, Maty echoes her words: ‘It’s not a question of whether they’ll die 
but how they’ll die’.30 In the final moments of Act 3, as the rounding-up for a deportation 
continues off-stage, many characters become reluctant resisters. They barricade themselves 
in the flat even though they have only one revolver between them. They are defenceless, 
but not powerless. They assert their power by controlling the way they will die: on the 
degrading terms imposed by the Germans, or on their own terms. 
Zahorska’s play, however, has a twist in the Epilogue. Thus far, the concept of heroism 
has been subject to continuing negotiation, and connections between ‘heroic’ and 
‘unheroic’ identities have been made and remade. The Epilogue erases civilian/non¬ 
civilian and male/female alliances and recovers a romanticized lost world of virile military 
heroism. On the barricade that the civilians have built we see only a group of male 
insurgents who identify themselves as soldiers of the Jewish Combat Organization. They 
seek in a concerted military action an honourable alternative to a life lived in subjugation 
and despair. The uprising is in its final stage; the ghetto is burning. When the Germans 
close in on the insurgents, their commander orders a retreat. The chances of breaking 
through the enemy line are slim, but laying down their arms is out of the question for the 
ghetto fighters. 
What is true of the insurgents in the epilogue of Smocza 13 is also true of Samuel Freud 
in Wielkanoc — with a difference. On the eve of the uprising, he is offered an opportunity 
to escape from the ghetto in his hometown, but he chooses to remain there. For him, there 
are things that matter more than merely staying alive: his honour and his reputation in the 
eyes of history. When the deportation of the ghetto begins, he leads a charge against the 
enemy. In Wielkanoc, as in Smocza 13, the uprising returns the underground resistance to 
the traditional chivalric paradigm of meeting the enemy in battle.31 
In Wielkanoc, many of the Jewish insurgents break out and eventually join Polish 
partisans in a surrounding forest. Samuel, however, dies when he confronts his attackers in 
hand-to-hand combat. Thus, he dies what was considered in the chivalric ethos a beautiful 
27 Skloot points out, ‘the issue at the heart of the Holocaust experience [is] the nature and 
possibility of choice’ (Robert Skloot, The Darkness We Cany: The Drama of the Holocaust, 
Madison, WI, 1988, p. 19). Elsewhere he observes that Shoah plays ‘remind us that there are 
choices to be made’ even in circumstances of extreme physical degradation and spiritual doubt 
(Introduction to his anthology, The Theatre of the Holocaust: Four Plays, Madison, WI, 1982, 
p. 37; Skloot’s italics). 
28 Stefania Zahorska, Smocza 13: Dramat w 3 aktach, London, 1945, p. 14. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 37. 
31 In Polish cultural mythology, clandestine activity has always presented a moral problem 
because of its vulnerability to manipulation. See Maria Janion, Zycie posmiertne Konrada 
Wallenroda, Warsaw, 1990. 
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death rather than, to use Gliksman’s phrase in Smocza 13, ‘a debased death’.32 In keeping 
with the chivalric ethos, Samuel’s death in battle is constructed as the necessary 
culmination of his heroism and as a permanent moral victory. It is tacitly fundamental to 
his heroism that he dies to demonstrate the sincerity of his commitment. His death 
provides the grounds for imagining a transcendent version of heroic identity, free from the 
contaminating influence of the life of a hero who has survived. Without the badge of death, 
Samuel’s glory would be lessened. 
Otwinowski’s play, moreover, broaches the issue of ethical choice confronting a non- 
Jewish character. Stanislaw Laski, a young Warsaw intellectual, leaves the city when the 
fighting in the ghetto begins; the news of German atrocities is weighing him down. He 
seeks psychological shelter in the home of his uncle, Przypkowski, who lives in a small 
town near Warsaw. Just as Stanislaw and his uncle sit down to celebrate Easter, Samuel’s 
sister, Ewa, arrives to seek help. Stanislaw has an opportunity to put his high-minded 
ideals into practice, but he refuses to become involved. A moment before, in the initial 
nervous confrontation between Ewa and the characters around Przypkowski, including his 
antisemitic housekeeper, the boundary between the ‘inside’ (the ghetto) and the ‘outside’ 
(non-Jewish society) is clear-cut and presumably uncrossable. And yet Stanislaw 
eventually crosses this boundary. He ventures beyond the dominant cultural narrative 
which would cast him at best as a silent, if supportive, witness. He plucks up his courage 
and offers Ewa his Warsaw flat as a refuge. 
Stanislaw’s choice is, however, not entirely voluntary. He is shamed into making his 
decision by the antisemitic Sicinski who has volunteered to help Ewa. Moreover, 
Otwinowski romanticizes Stanislaw’s motive. Stanislaw realizes that Ewa’s and his mutual 
attraction is love. This realization hastens his choice. In Act 3, all the pieces of this 
carefully engineered play come together. The cast of characters in this act comprises Ewa, 
Stanislaw, the janitor and the pharmacist Twardowski. Figuratively speaking, a man 
embraces a woman; a non-Jew embraces a Jew; a working-class man embraces an 
intellectual; the old embrace the young; the order puts us at ease. 
This order is to a large extent predicated on a particular construction of Ewa and Samuel 
and their mother. They are the only Jews we see on stage. We know from the extended 
Prologue set in 1938 that they are likeable people, fully acculturated into the Polish 
sociosymbolic order; their qualities make them ideal good neighbours. At a moment in 
history when antisemitism is intensifying, Mrs Freud insists that a nation is not a ‘race’, 
but a community of people living in the same place. She answers antisemitic notions by 
asserting that although she is a Jew, her nation is Poland.33 Five years later, Przypkowski 
challenges the presumptions of Sicinski’s antisemitic discourse which objectifies Jews as 
The Jewish luestion’ and Poland’s ‘major internal problem’.34 Przypkowski argues: ‘[Ewa 
Freud is] a smart and pleasant woman. Her whole family is like that. [...] A respectable 
family. They’ve always been nice to me. [...] They’re not Poland’s internal problem, but 
simply my closest neighbours. They’re not Jews, but people like us.’35 
In other words, he locates the grounds for acceptance not in some abstract realm of 
liberal ‘tolerance’, but in the constitution of a person’s own identity: the Freuds are ‘people 
like us’. At the same time, he offers a representation of the Freuds that, while calling into 
question Sicinski’s dehumanizing discourse, none the less enforces its own repressive 
32 Zahorska. Smocza 13, p. 33. For a discussion of Polish representations of heroic death, see 
Antonina Lubaszewska, 'Egzekucja i zdrowa smierc: Polska topika bohaterskiej smierci’, Ruch 
Literacki, 3, 1991, pp. 187-97. 
33 Otwinowski, Wielkunoc, p. 29. 
34 Ibid., p. 45. 
35 Ibid., p. 49. 
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mode of expression. That is, the Freuds deserve respect and compassion not as Jews but as 
acculturated Poles. Thus, Przypkowski constructs the acceptance of Jews on a foundation 
that leaves dominant assumptions intact. 
While Smocza 13 does not shy away from representing Jews with whom audiences may 
not necessarily sympathize, Wielkanoc focuses on a Jewish family that is different from 
Polish families, yet made acceptable to the Polish characters (including the antisemites) 
and, presumably, to Polish audiences. The construction of the Freuds’ identity raises 
questions about the mechanisms that liberal ideology uses to make acceptable those whom 
it identifies as different. The Freuds’ identity pivots on a notion of acceptance that recasts 
the unfamiliar in familiar terms, terms with which one can safely identify. The other 
becomes like, so that one’s own subjectivity is not threatened. This familiarizing of the 
unfamiliar is a conservative gesture, one that is more fully constructed in the scene which 
wraps the ghetto uprising in enactments of Polish cultural mythology. 
Ill 
Wielkanoc begins in 1938, prior to the construction of an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’, while 
Smocza 13 opens in that rift of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ are, 
most apparently, the space of the Jewish people inside the boundaries of the ghetto and the 
space outside those boundaries reserved for non-Jews. Clearly, however, there is more than 
one ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ in these plays. The literal ‘inside’ of the ghetto and the literal 
‘outside’ of the non-ghetto are implicitly far more complex than geographical boundaries. 
In Wielkanoc, the lines of inclusion and exclusion are drawn less sharply than in Smocza 
13, so that it is possible for Poles like the self-proclaimed eccentric Twardowski to become 
partners in a common struggle, not merely passive observers. To become partners 
predicates a notion of partnership on the spaces of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that are neither 
singular nor exclusive. The key to this configuration is Twardowski’s enigmatic mission 
which takes him across the boundaries between the ghetto and the non-ghetto and between 
Warsaw and non-Warsaw. In the play’s questioning of the opposition of ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, a paradigm of nomadic sensibility which Twardowski represents is more 
important than his specific role in the underground resistance. Rosi Braidotti employs 
nomadism to describe ‘the subject who has relinquished all idea, desire or nostalgia for 
fixity. This figuration expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive 
shifts, and coordinated changes, without and against essential unity’.36 In a passage which 
could appear to have been written according to what Braidotti would call a ‘nomadic 
aesthetics’, Twardowski articulates the non-static, migratory nature of his activism: 
STANISLAW: 
twardowski: 
ewa: 
twardowski: 
Where should we look for you in case we need you? 
For the time being, I live in Borderlands. 
Is that on the Otwock line? 
No, it’s on the moveable line. Between one forest and another. 
Sometimes between Warsaw and the woods.37 
Twardowski’s Borderlands are actual as well as broadly metaphorical. He drives a wedge 
into the dyadic vision of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and thus, one might say, claims the border 
as a trope of identity. 
This conversation takes place after some 6,000 Jewish insurgents, according to 
Twardowski’s report, have broken out of the ghettos to join Polish partisans in the woods. 
36 Rosi Braidotti, Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary’ 
Feminist Theory, New York, 1994, p. 22. 
37 Otwinowski, Wielkanoc, p. 88. 
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Hence, figuratively speaking, Twardowski is living perpetually at a crossroads where 
Polish and Jewish cultures meet, a place defined by nomadic restlessness. Foregrounding 
the necessity of exchange, which presumes the presence of another, he offers a vision of 
community in which connections between self and others are continuously made and 
remade and in which identity never hardens into essence. When he speaks of his enigmatic 
travelling, he helps direct attention to the role betweenness can play in the relations 
between non-Jews and Jews. Wielkanoc suggests that this cross-cultural travelling can be 
enormously productive. 
At the same time, however, Wielkanoc iterates and reiterates a ‘becoming one’ that is 
postulated as virtually always already existing. It opens by citing a past of integral bonds 
between the Jewish people and Polish land. This relation is, clearly, both ‘naturally’ (the 
reference is to being bom in Poland) and historically prior to the Germans’ construction of 
‘inside’ and ‘outside’. The play makes it possible to recover a version of community based 
on ‘becoming one’. But this possibility is enacted in a deceptively sympathetic 
environment where the terms of acceptance are tantamount to erasure of difference. In its 
modulations between the Freuds’ acculturation and Twardowski’s nomadism, the play 
creates a dialectic of perpetuated repression that masquerades as acceptance. 
In Smocza 13, the boundaries of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seem rigid. Regina 
Feigenblatt, a Jew who has been deported from a provincial town, identifies the Warsaw 
ghetto with Warsaw: This is only my second day in Warsaw. I’ve never been to Warsaw 
before.’ The professor’s wife corrects her curtly: ‘You’re not in Warsaw; you’re in Smocza 
Street.’38 Likewise, Basia speaks of her anticipated escape from the ghetto as if it were a 
trip to another city: ‘We’re going to Warsaw.’39 In other words, the suffering puts the 
ghetto outside ordinary human experience. This defamiliarizing sense of psychological 
distance brings about the dichotomy of the ghetto and the non-ghetto in the play.40 
The opposition of‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that dominates Act 1 is reinforced in Act 2 with 
the arrival of Andrzej, a liaison between the ghetto resistance and an unspecified left-wing 
organization on the other side of the wall. The ghetto conspirators want arms; he brings 
them spare parts for their radio and printing press as well as some underground 
publications. He argues that publishing is important because ‘it’s necessary to prepare the 
people not only for a struggle against the Germans, but also for a social struggle’.41 
Eventually, however, he concedes that he has been sent merely to convey empty phrases of 
solidarity. The divide between the Jewish underground and Andrzej’s organization thus 
leads back to the tropological divide along the wall between the ghetto and the non-ghetto. 
In contrast to Wielkanoc, Zahorska’s play problematizes the notion of how fully, even if 
invisibly, the Jews had always been integrated into the fabric of Polish life. In Smocza 13, 
the ghetto is something like a black hole in Polish reality, and the elegiac tone of the 
evocation of inside’ is unmistakable. The play frames itself as a representation of the 
passing of the Polish-Jewish community. 
There is more, however, to Zahorska’s configuration of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. Kluger, 
one of the ghetto conspirators, insists that the ghetto resistance is ‘part of Poland’s 
38 Zahorska, Smocza 13, p. 19. 
39 Ibid., p. 43 
40 This may appear obvious if one does not see it in its Polish context. Compare, for example, 
Maciejewska s assertion that the 'Warsaw ghetto was part of the city; its plight was part of the 
plight of Warsaw . Irena Maciejewska, 'Getto warszawskie w literaturze polskiej’ in Michal 
Glowinski and Janusz Slawinski (eds), Literatura wobec wojny i okupacji, Wroclaw, 1976, 
p. 136. 
41 Zahorska, Smocza 13, p. 36. 
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underground movement’.42 At the same time, Kluger and his fellow conspirator, Szloma, 
declare their own wish to enter, as it were, more fully into the larger scheme of things. 
Both are Socialists who associate the ghetto resistance with an international struggle aimed 
at the removal of pre-war social injustice and political oppression. Szloma urges his 
colleagues: ‘We’ve got to stir the conscience of the whole world! We’ve got to scream that 
what’s going on here is an atrocity such as has never taken place before. After all, there are 
democratic countries in the world; there are socialists, workers! They won’t let us perish 
like this!’43 They do. The ghetto fighters rise against the Germans while those on the 
outside look on. 
Kluger and Szloma are both more outspoken than the other members of the resistance 
group; moreover, Kluger is in command when the uprising begins. Hence it is tempting to 
see Kluger and Szloma as the play’s raisonneurs whose political rhetoric is to serve as a 
yardstick against which the actions of others are to be measured. On the barricade, 
however, all the insurgents stand united regardless of their ideological positions, Socialists 
and ‘Jewish mystics’ alike.44 For Gliksman, one of the ‘mystics’, the inevitable defeat of 
the uprising represents ‘the end’. Kluger corrects him: ‘No, it’s not the end’.45 If the Shoah 
is a symptom of a profound malaise of our civilization, then, as Kluger suggests in his final 
speech, the ghetto uprising is the turning point in modem history. He challenges the 
‘outside’ to meet the moral standard set by the ghetto fighters and to take up their struggle. 
The ‘outside’ here is clearly not only non-Jewish Polish society. 
IV 
In Zahorska’s play, the ghetto uprising is doomed from the beginning. It is presented, 
however, as a denial of‘debased death’ and a constitution of heroic death that will be not 
only a permanent reminder to the rest of the world, but also the starting point of a new 
history. The play’s left-wing framework comprises a reconceptualization of the uprising as 
an empowering investment in the future rather than as a sacrificial offering.46 The 
conclusion calls for a commitment from the ‘outside’ to a dual emancipation: political 
freedom and social justice. Gliksman, however, has the last word. He asks those on the 
‘outside’: ‘Can you hear us? Can you hear us?’47 Thus, the play leaves disturbingly open- 
ended the question whether the story of the ghetto uprising is powerful enough to effect a 
transformation of the kind that Kluger has in mind. 
Wielkanoc does not end by denouncing the twentieth century’s failure to achieve its lofty 
goals. It reminds us instead that high hopes and shattered dreams are not the property of 
our age alone. The play abounds in references to visions that had failed. It draws on a 
progressive construction of the Polish Reformation and the Polish Enlightenment, 
repeatedly invoking a major project of the Polish Reformation, the Rakow Academy 
(1602-38) known as the Polish Athens, and the KoIIqtaj Smithy (1788-92), a group of 
42 Ibid., p. 38. 
43 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
44 Ibid., p. 32. 
45 Ibid., p. 71. 
46 This left-wing framework does not seek to endorse the Soviet system. In the story of Regina 
Feigenblatt’s husband, who died on the way to a Soviet labour camp, Zahorska makes the Nazi 
terror indistinguishable from the Stalinist. This most likely precluded the possibility of the play 
being staged in Soviet-controlled Poland. Otwinowskrs Wielkanoc, for all its talk about 
progress and the international proletariat, does not mention the Soviet Union. Wielkanoc is 
forcefully polonocentric in that it represents the progressive agenda of the Polish Reformation 
and Enlightenment as a model for the future. 
47 Zahorska, Smocza 13, p. 71. 
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reformist politicians in Warsaw.48 These projects ended in defeat. Wielkanoc suggests that 
our age can do better. Samuel was killed, but Twardowski has recovered his unfinished 
study of the Polish Reformation and the Kollqtaj Smithy. As the play draws to a close, 
Twardowski hands the manuscript over to Stanisfaw, charging him with the task of 
completing Samuel’s work.49 The Shoah is history run amok, but survivors can undertake a 
restorative project of progressive, rationalist thought. 
In contrast to Smocza 13, Wielkanoc is among the most optimistic of Shoah dramas. 
Smocza 13 leaves us with Gliksman’s disturbing question emphasizing uncertainty about 
the future; in Wielkanoc, the leading characters see themselves labouring at the edges of 
the future. Quite apart from the reiterated information about ghetto fighters joining Polish 
partisans in the woods, Otwinowski places the stories of Samuel and Stanisfaw within a 
master narrative: the story of inexorable progress towards a better future. In such a 
narrative, the answer is already known. Wielkanoc, then, is a play that looks forward, to a 
time when the amalgamated agendas of the Rakow Academy and the Kottqtaj Smithy will 
be completed. 
Given that Wielkanoc takes place entirely outside the ghetto,50 one could say that the 
play has no need for the inside because the uprising is represented as a military manoeuvre 
aimed at escape from confinement. In its circumvention of the inside, Wielkanoc spares the 
audience awkward or unsettling confrontations. It elides the incompatible in ‘the frame of 
[...] what can be seen', as Teresa de Lauretis has argued in a related context.51 Providing 
an outside image of the Jewish community, one that leaves the audience’s dominant 
subjectivity intact, the play demands acceptance of what it only claims rhetorically to have 
presented. One could argue that the neutralizing disparity between what can be seen and 
what cannot makes us aware how ill-defined notions of acceptance often are. The theatrical 
technique of circumventing the inside, however, also sets the stage for clothing the ghetto 
uprising in the attire of Polish cultural mythology. 
We see no actual violence; as in Greek tragedy, violence is recounted by the characters 
on stage. The uprising is also represented by stage effects like gunfire or the glow of the 
burning ghetto. The scene opens with the sound of‘Warszawianka’ (The Song of Warsaw, 
1831), the song of the 1830-31 Polish Uprising against Russia. Originally written in 
French by Casimir Delavigne, with music by Karol Kurpinski, ‘Warszawianka’ urges 
Poles to rise and break the shackles of foreign oppression in a decisive move that will 
bring either victory or death. This scene closes with a story of Samuel’s death told by the 
chorus of the (non-Jewish) townspeople. Samuel fought to the last, and was killed outside 
the ghetto, at the foot of a monument to Tadeusz Kosciuszko, the leader of the anti- 
Russian insurrection of 1794. 
48 I call this particular construction ‘progressive’ in the sense of its dynamic conception of 
historical time. I realize, however, that the actual Kollqtaj Smithy was distinguished not so 
much by its progressive view of historical time (which was, after all, quite common at the 
time), but by its approach to political change. 
49 Stanislaw s last name, we will remember, is Laski. Thus Otwinowski links him, somewhat 
schematically, with a leading figure of the Polish Reformation, Jan Laski. 
50 The perspective from outside characterizes most Polish literature on the ghetto uprising. 
Maciejewska argues that this perspective is intentionally ambivalent’ in that ‘it shows, on the 
one hand, the tragedy of the Jews and, on the other hand, the [Polish community’s] inability to 
help them effectively . She suggests, moreover, that the perspective from outside is a literary 
device representing Polish indifference and complicity as well as Polish helplessness. See her 
Introduction to Mqczehstwo i zaglada Zydow, pp. 23-24. 
51 Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Sexual Indifference and Lesbian Representation’ in Sue-Ellen Case (ed.). 
Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre, Baltimore, MD, 1990, p. 33; de 
Lauretis’s italics. 
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This particular construction of the ghetto uprising affects the production of meaning at 
the basic levels of aural recognition and association. ‘Warszawianka’ may suggest that the 
Jewish insurgents are heirs to the Cadet Corps in Warsaw who, on 29 November 1830, 
took up arms against the Russians. But the spiritual patron of the ghetto insurgents is 
Kosciuszko, whose monument functions as the axiological centre of the play’s spatial 
configuration. Throughout his ‘afterlife’, Kosciuszko has been said to incarnate all that is 
‘natural’, ‘timeless’, and ‘self-evident’ in Polish culture. With the figure of Kosciuszko 
and the ‘Warszawianka’ song, Otwinowski puts the Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1943 into 
the timeless realm of myth. 
One could argue that this myth-making is subverted in the context of the virtually 
explicit suggestion inherent in the play’s title. During the Holy Week of 1794, Kosciuszko 
was in the south of Poland, where he had defeated the Russians in the Battle of Raclawice. 
Meanwhile, a patriotic conspiracy of artisans and shopkeepers was afoot in Warsaw. It was 
led by the shoemaker Jan Kilinski. On Maundy Thursday, 17 April 1794, Kilinski resolved 
to drive the Russian garrison out of the city. By Easter Sunday, Warsaw was liberated. In 
Otwinowski’s play, Kilinski is absent. The play thus interrupts the normative narrative of 
the Kilinski revolt to allow Kosciuszko to take Kilinski’s place. Omnipresent though 
unseen, Kosciuszko directs the action on stage and off. Someone unfamiliar with Polish 
history is likely to conclude that the Warsaw revolt of 1794 was in fact led by Kosciuszko. 
At issue here are not only time (Holy Week) and place (Warsaw), but also class. For 
Otwinowski, Kilinski’s revolt in Warsaw during Holy Week is a godsend — even without 
Kilinski — because it was fought by the common people. This enables him to construct a 
syllogism which directs the audience to look beyond mere chronology and to seek a sense 
of mythologized sociology. The revolt, which was fought in Warsaw during Holy Week, 
1794, was plebeian; therefore the ghetto uprisings, which began during the Holy Week of 
1943 in Warsaw and in provincial towns, are plebeian as well. Or, as Stanislaw declares in 
his closing speech, ‘The Jewish people have embraced the Kosciuszko tradition’.52 Doubly 
encoded as a struggle of the common people for a free and democratic Poland, the ghetto 
uprisings are thus appropriated by the left-wing insurgent vision. 
I cannot leave this appropriation without specifying the circumstances of Samuel’s 
death. Pursued by German soldiers, he is cornered in a space between the Kosciuszko 
munument and an old well where, according to legend, a group of drunken Poles had 
drowned a Hasidic Jew. Samuel, then, finds himself in the border area between Polish 
antisemitism and Polish democratic patriotism. He refuses to surrender and jumps into the 
well and drowns. In Stanislaw’s interpretation, ‘The Jews were dying while destroying the 
centuries-old legend of their subjugation. There is a well in town. The leader of the 
insurrection turned the well first into a bunker for his defence, then into a monument of his 
52 Otwinowski, Wielkanoc, p. 91. One could speculate that Otwinowski chose Kosciuszko over 
Kilinski because Kosciuszko, through Berek Joselewicz’s cavalry division which fought in the 
insurrection of 1794, has been associated with the notion of a patriotic alliance between Poles 
and Jews (see Reuben Ainsztein, Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe with a 
Historical Survey of the Jew as Fighter and Soldier in the Diaspora, New York, 1974, pp. 112- 
14). Wielkanoc, however, says nothing about Joselewicz. It is possible, then, that Kosciuszko 
was made patron of the ghetto uprising simply because of his pre-eminence in Polish cultural 
mythology. The invisible Kosciuszko is also present, though briefly, in Smocza 13. We learn 
that the Professor’s last research project had dealt with Kosciuszko’s rebellion. That is the only 
reference to Kosciuszko in the play. Perhaps it is mere coincidence that this reference is there at 
all. But there is also the possibility that Zahorska was indicating the temptation to draw a facile 
parallel with the Polish insurgent tradition in order to distance herself from it. 
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everlasting glory’.53 Through Samuel’s blood, the site of an antisemitic attack has become 
a marker of Jewish heroism. But this marker is presided over by an earlier monument, the 
monument to Kosciuszko and his democratic project in the service of Poland’s liberation. 
Stanislaw’s conclusion (‘The Jewish people have embraced the Kosciuszko tradition’) now 
has a different resonance. In the blind spots that separate the well from the monument, the 
play thematizes a transgressive, empowered subjectivity of the Jewish insurgents, which 
had been legitimized by Kosciuszko’s spiritual sponsorship. Empowered by the example of 
Kosciuszko, the Jews rose against the foreign invaders and thus dismantled the stereotype 
of the cowardly, submissive Jew. From Stanistaw’s point of view, ‘the Jewish people have 
embraced the Kosciuszko tradition’, that is, they have become fully assimilated into Polish 
culture. 
Thus, Wielkanoc once again enforces a repressive mode of expression. Ironically, its 
progressive agenda mingles with repressive ideological currents. The play diminishes the 
Jewishness of the ghetto uprising and foregrounds its commonness in the double sense of 
class (the common people) and a shared store of cultural images (the Kosciuszko 
tradition). In other words, Wielkanoc avoids the problem of difference and throws the 
insurrections of 1794, 1830-31 and 1943 into the same pot. This may be an example of 
what Skloot, drawing on Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi’s study, calls ‘the problem of the 
“diminishing analogy’”.54 Ezrahi writes that ‘Even the most vivid presentation of concrete 
detail and specificity, the most palpable reconstruction of Holocaust reality, is blunted by 
the fact that there is no analogue in human experience’.55 But this is exactly what 
Otwinowski fails to acknowledge with his play. He insists on finding an analogue, not for 
the Shoah, but for the heroism of the ghetto insurgents. Wielkanoc therefore makes 
acceptance of others easy because it represents them in terms that reinforce the Polish 
model. Hence it is not suprising that the play ends with a tribute to Warsaw, the traditional 
centre of Polish heroic mythology. In the world of Otwinowski’s play, ghetto resistance, 
subsumed under the paradigm of the 1794 rebellion in Warsaw, confirms the essentialist 
concept of Warsaw as the heroic city. 
The slippages of Otwinowski’s play (the slippages between the cross-cultural travelling 
of Twardowski and the insistent inscription of the ghetto uprising into the Polish insurgent 
vision) can be seen as a symptom of ideological indecisiveness. In 1945 and 1946, during a 
period marked by Polish violence against Jews, however, Wielkanoc's message of 
‘becoming one’ was well suited to touch Polish audiences. The play had its first night 
three months after the pogrom in Kielce in July 1946. Another production soon followed, 
opening in December in Cracow, which had been the site of an attack on Jews in May 
1945. 
The play is a rite of hope that resists emotional frustration and intellectual uncertainty, a 
work that envisions a healing of the broken community of Jews and non-Jewish Poles. The 
audience can leave the theatre appreciating the small, if temporary, victory of the forces 
which affirm life over the horror of what seems to be meaningless death. Hope, solidarity, 
the value of achievement, a belief in order, in rationality, in human goodness, love, loyalty: 
the entire realm of the ‘ideal’ remains intact in Otwinowski’s play. In Zahorska’s play, all 
this is put in doubt. What is left are a little hope and solidarity. 
53 Otwinowski, Wielkanoc, p. 91. 
54 Skloot, Introduction to The Theatre of the Holocaust, p. 19. 
Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, By Words Alone: The Holocaust in Literature, Chicago, IL, 1980, p. 3. 
5 The Politicization of Mass Murder: Immediate 
Czech Reactions to the Shoah, 1945-49 
Derek Paton 
Introduction 
By the autumn of 1947, the number of book-form works of reportage and belles-lettres 
concerning Czechoslovaks’ experience of concentration camps and Gestapo prisons had 
reached around 100, and they had a wide readership.1 The most lasting of these, initially 
not only because of the Communist Party manipulation of the book into cult status, was the 
record of prison life and torture by Julius Fucfk, Reportaz psane na opratce (Reports 
Written in the Noose, 1945).2 This naive work of an apparently charming, self-centred, 
courageous man utterly devoted to the Communist cause verges, in the end, on 
sentimentalizing popular literature. The Jews have no role to play here. Ideology has taken 
over personal suffering: Nazism and its roots are the enemy, not the Germans, and the only 
way to provide human beings with happiness is Communist-led socialism. In contrast to 
Reportaz, the second most lasting book to come from the period is a documentary written 
by two Jewish Czechs, Ota Kraus, who after the evacuation of Auschwitz was shipped to 
Buchenwald, and Erich Schon (who soon assumed the name of his wife’s family, Kulka), 
Tovarna na smrt (The Death Factory, 1946).3 Schon escaped with his son from the train 
taking him south from Auschwitz. This coolly written documentary, which supplies the 
names of the worst brutes in Auschwitz-Birkenau, maps of the Auschwitz complex and so 
forth, while dealing almost entirely with the Jews, has as its chief theme that just as the 
Germans murdered Jews, so they murdered others; apart from the badges on one’s tunic, 
once one was in Birkenau, race-laws no longer functioned, although Kraus and Schon do 
tell us of SS guards punished, by death or being sent to die on the Eastern Front, for falling 
in love with Jewish or Gypsy women. Tovarna na smrt, while remaining primarily a 
devastating account of the implementation of Nazi ‘race theory’, strives to put across a 
liberal humanist message. A gang of brutes had set about first turning other human beings 
into slaves, and then brutalizing them as well. Kraus and Schon are also proud to be 
Czechoslovak. On only two, very minor, occasions does the reader see a little left-wing 
political thinking here, but one notices that they use as mottoes for chapters (when they 
have mottoes) the words of liberals, or right-wing socialists, President Benes and 
1 Vaclav Behounek, ‘Nase vezenska literatura’, Kytice, 2, 1947, 9, pp. 385-96. (In 1948 re-issued 
as an offprint, published at author’s expense.) On the wide readership see p. 386. Behounek’s 
article was the only attempt to produce a literary critical survey of this literature for nearly fifty 
years. 
2 For an account of the work, the cult and how it fitted in with the Czech ‘martyr complex’, see 
Robert B. Pynsent, Questions of Identity. Czech and Slovak ideas of nationality and 
personality, Budapest, London and New York, 1994, pp. 207-09. 
3 An expanded version of Tovarna na smrt, was published in 1950, with the additional 
testimonies of Bruno Baum and Viktor Lederer; the 1957 fifth edition was further expanded, as 
was the sixth edition of 1959. Tovarna na smrt was translated into English, German (GDR), 
Hebrew, Hungarian, Roumanian and Russian. Schon, as Erich Kulka, defected to Israel in 
1968, and from 1969 onwards worked in the Institute of Contemporary History at the Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem. Fucik’s Reportaz was translated into over seventy languages, many of 
these languages of the Soviet Union. 
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Ferdinand Peroutka, a leading Czech journalist. Kraus and Schon say virtually nothing 
about their own suffering; almost all we learn about them is that they worked as fitters in 
the Auschwitz complex and so had access to all the various camps and that since they had 
been initially arrested for political reasons, not on the basis of the race laws, they were 
protected from the gas chambers. Tovarna na smrt was not ‘positive’ enough for the 
Communists ever to cultivate the authors. The fact that they were Jewish also spoke 
against them. 
Tovarna na smrt is not belles-lettres, but, in the end, Fucik’s Reportaz is, even if it 
remains more or less on the level of an adventure story. One work, however, offered 
serious competition to Fucik’s, a work of sophisticated (deceptively simple) belles-lettres, 
the collection of verse, Vezeh za draty (Prisoner Behind the Wire, 1945), by Rajmund 
Habrina. Habrina was well over three years in Mauthausen, but his poems say nothing of 
his own suffering — with one exception, when he thinks of his little daughter at home, 
whom he has never seen. In his approach to concentration-camp life, Habrina manifests the 
same liberal humanism of Kraus and Schon. Similarly to them, he makes only one 
statement that could be interpreted as vaguely left-wing, when he or his persona looks 
forward to the day when everyone will have his or her own place in the sun and equal 
rations of bread. Habrina’s book was far too compassionate to be to the liking of the 
Communists. It remains forgotten, however admired it was in the three years before the 
Communist take-over. 
The treatment or non-treatment of the Jews in Czech literature (in the broadest sense of 
the term ‘literature’) in the period 1945—49 must be seen in two contexts: the political, 
ethnic and social circumstances of the Bohemian Lands in the period, and the history of the 
Czech literary Gentile’s attitude to Czech Jews in the period from the turn of the century to 
the Munich Agreement or the German occupation of March, 1939. First, the Czechs had 
been wounded by the West’s betrayal in 1938, which they saw as morally corrupt. Initially 
they blamed the French more than the British, but during and after the war they rightly 
blamed the British more than the French. Much to Churchill’s disapproval, Benes signed a 
pact with the Soviet Union during the war, a pact that was to form something of a model 
for other East European states after the war. This pact was, however it was intended, also 
an expression of Czechoslovak collusion in Stalin’s new Panslavism. Furthermore, Stalin’s 
Panslavism fell on fertile ground among the Czechs, where the Slavonic Institute had a 
significant political significance in the 1930s. Benes was neither a Communist nor a fellow 
traveller, just a man starting a new game of power politics. He had, however, been 
fervently anti-German, one might say in a racist manner, at least ever since the beginning 
of the First World War. During and after the Second World War he did all he could to gain 
support from the public for his wartime decision to expel all Germans from Czechoslovak 
soil. He attributed the blame for the razing of the village of Lidice, one of the most 
‘traumatic’ experiences of the war for the Czechs, to the whole German nation, not to the 
Nazis. He led his nation, naturally with the ardent help of the Communists, to looking east 
for their future. The formerly Czechoslovak Germans (‘formerly’, since they had had their 
nationality removed from them by presidential decree), had to be expelled, for they were 
considered nearly all pro-Nazi, and certainly they were an obstacle to the creation of a new 
Slav state that was needed to engineer the social and economic revolution Benes and the 
Communists desired. 
Who was or was not a German was decided primarily on the basis of declared 
nationality’ in the 1930 census. This meant that Jews who had registered German 
nationality were deported again, having returned from the camps or having spent the war 
in hiding. In mid-1946, the decree was eventually amended, so that ‘German’ Jews were 
not included in the expulsion. This inhuman bureaucratic assessment of who was or was 
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not a German had its mob equivalent in the beating up and sometimes killing of German 
or Yiddish-speaking Jews on the streets of Prague. The expulsion of the Germans was 
generally well, and often brutally, organized. The resettlement of the German areas was 
not; it was almost entirely under Communist control, and was exploited by all manner of 
Communist and non-Communist profiteers and hooligans. The chaos engendered by this 
major piece of land-reform had to be apologized for (for example, by the Social Democrat 
philosopher Jirina Popelova), since it threatened the popularity of the Communist Party. 
Other factors increased the general chaos, most of which were common to other parts of 
Central Europe: displaced persons; mass raping and plundering by the Red Army (though 
the Soviets started moving out of Czechoslovakia early, in November, 1945, the scars of 
the raping and plundering remained for decades); former prisoners returning from camps 
(in the case of the Jews, not to families, but often to a vacuum, their homes and 
belongings disappeared, or in the case of richer Jews, their property nationalized or on the 
verge of being nationalized); people’s courts; retribution (one novelist trampled to death 
by a mob in Pilsen because suspected of having been an active collaborator, and so forth); 
newspapers asking Czechs to stop beating up Germans on the street because it did not 
look good to foreigners; broad popular support for the Communists until after the winter 
of 1946^17, and then an ever-growing fear of them in all sections of society; compared, 
however, to other countries in the region there was very little war damage to industry. But 
it was seen as a period where out of the chaos a dancing star would soon emerge. As 
elsewhere in Europe, the intelligentsia considered the end of the war not just the end of 
the Occupation and the end of Nazism, but the beginning of something entirely new. For 
the Czechs (and Slovaks) it was people’s democracy, sometimes referred, and not only in 
Moscow, as ‘new’ democracy. More than a transition the early post-war years were seen 
as a time of immediate change. That applied also to literature; thus, for example, 
Frantisek Gotz entitled a collection of literary critical essays, Na predelu. Krise sveta v 
zrcadle literatury a dnesni vyvojove perspektivy (On the Dividing Line. The World Crisis 
as Reflected in Literature and Today’s Perspective on Developments, 1946), or Jin Hajek 
entitles his collection of political essays, Generace na rozhrani (Generation on the 
Border-line, 1946). 
The political and material chaos of the times affect the way in which Czech writers, 
Jewish and Gentile, treat the genocide of the Jews. And one remembers that the genocide 
of the Jews and Gypsies was thought to be just the beginning, that the intention had been 
thereafter to obliterate the small Slav nations.4 In other words, the mass murder of the Jews 
had been just the beginning of the plan to ensure that the master race could achieve its 
thousand-year empire of bliss. Secondly, and this may seem shocking today on the grounds 
that the gap between planned mass murder and unplanned death in war is morally 
insurmountable, given that the Czechs’ new orientation towards the USSR, the number of 
deaths resulting from racial persecution seemed small compared with the number of Soviet 
citizens who died in war, as soldiers or civilian victims of the Germans. Nevertheless, the 
German persecution and murder of the Jews cured, brutal as that might seem, many Czechs 
of their antisemitism. Much Czech antisemitism had been intimately connected with the 
fact that the Czechs perceived the Jews as Germans or henchmen of the Germans. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century popular antisemitism (the blood libel, the fear of the 
alien or different) had been ‘rationalized’ by nationalists. Jews were nasty modernizers, 
4 See, for example, Ota Kraus and Erich Schon, Tovarna na smrt, Prague, 1946, p. 31. Elsewhere 
they inform us, on the basis of what they had gathered from a Slovak Jew interned in 
Auschwitz, Sylvia Friedmanova, who had worked as a slave assistant in the sterilization 
experiments conducted by Mengele and his team, that the Germans had intended sterilizing any 
number of European nations, pp. 96-98. 
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factory-owners spoiling the Slav countryside and thus turning picturesque peasants into 
ugly proletarians. Of course, the other aspect of racist stereotyping remained frequent in 
Czech culture, for example, the Jews as sexually perverted or salacious or not knowing 
romantic love: the Jews as entirely money-minded and so forth, and these stereotypes are 
clearly exploited even by major writers5 during the interwar years. During the First World 
War, in exile publications and after the war in the new republic the Jews were imagined to 
be spies for the Habsburgs, profiteers, and generally to have had cushy behind-the-lines 
jobs. After the war there was a pogrom in Holesov, for which no one was taken to court.6 
At the same time, in the First Republic, Jews had senior positions in public life, as 
politicians, newspaper editors, industrialists, and in the cultural elite. While antisemitism 
remained endemic, even in the first years of the Second World War, Gentiles gave their 
names to Jewish writers so that they could publish their works and the hundredth 
anniversary of a major Jewish Czech writer, Julius Zeyer, in 1940 was turned into 
something like a national celebration amongst the intelligentsia. I am not suggesting that 
antisemitism disappeared after the war. The crassest example of antisemitism was the 
show-trial involving senior Communists in November 1952. The 1960s saw the first works 
of‘high’ literature dealing with the Shoah for what it actually was. Not until after the fall 
of Communism, however, has anything like the German ‘philosemitism’ that Robert 
Wistrich writes about in this volume come into being.7 8 Jan Masaryk, who had always been 
an advocate of Jewry and who did consider the Jews as a special group that needed care in 
the post-war period, said in a wartime broadcast on the BBC’s Czechoslovak service, ‘It is 
true that every nation can be judged by how it behaves towards the Jews, and we have 
behaved decently.’ He continued, however, presumably ignorant of the full extent of what 
was going on: 
It is also true that some Jews did not behave properly. They used to go to Prague’s cafes and 
chatter away in German, even after 1933. But they have learned their lesson; after the war it 
will be hard to find a Czechoslovak Jew who would repeat that mistake. But, of course, I also 
knew many, very many, decent, proper, loyal, modest Jews, legionaries and members of 
Sokol, and they belonged among us, as our people. Many of them are in our army in England 
and in Russia. 
Even given his fragmentary knowledge of what was actually taking place in German- 
occupied Europe in 1943, Masaryk’s ‘they have learned their lesson’ sounds repugnantly 
flippant. By 1933, he does not mean only Hitler’s coming to power, but also the immediate 
flood of refugees, Jews and non-Jewish political opponents that came to Czechoslovakia in 
the mid-1930s, which was then swelled after the Anschlufi by Jews and Viennese Czechs 
who had not ‘returned’ in the first two years after the establishment of Czechoslovakia. 
5 See, for example, Robert B. Pynsent, ‘Cesky zensky antisemitismus v prvni polovici dvacateho 
stoletf in Dobrava Moldanova (ed.), Zena-jazyk-literatura, Usti nad Laben, 1996, pp. 102-07. 
6 For a serious account of this pogrom and its aftermath, though unfortunately journalistic, see 
Inna Mirovska, Den peti svetel. Svedectvi o poslednim protizidovskem pogromu na Morave, 
Prague, 1998. 
For antisemitism in the ‘period of transition’, see Helena Krejcova, ‘Cesky a slovensky 
antisemitismus 1945—1948 in Karel Jech (ed.), Strankami soudobych dejin. Sbornik stati k 
petasedesdtindm historika Karla Kaplana, Prague, 1993, pp. 158-72. See also Kurt Wehle, 
The Jews in Bohemia and Moravia: 1945-1948’ in Avigdor Dagan et al. (eds). The Jews of 
Czechoslovakia, 3 vols, New York, 1968-81, m, pp. 449-95, and Petr Brod, ‘Zide v 
povalecnem Ceskoslovensku in Vaclav Veber (ed.), Zide v novodobych dejinach, Prague, 
1997, pp. 147-62. 7 * 
8 Jan Masaryk, 'Ruda armada ve Smolensku — Zidovsky novy rok 5704 — Slovo k 
antisemitum’, 29 September 1943, in his Void Londyn, 5th edn, Prague, 1948, p. 263. 
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After the implementation of the Munich Agreement, the numbers swelled further, but so 
did emigration. Franz Kafka’s friend, the Gentile Milena Jesenska, was the most 
vociferous propagator of these refugees’ rights. She died in Ravensbruck.9 
Dawidowicz has suggested that ‘In modem times, Jews came to believe [...] in the moral 
force of their history, in the compelling power which the history of Jewish sufferings and 
martyrdoms could exercise on non-Jews and thereby purge them of their Jew-hatred.’10 In 
very general terms the Czechs seem to have been purged, at least for the transition period, 
but their ‘martyrdom’ had to compete with the ‘martyrdom’ of the Slavs including the 
Czechs, and of the Communists, including students. On no account can one say that they 
had to compete in all the books written by Czechs. Jin Roubal’s work on the trial of the 
commandant of the Small Fortress in Theresienstadt is a case in point. For all the Czech 
patriotism, indeed nationalism, of the book, in his selection of atrocities Roubal puts his 
chief emphasis on the suffering of the Jews. Still, Czechoslovakia was a highly politicized 
society, and suffering was eminently politicizable for use in propaganda. Suffering, 
however various the degrees, was the Czechs’ common experience. Bluntly, the suffering 
of the Jews was in the immediate post-war days not useful for party politics, except insofar 
as a Jew exploited that suffering to some party end. At this stage, Communists actually 
made virtually no use of their Jewish comrades’ suffering except insofar they could 
demonstrate that a given Jew had gone to his or her death thinking of the Communist 
cause. For example, in an anthology of letters sent on or just before execution or slow 
death in a concentration camp, edited by a poet who would soon be condemned as a 
bourgeois decadent with a pernicious influence on youth, Frantisek Halas, Kurt Beer 
remarks in his letter: ‘I never feel lonely. I have never been so conscious of my 
membership of and commitment to our great family.’* 11 It goes without saying that the 
family is the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 
One aspect of the politicization of suffering that was common to all political parties, was 
its anti-German nature. And here even the hardest-line Communist internationalist could 
speak of the German as the age-old enemy of the Czechs or the Slavs. The nationalist 
literary historian and leader of the Prague May Uprising, Albert Prazak, went so far as to 
write of the expulsion of the Germans as the fulfilment of the political programme given to 
the Czechs by an early fourteenth-century teutonophobic loather of Western institutions 
like the hereditary peerage, chivalry and tournaments.12 Kraus and Schon quote from an 
early tenth-century Old Bulgarian author. One section of this quotation runs as follows: 
‘And these saints were taken by the mercenaries, barbarian people, for they were Germans, 
who are by nature savage, and now, on orders, they became even crueller, leading them 
[the saints] out of the city and, having stripped them, dragged them along naked.’13 Roubal 
goes further back: ‘The German nation has inherited all those characteristics of the 
9 On Czechoslovakia as a refuge, see Jin Vesely et al. (eds), Azyl v Ceskoslovensku 1933-1938, 
Prague, 1983. Given the date of publication one should be slightly wary of using this volume 
because of omissions. None the less, it is a useful compendium, particularly for its 
bibliographical information. 
10 Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians, London and Cambridge, MA, 1981, 
p. 126. 
11 Frantisek Halas (ed., author of foreword), Posledni dopisy, Prague, 1946, p. 41. 
12 See Robert B. Pynsent, ‘Die Dalimil-Chronik als polymythischer Text (Dalimil-Fichte-Havel)’ 
in E. Behring, L. Richter and W. F. Schwarz (eds), Geschichliche Mythen in den Literaturen 
und Kulturen Ostmittel- und Siidosteuropas, Stuttgart, 1999, pp. 199-232 (210). 
13 Kraus and Schon, Tovarna na smrt, p. 9. 
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barbarian that Julius Caesar knew.’14 Similarly, Vokolek portrays the Germans as 
sacrificing to Woden in his long, grotesque, almost Baroque poem on the war.15 It was by 
1946 a cliche of concentration camp literature to mention Dante’s Inferno, usually stating 
that even Dante’s imagination was not vivid enough to envisage a death-camp or that the 
inscription over the entrance to Dante’s Hell was the real meaning of ‘Arbeit, macht frei’. 
So too it was a cliche of anti-German passion to write of the Nazis’ inspiration from 
Nietzsche, and of the SS as supermen. It depended on the education of the author whether 
or not it was admitted that the Nazis perverted Nietzsche grossly. This cliche is important 
from the point of view of cultural history since Nietzsche remained a bete noire of the 
Czechoslovak Communists throughout their rule.16 The journalist Roubal writes that ‘Only 
people without true awareness of their humanity and fanaticized by Nitsche’s [s/V] 
philosophy of the superman supported by the Germanic political faith, that is Nazism, 
could imagine setting up the horrifying death-camps.’17 Habrina, who had published his 
first essay on Nietzsche’s thought in 1935, after the war wrote a work on the Nazis’ 
perversion of Nietzsche, Nadclovek a nadnarod (Superman and Supemation, 1946), in 
which, for example, he maintains that the Nazi hero ‘is a hero of Blut und Boden: the body 
is everything, the spirit only instinct. He is hard and ruthless and the Nietzschean 
command, “Become hard”, has been so inculcated into him, that it has entered his blood¬ 
stream.’18 In his Mauthausen poems (which Habrina wrote in his head, and recited in the 
evenings to fellow Czech, and towards the end Slovak, prisoners; he wrote them down on 
paper only after the liberation of the camp), he writes a piece addressed to Sebastian 
Kneipp. Kneipp was the devisor of vigorous water therapy to cure obese bourgeois. 
Habrina calls the poem ‘Vodolecba’ (Hydropathy); it concerns the German practice of 
drowning prisoners in sealed ‘shower-rooms’ because it was cheaper than using gas;19 he 
calls the man who invented concentration camp hydropathy ‘your [Kneipp’s] chosen 
superman’.20 In a poem addressed to Christ, Habrina writes that the ‘superman with a 
skull’, that is the SS, would drive Him against the electrified fence, drown Him in a barrel 
(which normally means a barrel of excrement, not water) and drive Him into the gas 
chamber.21 In the fourth cycle of his ‘Buchenwald canti’, Alois Cap embodies German 
designs and deeds in the voice of‘V’; that is ‘Will’, and the self-evident connotation is the 
would-be Nietzchean Wille zur Macht. Thus, Will speaks of destroying everything and 
building new temples on the ruins, of having already removed the foundations of nations, 
and killed the old gods; immortality is now ripe, built on blood and lies.22 The lying is 
important, for the image of the deceitful German goes back to the beginnings of the 
vernacular tradition in Czech literature. German deceit makes for a refrain in Kraus and 
Schon, and in Roubal. The sheer arrogance of the Germans makes for a similar refrain. 
Because Cap employs a liturgical lexis and imagery, and writes of pride as a source of all 
other sins,2 ' the Germans implicitly became the embodiment of Lucifer, and thus in the end 
14 Jiri Roubal, Terezm zustane vecnym svedectvim. Pind’a — Jockel se odpovlda spravedlnosti, 
Prague, 1947, p. 7. 
15 Vladimir Vokolek, Narod na dlazbe, Prague, 1945, p. 20. 
16 I think one may say that, for similar reasons, Nietzsche was not fully ‘re-habilitated’ in Western 
Europe until the 1960s. 
17 Roubal, Terezin zustane..., p. 9. 
18 Rajmund Habrina, Nadclovek a nadnarod. Kapitoly jan casove?, Bmo, 1946, p. 37. 
19 He mentions this in ibid. 
20 Rajmund Habrina, Vezehza draty K. L. Mauthausen, 3rd edn, Bmo, 1947 p.42. 
21 Ibid., p. 64. 
22 See Alois Cap, Sestoupilo mezi nas neuveritelne slovo, Prerov, 1946 pp 19 29 and 37 
23 Ibid., p. 21. 
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of Antichrist (this again in Cap, but also in Vokolek). That is a grand version of anatural 
epithets ‘diabolical’, ‘infernal’, ‘satan-like’ lent to the acts of camp commandants and their 
henchmen. In the camps, only the dead are not victims of the arrogance of the ‘stupid 
Teuts’.24 All this has to be set against the fact that, since the Enlightenment, the Germans 
had been regarded as the supreme Kulturtrager of Central Europe. Hence, for example, 
Selepa’s lines, ‘May your poets, Germany/fall silent with shame on their cheeks.’25 
One may also associate this with the inexpressibility of the horror of the camps. And this 
oft-repeated notion of inexpressibility may in turn be associated with the brutalization of 
normal human responses. Adorno’s melodramatic words were prefigured more 
convincingly by the emotions of the camp survivors. Kraus and Schon’s statement is 
representative: ‘no writer, of prose or poetry, will ever be found who could express the 
thoughts and feelings of the prisoners who knew they had to die in Birkenau, Birkenau 
where all life lay in the shadow of the chimneys’.26 They are aware of their own 
inadequacy also, and suggest that it might be attributed to inurement: ‘We are incapable of 
expressing the feelings of fear, terror, despair, mental torment of individuals whose death 
sentence had been aggravated by living in Birkenau. Perhaps that is because we lived in 
that environment for too long.’27 They do explain, however, that ‘in an extermination camp 
like Birkenau, human emotion became entirely extinct’ and that all ‘who live there for 
some while became callous and insensitive — and one could expect an unusual deed only 
from a child’.28 Habrina does endeavour to express the well-nigh cataleptic insensitivity of 
concentration camp prisoners, though, in the afterword to the third edition it looks as if he 
feels he needs to defend that because critics have noted his lack of subjectivity. This lack, 
he writes, ‘is the result of a long process of depersonalization, and the eventual state of 
depersonalizedness’.29 In his ‘Vsedni balada o musulmanovi’ (An Everyday Ballad of a 
musulman)30 Habrina describes a man who had hitherto survived by dreaming of home; he 
was in charge in that dream, where in life he was someone else’s machine. In the end, 
however hungry, he cannot even eat his beet soup, and drops his spoon. Habrina describes 
the man’s loss of his dream thus: 
Kdyz hvezdy v rakve sesuly se, 
ranami sfaty ve stiny, 
ma hvezda stitem chranila mne, 
muj domov, sen muj jediny. 
Kdyz na stavbach zlych faraonu 
mne kapo kyjem stval a bil, 
zafal jsem rty jen, k snu se modle, 
by silu vleval do mych zil. 
Az srazen hladem, citim nahle, 
ze hlava nejak lehka je, 
ze z hrudi zvolna odkapava 
po kapce kapka nadeje.31 
24 Habrina, Vezeh za draty, p. 48. 
25 Karel Selepa, Lidice Osvetim Dachov. Tri balady, Prague, 1945, p. 16. 
26 Kraus and Schon , Tovarna na smrt, p. 217. 
27 Ibid., p. 79. 
28 Ibid., p. 128. 
29 Habrina, Vezeh za draty, p. 100. 
30 In concentration-camp slang a musulman was a prisoner whom hunger, despair, depression had 
driven into a state of utter apathy, and thus inability to work. 
31 Habrina, Vezeh za draty, p. 16. 
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(When the stars have collapsed into coffins,/cut off by flows into the shadows,/my star 
protected me like a shield,/my home, my only dream.//When on the evil pharaohs’ building 
sites/the kapo drove me, beat me with his cudgel,/I just gritted my teeth, praying to my 
dream/to pour strength into my veins.//Until, knocked down by hunger, I suddenly feel/that 
my head is somehow light,/that drip by drip from my chest/is slowly dripping hope.) 
Elsewhere Habrina writes of prisoners’ eyes turning into ‘fractured glazed light’, and 
themselves becoming ‘fish people’waiting for a death devoid of the compassion of those 
around.32 What Habrina attempts, and usually succeeds in achieving, is a psychology- 
based dignified portrayal of emptiness, dehumanization. So the doctor, Mila Janu, writing 
her last letter from Ravensbruck, writes of almost becoming what the Germans wanted her 
to become, ‘a robot, without feeling, without conscience’. Her cool description of her 
approaching death is evocative of the atmosphere Habrina portrays in his poems: 
What is death for me? Perhaps I shall fall asleep; someone will come and register one corpse; 
the usual undressing will follow, the carrying away; perhaps someone will come to have a 
look; then I shall wait in the mortuary, wait for the last time...Then they will take me 
through the gate to the crematorium and bum me up. Perhaps it will be roll-call and the 
flames will shoot up high. That will catch people’s attention and there will be something new 
to talk about.33 
The wound Germany had inflicted on individuals had actually been inflicted on the 
whole of European civilization, maintains Habrina in his afterword, and those individuals 
sometimes forgot they were more than individuals: 
those who suffered as individuals sometimes came close to the danger of forgetting that in 
the crowds of thousands a Human Being was suffering. And that what was suffering in that 
human being was above all everything great and beautiful, everything human that 
generations, ages had created from Antiquity to the twentieth century. It was anyway the 
greatest crime of Nazism that cynically, pervertedly, laughingly and angrily it desecrated, 
trampled under foot this very European humanity.34 
The art historian and literary critic, Frantisek Kovama, also considers that the chief 
target of the German’s assault was European civilization. He goes further, however, 
somewhat hysterically, and declares that by their actions they had definitively proved that 
they were not Europeans, and now they deserve to be expelled from Europe.35 Vladimir 
Sis in his Introduction to Roubal’s book on Theresienstadt is not hysterical, considers that 
the Germans must experience contrition before they can be re-admitted to humanity: 
‘Before the German nation itself recognizes its profound moral degeneration, before it 
becomes horrified by the crimes committed in its name by these monstrous Jockels, there 
is no hope for its renewal and its return to democracy and humanity.’36 
Not even a Communist would have denied in the years 1945^18 that German inhumanity 
had been experienced by the Jews more than by the Soviets, whatever figures might appear 
to say. Still the Communists had their own in effect equally inhuman interpretation of it, 
that German extreme antisemitism was simply an excrescence of decaying, degenerate 
capitalist society. Like the nationalists, Panslav or not, the Communists, at least in the 
period, avoided the issue of Gentile complicity (that would be thinking on the basis of a 
false superstructure; one may only think in terms of the class struggle). What Gross writes 
32 ‘Svetla na celech’, ibid., p. 82. 
33 Halas (ed.), Posledni dopisy, p. 74. 
34 Habrina, Vezeh za draty, pp. 101-02. 
35 Frantisek Kovama, Listy mrtvemu priteli, Prague, 1946, p. 50. 
36 Roubal, Tere zin ziistane..., p. 8. 
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about Poland might be applied to the Bohemian Lands, although the Jewish population was 
broadly distributed amongst the rest of the populace in the Bohemian Lands, where 
significant ghetto-like concentrations were still normal in large parts of Poland: 
The Holocaust [...] was not confined to the pitch dark interiors of gas chambers and 
covered vans. It took place in full daylight, and was witnessed by millions of Poles who — 
and this will be a very minimalist interpretation — by and large did little to interfere with 
it. [...] What happens to people who passively witness the brutal murder of their fellow 
citizens?37 
I cannot answer that question; on the other hand, there is little doubt that German 
persecution as a whole produced many more Communists than it destroyed. A particularly 
repellent irony arose from that: the perception of Wall Street as a far greater enemy than 
Hitler, whereby, especially in early post-war propaganda, the capitalist West also 
potentially posed a Fascist threat. Neither Nazis nor Communists were particularly fond of 
intellectuals, but from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s, Communists and intellectuals 
generally colluded. (I do not forget the intellectuals who ended up in exile or Communist 
prisons, but that is covered by other chapters in this volume.) There is little doubt that the 
Germans had picked on Czech intellectuals during the war, and particularly after the 
assassination of Heydrich. The clearest example of this was the execution of the best 
Czech fiction writer of the interwar period (who had been ejected from the Communist 
Party in 1929), Vladislav Vancura. Almost as important was the execution, in the same 
series of reprisals, of the political writer, feminist pillar of the Masarykian establishment, 
F. F. Plaminkova, who had an immense reputation in the international women’s 
movement. The Social Democrat chairman of the Czechoslovak delegation at the 
Nuremberg Trials, General Bohuslav Ecer, cites Hans Frank, the governor of Poland, who 
had claimed that Konstantin von Neurath had the following plans for the Protectorate; ‘the 
intellectuals were to be “taken care of’; for the time being the remainder of the population 
was to be germanized rather than deported or liquidated, since there were not enough 
Germans to colonize Bohemia-Moravia’.38 The physical experience of the Germans’ 
intention to suppress intellectual life began before the reprisals for the assassination chiefly 
in the repercussions of the patriotic demonstration in Prague on 28 October 1939, when the 
Germans fired into the crowd, and two demonstrators were killed, a labourer and the 
medical student Jan Opletal; the memorial gathering for Opletal on 15 November turned 
into another mass anti-German demonstration. On the night of 16 and early morning of 17 
November, the Germans raided student halls of residence in Prague and Brno, as a result of 
which nine student-union officers were executed without trial in the Ruzyne barracks 
outside Prague, and about 1,060 other students sent to concentration camps. One of these 
students, actually a graduate activist, Jin Hajek, who had been in Sachsenhausen, was a 
Communist who exploited his own experience after the war and declared that young 
people had been the chief targets of Hitler’s persecution. The following statement amounts 
to what would now be called ‘Holocaust denial’: ‘[once the German occupation had begun 
in March 1939] it became every clearer where German Fascism — which Czech 
“patriotic” reactionaries so frequently invoked — was primarily aiming its attack: it would 
be our country, essentially Czech youth who, in the event that the German Fascist plan 
37 Jan Gross, ‘War as Revolution’ in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds), The 
Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, Boulder, CO, 1997, 
p. 30. 
38 Bohuslav Ecer, Norimbersky soud, Prague, 1946, p. 342. 
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should succeed, would become its first victim’.39 A few pages later he continues, in his 
usual cumbersome style: 
It was the young people who bore the heaviest burden in the German occupation [...] they 
directed the first great assault of their ferocious hatred against Czech students, and then, 
again and again, they struck innumerable groups of young people in the underground 
Resistance [...]. This generation has had its horizon broadened [j/c] by the terrible 
experience of Gestapo torture chambers, concentration camps, prisons and places of 
execution.40 
This broadening of their horizons means, when uttered by a Marxist-Leninist, realizing 
the truth of dialectical materialism, the course and the eventual outcome of the class 
struggle. In the whole book, Hajek does not mention once the genocide of the Jews. In his 
Foreword to Posledni dopisy, Halas also confines himself to Nazism’s meaning for the 
happy future. He condemns all those who have not been either Communists or in the 
resistance movement, or both, the ‘empty, putrescent hearts of those complacent accepters 
of the given circumstances’, who had decided ‘prudently to sit it out, concealing their 
cowardice behind loud-mouthedness or whispered views’.41 The words of the dead authors 
of the letters will help preserve the memory of Nazism, be a warning to the future, 
however much more conciliatory that future might be in comparison with now. Most 
important, however, these dead men and women ‘had caught sight off...] the springboard 
for an historic leap, had witnessed moments when it would be possible to change things for 
centuries to come’:42 in other words, in their encounter with the full brutality of Nazism, 
their faith in Communism had been strengthened. Indeed, it is clear from a great many of 
these letters that faith in Stalin, Gottwald and the cause fortified them, gave them the sort 
of strength Christian belief gave others. They were, they imagined, not dying as a witness 
to God whom they would meet in Heaven, but dying for a better, socialist world after the 
defeat of the Fascist class enemy. These were Communists with a ‘natural’ sense of self- 
sacrifice, ‘far from playing any games of martyrdom’. Before their executions, ‘the cause 
of the class, the nation, and humankind [...] replaced the will to live with the will to 
sacrifice themselves’.43 The medical student, Frantisek Jirasek, for example, declares, ‘My 
faith in the USSR and the infallibility of Leninism keeps me in a good mood here.’44 
Frequently, these brave men and women link their belief in glorious socialist morrows with 
patriotic sentiments. The miner, Josef Matusek, for example, writes: ‘It seems that I must 
pay a tax for my love of the working classes and my nation — my head [...]. Dear Czech 
nation, Daddy Joseph [that is: Joe Stalin]! In the end we shall be victorious.’45 That there is 
no mention of the Jews in this anthology is less disconcerting than in the case of the Hajek 
book. Posledni dopisy does not pretend to be anything else but propaganda to legitimate 
Communist rule on the (spurious) grounds that only Communists had genuinely sacrificed 
themselves for the nation. 
The second group of contenders for the title of greatest victim of the Germans are the 
Slavs. And here we enter the murky borderlands between self-pity and self-heroization. 
Again I start with Ecer. He has so to speak appropriated the Shoah in the following, by not 
mentioning the Jews of Poland, the Baltic states, White Russia, the Ukraine: 
39 Jiri Hajek, Generace na rozhrani, Prague, 1946. p. 107. 
40 Ibid., pp. 113-14. 
41 Halas (ed.), Posledni dopisy, p. 5. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
44 Ibid., p. 17. 
45 Ibid., p. 21. 
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In its judgement the court adds that the worst crimes were committed against the civilian 
populations of the Soviet Union and Poland. It then describes these crimes in greater detail, 
and the commands and speeches of Nazi leaders that preceded the crimes and stimulated 
them. For us as citizens of a Slav state these parts of the judgement are particularly 
instructive. The Nuremberg court went to the root of the crimes committed against the Slav 
nations and its judgement reveals, confirms the historical fact that the chief target of the 
German attack was the Slavs.46 
Slav feeling need not necessarily be linked with victimhood. In Habrina we encounter 
Panslav sentiments which seem to form part of his mental survival kit in Mauthausen. In 
the first example, he expresses love for the Soviets as the coming liberators of his country 
and associates that with a Hussite warrior hymn: ‘you, my native brothers, brothers from 
the Vltava,/where a new battle-mace is being forged in the workshops of anger,/where the 
waiting land is prepared/for the call of the chorale “Ye Warriors of God”,/you from the 
Dnieper, the Volga, from spreading Rus',/where gigantic wings smother the nightmare 
enemy’.47 The second occurrence suggests Slav unity (there is no Stalinist undertone, 
though): ‘from the Volga to the plains/where the Vltava is on guard,/from the Vistula to 
the towers of Ljubljana, there lies our home.// We are coming, we are coming, oh, 
home,/to avenge our great dead.’48 Kraus and Schon and Roubal write of the Germans’ 
especially cruel treatment of Russians in concentration camps. The Slavs come off pretty 
well in Kraus and Schon’s assessment of capacity to endure concentration-camp life (and 
the Russians are the most successful escapers, too). Nevertheless, in the following we see 
that actually, the less pampered a society a group comes from the greater their endurance 
will be (we remember that the Hungarian Jews in the Auschwitz complex were from 
provincial Hungary, not rich Budapest). I do not, however, think for one moment that the 
authors are maintaining that the West is decadent: 
The Dutch had the least staying power; a few days after arrival they contracted stomach and 
intestine diseases from which they never recovered. 
Other west European prisoners, the French and Belgians, found it difficult to endure camp. 
Greeks and Italians did not last long either. 
Russians, Poles and Hungarians held out the best. 
Czechs and Slovaks came somewhere in the middle.49 
I do not wish to desecrate the memory of the Czechs and Slovaks who perished in the 
Auschwitz complex; the reader cannot but notice, however, that the Czechoslovaks were in 
the middle, not quite Western, not quite Eastern, the bridge that President Benes so desired 
them to be. On the Czechs in Birkenau, Kraus and Schon manifest their national pride 
when they state that (there is no Slav Reciprocity here): ‘The Czechs were neither 
insensitive nor ruthless enough to obtain any position of prison authority. The Poles called 
them Pepiks. But the Czechs gained respect through their specialist expertise [...] We 
never saw a Czech hitting or bullying a prisoner.’50 One cannot but be reminded of Jin 
Benes’s depiction of Czech prisoners in the Mittelbau concentration camp, and then just 
after they enter the part of Germany liberated by the Russians. In his account the worst 
looters were Polish and Hungarian Jewish women; the Hungarians claimed to be 
Czechoslovaks, but were either non-Slovak, especially Hungarians from eastern Slovakia, 
or from Hungary. Those who turn out to be from Hungary are set to work by the Soviets 
46 Ecer, Norimbersky soud, pp. 341-42. 
47 Habrina, Vezen za draty, p. 45. 
48 Ibid., p. 90. 
49 Kraus and Schon, Tovarna na smrt, pp. 184-85. 
50 Ibid., p. 208. 
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digging beet. Benes does not comment on that. Furthermore, ‘all acknowledged, Germans, 
Poles, French, Yugoslavs and above all, primarily Russians, that the Czechs behaved most 
decently’.51 It is telling that one reviewer of Benes’s memoir, Amost Blaha, particularly 
picked on the behaviour of these Polish and Flungarian Jews; he also noted with 
satisfaction that the Italians and French were ‘the least resistant physically and morally’.52 
Of course, I accept that the dominant mode of thinking after six years’ German 
occupation will mean that ‘we Czechs’ and ‘our sufferings’ will be at the centre of Czech 
literary attention in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. And of course, I accept that 
many writers included Jewish Czechs among the Czechs as fellow victims, fellow citizens 
in an unbiased, liberal manner. But still, in general, the special nature of the Jewish lot is 
grossly underplayed. Sometimes, even when it is the last thing the writer intends, prejudice 
emerges. For example, in Selepa’s long Dachau poem, we read: ‘the Germanic devil 
tries/to bow your heads into the dust//the way that wretched Jew had to fall to the ground 
and kiss it/rise and fall again.’53 It leaves a nasty taste in one’s mouth when Ecer writes, 
concerning the numbers of people murdered in the Auschwitz complex when Hoss was 
commandant, that the majority consisted of ‘Jews, but, as is well known, there were also 
members of other nations, many of whom were Czechs’.54 That is not the same as Kraus 
and Schon’s special liking for Czech Jews. Ecer was an educated man; Roubal was less 
educated, but expresses the same thing as Ecer, albeit about the Theresienstadt Small 
Fortress rather than Auschwitz, in a decent way. He is writing of the commandant Jockel; 
‘his unheard of cruelty, sadism and mortal loathing of everything Czech and Slavonic, but 
chiefly his race hatred of the Jews’;55 Roubal makes no comment on the fact that Jockel’s 
two most brutal henchmen, ‘for whom the prisoners and particularly the Jews were not 
human at all’,56 had one a Slovak, Rojko, the other a Czech name, Soukup. He does not 
need to point that out to the Czech reader. Habrina is perhaps the strongest in his 
condemnation of the Germans for the mass murder of the Jews and for the war, since he 
will not accept that it was the responsibility of the Nazi leadership and their ‘law’- 
enforcement agencies; 
The Germans wanted the First World War and, illogically, attributed their defeat to the Jews. 
They also wanted the Second World War, which was only a continuation of the First. In a 
rising wave of chauvinism and antisemitism they swept away the Jews and prepared the war 
[...] And these things were not a matter only of a certain social class or a small stratum of the 
nation; on the contrary, it was a war of the nazified masses, a war of the whole nation.57 
Habrina continues: ‘And that is why President Benes is right when he says that the 
whole German nation is responsible for the concentration camps. And Thomas Mann 
fearlessly faces his nation and accuses it [, argues that] it is impossible to expect the 
nations of [...] the world to draw a dividing line between the Nazis and the German 
people.’58 Habrina, of course, favours the expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia. 
The spirit of vengeance had been a minor motif of his Mauthausen verse anyway, in the 
image of the circling raven, and as the whisper under the breath of prisoners, the spirit of 
vengeance here as an upholder of morale. Selepa also writes in the Lidice poem: ‘away 
51 Jirl Benes, V nemeckem zajeti, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 292. 
52 Amost Blaha review in Sociologicka revue, 12, 1946, 2-3, p. 115. 
53 Selepa, Lidice Osvetim Dachov, pp. 51-52. 
54 Ecer, Norimbersky soud, p. 340. 
55 Roubal, Tere zin zustane..., P-21. 
56 Ibid., p. 23. 
57 Habrina, Nadclovek a nadnarod, p. 51. 
58 Ibid., p. 52. 
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with all who are not at home here, /who have intruded,/who are now nailing my country/on 
their arrogant swastika-cross’.59 
The different emotional currents at play in Czech reactions to the Shoah may be seen in 
the brief series of obituaries for the sociologist Bruno Zwicker that appeared in the 
Sociologicka revue. Zwicker had been interned first in Brno, and then, 22 March 1942, 
taken to that Theresienstadt ghetto, where he worked as a schoolmaster. On 28 September, 
1944, he was deported to Auschwitz where he was immediately sent to the gas chamber; 
he was murdered on the night of 29-30 September. It is difficult to tell whether the tribute 
by Milos Trapl exhibits the author’s desire to accept a Jew as a Czech or the view common 
in Czech writing, especially from the second decade of the twentieth century onwards, that 
there was no reason why a Jew, if he assimilated, could not be a good Czech. In either 
case, Trepl’s words are politicized: 
He came from a Jewish family in Moravia. The family had never grown rich from commerce 
and it was perhaps for that reason that he fused almost completely with the surrounding 
Czechs: the family spoke Czech and felt Czech. For our friend assimilation was not a 
problem, but a matter of course. He did not only want to be a true Czech, but he always 
identified himself with all the nation’s endeavours and suffered when something went wrong 
for the nation. He was a true Czech.60 
Antonin Obrdlik’s tribute to Zwicker not only sounds a little cold, but, even more than 
Trapl, he appears to be appropriating the Shoah for the Czech cause: ‘And so the poor 
fellow, after the long Calvary of his suffering, which led from Theresienstadt to 
Auschwitz, found redemption and peace in the gas chamber. [...] He was a devoted 
cultivator of scholarly truths and at the moment of his death died as a member of the young 
Czech intelligentsia on the barricade of the spirit.’61 That is semantically and emotionally 
different from, say, E. F. Burian’s words in his preface to Tovarna na smrt, though one can 
certainly also label Burian’s words ‘politicized’: 
You [reader] will be addressed [in this book] by those who laid down their lives for your 
freedom. For a better future for your children. [...] Do not be horrified by the faces of the 
dead who speak to you here. They are you; these dead are part of you, pieces of the body of 
your country [...]. 
Do not torment yourself, but harden your heart and swear that you will never, never allow 
such a sacrifice to be repeated.62 
Burian himself had been in the camps, in Dachau and Neuengamme, where Kraus had 
become his friend. Burian’s words must be understood as an interpretation, and indeed his 
interpretation approaches that implicit in the term ‘holocaust’. The trouble is that, at least 
on the surface, it forgets the German element, the fact that the Jews (and Gypsies and 
homosexuals) were primarily sacrificed to the Nazi ideal of racial purity. One further 
point, which does not make various Czech ‘patriotic’ writers’ words less disturbing, but 
which does make me wary of declaring that there was a more or less general Czech or 
Czechoslovak appropriation of the Shoah, is the importance Kraus and Schon lend to 
murdered Jews’ Czechness. Twice they write in their memoir that Czech Jews on entering 
the gas chamber sang the Czechoslovak national anthem (both the Czech and Slovak 
parts), and only then a Hebrew song.63 Similarly, Polish Jews, like Polish Gentiles, called 
out ‘Long Live Poland’ before they were executed, and Russian prisoners, like the Czech, 
V 
59 Selepa, Lidice Osvetim Dachov, p. 10. 
60 ‘In memoriam nasich spolupracovniku’, Sociologicka revue, 12, 1946, 2-3, pp. 19-20. 
61 Ibid., pp. 22-23. 
62 Kraus and Schon, Tovarna na smrt, p. 7. 
63 Ibid., pp. 146 and 158. 
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never accepted posts of authority like kapo or Blockaltester. Kraus and Schon are, 
however, not afraid of touching on taboos, female and, chiefly, male homosexuality in the 
camps, but more than that, the Jewish persecution of the Jews there. Kraus and Schon had 
clearly never lost their sense of shock at that, but they do endeavour to write with 
understanding. I first take one example, where understanding is not evident, but an 
example which incidentally serves to demonstrate their journalist style, too. We might also 
note the influence of the West here: ‘Polish Jews, particularly those who had come from 
France, soon adopted Nazi ways. They also proved themselves competent collaborators of 
their persecutors. It seems incredible that these Jews tormented and beat to death 
subordinate defenceless Jewish prisoners, but it is true!’64 Kraus and Schon do have some 
explanation: 
In the first half of 1943 some Jews actually became Blockalteste, with the result that even 
"racially pure’ German prisoners were subordinate to them. Jews also became kapos, whose 
orders had to be obeyed by the Germans, too. The SS rejected all protests against this. 
Entrusting prison posts to Jews was a component of the sophisticated policy of the camp 
command. It put mainly old prisoners more at ease, and it gave the others the impression that 
they were out of danger. 
A few cases of the ‘aryanization’ of Jews also occurred in Birkenau. A few Germans of 
mixed race were honoured with the privilege of wearing a red triangle — the badge of 
political prisoners. Overnight these formally mixed-race Germans became arrogant, coarse 
lackeys of the Nazis. Jews bore the brunt of their changed behaviour.65 
Kraus and Schon sound a little too like Communists in part of their assessment of why 
prisoners persecuted members of their own ethnie, and not only Jews (I wonder whether 
the Czechs are included): 
Prisoners of all nationalities indulged in brutality: Nazism affected everyone. 
In the conditions obtaining at the time, it stood to reason that German kapos and 
Blockalteste tormented and beat to death members of other nations, especially Jews, in order 
to prove their Germanness. By their enthusiasm they hoped to win acceptance in the Nazi 
national community. But why did Poles torment and kill Poles, French Jews French Jews, 
and Polish Jews Polish Jews? 
The chief reason for the psychosis of crazed destruction and mutual hatred were as 
follows: hunger, a lack of political education and awareness, and the poison of Nazism.66 
Roubal does not write about such things, partly because of the nature of his book, the 
report of a trial, rather than the report of survivors. For the same reason, he concentrates 
more on the Jewishness of the victims than Kraus and Schon, whose main aim is to 
demonstrate the base criminal horror of the whole system. Roubal’s book also concentrates 
on the crimes of the commandant Jockel himself; without showing the slightest lack of 
compassion for Gentile prisoners, Roubal’s compassion lies chiefly with the Jews. His 
book is also angrier that Kraus and Schon’s. Before I come to two typical instances of the 
horror of the Small Fortress, I record the story of an airman like Douglas Bader, not only 
because it constitutes an exceptional case, but also because it appears to manifest 
something of the old Czech sense of inferiority. A hero like this could not possibly have a 
simple Czech name: ‘A British airman, Jan Blaha, was also imprisoned in the 
Theresienstadt Small Fortress; he had lost both legs. His name was probably false, for he 
was a very intelligent man and the rumour spread that by origin he was a noble from the 
64 Ibid., p. 209. 
65 Ibid., p. 108. 
66 Ibid., pp. 38-39. 
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Lobkowicz family.’67 Blaha is kept in a cell away from the rest of the prisoners and was 
eventually beaten to death by Rojko. Roubal gives as an example of the savagery of 
Theresienstadt the fate of deportees sent to Theresienstadt in January 1945 from Auschwitz 
as it was being evacuated. Three hundred and eighty-seven prisoners arrived on the train, 
80 per cent of whom are Jews. Seventeen of them were beaten to death by Jockel’s men 
before they entered the Theresienstadt camp gates. At the end of the war, four months 
later, only thirty of the original 387 had survived, and only eight of these left the camp 
alive, including a twelve-year-old boy, Roman Kowalski, who had been in concentration 
camps since the age of six. I give my two examples of particular brutality towards the Jews 
as demonstrations of what the Czech Communist leadership knew when they began their 
campaign against the Jews five years later. First, an event concerning a Jewish couple, 
who, in 1942, were moved from the Theresienstadt to the Small Fortress; they had been 
moved, ‘only because the wife was pregnant and, by decree, at that time Jews were not 
permitted to have children. In the most brutal manner, the accused [Jockel] beat the woman 
with a stick until he managed to make her abort her child, and then he left her lying there 
to die in terrible agony. Her husband was beaten to death by guards that same evening.’68 
My second example also depicts mass humiliation, quite apart from the brutality any 
reader of Czech literary accounts of the Shoah from the immediate post-war period expects 
of the Germans: 
On Sundays it often happened that Jockel became bored, and the other guards were in a 
similar state of mind; then he ordered a number of Jews be paraded in the courtyard. They all 
had to take up pitchforks, stand opposite each other in two groups and then stab each other 
until their opponents were lying wounded on the ground. On one of these Sundays three 
victors were hanged because they had killed their three opponents. The hanging had to be 
carried out by a Jewish doctor, who later went mad as a result of his Theresienstadt 
experiences.69 
The Communist interpretation of the persecution of the Jews is embodied in Jin Weil’s 
novel, Zivot s hvezdou (Life with the Star, 1949). Here a Jew manages, like Weil himself, 
to escape deportation by going into hiding. After depicting the humiliation of everyday life 
for his hero as a Jew, Weil has his hero find some spiritual help among a group of 
Communist workers. Solidarity with the workers saves the hero from surrendering himself 
to concentration-camp death, or helps him escape it as a result of his political 
consciousness. The Communists subsequently banned this novel, as too degenerately 
subjectivist. Elsewhere, Weil also discussed the function of private firms in concentration 
camps and in the slave-labour system as a whole. From time to time, Kraus and Schon 
devote space to the ‘private employees’ who work in the camps and who are not permitted 
to reveal anything they see there to anyone, on pain of death or severe punishment. The 
prisoners use them as postmen, and the ‘private employees’ sometimes manage to bring in 
provisions. If they are caught communicating with prisoners, let alone bearing mail for 
them, they are normally killed. These men are Germans, Poles and Czechs, normally slave- 
labourers working for firms outside the camp perimeters. Weil is concerned with one of 
the firms most closely associated with slave-labour, a firm which took over numerous 
Czechoslovak enterprises in both the Sudetenland and the Protectorate. This firm was I. G. 
Farben, which, especially through its taking over of the Prague-based Aussiger Verein, 
67 Roubal, Terezin ziistane..., p. 89. 
68 Ibid., p. 31. 
69 Ibid., p. 70. 
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was particularly powerful.70 In the leading article of the last number of Literarm noviny for 
1948, Weil reported on an intellectuals’ congress in Wroclaw. Here a Jew who had had a 
very unpleasant war blames the camps on the capitalist greed of I. G. Farben and, 
indirectly, by association, on the Americans. With this quotation I come back to the 
beginning of my chapter, and give my final example of the appropriation of the Shoah, this 
time in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist vein: 
It was no accident that Wroclaw was chosen. Wroclaw shows what war means. To what 
destruction it leads, for though it may sound strange, there are still nations that have not 
experienced war in its true form, thus do not know what war looks like. This is particularly 
true of the Americans. It is sad that a few years after the bloodiest war in the history of the 
world it was necessary to [...] warn the world of the danger of a new war. It is sad that, after 
all the mass murder and all the destruction of property and culture, after Buchenwald, Belsen, 
Majdanek and Auschwitz, intellectuals have to charge their governments not to perpetrate a 
madness that could lead to the annihilation of civilization. [...] And there was yet another 
circumstance, the most serious: the I. G. Farben trust was linked with international trusts in 
Europe and America, and these trusts shared I. G. Farben’s profits. And what is even more 
astonishing is that the I. G. Farben trust still exists after the war, although led by Americans. 
[...] The Wroclaw congress demonstrated that intellectuals cannot shut their eyes to similar 
facts, that they must look for the causes of war and human suffering where they really are, in 
capitalist trusts which are preparing for another war.71 
70 For an account of the German industrial occupation of central and south-eastern Europe, see 
Anthony McElligot, Reforging Mitteleuropa in the Crucible of War’ in Peter Stirk (ed.), 
Mitieleuropa. History and Prospects, Edinburgh, 1994, pp. 129-59. 
71 Jin Weil, ‘Vratislavsky sjezd’, Literarm noviny, 17, 1948, 9-10, p. 121. 
6 ‘Old Wine in a New Bottle’: The Jews as 
Perceived in Post-war Communist Poland, 
1945-47 
Joanna Michlic 
Introduction 
In recent years it has been widely recognized that national myths constitute one of the 
fundamental driving forces of modem society and that in fact they are an important part of 
national identity and nationalism.1 Yet little work has been done on the impact of national 
myths on interethnic relations, as indicated by Anthony D. Smith, in his study Nations and 
Nationalism in a Global Era: ‘in the intellectual and popular uses, and limits of [myths, 
memories and symbols] we must search for more adequate answers to the variations of 
interethnic relations and the invocation of nationalism as the ultimate political and 
territorial solution to ethnic relations in mixed areas’.2 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact of national myths, especially the 
myth of the ‘Threatening Other’ in Poland in the years immediately after the Second 
World War. I will chiefly examine the mythologized image of the Jew among the political 
elites in government and in opposition, and in society as a whole. 
My main argument is that, in order to understand how the Jewish ethnic minority was 
perceived in post-war Communist Poland we have to take into account the dominant 
concepts of the Jews in pre-war Poland, mainly the myth of the Jew as the greatest 
political, economic and cultural enemy of the Polish nation. This myth, developed and 
advocated within the integral nationalist camp, proved to have a considerable impact on 
the perceptions of realities among a large segment of Polish society in both the pre-war 
and post-war periods. The years between 1945 and 1947 provide an insight into how the 
myth continued to exert influence on society and how the new Communist regime began to 
exploit the myth for its own political ends. Before examining the period 1945-47, I first 
briefly discuss the myth of the Jew as the enemy of the Polish nation. 
The Myth of the Jew as the Enemy of the Polish Nation: A Survey 
During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, a new type of literature regarding 
the Jewish ethnic minority emerged among the Polish lower middle class. This literature, 
consisting of articles in the press, political pamphlets and novels, was chiefly engaged in 
polemics with the so-called Positivist camp that promoted equal rights for Jews.3 
1 See Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations, Oxford, 1986, pp. 6-7; George 
Schopflin: ‘The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths’ in Geoffrey Hosking and 
George Schopflin (eds). Myths and Nationhood, London, 1997, pp. 19-35. 
2 Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge, 1995, p. 80. 
3 On the discourse between the Positivists and their opponents see, for example, K. Stepnik, 
‘Powiesc antysemicka w ostatnich latach Kongresowki’, Krytyka, 39, 1992, pp. 82-83. A good 
example of the anti-Positivist work is J. Jelenski, Zydzi, Niemcy i My, Warsaw, 1880, where the 
author strongly criticizes a leading Polish writer, Aleksander Glowacki (Boleslaw Prus), for 
supporting Jewish emancipation. Characteristically, Jelenski perceived himself as a member of 
a small minority that was able to recognize the true danger facing the development of the Polish 
nation. He was one of the first writers who indicated that, in the best interest of Poland, the 
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The main arguments presented in these writings were the following: first, that the Jews 
are not suited to integration into the Polish nation since they are alien culturally and 
ethnically and, furthermore, they are a much older and more powerful people than the 
Poles. Secondly, among ethnic groups the Jews constitute a special case, one that has had 
in the past and could have in the future a disastrous impact on the Polish state, nation and 
national culture; that, in fact, they are permanently engaged in the process of a Judaization 
(zazydzenie) of the Polish universe, its territory, politics, economy, language, religion and 
traditions; that the Jews are also traitors of Polish national causes since they frequently 
represent foreign interests, especially those of other Polish enemies, the Germans and the 
Russians; that Poland is an innocent, a suffering victim of the Jewish invasion; that all the 
misfortunes that have befallen her including the partitions of the Polish state (1772, 1792, 
1795) were caused by this alien minority; finally, that Poles should defend themselves in a 
much more organized and effective way in order to show the Jews that ethnic Poles are the 
true and only owners of Polish territory; that the Jews are not suited to residing among the 
Poles but should look for a homeland elsewhere. 
The myth of the Jew as the greatest enemy of the Polish nation has its roots in the sense 
of national, economic and cultural inadequacy strongly felt by the Polish middle classes 
and the impoverished intelligentsia.* * 4 The myth’s main early propagators, Teodor Jeske- 
Choinski (1854-1920), Jan Jelenski (1845-1909) and Andrzej Jan Niemojewski (1864— 
1921) enjoyed considerable popularity and their works were reprinted many times, before 
and after Poland regained its independence in 1918.5 
At the same time, the myth entered the realm of Polish politics. In fact, the National 
Democrats (Endecja) the main representatives of Polish integral nationalism employed 
it as one of the core elements of their ideology.6 Furthermore, this system of beliefs 
advocated by the Endecja and its off-shoot radical organizations was also spread in 
various forms and to a varying degree among the conservative, monarchist and peasant 
parties and among large parts of the Polish Catholic Church. The only main political 
groups to reject this were the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Jozef Pilsudski’s camp, 
the so-called Sanacja. However, in the case of the latter, after the death of Pilsudski in 
Jews should first be isolated from the Poles and then disappear/emigrate from all Polish 
territories. 
4 Krystyna Kersten states: ‘In Poland’s circumstances Jews were perceived less as bearers of 
metaphysical evil than as an ethnic, religious and cultural minority posing a threat to a “young 
nation [...] only forming its character” — to the underdeveloped Polish middle class, to the 
inefficient bourgeoisie, to the pauperized intelligentsia’, Krystyna Kersten, ‘The “Jewish 
Communism” Stereotype (The Polish Case)’, in A. Gerrits and N. Adler (eds). Vampires 
Unstaked: National Images, Stereotypes and Myths in East Central Europe, Amsterdam and 
Oxford, 1995. Roman Dmowski elaborated the concept of the young Polish nation struggling 
with the mature Jewish nation in one of his most popular works Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka, 
2nd edn, Lemberg, 1994. 
5 This literature includes a vast number of works for example, T. Jeske-Choinski, Program i 
metoda Zydowee Warsaw; T. Jeske-Choinski, Poznaj Zyda, 2nd edn, Warsaw, 1912; T. Jeske- 
Choinski, Mocarstwo podziemne, 5th edn, Warsaw, 1927; J. Jelenski, Zydzi, Niemcy i My, 
Warsaw, 1880; J. Jelenski, Wrogom wlasnej ojczyzny, Warsaw, 1906; A. Niemojewski, Sklad i 
pochod armii piatego zaboru, Warsaw, 1911; A. Niemojewski, Dusza zydowska w zwierciadle 
Talmudu, 2nd edn, Warsaw, 1914. 
6 Andrzej Friszke, in a short article ‘Pytania o polski nacjonalizm’, Wiez, 11, pp. 74-85, 
summarizes the problem of the heritage of anti-Jewish thought in the camp of the National 
Democrats. See also S. Rudnicki, Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny. Geneza i dzialalnosc, Warsaw, 
1985, pp. 112—13 and B. Grott, Nacjonalizm Chrzescijanski. Mysl spoleczno-panstwowa 
formacji narodo-katolickiej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej, Cracow, 1991, pp. 255-60. 
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1935 the mythologized image of the Jew began to influence its policies towards the 
Jewish minority.7 
From its emergence and until the end of the Second Republic, the integral nationalist 
camp used the myth with greater or lesser success as a catalyst for social mobilization and 
national coherence. This use of the myth was especially intensified at times of social, 
political and economic crisis, for example, during the formative years 1918-1920, then 
between 1929 and 1931, and between 1936 and 1939. 
Furthermore, the myth was supposed to fulfil another function, namely that of asserting 
legitimacy and authority, and discrediting political rivals. For example, in the Endecja 
press, Jozef Pilsudski was frequently portrayed as a politician favoured by the enemies of 
Poland: the Jews together with the Germans and the Ukrainians.8 In the early 1930s, the 
ruling Sanacja was often accused of representing the Jewish interest above that of Poles,9 
while the PPS was simply labelled Jewish.10 
Belief in the Jew who nursed a particular hatred for Poland clearly qualified the 
perception of antisemitism. Thus, within the integral nationalist camp, antisemitism was 
defined and understood as a form of national self-defence against the danger of 
Judeopolonia.l] As early as 1902, Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Endecja, demanded 
that an apparatus of professional antisemitism should be established.12 The myth also 
exerted great influence on the policies and practices of the ethnic nationalization of the 
Polish nation-state, a project that received wide support among political elites and the 
masses, especially in the second half of the 1930s. What the project set out for the Jewish 
ethnic minority was emigration.13 This idea continued to dominate integral nationalist 
circles during the Second World War. The general conviction that the presence of the Jews 
would be harmful to the future Polish nation-state was also shared by some political and 
social groups who were actively engaged in helping the Jews during the Shoah.14 
7 Y. Gutman, ‘Polish Antisemitism between the Wars. An Overview’ in Y. Gutmann, E. 
Mendelsohn, J. Reinharz and C. Shmeruk (eds), The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars, 
Hanover and London, 1989, pp. 103 and 106. 
8 Mysl Narodowa and Gazeta Warszawska often presented such an image of Jozef Pilsudski. For 
excerpts from these newspapers see, for example, A. Domoslawski, ‘Biale orly, szare sepy’, 
Gazeta Wyborcza, 14-15 March 1998. 
9 J. Tomaszewski, ‘Dokumentry o zaburzeniach antysemickich na Uniwersytecie Warzawskim 
najeseni 1931 r.’, Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, 2, 1997, p. 77. 
10 S. Rudnicki, Oboz Narodow-Radykalny, pp. 112—13. 
11 On the subject of definition and understanding of antisemitism by the Polish integral 
national/nationalist camp see W. Mich, Obey w polskim domu. Nacjonalistyczne koncepcje 
rozwiazania problemu mniejszosci narodowych 1918-1939, Lublin, 1994, pp. 18-25. 
12 See Rudnicki, Oboz Narodowo-Radykalny, p. 112. 
13 On the whole, the only substantial difference between the various political groups that 
supported the project of ethnic nationalization was that of tactics, not of ideology. In the cases 
of other minorities, this project advocated the forced assimilation of Slav minorities and the 
marginalization of the German ethnic group. See Mich, Obey w polskim domu, pp. 18-25; R. 
Brubaker, ‘Nationalizing States in the Old “New Europe” — and the New’, Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, 2, 1996. 
14 See, for example, wartime articles by Zofia Kossak-Szczucka, the founding leader of the 
Catholic front for the Rebirth of Poland (front Odrodzenia Polski, LOP) and the Relief Council 
for the Jews, the Zegota. Z. Kossak-Szczucka, ‘Komu pomagamy?’, Prawda, August- 
September 1943, and an unpublished programme of the POP written by Witold Bienkowski in 
K. Przybysz (ed.), Wizje Polski. Programy polityczne latwojny i okupaeji 1939-1944, Warsaw, 
1992, pp. 135-49. 
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Throughout the inter-war period, the myth proved to be a versatile phenomenon 
consisting of elements that not only overlapped but contradicted each other.15 Its main 
repeated components or sub-myths were the following, familiar from other nations’ 
nationalism: that the Jews were the greatest enemy of the Polish religion; that the Jews 
were behind Freemasonry which desired to rule the Polish state; that the Jews were the 
exponents of international finance, which damaged the Polish economy; that the Jews were 
moral degenerates who had a demoralizing effect on Polish culture and people, and that the 
Jews were inventors and propagators of free thinking, liberalism, socialism, Communism 
and Bolshevism — ideologies alien and deleterious to the Polish national cause. 
Judaeo-Communism and Judaeo-Bolshevism were the loudest and the most commonly 
employed parts of the myth of the Jews as the enemy of Poland.16 Linking the Jews to the 
anti-national forces of Communism and Bolshevism took place on a grand scale. Even 
before the Polish-Russian war of 1920 started, a substantial bulk of literature had emerged 
that portrayed Bolshevism as a Jewish conspiracy aimed at oppressing the Russian 
people.17 In 1936, the Committee of the Press of the Young (Komitet Prasy Mlodychj 
represented by fifteeen different ultra-nationalist , conservative and Catholic newspapers, 
was set up in order to fight Communism and to promote exclusivist integral nationalism.18 
One of the main messages disseminated by this press was a warning against Judaeo- 
Bolshevism. Characteristically, the Catholic monthly Pro Christo, directed at the 
intelligentsia, published, along with articles on Judaeo-Communism, articles on ritual 
murder explaining that such a ritual was practised among the Jews — including those in 
contemporary Poland.19 
In summary , at the end of the Second Republic the myth of the Jew as a source of threat 
was a well-established part of thinking among a large section of society. Among the many 
political and social functions the myth fulfilled was, above all, a sense of a reasserted 
positive image of Poland: if it were not for the Jews, Poles would be a great and 
prosperous people. It also encouraged the belief that Poland was a victim mistreated by 
others throughout history. These two perceptions became central to the Polish experience 
immediately after the Second World War. 
The Communist Take-over in Poland and the Jewish Ethnic Minority 
The immediate post-war years constituted one of the most dramatic chapters in modem 
Polish history. With the help of the Red Army, the Communists succeeded in consolidating 
power in their hands and were not prepared to share it, not even with the legal political 
opposition which they were finally to crush in 1947.20 This had already been declared by 
15 According to George Schopflin, the latter fact is immaterial to the existence of a myth since its 
different components/sub-myths receive different emphases at different times to cope with 
different challenges. Schopflin, ‘The Functions of Myth...’, p. 35. 
16 According to Krystyna Kersten: ‘Jews and Communism merged into the single category of 
enemies of God, Nation and Motherland, all the more baleful for being both within and 
without, overt and hidden, lying in ambush’, Kersten, 'The “Jewish Communism” Stereotype’. 
17 I. Kaminska-Szmaj, Judzi, Zohyzda, ze czci odziera. J^zyk propagandy politycznej w prasie 
1919-1923, Wroclaw, 1994. pp. 143-49. 
18 Rudnicki, Oboz Narodow-Radykalny, pp. 300-03. 
19 Wojciech Zajety’s article ‘Mord rytualny u Zydow’, Pro Christo, 3, 1927, pp. 224-27, is 
typical of this genre. The author writes: 'ritual murder has survived among this outrageous 
nation until today [...] there were attempts at ritual murder in Wagrowiec in 1922 and Dobrzyn 
in 1926’. He supports his stance with two allegedly scientific works by Pranajtis and Brant. 
20 Andrzej Paczkowski, Zdobycie wladzy. 1945-1947, Warsaw, 1993, p.80; A. Friszke, Opozycja 
polityczna w PRL 1945-1980, London, 1994, pp. 23-36. 
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the First Secretary of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR), Wladyslaw Gomulka (1905-82), in 
June 1945: ‘Once we have taken power, we will never give it up’.21 Thus, despite the 
wishes of the maiority of society, Poland rapidly moved into the sphere of influence of the 
Soviet Bloc.22 
For many Poles in both legal and illegal opposition and among the masses, the 
Communist take-over was identified with the rule of Judaeo-Communism, the myth that 
had already been strengthened during the Soviet occupation of the Eastern Provinces that 
began in September 193 9.23 The fact that a group of Jews held prominent positions within 
the Central Committee of the PPR, the government, the army and the security apparatus 
reinforced the perception that ‘we’ Poles were being governed by ‘them’, the Jews.24 
Therefore, in anti-Communist propaganda, the names of prominent Jewish Communists 
were put in their plural forms in order to stress the enormity of the Jewish take-over.25 A 
good example of this linguistic manipulation can be found in the later statement of an 
emigre intellectual based in London, Andrzej Lobodowski: ‘if Poland had regained its 
independence, everything would have developed differently [...]. But Poland has not 
regained its independence and the fact that among the Communist elite there were as many 
Mines, Bermans, Katz-Suchys, Rozanskis and Fejgs had to bode evil upon the future’.26 
In presenting the Jews as a collectivity ruling Poland, the mythopoets ignored the fact 
that a substantial majority of the Jewish survivors of the Shoah did not actively participate 
in the Communist regime and that the Jews who did were, to use the popular term, mostly 
‘non-Jewish Jews’ to whom their ethnic identity was of no significance.27 Furthermore, 
they failed to recognize that the size of the Jewish community had been reduced to a mere 
1 per cent of the entire population, compared with 10 per cent in pre-war Poland, and that 
among the victims of the secret police were also Jews and persons of Jewish origin.28 
Thus, in a sense, the extent of the myth of the Jew as the enemy of Poland in the early 
post-war years already confirmed the aptness of Aleksander Hertz’s pre-war thesis that 
mythologization of the ‘other’ as the enemy can continue regardless of the real position of 
21 Wladyslaw Gomulka made this statement during the political meeting of the Provisional 
Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rzad Jednosci Narodowej) in which the PPR was 
the Soviet-sponsored body. Archives of the Worker’s Movement, vol. 9, p. 110, quoted by 
Paczkowski, Zdobycie Wladzy, p. 5. 
22 Krystyna Kersten, Miedzy wyzwoczniem a zniewolzniem: Polska 1944-1956, London, 1993, 
pp. 5-27. 
23 Kersten, 'The “Jewish Communism” Stereotype’; Michael C. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: 
Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust, New York, 1997, p. 50. 
24 On the subject of the participation of the Jews in the Communist regime see, for example, J. 
Schatz, The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland, Berkeley, CA, 
1991, and Kersten, Polacy, Zydzi. Komunizm Anatomia polprawd 1939-68, Warsaw, 1992, 
pp. 76-88. 
25 Schatz, The Generation, p. 206 
26 A. Lobodowski, quoted in the article by Barbara Toporska, ‘Wybieram watek najmniej 
populamy’ Wiadomosci, 47, 1970. The article was reprinted in J. Mackiewicz and B. Toporska 
(eds), Droga Pani, London, 1984, p. 121. 
27 The sociologist Percy Cohen names this type of Jewish Communist ‘Jewish Radical’, as 
opposed to the Radical Jew who together with his/her membership of the Communist Party was 
a declared member of a Jewish organization. Percy S. Cohen, Jewish Radicals and Radical 
Jews, London, New York and Toronto, 1980, pp. 85-88. 
Schatz, The Generation, pp. 224-25. 28 
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the mythologized subject.29 In the 1950s and 1960s this phenomenon was to become even 
more clearly visible since the myth continued to be potent among the population and the 
members of the Polish United Workers’ Party (PZPR), despite the continuous gradual 
reduction of the number of Jews in the army, the PZPR and the state apparatus.30 
In the early post-war years, the radical integral nationalists emphasized that 
Judaeopolonia had actually already come into being and that true Poles could not support 
such an anti-national regime.31 Jews who held prominent positions in the administration, 
the army and the security apparatus were perceived, according to the pre-war pattern, as 
the servants of foreign interests, namely those of the Soviet Union.32 At the same time, it 
was believed that ethnic Poles who joined or supported the Communists were simply 
puppets in the hands of the cunning Jews, since they came from a disadvantaged 
background and thus were unaware of the ‘true’ political reality. Even the ethnic Polish 
members of the Central Committee of the PPR were portrayed as having no power in 
decision-making.33 Furthermore, the secret security service responsible for the terror, 
arrests and political murders was perceived as entirely Jewish. Subsequently, during the 
1950s, all Stalinist crimes of 1949-55 were to be ascribed to the Jews alone. Stalinism was 
to become synonymous with Judaeo-Stalinism, and ethnic Poles who participated in 
Stalinist crimes were to become dissociated from it. Such a position was held by the Polish 
National Communists throughout the 1950s and 1960s and is still advocated to this day by 
some political parties that identify themselves as the followers of the Endecja.34 
Consequently, in some circles in 1947 the Jews were perceived as responsible for deaths 
on both sides during the struggle for power between 1945 and 1947. In other words, they 
were to blame for the civil war. An expression of such a belief can be found in the illegal 
leaflet signed by ‘The Committee against Jewish Influence’, circulated in Bydgoszcz in 
October 1947: 
Disgrace! Disgrace! A handful of degenerate Jews have taken over the state and are ruling 
millions of stupid Slavs [...]. Forty-five thousand Poles from the Home Army (AK), the 
National Armed Forces (NSZ) and Freedom and Independence (WiN) have been shot or 
hanged and thirty thousand Poles from the PPR and the Secret Police (UB) have been killed 
between 1946 and 1947. This is the result of the bloody regime of the Jewish clique; Jews are 
our mortal enemy. Bydgoszcz, 8 October 47.35 
It is clear that this type of anti-Jewish propaganda was supposed to serve the purpose of 
encouraging national coherence and mobilizing the Polish community to take action 
against the Jewish enemy. Within this perception the Jews were chiefly identified as a 
collective that constituted a distinctive political and biological threat to the nation. 
29 This argument was put forward by Aleksander Hertz in the article ‘Swoi przeciw obcynr, 
Wiedza i Zycie, 6, 1936, reprinted in J. Garewicz (ed.), Aleksander Hertz Socjologia 
nieprzedawniona. Wybor publicystyki, Warsaw, 1990, p. 159. 
30 P. Machcewicz, Polski rok 1956, Warsaw, 1993, pp. 216-31, and T. Pioro, ‘Czystki w wojsku 
polskim 1967-1968’, Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, 2, 1997, pp. 60-61. 
31 This was advocated by the radical right-wing nationalist philosopher and historian Feliks 
Koneczny as early as 1945. See J. Giertych, Polski Oboz Narodowy, 5th edn, Warsaw, 1990. 
32 Schatz, The Generation, p. 225. 
33 Kersten, Polacy, Zydzi, Komunizm, pp. 78—80. 
34 Gietych, Polski Oboz Narodowy, pp. 33—35. 
35 ‘Bulletin of the Ministry of Public Security no. 17, 1947’, Biuletyny Informacyjne Ministerstwa 
Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego 1947. Zrodla do historii Polski XX wieku — zc zbiorow 
Centralnego Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnetrynych, Seria C, vol. 1, Warsaw, 1993, 
pp. 182-83. 
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The perception of the Jews by the state apparatus and members of the Polish Workers’ 
Party is a more complex matter. However, ambivalent paradoxical attitudes towards the 
Jewish ethnic minority are clearly evident on the part of the Communist regime during the 
period between 1945 and 1947. 
On one hand, the Central Committee of the PPR presented itself as a party that was fully 
committed to fight antisemitism and guarantee the Jewish ethnic minority an equal status 
with the ethnic Poles.36 On the other hand, the ethnic Poles within the party and the state 
apparatus, including the Ministry of Public Security, showed increasingly anti-Jewish 
attitudes towards their Jewish comrades. Samples of these attitudes can be found in the 
Boleslaw Bierut Archives held in the Archives of New Documents (ANN).37 They can be 
summarized by the simple slogan ‘there are too many Jews among us and we do not want 
them’.38 The notion of ethnic identification within the Communist regime seems central to 
an understanding of the ambivalence of Communist attitudes towards the Jews in the early 
post-war period. 
Within the PPR, a clear discrepancy between ideology, on the one hand, and policies and 
practices, on the other, regarding the general problem of ethnicity, can be observed both 
before and after 1945. On one hand, the PPR declared its adherence to the principles of 
internationalism. On the other, the leading Communists Alfred Lampe, Boleslaw Bierut 
and Wladystaw Gomulka declared that the PPR was committed to support the ethno- 
national model of the Polish state.39 Thus, ironically, the chief goal of the pre-war integral 
nationalists was advocated by and attained under the Communist regime.40 
As early as 1945, the PPR’s frequent emphasis on the concept of the one-nation state had 
raised concerns among the Jewish Section of the Polish Workers’ Party. The documents of 
the Central Committee of the Jews reveal that the growing ethno-nationalization of the 
state was perceived by Communist Jews as a factor both in the increasing displacement of 
other ethnic minorities and in the increase in antisemitic violence.41 A lack of concern for 
the safety of Jews, silence in the face of anti-Jewish crimes and lenient treatment of the 
perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence were the typical responses of the new local political 
leaders. For example, many local PPR committees refused to take any action to prevent the 
first wave of anti-Jewish violence that spread all over Poland in 1945.42 In some cases, the 
36 B. D. Weinryt, ‘Poland’ in P. Meyer et al. (eds). The Jews in the Soviet Satellites, Syracuse, 
NY, 1953, pp. 258-63. 
37 I am grateful to Professor Andrzej Paczkowski for giving me access to a selection of Bierut’s 
notes. 
38 Jonathan Frankel discusses the general pattern of replacing the Jewish Communists by 
members of major (territorially based) nationalities during the period of Communist 
consolidation of power in his article, ‘The Soviet Regime and Anti-Zionism’ in E. Mendelsohn 
(ed.), Essential Papers on Jews and the Left, New York and London, 1997, pp. 449-51. 
39 Such declarations were made in their New Year addresses in 1946 by both Bierut and 
Gomulka. Furthermore, PPR propaganda frequently used the term national to describe 
Communist activities; see Kersten, Miedzy wyzwoleniem a zniewolzniem, p. 12. 
40 T. Lepowski, Uparte trwanie polskosci. Nostalgie, spory, nadzieje, wartosci, London, 1989, 
pp. 31-32; Norman Davies, ‘Polish National Mythologies’ in Hosking and Schopflin (eds), 
Myths and Nationhood, pp. 141-58; J. Jedlicki, ‘Nationalism and State Formation’ in Gerrits 
and Adler (eds), Vampires Unstaked, p. 130; Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead, p. 43. 
41 See the Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute, Section on Organization of the Central 
Committee of the Jews, 15, Minutes of the Committee of the Jewish Section of the PPR 
(spring-summer 1945). Short excerpts from the documents were published by Maciej Pisarski, 
‘W nowej Polsce’, Karta, 18, 1996, p. 114. 
42 D. Brus-Wegrowska, ‘Ocalzni. Atmosfera pogromowa’, Karta, 18, 1996, pp. 87-99; J. 
Andelson, ‘W Polsce zwanej ludowa’ in J. Tomaszewski (ed.), Najnowsze dzieje Zydow w 
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committees ignored or dismissed Jewish petitions for help to put an end to the anti-Jewish 
atmosphere.43 In other cases, the local Communist governments discontinued 
investigations into murders of individual Jews despite the fact that there were sufficient 
testimonies by witnesses.44 Moreover, the representatives of the state apparatus, the army 
and, especially, the militia, not only allowed anti-Jewish violence to take place but also 
participated in such events themselves.45 
Thus, it can be argued that the nationalization of Communism or the ‘communization’ of 
nationalism had already started within the new Communist ranks46 and that the process of 
ethnic nationalization of the state was the driving force behind the Communist regime in 
the early post-war years.47 Such developments were noticeable to foreign diplomats. 
William Mack, the political adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces of 
Occupation in Austria wrote in February 1946: ‘The Polish government may not be anti- 
semitic, but it is doing everything possible to get rid of its Jewish population (except that 
part which is Communist).’48 
The Kielce Pogrom of 4 July 1946 
The early post-war years witnessed the worst anti-Jewish violence in the modern history of 
Polish-Jewish relations.49 Moreover, the violence that occurred in Poland was the worst 
contemporary antisemitic violence in the whole of East Central Europe.50 It is estimated 
that between 1,500 and 2,000 Jews were murdered between 1944 and 1947 in Poland, and 
that most of them died because of their Jewish origin rather than their political affiliation. 
The Kielce pogrom was the worst such incident: ordinary civilians, together with 
soldiers and militiamen, murdered forty-two members of the Jewish community and 
injured more than 100. According to witnesses, the pogrom lasted over six hours and was 
conducted in an atmosphere of enthusiastic festiveness. The number of people who 
surrounded the building at 7 Planty Street on that day grew from an initial fifty in the 
morning to 15,000 by the afternoon. On the evidence of medical examinations and eye¬ 
witness testimonies, the pogrom cannot be described as anything but slaughter.51 
Historical research on the Kielce pogrom has concentrated almost entirely on two 
aspects: the description of the event itself and the ensuing investigation into the forces that 
allegedly masterminded it.52 Indeed, the investigation constitutes the central theme of the 
Polsce w zarysie (do 1950 rokuj, Warsaw, 1993, pp. 400-02; Alina Cala and Helena Datner- 
Spiewak, Dzieje Zydow w Polsce 1944—1968. Teksty zrodlowe, Warsaw, 1997, pp. 16-18. 
43 Brus-Wegrowska, ‘Ocalzni’, pp. 98-99. 
44 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
45 Ibid., pp. 98-99. 
46 E. Hankiss, East European Alternatives, Oxford, 1990, p. 212. 
47 In late 1945 the PPR numbered 230,000 members, in the autumn of 1946 the membership had 
increased to 400,000 and in 1947 reached the figure of 800,000. Paczkowski, Zdobvcie Wladzy, 
p. 79. 
48 FO 371/56534; Antony Polonsky, ‘Documents from the British Foreign Office’, Soviet Jewish 
Affairs, 10, 1, 1980, p. 56. 
49 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead, p. 51; Cate and Datner-Spiewak, Dzieje Zydow, p. 15. 
50 Kersten, Polacy, Zydzi, Komunizm, p. 135. 
51 S. Meducki and Z. Wrona (eds), Antyzydowskie wydarzenia Kieleckie 4 Lipca 1946 roku. 
Dokumenty i materialy, Kielce, vol. 1, 1992, pp. 103-17. 
52 See, for example, a discussion on the research on the Kiecle pogrom, ‘O stanie baden nad 
pogromen w Kielcach’, Biuletyn Zydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, 4, 1996, pp. 3-17. 
Jews as Perceived in Post-war Poland 95 
historiography of the subject, and has come up with at least four different theories.53 
However, there is a body of opinion that states that the willingness on the part of the popu¬ 
lation to commit the murders is itself more significant than the issue of who was behind the 
pogrom. Such a view was expressed by Herling-Grudzinski: ‘Whatever we may say about 
the Kielce pogrom being a deliberate provocation on the part of Public Security and the 
NKVD [...] we cannot neglect the speed with which the spark turned into wildfire. It was 
as if the earth itself had been waiting for that spark.’54 This view is also held by a former 
member of the Bund, Marek Edelman, who rejects the idea of a plot and links the event to 
the psychological hatred of the ‘other’, to nationalism, and to the impact of Nazism: 
National instincts, hatred, and the criminal mentality are deeply rooted in human nature [...]. 
There is no doubt that the Kielce pogrom was a post-Hitler phenomenon [...]. We have to 
understand that if a man is told that he is better than another, he then loses any interest in the 
other. This is particularly true in the Jewish case. As people used to say, three million Jews 
have been killed here in Poland, so there is no Jewish problem anymore. And so, if the 
survivors were also killed, it was right for them to have been killed, even good that they were 
killed. Psychological factors were present that allowed the incident to happen. Even if the 
incident had been a deliberately organized plot it would still have struck fertile soil. The 
Kielce incident did strike good soil. There were many reasons that the soil was good: Hitler's 
propaganda, materialism, jealousy and other reasons. There is no evidence that the incident 
was orchestrated by Polish Communists or the Russians. Probably it happened by sheer 
chance. Someone may have helped to aggravate it. It is likely that when the incident had 
already started and when the rumour had spread that the Jews had killed a Polish child, some 
Polish Communists or Russians might have aggravated the situation. But they could not have 
played a main part in it.55 
The Kielce pogrom was not the first case of violence experienced by the Jewish 
communities of the Kielce region. Eighteen Jews had been murdered in five attacks in 
April 1945, and thirteen others were killed the following June. And during the festival of 
Channukah in 1945 grenades were thrown into the building at 7 Planty Street.56 In a sense, 
the events and aftermath of the pogrom can be interpreted as a sign of support for the 
ethnic nationalization of the state. Stanislaw Ossowski, a leading post-war philosopher was 
the first to point out that there was a link between the Communist advocation of the 
concept of the one-nation state and the growing intolerance and hatred towards ‘others’. 
53 It is possible to differentiate the following four main theses: first, the pogrom was orchestrated 
by the illegal political opposition, the so-called reactionary forces of the underground. This 
stance, rejected on the whole by the Polish historiography, is for example supported by I. 
Gutman, Hajehudim bepolin acharei milchamat haolam hasznija, Jerusalem, 1985. The second 
theory, which maintains that the pogrom was prepared by the Soviet security forces, is 
supported by Michael Checinski, Poland: Communism — Nationalism — Anti-semitism, New 
York, 1982, and by Krystyna Kersten, ‘Pogrom kielecki-znaki zapytania’ in Wrzesinski (ed.), 
Polska-Polacy-Mniejszosci Narodowe. The third, asserting that the pogrom was a spontaneous 
event, is supported by J. Andelson, ‘W Polsce zwanej udowa’. This stance is not favoured in 
Polish historiography. The fourth, suggesting that the pogrom was organized by the Zionists 
themselves in order to make the Jews emigrate from Poland, is supported by a pseudo-historical 
work by J. Orlicki, Szkice z dziejow i stosunkow polsko-zydowskich 1918-1949, Szczecin, 
1983. Orlicki’s work serves as an example of the portrayal of the Poles as the chief victims of 
the Kielce pogrom. 
54 Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski, ‘Dziennik pisany noca’, Kultura (Paris), 9, 1991, 528, p. 16. 
55 My interview with Marek Edelman on 29 March 1994. 
56 Bozena Szajnok, Pogrom Zydow w Kielcach 4 Lipca 1946, 1992, pp. 25-28. 
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especially the Jews. In an article published in the left-wing Kuznica in September 1946, he 
criticized the manipulation of nationalist resentments in the Communist press.57 
It is widely recognized that the direct cause of the Kielce pogrom was the accusation of 
ritual murder. The rumour that a nine-year-old boy, Henryk Blaszczyk, had escaped from 
Jewish captivity and that other Polish children had been killed by the Jews generated 
instant public interest. Moreover, it caused an atmosphere of vengeance directed at all 
Jews living in Kielce. The then twenty-seven-year old tailor, Mojzesz Cukier, an eye 
witness who lived at 7 Planty Street remembered that ‘At about nine o’clock, on 4 July, 
crowds started to surround the building. I heard voices from the crowd: “You Jews have 
killed fourteen of our children! Mothers and fathers unite and kill all the Jews!’”58 
In pre-war Poland the ritual murder myth was pre-eminent among the peasants and the 
lower classes and a significant section of the Catholic Church. In fact, the Catholic Church 
was responsible for disseminating this belief in its various publications directed at different 
social groups before and after Poland regained its independence in 1918. According to 
these publications cases of ritual murder were alleged to have occurred in Poland 
throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century, However, it appears that the 
number of ritual murder accusations reached its peak in the early post-war period. This 
belief in ritual murder, propagated in the teaching of the Catholic Church in previous 
periods, had become a standard element of the way of thinking about Jews in a substantial 
segment of the Polish population.59 One could also argue that the experiences of the war 
contributed to the intensification of this belief. After all, the war had generated a profound 
sense of insecurity and fear among many Poles which was only reinforced by the terror 
orchestrated by the new Communist regime. This sense of insecurity made the populace 
more prone to explanations based on superstition. The blood libel would then be one 
instance. 
The superstition of ritual murder was to emerge during many attempts at inciting anti- 
Jewish pogroms and panics before and after the Kielce pogrom. In all cases Jews were 
presented as a physical threat to the Polish nation and particularly to its children. This 
suggests that the allegations of ritual murder used in the national context reinforced a 
belief in the Jewish enemy who murdered Catholic Poles and desired both world 
domination and Polish servitude. Material concerning public opinion at the time collected 
by the police reveals the extent of the belief in ‘the Jewish enemy’ threatening the real 
existence of the Polish nation. I give three examples of the anti-Jewish rumour and 
whispered propaganda published in the Bulletins of the Ministry of Public Security: (1) 
‘Rumours have spread in the Brzeski district that in Silesia a Christian child has been 
allegedly killed by two Jews in a ritual murder. Cracow, 31 March 47’ (Bulletin 2, p. 30);60 
(2) ‘Once again a nine-year-old girl has disappeared. It may be that the Jews from 
Rzeszow have eaten her and have now run away from the town in fear. Rzeszow, 7 July 
47’ (Bulletin 12, pp. 134-35); and (3) ‘Jews have murdered Christian children in Lodz. 
The police have already discovered some corpses during a one-day search. Kielce, 20 
September 47’ (Bulletin 17, pp. 182-83). 
Immediately after the pogrom the Communist regime and the political opposition 
released statements in which both sides accused each other of masterminding and carrying 
57 Stanislaw Ossowski, ‘Natle wydarzen Kieleckicla’, Kuznica, 38, 1946, pp. 123-25. 
58 See Meducki and Wrona (eds), Antyzydowskie Wydarzenia Kieleckie, vol. 1, Kielce, 1990. 
59 According to Alina Cala, the belief in ritual murder existed among peasants even in the 1970s. 
Among the sixty peasants she interviewed during her field-work, only twelve firmly rejected 
the concept of ritual murder. Alina Cala, The Image of the Jew in Polish Folk Culture, 
Jerusalem, 1995. 
See footnote 35. 60 
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out the crime. A typical Communist pronouncement attributed the pogrom to Fascist 
elements, namely members of the National Armed Forces (NSZ). It also accused the 
Church of supporting the legal opposition and allowing itself to become an instrument 
directed against Poland, and at the same time asserted ‘that the whole nation was indignant 
at the atrocities committed in Kielce’. One of the official appeals made to the people of 
Kielce by the six-party committee, which included representatives of the regional Trades 
Union Committee, the Labour Party, the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Workers’ 
National People’s Council, ran as follows: 
The incidents of 4 July in our town have been caused by irresponsible elements of society 
and have tarnished Poland’s reputation. Our nation has always been famous for its tolerance. 
Irresponsible individuals exploited the crowd which gathered as a result of false and biased 
news spread by hired servants of the aristocracy [...]. 
In the name of the innocent blood shed on the paving stones of Kielce, our town, we 
appeal for calm and urge you to resist those elements of society who incite hatred, and who 
attempt deliberately to sabotage the rebuilding of Poland. Kielce 4 July 1946.61 
Statements made by the opposition accused the Communist government of 
masterminding the pogrom in order to divert international attention from the results of the 
rigged Referendum of 30 June, and stressed the political nature of the incident.62 
A typical pronouncement by the illegal Freedom and Independence (WiN) organisation 
runs as follows: 
This anti-Jewish pogrom was neither the first such event, nor an isolated incident. We should 
not deceive ourselves. It was neither the first nor the last incident in a chain of murders 
committed by Public Security officers. The Kielce pogrom is a classic example of 
provocation [...]. Although some of the perpetrators were charged and sentenced, that does 
not mean that the actions of plain-clothed security agents, and those members of the police 
and Public Security who murdered defenceless people, should be forgotten. 
These are the facts which shed some light on the methods of the NKVD and the UB [secret 
police] and on the secret tactics of Bolshevism in Poland. 
The Kielce incident should be considered as part of a broader issue: Communism — Jews 
— reactionary movements [...]. 
Among the small number of Jews in Poland, a majority of them, four out of five, are 
employed by [the Ministry of] Public Security [...]. Thus, the Warsaw government has 
created the perfect conditions for the spread of antisemitism and racism, which in turn has 
led to the West’s hostile attitude towards Polish nationalism, and has finally given Moscow 
an excuse to provoke the Polish population and then to repress it. 
The foregoing statements of the Communists and the opposition can be read as an 
expression of contemporary political conflicts. What both sides had in common, however, 
was that they saw the pogrom as chiefly a problem of the reputation of Poland in the 
Western world, and as a defamation of the country’s good name. The Jewish issue was of 
only secondary importance. In the Communist statements, the word antisemitism had a 
hollow ring, and served merely as an useful tool to fight political opposition. While in 
opposition circles the word Jew chiefly meant a political enemy of Poland. Reading the 
eye-witness testimonies and special reports that were prepared for the members of the 
Politburo after the pogrom, one has the impression that a considerable proportion of the 
population was convinced that they and not the Jews were the real victims. 
61 Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 750, Appeals, cited in Appendix to Szajnok, 
Pogrom Zydow. 
62 Honor i Ojczyna (Warsaw), 8 August 1946. 
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Workers of many large factories organized strikes in protest against the first twelve 
people sentenced at the trial of 11 July. For them, those who participated in the pogrom 
were patriots, not villains. Furthermore, during various meetings organized by the 
Communist representatives from Warsaw, the workers openly expressed their anti-Jewish 
feelings. For them, the Jews were the enemy, running the Polish state and oppressing the 
people. 
The following two excerpts from documents in the former Archives of the Central 
Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party show the extent of such beliefs: 
Report by Comrades Dolinski, Domagala, Krych and Fir regarding their business trip to Lodz 
between 11 and 13 July 1946. 
Workers from the sewing factory (Niciamia) and from the Schaibler and Grohman factories 
have organized a strike in protest against the sentences at the Kielce pogrom trial on 
Thursday 11 July [...]. Workers at the Schaibler factory from both shifts have also gone on 
strike. The first shift stopped work for half an hour and the second for forty-five minutes. 
The workers gave as their reason for striking the fact that they had been misrepresented as 
accepting the resolution against pogroms as published in Glos Robotniczy [The Voice of 
Workers], According to the paper, all the workers have supported the resolution, whereas in 
reality it was only one department. 
The following factories organized protest strikes on 12 July: Scheibler at Ksiezy Mlyn, the 
sewing departments of Dietzel, [...] Buhle, Cimerman, Kinderman, Warta, Tempo ‘Rasik’. 
The strikes of 13 July took place in Wejrach — the ribbon factory, Hofnichter, Gampe i 
Albrecht, and Gutman [...]. 
The social situation in Lodz is serious. The strikes have moved swiftly from one factory to 
another and the women are very aggressive [...]. Women are calling for revenge if the death 
sentences of the Kielce trial are carried out [...]. They use arguments such as: ‘A pregnant 
Jewess gets 60,000 zloty and I get nothing!! [...]. Why are there no Jews working here? The 
Jews are running Poland!’63 
and: 
Report by Stefan Tomaszewski, the Head of the Warsaw Department of Communication, 
regarding his business trip to Deblin on 10 and 11 July 1946. 
[...] The meeting lasted two hours and was very stormy. Comrade Chodkiewicz and I both 
made our statements. During the speeches people shouted back: ‘Get rid of the Jews! It’s a 
disgrace that they have come here to defend the Jews!’ [...] ‘The Jews have murdered 
thirteen Polish children and they are defending them!’ ‘Bierut would not have the guts to 
sentence them [the Jews] to death!’ [...] Those shouting such words received a big round of 
applause from the workers. [...] People asked about the Eastern borders and shouted: ‘Wilno 
[Vilnius] and Lwow [Lemberg] should be ours, why haven’t the Soviets left them?’ 'In 
Poland the Soviets drive tanks and terrorize us with their rifles! Is this Freedom?!!!’ 'Why 
are so many Poles held in prisons and why are the military barracks full of those arrested?!’64 
Examples of the persistence of this myth of the Poles as the victims of a Jewish invasion 
can be found in leaflets and anonymous correspondence addressed to local Jewish 
communities after the Kielce pogrom. The following letter was sent anonymously to the 
Chairman of the Jewish Community in Wtoszczow: 
As I know you personally from our village I would have feelings of remorse if I did not warn 
you. Something bad might happen to your people. No one is going to forgive you for Kielce. 
Revenge is on its way since you have treated Poles badly. Nothing can help your people, not 
even Public Security officers. A terrible revenge against you is coming from the entire 
63 Quoted in Andrzej Paczkowski, ‘Raporty o Pogromie’, Puls, 3, 1991, pp. 110-11. 
64 Ibid., pp. 112-13. 
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country, you to leave for the Promised Land; otherwise there is going to be bloodshed in the 
spring. Kielce, 30 March 1947.65 
Despite the hopes and expectations of a considerable minority of ethnic Poles and a 
majority of Jews, the Shoah did not eradicate the myth of the Jew as the enemy of the 
Polish nation. The myth came to be used by both the nationalist and Communist camps, in 
different ways and to suit their different purposes. This chapter has attempted to show the 
ways such myths functioned both among the political elites and in society as a whole in the 
early post-war years. What the long-term consequences of the myth may have been on 
Polish political culture of the second half of the twentieth century is not yet clear. 
65 Ibid., pp. 194-95. 
7 Yugoslav and British Policy towards the 
Carinthian Question, 1941-45 
Dusan Biber 
Introduction 
Yugoslav and British policy towards the Carinthian question can be explained only in the 
wider context of Yugoslav war aims and long-term political strategy, in the framework of 
British policy towards the Soviet Union in general, and Yugoslavia and Austria in 
particular. A number of factors have to be taken into account: the problem of Yugoslavia’s 
western borders, the Julian March (Venezia Giulia) and Trieste, as well as the delicate 
international position of Yugoslavia in 1944 and 1945.* 1 
The Yugoslav-Austrian Border and Slovene War Aims 
In the Carinthian plebiscite of 1920 the majority of votes needed for the union of Carinthia 
and Yugoslavia was not even achieved in the first wave of voting in Zone A. However, a 
part of the Slovene public and some politicians still nurtured the illusion that, in the event 
of an Anschlufi, the Carinthian problem might be reopened, since the plebiscite in 1920 had 
not concerned Greater Germany, the Third Reich, but only Austria. The Slovene emigrants 
from Carinthia were unsuccessful in their proposal to the premier Milan Stojadinovic that 
his government should, after the Anschlufi, request the annexation of Slovene Carinthia to 
Yugoslavia. The creation of Greater Germany was a signal for general alarm, and not only 
in Slovenia, where fears were expressed that this was only the first step towards the 
realization of the German bridge to the Adriatic. One of the responses was the campaign 
for the defence of the northern border in Slovenia, which was undertaken by Action 
Committees initiated by the Communist Party of Slovenia.2 However, after the Hitler- 
Stalin Pact, no more traces of such public action by the Action Committees are to be 
found, presumably due to Comintern instructions.3 However, the border question, defence 
This chapter, now slightly shortened and amended, was originally presented as a paper entitled 
‘Jugoslovanska in britanska politika o koroskem vprasanju 1941-1945’ at the Third British— 
Yugoslav Round Table at Kupari near Dubrovnik, 19-21 September 1978, and was published in 
Zgodovinski casopis, 33, 1979, 1, pp. 127-43. 
1 See my ‘Mednarodni polozaj Jugoslavije v zadnjem letu druge svetovne vojne’ in Tone Ferenc 
et al. (eds), Osvoboditev Slovenije, 1945, Ljubljana, 1977, pp. 237-57, which provides the 
broader background to this subject. 
2 See Dusan Biber, Nacizem in Nemci v Jug os lav iji, 1933-1941, Ljubljana, 1966, pp. 93-166. 
Compare Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), FO 371/22313, R 2116/137/3; FO 
371/22317, R 2853/137/3. 
3 On 1 June 1940 the Comintern gave, inter alia, the following advice: ‘The development of a 
broad mass movement with the slogan of the independence of the nations of Yugoslavia and 
their right to national self-determination and mutual help against all tyranny. But no slogans 
about the defence of the borders.’ A similar statement is to be found in the resolution of the 
Executive Committee of the Comintern of 15 September 1940: ‘In fact, the Party is not putting 
out a slogan about the defence of the borders of the Yugoslav state as it is today’. It appears 
that with this the Executive Committee did not have in mind only the Soviet—German pact on 
borders and friendship. See Josip Broz-Tito, Sabrana djela, 30 vols, Belgrade, 1978, v. 
Appendix 1 and 3 (in manuscript only). 
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against the advance of German imperialism and Fascism, greatly preoccupied various 
Slovene political circles, including those which later joined the Tripartite Pact. 
The British government, following the initiative of the Yugoslav envoy and minister 
plenipotentiary to Moscow, Milan Gavrilovic — hoping to influence the Croats (Slovenes 
were not mentioned), to prevent Yugoslavia from joining the Tripartite Pact and to push 
her into the war — sent an oral message, conveyed by Ronald Campbell, first to Prince 
Paul and later to General Dusan Simovic, premier of the coup d’etat government. The gist 
of this message was that the Yugoslav demands for a revision of the Yugoslav-Italian 
border would be benevolently supported by Great Britain at the peace talks. Thus it is clear 
that possible revision of the Austro-Yugoslav border was not mentioned, let alone 
considered at that time.4 
In the opinion of the British Foreign Office, Miha Krek was not informed of this British 
action regarding a possible revision of the Yugoslav-Italian border.5 Flowever, the first 
‘Memorandum on the Slovene Territorial Claims at the Moment of the Establishment of 
the New Boundaries of the Yugoslav State’ was dated as early as 1 May 1941, in 
Jerusalem ‘at the seat of the Royal Yugoslav Government’. Actually, this was the 
memorandum of the Slovene People’s Party. According to Dragovan Sepic this had been 
hurriedly written by Krek, Alojzij Kuhar, Franc Snoj and Franc Gabrovsek. Flowever, in 
view of the fact that it was written, printed and handed over in English (if the date is 
correctly stated) hardly two weeks after the Royal Yugoslav Government had fled the 
country via Athens, Crete and Egypt to Palestine, there appears to be some justification for 
the hypothesis that the subject had been thought and written about even before the German 
attack on Yugoslavia.6 
In a letter to Anton Zakrajsek, dated Trinidad, 31 July 1941, Alojzij Kuhar also 
explained the necessity of action in the USA: 
The world knows so little of the Slovenes. [...] The notion of the ‘Slovene territory’ and the 
‘Slovene nation’ must be formulated still. We shall have to do it very quickly as long the war 
lasts. At the peace conference it would be too late. This is our great preparatory work. [...] 
The echo that the White House must get from the repetition of the main claim: the final and 
definitive reunion of Slovene territory, regardless of what the new democratic order in 
Europe may happen to be.7 
The representatives of the Slovene Liberal Party, however, clearly indicated to British 
diplomats in Palestine that they did not fully agree with the ‘new frontiers, which, they say, 
embrace districts not ethnically Slovene’. However, they are not particularly mentioned as 
opponents of the new borders with Austria, not even on the Hohe Tauem, but they did 
mention that the Isonzo river would be a ‘more justifiable line’ with Italy than the 
Tagliamento river.8 
And while Kuhar, a Catholic priest and leading Slovene clerical politician, stressed such 
a maximal territorial programme for a ‘United Slovenia’, his brother, Lovro Kuhar, who 
was a well-known novelist writing under the pseudonym Prezihov Voranc and a close 
collaborator of Tito during his stay in Paris, wrote a pamphlet in 1942, entitled ‘O 
slovenskih mejah’ (On the Slovene Borders), published by the Agitprop (Agitation and 
4 Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War, London, 1976, 
pp. 87-88; Dragovan Sepic, ‘Velika Britanija i pitanje revizije jugoslavensko-talijanske granice 
1941’, Zgodovinski casopis, 30, 1976, 1-2, pp. 47—77; PRO, PREM 3/394/3, W.P.(42).B. 
5 PRO, FO 371/30221, R 10174/162/92. See Sepic, ‘Velika Britanija’, p. 61. 
6 Ibid., pp. 56-59. 
7 PRO, FO 371/30219, R 8157/162/92. 
8 Sepic, ‘Velika Britanija’, p. 58; PRO, FO 371/30240, R 7539/960/92. 
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Propaganda Commission) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia. 
Lovro Kuhar strongly opposed the ‘historical borders’ as an essentially imperialistic 
slogan. ‘I do not want anything belonging to others — I will not give what is mine’, 
concluded Lovro Kuhar. This slogan later became generally known through Tito’s speech 
on the island of Vis on 12 September 1944. However, Lovro Kuhar did demand those 
territories which had been forcibly denationalized in the imperial era, including linguistic 
islands in Carinthia, Klagenfurt and Zeellfeld.9 
In its communique of 1 December 1942, on the occasion of the first meeting of the Anti- 
Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the Executive Committee 
of the Liberation Front in Slovenia particularly stressed that the new Yugoslavia would be 
joined by ‘a free and united Slovenia from Trst [Trieste] to Spilje [Spielfeld Strass], from 
Kolpa to Celovec [Klagenfurt]’.10 
One gets an insight into the policy of the Communist Party of Slovenia at the time from 
a letter written by Edvard Kardelj to Tito, dated 14 December 1942: 
The border question is probably of more immediate importance to us than it is even to the 
British Empire. There is a quite special Slovene sensitivity in this regard, which we have for 
a long time tried to avoid by general declarations of principle, but now this is becoming less 
and less possible. The Slovenes, who have been disunited for 1,000 years, feel that the time 
has now come for the old slogan of a ‘United Slovenia’ to become a reality, and therefore the 
masses keep asking: within which borders? Reactionary circles mostly use this very point to 
try to discredit our Party among the masses. At least half their slanders concern our Party’s 
attitude towards the borders. They try to prove their assertion that our patriotism is only 
verbal, and that in fact we are selling out in the name of ‘proletarian internationalism’ parts 
of Slovene soil to the Germans and Italians. 
Kardelj explains that during ‘the national war of liberation [...] these questions must be 
put in the same way as they are put in the framework of capitalism’, while ‘in socialism, of 
course, the question of the state to which towns as language islands belong would be abso¬ 
lutely unimportant. [...] We have clearly accepted the demand for the annexation of the 
whole Slovene Littoral with Trieste as an autonomous city and Carinthia with Klagenfurt. 
Had we not stated this quite clearly at this time, we would have given ammunition to 
Mihailovic’s men, who make all sorts of demands in their illegal literature.’* 11 
Miha Krek was undertaking a systematic campaign in London, writing to various indiv¬ 
iduals, including the Times journalist Iverach McDonald. Dragovan Sepic thinks it likely 
that the Memorandum of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London, dated 27 December 
1941, was the first of these official memoranda.12 However, according to a minute taken in 
the Foreign Office, it appears that the Memorandum of the Slovene People’s Party, which 
did not sign itself as such, was issued as an official government communique.13 
Many of Krek’s activities were prompted by a fear of possible secret transactions 
between Great Britain and Italy, on the model of the London Pact of 1915, aimed at 
dividing the Axis and drawing Italy away from the German side in the war. In vain he 
9 See Fran Zwitter, ‘Priprave Znanstvenega instituta za resevanje mejnih vprasanj po vojni’ in 
Ferenc et al. (eds), Osvoboditev Slovenije 1945, p. 261. 
10 Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kridic, Jesen 1942, ed. Tone Ferenc et al., Ljubljana, 1963, pp. 433- 
90. 
11 Zbormk dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilackom ratu naroda Jugos/avije (hereafter 
Zbornik), part 2, vol. 7, no. 24, Belgrade, 1959, pp. 85-86. 
12 Sepic, Velika Britanija’, pp. 62—63, quoting from Yugoslav Diplomatic Archives. Reference in 
PRO is FO 371/33446, R 35/35/92. Sir Orme Sargent told the Yugoslav minister Ivan Subotic 
that the Foreign Office would not give any official reply. 
13 PRO, FO 371/30240, R 7539/960/92, minute of 1 August 1941 on p. 279. 
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constantly begged the British Government to refute publicly the London Pact and give 
official support to at least some Slovene territorial demands.14 
Shortly after that Memorandum Miha Krek wrote a letter to George Rendel, dated 10 
January 1942, giving details of some of the Slovene territorial demands with regard to the 
northern border, but this time he no longer insisted on the Hohe Tauem, but stated: ‘These 
demands of ours concerning Austria, or Germany, are based principally on the demands 
put forward already in 1919 by Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference.’15 
George Rendel commented on 12 March 1942: ‘From all accounts the systematic 
extermination of the Slovenes is proceeding steadily, and if the war has to go on for 
another two or three years it may be that when we come to make peace there will be no 
Slovenes left to whom to assign any particular area.’16 P. L. Rose, having acquainted 
himself with the opinion of Robert Laffan, minuted: ‘wild and politically exaggerated are 
the Slovene claims’. 
Laffan gave a critical and detailed analysis of the contents of Krek’s letter in March 
1942. He, of course, had no knowledge of the instructions given by Anton Korosec and 
Milan Stojadinovic to the Slovene national minority in Carinthia to vote for the Anschlufi 
and noted: ‘The younger generation of Slovenes appears to have accepted Nazi ideas. The 
Slovene districts were prominent in the abortive Nazi revolt of 1934 and gave a vote for the 
Anschluss in 1938 even higher than that of the rest of Carinthia. [...] The frontier proposed 
[...] appears [...] not to be justified by any argument except that of archaeology.’17 
Laffan actually even dissented from the opinion (his own?) expressed in the 
‘Memoranda on Frontiers of European Confederations and the Transfer of German 
Populations. Prepared by Foreign Research and Press Service, Balliol College, Oxford’, 
dated 20 February 1942, in which no change of borders is proposed but the following 
statement is nevertheless made: ‘Ethnographically, Yugoslavia might still lay claim to part 
of the [Klagenfurt] basin, and possibly a narrow strip along its southern edge might even 
prefer Yugoslav sovereignty. Economics and strategy, however, would require either no 
change or the annexation of the whole basin.’18 
In another such analysis, which Laffan sent to Douglas Howard, head of the Southern 
Department in the Foreign Office on 13 May 1942, a pessimistic forecast is given: ‘A 
diminishing remnant of these Slovenes has maintained a vigorous struggle for its corporate 
existence, but appears destined to extinction, unless wholly new relations arise between the 
reconstructed States of Austria and Yugoslavia.’19 
In general, in all subsequent memoranda and analyses, the Yugoslav demands with 
regard to Austria, that is, Carinthia, were rejected, whether they came from the Royal 
Government in exile or from Marshal Tito. Instead, an exchange of the German minority in 
Slovenia and the Slovene minority in Austria was envisaged and economic reasons were 
14 PRO, FO 371/33470, R 5976, 6386, 6161/178/92; FO 371/37630, R 2038/246/92; Sepic, 
‘Velika Britanija’, p. 61; FO 371/30219, R 8179, 8287/160/92; FO 371/33446, R 1764, 
2633/35/92. The Foreign Office merely confirmed on 12 May 1942 that it would ‘not enter into 
any commitments affecting Yugoslav interests without first consulting the Yugoslav 
Government’ (FO 371/33446, R 2864/35/92). In an aide-memoire to the Royal Yugoslav 
Embassy in London, dated 19 November 1942, Sir Orme Sargent pointed out that it was ‘still 
our policy not to discuss or commit ourselves during the war on any of the territorial questions 
which would have to be considered and dealt with at the peace settlement’ (FO 371/33446, R 
7984/35/92). 
15 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 391, R 2633/35/92. 
16 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 1764/35/92. 
17 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 1580/35/92. 
18 PRO, FO 371/33148, R 6150/646/92. 
19 PRO, FO 371/33498, R 3425/3425/92. 
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put forward for some border correction in favour of Austria in the Windische Biiheln to the 
south of the River Mur.20 
In the spring of 1943 the conflicts between Serbian and Croatian ministers in the Royal 
Government in exile led Miha Krek to begin to doubt the possibility of the reconstruction 
of a common Yugoslav state. He mentioned a possible Slovene independent, neutral state. 
George Rendel noted Krek’s thoughts on 4 March 1943: ‘if Yugoslavia disintegrates, 
Slovenia might form a unit in some new politico-economic group based on, and forming 
the hinterland to, the ports of Trieste and Fiume. [...] One feature of the scheme would of 
course be the return to Slovenia of Slovene districts of Italy and Carinthia, and possibly 
allocation to the Slovenes of the whole of Istria.’21 
And, while Miha Krek assured George Rendel at the end of May 1943 ‘that, in 
conditions of modem war, effective defence of Slovenia, even as part of larger unit, would 
in fact always prove impossible’, and that the ‘future of Slovenia could only be assured by 
political and economic and not by military means’,22 a meeting of the Provincial 
Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia, held on 12 May 1943, 
stressed in a greeting to the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front that the whole of 
Slovene Carinthia was formally joining the struggle of the Slovene people for liberation 
and union in a free and united Slovenia. In the greetings sent to Tito, it was said that it was 
Tito himself who had given the people of Carinthia a new faith in the final victory and in 
union with the other parts of Slovenia in a new democratic Yugoslavia.23 
A Special Commission of the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front in Ljubljana 
began studying the question of the future borders at the end of 1941 and in early 1942. 
This Commission was composed of politicians, historians and geographers; no written 
evidence of its work has been preserved. At the beginning of October 1943 the initiative 
for further academic research on these questions was given, in agreement with Edvard 
Kardelj, by Fran Zwitter, later Director of the partisans’ Scholarly Institute (Znanstveni 
institut), a unique institution among the resistance movements in Europe, and in 
Yugoslavia. His report Problem bodocih slovenskih me] (The Problem of the Future 
Slovene Borders), which was intended for internal discussion, defended the principle of the 
possible division of Carinthia on the basis of the more or less old ethnic frontier from the 
middle of the nineteenth century and rejected subjective criteria or a plebiscite. It 
envisaged the expulsion of the definitely German population in Slovenia, but not in 
Carinthia, a procedure which Rodoljub Colakovic had already announced earlier for the 
whole of Yugoslavia. Fran Zwitter also wrote two reports for the Allies on the Slovene 
minorities in Italy and Carinthia, giving the necessary information, but not defining 
territorial claims. As early as February 1944, the British Mission requested and received 
from Edvard Kardelj information about these minorities. 
On the basis of the results of discussions held on 9 September 1944, Zwitter wrote a new 
report: Meje Jugoslavije. A: Meje Slovenskega ozemlja. (The Borders of Yugoslavia. A: 
The Borders of Slovene Territory). In the second half of 1944 this Institute produced about 
20 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 2986/35/92; FO 371/37174, R 808/369/67 (1943); FO 371/48926, R 
17242/2395/92 etc. It would be worth doing some research on whether these ideas were still 
retained at a later date. 
21 PRO, FO 371/37630, R 2038/246/92. See also Dusan Biber, ‘Federalna drzavnost Slovenije v 
zavezniskih dokumentih do maja 1945 in B. Grafenauer et al. (eds), Slovenci in drzava, 
Ljubljana 1995. pp. 261-67. 
22 PRO, FO 371/37630, R 4737/246/92. 
23 Archives of the Institute for the History of the Labour Movement in Ljubljana (Institut za 
zgodovino delavskega gibanja), file 650 (AIZDG), now Archives of Slovenia (Arhiv 
Slovenije). 
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twenty reports, written by various authors, on border and minority questions. The 
territorial demands with regard to Austria which Yugoslavia submitted to the conference of 
deputy foreign ministers in London in 1947, were in essence, the same as those formulated 
in September 1944, where the demand was made for the annexation of the ethnic Slovene 
territories, with some minor corrections.24 
In mid-1944, the so-called ‘Carinthian Declaration’ was issued on behalf of the political, 
cultural and economic organisations of the Carinthian Slovenes, which demanded a natural 
border on the Hohe and Niedere Tauem and also the cession of Styria as war reparation, all 
with the aim of redirecting Deutschtum in Austria from a south-eastern imperialistic to a 
German central European orientation.25 It is not clear who was actually the author of this 
declaration, whether and how it was treated and whether it was widely circulated and 
brought to the attention of the general public. 
In a letter of 5 February 1944, written on behalf of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Communist Party of Slovenia, Edvard Kardelj 
requested, among other things, that in the interest of the general struggle against Fascism 
there should be no discussion among the masses of the annexation of Slovene Carinthia, 
adding that it was wrong to talk of the Austrian national minority in Carinthia. Talks 
should be held with the leadership of the Austrian Anti-Fascist Movement about a 
common struggle against Hitler, but certainly not about the nationalities and border 
questions. Territorial claims on an imperialist Austria would, in any case, be greater than 
on a people’s democratic Austria. It was the anti-Fascist and not solely the national 
element which should be stressed. Emphasis on the national element might separate the 
peasants from the workers, since the workers rather tended towards the Germans.26 
The secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for 
Carinthia, Dusan Pirjevec-Ahac, duly acknowledged the mistakes, but he explained that 
the Committee had only carried out the instructions given by the secretary of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia. It had been no coincidence that there had 
been such strong emphasis on the idea that Slovene Carinthia belonged to Yugoslavia. It 
had been found that the masses in Carinthia were not yet ready for the battle, but that they 
were nevertheless in favour of annexation to Yugoslavia. They saw the Partisans in the 
same light as General Maister’s fighters who had fought for the northern border of 
Slovenia (Yugoslavia) in 1919 and 1920.27 Clear Party instructions were given to the effect 
that in the Committee’s contacts with the Austrian Communist Party no discussion about 
the borders should be opened.28 
After the speech which Tito delivered on Vis on 12 September 1944, in which he also 
mentioned the liberation of ‘our brothers’ in Carinthia,29 a propaganda campaign clearly 
pronounced that ‘Klagenfurt, as the centre of the Carinthian part of Slovenia, belongs to 
24 Zwitter, ‘Priprave Znanstvenega instituta’, pp. 258-76. Perhaps these reports could be found in 
the WO files of 37. Military Mission in WO 202 in PRO. 
25 Metod Mikuz, ‘Trojna (dvojna) intemacionalisticna akcija CK KPS (CK KPJ) na KoroSkem 
med NOB do konca 1943 dalje’ (hereafter ‘Trojna (dvojna)’), Zgodovinski casopis, 24, 1970, 
3-4, p. 266; AIZDG, Archives of Slovenia, file 649. Mikuz does not mention the demand for 
the annexation of Styria. According to the historian Vlado Habjan, the writer of this resolution 
V 
was Tone Cop in Vienna. 
26 Mikuz, ‘Trojna (dvojna)’, pp. 254-57. 
27 Ibid., p. 259. 
28 AIZDG, f. 649. Provincial Committee of CP of Slovenia for Carinthia, 24 March 1944, 
Archives of Slovenia. 
29 Josip Broz-Tito, Vojna djela, I: 1941-1945, Belgrade, 1961, pp. 278-79; idem, Sabrana djela, 
xxm, pp. 111-14. 
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united Slovenia and to Federal Yugoslavia’; simultaneously relations with the Austrian 
Communist Party deteriorated considerably.30 The Chief of the Allied Mission in Styria 
with the Fourth Operative Zone, the American Major Franklin Lindsay, reported on the 
local campaign of posters and meetings for the return of Slovene Carinthia. He suspected 
that the mobilization by the Partisans of 4,000-5,000 men a month, despite the fact that 
there were no weapons for them, was being undertaken with a view to Carinthia.31 
Before the end of the war the Cuckold Mission reported on 28 April 1945: "no exact 
V 
statement has been made [...] all Korosko and Stajersko are rightly Slovene [...] almost 
certainly include Villach and Klagenfurt.’32 The British Major W. Pears made similar 
observations on 15 April 1945 at the Headquarters of the Slovene National Liberation 
Army.33 Boris Kridic’s statement in Cmomelj on 16 April 1945, on the occasion of the 
celebration of the signing of the Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty, that the fulfilment of 
the demands for the annexation of the Slovene Littoral with Trieste and Gorizia, and 
Carinthia with Klagenfurt, now that they were being guaranteed by Soviet support, 
certainly attracted attention.34 Whether this was actually true or not, it was a disturbing 
dilemma in May 1945, probably not only for the British. 
Yugoslav-British Co-operation in Attempts to Penetrate Austria 
On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia, on 15 July 1943 
the Secretary Franc Leskosek-Luka informed the Provincial Committee of the Communist 
Party of Slovenia for Carinthia of the arrival of the British Mission to the Slovene 
headquarters. "Should such officers happen to join you, welcome them, make all facilities 
available to them, but be careful in your statements to them. Let them have everything 
consistent with our line and the liberation struggle’, he wrote.35 
According to all available evidence the first British officers apparently entered Carinthia, 
as did many partisans, through the Littoral Region and the Headquarters 9th Corps which 
was stationed there. Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Wilkinson and Major Alfgar Hesketh 
Prichard, who introduced himself to the Slovene Partisans as Cahusac, led the ‘Clowder’ 
mission. This SOE Mission tried to penetrate Austria and further into Central Europe.36 
Wilkinson wrote: 
As far as the Slovenians’ fs7c] attitude to the Allies is concerned they have a blind (and 
almost pathological) admiration for the USSR (especially for the Soviet Army), a somewhat 
chilly respect for Great Britain (in particular for her democratic parliamentary institutions) 
and an indifference, almost amounting to contempt, for the Americans. [...] This Russian 
influence may prove significant if, after the war, there is a revival of Russian imperialism. 
For we should remember that Greater Slovenia stretches from Trieste in the West to Villach 
30 Archives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia (ACKZKS), Nr. 
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35 ACKZKS, Nr. 1295, Archives of Slovenia. 
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and Klagenfurt in the North; and after Czechoslovakia, Slovenia offers Russia her most 
important gateway to the West.37 
Tito informed the Croatian headquarters of the arrival of Wilkinson as early as 18 
November 1943, and on 1 January 1944 he gave him permission to send his men into 
Austria through Slovenia.38 ‘We understood that CLOWDER would use Partisans purely 
as a springboard for penetration Central Europe [...] We fear Pzns will object to being 
used as passive instruments for activities they do not rpt not control’, Lieutentant-Colonel 
F. W. Deakin anticipated on 13 February 1944.39 This proved to be correct, although, 
according to all available evidence, somewhat later, for example in a letter written by the 
Political Commissar Mitja Ribicic on 27 June 1944, addressed to Viktor Avbelj, Deputy 
Political Commissar at the HQ of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments 
of Slovenia: ‘The problems with the English are increasing, because they are too interested 
in Austria. [...] It will be very difficult to control all those people, if the missions keep 
arriving. Cahusac by all means insists going to Austria. [...] To send him across today 
would cause his death. The boy is tall and clumsy and he will be in trouble in the very first 
inn he stays overnight.’40 
Actually, in his letter of 5 February 1944, Edvard Kardelj had particularly stressed that 
one of the tasks of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for 
Carinthia was to organize the broadest possible intelligence network in Austria, because 
such information would be needed also by the Allies.41 
Thus Major William Jones could report, on 10 February 1944, that the Slovene HQ was 
prepared to co-operate and to ‘push Partisan intelligence groups into ROME, VIENNA and 
any points you suggest. [...] Partisans have English-speaking personnel and operators who 
will tie into the present British intelligence network. Partisans will lend entire propaganda 
organization to penetrate AUSTRIA, GERMANY and ITALY.’42 
Wilkinson assessed the beginning of this co-operation as follows: ‘Considering their 
possibilities, the information received from Austria by the Partisans is most disappointing 
— political waffle and Communist propaganda for the most part. In fairness it must be said 
that now they know what we want, the Partisans are trying to develop their organization to 
meet our requirements.’43 
In any case, on 12 February 1944 F. W. Deakin proposed, in connection with Jones’s 
report among other things: ‘To get in sets, and through SLOVENE Pzns develop their 
suggested network in co-operation with ISLD and OSS.’44 The Slovene Partisan HQ issued 
an order that all possible assistance be given to the Clowder mission. However, all care 
should be taken to ensure that the mission was not exploited by enemy elements.45 The 
same HQ issued an order to the HQ of the Carinthian Group, dated 23 June 1944, to the 
effect that the Allied intelligence centres should be given only military information and not 
37 Ibid. 
38 Zbornik, part 2, vol. 11, no. 52, p. 90, no. 173, 318; Broz-Tito, Sabrana djela, XVII, p. 231. and 
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44 PRO, WO 202/361. 
45 Zbornik, part 6, vol. 10, no. 101, p. 206. 
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under any circumstances political information or statements. The HQ stressed that no 
outsider should have any insight into the partisans’ intelligence service.46 
Franklin Lindsay estimated that the Allied missions with the HQ of the Fourth Operative 
Zone succeeded in collecting only 10 per cent of the potentially available information. 
Despite assurances to the contrary Lindsay was convinced that the partisans had regular 
contacts in towns such as Villach, Klagenfurt, Graz and Vienna at that time. And while the 
Partisans, supported by Lindsay, proposed that in order to cross the River Drava, the Allies 
should send all possible assistance and supplies by air; after Tito’s speech on Vis the 
Foreign Office and the Political Committee at Balkan Air Force HQ took a negative 
attitude.47 Hesketh Prichard nevertheless did succeed in crossing the River Drava in mid- 
October 1944.48 But after 3 December 1944 his superiors lost all contact with him.49 
The British intention was primarily ‘to form Austrian “resistance”’ independently of the 
Partisans’. This proved impossible and the whole matter was postponed till the end of 
March 1945. The only possibility which was still open was the setting up of ‘small 
clandestine groups with WT communication [...] a valuable source of intelligence’. The 
Allied Mission which tried to penetrate into the eastern Tyrol and south-west Carinthia 
was faced with a similar situation: ‘we conclude that there is no further value in 
stimulating armed “resistance” inside AUSTRIA’, they wrote, adding: ‘In South Carinthia 
close relations have already been established with members of the Slovene minority and 
JANL units operating in the frontier districts.’ All that was planned for the Clowder 
mission at that time were special assignments connected with the Allied occupation of 
Austria such as sending a group of Social Democrats to Graz. ‘Contact with reliable 
Christian Social and Social Democratic elements in AUSTRIA’ had, however, already 
been established at an earlier date.30 The Allied efforts to organize a resistance movement 
in Austria were unsuccessful, noted the official history of the HQ for Special Operations at 
the AFHQ.51 ‘As regards SLOVENE activity in AUSTRIA (CARINTHIA) we are 
avoiding any contact with SLOVENE Partisans in this area, and are giving them no supply 
by air except occasional non-warlike “comfort” stores on a small scale’, it was stated on 21 
March 1945.52 
Co-operation and Misunderstandings between the Communist Parties of Slovenia 
(Yugoslavia) and Austria 
In the first year of the National War of Liberation, Tito took steps to set up contacts with 
Austrian Communists. From a dispatch sent by him to the Comintern on 29 April 1942, we 
learn that the Yugoslav Partisans were in a position to provide all the necessary forged 
documents and to send Austrian comrades to Austria, either with the help of partisan 
detachments or simply by regular trains.53 It is not known if and what the Comintern 
replied to this suggestion. When Tito received news that the British were trying to organize 
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a Socialist Party of some kind in Italy, he informed the Comintern in a despatch dated 2 
December 1942 that he could organize illegal entry into Italy for some well-known Italian 
comrades. He considered it necessary that Ercoli (that is, Palmiro Togliatti) should by all 
means leave for Italy.54 On 5 January 1944, Tito instructed Slovene HQ to give special 
attention to the question of smaller partisan units, which should infiltrate into Austria from 
Styria across the River Drava and establish contacts with Austrians. In the west contact 
should be established with Italian partisan units, mutual confidence developed and co¬ 
ordinated action taken.55 
By the end of 1943 first contacts had been established between Slovene and Austrian 
Communists. However, on 7 October 1942, Edvard Kardelj had reported to Tito about co¬ 
operation with the Austrian Communist Party. For a long time there were doubts in the 
Central and Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia about whether they 
were dealing with real members of the Austrian Communist Party' or with ‘agents 
provocateurs’. At the end of November 1943 the Slovene Communists had their first 
meeting with Andreas, the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Austrian Communist 
Party. Following instructions from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Slovenia it was agreed that the Austrian Communist Party would hand 
over its organizations in Slovene Carinthia. An agreement was reached that Klagenfurt 
indisputably belonged to Slovenia, while the position of Villach remained open to 
discussion. A Landeskommitat der Osterreichischen Freiheitsfront fur Kamten (Provincial 
Committee of the Austrian Liberation Front for Carinthia) was to be set up for the Austrian 
minority. The Communist Party of Slovenia would support the establishment of 
independent Austrian partisan units. The first recruits should come from Villach, and a 
Contact Committee was to undertake the co-ordination of both parties’ activities.56 
At the second meeting held on 20 January 1944, there were already difficulties with 
regard to these decisions, especially regarding the yielding of control over Austrian 
Communist Party organizations. Thus the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party 
of Slovenia proposed to the Party Central Committee that the question of competence in 
Carinthia should be cleared up with the Austrian Communist Party through the Comintern. 
But on 28 January 1944 German units attacked the HQ of the Provincial Committee of 
Slovenia for Carinthia and seized all the files. Again in his letter of 5 February 1944, 
Kardelj criticized the work of the Provincial Committee. They should refrain from giving 
lectures on the national question, but organize special independent Austrian partisan units, 
which should remain, nevertheless, for as long as possible, under the command of Slovene 
Partisan Headquarters until such time as an anti-Fascist movement could be developed in 
the rest of Austria. The political line of the Austrian Communist Party should be aimed 
towards the establishment of an independent people’s democratic Austria, with close ties 
with the peoples of Yugoslavia and supported by the Soviet Union. 
Without going into the interesting details of the meetings which followed, the disputes 
and mutual reproaches, I must mention the fact that Andreas was arrested at the beginning 
of May 1944.57 However, on 6 May 1944 Kardelj sent a message to Leskosek-Luka, 
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saying that the Comintern, and Koplenig in particular, were very much interested in the 
possibility of contacts with Austrians. It would be best to inform ‘Grandfather’ directly, 
particularly if it would be possible to establish contact with the Central Committee of the 
Austrian Communist Party for comrades who would come to Slovenia.58 
Franz Honner, a prominent member of the Central Committee of the Austrian 
Communist Party and two other ‘comrades’ arrived safely at the seat of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and ‘Grandfather’ (the Comintern, at 
that time already officially disbanded) informed Kardelj on 30 June 1944, that Honner and 
his escort were to be given all support in carrying out their unspecified assignment. They 
then left for Slovenia, to the free territory in Bela Krajina.59 The despatch from Moscow 
giving instructions stressed that the borders must not be a subject of controversy. ‘The 
Austrian Communist Party is, in principle, for the union of the Slovene regions with a 
future Yugoslav state, that is, with Slovenia’, Andrej (Ales Bebler) wrote in a letter to 
Leskosek-Luka on 18 July 1944.60 
On 3 September 1944, Kardelj informed Tito of the conversation with Honner, whom 
Tito had already met in Zagreb in 1940: ‘Grandfather informed him that we should occupy 
part of Austria instead of others. He also informed me that Grandfather had told him that 
the USSR would not give up Austria, because it will be a link between Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. In Austria itself there is still no serious movement.’61 
At this time Churchill was suggesting an Allied landing in Istria and a breakthrough in 
the ‘Ljubljana Gap’. ‘It is indispensable that Trieste and Istria should be taken this year’, 
Churchill wrote to General Wilson on 4 September 1944. In Churchill’s minute to General 
Ismay on 9 September 1944, we read: ‘The possibility of making an amphibious descent 
from Ancona or Venice — if we get it — upon Istria, holds a very high place in my 
thoughts, it is by this means we could widen our front of advance into Austria and 
Hungary, having the ports of Trieste and Fiume at our disposal.’62 
‘Your task: to assist the development of partisan movement in Austria under the 
leadership of the Austrians themselves at all costs. The aim must be to encourage the 
development of a partisan movement all over Austria.’ Those were the instructions issued 
by the Slovene Partisan HQ, dated 25 May 1944. As early as 16 January 1944, the 
Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia had issued a Party 
directive that the Austrian national minority in Carinthia must be revolutionized and anti- 
Fascist work developed among the German soldiers, particularly among the Austrians.63 
However, the Austrian Battalion on the Free Slovene Territory in Bela Krajina, which 
was set up with the agreement of the Supreme Command of the National Liberation Army 
and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, was not established until 24 November 1944. 
Honner agreed that the Austrians should join Yugoslav National Liberation Army units. 
The Austrians should be gathered in camps in Styria and Bela Krajina, while German 
POWs of Austrian origin were flown in from the Soviet Union. Many Slovene names can 
be found on the list of fighters in this Austrian Battalion. 
The Avantgard Kampfgruppe Steiermark, with its commanding officer Ferdinand (code- 
name), had parachuted from Soviet aeroplanes onto the territory of Bela Krajina in 
Slovenia in June 1944. In October 1944 this unit crossed the River Drava but soon returned 
across the old Yugoslav—Austrian frontier in Styria. By April 1945 this unit had grown to 
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500 men. The Austrian Battalion fought in Slovenia, however, mostly very close to the 
free territory.64 In short, Soviets and British both recruited volunteers from among German 
POWs, using them in order to further their political aims in Austria. So did the Slovenes. 
‘Grandfather’, or the already disbanded Comintern, gave instructions (at the beginning 
of February 1945) that the Party in Vienna should contact Bonner through the 
communication channels of the Communist Party of Slovenia. It is not, however, known 
whether this was actually done. When the Yugoslav units withdrew from Carinthia, the 
greater part of the Austrian Battalion remained behind. Allegedly, the British gave this 
Battalion the status of Austrian Partisans.65 
Just before the end of the Second World War the high-ranking Slovene party official 
Dusan Pirjevec-Ahac was upset by a letter from an Austrian Communist Party official, 
particularly because of the sentence: ‘we shall, also in the future [...] support [...] all 
efforts of the Communist Party of Slovenia, in so far as they conform to the line of the 
Third International’. In his reply Pirjevic-Ahac put one question only — whether the 
Austrian Communist Party was at least now, when the Red Army units were so close, 
capable of organizing at least one single partisan unit?66 
The British also tried to follow this aspect of the political and military problems in 
Slovenia. Among the members of the Soviet Military Mission which was flown in with 
British help, by glider, to Tito’s headquarters only in February 1944, there were two ‘well- 
known Austrian Communists’. They were presumed to have gone into Croatia.67 
Conclusion 
At the end of this chapter I quote some British documents that help us understand the 
political situation of the time. In connection with Colonel Peter Moore’s second long 
report from Slovenia, Sir Orme Sargent wrote, on 23 April 1945, to General Hollis inter 
alia: ‘This report prompts the very cynical reflection that it would be not at all 
inconvenient if events should develop in such a way that Tito is temporarily held up by the 
opposition of the Ustashi and White Guard forces, round, say, Ljubljana and Zagreb, while 
the Allied forces from Italy are enabled to occupy Venezia Giulia and Carinthia in 
comparative tranquillity.’68 
In this report Moore had written the following: ‘Britain is regarded with intense dislike 
and suspicion by the Partisan authorities, who fear we may oppose their territorial claims 
or try to force them to moderate their internal policy. This is however likely to pass 
with time.’69 
The British ambassador to Belgrade, Ralph Skrine Stevenson, telegraphed to London on 
10 May 1945, reporting that fighting was still in progress in Slovenia, despite the fact that 
the Second World War had officially been over by the capitulation of the Third Reich: 
‘Yugoslav pretensions will be unbounded. They must be curbed now or we will see 
“national liberation committees” being set up not only in Italian territory far west of Isonzo 
but also well into Southern Austria.’70 This was not an isolated opinion. In a Foreign 
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Office minute of 14 March 1945 we read ‘We certainly do not want to have the Yugoslavs 
occupying any part of Austria after the surrender [...] they would also spread Russian and 
Communist influence wherever they went’.71 
‘Let me know what you are doing in massing forces against this Muscovite tentacle, of 
which Tito is the crook’, Churchill asked Field-Marshal Harold Alexander on 7 May 
1945.72 ‘Our troops reached Klagenfurt three hours before the Yugoslavs’, General Sir 
Richard McCreery, the Eighth Army Commander, reported on 9 May 1945. Harold 
Macmillan’s despatch reads: ‘beat the Yugoslavs to Klagenfurt by three hours’.73 
These few quotations serve to illustrate the real atmosphere on the British side at the end 
of the Second World War. The course of events has already been briefly sketched in the 
official history on British foreign policy during the war.74 British opposition to Yugoslav 
demands and Slovene national aspirations was, naturally, conditioned by the balance of 
power within the Allied camp at the time. However, this was not the primary 
consideration. In the Handbook for Yugoslavia, prepared by the Foreign Office Research 
Department, one paper, dated 20 January 1944 and entitled ‘The Austro-Yugoslav 
Frontier’, states categorically: 
Since April 1941 {sic\, Yugoslav leaders, including Marshal Tito, have demanded that 
Yugoslavia should be extended to include all the Slovene-speaking elements north of this 
frontier. [...] Such a demand is not justified by ethnic, economic or strategic considerations. 
It would entail the annexation to Yugoslavia of populations predominantly German and 
separated from the rest of Yugoslavia by high mountains.75 
The old ideal of a united Slovenia, formulated first in 1848, came true for only a few days 
after the last shot had been fired from partisan rifles. 
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8 The Sorbian Movement in Lusatia, 1945-1948 
Peter Schurmann 
The Local and International Context 
The post-Second World War Sorbian movement was led by the Domowina. This 
institution, the umbrella organization for Sorbian associations, was founded in 1912, 
banned in 1937, and renewed its activities in Crostwitz, near Bautzen, on 10 May 1945. 
The Domowina worked side by side with the Sorbian National Committee, founded in 
Prague on 9 May 1945, and the Slav Committee, founded in Bautzen in December 1945. 
These representative institutions shared the same goal, the preservation of the ethnic- 
national identity of the Sorbs, particularly their language and culture. In Saxony and 
Brandenburg, they supported the establishment of schools with Sorbian as the language of 
instruction, the involvement of Sorbs in local and supraregional government offices, the 
development of a broadly based Sorbian cultural and social life, the re-opening of a 
Sorbian printing-office, and the publication of newspapers, periodicals and educational 
material in Sorbian. 
In the beginning, the boards of the National Committee and the Domowina believed the 
best way to preserve the Sorbian ethnie would be to make Lusatia a unified administrative 
region of Czechoslovakia. Their minimum goal was the creation of cultural autonomy 
within Germany, in particular the autonomous administration of cultural matters. To 
facilitate this the two regions inhabited by the Sorbs, Upper and Lower Lusatia, should be 
united. The activists involved derived the self-confidence to try to achieve the 
emancipation of the Sorbs chiefly from the defeat of Nazism and the social, economic and 
ethnic consequences of the war. The activists’ goals were stimulated by both the presence 
of a Slav occupying power and the expressions of solidarity of pro-Sorb soldiers and 
politicians in other Slav lands, particularly Czechoslovakia. 
After the Potsdam Conference, the leaders of the Sorbian movement had as their 
maximum goal the achievement of independence, resulting from the peace negotiations 
concerning Germany. International agreements like the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the 
United Nations Charter (1945) pointed to free cultural, economic and political 
development on the basis of democracy for all peoples liberated from Nazism and Fascism. 
That is what the representatives of Sorbian interests wanted for their people. 
Corresponding appeals were sent to the Paris peace conference in 1946. 
Thanks to the intercession of Yugoslavia, at the beginning of 1947, the Sorbs harboured 
the hope that a settlement of the Sorb question would be arrived at during the negotiations 
on a German peace treaty at the foreign ministers’ council in Moscow. Thus far the 
Domowina had not succeeded in introducing legal stipulations concerning the Sorbs into 
the new Land constitutions of Brandenburg and Saxony. The Domowina noted, at the end 
of 1946 and beginning of 1947, an increase in efforts to restore former systems in the 
Western zones of occupation, while the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the Soviet 
occupation authorities were holding fast to the goal of German unity. In addition to this, 
rumours started spreading about an early end of the occupation. The Domowina and the 
National Committee considered the Sorb question ‘unresolved.’* 1 Anxious about the 
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continued existence of the Sorbian nationality, the two institutions sent separate 
memoranda to the Moscow foreign ministers’ council. In the Domowina’s view, one or 
more Slav states should guarantee the autonomy of a neutral Lusatia. The Nationalrat (the 
executive of the National Committee) insisted on the creation of a free Lusatia completely 
independent of Germany. 
After the Moscow conference basic conditions improved for the Sorbs. With the support 
of the SED faction, the Domowina put before the Saxon parliament a bill guaranteeing the 
rights of the Sorbian population, which was passed unanimously by all parties on 23 
March 1948. Henceforth the Domowina took the line that the Sorbian question should be 
discussed only inside the Soviet zone of occupation or Germany as a whole, not 
internationally. The fact that primarily the SED supported the efforts of the Domowina to 
settle the Sorbian question had a positive effect. In comparison with the Christian 
Democrats (CDU) and the Liberal Democrats (LDPD), the SED manifested The greatest 
activity in policy concerning the Sorbs’ in Saxony.2 
The Nationalrat, however, maintained its position that the Sorbian question should be 
settled on an international level until the late summer of 1947. But in contrast to the 
Domowina, it did not exclude help from the Western occupation powers. The Nationalrat, 
and hence the National Committee, rejected any party-political orientation, let alone 
affiliation, such as fostered by the Domowina, which had a shared list with the SED in the 
first post-war elections in the Soviet zone in 1946. It did not want to base its work towards 
the freedom of the Sorbs in the German-dominated parties and administration. In 1945 and 
1946 both the National Committee and the Domowina had sought support for Sorbian 
interests from the Soviet occupation authorities. After the Domowina representatives had 
left the Nationalrat, the remaining members manifested a detached, critical attitude to the 
Soviet Military Administration of Germany (SMAD). This attitude resulted from the fact 
that the Domowina had come under political pressure from the Soviets, probably with 
regard to Sorbian teachers’ joining the SED. The representatives of the National 
Committee were evidently also afraid that any promotion of the Sorbs by the Soviet 
military authorities might have a negative impact on Sorb-German relations once the 
occupation was over. 
Problems with Prague 
In July 1945 the Domowina considered it the order of the day that Germans and Sorbs 
should settle all matters in Lusatia together. For the Domowina co-operation between 
Germans and Sorbs was a key element in the reforming not only of intellectual and 
cultural, but also of socio-economic and political life. This demanded that both sides 
informed each other about such matters. The Domowina sought contacts with municipal, 
district and Land administrations in Saxony and the Cottbus provincial council in 
Brandenburg. Since August 1945 the Domowina had been working side by side with the 
four permitted parties of the anti-Fascist bloc. Its activities were, however, limited in time 
— they lasted only weeks — and in space: the Bautzen district in Saxony. The possibilities 
of the Sorbs’ lending political force to their ethnic demands remained restricted. This 
situation encouraged the Domowina’s merging with the National Committee in Bautzen in 
September 1945, after the latter had moved its headquarters there from Prague. All cultural 
and political endeavours within and outwith the Soviet zone of occupation were to be 
managed through a new co-ordination centre. The Nationalrat had developed from this 
merger; it consisted of two members of each institution, including the two presidents, the 
2 Heiko Kosel, 'Die Sorbenpolitik der SED, der CDU und der LDPD in Sachsen von 1945 bis 
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schoolmaster Pawol Nedo from the Domowina and the priest Jan Cyz from the National 
Committee. 
A branch remained in Prague, headed by the lawyer Jurij Cyz, but now the National 
Committee, through the Nationalrat in Bautzen, became actively involved in the socio¬ 
political affairs of Lusatia. From September 1945 onwards it was Jan Cyz in particular 
who lobbied the occupation authorities in Dresden and Berlin on behalf of the Sorbs’ 
gaining equal rights of participation in regional and supraregional government 
administration. This was pertinent to the licensing and printing of a Sorbian press. The 
National Committee had come to terms with the political realities of Soviet occupation. 
The Prague Sorbs, however, who had for the most part spent their lives outside Germany, 
had only a superficial knowledge of the actual situation in Lusatia. The problems of post¬ 
war life in Saxony and Brandenburg were clearly alien to them. In addition to this, they 
increasingly ignored the agreements Jan Cyz and Pawol Nedo had come to in Bautzen. 
Furthermore, the Prague branch remained wedded to an internationally agreed solution to 
the Sorbian question right up to the time it was dissolved in February 1948, at the time of 
the Communist take-over. 
Things were not easy in Bautzen either. Once the Domowina functionaries had left the 
Nationalrat, this body united only Roman Catholic Sorbs. Now it began to suffer political 
discrimination, and was labelled a centre of ‘blackest reactionaries.’3 Supported by the 
Domowina, the political defamation and exclusion of all Nationalrat activists, including 
their sympathizers outside the Soviet zone, led to a serious reduction in the number of 
people upholding ‘Sorbness’. 
The Political Background to the Sorbian Movement 
The extent of the demands of the Sorbian movement, and the manner in which it made 
them, depended greatly on the relations between the German majority and Sorbian 
minority in Lusatia. Misunderstanding and mistrust were mutual. Both the idea of ceding 
Lusatia to Czechoslovakia and the idea of an independent Sorbian state disquieted the 
German, and to a degree the Sorbian, population, especially in Lower Lusatia. Both ideas 
arose from the Sorbian leadership’s, and not just its so-called right-wing, desire to secure 
the ethnic identity of the people. Three forms of experience led to the movement’s 
activism. 
(a) The Nazi regime had put the existence of the Sorbian ethnie into question. The Nazis 
intended to assimilate and permanently germanize these ‘Wendish-speaking Germans’ 
through integration into the ‘National Socialist national community’ and through the 
forbidding of the Sorbian language and manifestations of Sorbian culture. Sorbian and 
Slav place-names and local names of topographical features (fields, hills and so forth) were 
germanized, Sorbian books and printing presses confiscated and destroyed, Sorbian 
schoolteachers and clerics removed and put in German-speaking schools and parishes, and 
representatives of Sorbian cultural life were either forcibly isolated from their fellows or 
arrested.4 
(b) In the first few weeks after the end of the war, the presence of starving DPs and the 
transit of tens of thousands of refugees from the erstwhile eastern areas of the Reich 
aggravated the already difficult social, economic, political, and ethnic situation. 
Impoverished Sorbs devastated by the raping and plundering and other gratuitous violence 
of the victors came to the Domowina to ask for help. During May and June, 1945, those 
3 SKA, N IV. 17 B. p. 168. 
4 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945, 
Cambridge, 1991, pp. 131-35. 
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workers of the institution who were for the moment trying to establish local groups in the 
Bautzen and Kamenz districts used to be asked, ‘When are the Czechs coming?’5 
(c) On 17 May 1945 the SMAD in Bautzen gave its formal approval to the cultural 
activities of the Domowina, and, at the beginning of August, recognized it as the ‘political, 
anti-Fascist, and cultural representative of all Wends’.6 This was in conflict with the 
principle propagated by the Communists (KPD) that the re-formation of Sorbian life could 
be the task only of established political parties. As a direct result of this, none of the bodies 
representing Sorbs’ interests, neither the National Committee nor the Domowina, was 
officially recognized as a registered association. The attempt to form a Lusatian Peasants’ 
and Workers’ Party failed in March, 1946. This party had been intended to be a ‘Christian, 
democratic, socialist party’ that would represent ‘the political and economic interests of 
the working people of Lusatia.’7 In contrast to, for example, the Kulturbund, it was not 
permitted to join with its own list in the Saxon local, district, and Landtag elections of 
1946. This obstructed its work and led to a general sense of insecurity in the institution. At 
the same time the political parties, including the SED, had too much else to do to be able to 
support the Sorbs in the fostering of their language and culture. The leadership of the 
Sorbian movement was soon to be disappointed again. After partial success in organizing a 
Sorbian teachers’ training institute, the authorities suddenly put a question-mark on the 
whole enterprise. Then obstructions were continually put in their way when they applied 
for a licence to publish a Sorbian newspaper. In Brandenburg circumstances were far 
worse than in Saxony: no political party or administrative office would have anything to do 
with Sorbian enterprises before 1947. 
The Work of the Movement 
The bodies representing Sorbs’ interests were attempting to unite all Sorbs, whatever their 
confession or political allegiance. Normally the three institutions, the Domowina, the 
National Committee and the Slav Committee, worked together in their negotiations with 
German and occupation authorities. Thus the fact that the Sorbs gained recognition in the 
minority-rights legislation of 1947-48 resulted from the work of a united movement. 
GDR historians normally depicted two hostile, independent camps in the post-war 
Sorbian movement, whereby the Domowina was normally labelled ‘progressive’ and the 
National Committee (or the Nationalrat) counted as ‘reactionary’. This was a gross 
simplification. As Solta writes, the ‘official’ status of the Nationalrat as scapegoat 
standing for everything reactionary prevented ‘any thorough analysis of the sources or 
evaluation of the circumstances’ of Sorbian nationalism and separatism.8 The following 
matters speak against a schematic bipartition of the postwar Sorbian movement: 
(a) Both the Domowina and the Nationalrat had appealed to the Moscow foreign 
ministers’ council for Lusatian political autonomy, even if separately. Both institutions 
thus opposed the line taken by the SED and the Soviets, who were striving for a united 
Germany, and the institutions’ leaders, Nedo and Cyz, were fully aware that they were 
demanding a maximum that would eventually be negotiable. This radicalization was a 
5 SKA, D II. 1. 1. A. p. 3. 
6 'Politische, antifaschistische und kulturelle Vertretung des gesamten Wendentums’, Central 
State Archive of Saxony, Dresden/SED District Party Archive (SaHStA/BPA) I/A/017/2. 
7 SKA, D II. 1. 1. B. pp. 64-65. 
8 Jan Solta, ‘Gedanken liber die sorbische Geschichtsschreibung in “den 40er. Jahren’”, Letopis, 
Zeitschrift fur SorabistiK 39, 1992, 1, p. 46. 
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‘logical and consistent consequence of the helpless state of the Lusatian Sorbs’ who were 
‘justifiably anxious about their continued existence as a nation’.9 
(b) The accession of Lusatia to Czechoslovakia and the establishment of an autonomous 
Lusatia remained declarations of intent. Whatever the National Committee declared it 
wanted in June 1945 (shared economy, legislation and currency with Czechoslovakia after 
the liberation of Lusatia by the Czechoslovak Army), nothing of the sort ever came to pass. 
These aspects of Lusatian dreams were never discussed at the foreign ministers’ council or 
at any other similar meeting. 
(c) The National Committee, like the Domowina and the Slav Committee, did attempt to 
make the future of the Sorbs a matter of international, particularly Slav, concern. 
Politicians and representatives of the military authorities of Czechoslovakia, France, Great 
Britain, Poland and Yugoslavia were consulted on the Sorbian question by the National 
Committee. This was in addition to consultations with the Soviet zone of occupation 
authorities at all levels, and with the military missions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
Yugoslavia in Berlin. The National Committee pursued the elimination of the 
consequences of Nazi policies and the democratization of society. Among other things, this 
involved attempts to ensure the release of Sorbian prisoners of war, to obtain a licence for 
a Sorbian newspaper, to ensure Sorbs were represented in government offices. At no time 
were the activities of the National Committee reduced to nationalist or separatist demands. 
That explains why, at the beginning of 1947, the Soviet military authorities in Bautzen 
advised Jurij Rjenc to seek recognition of the Nationalrat by the SMAD in Berlin- 
Karlshorst. 
The view of East German historians that the Nationalrat followed a bourgeois line, 
directed its policy towards the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, who supported it only in the 
interests of power politics, is untenable. In fact, the Nationalrat (and the National 
Committee as a whole) received moral and material support from people representing the 
whole spectrum of Czechoslovak politics, from National Socials, members of the (Roman 
Catholic) People’s Party, from Social Democrats, and from Communists. The money 
handled by the Prague branch contributed to the financing of cultural work in Lusatia, 
enabled the publication of Sorbian periodicals in Czechoslovakia, and ensured the 
grammar-school and university education of young Sorbs. The millions of crowns put at 
the disposal of the Sorbs by the Ustfedni Matice skolska (Central Schooling Foundation) 
and the Spolecnost pratel Luzice (The Friends of Lusatia Society), and indeed some Prague 
ministries, were given freely and unconditionally. There was never any question of 
repayment. Nevertheless representatives of bodies of various political colours did 
successfully recruit Sorbs from Lusatia to work in Czechoslovakia, particularly in the 
frontier areas of North Bohemia. These Sorbian workers in North Bohemia were to help 
compensate for the loss of the vast majority of the local labour-force following the 
Czechoslovaks’ expulsion of Sudeten Germans. This was of considerable economic 
advantage to the Sorbian workers, but from the end of 1946 onwards the Domowina 
condemned the recruitment, and illegal border crossing, of Sorbs and appealed to them to 
return to Lusatia. There is no evidence that the Nationalrat changed course like the 
Domowina. 
The Sorbs in Brandenburg 
The development of Sorbian affairs in Brandenburg was notably different from that in 
Saxony. Neither the National Committee nor the Slav Committee were active as 
9 Archive for Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archive/Central Party 
Archive of the SED (SAPMO-BArch/ZPA), NL 36/741, p. 43. 
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institutions in Lower Lusatia, and the Domowina had no tradition there either. Until 1936 
the only representative institution there was the Masica Serbska (Sorbian Foundation) 
book-club, which supported the cause of Sorbian language and culture throughout Lower 
Lusatia. In August 1945, members of the Masica Serbska who had been active before 1936 
sent, with the support of the Domowina in Bautzen, a memorandum to the Soviet military 
authorities in Cottbus. In this memorandum they asked the Soviets to support the Sorbs of 
Lower Lusatia in their fostering of their language and culture. The military authorities, 
however, showed little interest. In February 1946, the Lower Lusatians tried to establish a 
Domowina section in Cottbus. The Soviet authorities did not recognize either the Cottbus 
Domowina or the Domowina board in Werben, near Cottbus, which had been elected in 
September 1946; they insisted that the activities of the Domowina in Lower Lusatia must 
be approved by the Brandenburg Land command in Potsdam. Furthermore, Brandenburg 
regional and supraregional administrations frequently turned down Sorbs’ requests to 
attend to the Sorbian question. In as late as April 1948, Friedrich Ebert, chairman of the 
Brandenburg SED, together with close colleagues, expressed the view that ‘no legislative 
measures in the Land of Brandenburg were necessary’ as far as the Sorbs were 
concerned.10 
The stubborn denial of the existence of a Sorbian question in Lower Lusatia on the part 
of the Land government and the SED leadership contributed to the radicalization of the 
Sorbian movement in Upper Lusatia — and in Prague. Likewise the Upper Lusatian or 
Prague demands for an autonomous Lusatia had unintended consequences for the Sorbs of 
Lower Lusatia. From the beginning of 1946 to the spring of 1947 the possibilities for the 
Sorbian movement in and around Cottbus were diminished. The military command forbade 
the formation of local Domowina groups and instructed the Cottbus leadership to transfer 
its documentation on membership to Bautzen. This made the organization of activities 
practically impossible. 
In May 1947, Domowina representatives from Upper and Lower Lusatia, together with 
functionaries of the SED met in Werben to discuss co-operation and the means by which 
the Domowina could be supported. Nothing practical, however, came out of this meeting. 
The Germans continued to be uninterested. The situation was not helped by the fact that 
the Domowina had anyway been concentrating its efforts on the Saxon Sorbs. Not until the 
end of March 1948 and the law protecting the rights of the Sorbian population, a law 
which was an important step towards the recognition of the Domowina, did the Bautzen 
headquarters begin consistently supporting the efforts of the Lower Lusatian Sorbs for the 
preservation of their language and culture. Now the Upper and Lower Lusatians began to 
lobby for the extension of the application of the ‘Sorb Law’ to cover Brandenburg. At the 
end of October 1948, the Land secretariat of the SED in Potsdam declared itself willing to 
approve the cultural work of the Domowina in Lower Lusatia. In January 1949, the 
Brandenburg SED agreed to the establishment of a secretariat of the Domowina in Cottbus. 
Conclusion 
The passing of the ‘Sorb Law’ by the Saxon Landtag in March 1948 and the legislation of 
the Domowina by the Brandenburg government in January 1949 marked a new direction in 
post-war policy concerning the Sorbs. They provided a better framework within which the 
Sorbs could press for equal rights with the Germans. They did not, however, come about as 
a result of the selfless generosity of the Germans, but of the perseverance of both the 
Saxon and the Brandenburg Sorbs in pursuing the interests of ethnic survival. 
10 Ibid., p. 82. 
9 How Soviet Was the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation in Germany, 1945-49? 
Martin McCauley 
Germany’s total military defeat in May 1945, the consequence of the Allied demand for 
unconditional surrender, meant that there was no legitimate successor government. The 
German generals signed the documents of surrender and thereby the Third Reich was laid 
to rest. It was now the task of the Allies to appoint a new, democratic German government. 
Therein lay the problem. The Soviet understanding of democracy was Marxist-Leninist 
with a ruling Communist Party acting in the name of the proletariat. This perception of 
democracy saw the working class as the ruling class; other classes were to acknowledge its 
hegemony. The Western allies, the USA, Britain and France, understood democracy 
differently. They acknowledged as legitimate all views which accepted that the will of the 
electoral or parliamentary majority should prevail. There were, of course, limits. If there 
had been all-German elections in 1945 and the Nazis had won, the will of the majority of 
the electorate would have been ignored. The occupying powers agreed that all views which 
flowed from the ideology of National Socialism were illegitimate. A major task for the 
powers would be the re-education of the Germans. They were to be weaned away from 
totalitarian ideology to democracy. The occupying powers had the right to administer their 
zones (sectors in Berlin) as they thought fit. This implied that each power could define 
what constituted Fascist, anti-democratic behaviour and was required to act against it. 
Germany was to be ruled as a single state with the Allies meeting periodically in Berlin to 
agree all-German policy. 
The Red Army defeat of the Wehrmacht was a stupendous achievement, crowned by the 
taking of Berlin and the hoisting of the red flag over the Reichstag. The Soviets had won 
but they were only military victors. Who would win the inevitable political conflict which 
would commence after hostilities? Would the Red Army impose a red, Stalinist 
dictatorship or would Moscow settle for something else? In 1945, no one knew, least of all 
in Moscow. Did Stalin have a master plan for Germany or did he make policy 
pragmatically, seeking advantage wherever it could be found? Is it possible to speak of a 
consistent Soviet policy, one which gradually unfolds or was policy often contradictory 
and self-defeating? Since the state that the Soviets eventually brought into being, the 
German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union itself, both collapsed in 1990-91 it is 
tempting to conclude that it was a case of the blind leading the blind. However, neither 
state was predetermined to fail. The fact that they both passed away was due to the form of 
government which evolved. It was effective during the construction of the state but was 
unable to adjust to the demands of the modem world economy. The Soviet model 
crystallized during the 1930s and was apparently confirmed as viable by the defeat of 
Germany. This was the model which was offered to the East Germans and the ruling 
Communist Party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), transformed it into a 
highly effective instrument for running the GDR. The reasons for the failure of the GDR 
and the Soviet Union are remarkably similar. In each case a ruling party, backed up by an 
effective political police force, blindly ignored the economic revolution which was taking 
place beyond its frontiers. The old men in charge did not want to hear bad news. When 
Gorbachev, in the Soviet Union, and Krenz, in the GDR, attempted to change course the 
whole edifice collapsed. Should one deduce from this debacle that the reasons for the 
collapse of the GDR were to be found in Moscow or were the rulers in East Berlin the 
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architects of their own demise? How much autonomy did the East German Communists 
have in fashioning their own state? Would SED leaders, had they not been Ulbricht and 
Honecker, have produced a different society? What about German political culture? Did 
the legacy of the authoritarian Nazi state produce almost inevitably the authoritarian 
Communist state? These are some of the questions to be considered in this chapter. An 
attempt will be made to assess to what extent East Germany was the result of Soviet or 
German tradition. 
Stalin: Man and Statesman 
In the twentieth century, Germany was always the most important country in Europe from 
a Russian or Soviet point of view. The German attack on imperial Russia in 1914 so 
weakened the ruling class that the February Revolution dispensed with the Romanov 
dynasty. Shortly afterwards the October Revolution brought Lenin and the Bolsheviks to 
power. German intervention had changed Soviet history. Buoyed up by victory the 
Bolsheviks expected revolution in Germany and the headquarters of the international 
Communist movement to move to Berlin. In other words, they expected Germans to lead 
the world. The Moscow comrades were bitterly disappointed when the flames of revolution 
died down in Germany and they were left alone in the world. The rise of Hitler appeared to 
offer great opportunities and the German Communists were instructed to work with the 
Nazis against the German Social Democrats. Again the Russians miscalculated. This was 
compounded by the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939 which almost proved fatal 
for the Soviet Union. In 1945 Stalin was offered another chance to rethink his German 
policy. What were his policy options? There were six: (1) a socialist Germany which was 
friendly towards Moscow; (2) a socialist Germany ruled by a Communist Party loyal to 
Moscow; (3) a dismembered, truncated capitalist Germany which had limited political and 
economic potential; (4) long-term occupation of Germany by the victorious powers: this 
could also involve transferring German territory to its neighbours; (5) a united, neutral 
Germany; (6) a divided Germany with the Communists running their own state.1 
Before examining these options it is worth looking at Stalin as a person and as a 
politician. Stalin did not speak German and never set foot on German soil. He did, 
however, visit a German-speaking country, Austria. He was a voracious reader and 
possessed a remarkable memory. Just how au fait he was with German affairs is illustrated 
by the following two stories, related to the author in June 1991 by Vladimir Semenov, one 
of Russia’s leading German specialists, who first served in the Soviet embassy in Berlin in 
1940 and later became ambassador in East Berlin. Stalin sent for Semenov in late 1945 and 
asked him if there were military factories in Berlin-Zehlendorf, a well-heeled suburb. 
Stalin walked around the room and then fixed his gaze upon Semonov who had been 
invited to sit down. Semenov confidently answered in the negative whereupon Stalin 
began to swear. This made Semenov nervous and he began to fear the worst. To his great 
relief, Stalin then stated that an official had informed him that there were military 
enterprises in Zehlendorf. Semenov again assured Stalin that this was incorrect and then 
demonstrated his detailed knowledge of Berlin. Stalin accepted his opinion. On another 
occasion Stalin asked Semenov’s opinion of a matter concerning Germany. After he had 
presented his analysis there was silence. Then Stalin pointed out that on such and such a 
date he had arrived at quite a different analysis of roughly the same problem. Why had he 
This draws on the penetrating study by Hannes Adomeit, Imperial Overstretch: Germany in 
Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev, Baden-Baden, 1998, pp. 60—87. This volume makes 
extensive use of Soviet archival material. 
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changed his mind? Semenov calmly presented his reasons. Thus Stalin had a retentive 
memory and a mass of information on Germany. 
Stalin was the chief decision maker on Germany but he was dependent on his sources of 
information, which was channelled into his personal chancellery and assessed there.2 Stalin 
did not rely on any one source and ensured that he had several strands of information. 
However, it is known that his subordinates tailored their assessments to conform to his 
perceived viewpoints. The war weakened Stalin physically and a slow decline in his health 
set in. This led to intense rivalry among various interest groups around Stalin. The master 
of the Kremlin was a past master at playing one off against the other but at times became 
caught in his own trap. He made many crucial policy mistakes between the end of the war 
and his death in 1953. He mishandled relations with the Yugoslav Communist leader, Tito, 
eventually drumming him out of the Communist movement in 1948. He appears to have 
believed that Tito would buckle and that he could dictate terms to the Yugoslavs. Was he 
fully apprised of the fact that Tito was a loyal Stalinist and wished to reach an agreement 
with him? Was he misled about Tito’s intentions? Another example is the Berlin Blockade. 
He could have reached a solution which benefited the Soviet Union but provoked a 
confrontation he could not win since he was not willing to use force. His advisers in Berlin 
had not envisaged an airlift and even during it predicted it would fail.3 His actions ensured 
that the Americans, after the Blockade was lifted in May 1949, could never envisage 
abandoning West Berlin. The Blockade also ensured the coming into existence of a West 
German state and the formation of NATO. Further it allowed many American politicians to 
argue that Moscow was bent on an expansionist policy and this prepared the ground for the 
American commitment to stay in Western Europe, expressed in the NATO treaty. The 
Berlin Blockade was arguably the most disastrous piece of Soviet decision-making after 
1945. Another strange episode was the Leningrad Affair which began to gather momentum 
after the death of Andrei Zhdanov in June 1948. It eventually resulted in the execution of 
many leading Leningrad Party and government officials. The most bizarre case, however, 
was the Doctors’ Plot in 1952. Supposedly a group of Zionist doctors had been killing 
leading officials, including Zhdanov, and plotting to eliminate others. After Stalin’s death 
it was revealed that the whole thing had been fabricated. 
It is tempting to conclude that Stalin’s grasp begins to slip in 1948 and goes downhill 
thereafter. If this was so, what were the consequences for East Germany? It is worth 
mentioning that the Russians sent their best soldiers and officials to East Germany but this 
did not guarantee that the policy followed was in the best interests of the Soviet Union. 
The archives reveal that Moscow was well informed about events not only in the east but 
also in West Germany. They had good sources of intelligence and were skilled at 
penetrating Western governments, including the American. A major problem was the 
evaluation of the material gathered. Only a small group had access to it; Stalin was the 
ultimate decision-maker, but not all material was forwarded to him. There seems to have 
been concern, at times, not to provide him with information which might reflect poorly on 
those sending it.4 If he were not in good health or were concerned about other matters, no 
decision would be taken. The exception to this appears to have been nuclear espionage. 
The importance of the matter ensured prompt action. One of the reasons for this, however, 
was that Beria was in charge of the project and hence had access to all incoming material. 
2 N. E. Rosenfeldt, Knowledge and Power: The Role of Stalin’s Secret Chancellery in the Soviet 
System of Government, Copenhagen, 1978, is the most informative source. 
3 D. E. Murphy, S. A. Kondrashev and G. Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold 
War, New Haven, CT and London, 1997, provides examples. 
4 Ibid., p. 57. 
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Soviet Policy 
Various hypotheses about goals can be tested in an effort to arrive at an understanding of 
Soviet policy, and of the six options theoretically open to them in Germany. 
(1) A socialist Germany which was friendly towards Moscow: the omens for a socialist 
Germany in 1945 were good. National Socialism, understood by Moscow as an extreme 
form of finance capitalism, had discredited capitalist solutions to Germany’s economic and 
social order. The road was open for a new beginning and the large, skilled working class 
was in a prime position to take advantage of the disarray of the German bourgeoisie. 
Soviet control of part of Germany would be used to promote socialist goals on a all- 
German level. The collapse of Nazi Germany was immediately followed by the emergence 
of socialist groups and youth movements. There was a widespread understanding that one 
of the reasons for the rise of National Socialism had been the conflict between Social 
Democrats and Communists to gain the allegiance of the working class. In the future, unity 
on the left would block the re-emergence of a Fascist threat. 
The Russians legalized anti-Fascist political parties in their zone in June 1945 and these 
parties were permitted to act not only in the Soviet zone but in the whole of Germany. 
They were under the supervision of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany 
(SMAD). This took the Western allies by surprise and they reluctantly permitted political 
activity later in their zones but only, initially, at the local level. Instead of a new united 
party of the left, the Soviets promoted the re-emergence of the traditional German parties. 
These included the Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). 
Simultaneously the Soviets forced all Socialist and Communist movements, youth 
organizations, anti-Fascist groups and all other spontaneously organized formations to 
dissolve. One example was Flermann Brill, a Social Democrat and a survivor of the 
Buchenwald concentration camp, and provisional minister-president of Thuringia for a few 
weeks in the summer of 1945. He strove valiantly to establish a Bund Deutscher 
Sozialisten (Association of German Socialists) but to no avail.5 Trade unions, youth 
movements and other social organizations would be set up under SMAD direction. Politics 
was to be run from above and not from below. This conformed to traditional Soviet 
thinking as demonstrated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 
By consciously stifling grass-roots politics the Soviets missed a great opportunity to 
promote a socialist Germany. A vibrant socialist East Germany would have been attractive 
to the other zones and it would have been friendly to Moscow. This option was never 
seriously considered by Stalin. He may have feared that a socialist Germany, understood as 
an SPD-led Germany, would have pursued German national aims and therefore could have 
turned against the USSR. However he should have borne in mind that a socialist Germany 
would have been anti-militarist and therefore would not have posed a threat to Soviet 
security. 
(2) A socialist Germany ruled by a Communist Party loyal to Moscow: this was the 
dream solution from Stalin’s point of view. It guaranteed security and the opportunity to 
attract Germany’s neighbours into the Soviet camp. Had a Communist Germany emerged 
it is likely that France and Italy would also have chosen Communism. A Communist 
Europe would then have been on the agenda. 
The dream of a Communist-dominated Germany began to fade in the autumn of 1945 as 
it became evident that the SPD was becoming more popular than the KPD. The fault for 
this lay fairly and squarely with the Soviets. Moscow wanted reparations and began 
H. Mehringer (ed.). Von der SBZ zur DDR. Studien zum Herrschaftssystem in der Sowjetischen 
Besatzungszone und in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Munich, 1995, contains a 
chapter on Brill by Gunter Ehnert. 
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dismantling industrial plant and other installations in its zone of occupation in the summer 
of 1945. The Allies agreed that the Soviets had the right to reparations, but Socialists and 
Communists in the East could not understand why industry and the infrastructure were 
being dismantled if the goal was the promotion of socialism. Then there was the 
framework for political activity. It had all to be agreed at the top and this favoured 
Communists over Socialists. Last but not least was the problem of rape. East German 
society was the most female in Europe with about three million more women than men. 
Soviet personnel were allowed free access to the female population. If the woman 
attempted to gain redress from the authorities and condemned the behaviour of her 
assailant she could be sent to prison for anti-Soviet remarks. Those who criticized Soviets 
were treated by the courts as Fascists. It was only in 1947 that rape declined dramatically 
when Soviet troops were confined to barracks. Rape was an important reason for the poor 
showing of the SED in the 1946 elections and the unwillingness of women to stand for 
election. The KPD came to be perceived as the Soviet party and was blamed for everything 
the population did not like about the Soviet occupation. The Soviets added to their 
unpopularity by their lawless behaviour. If a group of German prisoners was being 
escorted from one place to another and, say, six escaped, it was normal for the Soviet 
guards to make up the numbers by grabbing six innocent males and counting them as 
prisoners. Only after prolonged protests from Germans did the Soviets release these men. 
The situation was such in the immediate post-war period that the sight of Soviets led to the 
local population running for cover. 
The rise in SPD popularity so alarmed the SMAD that it ordered the fusion of the KPD 
and SPD, which took place in April 1946. Most Socialists were positively inclined towards 
a united party of the left but the forced marriage alienated them. This was demonstrated by 
the results of the first local and Landtag elections in the east in October 1946. The SED 
failed to achieve 50 per cent of the vote anywhere. The results in Berlin were a humiliation 
for the SED. The SPD polled 48.7 per cent, the Christian Democrats, 22.2 per cent, the 
SED 19.8 per cent and the Liberals 9.3 per cent. Even in East Berlin, the SPD proved the 
most popular party, obtaining 43.6 per cent of the vote against the SED’s 29.8 per cent (the 
SPD was legal in East Berlin and the SED in West Berlin because Berlin was administered 
separately by the Allies). 
The Western Allies vigorously opposed the fusion of the Socialist and Communist 
parties in their zones of occupation. Election results in the east, however, allayed their 
fears that the Communists were on the march. The prospect of the old (KPD) or the new 
(SED) Communist Party gaining a majority in elections was now remote. Only a Soviet- 
imposed revolution could transform Germany into a Communist state. 
(3) A dismembered, truncated capitalist Germany which had limited political and 
economic potential: Stalin accepted that any attempt to reduce Germany to an agrarian 
state was doomed to fail. The Soviet goal was to ensure that Germany never again 
developed the industrial capacity to attack the USSR. One way to achieve this was to 
reduce Germany in size. The dismemberment of Germany began at the Tehran conference 
in 1943, when it was agreed to transfer the northern part of East Prussia to Russia and to 
compensate Poland for territory it was going to lose to Russia in the east. Hence Poland 
was to get the rest of East Prussia, Pomerania, Upper and Lower Silesia, Danzig, Stettin, 
indeed all territory up to the western Neisse. This was to achieve two Soviet objectives: 
take territory from Germany and ensure that Poland became dependent on the Soviet 
Union because its acquisition of German land would ensure Polish-German enmity. 
Germany was also to be weakened by being obliged to pay reparations. At the Yalta 
conference the sum of $20 billion was proposed, with the Soviets qualifying for half. 
Initially they took capital equipment from their zone but subsequently they took from 
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current production as the economy began to recover. They obtained little from the western 
zones and the Americans stopped sending anything in May 1946. Thus eventually 
reparations did more harm to the East than the West German economy. As a policy for 
reducing German economic strength it was a signal failure. 
The hub of German military and industrial capacity was the Ruhr and the Allies agreed 
to internationalize it. It was impossible, however, to reach agreement since the Americans 
would not accept Soviet participation if they held on to everything in their zone of 
occupation. The British were also finding the cost of occupation burdensome and wanted 
to cut their food deliveries. It became more important to get the Ruhr working than to 
argue over who should own it. 
(4) A long-term occupation of Germany by the victorious powers (this could also 
involve transferring German territory to its neighbours): in the event four-power 
responsibility for Germany lasted until 1990. However the main reason for this was the 
inability of the Allies to agree on a common all-German policy. Lack of consensus 
produced two German states which became surrogates for super-power rivalry. 
(5) A united, neutral Germany: this would have entailed the Soviets, sooner or later, 
leaving their zone of occupation and permitting the emergence of an all-German 
government, elected by all Germans. Four-power supervision of Germany could have been 
agreed to ensure that Germany never developed a military capacity to threaten its 
neighbours. During the period 1945^19 Moscow never openly advocated a united, neutral 
Germany. It always spoke of a united, democratic Germany, democratic being understood 
in the Marxist-Leninist sense of the word. The Russians knew that a united, neutral 
Germany would have a market economy and this would lead to its integration with the 
West. 
Since Moscow accepted a united, neutral Austria, in 1955, why did it not accept the 
same solution for Germany? The answer must be related to the size and economic potential 
of Germany. It was too dynamic to be regarded as just another state in Europe. 
(6) A divided Germany with the Communists running their own state: all I have said so 
far almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that Stalin favoured a divided Germany with 
his own state in the east. This would, however, be a false conclusion. Stalin never set out 
to divide Germany; it simply occurred as a result of his policies. The possibility of a 
divided Germany was always present but, given Stalin’s concerns about Soviet security, 
the division of Germany became more probable as time passed. One can argue that, had 
Stalin always had an East German Communist state in mind, he would not have deprived 
Germany of so much territory. The Soviet zone of occupation did not have a raw materials 
base. An East Germany with all excised German territory (except East Prussia) would have 
been a viable state. There would also not have been the need to expel many Germans from 
lost territories (eventually a total of nine million were expelled). One can argue that 
Stalin’s keenness to move the German frontier to the western Neisse and not to be content 
with the eastern Neisse reveals that he was not expecting to end up with a Communist East 
German state. At Tehran he may have thought that the Soviets would not eventually 
occupy any part of Germany and, if they did, the occupation would be of short duration. 
What conclusions can one draw from Soviet policy in Germany in 1945 about their 
predilection for a separate Communist state? The institutions set up by Moscow in their 
zone in 1945 were intended to be all-German. The political parties, trades unions, youth 
organizations, central administrative bodies in Berlin, were all expected to function 
throughout Germany. These central administrative bodies coexisted with their counterparts 
in the Lander and provinces. Power was decentralized by the Allies in 1945 with a view to 
building a federal state. The relationship however, between, for example, the central 
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financial administration and the ministries of finance at the local level was unclear.6 The 
Soviet military had representatives in Frankfurt on Main, in the west, and the Western 
Allies in Potsdam, in the east. Maintaining an all-German presence was important for 
Moscow. 
On the other hand the SMAD proceeded with reforms in the east which, presumably, it 
thought would serve as a precedent in the other zones. The nationalization of enterprises 
and farms owned by former Nazis was carried out in 1946 and thereby placed most 
economic activity in the state sector. However, the Communists did not gain much 
politically in the east or west from these initiatives. This applied especially to the land 
reform, which provided small and landless peasants and refugees with some land. It is 
striking how often the Soviets acted unilaterally in their zone in the hope of setting the all- 
German pace. Another reading of their behaviour would be that they were attempting to 
secure their own political and economic base in the east. When it came to personnel 
changes they were on stronger ground. They systematically removed teachers, judges, 
lawyers, officials and others with a Nazi past. This paralleled de-Nazification in the west. 
However they also removed officials, especially if they were Social or Christian 
Democrats or Liberals who had served in the administration up to 1945. This process was 
accelerated in 1947-48 when the Communists began rapid centralization of power and 
effectively ended the federal system. 
Is it possible to date Stalin’s reluctant acceptance of a separate East German state? The 
evidence points to 1947. Jochen Laufer concludes, on the basis of archival evidence, that 
the SMAD and the SED were working together to shape a separate East German state well 
before the Munich conference of Land minister-presidents in June 1947.7 The East 
Germans left the conference after only a few hours’ discussion since no agreement had 
been reached on their proposal for the establishment of a central German administration 
which would pave the way for a unified German state. The Soviets however were not 
leading but reacting to events. The British and Americans had established Bizonia, the 
fusion of the economic administrations of their zones, on 1 January 1947. Molotov, the 
Soviet foreign minister, consistently offered a unified, democratic Germany at conferences 
of the Allied foreign ministers throughout 1947. The German Economic Commission 
became effectively the government of the Soviet zone in March 1948 since it could issue 
orders which were binding on all other organizations. Also in March 1948 Marshal 
Sokolovskii walked out of the Control Council in Berlin and effectively ended four-power 
collaboration on Germany as a whole. The SMAD declared the division of Germany an 
‘established fact’. Then came the Berlin Blockade and this cemented the division of 
Germany. However this does not mean that the Russians accepted a divided Germany as 
an unalterable fact. They tried to make a united Germany attractive to the Western Allies 
and Stalin never conceded defeat. The West, however, was not willing to risk its control 
over two-thirds of Germany for the sake of a united Germany. 
German or Soviet Institutions? 
The whole of Germany needed new institutions in and after 1945. The same functions had 
to be performed in east and west. In each zone the occupation forces rewarded those who 
co-operated with them and acted against those who opposed them. The goal was to shape a 
political and economic system which resembled that in the Allies’ own countries. What 
was different about institutions in the east? 
6 
7 
Ibid. See the chapter by Frank Zschaler. 
See his chapter in J. Kocka (ed.), Historische DDR-Forschung. Aufsatze und Studien, Berlin, 
1993. 
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Germany in 1945 had been a regulated market economy. The Nazis had decided against 
introducing a command economy and had attempted to take agriculture out of a 
competitive market economy. They promoted collectivity over individualism in economic 
matters. The eastern policy of nationalizing large and medium sized enterprises and taking 
over the landed estates could have been seen, therefore, as not a break with tradition, but as 
an expression of traditional collectivism. In October 1945 the SMAD took over all 
property that had belonged to the Third Reich, the NSDAP, Nazis, war criminals and 
banned organizations. Over 7,000 enterprises were nationalized. Some of these enterprises 
were turned into Soviet limited companies (SAGs) and the rest handed over to the local 
German administrations. A referendum in June 1946 supported the taking over of 
companies owned by ‘Nazis and war criminals’. This was the signal for the nationalizing 
of any enterprise desired by the authorities. Almost all heavy industry was now in the state 
sector and by 1948 about 40 per cent of gross industrial production came from nationalized 
companies. The only articulated opposition came from the Christian Democrats and 
Liberals who argued that such a radical change in ownership should only be effected at an 
all-German level. The SMAD, however, soon overcame their opposition. The Christian 
Democrats and Liberals were always mindful of the fact that their supporters were mainly 
from the middle class and therefore would be impoverished by the seizure of their 
businesses since no compensation was offered. 
The SAGs were run as Soviet enterprises and the profits passed to Moscow. They 
recruited German labour and Germans were expected to work in these companies 
whenever requested. A striking example of this was the uranium mine, SAG Wismuth, in 
which working conditions were very poor and wages low. Skilled labour from this or other 
SAGs could be shipped off to the Soviet Union to work on projects there. The SAGs were 
a clear example of a policy developed in the sole interests of the Soviet Union. One can 
argue that the nationalization of leading enterprises might have been carried out by a 
Social Democrat administration in the east, hence it was not necessarily only Soviet policy. 
Nationalization, in fact, made it easier for the German Economic Commission (DWK) to 
dominate the eastern economy from 1948 onwards, when output was almost back to 1936 
levels. 
The economy in the east before 1949 was not a command economy. East Germany had 
limited raw materials and energy and therefore was dependent on the Western zones of 
occupation. It was only after the Berlin Blockade that efforts were made to reorientate the 
economy increasingly to the east. Arguably it was only in 1958, after Walter Ulbricht had 
defeated the challenge of Karl Schirdewan and Fred Oellsner, that the GDR moved away 
from a regulated market to a command economy. Schirdewan, Oellsner and others, 
influenced by Yugoslav self-management methods, had favoured a minimum of central 
controls and a maximum of initiative and independence from below all based on economic 
laws, especially the law of value. However had it not been for the USSR’s ability to supply 
the east with raw materials and energy, the eastern economy could not have survived 
without integration with West Germany. The expansion of trade with the Soviet Union 
inevitably inclined East Germany towards a command economy, and this was direct Soviet 
influence. A Communist East Germany (without a Soviet presence) or a Communist 
Germany would almost certainly have retained a regulated market and rejected a command 
economy. 
The legal system had to be comprehensively overhauled and new personnel trained 
hastily. The zonal courts dealt only with civil and criminal cases and in the early years 
crime was rampant. The beginnings of the Communist police force only emerged in 
August 1946 when the Deutsche Verwaltung des Innem (German Interior Administration) 
was founded. In December 1946 it became responsible for the whole of the Soviet zone of 
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occupation and thereby the Lander and provinces lost their police powers. K-5, the 
precursor of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi) only surfaced in 1947. It found gaining 
public acceptance difficult, and it was even more difficult to recruit reliable personnel 
(many of them were to side with the insurgents in the June 1953 uprising). One of the 
reasons for K-5’s difficulties was that it was seen as the German arm of the Soviet 
intelligence services. During the period 1945-49 Soviet courts were responsible for 
dealing with political opposition. They acted according to the RSFSR criminal code of 
1927. The SMAD dealt vigorously with what it perceived as threats to its hegemony. Over 
the period 1945-49 there were about 120,000 political prisoners in NKVD-MVD camps 
(the Gulag) with over 42,000 dying in captivity.8 The Soviets had no compunction about 
using former Nazi concentration camps to house their prisoners. Some of the inmates were 
SPD members who had opposed the fusion of their party with the KPD and others were 
linked to the SPD Ostbiiro which engaged in opposition in the eastern zone. Political 
opponents of the Western Allies were imprisoned, not placed in concentration camps. 
Soviet practice in the east was similar to that in the USSR itself. 
The East German legal system was arbitrary during the years before 1949 and the 
Christian Democrats and Liberals complained on many occasions about legal judgements. 
The latter favoured the emergence of a Rechtsstaat, the rule of law, but the SMAD 
demonstrated little interest in that. However, a full-blown Communist legal system began 
to emerge in the GDR only in the 1950s under the direction of the ruthless Minister of 
Justice Hilde Benjamin. After 1949, GDR courts became responsible for dealing with 
political opposition. The deliberate rejection of a Rechtsstaat by the occupying power is 
clear evidence of Russification. 
In education the first task was to remove Nazi teachers and, since they formed the 
overwhelming majority, this left a gaping hole in school staffs. Crash courses were 
arranged for new recruits, predominantly women. The curricula remained almost intact 
until 1948 when Communist influence began to be felt. Russian was introduced as the 
foreign language and children were taught to see the Red Army as the liberators of 1945. 
The same applied to the university sector but not much pressure could be put on the 
desperately needed staff since they could move to West Berlin or the Western zones if they 
so desired. 
In May 1948 Major Tyulpanov of the SMAD expressed himself very clearly. The time 
was ripe for the emergence of a party of a new type. He had in mind the SED which until 
then had been a mixed Communist and Social Democratic party. Until then the factions 
enjoyed parity of office. The scene was now set for the SED to become more like the 
Soviet Communist Party. This involved a radical departure from the agenda the Social 
Democrats advocated for the SED: inner-party democracy within a pluralist society which 
had implied that socialism would take over through evolution and not revolution and that 
violence would not be used for political ends. The SED had proclaimed the German road 
to socialism in 1946 but this was abandoned in 1948. A fundamental problem was the base 
organization. For the Social Democrats this was the local (Bezirk) organization but for the 
Communists the enterprise (Betrieb) organization. These two forms of organization were 
acknowledged as equal in April 1946, but in December 1946 the enterprise organization 
was declared to be the primary SED organization. In 1947 the associations of local 
organizations were simply dissolved. No party congress convened in 1948 and 1949 and 
instead a party conference, not envisaged in the party statutes, met in 1949 to launch a 
party of a new type. All these moves were discussed with and implemented under SMAD 
8 A. Kilian, ‘Verschollen in Deutschland seit 1945, 1946, 1947...’, Deutschland Archiv, 9, 1995, 
pp. 936-47. 
128 The Phoney Peace 
guidance. Does this reveal that the SED had no choice but to become a party of a new type 
because that is what Moscow desired? 
The Russians could not have obliged the SED to become a party of a new type without 
the support of the leadership. Nominally the party was led by Wilhelm Pieck and Otto 
Grotewohl, but Walter Ulbricht was the power behind the throne and had the best 
connections with the SMAD. Did Ulbricht favour a separate East German state from 1945? 
An argument to suggest that he did would be that, once it became clear in the autumn of 
1945 that the Social Democrats were becoming the more popular party of the left in the 
east, the only way to power for the Communists was a united party of the left protected by 
Soviet power. Since Ulbricht was very ambitious, the argument would go, the route to 
becoming leader in the east was clear: become the leader of a party run on the lines of the 
Soviet Communist Party since a party in which Social Democrats were influential might 
not elect him leader and certainly would not permit him to acquire the dominance he 
wanted. The archival evidence reveals that he consistently pursued a radical line, 
advocating the centralization of economic and political power, central planning, the 
reduction of the influence of other political parties, the single-minded pursuit of (working) 
class interests and the propagation of the Soviet model for Germany. (All this sits ill with 
the Ulbricht of the 1960s. Then he pursued GDR interests in his relations with Moscow 
and was much concerned with the unification of Germany.) 
What is striking about the 1945^19 period is that it divides into two neat halves: 1945— 
47 and 1947-49. The institutionalization of a Communist regime begins quite clearly in the 
second period. The decisive factor was the nature of the international environment, not the 
domestic scene. 
Conclusion 
The term sovietization is controversial: by it I mean the articulation and implementation of 
the Soviet model. This applies to the state and to society.9 The primary institution for 
sovietization was the SED and a key factor in the evolution of the KPD-SED was the 
leading role played by those who returned from exile in Moscow. The SMAD, naturally, 
gave them preference over those who had returned from Western exile. Opposition within 
the SED came more often from left Communists and left Social Democrats than from 
mainstream Social Democrats, and the policy adopted by a Communist Party when 
confronted with opposition within its ranks was the purge. The archives reveal that the 
SED had a high level of autonomy when it came to purging its ranks of undesirables. The 
Soviets monitored the exercise but interfered little in its implementation. The Ulbricht 
leadership could not overtly act against the advice of the SMAD but it could propose and 
implement policy to maximize its own influence. The transformation of the SED into a 
party of a new type was as much in the interests of the SED leadership as of the Soviets. 
The same applied to the state management of the economy. 
The SED leadership always felt insecure vis-a-vis Moscow because it could never be 
certain that the Soviets would not do a deal with the Western allies which would obliterate 
the eastern state. Arguably it was only in 1958 that Moscow came to the conclusion that a 
socialist GDR was preferable to a united, neutral Germany which would inevitably slide 
into the Western camp. Until then the GDR was negotiable. Khrushchev had no illusions 
about the model in the east winning over the west. He was quite aware that if the Soviets 
left, the GDR would collapse. The Berlin Wall was built because eastern Germany could 
not compete with the West; without it the completion of the building of socialism was not 
9 See the discussion of sovietization by A. Malycha, ‘Probleme der Sowjetisierung’, Deutschland 
Archiv, 6, 1997, pp. 949-52. 
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feasible. All this suggests that at some point after 1945 Moscow concluded that its model 
was not attractive enough to conquer West Germany. This may have been in 1946, 1948 or 
perhaps in 1952 when the Stalin note of 10 March offered far-reaching concessions but not 
free all-German elections. A further note of 9 April offered discussions about future 
elections but the Soviets reiterated their previous view that a peace treaty had to precede 
all-German elections. The exchanges petered out. Moscow may also then have concluded 
that if it left, the SED would lose power. This means that it never expected the SED to gain 
the level of legitimacy which would guarantee its continuance in power. If this is correct 
then sovietization was merely a mechanism for making it easier to run the east. The 
division of Germany was a price which Moscow was willing to pay to enhance its security 
but it remained a temporary arrangement until 1958. Hence one can state that Moscow’s 
policy until 1958 was negative, preventing the whole of Germany falling into the Western 
camp, rather than positive, promoting the division of Germany with a Communist state in 
the east. In 1958 the Soviets appear to have concluded that the division of Germany 
enhanced their security and was thus in their interests. After 1958, proposals about a united 
German state tended to focus on a confederation, not a federation. Ironically, by 1961 the 
SED had developed its own mechanism of rule and borrowed only those aspects of the 
Soviet model it found useful for cementing its power monopoly. As the GDR matured as a 
socialist state so the attractiveness of the Soviet model declined. Indeed in the 1960s 
Ulbricht was holding up the GDR as a model for the USSR to follow. This then prompts 
the question: was the Soviet model, sovietization, ever adopted in the GDR? All the traces 
of Soviet influence, the refusal to implement a Rechtsstaat, the implementation of a 
command economy, the rejection of market socialism and a pluralist socialist society, the 
growth of the security police (Stasi) and the militarization of society were all policies 
willingly adopted by the east German Communists. The GDR state was ruled by the GDR 
model but it was inspired by the Soviet model. The SED grasped (except in the late 
Honecker years) that its power rested on Soviet foundations. Egon Krenz, in 1989, 
demonstrated this by pleading with Gorbachev to help the GDR since the USSR had 
fathered the east German state. 
There is also the intriguing question of why the SED fashioned the most authoritarian 
state in East Central (that is excluding South-East) Europe. Whereas the Poles, the 
Czechoslovaks and Hungarians developed an intellectual opposition, which included 
radical, pro-market economists, nothing similar emerged in the GDR. In 1989 the 
opposition moved into government in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The exception 
was the GDR because it was intellectually bankrupt. There was not a single pro-market 
economist of repute in the country. 
In 1945 the desperately difficult struggle to survive took precedence and the right of the 
Red Army to administer the territory could not be denied. The old institutions had failed 
and they had to be replaced. At the family level traditional German values prevailed with 
males well placed to reimpose their authority, even though they were outnumbered by 
women. These traditional hierarchical values were reproduced in society with the 
Communists playing the paternal role. Society could not be permitted by the Soviets to 
evolve democratically, in the pluralist sense, since this could result in the reemergence of 
Nazi-inspired political, economic, social and cultural values. The occupying power had to 
act patemalistically since it was attempting to re-educate and reform. The Western Allies 
were just as paternalistic in their zones. Developments were to reveal that in the Soviet 
zone of occupation paternalism developed into authoritarianism whereas in the Western 
zones it gradually gave way to pluralistic democracy. The onset of the Cold War in 1947 
was probably the primary reason for this evolution in the Soviet zone. However, in the 
Western zones there was no guarantee that pluralistic democracy would put down deep 
130 The Phoney Peace 
roots in the years immediately after 1945. The most impressive argument for the 
legitimacy of the views of the Allies in the Western zones was the economic boom which 
began to gather momentum after the currency reform of 1948. The east never enjoyed such 
an economic advance. Lack of rapid economic success increased the Communists’ natural 
predilection for authoritarian methods because they wanted to keep themselves in power. 
The rush to introduce a planned economy, beginning in 1948, in order to compete with the 
market economy in the West, provoked the uprising of June 1953. One of the 
consequences of the failed uprising was to strengthen the authoritarian elements in the 
SED and to eliminate the influence of former Social Democrats. The fear of dissent and 
opposition gnawed away at the roots of the East German state and ended, in 1989, in the 
situation whereby there were in the GDR there were more secret police for every thousand 
citizens than there had been in Nazi Germany. 
The source of authoritarianism in the east is to be found in the 1945-49 period when 
almost everything which happened after 1947 was a reaction to events in the West. For 
example, the coming into being of the GDR, in October 1949, was in response to the 
establishment of the Federal Republic. East Germany continued to be different from the 
other Soviet-occupied countries in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe in that policy 
was predominantly moulded by events in West Germany rather than in the USSR or 
elsewhere; it was just as preoccupied with West Germany as the USSR was with the USA. 
May one argue that the authoritarian political culture before 1945 prepared the way for 
the dictatorship of the SED? An instructive aspect of East German society was the role of 
women. On average, they were better qualified than men. However, the less qualified men 
were placed above them in the administration, schools, police, the legal system and so on. 
This continued throughout the history of the GDR. It was a male-dominated society in 
which male values prevailed. This development was the consequence of sovietization and 
a continuation of German tradition. It constituted an example of Soviet practice dovetailing 
neatly into East German practice, one reinforcing and legitimizing the other. One cannot 
blame the Soviets for the East German regime but one can say that without their presence 
there would have been no such regime. 
10 A ‘Soviet’ Currency Reform in Germany. The 
Soviet Union and the Question of German 
Currency, 1945-48 
JOCHEN LAUFER 
The impact of the post-war intentions of Moscow’s and East Berlin’s politicians on 
Germany as a whole is still overestimated. What are underestimated, however, are the 
difficulties the Soviet Union faced in securing its position in Germany at that time. Among 
contemporary historians the assumption prevails that until the spring of 1948 the USSR 
had been in favour of an all-German currency reform and that it was forced to act quickly 
only in reaction to preparations for a separate currency reform in the Western zones. In this 
chapter, I question this assumption in order to investigate the correlation between, on the 
one hand, the currency reform in the Soviet zone of occupation and, on the other, the 
transformation of the political and economic situation there. 
Research in the area of contemporary history still faces huge problems as soon as it 
attempts to analyse Soviet sources systematically. The files of the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany 
(SMAD), but also files concerning German issues from a number of different Soviet 
ministries are either not available at all, or only partially so. In contrast to this dissatisfying 
situation, the archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation opened its stacks to 
the public in 1992-93 fairly generously. Unfortunately, no financial decisions were made 
there. But staff members of the Foreign Ministry were involved in the correspondence 
between the Moscow Ministry of Finance and the Financial Department of the SMAD. 
This allows me to document here various events. The background of the few decisions that 
were made quite hesitantly, remains, however, hidden. 
In this chapter, I shall proceed in three stages: first, I shall point out special 
circumstances in the finances in the Soviet zone of occupation; secondly, I shall present 
the SMAD’s plans for currency reform in Germany; and, thirdly, I shall show how the 
currency reform was realized in East Germany. 
I 
Currency matters in the Soviet zone must be analysed in the light of a number of special 
circumstances. First, to this day, we do not know why in the spring of 1944, the United 
States handed over a second set of printing plates to the Soviet Union, without any 
agreement about the amount of and the accountability for the money to be issued.* 1 Because 
of this separate printing of common occupation currency, it not only became the case that 
monetary standards developed differently in the American, British and French zones of 
Germany, on the one hand, and in the Soviet zone, on the other. In addition, the Soviet 
Union had the necessary financial basis to practise its own occupation politics. 
Much of the information in this chapter will be found in my article, ‘Die UdSSR und die deutsche 
Wahrungsfrage 1944-1948’, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 46, 1998, 3, pp. 455-85. 
1 See Vladimir Petrov, Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War //, 
Baltimore, MD, 1967. 
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In contrast to the Western forces, the Soviet Union used its occupation money, called the 
‘M-Mark’ (military mark), to a great extent to buy goods. The Soviet Union used these 
goods not only to support its troops and other Soviet staff in Germany, but also delivered 
some to the USSR. Between 1944 and June 1946 the USSR had large amounts of 
occupation money printed. Between 7 February 1945 and 20 April 1946, an ‘allowance’ 
(in fact, the entire run) of 17.5 million ‘military marks’ to different Soviet institutions was 
issued on the basis of orders from the Soviet Council of Ministers. The Western forces 
waited until the autumn of 1945 to ask the Soviet Union to account for the sum of M- 
Marks it had put in circulation; they did not receive an answer. 
As far as we know, the USSR stopped issuing the Allies’ military mark in June 1946. 
Until this date, the Soviet Union had used this money chiefly to cover its costs of 
occupation, which had been particularly high. Complete figures, however, are still not 
available. At the beginning of the occupation, these costs included the complete expenses 
of the USSR in Germany, for example the costs of the dismantling of plant and the 
acquisition of goods. According to internal Soviet reports, the costs of occupation between 
early 1945 and 1 April 1946 totalled 13.7 billion Reichsmark. More than half this sum — 
8.5 billion — was covered by issuing M-Marks. According to the same report, the 
remaining 5.2 billion Marks were covered by the Soviet Union. Not included here are the 
expenses related to the occupation which the Soviet Union had sustained at home.2 
Secondly, from immediately after the occupation until August 1945, all banks closed on 
the orders of Soviet military commanders. The Reichsmark holdings were confiscated and 
all accounts which had existed up to 8 May 1945 were blocked. These drastic measures 
served a number of purposes. They were as radical as the currency reforms which in 1945 
were carried out in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which served the same purpose as in East 
Germany: to ‘freeze’ the huge amount of money which had come into circulation during 
the war.3 These measures also had the character of confiscation. They marked the 
beginning of the anti-Fascist democratic upheaval’ in the Soviet zone of occupation.4 They 
were not entirely directed at the ‘finance capitalists’ who had been, according to the 
Communist line, the people truly responsible for the ‘Fascist’ regime in Germany. The 
confiscation was also directed against the propertied classes. Most assets acquired as of 8 
May 1945 — according to estimates about 57 billion Reichsmark — were first blocked and 
later confiscated.5 The closing of banks and blocking of accounts, a measure the Soviet 
Union had already practised during its occupation of eastern Poland and the Baltic states, 
also served the purpose of transforming German society. By de facto expropriation, not 
only all holders of government loans were punished for financing the war, but also the 
downfall of the middle class stripped of its capital was envisaged.6 When, following a 
SMAD order, new banks opened,7 the previous German system of banks and savings 
2 Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation (AVP/RF), 082/30/130/32, pp. 42- 
43, Lozovskii to Mikoyan, 25 April 1946. 
3 See V. P. Komissarov and A. N. Popov, Den 'gi, /credit i financy evropeiskich stran narodnoi 
demokratii, Moscow, 1960. 
4 See Kurt SchmalfuG, ‘Die Entwicklung des Bankwesens in der Deutschen Demokratischen 
Republik (1945-1961)’, PhD dissertation, (East) Berlin, 1984. 
5 Frank Zschaler, ‘Die vergessene Wahrungsreform. Vorgeschichte, Durchftihrung und 
Ereignisse der ostdeutschen Geldumstellung 1948’, Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 45, 
1997, 2,pp. 215ff. 
6 Gunther Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945-1948. Alliierte Einheit — deutsche 
Teilung?, Munich, 1995, p. 258. 
The order is published in G. Kohlmey and C. Dewey (eds), Bankensystem und Geldumlauf in 
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1945—1955. Gesetzessammlung und Einfiihrung, 
(East) Berlin, 1956, pp. 115-18. 
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banks had been completely destroyed. Companies and individuals both had to use the new 
institutions, which granted credit according to new rules. 
II 
In early March 1946 the head of the SMAD, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, passed on to 
Moscow a proposal by his Financial Administration for an all-German currency reform.8 
What is surprising about his initiative is both its early date and its similarity to a proposal 
by American financial experts, which was transmitted to the head of the American military 
government, General Lucius Clay, only two months later. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in Moscow refused to present Zhukov’s suggestion to the Allied Control Commission. It 
agreed, however, informally to meet American experts in Berlin. Based on these talks, 
Zhukov’s successor, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, repeated, in May 1946, the suggestion of 
a currency reform.9 
In evaluating both initiatives for an all-German currency reform, we have to answer the 
question of whether the SMAD was interested in actually carrying out the reform, the need 
for which was caused by the situation in its own zone, or whether its initiative was a 
tactical move intended to thwart an anticipated American initiative. 
The first part of this question has been and still is highly contested. Whereas in 1988 
Christoph Buchheim, using American sources, rated the SMAD’s interest in actually 
carrying out a currency reform very low,10 Gunther Mai in 1995 had tended to give it more 
weight.* 11 Frank Zschaler supports his argument.12 All three base their claims on the 
judgement of a Soviet financial expert who pointed out the negative effect the desolate 
currency situation had had on the East German economy, where an abundance of money 
and a lack of goods resulted in a lowered interest rate to increase productivity in the 
industrial and agricultural sectors and in small businesses, and spurred inflation.13 And 
indeed, in May 1946, Sokolovskii stressed internal reasons for a reform to a much greater 
8 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, pp. 20-21, Zverev to Molotov, 21 March 1946. 
9 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, pp. 46-50, Sokolovskii to Molotov, 17 May 1946. 
10 Christoph Buchheim, ‘Die Wahrungsreform 1948 in Westdeutschland’, Vierteljahreshefte fiir 
Zeitgeschichte, 36, 1988, 2, p. 207: ‘On the one hand a certain diminishing of money in 
circulation had come about through the shutting of banks in their zone; on the other, non¬ 
monetary stimuli (for example, the legal obligation to work or the marked differentiation of 
food rations) played a greater role in the economy of the Soviet zone of occupation than in that 
of the Western zones. Apart from that, the Soviets’ aim of exploiting their zone as much as 
possible constituted an argument against currency reform inasmuch as this would lead to a 
boost in production and a rise in the standard of living in the Western zones of occupation, and 
would make the maintenance of low-level provision of the population of the Soviet zone in 
order to benefit supplies to the Soviet Union markedly more difficult politically. On top of that 
the Soviet Union was apparently not interested in currency reform for ideological reasons, since 
the restoration of a functioning monetary economy would make the re-establishment of a 
capitalist system possible.’ 
11 Mai, Der Allierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland, p. 281: ‘Finally, in the Soviet zone of occupation, 
“the bad state of the currency” increasingly influenced “production and distribution”, since 
though the blocking of accounts had had a deflationary effect, it had not limited the circulation 
of banknotes as such and thus had “become for the most part ineffective.’” 
12 Frank Zschaler, Offentliche Finanzen und Finanzpolitik in Berlin 1945-1961, Berlin, 1995, 
p. 75: ‘The few extant sources allow us to assume that the Russian representatives’ willingness 
to compromise has been underestimated.’ 
13 See V. K. Sitnin, Finansy Germanskoi Demokraticheskoi Respubliki, Moscow, 1951. 
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extent than Zhukov had done before him. Overall, he argued, all democratic parties and a 
broad segment of the population would press for a currency reform.14 
Without any doubt, there was enough reason for such a reform on the part of East 
Germany by early 1946. More decisive, however, were political considerations. The fact 
that the reaction of the Moscow authorities was negative supports this view. In March 
1946, the Soviet Minister of Finance demanded a guarantee for the Soviet zone of 
occupation that following a currency reform it could continue to print German money 
independently and without any restrictions.15 By the end of May of that year, the Soviet 
foreign ministry’s economists and experts on Germany raised objections. They emphasized 
the point that before the formation of a central German government the issuing of a new, 
undivided currency, no matter whether this was done in certain zones or centrally, would 
be too early. They further argued that the foundation of a central German bank of issue and 
the introduction of a new German currency would lead to a healthy German economy, but 
at the same time would be against Soviet interests, since the Americans considered that 
ending the issue of M-Marks, as well as the curtailment of both costs of occupation and of 
expenses for reparations, were prerequisites for carrying through the currency reform.16 
The Soviet position up to March 1948 may be characterized by the following dilemma: 
in Moscow, the people in charge neither wanted to allow an all-German currency reform 
that was initiated and controlled by the Allied Control Commission, nor did they want to 
refuse such a reform openly. Had they agreed to an all-German reform carried out under 
the control of the four powers, the transformation process of the East German economy, at 
that time well on its way, would have been endangered. At the same time, an open refusal 
of an all-German reform bore the danger of provoking a separate reform in the Western 
zones. In order to get out of this dilemma, Sokolovskii was to be instructed to agree to a 
currency reform in principle but, when it came to discussing how the reform was to be 
realized, to insist on a zonal right to issue, and thereby block the reform altogether.17 
Nevertheless, the Soviet side also considered alternatives. In late January 1947 a draft of 
the Soviet Minister of Finance read: ‘We consider it possible to agree to a four-sided 
control of issuing and the establishment of an all-German banking mechanism, consisting 
of a federal bank council and a commission of the German local banks at the Control 
Council, under the proviso that the Allies will guarantee full compensation of our 
occupation and reparation costs, including those met by current production.’18 Proposals of 
this kind remained scenarios developed on a ministerial level. They were never proposed 
to Stalin or to the Politburo. This fact suggests that their acceptance was not only 
considered highly unlikely but also that no one wanted to risk being blamed. Those 
members of the Soviet leadership who feared risking such a proposal lest it be accepted 
apparently proceeded on the assumption that surrendering sole fiscal autonomy in the 
process of an all-German currency reform would result not only in their losing control over 
Soviet-occupied territory, but also in endangering the interim results of the ‘anti-Fascist 
upheaval’ in East Germany. 
In the SMAD preparations for an autonomous currency reform in the Soviet zone of 
occupation began in December 1946, shortly after negotiations in the Allied Control 
Commission about an all-German reform had begun. These preparations were triggered by 
hints that the Western powers might prepare such a reform on their own. Without waiting 
for the outcome of negotiations at the Control Council, Sokolovskii, at the end of 1946 and 
14 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, pp. 46-50, Sokolovskii to Molotov, 17 May 1946. 
15 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, p. 20, Zverev to Molotov, 21 March 1946. 
16 AVP/RF 07/11/13/177, pp. 10-12, Smirnov und Gerashchenko to Vyshinskii, 20 May 1946. 
17 AVP/RF 07/11/13/177, pp. 13-14, Zverev to Molotov, 03 June 1946. 
18 AVP/RF 06/9/48/704, pp. 7-13, Zverev/Maletin to Molotov, 21 January 1947. 
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beginning of 1947, proposed in Moscow the printing of separate banknotes for the Soviet 
zone of occupation.19 
Ill 
Immediately after the end of the London Council of Foreign Ministers, concrete political 
preparations began for changing the currency in the Soviet zone of occupation. The 
SMAD, anticipating corresponding moves on the part of the Western powers, took the 
initiative. In December 1947, Sokolovskii cabled the Soviet foreign ministry with drafts of 
two regulations concerning an East German currency reform to be released by the Council 
of Ministers of the USSR. But events took a different course. The first regulation brought 
into force Order no. Ill of the SMAD, signed on 23 June 1948.20 The same day, an edited 
version of the second regulation was announced as a ‘Decree of the German Economic 
Commission [Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission] on Currency Reform in the Soviet Zone of 
Occupation’.21 Added to both December drafts was a seven-page memorandum classified 
as ‘top secret’. Here, the head of the SMAD presented the scenario for reform. The 
coupons which, in the event of the exchange of money, were supposed to be glued on to 
the old Reichsmark notes, were at that time ready for use (December 1947).22 
From 1946 onwards, the SED (German Unity Party) leadership had not been informed 
about the SMAD’s preparations for currency reform. It was only in late January 1948 that 
Maletin explained to Wilhelm Pieck, head of the SED, the SMAD’s ideas regarding an all- 
German currency reform. He announced that instead of current efforts to stabilize the 
Reichsmark, the old money should be withdrawn from circulation and exchanged for new 
banknotes.23 
At the same time, in Moscow, the issue was not a choice between an all-German or a 
Soviet-zone currency reform. In the process of coming to a decision about the drafts which 
Sokolovskii had sent in December 1947, what was at stake were merely the procedures of 
a reform that had been planned for the Soviet zone of occupation. The alternative, not 
taken into consideration at that time, was to prevent a separate reform in the Western zones 
through a compromise with the Western powers, thereby preparing the ground for an all- 
German reform. On 14 May 1948, the final version of the heavily edited December 1947 
draft was sent to Stalin.24 Moscow provided more than the political decision to reform the 
currency: even the details of implementation had been worked out by close co-operation 
between the SMAD’s financial administration and the Soviet Ministry of Finance. In 
general, the conditions for money exchange were detrimental to property-owners; they 
favoured others — the unpropertied and small savers. 
The exchange of the Reichsmark, Rentenmark (pension mark) and M-Mark, which until 
that day had been in circulation in the Soviet zone of occupation, began in all financial 
institutions on 24 June 1948, a Thursday. It ended on the following Monday, 28 June. On 
30 June 1948, when the first stage of currency conversion had been barely completed, and 
the final exchange of coupon-marks into new banknotes had not yet been announced, the 
SED party board (Parteivorstand) published its draft of a two-year plan for 1949-50 ‘to 
19 AVP/RF 082/30/131/33, p. 122, Zverev to Malik, 23 December 1946. 
20 Published in Ministerium fur Auswartige Angelegenheiten der DDR (eds), Um ein 
antifaschistisch-demokratisches Deutschland. Dokumente aus den Jahren 1945-1949, (East) 
Berlin, 1968, pp. 659-66. 
21 See Kohlmey and Dewey (eds), Bankensystem und Geldumlauf in der DDR, pp. 201-09. 
22 AVP/RF 07/21 zh/44/8, pp. 1-7, Sokolovskii to Molotov, 23 December 1947. 
23 Zschaler, ‘Die vergessene Wahrungsrefornf, p. 204. 
24 AVP/RF 06/10/42/560, p. 2, Molotov to Stalin, 14 May 1948. 
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restore and develop the peace economy in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany’. The 
primary goal of the currency conversion in the Soviet zone was the achievement of the 
financial prerequisites necessary to implement this long-term economic planning system. 
The two-year plan marked one further step on the way to the zone’s economic and political 
separation from the rest of Germany. 
The preparation of the second step of the currency exchange in the Soviet zone was also 
in Soviet hands. On 4 July 1948, Molotov passed the draft of a decree on the matter on to 
Stalin. According to this draft, the exchange, at parity, of the coupon-mark with the new 
‘Mark der Deutschen Notenbank’, which was to be printed in the USSR, was to take place 
between 25 and 29 July 1948.25 Even the last step of the currency reform, the destruction 
of the invalidated money, was decided in Moscow. On 9 October 1948, the Soviet Council 
of Ministers announced a decree to destroy a total of 1,600 tonnes of banknotes worth 
about 28 billion Reichsmark and M-Marks. The old money was supposed to be recycled 
into high-quality paper. To prevent the Germans finding out the exact amount of money 
involved, it was decided not to count it before it was destroyed.26 
Conclusion 
In the Soviet zone of occupation, then, the currency reform was not intimately linked to the 
conversion of money that took place in the summer of 1948. The Soviet zone’s currency 
reform was part of a lengthy process of transformation that began in the financial 
circumstances of 1945 and moved towards socialist-orientated financial management. The 
publication in July 1948 of a two-year plan for the Soviet zone, modelled on plans for the 
USSR and the other Eastern Bloc countries, between stage one and two of the East German 
conversion, indicates the degree of transformation that had been reached by that time. It 
was this process of transformation that determined the form and content of the East 
German currency reform. It is indicative of the interests of the Soviet occupation power: as 
far as currency matters are concerned, there is no indication of any USSR interest in an all- 
German solution. The USSR’s main concern was to secure its position in the Soviet zone. 
Given this background, the key position played by the head of the SMAD and his co¬ 
workers in the quarrels about currency issues becomes explicable. Precisely because they 
knew much more about the precarious Soviet position in Germany than the Moscow 
leadership, they took the initiative for the Soviets. The SMAD could settle on its own, 
without formal confirmation from Moscow, important currency matters, such as the partial 
release of frozen old accounts in March 1946, or the establishment of clearing-banks and a 
bank of issue in February 1947. The SMAD administration prepared the material for all the 
Moscow leadership’s fundamental decisions. The SMAD’s relative independence only 
came to an end during negotiations with the Allies. Here, the Soviet negotiating partners 
remained unable to act without orders from Moscow. 
25 AVP/RF, 06/10/41/559, pp. 3-5, Molotov to Stalin, 4 July 1948. 
26 GARF R-5446/50a/3809. Postanovlenie Sovet Ministrov SSSR no. 3829-15515. 
11 Reform and Retribution: The British Impact 
on the Re-establishment of the Rule of Law in 
Germany after the Second World War 
Ulrike Walton-Jordan 
Introduction 
On 5 June 1945, the Allied Occupying Powers declared their ‘supreme authority with 
respect to Germany’. A major consequence of this was the abrogation of the National 
Socialist legal system and the aim to see it replaced by a new legal order. The Allies 
recognized that the perversion of the whole judicial process and the ensuing terror 
jurisdiction and legislation had been one of the pillars of the Nazi dictatorship. The 
reconstruction of the rule of law in Germany was closely bound up with the perceptions of 
the nature and legacy of Nazism and its impact on the judicial system. The Anglo- 
American Allies based their collective post-war plans for law reform in Germany on their 
own perceptions and, very important, on the views of emigre lawyers. In the Allies’ view, 
the legal system in Germany had witnessed a step-by-step corruption and ultimately a total 
instrumentalization by the Nazis’ terror jurisdiction. While the Special Courts 
(Sondergerichte) and the People’s Court (Volksgerichtshof) were created for these 
purposes, ordinary criminal courts had served as perpetrators of terror as well. This had 
been made possible by the introduction of new norms and general clauses, which had 
authorized judges to pronounce verdicts on the grounds of Nazi ideology: the will of the 
Fuhrer, so-called ‘sound popular sentiment’ and the alleged ‘common good’ were only a 
few examples of such newly introduced criteria. Moreover, the police had taken over 
authority from criminal justice in certain areas, most notably with respect to ‘anti-social’ 
elements and Jews in the racist Nazi definition of the term.1 
Against this background, I shall concentrate on the British impact on the endeavour to 
deal with the state and consequences of National Socialist jurisdiction and legislation, 
which I hope to disentangle from the general Allied approach. In order to understand the 
post-war development, it is, however, necessary to trace this policy back to its roots in the 
1930s and the war years. External and internal factors contributed to the evolution of 
occupation legal policies: external factors like the course of the war and inter-Allied 
agreements, like the ‘unconditional surrender’ formula which was present in American and 
British political discourse as early as 1942 as well as internal factors like the decision¬ 
making processes within the institutions of government.2 Thus, my attempts to shed further 
light on these questions follow an interdisciplinary approach which aims to unite the 
perspectives of legal, political and social history. Historical research has so far 
1 For an overview of the deformation of legal norms and jurisdiction in Germany from 1933 to 
1945, see, for instance: Bemd Ruthers, Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im 
Dritten Reich, Munich, 1988; Lothar Gruchmann, Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933-1940. 
Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ara Giirtner, Munich, 1988. For a very influential 
contemporary analysis see Franz Neumann, Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National 
Socialism 1933-1944, New York, 1944. 
2 See Lothar Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung. Die Deutschlandplanung der britischen 
Regierung wahrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Gottingen and Zurich, 1989, pp. 186—87 et 
passim. 
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concentrated on other key areas of post-war planning and policy.3 There is, then, a place 
for an independent study of the legal thought which went into the planning phase. Since 
this was closely linked to the German-speaking emigres’ role in the evolving planning 
process, the whole field of exile studies makes for a pertinent area in the historiography of 
my theme.4 This has, in particular, sparked off studies on professional groups, most 
notably on the social sciences and history.5 However, an emphasis has lain on emigration 
to the USA. More work has recently been done on Britain, mainly on the basis of 
biographical or sociological approaches.6 
The Evolution of British Legal Policy and the Role of Refugee Lawyers 
In my attempt to outline the re-establishment of the judiciary and of legal norms in post¬ 
war Germany I shall focus on three broad chronological and topical phases in the evolution 
of a British legal policy vis-a-vis Germany: (1) The background of a growing knowledge 
of the situation in Germany from 1933 until 1941/42; (2) the phase of planning for the 
post-war situation, which moved from a scholarly to a practical plane from 1942 to 1945, 
and (3) the implementation of British legal policy in the zone of occupation from 1945 to 
1949. 
In the first phase, all British legal policy was developed with the help of German 
refugees’ expertise, which was mostly of great benefit to the process of conceptual 
clarification. Initial information about the abolition of legal guarantees, most of all for 
those deemed ‘non-Aryan’ and ‘anti-social’ in Nazi ideology, was gathered through 
various channels of communication. Not only did the first wave of refugees from 1933 to 
1938 bring personal experience to bear on British public opinion, but many individual 
attempts to relay vital information were made through individual networks (for example, 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his circle to the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell). British 
visitors to Germany as well as diplomats and journalists constituted another source of 
information. But the overall awareness remained patchy, as current research in these fields 
is revealing: private impressions often derived from mixed reactions to Nazism, and 
displayed a high regard for the so-called ‘social revolution’ of the Nazis. Moreover, feelers 
from the German opposition, often coming from Anglophile personalities like Adam von 
Trott zu Soltz, almost never reached government circles.7 
An important source of information, however, was the Manchester Guardian's network 
of spies, the ‘Special Information Service’, within Germany, which provided detailed 
information of State oppression from 1933 to 1941.8 One could argue that this source 
formed the basis of the Foreign Office Research Department’s comprehensive document 
on anti-Jewish legislation in Germany from 1933 to 1941. The interpretation of this 
3 As, for example, on the reconstitution of the civil service (Ulrich Reusch), the establishment of 
political institutions (Barbara Marshall), economics (Ian Turner), as well as broad planning 
issues (Lothar Kettenacker). 
4 See the analyses of Marion Berghahn, Gerhard Hirschfeld and Werner Mosse, amongst others. 
5 The latest example is Peter Alter, Out of the Third Reich: Refugee Historians in Post-war 
Britain, London and New York, 1998. 
6 See, for example, the biography of Gerhard Leibholz, brother-in-law of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, by 
Manfred H. Wiegandt, Norm und Wirklichkeit. Gerhard Leibholz (1901-1982) — Leben, Werk 
und Richter amt, Baden-Baden, 1995. 
See Patricia Meehan, The Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler, 
London, 1992. 
8 See Markus Huttner, Britische Presse und nationalsozialistischer Kirchenkampf Eine 
Untersuchung der ‘Times’ und des ‘Manchester Guardian’ von 1930 bis 1939, Paderbom, 
Munich, Vienna, and Zurich, 1995. 
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anonymous report, which presumably dates from 1941/42, supports clearly what has later 
come to be known as the ‘intentionalist’ analysis of Nazi racist policy, that is, broadly 
speaking, the idea that the murderous racist and political intentions had been in place from 
(at least) the beginning of the Nazi dictatorship: 
The militant anti-Jewish persecution, one of the main pivots of the National-Socialist 
Revolution, has most decidedly been carried out according to a minutely planned and 
thoroughly organised campaign. Every move, every incident— 'official’ or ‘spontaneous’ — 
was a step in accordance with a most carefully prepared and controlled programme. A huge 
flare-up of press-propaganda, mass-meetings and wireless-talks initiated each new phase of 
spontaneous incidents, mobilising a tidal wave of popular ‘passion’ against the Jews. This 
climax was then mostly followed up by measures of local administration, resulting in official 
anti-Jewish Legislation using a phraseology which for many years duped world public 
opinion. All Legislation and unofficial spontaneous incidents must therefore be interpreted as 
co-ordinated or at least very closely interrelated activities, more often influenced by coming 
political events, or manipulated as a camouflage of internal cryptic tensions within the Party- 
hierarchy. The technique of this active and militant Antisemitism is as novel as it is 
destructive, and may certainly be well-worth studying as a pars pro toto of National-Socialist 
methods and mentality, of mass-psychology, intimidation and shock-tactics, culminating in 
the totalitarian Blitz-strategy of annihilation.9 
The legal aspects involved in evaluating Germany’s position were crucial to the British 
understanding of the National Socialist state and identifying the human rights issues 
involved. The Loreign Office Research Department documentation seems to support this 
view. In the years leading up to the outbreak of war and into the first two years of its 
duration, this exploration of the legal situation in Germany and its consequences deepened. 
Networks of emigre lawyers which provided links with key figures of the British academic 
and political world slowly began developing. The odds against which this took place have 
been described by scholars working in exile studies.10 
A few examples will serve to illustrate these difficulties. The ‘List and Supplementary 
List of Displaced German Scholars’ for 1936 and 1937, as well as the report for 1941 of 
the ‘Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced foreign Scholars’ mentions among the 
over 100 displaced German jurists at that time nine emigrants to Britain.* 11 Among them 
were influential scholars like Max Griinhut, formerly Professor at Jena University, or Ernst 
J. Cohn, who left his chair at Breslau University in 1934. The future contributors to reform 
proposals came from a variety of professional backgrounds, but for the most part shared a 
Jewish background. Apart from London (predominantly north-west London), academic 
jurists were based in Oxford and Cambridge. My own analysis of the Society for the 
Protection of Science and Learning’s records have yielded about 130 refugee lawyers, a 
considerable proportion of whom, however, did not remain in Britain.12 Among the more 
9 ‘Anti-Jewish Legislation in National-Socialist Germany from 1933-1941’, typescript, foreign 
and Commonwealth Office Research Department Archive. I would like to thank Bob Dixon, 
foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department, for his kind permission to use this 
material and the material mentioned in footnote 20. 
10 for a sociologically informed study see Marion Berghahn, Continental Britons: German- 
Jewish Refugees from Nazi Germany, Leamington Spa, 1988. 
11 See Herbert A. Strauss et al., (eds). Emigration. Deutsche Wissenschaftler nach 1933. 
Entlassung und Vertreibung. List of Displaced German Scholars 1936. Supplementary List of 
Displaced German Scholars 1937. The Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign 
Scholars, Report 1941, Berlin, 1987, parts 1-3. 
12 Based on an analysis of the records of the Academic Assistance Council/Society for the 
Protection of Science and Learning (now the Council for Assisting Refugee Academics) held at 
the Bodleian Library. 
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prominent members of the legal profession who came to Britain and influenced the 
development of progressive legal thought there, Hermann Mannheim and Otto Kahn- 
Freund also contributed to the advisory bodies’ work. 
In the second phase of legal planning, during the early 1940s, the British government 
came to recognize the potential of expert advice, and contributions of emigrant jurists to 
this complex and controversial issue played a certain, though often indirect, role in the 
development of British planning from 1942 to 1945 and beyond. There was a change from 
a predominantly analytical to a more concrete, practical and educational approach over the 
period 1942 to 1945. From 1942 onwards the broad political-legal perspective of future 
regulations in Germany assumed centre-stage in the views of refugee jurists and British 
officials alike. Here as in other respects, the Italian capitulation in summer 1943 made the 
need to formulate plans for the post-war era more urgent.13 From around 1942, attention 
moved from the detailed economic considerations of a revision of the Versailles Treaty for 
the purposes of a future peace treaty with Germany to the need of a thorough revision of 
German law.14 Naturally, the German legal experts involved in drafting resumes were 
eager to influence future British policy. 
The first German emigrant advisory body under the direction of Ernst Wolff, the former 
President of the German and Berlin Bar, had been advising on the future peace treaty 
provisions since early in the war.15 Communication between the Foreign Office and the 
‘Wolff Committee’, had been through Sir Cecil Hurst, a former Legal Adviser at the 
Foreign Office, now engaged in work for the Home Office’s Interned Enemy Aliens 
Tribunal at the Royal Courts of Justice. Hurst actively supported the setting up of the 
‘Committee for the Revision of German Law’ under the chairmanship of Ernst Wolff and 
another emigre lawyer, E. K. Schalscha. On 6 January 1942, he met with Wolff and 
Schalscha, and two days later told the Foreign Office’s Legal Adviser, Sir William Malkin: 
The upshot of our discussion was that it would be a good thing to have this question 
explored. Dr. Wolff and Dr. Schalscha are to see whether they can obtain the collaboration of 
a few qualified individuals, say six in all, to undertake the enquiry, but these individuals will 
do so upon the distinct understanding that HMG [...] are not in any way to be committed to 
the view that the terms embodied in the peace settlement at the end of the war will contain 
any provisions on the subject.16 
Encouraged by this interest on the government’s part, be it ever so guarded, the two 
lawyers solicited the co-operation of colleagues who were willing to get down to work 
immediately. The new committee laid down the rules which the later advisory bodies, 
which were linked with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and 
the British Control Commission, would implicitly follow: ‘The idea underlying the 
Committee’s work is to examine all laws created by the Nazis with the view to suggest 
which of the provisions would have to be abolished for being incompatible with the 
elementary principles of justice and liberty, which could be modified and which could 
possibly be maintained.’17 
Though law created by National Socialism, the lawyers agreed, must to a large extent be 
considered incompatible with fundamental principles of humanity and civilization, they 
13 Kettenacker, Krieg zur Friedenssicherung, pp. 172-80. 
14 This is illustrated by the involvement of Ernst Wolff as government adviser. Public Record 
Office (hereafter PRO), FO 371/39032/Doc C 1115/291/18 and Doc C 291/291/18. 
15 On the wider question of the post-war settlement plans, see Kettenacker, Krieg zur 
Friedenssicherung, pp. 394-409. 
16 PRO, FO 371 /39032/Doc C 291/291/18, Sir Cecil Hurst to Sir Wiliam Malkin, 8 January 1942. 
17 PRO, FO 371/39032/Doc C 1115/291/18, Wolff to Sir Cecil Hurst, 19 January 1942. 
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were reluctant to cancel all Nazi-created law. In any case, so the argument ran, this could 
not be done with retroactive effect, since numerous legal relationships established under 
and based on Nazi law would thereby be deprived of all foundation. As a result, each law 
was looked at on an individual basis and recommendations were made on its status. 
The Wolff Committee’s work was the first significant step in post-war legal planning. 
The following three points were essential to their general approach: (1) At no stage did the 
Committee consider rewriting the German constitution of the Weimar years, nor, indeed, 
put any other pre-existing constitution in place after the war. It was for the German people 
to decide on their constitution at a later stage. (2) The Committee planned to include as one 
of the most urgent measures a declaration of the Rights of Man, referring back both to the 
German and American/French traditions and to the most recent developments in the Law 
of Nations. These rights included, among others, the Lockean triad of civil liberties (rights 
to life, liberty and property) without distinction of nationality, race, language or religion, 
legal security in the economic and professional area and equality before the law. (3) A 
proclamation to the German people was drafted which named these and other rights, and 
fundamental statements like ‘Judges shall be bound by existing law’. Over the years, the 
Wolff Committee developed their survey of objectionable laws, widening the scope of 
their analysis to cover civil and criminal law in their entirety.18 Following this initial co¬ 
operation between the British and refugees in the first half of 1943, a British policy began 
to take shape which departed from the philosophical, and political and moral, foundations 
of the refugees. Linked with the refugees’ vision was consideration of compensation for 
sufferings inflicted as a consequence of the deterioration of law in Germany. The British, 
and later the Anglo-American, initiatives still used the experts’ knowledge in the working 
groups established as the Special Legal Unit Germany and Austria (under SHAEF G-5) 
and the British Special Legal Research Unit (Control Office Germany and Austria, 
London), yet they concentrated their efforts on the practical realization of occupation 
policy objectives ‘on the ground’. This meant providing, among other things, lecture 
courses for future occupation officers, completing the list of objectionable legislation, 
summarizing the German legal system and the status of law-enforcement agencies. All of 
these matters were dealt with by emigres to Britain or the USA (best known among them 
was perhaps the future legal adviser to General Clay, Fritz E. Oppenheimer).19 This 
pragmatic approach of the Allies, however, did not lose sight of the need to eradicate all 
vestiges of specifically Nazi law. 
On the British side, there were deliberations on the general theme of the control of courts 
through another power in 1944, a topic which was not unheard of in British colonial 
history. It is, then, not surprising that the example of British control over Egyptians courts 
in the late nineteenth century featured in the Foreign Office’s discussions on the matter.20 
Similar models were implicitly followed in some areas of post-war legal policy in the zone 
of occupation, such as in the institution of regional court control teams. 
18 PRO, FO 371/8835/Doc C 8835/8835/18 (Report dated 31 July 1943). Cf. PRO, FO 
371/39069/Doc C 902/116/18 (Supplementary Report dated 18 January 1944). 
19 For the general background and organizational affiliations, see Matthias Etzel, Die Aufhebung 
von nationalsozialistischen Gesetzen durch den Alliierten Kontrollrat (1945-1948), Tubingen, 
1992. 
20 ‘Control of the Administration of Justice by a Foreign Power’, paper in the collection of the 
Foreign Office Research Department, 16 September 1944, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
Archive, Whitehall, London. 
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The British ‘Blueprint’ and its Implementation 
In the course of 1944^15 Anglo-American discussions led increasingly to concrete law 
policy outlines. The eventual outcome of post-war legal planning, the ‘blueprint’, as it 
were, of British legal policy before the end of hostilities (an analysis of American policy 
would differ somewhat) can be found in the statement of the UK member of the European 
Advisory Commission of 28 February 1945: 
(a) The abolition of legislation discriminating against individuals on racial, religious or 
political grounds; (b) the restoration of the equality of all citizens before the law; and the 
release of political prisoners; (c) the re-establishment of the ‘rule of law’ and of the authority 
and impartiality of courts and judges; (d) the purge of the German judiciary and the German 
public legal service of unreliable or politically undesirable judges or magistrates or officials; 
(e) the abolition of detention and imprisonment without trial.21 
This whole process of finding such a legal policy blueprint had not, however, led to any 
mixed refugee-Allied groups, nor had it at this point led to the establishment of a sustained 
direct consultation between Allied institutions and refugee legal experts. Their long-term 
influence was none the less formidable. While their practical and empirical influence is 
clearly borne out by Allied legislation after the war, some of their underlying assumptions 
were also in harmony with British and Allied approaches. Their reluctance to impose a 
constitution on defeated Germany, for example, coincided with the British approach to the 
re-establishment of the rule of law in post-war Germany. Reports by the Special Legal 
Unit Germany and Austria were used in two ways for the formulation of Military 
Government Law No. 1 on the abrogation of National Socialist law (September 1944). 
Compilations of racially discriminating laws were completely incorporated into Part II of 
that law, and the concept of a general clause of abrogation, suggested by the Special Legal 
Unit Germany and Austria, was followed (against original British wishes for a suspension). 
Also, the evolving Allied and British legal policy statements, most important, those drafted 
in autumn 1945, partially bore out the emigres' ideas. 
There were, however, important differences in the British government and the emigres' 
approach to the questions of German law revision and reform. The emigres' emphasis on a 
‘natural rights’ basis to all their deliberations on the re-constitution of German legal norms 
is an important feature of their analysis on the theoretical level.22 This perspective follows 
the Enlightenment tradition of pre-constitutional inalienable individual rights as 
documented in the English Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the American Constitution. These all prefigure the United Nations declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948. In this instance it seems that the French-American legal tradition of 
catalogues of rights comported with the English civil rights tradition in an attempt to create 
a firm ground from which to judge and legislate. The emigres also sought to continue the 
developments in international law which had taken place in the 1920s. While the British 
showed consideration for individual civil liberties, the ideas of pre-constitutional 
declaratory rights and the goal of international accountability for violations of human 
rights (a transparent international awareness of the contents of an ‘International Magna 
21 European Advisory Commission, Administration of Justice, Memorandum by the UK 
Representative, Lancaster House, London, 28 February 1945. PRO, FO 1060, no. 729. 
22 This can be evaluated in the context of the so-called renascence of ‘natural rights thinking’ in 
Germany after 1945. See Joachim Perels, ‘Die Restauration der Rechtslehre nach 1945’, 
Kritische Justiz,\l, 1984, pp. 359-79. 
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Carta’) is not taken up.23 Yet the British supported fully the Allies’ general proclamation 
of 20 October, 1945 which voiced exactly these concepts of universal human rights: ‘The 
Control Council, in accordance with its proclamation to the German people, dated 20 
October 1945, deciding that the German judicial system must be reorganised on the basis 
of the principles of democracy, legality and equality before the law of the citizens, without 
distinction of race, nationality, or religion.’24 
As far as the implementation of these legal policy guidelines are concerned, it appears 
that the transition between planning and realization was marked by a number of 
institutional and theoretical continuities. The key group responsible for government legal 
advice, the British Special Legal Research Unit, continued to produce reports and analyses 
from London, which were frequently used in the day-to-day operations of the Legal 
Division of the Control Commission for Germany (British Element). Nevertheless, the 
practical situation and the inter-Allied command structure demanded changes to the British 
approach. Above all, this meant adjustment to the other Allies’ ideas and perceptions of 
legal questions relating to Germany. At the Allied Control Authority Legal Directorate in 
Berlin a working group was established to produce a draft for the ‘Reform of German 
Law’. This group met alongside the Allied Control Authority Legal Directorate meetings. 
Yvette Monier, a member of the French delegation, records in her memoirs: 
It was an extraordinary atmosphere: we felt like pioneers and in a sense we were. Nothing 
like it had ever happened in the history of the world. We now have [...] become used to 
international co-operation in permanent or semi-permanent bodies like the United Nations, 
International Courts and, more recently, the European Parliament etc. But the idea of four 
countries, as geographically and ideologically diverse as ours, meeting week after week in an 
atmosphere of cordiality to re-establish order in a defeated, demoralised and ruined enemy 
country, and setting it back on its feet, was absolutely new and wonderful.25 
In the British zone of occupation in north-west Germany arrangements were made for 
the implementing of ‘indirect rule’. In other words, the extent of obvious control over 
German courts was limited. A small German advisory group was established in late 1945, 
recruited from German lawyers who had been prisoners of war in Britain. Key figures in 
the German legal establishment were also found who could act as mediators of British 
guidelines (the eight presidents of the old Land supreme courts [Oberlandesgerichte] 
recommended themselves at first, until the establishment of Lander Justice Ministries and 
the Central Legal Office for the British zone in 1946 expanded the circle).26 
All theory about legal occupation policy merged into the necessities of practice when the 
occupation of Germany began in the autumn of 1944. Faced with the problem of 
reconstituting the administration of justice, all zones of occupation encountered similar 
23 Compare the ‘Wolff Committee’s’ term ‘negative Magna Carta’ for the Nazi law of 28 
February 1933 which virtually annihilated all fundamental rights guarantees in Germany: PRO, 
FO 371/8835/Doc C 8835/8835/18. 
24 Allied Control Council Law No. 4, ‘Reorganisation of the German Judicial System’, dated 30 
October 1945, in ‘Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Co-ordinating 
Committee Germany for 1945’, Microfilm 10 Omgus SK11, DK 112.003 (Institute of 
Contemporary History, Munich). 
25 Lady Wilberforce, Anecdotes in My Life (A Memoir), published by The Philippine Branch of 
the International Law Association, Manila, 1993, p. 66. 
26 The structure of the British Control Commission Legal Division in Berlin and its sub¬ 
headquarters in Biinde and Herford has been analysed by German and British scholars. See, for 
example, Martin Broszat, ‘Siegerjustiz oder strafrechtliche “Selbstreinigung”. Aspekte der 
Vergangenheitsbewaltigung der deutschen Justiz wahrend der Besatzungszeit 1945-1949’, 
Vierteljahrshefte fur Zeitgeschichte, 29, 1981, pp. 477-544. 
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difficulties: an increased rate of criminality, a backlog of civil proceedings (mostly divorce 
matters) and the accumulation of untried cases from the pre-1945 period created serious 
problems throughout Germany. The influx of refugees from the east as well as housing and 
food problems and the extensive and often violent black market were only the most urgent 
among the problems that the occupying powers had to deal with. As Alan Kramer has 
pointed out, in the immediately post-war years the major law-and-order problem was 
property crime.27 
Apart from economic dislocation, shortages and the physical destruction of cities, other 
factors contributed to the crime wave. The presence of Displaced Persons in Germany 
(former slave labourers, prisoners of war and concentration-camp inmates) caused 
widespread concern, since they frequently survived on the basis of gang raids 
predominantly led by Polish DPs, but also by Germans; murder and armed robbery were 
rife.28 The Military Government was, then, faced with considerable jurisdictional 
responsibilities. Given the size of the task, the implementation of the reconstitution (and 
control) of courts, was remarkably fast. On the basis of the court constitution law of 1924, 
local and Land courts opened in late May 1945, and in the autumn of 1945 the eight 
supreme Land courts followed. By the spring of 1946 a reasonable system of German law 
courts was working. The task of maintaining order was subject to a threefold organization 
of Summary, Intermediate and General Courts. These had jurisdiction over every person in 
the zone of occupation and pronounced sentences according to Allied, British and German 
criminal law. These courts were the main focus of criminal jurisdiction for both British and 
Germans at the time. 
Using the ‘blueprint’ for British legal policy of February 1945 as my point of reference, I 
shall briefly explore the intent and realization of the key objectives in the British plan. I 
have chosen these objectives to illustrate the decisions that were taken in fulfilling them by 
the British Military Government and the British Control Commission from 1945 to 1949. 
In some cases, a model of congruence or discrepancy cannot be applied — a case in point 
is de-Nazification. In other cases one can broadly use it as in the case of the rule of law. 
As far as the British law-and-order policy was concerned, not only criminal jurisdiction, 
but also the potential resurgence or persistence of Nazi tendencies exercised the British. 
Strong preventive principles existed along the lines of military occupation jurisdiction for 
some time and subsequently gradually gave way to jurisdiction by the British occupation 
power, which was less bent on the principle of deterrence. The de-Nazification of the law, 
on the other hand, had been a core task of the planning phase and saw implementation 
within the year 1945. After the first wave of Allied and British decrees and laws governing 
the abolition of the most obvious Nazi laws and institutions (Special Courts and so forth), 
the greatest effort went into the control of German jurisdiction through regionally and 
locally active groups of officers who shared for the most part a civilian legal background 
and thus implemented the principle of British ‘indirect rule’. 
The de-Nazification of legal personnel constituted a field of action which had of 
necessity to wait until the actual occupation. After a first surge of ‘purging’, by late 1945 
the so-called Huckepackregel (piggy-back rule), that is the admission of one nominal 
27 Alan Kramer, “‘Law-abiding Germans”: Social Disintegration, Crime and the Reimposition of 
Order in Post-war Western Germany, 1945-9’ in Richard J. Evans (ed.). The German 
Underworld: Deviants and Outcasts in German History, London and New York, 1988, 
pp. 238-61. 
28 See the statistics gleaned from a survey of British courts’ jurisdiction in the British zone of 
occupation from 1945 to 1955. Murder and armed robbery (and related offences) were the 
second most frequently occurring crimes tried in the high courts and in the general and 
intermediate courts. See appendix at the end of this chapter. 
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National Socialist for every ‘clear case’ of no existing Nazi affiliations, prevented a 
thoroughgoing process of personnel exchange. In general, de-Nazification of the top 
positions assumed primary importance. This had a political impact as the years went on, 
which sometimes took the shape of anti-Communist tendencies, as the example of the 
establishment of the Hamburg judiciary demonstrates.29 In contrast to these measures, the 
British attempts to influence the corporate identity of the new German generation of 
lawyers belonged to a different variety of ‘indirect’ policy. It differed from the other 
aspects in that it was firmly rooted in the post-1947, broadly-speaking ‘early Cold War’ 
era of the occupation. The courses for young lawyers (articled clerks), who came to Britain 
and took a short course on the principles and theory of English law, proved very successful 
throughout.30 
Something that was outside British legal policy planning, but where British lawyers 
became intimately involved was the war crimes tribunal. Especially the liberation of 
Belsen, but then the even more horrifying news of the German camps in Russian-liberated 
Poland, particularly Auschwitz and Majdanek, forced the British authorities to ponder the 
question of nulla poena sine lege, that is the admissibility of retroactive jurisdiction, which 
constituted the basis of the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. The official British standpoint 
adhered to the conventional definition of war crimes, but a debate was started under the 
strong influence of the American (and partly the German) view of the predominance of 
‘principles of humanity’. The Belsen trial under British auspices was especially important 
as the first Allied trial of this kind. 
Conclusion 
In December 1943, an internal Foreign Office memorandum expressed an opinion that 
summarized the general attitude of the British government to law reform in Germany 
during the post-war planning phase: ‘German law regulates German lives, not ours: it is 
only just and reasonable that they should reform it themselves’.31 ‘Just and reasonable’ — 
the two poles of British idealism and pragmatism — posed different problems for the 
realization of post-war legal policy after the transition from war to peace. British legal 
policy in Germany evolved from an extremely important, yet insufficiently known subject 
amongst the issues of evaluation and post-war planning to a centre part of British 
occupation policy. In this transition, it lost most of its (em/gre-motivated) role as yardstick 
for assessing the Nazi tyranny and assumed the key characteristics of the occupation policy 
as a whole: a measured, indirect control was paired with the encouragement of democratic 
and Anglophile legal thinking (without any attempt to alter the German approach 
altogether). However, this policy underwent an evolution dictated by the political events 
during the volatile period 1945—49: at first there was an approach to jurisdiction which was 
informed by the demands of military occupation and deterrence, while from around 1946— 
47 the agenda of the nascent Cold War entered the apparently ever-growing conformity of 
legal occupation policy in the British zone of occupation and among the Allies altogether. 
29 See PRO, FO 1060 no. 1032 passim (Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, German Courts and 
Officials). 
30 See Bundesarchiv Coblenz, collection Z 21, Vol. 314. 
31 PRO, FO 371/8835/Doc. C 12961/8835/18, Foreign Office memorandum, ‘The Reform of Nazi 
Law’, dated December 1943. 
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Appendix 
Statistics concerning criminal jurisdiction by British Courts in the zone of occupation, 
1945-55 
1: Control Commission High Courts, Records of individual cases 1945-55 
Unlawful possession and use of firearms/explosives 52 
Theft/aggravated theft/armed robbery/plunder/illegal export 45 
Murder including attempted murder 26 
Crimes against humanity 15 
Offences prejudicial to the security of the Allied Powers 7 
Acts hostile/prejudicial to the Allied Forces 3 
Abortion 1 
Public Disorder (AHC Law 14) 2 
Offences against the German Opium Law 1 
Illicit slaughter 1 
Unlawful distilling 1 
Indecency 1 
2: Control Commission Summary Court, Records of individual cases 1945-55 
Fraud 20 
Disobedience and Resistance to Military Government 10 
Theft/plunder 8 
Unlawful possession and use of firearms and explosives 7 
Assault 3 
Dangerous driving 3 
Acts to the prejudice of the Allied Forces 2 
Acts to the prejudice of good order 1 
Conduct hostile or disrespectful to the Allied Forces 1 
Abortion 1 
Murder 1 
Illegal border-crossing 1 
Violating the prostitution laws 1 
Escape 1 
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3: Control Commission General and Intermediate Courts, Records of Individual Cases 
1945-55 
Unlawful possession and use of firearms 96 
Murder including attempted murder and connivance 52 
Theft/aggravated theft/looting 50 
Fraud/bribery 27 
Assault/riot 20 
Acts to the prejudice of good order 13 
Death by negligence 10 
Wilful concealment of records/false statements 9 
Disobedience to Military Government including insulting 9 
Manslaughter 7 
Public disorder including incitement 7 
Sabotage 5 
Black market offences 5 
Escape 5 
Assistance after escape/failing to report 4 
Rape 4 
Acts in support of the NSDAP and HJ (Hitler Youth) 3 
Endangering the security of the Allied Forces by removing 
marks of blood groups of SS members 2 
Disrespectul conduct towards the Allied Forces 2 
Conspiring to commit acts in support of the NSDAP 2 
Acts prejudicial to the interests of the Allied Forces 2 
Wandering without permit during curfew 2 
Promoting/aiding a public gathering without permit 1 
Illegal border-crossing 1 
Desertion from POW camp 1 
Intelligence given to Wehrmacht 1 
Abortion 1 
Indecency 1 
Threatening girls associating with British soldiers 1 
Crimes against humanity 1 
Espionage including intended espionage 1 
Infanticide 1 
Unlawful imprisonment 1 
Illegally entering Germany 1 
Illegal border-crossing 1 
Enforcing measures against a person co-operating with 
the Allied Forces 1 
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4: Control Commission Court of Appeal, Records of individual cases 1945-55 
Unlawful possession and use of firearms and explosives 23 
Fraud/false statement in documents 22 
Theft 21 
Dangerous driving 10 
Assault/unlawful killing 3 
Crimes against humanity 2 
Escape 2 
Murder including incitement to murder 2 
Disobedience to Military Government orders 2 
Offences against the prestige and security of the Allied 2 
Forces (AHC Law 5) 
Acts against the security of the Allied Forces 1 
Acts prejudicial to good order 1 
Black-market offences 1 
Disrespectful conduct towards the Allied Forces 1 
Buggery 1 
Contempt of court (British national) 1 
Act of assistance to a state at war with Belgium (Belgian 1 
national) 
All data based on Public Record Office, FO 1060 
12 Young People and Youth Movements in the 
Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany 
Gareth Pritchard 
From the very beginning of the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany, the military 
authorities, and the leaders of both the Communist party (KPD) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SPD), regarded the winning of the hearts and minds of youth as one of their key 
political objectives. There were several reasons for this. In the long term, young people 
represented the future of Germany, and both the Soviets and the German Communists were 
anxious to shape that future. In the short term, the loss of so many adult males during the 
war meant that, out of sheer pragmatic necessity, the process of economic and political 
reconstruction would require the full and active participation of young people. The Soviet 
authorities and Communist leaders also believed that German youth had been more deeply 
impregnated by Nazism than almost any other section of the population, and therefore 
required special remedial attention. According to Walter Ulbricht: ‘The whole tragedy of 
the Hitler catastrophe weighed on the young German generation. Never were young people 
more shamefully betrayed and more completely led astray.’1 
In their strenuous efforts to influence young people, the east German authorities used a 
wide variety of tools. They implemented a sweeping reform of the education system in 
order to break what they saw as the reactionary traditions of German schools and 
universities, and in order to open up educational opportunities for young people from 
peasant or working-class backgrounds. They encouraged young people to join one of the 
various ‘antifascist’ parties licensed by the Soviets, ideally the Communist Party, or, 
following its creation in April 1946, the so-called ‘Socialist Unity Party’ (SED). There was 
an effort to win the gratitude of young people through enacting various reforms to improve 
their legal, political and economic rights. In addition to these positive measures there was 
also, of course, the use of repression and terror against those deemed to be irredeemable. 
Many thousands of young people, for example, were arrested and interned during the 
Soviet occupation on suspicion of being members of the supposed Nazi underground 
movement, the ‘Werwolf’.2 
Two of the most important tools with which the Soviet and Communist authorities 
sought to influence and control young people were the ‘antifascist youth committees’, 
which emerged in the summer of 1945, and the so-called ‘Free German Youth’ (FDJ), 
officially created on 7 March 1946. Since there were considerable differences between the 
youth committees and the FDJ in terms both of size and character, the remainder of this 
chapter will look at the two movements separately. 
The Antifascist Youth Committees 
The antifascist youth committees emerged more or less spontaneously during the first 
weeks of the occupation, and were given official recognition by the Soviet Military 
Administration (SMAD) on 31 July 1945. Working under the direction of local 
government, the antifascist youth committees set out ‘to win young people to participation 
1 Walter Ulbricht, Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit, Berlin, 1955, pp. 169-70. 
2 M. Klonovsky and J. von Flocken, Stalins Lager in Deutschland, Munich, 1993, pp. 58, 74, 91, 
98, 110, 143 and 179. 
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in the anti-Fascist democratic transformation’. On 10 September 1945, a Central 
Antifascist Youth Committee, under the leadership of one Erich Honecker, was set up in 
Berlin to co-ordinate the activities of youth committees throughout the Soviet zone of 
occupation.3 In these early, chaotic days, the antifascist youth committees tended to be 
small, usually comprising no more than thirty or forty young people. On the other hand, 
those who participated did so out of genuine commitment, and often displayed a good deal 
of spontaneous enthusiasm. 
The youth committees attracted young people from a variety of social backgrounds. The 
bulk of the membership, however, was drawn from the ranks of the working class, and the 
committees were at their strongest in precisely those towns and cities where the traditions 
of the German labour movement had become most deeply entrenched. In the working-class 
districts of cities such as Berlin, Halle and Leipzig, the Nazis had never been able entirely 
to prevent these traditions from being passed on to young people, hence the proletarian 
youth gangs or ‘Meuten’ which had plagued the Nazi authorities from time to time in these 
localities.4 The children of KPD or SPD activists, moreover, had often been persecuted and 
humiliated by Nazi teachers and zealous Hitler Youth members, and understandably 
emerged from the rubble in 1945 with a burning desire to exact revenge on their former 
tormentors.5 
Another important factor which motivated working-class youngsters to become 
politically engaged was direct personal contact, either during the war or in its immediate 
aftermath, with adult members of the Social Democratic or Communist resistance.6 
Typical is the case of Herbert Prauss, who, during the war, had been greatly impressed by 
a Communist family who happened to be on friendly terms with his parents. According to 
Prauss: 
This family impressed me through their consistent opposition to Hitler and their willingness 
to make sacrifices for their Communist ideals. They did not always hold their tongues and, 
since they were known Communists; they thereby risked arrest on a daily basis. As a child, I 
felt for these Communists only admiration and open sympathy [...]. 
Later on in the war, after he had been apprenticed to a printing works, Prauss fell in with 
some Communist workers who impressed him by the fact that they ‘openly denounced the 
injustices of the Hitler regime, and helped the racially persecuted foreign slave labourers in 
the factory to pull through and to find their feet in Berlin’.7 
Much of the activity of the youth committees revolved around reconstruction and relief 
work. In Berlin, 10,000 young people, organized by the youth committees, helped to mend 
roofs and establish 200 youth centres. In Thuringia, the committees collected 400 
hundredweight of apples for hungry children in Berlin.8 According to Peter Bordihn, an 
enthusiastic member of a typical youth committee in Berlin: 
We removed rubble, organized emergency quarters for families in need, helped with the 
harvest in Malchow, and, along with experienced women, we set up sewing clubs 
[Nahstuben] in Langbahnstrasse, on the Mirbachplatz, and in Hohenschonhausen. In Berlin 
3 K. Jahnke et al., Geschichte der Freien Deutschen Jugend, Berlin, 1978 (hereafter Geschichte 
der FDJ), pp. 11-13. 
4 D. Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, London, 1987, pp. 165-66. 
5 See, for example, Saxony State Archive (hereafter SStA), Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl- 
Marx-Stadt, KPD 1945-46,1/4/21, Bl. 64-b7. 
6 See, for example, SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 
1945-46, V/5/090 and 5/335. 
7 H. Prauss, Dock es war nicht die Wahrheit, Berlin, 1960, pp. 13-16. 
8 J. Heise and J. Hofman, Fragen an die Geschichte der DDR, Berlin, 1988, p. 50. 
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alone, 20,000 items of clothing for needy children and families were made for the first 
peacetime Christmas.9 
The youth committees were also heavily engaged in political work. They held meetings 
and organized discussion circles. They put on courses to which they invited leading 
Communist and SPD functionaries as speakers.10 Significantly, during this early stage of 
the east German youth movement there was no attempt to impose ideological uniformity 
on the young activists. One did not have to be a Social Democrat or Communist to join a 
youth committee, though the centre of political gravity in the committees was definitely on 
the Left. Within the committees there was also open and often passionate discussion, even 
of sensitive issues such as reparations or the unification of the KPD and SPD. According to 
Peter Bordihn: ‘Everyone could put forward their ideas without restriction, give free 
expression to their thoughts and opinions, bring in all their ideas and feelings. This woke 
in us the hope for a truly democratic development of the new society.’* 11 
In an attempt to win over the majority of young people who had no interest in politics, 
the committees made a point of campaigning for the rights of youth in education and at 
work. The youth committee in Chemnitz, for example, was actively involved in the 
recruitment of new, anti-Nazi teachers, and the appointment of youth trustees to supervise 
the employment conditions of young people in the city’s workplaces.12 More important, 
the committees attempted to broaden their appeal by organizing cultural, leisure and 
sporting activities. In the Dobeln area of Saxony, for instance, the local youth committees 
organized theatre groups in all the towns and in many of the villages of the district as part 
of the Christmas celebrations. Dances and other cultural events were staged. Five separate 
youth centres were established in the district in which members of the youth committees 
set up clubs for literature, music, singing, dancing, theatre, chess, table-tennis and even 
foreign languages.13 Given the absence of other forms of entertainment during those bleak 
post-war months, many young people were attracted to the committees simply because 
‘etwas los war’ (something was going on).14 
Yet, for all their activism, and despite their success at attracting numbers of otherwise 
apolitical young people to their social activities, the youth committees never came even 
close to achieving the goal for which they had been created in the first place, namely, the 
winning of young people ‘to participation in the anti-Fascist democratic transformation’. 
The great majority of young east Germans in those first post-war months remained either 
indifferent or actively hostile to what the youth committees were trying to do. Internal 
KPD reports from the period continually noted that it was extremely difficult to interest the 
majority of youth in any form of political or public life.15 Most young people seemed to be 
apathetic, individualistic, and concerned only with matters which directly affected either 
themselves or their immediate circle of family and friends. In the words of Walter 
Ulbricht: ‘The mass of young people were full of despair, letting themselves be driven by 
events, and many lived according to the principle of “‘every man for himself”.16 
9 Peter Bordihn, Bittere Jahre am Polarkreis, Berlin, 1990 (hereafter Bittere Jahre), pp. 12-13. 
10 See, for example, SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 
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A number of factors underlay this apathy and individualism on the part of German 
youth. To begin with, the Nazis had to some extent succeeded in breaking down traditional 
collective identities based on religion, class, or political outlook. From the point of view of 
the authorities this was particularly problematic in terms of working-class youth, for it was 
precisely amongst this group that the Communists expected to find a natural constituency. 
Some working-class children in the Third Reich had, indeed, like Herbert Prauss, picked 
up certain notions of class consciousness from their parents, neighbours or older 
workmates, but many working-class youngsters knew little and cared less about the 
socialist traditions of their parents and grandparents.17 
These tendencies towards political apathy and individualism were greatly reinforced by 
the concrete material circumstances obtaining in post-war Germany. On the one hand, 
food, fuel and other essentials were in desperately short supply. Sheer physical survival 
was a primary concern for most people, leaving them little time or energy for other 
matters. The state apparatus, meanwhile, had almost entirely disintegrated during the last 
stages of the war, and it took months before it could be put back into working order. In the 
struggle for survival, young people could thus expect little help from the new authorities or 
from any other public body. For many youngsters, individualism was thus a pragmatic 
response to the problem of stay ing alive. 
In some ways, indeed, the new authorities constituted an obstacle to the short-term 
material interests of young people. The black market, for example, was a serious threat to 
long-term economic reconstruction, and the authorities therefore struggled hard to suppress 
it. For many young people, however, as for the population as a whole, survival in the short 
term required participation in the black market. In a similar vein, the authorities 
campaigned vigorously against the common practice of skipping school or work in order to 
travel into the countryside in the hope of bartering with the local farmers. From the point 
of view of the authorities, absenteeism was a major economic problem and an obstacle to 
the normalization of everyday life.18 Yet, from the point of view of individuals, such trips 
into the countryside might mean the difference between eating and going hungry.19 
For most young people, the clash between the long-term public interest, as represented 
by official rules and regulations, and the short-term private concerns of the cold and the 
hungry, militated against any interest in the public sphere and in politics. In many cases, 
however, the contradiction between the public and the private interest took the form of 
criminal or delinquent behaviour. Under the prevailing conditions of social, economic and 
family breakdown, it was all too easy for occasional participation in the black market to 
lead to a more serious involvement in theft, fraud or prostitution. 
Even before the outbreak of war in 1939 there had been an increase in youth criminality 
thanks to the Nazis’ subversion, not just of the traditional moral order, but also of 
established authority figures such as parents and schoolteachers.20 After 1939, the situation 
worsened considerably, for the war broke up families, made regular schooling impossible 
and exposed young people to the brutalities of war.21 The problem of juvenile delinquency 
was greatly exacerbated by post-war conditions. With the almost complete collapse of state 
and society in 1945, many children, whose moral bearings had already been corrupted by 
the Nazis, simply ran amok. In Berlin, for example, the level of youth crime in 1946 was 
17 Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, pp. 145—72. 
18 See, for example, Thuringian Main State Archive (hereafter ThHStA), Weimar, 
Bezirksparteiarchiv Erfurt. Ministerium des Innem [Ministry of the Interior], 142, Bl. 45. 
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University of Wales, 1997, pp. 15-22. 
20 R. Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich, London, 1971, pp. 340-41. 
21 Peukert, Inside Nazi Germany, pp. 150-54. 
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no less than 850 per cent higher than it had been in 1938.22 In a typical report on the 
behaviour of young people in the Saxon town of Waldheim in December 1945, it was 
noted that 
the waywardness of young people as well as of children is taking on alarming forms [...]. 
Their wildness manifests itself above all in gambling, in twelve-year-old children smoking 
tobacco in public [...] and in stealing. It must also be acknowledged that a large part of youth 
get out of doing any work. Hardly a day passes without the police having to intervene against 
young people or children. It is an absolute necessity that steps be taken here.23 
In the words of one leading Communist functionary, speaking at a meeting in Leipzig in 
March 1946: 
We must acknowledge the problem of youth, and here I have to say that we stand before the 
most difficult and most tragic task of the time. Nazism has produced such an abysmal 
confusion in the heads of young people that I must say today that the simplest concepts of 
good and evil, honest and dishonest, right and wrong, are scarcely to be found amongst 
German youth.24 
The impact of Nazism, war and post-war material hardship on the political views and 
moral behaviour of youth was not substantially different in the Soviet zone from what it 
was in the western parts of Germany. In the British, French and American zones, as in the 
Soviet, the majority of young people had no interest in public affairs and was more 
attracted to the black market than to political engagement. In the Soviet zone, however, 
there was an additional factor which made east German youngsters even more reluctant to 
participate in public and political life than their West German counterparts, namely, their 
often traumatic encounters with Red Army soldiers. 
For, during the final days of the war, German children and teenagers had often witnessed 
the arbitrary shooting of German civilians by Soviet soldiers, or had been caught up in the 
wave of drunkenness, violence and looting which had accompanied the Red Army’s 
invasion. Later on, many thousands of young people were either arrested themselves on 
suspicion of Werwolf membership, or had members of their families arrested. All such 
incidents tended to leave long and bitter memories, and prejudiced German youngsters 
against all those organizations, such as the youth committees, which sought to co-operate 
with the hated Soviet conquerors. 
Above all, large numbers of German girls were raped by Soviet troops, not only during 
the invasion, but also in the months and years thereafter. Such experiences often left an 
indelible legacy of hatred, not just against the Soviets, but against those who worked with 
them.25 In one case, for example, a sixteen-year-old girl, shortly after having been 
repeatedly raped by Red Army soldiers, was asked ‘if she did not want to participate in the 
building up of a new, democratic youth movement in east Germany’. Her reply was so 
vehement that she soon found herself in an NKVD cellar, and was thereafter sentenced to 
ten years’ hard labour by a Soviet military tribunal on the charge of ‘anti-Soviet 
propaganda’.26 
It would be quite wrong to suggest that Red Army troops always acted so barbarously 
during the Soviet occupation. They were also capable of acts of kindness and generosity, 
22 C. Klessmann, Die doppelt Staatsgrundung, Gottingen, 1991, p. 53. 
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particularly towards children.27 Just as young Germans who were raped or assaulted or 
robbed often never forgave the Russians for what had happened to them, so the experience 
of unexpected charity at Soviet hands often left a lasting impression that influenced 
political attitudes and behaviour. A good example of this is furnished by the experience of 
Lothar Loewe, who in 1945, as a Hitler Youth member, was sent into battle against the 
Red Army. He and his comrades had been led to believe that, should they be captured by 
the Russians, they would be brutally mistreated or summarily executed. In fact, however, 
after their capture they were neither mishandled nor abused, but, on the contrary, were 
treated by their captors with consideration and sympathy. Those who had been wounded 
were treated, and they were given cigarettes and something to eat. One Red Army soldier 
even lent his mess kit and spoon to Loewe, so that he could eat the food he had been given. 
According to Loewe: 
I had seen many Soviet POWs during the war. And I had also seen how they were treated 
[...]. The Soviets were always beaten, really, and they never got anything to eat. They were 
made to look like the subhumans we imagined them to be. The idea that a German soldier 
would give a Russian prisoner his mess kit and spoon to eat from was simply unimaginable 
to me. And the fact that this Soviet gave me his, voluntarily, happily, because he felt sorry 
for me, shook the foundation of my image of them. 
That’s when I told myself that perhaps the Soviets were much different from what they 
[the Nazis] had told us to believe. This was my first encounter with the Soviet people, and 
I’ll never forget it for the rest of my life. And it has continued to influence my feelings 
towards the Soviet Union.28 
On the whole, however, nothing did more to undermine the work of the antifascist youth 
committees than the perception that they were Soviet stooges, and nothing did more to 
provoke anti-Russian sentiments than the violent behaviour of Red Army troops. 
The Free German Youth 
In March 1946 the development of the east German youth movement entered a new phase 
with the foundation of the Free German Youth, a cross-party umbrella organization which 
aimed at building a genuine mass membership amongst young people from the age of 
fourteen upwards. In December 1948 a subsidiary organization, the ‘Young Pioneers’, was 
established for children between the age of ten and fourteen. The first chairman of the FDJ 
was the reliable young Communist functionary Erich Honecker, who continued to hold the 
post until May 1955. 
From the very beginning the FDJ was viewed with many reservations, even in circles 
which were otherwise sympathetic to the new regime in east Germany. Many Communists 
and Social Democrats, for example, wanted to see separate KPD and SPD youth 
organizations, rather than a broadly based mass movement such as the FDJ.29 Inside the 
antifascist youth committees there was much debate about whether or not the FDJ 
constituted a step forwards, for memories of the old, uniform and gleichgeschaltet Hitler 
Youth were still fresh, and many thought that the time was not yet ripe to found another 
unified youth organization.30 But the most serious obstacle to the creation of the FDJ was 
the fear of the other two antifascist parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberal 
See, for example, SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 
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Democrats (LDPD), that the FDJ would fall too much under the influence of the 
Communists. Only after Honecker solemnly promised that the leaders of the FDJ would 
guard its cross-party status ‘like the apple of our eye’ did they reluctantly concede to give 
the new youth organization their blessing.31 
The FDJ was designed to fulfil several functions, one of the most important of which 
was the selection and training of cadres. Not only did the mushrooming of the State and 
party bureaucracies create an insatiable demand for apparatchiks, but many of the veteran 
functionaries in situ were poorly educated, ideologically inflexible and, in the view of the 
authorities, obsolete.32 One of the primary tasks of the FDJ was thus to serve as a training 
ground for a whole new generation of educated, professionally competent and politically 
reliable apparatchiks. 
But the most important function of the FDJ, despite Honecker’s promise of party 
neutrality, was to act as a ‘transmission belt’ for Communist policy. Youth as a whole, it 
was hoped, would be guided and led by the FDJ, whilst the Free German Youth would 
itself be covertly directed by the Communists. To this end, young KPD and SED members 
were instructed to be as active as possible inside the Free German Youth in order to ensure 
that, in practice if not in theory, the FDJ would be under reliable political control. 
According to a leading FDJ functionary, speaking to young Communists and pro-KPD 
Social Democrats in Chemnitz in March 1946: ‘It is the case that the Free German Youth 
movement is still a child of our two workers’ parties [...]. Therefore it is necessary that it 
is precisely our comrades who become the most active members of the FDJ, for we have 
still a much, much higher goal than the one which, for the time being, we are able to 
proclaim.’33 
In the course of time, the covert domination of the FDJ by the Communists became more 
and more overt, particularly after the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947. In July of that 
year, Honecker led an FDJ delegation to the Soviet Union to study and learn from the 
Komsomol.34 In 1948, in accordance with the practices of the Komsomol, the 
organizational basis of the FDJ was changed from the geographical locality to the 
workplace, and discipline was tightened up considerably.35 In June 1949 the FDJ 
proclaimed that the goals of the SED were identical to its own. The SED leadership, 
meanwhile, began to intervene so openly in the internal life of the Free German Youth that 
the CDU and the Liberal Democrats withdrew their representatives from the FDJ Central 
Council as a protest.36 The process of Stalinization was eventually completed in 1952, 
when the FDJ officially embraced the Leninist principle of ‘democratic centralism’, and 
recognized the leading role of the SED in East German society.37 
In some ways the FDJ fulfilled its appointed duties with a degree of success. Most 
important, it grew so rapidly in size that, by the time the Soviet occupation officially ended 
in 1949, it could claim to be a genuine mass movement. Whereas the FDJ in June 1946 had 
only 240,000 members, by June 1949 this figure had swollen to 677,000.38 If one adds the 
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Young Pioneers to that figure, no fewer than 1.2 million young people in 1949 were 
organized under the umbrella of the Free German Youth.39 
This spectacular rise in membership was in part because the sporting and leisure 
activities organized by the FDJ attracted numbers of otherwise apolitical young people.40 
The FDJ also posed as the champion of youth, and, during the early months of its 
existence, campaigned vigorously for the rights of young people at work and in society. It 
helped, for example, to organize vocational training for those whose education had been 
neglected during the war.41 It did its best to ensure that more and more young people were 
elected to positions of responsibility in the workplace councils, trade unions and local 
government.42 Its propaganda and public declarations, at least before the onset of 
Stalinization in 1947, were designed to make the FDJ appear at the same time moderate, 
idealistic and genuinely concerned with the interests of young people. Themes such as 
German unity, the right of young people to equal pay for equal work and the importance of 
leisure and educational opportunities for young people, were continually stressed.43 
But there were also more negative aspects to the remarkable growth in membership. 
Increasing pressure, both at school and at work, was put on young people to enlist in the 
FDJ. It became increasingly clear over time that any young person who failed to join the 
FDJ was likely to be discriminated against in terms of educational and vocational 
opportunities. The authorities also attempted to ensure the success of the FDJ by attacking 
potential rivals, in particular the ‘Junge Gemeinde’ movement of young Christians, which 
from the beginning of the 1950s became the victim of a vitriolic SED propaganda 
campaign.44 
Another area in which the FDJ could be considered to have been a partial success was 
the selection and training of young functionaries. Young people who were prepared to give 
their loyalty to the regime, whether out of careerism or genuine commitment, could expect 
to rise rapidly through the ranks of the FDJ and thence into responsible positions in 
government and industry. In 1946, for example, 8,000 out of 118,000 delegates elected 
onto workplace councils were young people,45 and by 1947 the number of young people 
sitting on workplace councils had risen to 15,153.46 In Thuringia in 1950, young people 
made up 17 per cent of trades-union officials in nationalized enterprises and 18 per cent of 
the trades-union leadership in private firms, despite the fact that they made up just 15.6 per 
cent of trades-union membership in Thuringia.47 In the local elections of September 1946, 
some 2,000 young people were voted onto community councils, and by the end of 1946 
250 FDJ members were sitting in district councils and thirteen sitting in regional 
parliaments.48 By the spring of 1952, 35 per cent of all officials in government service 
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were young people, and 1,405 young people throughout east Germany occupied the post of 
Biirgermeister.49 
The rapid rise of a new generation of cadre excited a considerable amount of jealousy 
and resentment amongst the older apparatchiks who found themselves being eclipsed. 
Many of these older functionaries were veterans of the labour movement who had devoted 
their lives to the struggle against capitalism and Nazism. They therefore felt particularly 
aggrieved at being elbowed aside by youngsters who had no experience or memory of the 
battles of the past and who had never had to suffer for the faith.50 There was a strong 
tendency amongst the older functionaries to regard their youthful rivals as, in the words of 
one particularly disillusioned veteran, ‘conformists, subservient lickspittles, toadies, 
obsequious yes-men’.51 
The practical consequence of these resentments was that the official policy of fostering 
youth was continually hampered by the unwillingness of older, lower-ranking 
functionaries to implement it. Throughout the four years of the official occupation, a 
persistent complaint of the KPD/SED leadership was that Party officials were, at best, only 
paying lip service to the regime’s youth policy, and that at worst they were consciously 
seeking to subvert it. As early as the spring of 1946, for example, attempts were made on 
the part of older functionaries in the Halle district to exclude young people from the debate 
about the unification of the SPD and KPD. Young people, they reasoned, had no memory 
of the division of the labour movement in the period 1917 to 1933, and the resolution of 
those divisions was therefore not a matter on which they had any right to speak.52 In 1946, 
the Leipziger Volkszeitung roundly condemned ‘backward trade unionists’ for failing to 
understand that ‘the winning of youth to the trades-union movement is an important 
precondition for the stabilization of democratic relations in Germany’.53 In April 1948, the 
SED Party executive committee passed a resolution complaining that Party functionaries 
were ‘unclear’ about the importance and significance of the FDJ, as a result of which they 
gave insufficient support to its struggle to win over German youth. In June 1949, the joint 
chairmen of the SED, Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, wrote an open letter 
condemning the many older functionaries who either ignored their younger comrades or 
sought to boss them around.54 
If the FDJ could, broadly speaking, be considered a success in terms of the growth of its 
membership and its grooming of a new generation of apparatchiks, there were other, more 
fundamental, ways in which the Free German Youth failed miserably to fulfil its allotted 
tasks. It failed, for example, to lure young people away from the black market and instil in 
them a sense of work discipline. According to an internal report for the Thuringian 
Ministry of the Interior written in 1947, young workers in border districts were persistently 
absenting themselves from work and lived primarily from black-market trading and illegal 
crossings into western Germany.55 Juvenile crime continued to be a serious problem into 
the late 1940s,56 and young offenders demonstrated little eagerness to find rehabilitation in 
the ranks of the Free German Youth. The juvenile inmates of a prison in the Thuringian 
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town of Eisenach, for example, refused to join the FDJ on the grounds that ‘We were told 
that [the FDJ] was going to be a cross-party organization. What do we see, however? On 
social evenings the politics of the SED are forced upon us [...]. It is clear that, under such 
circumstances, no successful youth work can be performed.’57 
More important even than its failure to provide an alternative to crime and the black 
market, the FDJ did not succeed in establishing a firm hold over the hearts and minds of 
young east Germans. Nor did it instil in young people a feeling of loyalty to the east 
German regime or an acceptance of its political policies. Even Walter Ulbricht, who had 
every reason to play up the success of the FDJ, was compelled to concede that ‘The larger 
part of youth still stood to one side. Many of the wishes of young people, such as the 
creation of sufficient educational opportunities and the improvement of food supplies and 
working conditions, could under the existing circumstances only be satisfied very 
slowly.’58 According to one lower-ranking SED functionary, speaking to a meeting of 
young workplace council delegates in Leipzig in September 1946, young people could be 
divided into three categories. First, the activists, who accepted the regime’s policies and 
worked hard to implement them. Second, the doubters, who were openly sceptical. But the 
third and by far the largest group was comprised of the ‘eternally inert and waiting 
[.Abwartenden], who have no independent views on the questions of political life’.59 
To a large degree, the FDJ failed to attract young east Germans for exactly the same 
reasons as the old antifascist youth committees, namely, the continued legacy of Nazism 
and war, the impact of the material circumstances of the time, and the disgust produced by 
the violence of Red Army soldiers. In the later 1940s, however, the regime gave young 
people a series of new reasons to regard the FDJ with either indifference or contempt. 
Between 1945 and 1947, the antifascist youth committees and Free German Youth had 
been able to make some limited progress in terms of winning over east German youth. 
From 1947 onwards, three separate factors combined to negate much of the progress which 
had been made. 
First, the economic situation in east Germany continued to be precarious, partly due to 
unavoidable factors such as the exceptionally severe winter of 1946-47, but partly due to 
the huge amounts of reparations which were still being extracted by the Soviets. In the 
western zones, by contrast, a slight economic upturn in 1947 was greatly accelerated by the 
arrival in 1948 of millions of dollars of Marshall Aid. In 1945 and 1946, economic 
conditions had if anything been slightly better in the Soviet zone than in most of western 
Germany. By 1949, the west German economy was clearly pulling far ahead of that of the 
Soviet zone of occupation, a fact which no amount of SED propaganda to the contrary 
could conceal. 
What this meant in terms of young people in east Germany was that the fascination with 
the West, which had already been there in 1945, was greatly intensified. Not only did the 
West offer apparently unlimited material opportunities, but the individualistic and 
hedonistic character of American youth culture was much more in tune with the spirit of 
post-war German youth than the collectivist, austere, rather puritanical official culture 
promoted by the Free German Youth. In the words of Torsten Diedrich: ‘The American 
way of life held more appeal for most teenagers in the GDR than the role model of the 
diligent Soviet youth activist.’60 When the British journalist Gordon Schaffer visited the 
Soviet zone in 1947, he was told by a social worker in a home for delinquent youths that 
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‘The boys’ one idea is to get over the zonal frontier and to live on cigarettes and other 
goods cadged from the American and British soldiers. The girls are obsessed with the idea 
that they may succeed in marrying a British or American soldier if only they can reach the 
West.’61 
A second reason why it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Free German Youth 
to persuade young people to join and be active in the movement was the Stalinization of 
the organization itself. With the tightening of discipline and the introduction of regular 
political schooling, the activities of the FDJ became less and less attractive, even to many 
FDJ functionaries. As early as July 1946, we find a member of the secretariat of the SED 
in the Leipzig region not just bemoaning the low political level of the vast majority of FDJ 
members, but openly advocating that young people between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty be more or less abandoned as a lost cause since ‘they are not going to be converted 
by anything’.62 But, by the later 1940s and early 1950s, the problem of youth indifference 
to the FDJ had become much worse. When regular political schooling was introduced in 
the early 1950s, for example, the response of the FDJ membership was so unenthusiastic 
that even Neues Deutschland acknowledged that there was a serious problem.63 The 
internal life of FDJ groups, meanwhile, almost completely withered on the vine. Meetings 
were infrequent and poorly attended. FDJ literature was neither distributed nor read. FDJ 
notice boards in schools and factories were left empty or filled with notices and 
announcements belonging to other organizations.64 Even SED members, who were 
expected to be the most active and enthusiastic members of the FDJ, were affected by the 
mounting wave of disaffection. In a revealing incident in the Saxon town of Bohlen, the 
local SED secretary complained to the regional Party leadership that young SED members 
were interested only in their motorbikes and spent no time on their political work in the 
FDJ. In response, the regional leadership instructed the local FDJ secretary in Bohlen to 
confiscate their motorbikes ‘in order that they learn that they have other duties to fulfil’.65 
By 1952 even the Central Council of the FDJ was admitting that ‘many functionaries and 
leading organs have lost touch with youth both at work and in education’.66 
The national leadership of the SED in Berlin was aware that something was going badly 
wrong in the FDJ, but it had no real understanding of the causes of the problem, and no 
effective solutions. If young people did not want to participate in FDJ schooling, it must be 
because of ineffectual teaching.67 If the organizational life of the FDJ groups was grinding 
to a halt, the cause must lie in an insufficient level of ideological awareness, which could 
be countered only through more schooling and tighter discipline. The FDJ thus embarked 
on a vicious circle of its own making. The more alienated youth became, the more the 
regime sought to use the FDJ to control and indoctrinate, which only succeeded in making 
the FDJ still less attractive to young people. 
The third and probably most important reason for the gulf which divided the Free 
German Youth from the majority of youngsters was the close association between the FDJ 
and highly unpopular government policies. From 1947 onwards, Soviet economic practices 
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62 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/BV/94, Bl. 38. 
63 ‘SED Sachsen-Anhalt muB FDJ-Schuljahr mehr unterstiitzen!’, Neues Deutschland, 16 January 
1952, p. 4; ‘Die Erziehung der Jugend’, ibid., 27 January 1952, p. 1. 
64 See, for example, ‘Zirkelleiter sind bereit — aber die FDJ-Kresleitung hinkt nach’, ibid., 8 
January 1952, p. 4; ‘Die Hilfe fur die FDJ in den GroBbetrieben verstarken’, ibid., 15 February 
1952, p. 3. 
65 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/24, Bl. 97-100. 
66 “‘VergeBt das frohe Jugendleben nicht!”’, Neues Deutschland, 17 February 1952, p. 3. 
67 See, for example, SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/25, Bl. 30. 
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were imposed on the east German economy, gradually at first, but with increasing 
ruthlessness in the years before Stalin’s death. The introduction of centralized economic 
planning, production targets, piece-rates and shock-work bore down hard on the whole 
working population of the Soviet zone of occupation and was deeply resented. Young 
workers, being more vulnerable than their older, more skilled and more experienced 
colleagues, were particularly badly affected. The FDJ, however, made no effort to protect 
young workers from exploitation, but on the contrary justified the regime’s demands. The 
fourth ‘parliament’ of the FDJ in May 1952, for instance, announced the creation of Youth 
Control Brigades (.Jugendkontrollbrigaden) to invigilate young factory workers on the 
shop floor. In August 1952, the FDJ leadership demanded the strengthening of ‘socialist 
competition’.68 The consequence of the FDJ’s assumption of the new role of slave-driver 
was a final rupture of trust and confidence between thousands of young people and the 
movement which purported to represent their interests. 
In private, if not in public, the SED leadership was prepared to acknowledge these 
problems. Shortly after the uprising of 17 June 1953, for example, a member of the SED 
regional leadership in Leipzig frankly summed up the situation in the following terms: 
‘One of the main causes of 17 June was the fact that the larger part of young people had 
little or no trust in their FDJ at district or regional level [...]. We won the trust of young 
people after a real struggle [...] above all through representing their interests. Now we 
have lost this trust’.69 
More damaging even than the support lent by the FDJ to the government’s economic 
policies was its active role in the militarization of German youth. On 1 July 1952 the 
decision was taken to start building an East German army, which for propaganda purposes 
was euphemistically referred to as the ‘Peoples’ Police in Barracks’ (KVP). By December 
1952 the KVP had recruited 90,000 members, and by the summer of 1953 this figure had 
swollen to 113,000. Not only did this remilitarization take large numbers of people out of 
productive work, but equipping them with uniforms, vehicles and arms required a large 
financial commitment at a time when living standards were already coming under pressure 
as a result of the government’s economic policies.70 
With regard to the subject of this chapter, the most significant aspect of these 
developments was that the FDJ was given the task of acting as the regime’s primary 
recruiting sergeant. In schools, colleges and workplaces throughout eastern Germany, 
young people came under increasing political pressure from the FDJ to join up. Since the 
great majority of young people was extremely reluctant to enter the ranks, the methods of 
persuasion used by the Free German Youth often bordered on press-ganging. If a particular 
factory, for example, yielded insufficient recruits to the KVP, this would often be declared 
to be a sign of the presence of saboteurs and enemy agents, which in turn would lead to a 
witch-hunt.71 
The degree of bitterness which these policies occasioned in young people was 
demonstrated in explosive fashion during the uprising of 17 June 1953. It was a bloody 
testament to the failure of the FDJ that young people played a disproportionately large role 
in the events of that day, not just in terms of numbers, but also in terms of violence. It was 
also significant that one of the chief targets of the enraged crowds were offices and 
buildings of the Free German Youth.72 
68 Bundesministerium fur gesamtdeutsche Fragen, SBZ von A bis Z, Bonn, 1966, p. 137. 
69 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/28, Bl. 77-100. 
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Conclusion 
The East German youth movement was created in order to win over young people to the 
policies of the new, Soviet-backed government. In this task, both the antifascist youth 
committees and the Free German Youth failed. On the other hand, the antifascist youth 
committees did succeed in harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of a section of the 
juvenile population, drawn above all from the ranks of the anti-Nazi working class. With 
the creation of the Free German Youth in 1946, however, the regime greatly increased the 
size of the youth movement but at the cost of watering down its quality. With the influx of 
tens of thousands of young people, whose only motives in joining the FDJ were careerism 
or conformism, the idealism of the first post-war months was lost forever. 
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a number of factors combined to turn the indifference 
of the majority of young people towards the FDJ into active hostility. The ‘economic 
miracle’ taking place in West Germany greatly increased their dissatisfaction with life on 
the Soviet side of the iron curtain. The Stalinization of the FDJ, and, above all, the support 
of the FDJ for the government’s unpopular economic and military policies, caused an 
unbridgeable gulf to emerge between east German youth, on one side, and the east German 
youth movement, on the other. On 17 June 1953 the anger of young people spilled onto the 
streets, with crowds of enraged youngsters attacking FDJ functionaries and property. 
Nothing could illustrate more clearly that the movement which purported to represent the 
interests of young people had in fact become one of the primary instruments of their 
oppression. 
13 Compensation for Nationalized American 
Property in Czechoslovakia, 1945-49 
Slavomir MichAlek 
Developments in post-war Czechoslovakia did not take place in isolation from the rest of 
the world. On the contrary, they were determined by, and reflected to a large degree, the 
changes and the problems in international relationships. If we take into account the pending 
political incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of influence at the end of 
the Second World War, close economic co-operation between Czechslovakia and the USA 
seemed uncertain when the most important issue was the signing of a trade agreement and, 
related to that, the compensation of American citizens and companies for nationalized and 
confiscated property. The issue of compensation became a barometer of economic relations 
between Czechoslovakia and the USA in the first stages of the post-war period. 
Czechoslovak-American trade and economic relationships had been regulated by the 
trade agreement signed on 7 March 1938. Its validity was annulled by the USA following 
the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany. According to this American decree 
of 23 March 1938, the regulations of this trade agreement and its supplementary protocol 
ceased to be valid in Czechoslovakia.1 At the end of the Second World War, when normal 
trade and economic contacts were revived, there was a need for a new trade agreement 
between the two countries. 
A draft for the conclusion of a temporary economic agreement was worked out by the 
State Department and sent to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a memo¬ 
randum of 29 June 1945. This draft contained the same principles as the 1938 agreement. 
The Czechoslovak counter-proposals started a series of negotiations during which both 
parties were defending their own interests. 
At the end of April 1946, the Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimir Hurban held 
negotiations with the State Department. He proposed an agreement that would contain only 
the ‘most favoured nation’ clause and presented the Czechoslovak arguments against the 
adoption of other principles which related to the reorganization and revival of the 
economy. Czechoslovakia also had to deal with the economic collapse of neighbouring 
countries as well as transport difficulties. The American side agreed to this proposal but 
made a condition for the signing of the agreement: commencement of negotiations on 
compensation for American property which had been nationalized and confiscated. It also 
required that the texts of the Czechoslovak-Soviet trade agreement, the reparations 
agreement with Hungary and a general description of other Czechoslovak economic 
agreements were included.2 
Following further complicated multilateral negotiations in the first half of 1946, 
exchanges of diplomatic notes, proposals and supplements by both ambassadors and mini¬ 
stries of foreign affairs, the State Department presented a new text of the trade agreement 
on 8 July 1946.3 This proposal contained eight articles. The seventh article delimited the 
issues of compensation for the nationalized or confiscated property originally owned by 
1 Archives of Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter ACMFA), Prague, USA, box 32, no. 
70783/IV-1/B-45. 
2 P. Proks, 'Ekonomicko-politicke rokovani mezi Ceskoslovenskem a Spojenymi Staty v letech 
1945-1947’, Slovansky prehled, 1, 1992, p. 11. 
3 ACMFA, USA, box 18, no. 7894/46. 
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American nationals and companies. The State Department refused to restrict the issue to 
nationalized property only. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington recommended that 
the Prague government study this note and give urgent attention to its decision to sign the 
agreement, which could have positively affected the negotiations on a S50 million 
American loan for reconstruction in Czechoslovakia and the purchase of American 
products and equipment.4 
A difficult issue in the proposed trade agreement was the question of compensation not 
only for Americans but also for Czechoslovak citizens resident in the USA. The 
naturalization of Czechoslovak nationals in the USA and the status of their former 
Czechoslovak nationality were regulated by the treaty between Czechoslovakia and the 
USA of 16 July 1928 (no 169/29). According to Article 1 of this treaty, Czechoslovak 
nationals who have been (or will be) naturalized in the USA lose their original nationality 
and become US nationals. This regulation did not apply, according to Article 1, Section 3 
of the Treaty, to Czechoslovak nationals who obtained naturalization in the USA in time of 
war led by their own country. These citizens were considered still to be Czechoslovak 
nationals. That meant that Czechoslovak regulations for foreigners did not apply and they 
could not claim compensation for nationalized property.5 The most conspicuous case in 
this connection was that of Petschek’s property. The interests of the Prague financier 
Victor Petschek were defended by his lawyer Bernard Yarrow, who visited 
Czechoslovakia in early December 1945 and in 1946. In 1946 he spoke to President Benes, 
V 
Minister President Zdenek Fierlinger, Minister of Finance Vavro Srobar, the Minister for 
Industry Bohumil Lausman and the Minister of Foreign Trade Hubert Ripka. All these 
informed him that the compensation for Petschek (and another Czech banker, Gellert) 
would be adequate but recommended that they wait until the total level of compensation 
could be worked out. In his report to the senior partner of his firm in New York, F. Dulles, 
Yarrow expressed appreciation for the activity of the American ambassador, Steinhardt, 
who represented his government in this matter. Steinhardt required from Yarrow that the 
amount of compensation be stated. He also suggested that the American party set a 
minimum which he was willing to accept. In the conclusion to his report Yarrow wrote that 
the resolution of this matter would depend on the financial circumstances of the 
Czechoslovak government following the elections and the credits it would obtain from the 
USA.6 In December 1946 Hubert Ripka informed Yarrow orally that the Czechoslovak 
party had not yet appointed a representative for the resolution of the matter. 
The Czechoslovak government reacted positively to the American note of 8 July 1946 
that was to become the basis of the Czechoslovak-American trade and economic 
agreement. It proposed supplementing the text with a requirement of adequate and 
effective mutual compensation for nationalized and confiscated property, which the 
American party considered absurd,7 mainly because of the word ‘mutual’: no 
Czechoslovak property in the US or in Czechoslovakia had been or was to be nationalized 
or confiscated by the US government. 
According to the report of the American Ministry of Finance (Treasury Department) on 
the census of American property abroad published in December 1947, American property 
in Czechoslovakia was valued at $148 million on 31 May 1943. This consisted mainly of 
shares in companies ($67.1 million), metals, coins, deposits ($13.75 million) real estate 
($28.4 million), securities ($11.7 million), private property, life insurances, annuities and 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., box 12, no. 48134/VI-3. 
6 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC, Steinhardt Papers, box 83. 
7 Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, DC (hereafter FRUS), 1946, vol. 6, p. 227. 
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inheritance deposits.8 The American administration categorized the property related to 
company investments abroad according to whether they were independent companies or 
branches, and whether it was a matter of direct participation or of participation through 
foreign companies. The main companies involved were the Vacuum Oil Company, 
International Telephone and Telegraph, Remington Rand, the Standard Oil Company, 
Paramount and International Standard. The largest capital share in Czechoslovak industry 
was held by the Vacuum Oil Company. On the other hand, according to the Census of 
Foreign Owned Assets of the USA published by the Ministry of Finance in 1945, 
Czechoslovak property in America amounted to $9.4 million. These consisted of deposits, 
securities, land and real estate, inheritances and a small number of shares in companies.9 
When the nationalization of key industries was being prepared, the USA tried to prevent 
Czechoslovakia from nationalizing American companies. On 23 July 1945, that is, three 
months before the nationalization decrees, Steinhardt asked for a promise from the Czecho¬ 
slovak government to leave American companies alone. If, however, nationalization should 
go ahead, he asked for a promise of full and adequate compensation.10 In his negotiations 
with the minister of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimir dementis, on 29 
August 1945, he warned the Prague government not to nationalize the Kolin refinery that 
belonged to the Vacuum Oil Company. If that refinery should be nationalized, he 
threatened to stop supplies of the machinery necessary for oil drilling, which could have 
caused Czechoslovakia serious problems with oil and petrol supplies. Should the 
Czechoslovak government postpone the nationalization of the refinery, he promised oil 
supplies imported from Venezuela and transported via Cherbourg and Germany.* 11 
Steinhardt’s personal activity in the resolution of concrete cases in which original 
owners were demanding compensation is demonstrated, for example, by his letter to the 
managing director of the Vacuum Oil Company, Flarold F. Sheets, which was published in 
the Paris L ’Aube three days prior to the elections in the Czechoslovakia (the text was also 
published by Tvorba on 10 March 1948). Steinhardt’s letter pointed out the close link 
between the economic and political aspects of the matter. He wrote that he expected the 
victory of non-Communist parties in the coming elections (which did not happen), which, 
in his view, would have greatly influenced negotiations on compensation. Sheets was not 
to be concerned if he heard about limitations on credit from the Exim Bank because the 
granting of credits was to be conditional on compensation for nationalized property.12 The 
companies affected were also claiming compensation directly from the Czechoslovak state. 
The main companies involved in direct negotiations were the Vacuum Oil Company, 
Standard Oil, International General Electric (which was claiming its patent rights) and the 
Universal Oil Product Company (which had a share in the Bratislava Apollo refinery).13 
The question of compensation for International Telegraph and Telephone is particularly 
interesting. Its two companies on Czechoslovak territory — Lorenz in Vrchlabi and 
Schuchard in Bruntal — had been given to the Soviets as war booty (reparations), and their 
equipment had been slowly dismantled and transported to the USSR. 
On the matter of the total amount of compensation to be paid, Steinhardt negotiated with 
the head of the economic department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zdenek 
Augenthaler, on 29 October 1946. In answer to a direct question, Augenthaler stated that 
8 ACMFA, ZU-Washington, box 1946-1947, no. 1197947 
9 Ibid. 
10 FRUS, 1946, vol. 4, p. 478. 
11 ACMFA, USA, box 18, no. 24121/A/45. 
12 Library of Congress, Steinhardt Papers, box 58. 
13 National Archives and Records (hereafter NAR), Washington, DC, Rg-59, no. 860F.5034/5- 
2847, no. 860F.5034/6-1746, no. 860F.6363/5-946. 
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‘Czechoslovak experts’ had calculated the amount of justified American claims at $2.34 
million. Steinhardt pointed out that Vacuum Oil alone was demanding compensation of $14 
million. If the Prague government worked on the assumption that American compensation 
for nationlization would be in the range of two to three million dollars, ‘it will be difficult 
to resolve the matter’.14 In his report on these negotiations to the State Department, he 
further said that the Czechoslovaks would like to start he talks on the compensation for 
nationalized American property as soon as possible, in the hope that it would facilitate their 
obtaining the $50 million loan (negotiations on the loan had ceased in September 1946). 
Given that the Czechoslovaks had no intention of offering more than two to three million 
dollars, he concluded, ‘Therefore I am against the renewal of negotiations on the loan as 
long as the question of American property or rather its compensation is not satisfactorily 
resolved.’15 
The Czechoslovak government laid down the criteria for compensation at its session on 
8 November 1946. Compensation for nationalized property was allowed only in cases 
where it could be proved that the invested capital had come from abroad. Representatives 
of the American and Czechoslovak governments worked out the official versions of their 
countries’ declaration on the trade policy in late October 1946. The Czechoslovak text of 
the trade policy declaration was handed over with a memorandum to Steinhardt on 8 
November 1946 by deputy minister president Fierlinger (who had lost his post as minister 
president in the 1946 reshuffle), who explained the Czechoslovak view. Steinhardt did not 
agree with several passages of the memorandum and drew attention to the Petschek case. 
He pressed the State Department not to accept the memorandum on Czechoslovak 
procedure in compensation.16 
The Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington and the State Department exchanged 
diplomatic notes which were signed by Dean Acheson and the ambassador, Juraj Slavik, 
on 14 December 1946. This provided a practical basis for a new economic and trade 
agreement between the USA and the Czechoslovakia,17 while also putting an end to the 
current state of affairs, but with no agreement. Both notes (which were identical) were 
described as a ‘declaration on trade policy and compensation for nationalization’; they 
dealt with matters of economic co-operation. In the declaration both governments 
expressed their intention to start negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on friendship 
and trade as soon as possible. They gave the products of the other country ‘most favoured 
nation’ status and Czechoslovakia committed itself to giving America information on its 
trade relations with other countries. This clause was asymmetrical in the declaration, since 
there was no similar commitment on the American side. 
The issue of compensation for nationalized and confiscated property was resolved in 
Article 7 of the declaration where it was said that ‘the US government and the Czecho¬ 
slovak government will provide adequate and effective compensation to the other country 
in view of their rights or interests in the property that has been or will be nationalized or 
confiscated by the government of the other country’.18 
The signing of the declaration on trade policy and compensation signalled the fact that 
tensions between both countries had been overcome for the time being. With regard to the 
rather friendly atmosphere in which the final negotiations were held, it was assumed that 
the negotiations on the $50 million loan which had ceased on 13 September 1946 would be 
revived. The declaration was a signal to the USA that the countries in the Soviet sphere of 
14 Ibid., no. 860F.5034/10-2946. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Archives of UV KSC, State Central Archives (hereafter SC A), Prague, 100/24, no. 1157/1. 
17 ACMFA, USA, box 33, no. 11949/46. 
18 SCA, 100/24, no. 1157/1; ACMFA, USA 1945-54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/l. 
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influence could accept the American principles of multilateralism in respecting business 
norms as dictated by private enterprise. A substantial part of the declaration was given 
over to the fact (or rather to the Czechoslovak commitment to the fact) that American 
nationals whose property had been nationalized or confiscated by the Czechoslovak 
government would obtain compensation. 
Another reason why the declaration on trade policy and compensation was signed was 
that Czechoslovakia came to the final talks in the second half of 1946 in a new spirit. 
Freezing the credit for the purchase of American army surplus reserves in Europe and 
putting a stop to negotiations for the American loan on 13 September 1946, which caused 
some dismay in Czechoslovak trade circles, had acted as a goad. The government had 
decided to revise its procedures and to study the American conditions carefully. They 
were, in principle, identical with the conditions that the USA had stipulated for the Exim 
Bank reconstruction loan for the purchase of machinery, equipment and material. 
For Czechoslovakia the declaration meant, in addition to the possibility of reviving 
negotiations on the loan, also an opportunity to secure a loan from the International Bank. 
It also gave them hope that the high American customs tariffs that were preventing the 
expansion of commercial contacts between both countries could be abolished. However, 
the issue of full compensation had not been resolved by the declaration. This was the 
subject of further negotiations in 1947 which continued (after the Communist take-over) in 
the period between 1948-49, and later. 
There were two ways of resolving the issue of compensation for American individuals 
and companies, either on a case-by-case basis or as a package deal. In 1947, American 
interest was focused mainly on the cases of Vacuum Oil and Petschek, although together 
with such companies as ITT, Remington Rank or Com Product Refining, the Czecho¬ 
slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs registered a total of 225 American applications or 
petitions by 1 September 1947. The applications covered agricultural property, companies 
manufacturing rubber, silk, the mouthwash Odol and weaving mills, as well as paintings, 
manor houses and so forth. In this category one might mention Aries Gloves, the A. Stem 
National Cash Register Company, H. A. Evans, Manon Manion, the Maort Company, J. G. 
Ziegler, Otto Maria Mandl and G. Lambert.19 
Steinhardt was particularly firm in asserting the interests of Com Product Refining Co.; 
this was reflected in his personal message to Lubor Niederle, the Czechoslovak Govern¬ 
ment intendant, as well as the American Embassy note of 2 September 1947 which stated 
that ‘unless this property is returned, the company intends to take steps it will consider 
appropriate and which will relate to the reparation supplies for the CSR from Germany’.20 
The Americans’ dominant interest, however, concentrated on resolving the issues of 
Vacuum Oil’s and Petschek’s property. In Petschek’s case the American government 
proposed that Petschek transfer his claim to some American company which would then 
claim compensation. The settlement in the remaining cases was, to use Steinhardt’s word, 
‘smooth’, and compensation could be paid in Czechoslovak crowns. At the same time he 
said that Czechoslovakia could obtain a credit form the USA for $80 million.21 
The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, Ripka, also commented on the Petschek 
case in early November 1947. He was willing to accept the American proposal provided 
Czechoslovakia obtained the American credit. Steinhardt was of the opinion that 
Czechoslovakia would obtain the credit after Petchek’s application had been settled. 
Ripka, on the other hand, was arguing that both issues (Petschek and credit) should be 
19 SC A, 100/24, no. 1157/1. 
20 ACMFA, USA 1945-54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/l. 
21 Archives of Presidential Office (hereafter APO), Prague, no. T-3030/47. 
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settled simultanously.22 The Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior investigated whether 
the claim was justified. On 13 September 1947 it sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a 
letter dealing with all members of the Petschek family. It stated that, according to their 
investigation, all members of the Petschek family had registered as Germans in the 1930 
census. They had all acquired foreign citizenship, mostly American. The Ministry of the 
Interior further stated that the men, according to Article 240 and ensuing articles in 
Czechoslovak defence regulations (government decree no. 141/27), were not released from 
national service duties, and to ask for foreign citizenship at a time of increased threat to the 
Republic was considered as a breach of loyalty to the country. The conclusion of the letter 
stated that with such persons one of the conditions for being excluded from confiscation 
(according to decree 108/45, Article 1, Section 1, Point 2) had not been met.23 
Petschek’s property in Czechoslovakia was not negligible. The Americans were claiming 
compensation of 600 million Czechoslovak crowns, which, after the deduction of a 30 per 
cent property tax, was rounded to the amount of 400 million crowns. They were asking for 
50 per cent in dollars (400 million crowns) 20 per cent in pounds sterling (80 million 
crowns) and 30 per cent in crowns (120 million). 
The potential credit for Czechoslovakia was divided by Steinhardt into three parts: S20 
million for the purchase of cotton, $20 million for the purchase of goods for the 
Czechoslovak home market, and $40 million for the purchase of military surplus 
equipment, mainly tools and machinery for the maintenance of roads and vehicles. 
As far as Vacuum Oil was concerned, the exact amount of compensation had not been 
settled by autumn 1947. Steinhardt, who had been the company lawyer between the wars, 
was personally involved in the negotiations. Harold Sheets was willing to dispense with 
compensation provided the company obtained a privileged position in Czechoslovakia. 
This was a reference to crude oil drilling in South Moravia. Vacuum Oil would have 
provided technology and practical assistance and were willing to offer technical co¬ 
operation in the manufacture of synthetic fuels and in the prevention of losses in the 
production of light petrols. They also demanded participation in petrol stations and in the 
Czechoslovak trade in oil products.24 
The original amount of compensation was $14,683,000, more than 700 million crowns. 
It turned out at the negotiations that the Americans were insisting on compensation which 
was in the range of 200-300 million crowns after property tax; while a half of the amount 
was to be paid in US dollars.25 The Czechoslovak estimate was 80 million crowns. This 
calculation was based on the value of the company at the time of liberation, when the 
Kolin refinery was still in ruins after the Allied air raids.26 
In the summer of 1948, American diplomats started probing the possibility of reviving 
negotiations on compensation. Czechoslovakia, represented by the Office of the Govern¬ 
ment Intendant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responded favourably, but pointed out 
that compensation would not include claims resulting from the Czechoslovak land reform. 
Czechoslovakia was not willing to pay in cash and stipulated a condition that frozen com¬ 
mercial contacts be revived and extended.27 The Commission for Compensation, chaired 
by Eugen Lobl, decided that Czechoslovakia would pay compensation only if it received a 
22 Ibid. 
23 ACMFA, Generalni sekretariat-Kabinet 1945-1954, box 39, no. 3316. 
24 SCA, 100/1, box 82, no. 612. 
25 APO, no. T-3030, p. 2. 
26 SCA, 100/1, box 82, no. 612. 
27 ACMFA, USA 1945-54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/l. 
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US credit of two to three times the value of compensation paid. Lobl expressed the view 
that the higher the compensation, the higher should be the credit.28 
In September 1948 the commercial attache of the American embassy in Prague, Ernest 
Kekich, met a delegation from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington to discuss 
compensation. During talks with Karl Fink, Kekich mentioned that the US were willing to 
negotiate compensation for nationalized property on the basis of principles that had been 
the subject of preliminary negotiations at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Finance. He said 
that the Americans had agreed on the principle of a package deal on compensation. The 
compensation was to be determined on the basis of a percentage of overall exports from 
Czechoslovakia to the USA on the condition that there would be a single cash payment 
into the compensation account. As far as the amount of compensation was concerned 
Kekich said that the sum of $45 million had been negotiated. He added immediately that it 
could be $35 million or even less.29 The American commercial attache took the initiative 
and demanded that Fink inform the appropriate authorities in Prague that the negotiations 
on compensation for American property would continue on 15 December 1948 in 
Washington. Kekich explained the reasons for this American initiative by the fact that the 
Americans who have been affected by property nationalization are putting pressure on 
central authorities in Washington, pointing out that Czechoslovakia had already made 
agreements in this respect with other countries and therefore the Washington authorities 
had an interest in this issue being speedily resolved.30 In Kekich’s opinion it was necessary 
to revive foreign trade between the East and the West. In connection with the pre-war 
experience he placed special emphasis on the extension of foreign trade, mainly with 
Czechoslovakia and Poland. On the issue of resources for payment (the Czechoslovak 
shortage of dollars), he said that Washington had discussed this issue and was willing to 
offer credit, or partial credit, for this purpose.31 
In his letter of 2 November 1948, Fink informed Kekich that the Prague government 
wished to negotiate first in Prague and later in Washington.32 The material for the 
negotiations in Prague was drafted by the Commission for Compensation at the 
Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At its first meeting on 11 November 1948, it 
studied the American proposal for the package resolution of compensation. It suggested 
that, during further negotiations with the USA, the Czechoslovaks insist on an American 
credit twice as high as the agreed total amount of compensation as the only possible 
arrangement for Czechoslovakia. The procedure was argued on the basis of the 
permanently passive balance of payments with the USA and the difficulties of obtaining 
US dollars from any other source. An agreement on the payment of compensation 
concluded on any other basis would not be in earnest on the Czechoslovak side, because 
Czechoslovakia would not be in a position to abide by it. Another Czechoslovak condition 
was that American exports to Czechoslovakia not be limited by the refusal to issue export 
licenses. The Commission assumed that the credit would be covered by gold to the extent 
of between 50 and 60 per cent.33 
The preparatory meetings of September 1948 in Prague and Washington subsequently 
continued from 24 January to 7 February 1949 in Prague. The basic principles of American 
procedure expressed in the official government memorandum, the ‘Instructions for 
American negotiations with the Czechs on compensation requirements’, were drafted by 
28 
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the economic section of the State Department on 11 January 1949. It stated that under 
current circumstances it was not possible for the State Department to give active support to 
the issue of the International Bank loan to Czechoslovakia unless the issue of 
compensation was taken into account. The State Department, however, admitted that 
during the talks it would be possible to announce to the Czechoslovak party that the doors 
of economic co-operation with the West were open. Tn general, however, American 
financial assistance to Soviet satellite countries was in discrepancy with American policy’, 
but the memorandum did admit the possibility of credits. In this matter, however, the 
American attitude depended on the Prague response to compensation for nationalized 
property.34 An appendix to the quoted material from the economic section was worked out 
by the Central European and European departments on 13 January. It stated that the total 
amount of compensation required should not be less than $40 million. Under no 
circumstances was the delegation to go below this limit.35 
The American side was represented by Kekich, the commercial attache, and F. D. Taylor 
of the State Department. The Czechoslovak delegation was led by the deputy Minister for 
Foreign Trade, Lobl. Both delegations had accepted the principle of package compensation 
as the only possible way towards a successful resolution of the issue. There were different 
views, however, on the amount of compensation (H. Skala, on behalf of the Czecho¬ 
slovaks, suggested $18-20 million, Taylor insisted on $40 million) as well as the terms of 
payment. The Americans required payment in dollars, whereas the Czechoslovaks wanted 
to pay in crowns.36 
On 24 March, new American ambassador J. F. Jacobs informed the State Department 
that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had confirmed the negotiations on compensation by a 
note of 15 March. He also obtained information on Czechoslovak instructions to their 
delegation members for the coming negotiations. According to these, Lobl was to declare 
that if the attitude of the State Department towards the required credit was negative, then 
under certain circumstances Czechoslovakia was prepared to use its gold reserves as a 
guarantee for securing private loans. 
The Czechoslovak delegation, led by Lobl, left for Washington. The negotiations in the 
USA were influenced, in their early stages, by the decision of Skala, who had been most 
active in the previous negotiations, to resign and request political asylum on his arrival in 
the USA. He left the Czechoslovak delegation and took a substantial part of the 
Czechoslovak side’s documentation. The following day he sent a written note to the 
Czechoslovak ambassador, Vladimir Outrata, saying that he had never tried to hide his 
non-Marxist conviction and that by his resignation he was openly expressing a protest 
against the policy of the contemporary Prague government.37 
The talks were led by Paul H. Nitze for the USA. In his introduction he stated that the 
Americans welcomed the coming dialogue which was to resolve the issues of compensation 
for nationalized property. According to international law, the USA was ready to recognize 
the nationalization only after compensation had been granted. The Czechoslovak 
government had accepted the principle of compensation on several other occasions. He 
proposed adopting a bilateral agreement on a package resolution of the matter.38 The 
American proposal for the meeting’s agenda contained nine points; including the matter of 
dual nationality, claims which included investments in crowns, genuine property according 
to American law, claims arising from the land reform, public and private claims, methods 
34 NAR, no. 860F.5034/1-1449. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., no. 860F.5034/4-2349. 
38 SCA, 100/1, box 64, no. 523. 
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of compensation distribution, the amount of compensation and the terms of payment, and 
other economic topics.39 Lobl, the head of the Czechoslovak delegation, had arrived in the 
US with the instruction that the main task of the delegation negotiating compensation was 
to obtain a credit and an extension of commercial contacts. Lobl argued that the first six 
points could not be negotiated because of the missing Czechoslovak documentation. At the 
same time he suggested resolving the issue of compensation distribution, the sum involved, 
terms of payment and other economic issues (this included the granting of a credit). The 
delegations did not find common ground on any of these points and, following an 
instruction from Prague, which had been required and obtained, the negotiations on 
compensation for nationalization were interrupted for technical reasons.40 
In July 1949 Jacobs informed the State Department once again that, according to sources 
close to the Embassy, Czechoslovakia would like to revive the negotiations on 
compensation in September 1949, because of its need of credit and a proposal to abolish 
the American export controls. The Czechoslovaks wanted to suggest compensation of $32 
million.41 The delegation was to negotiate specific technical requirements; it was not 
authorized, however, to conclude an agreement. As the delegation members were not 
prepared for negotiations, their journey to the USA was cancelled.42 
The resolution of the matter of compensation was in the distant future. From 1950 
onwards, American interventions on behalf of American citizens’ property began to 
diminish. The Americans proposed a compensation package again in the summer of 1956, 
this time amounting to $18 million.43 They also specified the method of completion. One 
part was represented by the profit from the sale of a rolling mill ($9 million), a part was to 
come from a share in the government gold ($6 million). The outstanding amount of $3 
million was to be repaid gradually by setting aside a percentage of the profits from 
Czechoslovak exports to the USA, while securing a minimum annual payment of 
$500,000. The Czechoslovak side was willing to accept the American proposal of 
compensation based on the sum of $18 million, but with different terms of payment.44 Due 
to differing attitudes and the mutual unwillingness to find a compromise, the issue of 
compensation for nationalized and confiscated property of American companies and 
citizens remained unresolved. 
Another round of negotiations started in 1961. These were in connection with the return 
of Czechoslovak gold, a part of which was to be used for compensation. Czechoslovakia 
proposed allocating $12 million for compensation, which the USA refused to accept, 
arguing that the value of their property confiscated by the state after the war was substan¬ 
tially higher. This property was valued at $113 million. In 1967, when these issues were 
negotiated again, the American side reduced their demands and asked for only $44 million. 
The whole matter of compensation was resolved in the early 1980s. At the end of 
February 1982 a part of the Czechoslovak gold, looted by the German occupying forces in 
1939 and retained by the US government, was returned to Prague. A total of 18.4 tonnes of 
gold in foreign currency and coins at the market value of $247 million was handed over by 
Switzerland. The operation took place on the basis of the agreement of 29 January 1982, 
by which the Czechoslovak government accepted the obligation to pay $130 million in 
compensation for the property of American companies and individuals confiscated as a 
result of October 1945 presidential decrees. 
39 ACMFA, USA 1945-54 Secret, box 11, no. 41241 1/54-ABO/l 
40 Ibid. 
41 NAR, no. 860F.5034/7-2549. 
42 Ibid. 
43 SCA, 100/3, box 178, no. 603. 
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14 National or Social Revolution? Liquidating 
the Latifundia in Czechoslovakia, 1945-48 
Eagle Glassheim 
When politicians from all Czech political parties in 1945 called for a redressing of the 
Battle of White Mountain, they were echoing a slogan used twenty-five years before by 
proponents of land reform in the young Czechoslovak Republic. As the earlier reformers 
saw things, 1620 was a turning point in Czech history; after the White Mountain, Czechs 
lived as subjugated peasants on the estates of a foreign feudal aristocracy. Land reform 
was to be an enactment of historical justice, the expropriation of land from the great 
landowning nobility and its redistribution to small (mostly Czech and Slovak) farmers. In 
1945, ‘redressing’ the White Mountain took on a much more radical meaning. The nobility 
was largely forgotten, and in its place fell the whole German population of 
Czechoslovakia. ‘Historical justice’ came to mean the expulsion of over three million 
ethnic Germans. 
This chapter primarily concerns land reform from 1945 to 1948 in Czechoslovakia. But, 
as I shall argue, we cannot separate land reform from the expulsions. Nor can we separate 
either from the rhetoric and circumstances surrounding land reform in the inter-war period. 
I shall begin by comparing the use of anti-noble and anti-German rhetoric during the two 
transitional periods of 1918-20 and 1945-48. From there, I shall consider the interaction 
of national and social goals during the three stages of land reform from 1945-48. Overall, I 
shall suggest that all the stages of the post-war land reform were partially orchestrated by 
and played into the hands of the Communists. Not only did they effectively use the 
expulsions and land reform in their pursuit of absolute control of the state, but these acts 
also facilitated the collectivization of agriculture after the Communists had eliminated their 
political enemies in 1948. 
Redressing the White Mountain 
The collapse of Austria-Hungary under the strain of total war in 1918 was a catastrophe 
for the Monarchy’s proud and powerful aristocracy. The richest and most influential 
families of the Austrian half of the Empire held vast estates in Bohemia and Moravia. 
When these provinces became in 1918 an integral part of Czechoslovakia, nobles found 
themselves in a state whose leaders showed a marked hostility to the nobility they 
inherited. As early as November 1918, the provisional National Assembly outlawed noble 
titles and made it clear that a comprehensive land reform was imminent. 
Though the anti-noble mood was a popular manifestation, it also served the goals of 
Czechoslovakia’s state-builders. As contemporary politicians saw it, the largest threats to 
the new state were Habsburg revanchism, Bolshevism, and German separatism. Much of 
the Czech population identified the nobility with the Habsburgs, seeing both as anti-Czech, 
anti-modem, and anti-democratic institutions. While introducing the land reform 
legislation in 1919, the Social Democratic deputy Frantisek Modracek argued typically that 
‘the aristocracy formed a vital pillar of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire’.1 
1 Narodni shromazdeni, Meeting 46: 16 April 1919. Text at http://www.psp.cz/cgi- 
bin/win/eknih/1918ns/ps/stenprot/046schuz/. Technically Modracek was a member of a splinter 
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At the same time, most parties represented in the National Assembly feared the spread of 
revolutionary socialism to Czechoslovakia. Communist revolutions in Russia, Bavaria, and 
Hungary made the threat particularly vivid as legislators debated land reform in April of 
1919. Thus a proverbial Czech ‘hunger for land’ became, along with ‘redressing White 
Mountain’, a major rhetorical foundation of the land reform. If the seething countryside 
were not appeased, advocates argued, revolution was waiting around the comer. 
Finally, many legislators saw land reform as a way to make inroads on ethnic German 
ownership of the vast forested borderlands of Bohemia and Moravia. Though Sudeten 
German attempts to found an independent republic in 1918 failed, Czechs had every reason 
to believe in 1919 that the Germans would use all means available in a continued effort to 
separate from Czechoslovakia. The ostensible justification for the nationalization of border 
forests was military necessity, but it was clear to all parties at the time that the state was 
taking land out of the hands of what it considered an internal national and political enemy. 
The rhetoric justifying land reform legislation was historical. In 1918 large landowners, 
most of them noble, owned around one third of the land area of Czechoslovakia. To 
Socialists and Agrarians alike, these lands were ill-gotten spoils accrued by noble allies of 
the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century. To choose a symbolic 
point, politicians used the White Mountain, the battle soon after which the Habsburgs 
exiled much of the Bohemian Protestant nobility. Since the National Revival, Czech 
nationalists viewed 1620 as the start of a 200-year decline. The Revivalists sought to 
reverse this Czech ‘dark age’ by modernizing the Czech language and simultaneously 
restoring it to its late-sixteenth-century glory, at least from 1848 onwards, and asserting 
themselves politically within the Habsburg Empire. National independence in 1918 was 
the culmination of the Czech national movement, and land reform was seen as historical 
justice, the undoing of ‘three centuries’ of Habsburg subjugation. As Modracek argued in 
1919: 
By these several articles [of the land reform bill] we are deleting the landed aristocracy from 
the future history of the Czech nation. Today we are ridding ourselves once and for all of that 
aristocracy that played such an infamous role in the history of our nation, and an especially 
sad role from the Battle of White Mountain to the present.* 2 
Deputies like Modracek, as well as much of the Czech public, saw the nobility as not 
only feudal, but also foreign (German). After the White Mountain, the Habsburgs had 
encouraged Catholic noble allies from all over Europe to settle in Bohemia and Moravia. 
These families, from Ireland, Italy, Germany, and France, among others, made the 
provinces their home and for the most part adopted the German language and a Habsburg 
patriotism. Though some, like the Schwarzenbergs, had supported Czech national 
aspirations in the late nineteenth century, Czechs tended to think of nobles as German in 
sympathy. The National Democratic deputy Bohumil Nemec argued that all nobles were in 
fact germanized: ‘In the lands of the Bohemian Crown, there are many nationally alien, 
mercenary and rapacious noble families. Czech Catholic nobles also enriched themselves, 
but they soon lost their national consciousness; the Catholic restoration ended by 
germanizing them.’3 
As it turned out, the inter-war land reform treated individual Czech and German large 
landowners pretty much equally. Even so, the majority of Bohemian nobles were 
considered German, so the reform gave the appearance of bias against Germans. The 
social democratic party in 1919. He rejoined the Social Democrats in 1924. See Josef Tomes, 
Slovnik k politickym dejinam Ceskoslovenska 1918-1992, Prague, 1994, p. 124. 
2 Modracek, Narodni shromazdem, Meeting 46: 16 April 1919. 
3 Nemec, ibid. 
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important point is that both the Czech and German publics saw the reform in national 
terms.4 
Overall, the 1919 bill put around four million hectares (all holdings over 250 ha.) under 
zabor, or expropriation. labor was not confiscation; it left the land in the hands of its 
original owners, only reserving for the newly-established State Land Office the right to 
redistribute it as necessary. Dominated by the powerful Agrarian Party, the Land Office 
worked methodically, parcelling out some estates, sparing others. By the late 1920s, most 
of the reform was completed. Over a million hectares had gone to small and medium-sized 
farmers, who became solid supporters of the Agrarian Party. On the other hand, almost two 
million ha. were released from zabor, leaving most noble families with still substantial 
holdings, primarily forest land. The reasons for this are numerous, including international 
pressure; the government’s desire to leave nobles income to maintain historical and natural 
landmarks; and successful noble lobbying (including bribes) with Agrarian legislators. The 
reform, then, turned out far less radical than the speeches of 1918-19 would have 
suggested. 
Unsurprisingly, the rhetoric of ‘redressing the White Mountain’ and ‘hunger for land’ 
reappeared in similar form in 1945. Only this time it was used to justify far more than land 
reform. Redressing the White Mountain now meant the mass expulsion of the whole 
Czechoslovak German population. Though all political parties called for expulsions, the 
Communist daily Rude pravo, as usual, made the point the most vividly (and distorted 
history most effectively): ‘The decree on the expulsion of all foreigners from Czech soil 
[...] returns to the Czech nation land that has been for 300 years in the hands of a foreign 
nobility.’5 With the ‘cleansing’ of the borderlands, the White Mountain would be undone.6 
On 1 June 1945, thousands of farmers and workers gathered on a field on the western 
edge of Prague, the mythical White Mountain, to hear politicians speak on the 325th 
anniversary of the battle. The Social Democratic Minister President, Zdenek Fieriinger, 
made a clear connection of that battle with the German occupation of 1939-45: 
We have gathered on the historical soil of the White Mountain to celebrate one of our most 
important revolutionary acts: the confiscation of the land of our age-old enemies, the 
Germans and the Hungarians [...]. With today’s celebration we want to emphasize that the 
wrong inflicted upon us after the White Mountain, which was again to have been repeated 
under the Nazi regime, will be completely undone; that Czechs and Slovaks will again be the 
masters of their own land.7 
Fierlinger’s speech typically connected Czechs and Slovaks, as well as their putative 
national enemies, the Germans and Hungarians. Curiously, many Slovak politicians 
(especially Communists) also used the White Mountain formula for denouncing 
Hungarians in Slovakia, in spite of the lack of significant Hungarian or Slovak links to the 
battle. It is unclear if the White Mountain rhetoric had any resonance among Slovaks, 
however. 
Other Communist and Social Democratic speakers from the National Front hammered 
on with the same theme. The Communist Minister of Agriculture Julius Duris: ‘The White 
Mountain is undone! German aggression is historically liquidated’;8 the Social Democratic 
4 For an excellent recent overview of the Czechoslovak first land reform, see Mark Cornwall, 
“‘National Reparation”?: The Czech Land Reform and the Sudeten Germans 1918-38’, 
Slavonic and East European Review, 75, 1997, 2, pp. 259-80. 
5 ‘Odcizena puda se navraci narodu’. Rude pravo, 17 June 1945, p. 1. 
6 ‘Nase puda bude vyrvana z cizackych rukou’. Rude pravo, 7 June 1945, p. 1. 
7 Zdenek Fierlinger, 1 July 1945, in Odcinujeme Bilou horu, Prague, 1945, p. 12. 
8 Ibid., p. 16. 
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Minister of Food Vaclav Majer: ‘We are free once again. We have our own state. 
Therefore it is only just that the agricultural property of Germans be confiscated without 
compensation [...] an act finally undoing the unfortunate legacy of the White Mountain.’9 
The implications were clear: confiscation and expulsion were acts of historical justice. 
How did the White Mountain rhetoric’s implications change so dramatically by the end 
of the Second World War? All over Europe, depression, heightened national tension, and 
Nazi brutality had radicalized the sense of the possible in the 1930s and 1940s. Begun in 
the mid-1920s in the Balkans, massive population exchanges enjoyed increasing 
legitimacy. In contrast, transfer or expulsion was not raised as a possibility in 1919, when 
the primary threats were seen to be social: the influence of feudal and monarchist elements 
on the one hand, revolutionary agitation on the other. In 1945 the main enemy and threat 
was national; after six years of a humiliating and often brutal occupation, expulsion 
seemed to Czechs the best available method of securing their future as a national state. The 
White Mountain rhetoric was already familiar and popular, and Communist and non- 
Communist politicians alike adapted it successfully. 
The Expulsions and Land Reform 
Once President Edvard Benes had marshalled support among the Allies in 1943 for an 
expulsion of Czechoslovakia’s Germans after the war, that goal became paramount. The 
chance to create an ethnically pure national state was of such historical magnitude that 
returning politicians were willing to cut legal and political comers to carry it out. Like 
many other post-war goals, land reform took a back seat to the expulsions. On the other 
hand, confiscation and redistribution of German property in itself implied a radical change 
in ownership. What followed in late 1945 and in 1946 was a national and social revolution, 
or as the chief Ministry of Agriculture propagandist, Jin Kot’atko wrote: ‘The wholesale 
transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia [means] the liquidation of German 
land ownership on Czechoslovak soil, the national purge of Czech land, the national 
revolutionary period of the new land reform.’10 The expulsions were the first and most 
significant stage in a vast reorganization of the Czechoslovak countryside from 1945 to 
1949. 
Following the Soviet army on its way west, the new Czechoslovak government 
announced the general outline of its post-war programme in Kosice on 5 April 1945. 
German collaborators (later extended to all Germans, save anti-Fascists) would lose their 
citizenship and faced expulsion. Locally-elected National Committees, or in 
overwhelmingly German areas centrally-appointed Administrative Commissions, were 
mandated to choose National Administrators to oversee German property.* 11 Once the 
government arrived in Prague in May, the Ministry of Agriculture sent a directive to 
National Committees clarifying policy with regard to German land. Local and regional 
committees were to act at once to secure German land, ‘without waiting for the appropriate 
laws to be enacted’. They were to select members of Agrarian Commissions ‘for the 
preparation of parcelization of confiscated land’. Finally, the directive triumphed, ‘the 
property of the foreign Germano-Hungarian nobility will be confiscated without 
compensation’.12 
9 Ibid., p. 22. 
10 Jin Kofatko, Land Reform in Czechoslovakia, Prague, 1948, p. 13. 
11 Kosicky vladniprogram, Prague, 1974, pp. 23-24. 
12 'Smemice pro Narodni vybory o nejnutnejsich opatrenich v zemedelstvf, 10 May 1945. Statni 
ustredni archiv, fond Ministrstvo zemedglstvi-sekretariat (SUA MZ-S) 195, carton 372. 
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The returning Czechoslovak government enacted the Kosice Programme in a series of 
presidential decrees, now known as the Benes Decrees. On 21 June 1945 the government 
issued decree no. 12, mandating The confiscation and rapid distribution of the agricultural 
property of Germans, Hungarians, traitors and enemies of the Czech and Slovak nation’. 
The decree confiscated all German property without compensation, placing it temporarily 
in a National Land Fund. The Fund was to take applications from Czechs and Slovaks for 
up to twelve hectares of land. Priority in redistribution fell to Those who served in the fight 
for national liberation, particularly soldiers, partisans, former political prisoners and 
deportees’. In overwhelmingly German areas, the Fund would hold the land for eventual 
(post-expulsion) colonization. Local National Committees, often dominated by 
Communists, were to elect local committees of farmer-applicants to suggest and oversee 
plans for redistribution. Final decisions over parcelization rested with the Communist 
Ministry of Agriculture, which also was given a Technical’ advisory role locally.13 
The national land reform (that is, redistribution of German and some Hungarian land) 
involved a total of 1.65 million ha. of arable land and 1.3 million ha. of forest, almost 25 
per cent of Czechoslovakia’s surface area.14 By the end of the resettlement action, around 
1.1 million ha. of agricultural land had gone to private individuals (a total of 122,000 
families). Of the remaining agricultural land, 100,000 ha. went to co-operatives and 75,000 
ha. remained still unallocated as of 1948.15 Forest land went primarily to the state, which 
transferred 840,000 ha. to the National Forestry Administration.16 Of the total 
confiscations of around three million hectares, only 545,946 ha. fell in Slovakia. Because 
of Czechoslovakia’s failure to expel its Hungarians, most Hungarian land was not 
redistributed under the national land reform. The overall picture is of a substantial increase 
in the number of Czech small farmers working their own plots of around 10 ha. 
Because the land reform in the German borderlands was seen as primarily national, 
statistics on its impact on the Bohemian nobility are scarce. But it is clear that German 
nobles lost hundreds of thousands of hectares to confiscation. The Buquoy family, for 
example, must have lost around 20,000 ha; Clam-Gallas 18,000 ha.; Clary-Aldringen 7,000 
ha.; Thun-Hohenstein 10,000 ha.; Waldstein 25,000 ha. In addition, Adolf 
Schwarzenberg’s 55,000 remaining hectares were confiscated by a special law passed by 
the National Assembly in July 1947.17 After the inter-war land reform, the majority of 
remaining noble land was forest. In effect, then, the state took over the German latifundia 
as the administrator of vast forested estates in the borderlands. 
For agricultural land, the government developed a wide-ranging resettlement 
apparatus.18 The first stage, set up by decree no. 5 of 19 May 1945, called for applications 
for positions as National Administrators, who were sent to the borderlands to oversee 
German property. The key paragraph in the decree was typically vague, empowering 
National Committees to send National Administrators To all properties that require 
uninterrupted operation of production and of economic life, especially [...] those that are 
held, administered, rented or leased by people considered unreliable with regard to the 
13 Decree 12/45 Sb. Josef Sebestik and Zdenek Lukes, Prehled predpisu o Nemcich, Prague, 
1946, pp. 23-27. 
14 Jin Kofatko, Pozemkova reforma v Ceskoslovensku, Prague, 1949, pp. 24-25. 
15 Kofatko, Land Reform in Czechoslovakia, pp. 18-19, 23; around 100,000 ha. went to public 
entities, for military and other public uses. 
16 Ibid., p. 27. 
17 Usneseni ustavodameho Narodniho shromazdeni, 10 July 1947; copy in Archiv kancelare 
prezidenta republiky (AKPR), D 10429/47. 
18 For an informative account of resettlement, see Lubomir Slezak, Zemedelske osidlovani 
pohranici ceskych zemipo druhe svetove valce, Bmo, 1978. 
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state’.19 Though it was intended to apply to German firms and property that would be 
vacated in 1945 or 1946, the Communist government used the same law to ease kulaks (or 
‘the rich ones’, as the Czechoslovak Communists preferred) off their farms after February 
1948.20 Overall, by 1946 there were 82,000 National Administrators of agricultural land, 
70,000 of whom would gain full title to their fiefdoms after the Germans were expelled.21 
Parcelization and resettlement continued feverishly in the first half of 1946. Local 
Farmers’ Commissions and National Committees worked through a total of 157,000 
applications for land, approving a total of 122,000. Successful applicants tended to come 
from the ranks of landless labourers, small farmers, and occasionally non-agricultural 
workers. Agricultural resettlement was part of a vast colonization of the whole Sudeten 
region, or approximately 20 per cent of post-war Czechoslovakia. Altogether, 1.8 million 
Czechs moved into towns and cities in the borderland, occupying former German houses, 
taking over German land, and receiving title to German businesses. In the May 1946 
elections, these settlers would vote overwhelmingly for the Communist Party.22 In 
Slovakia, on the other hand, where resettlement was minimal, the Communists did poorly. 
As the year progressed, the expulsion and resettlement process went relatively smoothly; 
even so, in November 1946 the Ministry of Agriculture expressed frustration at the number 
of outstanding cases of ambiguous nationality before National Committees. Many German 
farmers had no objective signs of nationality, such as a census record or membership in 
particular German organizations. The Ministry urged National Committees to speed up 
action on such cases. Though there was no formal law on what to do, the Ministry directed 
Committees to base their decisions on subjective factors, such as mother tongue, ‘political 
conviction’, or even ‘methods of child raising’. In a chilling hint of what was to come in 
1948, the Ministry justified its approach: 
Every legal case is a living organism, on which it is not possible to apply mechanically the 
dead letter of the law by methods of formal jurisprudence. A jurist of the newly-forming 
legal order will have to take on functions similar to those of Roman praetorians, projecting 
himself onto new levels of popular law and thus becoming viva vox iuris publici, the living 
voice of popular law.23 
Overall, the Communists reaped an overwhelming political and administrative bounty 
through the land reform/expulsion process. The Ministry of Agriculture, under the 
relentless Slovak Communist Duris, was seen as the prime mover behind redistribution as 
well as the champion of small farmers. In areas where the population was overwhelmingly 
German, the Communist Ministry of Interior appointed regional Administrative 
Commissions as a substitute for elected National Committees. Thus Communists directly 
controlled redistribution in areas that had the most land subject to confiscation. Many, and 
perhaps most, elected National Committees also ended up under Communist control. As 
19 Decree no. 5/1945 Sb. in Karel Jech and Karel Kaplan (eds), Dekrety prezidenta republiky 
1940-1945, 2 vols, Brno, 1995, II, p. 216. 
20 Drahomira Kopejkova, kK uloze narodnich sprav a nucenych najmu jako nastroje zmen v 
pozemkovem vlastnictvi v Ceskoslovensku na konci 40. a na pocatku 50. let’, Slovansky 
prehled, 77, 1991, 5, p. 397. 
21 Ibid., p. 397. 
22 Vlastislav Lacina, 'Pozemkova reforma v lidove demokraticke Ceskoslovenske republice’ in 
Milan Otahal (ed.), Zapas o pozemkovou reformu v CSR, Prague, 1963, p. 216. See also Slezak, 
who points out that 80 per cent of the resettled border regions gave the Communists a majority 
ot votes (in a third of the districts, the Communist vote exceeded 60 per cent): Slezak, 
Zemedelske osidlovani, pp. 109-12. 
23 Ministerstvo zemedelstvi to Zemske narodni vybory (Praha, Brno, Ostrava) 25.11.46. In MZ-S, 
SUA, carton 372, inventory number 195, folder 1. 
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Kofatko succinctly noted, ‘The decisive factor in the first land reform was the bureaucratic 
machinery of government, controlled by the reactionary Agrarian Party; the new land 
reform is being carried out by Farmers’ Committees, democratically elected, and fully 
supported [...] by the ministry of agriculture.’24 Communists dominated the whole process 
of confiscation and redistribution, expulsion and resettlement; seen as the guarantors of 
these tremendously popular measures, they built a vast reservoir of support that helped 
bring them success in the 1946 elections. 
Revision of the First Czechoslovak Land Reform 
In early 1948, Kofatko summarized the results of land reform to date. ‘We can safely say’, 
he wrote, ‘that the problem of German ownership of land has been solved completely in 
Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia [...]. The first stage of the new Land Reform is thus at an 
end, having achieved its aims; it only remains to deal with the problem of large estates in 
the hands of Czech and Slovak landlords.’25 By the end of 1946, in fact, most Germans had 
been expelled from Czechoslovakia and resettlement w'as well under way. In late 1946 the 
National Front began what became a rancorous debate over Kofatko’s stage two, the 
parcelization of non-German large estates. The subsequent bill, known as the ‘Revision of 
the First Czechoslovak Land Reform’, was passed in July 1947. Combined with legislation 
creating a United Association of Czech Farmers, the revision further consolidated the 
Communist hold on the countryside during the crucial months leading up to the February 
crisis in 1948. 
All Czech parties of the National Front (Communists, Social Democrats, People’s Party 
and National Socials) agreed that the inter-war land reform had been insufficiently carried 
out. Though four million hectares had fallen under zabor in 1919, only around half was 
redistributed to small farmers or taken over by the state. Close to two million hectares were 
returned to large landowners, most of them members of the former nobility, by the early 
1930s. With resettlement of the borderlands almost complete in late 1946, the National 
Front began work on a bill that would return remaining large estates to zabor and then 
redistribute them to small farmers or the state. Much of the two million ha. released from 
zabor had belonged to Germans, and thus had already been confiscated in the course of the 
national land reform in 1945-46. Overall, the National Assembly estimated that 450,000 
ha. would fall under the proposed revision.26 The Communists, however, also questioned 
the redistribution of so-called ‘residual estates’ to allies of the Agrarian Party in the inter¬ 
war period. The Ministry of Agriculture therefore inserted language into the bill calling for 
revision of residual estates as well. The Communist slogan was ‘land to those who work 
if, and they saw residual estates as a bastion of absentee landownership. 
The aggressive approach of the Ministry of Agriculture in September of 1946 drew sharp 
responses within the National Front. A number of ministries complained that the Ministry 
of Agriculture had given insufficient time for consideration of the details of the proposed 
reform. Using a common Communist tactic, the Ministry had submitted the draft law with 
a two-day deadline for responses. The People’s Party-held Ministry of Posts raised a 
number of typical objections, most notably that the Communists were proposing an 
entirely new land reform, not just a revision. In their view, the definition of a residual 
estate was vague, and the bill would therefore be used to expropriate all but small farms. 
24 Kofatko, Land Reform, p. 29. 
25 Ibid., P. 33. 
26 Smejkal, 66. schuze ustavodameho Narodniho shromazdeni, 10 July 1947. Text at 
http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/eknih/1946uns/stenprof066schuz/. 
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Moreover, there remained almost 100,000 ha. of unsettled land in the border regions,27 and 
the effects of the national land reform on production, social structure and so on were still 
not clear. The People’s Party therefore questioned ‘whether undertaking a revision of the 
first land reform [...] is at this time suitable and expedient’.28 With substantial opposition 
within the National Front, the Communists withdrew the proposal, ostensibly to prepare a 
new draft of the bill. 
When the new, hardly-changed draft arrived in February of 1947, the Ministry of 
Agriculture was better prepared for opposition. First, the Communists had arguments to 
counter all the objections extended in 1946. Second, they mobilized the Agricultural 
Commissions, which flooded the government and National Assembly with petitions calling 
for rapid passage of the revision law. In spite of persistent objections from the People’s 
Party and National Socials,29 the bill reached the National Assembly in July of 1947. The 
Communists had made only two concessions. First, reconsideration of the first land reform 
was to be undertaken by a Revision Commission, with representatives of all political 
parties, and not directly by the Ministry of Agriculture. Second, the lower limit for 
expropriation of residual estates was to be set at a solid 50 ha., instead of the flexible limit 
favoured by the Communists.30 Even so, the fact that the term ‘large estate’ now meant any 
land-holding over 50 ha. bore witness to the remarkable Communist revalorization of 
inter-war rhetoric.31 Like the ‘foreign aristocrat’ that had come to symbolize all Germans 
in Czechoslovakia, now the concept of aristocratic landowner had begun to apply to 
kulaks, land-speculators, and anyone with over 50 ha. Like the German population, this 
group would have to be ‘liquidated’. 
As the Agriculture Committee and then the National Assembly debated the bill in June 
and July of 1947, a steady stream of farmers rallied in Prague and delivered petitions of 
support for quick passage.32 The Social Democrats supported the bill fully, but added the 
proviso that holdings under 50 ha. should remain secure.33 The People’s Party continued to 
voice serious reservations. As deputy Benda said in the National Assembly debate: 
The declared public interest of hunger for soil conflicts with the public interest of the 
preservation of the rule of law [...]. [Moreover] the revision excludes government estates, 
even though these today make up the largest latifundia. At the same time, the bill attempts to 
support collectivization [...]. Czech soil would be thrown onto the market of agitation, where 
it would not end up redistributed to small farmers, but would be used by the Communist 
Party as an instrument for gaining votes and for securing political power.34 
The Czech National Socials shared the People’s-Party concern over increasing state 
ownership and control of agriculture. Even so, they agreed with the fundamental premiss 
Overall, 16 per cent of the borderlands remained uninhabited in 1947. See Tomas Stanek, 
Odsun Nemcu z Ceskoslovenska 1945-1947, Prague, 1991, p. 347. 
28 Ministerstvo post to Ministerstvo zemedelstvi, 11 October 1946, SUA MZ-S 87/43, carton 73. 
29 See ‘Zaznam o porade 5-7.brezna 1947 v Ministerstvu zemedelstvi’, SUA MZ-S 88/34, carton 
90. Among other things, the People’s Party wanted to exclude Church property from the 
revision. 
30 Lacina, ‘Pozemkova reforma’, p. 223. 
31 In the inter-war period, the term iarge estate’ (velkostatek, Grossgrundbesitz) generally 
referred to holdings of 200 ha. or more. See Wilhelm Medinger, Grossgrundbesitz, 
Fideikommiss und Agrarreform, Vienna, 1919, p. 14. 
32 Lacina, ‘Pozemkova reforma’, p. 222. 
33 See speech of Social Democrat Sluka in 66. schuze ustavodameho Narodniho shromazdeni, 10 
July 1947. Text at http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/eknih/1946uns/stenprot/066schuz/. 
34 Benda, ibid. 
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of the reform, that those who work the land should own it. That being the case, they voted 
with the Communists and Social Democrats in favour of the bill. 
The new law, no. 142/1947, set up a Revision Commission to reconsider the release of 
any holdings over 250 ha. from zabor in the inter-war period. In addition, the Commission 
was to re-expropriate all residual estates in excess of 50 ha. The Ministry of Agriculture 
was responsible for naming commissioners and setting the Commission’s agenda, though 
both required the approval of the government as a whole.35 The process of revision went 
rather slowly, only beginning in early 1948.36 A little over one million ha. came under 
review, including 627,000 ha. of large estates and 400,000 ha. of residual estates. Around 
three-quarters of the total was forest, and therefore went to the state. Most of the rest was 
divided among small farmers.37 Because the national land reform had not been consistently 
carried out in Slovakia, just over 50 per cent of the total revision took place there. It is 
difficult to determine how much of the revision land was redistributed before 20 February 
1948 (the beginning of the government crisis), or the eventual amount of compensation 
received by the owners. Kofatko claimed that the Revision Commission settled ‘more than 
half of all revision cases’ before the February crisis.38 Lacina suggests that very few cases 
were resolved before the government crisis, but that ‘after February, the tempo of the 
Commission sped up markedly’.39 In any case, the Commission was decisively pro- 
Communist and worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture; its revisions served to 
further cement small-farmer support for the Communist Party. 
While working on the revision legislation, the Communists also prepared a proposal for 
the third stage of land reform, which would buy up all holdings over fifty ha. and those 
with absentee landlords. The idea was to realize completely the slogan ‘land to those who 
work if. Because of growing conflict in the National Front in late 1947, the law finally 
passed in March 1948, a month after the Communists took full control of the state.40 Only 
347,000 ha. fell under the conditions of the law, indicating the extent large and medium 
estates had already been broken up by mid-1948. In 1949 National Committees completed 
the final (pre-collectivization) stage of land reform, with most of the land going to the state 
or to newly emerging collective farms.41 
Concurrent with the earlier revision bill of July, 1947, the National Assembly passed a 
law formalizing the creation of a United Association of Czech Farmers (Jednotny svaz 
ceskych zemedelcu or JSCZ). In many ways, the German occupation and reordering of 
Czech politics prepared the way for this Communist mini-coup of 1947. Because of the 
taint of collaboration, the powerful Agrarian Party was banned from political life after the 
war. The Nazis themselves left their mark by outlawing all independent agrarian 
organizations and forcing the creation of a single Agricultural Union. With the field 
cleared, the Ministry of Agriculture had begun in 1945 preparing a unified organization on 
the lines of the National Front; there would be no external opposition, and internally, it 
would be dominated by Communists. 
In April 1947, the Ministry of Agriculture began consolidating its control of the new 
Union by sending two Communist ‘specialists’ from the Ministry to oversee the work of its 
35 ‘Zakon o revisi prvni pozemkove reformy’ (142/1947 Sb.), Prague, 1947. 
36 Jana Buresova, ‘Navrat k prvni ceskoslovenske pozemkove reforme po druhe svetove valce v 
mezinarodnich souvislostech", Uherske Hradiste, 1994, p. 132. 
37 Kofatko, Pozemkova reforma v Ceskoslovensku, p. 30. 
38 Ibid., p. 28. 
39 Lacina, ‘Pozemkova reforma’, p. 229. 
40 ‘Zakon o nove pozemkove reforme (trvale uprave vlastnictvi k zemedelske a lesni pude’, 
Sbirka zakonu a narizeni, 46/1948. 
41 Lacina, ‘Pozemkova reforma’, p. 231. 
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preparatory committee. In a terse note, the Ministry reminded the committee that its 
officials ‘are entrusted with the carrying out of all measures that the Ministry of 
Agriculture [...] considers necessary, and of which the preparatory committee of the Union 
will be duly informed’.42 Less than a week later, the People’s Party sent a strong protest to 
Julius Duris, accusing the Ministry of Agriculture of sending ‘government commissars’ to 
intervene unlawfully. Not only was the move undemocratic, but it went against the spirit of 
the National Front, which required all-party debate over major issues.43 Both the Social 
Democrats and National Socials shared the complaint of the People’s Party. A few months 
later, however, the leadership of the JSCZ sent an official request for Ministry of 
Agriculture oversight of ‘discrepancies’ in certain parts of the JSCZ organization.44 The 
Ministry willingly complied. 
The JSCZ received sanction for its monopoly with the passage of law #145/1947 on 11 
July 194745; though non-Communists managed to obtain a few concessions, the law 
mainly codified perpetual Communist control of the organization. The Ministry of 
Agriculture would have ‘control’ over the JSCZ’s work, and it could also send mandatory 
directives regarding ‘tasks of public interest’. The JSCZ itself was to be the sole 
representative of farmers; members and non-members alike were subject to its decisions on 
agricultural issues. In a concession to the non-Communist parties, the law stated that 
leaders of the Union were to be elected from lists submitted by all the political parties in 
the National Front. Even so, this made little difference, since Communists and their 
Socialist allies carried a majority in the Front. The result was a single, Communist-leaning 
agrarian union, representing all farmers whether they liked it or not. 
By the end of 1948, then, the reorganization of the Czechoslovak countryside was 
complete. Land-holdings were now fragmented, with few farmers owning more than fifty 
ha., and the majority under ten. The once strong large- and medium-estate lobby no longer 
existed, the Agrarian Party was broken up. Communists now dominated both the political 
and administrative organs of the countryside, leaving little democratic space for farmers to 
resist the transition to collectivization that would begin in 1948-49.46 
By late 1946, when a few former Agrarian notables came together to commemorate the 
death of the inter-war Agrarian giant Antonin Svehla, speeches were muted. When one 
farmer began criticizing the Communist agricultural programme, ‘Fie was repeatedly 
warned that he should not speak so loudly, that Duris had certainly sent his spies, that for 
the moment it is not worth it, that the Communists are only waiting for an excuse to take 
action against farmers.’ This was no idle paranoia, for at that very moment a Ministry of 
Interior agent was recording the speech and taking note of those attending.47 
Conclusion 
The most significant recurrent theme surrounding the Czechoslovak land reforms from 
1918 to 1948 was that of national purification. The relatively benign anti-noble, anti- 
German and anti-foreigner rhetoric of the inter-war period turned radical and violent in 
42 Ministerstvo zemedelstvi to Preparatory Committee, Jednotny svaz ceskych zemedelcu (JSCZ). 
2 April 1947, SUA MZ-S 87/36, carton 70. 
43 People’s Party to Julius Duris, 8 April 1947, SUA MZ-S 87/36, carton 70. 
44 JSCZ to Ministerstvo zemedelstvi, 7 August 1947. SUA MZ-S 87/36, carton 70. 
45 Zakon o organisaci zemedelcu republiky Ceskoslovenske’, Sbirka zakonu a narizeni, 
145/1947, 11 July 1947. 
46 For more on the transition to collectivization, see the useful document collection. Vznik JZD, 
kolektivizace zemedelstvi 1948-1949, Prague, 1995. 
47 'Hlaseni vyroci svehlova umrt F, Zemska oddeleni bezpecnosti II, PZ-U 148/A-Y 13/16 
17.12.46; copy in SUA MZ-S 202, carton 390. 
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1945, sanctioning one of the largest waves of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century. 
The expulsion of Sudeten Germans and the rapid resettlement of the cleansed districts 
became the primary task of the Czechoslovak government. Land reform was secondary; 
German land was redistributed quickly in 1945 and 1946, but a consistent, state-wide 
reform would have to wait until 1948. Ironically, the expulsions were the main obstacle to 
the Communists in their pursuit of society-wide land reform from 1945 to 1947.48 
Settlement of the border areas was seen as a goal of fundamental national and strategic 
importance, and non-Communist parties argued successfully that reform in the interior 
would have to wait until the borderlands were safely resettled. As a result, phase two of the 
land reform began only in January 1948. Most of the revision of the first Czechoslovak 
reform would take place only after the Communists had seized complete control of the 
state in February, 1948. 
Even so, the expulsions and the national land reform proved a significant help to the 
Communists on their road to total power in Czechoslovakia. As the flexible Communist 
use of the word ‘cleansing’ showed, it was not very far from the cleansing of Germans to 
the cleansing of class enemies. With this in mind, revisionist Czech historians of the 1970s 
treated expulsion in a moral sense, arguing that the expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans 
undermined respect for property, the rule of law, and democracy.49 Such moral arguments 
are hard to prove or disprove. But we can now say with certainty that the expulsions and 
land reforms helped prepare the way institutionally for the Communist seizure of power in 
February 1948. Along with control of security forces and National Committees, the 
Communists used the apparatus of confiscation and resettlement to dominate local politics 
and limit the democratic space available for opposition. By 1948 very few truly democratic 
institutions remained through which citizens could oppose Communist power. 
Though teleological history is often problematic, this is one case where it clearly applies. 
Czechoslovak Communists had a goal, and they pursued it unfailingly. Jin Kofatko 
admitted in 1945 the role land reform would play in the socialization of agriculture. His 
model was the Soviet Union. In spite of their collectivist convictions, he wrote, the 
Bolsheviks had handed out land to five million peasants, thus creating a deep well of 
support for the fight against counter-revolution. ‘And it was this very redistribution of land 
that brought Soviet power, after a twinkling of the eye in the cycle of dialectical evolution, 
to the socialization of land, to the victory of the kolkhoz system! Without the redistribution 
of land in October 1917, there would have been no collectivization in 1929.’ Czech 
Communists were also following a pragmatic course, Kofatko wrote, because farmers 
were unlikely to settle the depopulated borderlands without the promise of their own land. 
Though breaking up large estates might be a temporary setback on the road to 
collectivization, it was only ‘the first step’ in the agricultural revolution. ‘We know where 
we’re going’, he assured his Communist readers, ‘and we see our goal clearly!’50 
48 Ben Frommer argues that the expulsions similarly hindered Communist goals in post-war trials 
of collaborators: ‘Retribution in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War and the Forced 
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15 The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia: 
Western Policy and Response 
Abbott Gleason 
The vicious circle of the Munich syndrome was closed when 
the ‘Western betrayal’ of the Czechs (if there was such a 
thing) was compensated by the ‘Czech betrayal’ of the West, 
if there was such a thing.1 
Thus, within exactly a week, the second Munich was 
accomplished. The pattern following the settlement faithfully 
reproduced the well-known Hitler technique of arrests, purges 
and censorship. A picture of Stalin came to replace the picture 
of Hitler which had once adorned every classroom.2 
I 
One aspect of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia that jumps out at a newcomer to this 
problem is the readiness of the Western powers to write Czechoslovakia off very early, 
accompanied by a peculiar inability to understand fully that they had done so. At least in 
part because of Benes’s pro-Soviet policies, Czechoslovakia was from early on regarded as 
part of the Soviet empire, so the imposition of a Soviet dictatorship was not anticipated as 
being a serious defeat for the ‘West’. The so-called ‘Czech democrats’, in a not dissimilar 
piece of self-deception, declined to see the probable consequences of having delivered 
themselves into Soviet hands. This common lack of realism played an important role in 
shaping the crisis of 1948 and its consequences for the unfolding of the Cold War. 
The connection between the February coup and Munich is clear. Munich persuaded 
Benes he had to look east; when he did so (with a vengeance), he came to be regarded as 
naive by the West, or even as a Soviet pawn. Once that had happened, it was easy to 
decide that Czechoslovakia had been ‘lost’ — long before February 1948. ‘It is of cardinal 
importance to remember’, as an American revisionist historian writes, ‘that East Europe 
was given away not at Yalta but at Munich’.3 
As early as the Yalta conference (February 1945), Anthony Eden and his staff already 
considered Czechoslovakia to be a ‘satellite’ of the Soviet Union.4 Certainly as soon as the 
United States and Britain began to believe in a post-war Europe divided into spheres of 
influence, they would think of any Benes government as within the Soviet sphere. But the 
vital question of what a Soviet sphere of influence would actually be like remained for the 
future to reveal. 
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The view from the East seems to have been rather similar. Following the August 1945 
meeting in Potsdam, Molotov told the Yugoslav ambassador that the way the meeting had 
turned out indicated that the West had conceded Eastern Europe as well as the Balkans.5 
It was western Europe that was always the priority for the United States. Already in early 
1945, George Kennan wrote in a private letter to his friend and colleague Charles Bohlen 
that the United States would do well to settle for spheres of influence after the war, in 
which the Soviet Union would take eastern Europe and the United States western Europe. 
Bohlen at first disagreed, but within a few months had come to see that the Soviet Union 
was going to have its sphere and ‘is incapable of making a distinction between influence 
and domination, or between a friendly government and a puppet government’.6 
Churchill’s forebodings about Soviet behaviour in eastern Europe increased steadily over 
the spring and summer of 1945. He spoke to the visiting American envoy Joseph E. Davies 
of Soviet ‘gestapo methods’, and mentioned something which Davies (characteristically 
not getting it right) transcribed as a ‘Black Curtain’.7 
Truman initially failed to appreciate Churchill’s apprehensions. American policy coming 
into the Potsdam meetings was to seek to discourage both the British and the Russians 
from dividing Europe into spheres of influence.8 But his face-to-face meeting with Stalin 
quickly changed his mind. By the spring and summer of 1946, the disagreements over 
Germany had led to a process by which Washington had begun to ‘wall off the eastern 
part of Germany from the rest and integrate western Germany into western Europe. 
II 
The power and influence of the Czech Communists increased greatly between 1938 and 
the end of the war, for several reasons: Western behaviour at Munich, and the German 
depiction of Czechoslovakia as a ‘red aircraft carrier’ for the Soviet air force helped 
legitimize both the USSR and the idea of Communism. Russian treatment of Benes was 
more courteous than that of France, and Czechoslovaks were more than kept aware by 
Soviet diplomacy and propaganda of the major role that the Soviet Union was playing in 
the defeat of Nazi Germany. The USSR denounced the Munich Agreement and recognized 
the Czechoslovak govemment-in-exile before Britain did. It was also expected that the 
Soviet Union would support the expulsion of the German and Hungarian minorities in 
Czechoslovakia, envisaged for the post-war period.9 Britain and the United States did so in 
very general terms, but hesitated when they realized the scope of what the government 
intended.10 Soviet support remained firm. In the minds of the Czechs, Britain and France 
were actually associated with the Nazis.11 The Soviet Union was not.12 
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The grand wartime alliance confirmed Benes in the view that he had chosen the right 
policy after 1938 and that he ‘saw farther [...] than others’, that his pro-Soviet view was 
realism. He viewed France as incapable of leading Europe after the war — only Russia, he 
thought, could do that.13 In December 1943 came Benes’s trip to Moscow to negotiate a 
treaty of friendship. There he said to his Communist colleague, Klement Gottwald: ‘You 
will be the strongest element of the new regime. And this element I shall always uphold 
[...]. I shall pursue a policy which will enable you to be a part of every government’.14 As 
Benes reeled off a list of concessions, Gottwald and his colleagues in Moscow listened 
‘with growing disbelief. Lukes attributes Benes’s extreme position and optimism about 
Soviet intentions to what the West had done at Munich.15 Benes was perhaps not totally 
naive; for example, he hoped to dilute the power of the Czechoslovak Communist Party by 
incorporating it into a broader grouping of the left.16 His optimism was also connected to 
the upsurge of leftism in Czechoslovakia during the war, when belief in a post-war 
socialist Czechoslovakia was widespread. Such a Czechoslovakia would perforce be a 
close ally of the Soviet Union. But Benes was wilful and his vision of the post-war world 
was drastically inadequate.17 
It is hard to know how far ahead Stalin was thinking, during this visit in 1943. He ‘might 
have been willing [...] to consider a post-war arrangement which would not place 
Czechoslovakia fully inside the cordon sanitaire of socialist states [...] nevertheless [...] 
having found Benes willing to give more than to take, Stalin must have decided to give his 
blessing to a more complete design and faster timetable’.18 But when Stalin decided to 
move forward faster has not yet been wholly clarified by new documents. In 1944, Zubok 
suggests, the Czechoslovak treaty of the previous year helped Stalin persuade Hitler’s 
former allies to surrender to the Red Army.19 
General Eisenhower’s opposition (on the usual strictly military grounds, and Marshall 
agreed with him) to any effort to push Anglo-American forces dramatically further east 
reveals the degree to which spheres-of-influence thinking was already commonplace on 
the American side. ‘Why should we endanger the life of a single American or Britain 
[sic]\ Marshall wrote to Eisenhower, ‘to capture areas we soon will be handing over to the 
Russians’.20 As the Americans also believed that the Soviet Union would be needed in the 
war against Japan, it was not thought desirable to antagonize the USSR. So it was Marshal 
12 In defending the February 1948 coup, Gottwald chose his words well. ‘We should not accept 
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Konev who liberated Prague in March 1945, despite Churchill’s efforts to change the mind 
of the Americans.21 
By the autumn of 1945, the American government already informally regarded 
Czechoslovakia as ‘under complete Soviet domination’.22 US-Czechoslovak relations had 
already deteriorated because of small irritations, such as the persistent claims of 
Czechoslovak publicists that supplies that had come to Czechoslovakia from UNRRA 
were actually ‘gifts of the Soviet Union’.23 The Americans and British were not reassured 
by Benes’s remarks on freedom of the press: 
Journalism is a public service. Unbridled freedom to publish newspapers must not be re¬ 
established. This is a restriction of personal liberty [...] but one of the factors in public life 
that is subject to today’s socialising trend in journalism. How to harmonise that with freedom 
of speech is another matter, but the freedom of the individual must be subject to the freedom 
of the whole.24 
But both sides were interested in negotiating some kind of economic relationship. Doing so 
had not yet been ruled out by the development of spheres-of-influence thinking. 
One cannot escape the conclusion that neither the Czechoslovak democrats nor the 
Western allies had realistically thought through the consequences of their own policy 
assumptions. But the announcement of the nationalization of ‘key’ industries (with 
promises of compensation) on 28 October was an indication of the future Czechoslovak 
economic policy; despite the promises, only some American claims were satisfied. But the 
Red Army and the US army left (simultaneously) in November 1945. 
The Eighth Party Congress in March 1946 still saw the ‘present period’ as non-socialist, 
but added that the achievements of the national and democratic revolution ought to be 
‘further developed’. ‘The period of May 1945 to the spring of 1947 can only be described 
as a steady progress of the Communist party towards ever-greater authority and 
influence’.25 
In the 26 May 1946 elections, the Communist Party garnered 153 seats in the National 
Assembly and received 38 per cent of all votes cast, but only 30 per cent in Slovakia. 
British and American sources blamed Benes’s weak leadership for the Communist 
success.26 The Soviet Union planned to march some 100,000 troops through the country on 
the eve of the election, but this brazen attempt at intimidation was abandoned on 22 May, 
just four days before the election, when it began to appear seriously counterproductive. 
By the summer of 1946 it was hard for American eyes to see how the Czechoslovak 
coalition government could have followed the Soviet foreign political line more 
assiduously. Secretary of State Byrnes ‘was convinced that the time had come when [the] 
United States’ should endeavour by all fair means to assist [its] friends in Western Europe 
and Italy [...] rather than to continue to extend material aid to those countries of Eastern 
Europe at present engaged in the campaign of vilification of the United States’.27 In 
21 Myant, Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia, p. 52. 
22 Ibid., p. 59. See also Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), ‘The Conference 
of Berlin 1945’, Washington, DC, 1960, vol. 1, p. 831. 
23 See the account in Walter Ullman, The United States in Prague, New York, 1978, pp. 36-38. 
The Prague correspondent of The Times, reported on this problem on 14 May 1946 (‘Czech 
Critics of UNRRA’, p. 4). 
24 ‘The Press in Czechoslovakia’, Manchester Guardian, 11 November 1947, p. 4. For a more 
general view of the restrictions placed by the government on Czechoslovak democratic 
procedures, see Kaplan, The Short March, pp. 39-40. 
25 Kusin, ‘Czechoslovakia’, p. 78. 
26 Ullman, The United States in Prague, p. 55. 
27 Byrnes to Will Clayton, quoted in ibid., p. 43. 
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August Byrnes called a halt to economic assistance (an Export-Import Bank loan) to 
punish the Czechoslovak delegation for applauding Vyshinskii’s Paris Peace Conference 
remark that the United States ‘was enslaving Europe by means of economic handouts’.28 
Let us now turn to how the timing of the coup was determined. When in the spring of 
1947 French and Italian governments were formed without Communist participation, 
Stalin almost certainly counted this as militating against the prudence, perhaps even the 
possibility, of any gradualist approach. Did he then decide to ‘fence off’ his ‘East 
European Domain’?29 It was at least an important moment in the evolution of his thinking. 
Zhdanov and Stalin had been taken completely by surprise when the ‘increasingly isolated’ 
French and Italian Communists decided to leave their governments and go into opposition. 
Stalin’s decision against participation in the Marshall Plan played a crucial role. On 21 
June 1947, he approved a ‘reconnaissance mission’ to Paris, headed by Molotov, who 
arrived on 26 June. But after Molotov was given secret intelligence reports on Anglo- 
American conversations suggesting that the Marshall Plan was intended as ‘a defense of 
Western Europe against a Soviet threat’, at the session of 30 June he broke off the 
conversations and left the meetings, departing Paris on 2 July.30 
Discussions began in Prague about Czechoslovak participation as early as 24 June. By 4 
July, a tentative decision had been made to take part, provided, as Jan Masaryk put the 
matter, ‘its aim was to unite Europe’; he would be opposed to participation ‘if it acted as a 
divisive force’.31 
Continued Soviet indecision allowed Masaryk to issue a statement on 1 July saying that 
he ‘welcomed the opportunity’ offered to participate.32 But that decision did not last long. 
On 5 July, Stalin sent a telegram to Gottwald marked ‘only for the leaders of the 
Communist Party’. It clearly stated that the Soviet Union would not participate in the 
meeting and added that ‘some countries allied to the Soviet Union’ did not want to 
participate either. Even better than non-participation, however, would be to send 
delegations ‘which would demonstrate directly the unacceptability of the Anglo-French 
plan [for participation]’. Then they would leave, taking with them as many delegations as 
possible. But whether there was a communications problem on the Soviet side or not, as 
late as 6 July the Soviet ambassador indicated to Masaryk that a final decision had still not 
been made on participation, and so on 7 July Britain and France were informed that 
Czechoslovakia would come to Paris on 12 July. The Czechoslovaks were told that the 
Poles, too, would participate. The American press deduced that ‘after all there existed a 
certain freedom in Czechoslovakia’s relations to the USSR’.33 
The Czechoslovak delegation, with both Gottwald and Masaryk, left for Moscow on 8 
July, where discussions continued. Just before they left, they received a telegram from 
Stalin indicating that the United States, through the agency of the Marshall Plan, was going 
to infringe upon the sovereignty of small nations; and that its purpose was to create a 
‘West Bloc’, centring on western Germany. On 9 July in Moscow, Stalin first spoke alone 
with Gottwald and then received the entire Czechoslovak delegation. He told them that it 
28 William Taubman, Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War New 
York, 1982, p. 148. 
29 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia’, p. 80. 
30 Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, pp. 104-05. 
31 Masaryk s remarks made at a conference in Oslo, quoted in ibid., p. 76. Upon his return from 
Oslo on 26 June he reiterated and expanded upon this view. See Karel Kratky, 
'Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan’ in Odd Ame Westad, The Soviet 
Union in Eastern Europe 1945-1989, New York 1994 p 12 
32 Ibid., p. 13. ’ ' 
33 Ibid., p. 17. 
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would be ‘intolerable’ if the Czechoslovaks went to Paris. The die was cast.34 In 
December, Masaryk told Bruce Lockhart that T went to Moscow as the Foreign Minister 
of an independent sovereign state; I returned as the lackey of the Soviet government’.35 
Stalin’s view, not entirely incorrect, was that the Marshall Plan meant the United States 
was putting its weight behind the formation of a Western Bloc. Such a Western Bloc 
would have to be countered by an Eastern Bloc — which doomed whatever might remain 
of Gottwald’s hope for a policy of ‘separate paths to socialism’.36 Under such conditions, 
no participation could be contemplated. 
The Secretary of State, Marshall, matter-of-factly accepted that, although the 
Czechoslovaks were eager to come to Paris, the Soviets could prevent them. Lukes argues 
that if the West had in some spirited way defended the right of the Czechoslovaks to 
participate in the Marshall Plan, it might have made a difference in helping the 
Czechoslovaks to try to remain ‘masters in their own house’.37 This would seem doubtful. 
What could a verbal American intervention have achieved? Walter Uliman agrees with 
him, however, that the clear American tendency to write the Czechoslovaks off in the 
summer of 1947 ‘contributed immeasurably to the further and more intense division of 
Europe on ideological grounds’.38 Perhaps Benes agreed. When the new Swedish 
ambassador presented his credentials in June (that is, before the debacle over the Marshall 
Plan), Benes told him that ‘we can preserve ourselves only if a Soviet advance 
[prodvizhenie] is countered by a demonstration of Western force’.39 Neither the American 
ambassador in Prague, Laurence Steinhardt, nor the government in Washington was 
prepared to undertake anything of the kind, however. Steinhardt merely pledged to 
Washington a heightened state of alertness — among other things, for the possibility of a 
coup.40 
The Marshall Plan episode clearly forced a major step in Soviet thinking about the future 
and it had a significant impact on both Czechoslovak public opinion and on opinion in the 
West, although in different directions. The Prague correspondent of The Times reported 
that ‘a large part of [Czechoslovak] public opinion remains more moved by that absence 
[from Paris] than by any event in time of peace since the day of Munich’.41 Clearly public 
opinion in Prague understood that Czechoslovakia was becoming part of the East in a 
polarized world. 
34 There is now a much fuller text of Stalin’s remarks in recently released Soviet documents. For 
the official notes, see T. V. Volokitina et al., Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh 
arkhivakh 1944-1953gg., 2 vols, Moscow and Novosibirsk, 1997, l, pp. 672-75. See also I. I. 
Orlik, ‘Zapad i Praga v fevrale 1948’, Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, 1998, 2 (March-April), p. 5. 
A more general account can be found in Anna Di Biagio, ‘The Marshall Plan and the Founding 
of the Cominform’ in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds). The Soviet Union and Europe in 
the Cold War 1943-1953, New York, 1966. See especially pp. 210-11. 
35 Quoted in Lukes, ‘The Czech Road to Communism’, p. 251. For Moscow’s hesitation, see 
Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, pp. 27-28. Stalin’s contemptuous bullying of the 
Czechoslovaks is revealed in documents quoted by Orlik: see ‘Zapad i Praga’, p. 5. 
36 Kusin, ‘Czechoslovakia’, p. 81. 
37 Lukes, ‘The Czech Road to Communism’, p. 251. 
38 Kusin, ‘Czechoslovakia’, p. 86. See also the pessimistic view of H. Freeman Matthews, the 
head of the European desk at the State Department, in a late July letter to Dean Acheson, then 
under-secretary: Ullman, The United States in Prague, pp. 133-34. 
39 E. Taborsky, President Benes mezi Zapadem a Vychodem, Prague, 1993, p. 252, quoted in 
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40 Kusin, ‘Czechoslovakia’, p. 80. 
41 The Times, 14 July 1947, p. 4. 
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Walter Bedell Smith, the American ambassador in Moscow, thought the episode was a 
turning point. The Soviet decision — after ‘a disquieting hesitation’ — to refuse to 
participate in the Marshall Plan reconciled American officials once and for all to ‘the 
inevitability of a divided Europe’.42 Karel Kratky has recently written that the 
Czechoslovak refusal to participate ‘signalled the political and economic division of 
Europe into two spheres of influence. From mid-1947 on the Soviets seem to have 
methodically strengthened their control in Eastern Europe [...] to gain an extraordinary 
level of control.’43 Most Western observers would call that level of control ‘totalitarian’. 
The establishment of the Cominform too ‘must [...] considered as having induced an 
acceleration of the power struggle in Czechoslovakia, even if the issue did not figure on 
the list of topics then and there’.44 The first meeting, which took place in Szklarska Por^ba 
from 22 to 27 September 1947, saw the emergence of a new policy to respond to the 
Marshall Plan: the promulgation of a policy of two implacably hostile camps in Europe, 
already implied by the Soviets denial of Marshall-Plan participation to the nations of 
Eastern and Central Europe. The Cominform was to ensure that the Soviet nations fought 
the capitalists together, rather than separately.45 
Zubok put the matter even more bluntly: ‘this new policy entailed the transformation of 
five countries into Soviet satellites under the control of Communist regimes cloned from 
the regime in Moscow’. The creation of the Cominform ‘was a sketch of the future Soviet 
regional bloc with its affiliations in Western Europe — not a replica of the dead 
Communist International’.46 
Rudolf Slansky’s report to the Czechoslovak Politburo about the meeting in Poland on 2 
October almost certainly marked a stage in the movement towards ‘extra-parliamentary’ 
methods.47 The Czechoslovak Communist leader could hardly have failed to understand 
what was meant when Luigi Longo in Italy and Jacques Duclos in France were accused of 
‘parliamentary cretinism’ and it is likely that more concrete preparations were undertaken 
for a seizure of power, perhaps to be undertaken during the national elections in May 
1948 48 Thjs was essentially how The Times read the situation. The paper noted that the 
Czech Communist press (Rude pravo) had accused the Czechoslovak Socialists of 
‘defending the interests of millionaires, big landowners, black marketeers and 
collaborators’. If Czech ministers were to be subjected to the sort of harassment visited on 
their Slovak colleagues, the Times correspondent thought the National Front government 
could not continue; the ‘probably inevitable talk of coups d’etat’ would continue. The only 
42 Gaddis, The Long Peace, p. 56. 
43 Kratky, “Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan’, p. 21. The Prague 
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countervailing factor, he opined, was that Czechoslovakia needed Western help to get 
through the winter without starvation.49 
Even circles closer to the Communist Party evinced alarm. On 19 October, the Social 
Democratic Party, just then passing under the control of its right wing, criticized the 
establishment of the Cominform, which it described as an ‘instrument of strife’. 
Czechoslovakia, according to the statement, did not need the kind of democracy ‘brought 
in from abroad’.50 But despite its loss of influence, the Fierlinger wing of the party 
continued its close co-operation with the Communists. Benes, by this time more and more 
alarmed himself, was delighted to take credit for Fierlinger’s loss of influence in a 
conversation with the American ambassador.51 But at this point, the ‘scenario and 
timetable’ for the Communist taking of power was still related to the next parliamentary 
election, which was expected to provide the Communist Party with an absolute majority.52 
Various polls (public and otherwise) in late autumn of 1947 showed the Communists 
actually losing support. The bad harvest made people fear the coming winter and 
predisposed them towards the West, whence assistance might come. And if Communist 
support was eroding, that would be a recommendation for quick action. Fukes and almost 
all recent commentators believe that Communist support was dramatically declining by the 
turn of the year. If so, it made a Communist Machtergreifung truly plausible, especially if 
there were to be no strong Western reaction. Mastny agrees.53 Fukes also stresses the 
stunning defeat of Communist candidates in the university elections in November, 
especially in the Arts Faculty of Prague University, where they had previously been very 
strong. Benes seemed somewhat more open in expressing his hostility to the Communists. 
But the hour was very late. 
Shrewd Western observers were also expecting relatively quick and decisive action. In 
November, George Kennan anticipated that the USSR would probably try to offset its 
difficulties in Western Europe by consolidating in Eastern Europe, by ‘clamp[ing] down 
completely on Czechoslovakia’.54 Kennan did not suggest any American response, nor did 
Steinhardt, when Benes discussed the matter with him on 20 November.55 
‘What Benes and Masaryk seem still not fully to have grasped was clear to the 
Communist Party leadership: that the Western powers had no plans whatsoever to act, 
politically or otherwise, on behalf of the democratic cause in Prague.’56 How could Benes 
and Masaryk have not known that? But at the eleventh hour, one saw again that neither the 
Czechoslovak democrats nor the Americans had looked the future they had together 
created straight in the eye. The American charge in Prague, John Bruins, supported by 
Ambassador Steinhardt, in America for medical treatment, discussed the possibility of 
using a trade treaty as bait to turn Czechoslovak public opinion towards the United States; 
but before anything could come of that, the blow had fallen.57 
49 ‘A Czech Schism: East Versus West Controversy’, The Times, 14 October 1947, p. 3. 
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The Czechoslovak and Soviet Communists had a much better grasp of how little was to 
be expected from the West. By the end of 1947, crucial intelligence reports were not going 
to Masaryk, but to his Communist deputy, Vladimir Clementis. ‘Political circles in Great 
Britain’, according to these reports, ‘express doubts that under the present circumstances 
the anti-Communist elements will prove strong enough to resist outside pressures which 
are, in the opinion of the aforementioned circles, likely to increase.’58 
On 13 January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sent a memo to 
Marshall asking Washington to ‘reinforce the physical barriers which still protect our 
Western civilization’, suggesting that the Marshall Plan needed something more by way of 
physical capability to supplement it.59 The American reply, as George Kennan 
remembered it, ‘was encouraging’,60 and certainly marked a step in the direction of what 
became NATO. 
A little over a week later, an important speech by Bevin (22 January 1948) in the House 
of Commons called for a ‘Western Union’, and incidentally caused Czechoslovak 
intelligence to conclude that Britain had already given up on Czechoslovakia, and that in 
the event of an adventure, Western policy would be to draw together and keep 
Communism from coming any further West. And Czechoslovak intelligence read the 
Americans, based on a top-secret briefing of military attaches in Paris by Lucius Clay and 
others, as believing that they could not take the lead in a new war unless a strong Germany 
had already been built up.61 Rude pravo commented that ‘Mr. Bevin fired the opening 
shots in a global attack on the Soviet Union in which Britain, France, and Germany are to 
be the spearhead.’62 
So from Stalin and Gottwald’s point of view, as Lukes writes: 
There seemed to be little risk involved. British national security concerns were focused on 
efforts to secure the Empire and not central Europe. The United States would have to move 
swiftly to fill the vacuum the British were leaving in Greece and Turkey, and Stalin was not 
inclined to take France seriously. Therefore the lands between Germany and Russia were 
open to Soviet domination. The ZS [Czechoslovak intelligence] reports seemed completely 
plausible: no one in the West was prepared to challenge the imposition of totalitarian rule 
over Czechoslovakia.63 
Lukes has plausibly stated that the imposition of ‘totalitarian rule’ had been ‘accepted as 
a fait accompli’ weeks earlier, citing the visit of the new British ambassador in Prague, 
Pierson John Dixon, to the Minister of Justice, Prokop Drtina. The ambassador told Drtina 
that ‘according to his sources’ the Communist Party was likely in the near future to impose 
a Communist dictatorship as had happened in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere. Dixon did 
not express any particular British view of this, and Drtina alleged himself (presumably 
with considerable irony) to be ‘grateful’ that the British ambassador did not offer any false 
hope!64 
The day before the coup, Marshall notified the United States’ embassy in Paris that a 
seizure of power by the Communists ‘would merely crystallize and confirm for the future 
previous Czech policy’.65 Marshall seemed to confirm that as long as Czechoslovakia was 
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a de facto ally of the Soviet Union, it did not really matter that the country had not yet 
become a dictatorship. What was important was what might happen in the West: the 
democratic cause in Czechoslovakia had been written off. 
Had Stalin known, however, what the effect of the coup would be further west, he might 
well have hesitated: ‘to discredit the Soviet Union even further in the eyes of the West 
European left; [... to] hasten [...] final Congressional passage of the European Recovery 
Program and [to] stimulate [...] the beginnings of discussions that would lead, a year later, 
to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’.66 Characteristic of the American 
response was Senator Arthur Vandenberg’s interview with the Detroit Free Press, in 
which he said that ‘approval of the Marshall Plan was absolutely necessary to forestall the 
greatest “hazard since Pearl Harbor [...] if peace and justice are at the mercy of expanding, 
hostile, totalitarian aggression’”.67 
The Red Army did not have to be used; there was virtually no resistance. There was no 
overt military pressure from the Soviet Union, although troops were insistently offered by 
Stalin and were in fact already on the Hungarian border. Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian 
Zorin, the former Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, was present in a semi-official 
capacity, having arrived ‘late in the evening of February 17’ to threaten Benes if there 
should be ‘disturbances’.68 Gottwald refused the troops, saying he would not need them, 
and later observed that he ‘couldn’t believe it would be so easy’.69 According to Kaplan, 
Stalin himself told Gottwald on 19 February that the time was ‘now’. Gottwald ‘welcomed 
the order’.70 A secret report, delivered to M. A. Suslov in April, was scathingly critical of 
the Czechoslovak Party’s history of wavering and ‘parliamentary illusions’, but indicated 
that the Soviet government considered that the page had now been turned on all that.71 
The coup played an important role in Western Europe, and on the future of US-Soviet 
relations, but the initial Western response was purely verbal. The American, British and 
French ambassadors issued a joint statement of protest, but as far as joint action was 
concerned merely declared their intent to ‘discuss the development of events’.72 The 
American press used the increasingly widespread rhetoric of ‘totalitarianism’ to describe 
what had happened, led by Albion Ross of the New York Times, but there was no 
suggestion of action.73 
Despite the long-held and apparently complacent attitudes of both the Czechoslovak 
government and the Western allies, however, the broader reaction to the coup turned out to 
be as powerful as if it had been a bolt from the blue. Georges Bidault, the French foreign 
minister, soon issued a statement saying that ‘there can be no democracy where you shoot 
or hang your opponent, or where people speak of their truth, their freedom and their 
justice, and not simply of truth, freedom and justice’. Sir Oliver Harvey, the British 
ambassador to Paris, told critics of Western foreign policy that it ‘was really not difficult 
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or heroic to be totalitarian’.74 Herbert Morrison spoke of Munich and so did Georges 
Bidault.75 Secretary of State Marshall told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee behind 
closed doors that ‘by intimidation, fraud and terror, communist regimes have been imposed 
on Hungary and Czechoslovakia.’76 
Public opinion in both France and Italy saw the events in Prague as meaningful for them, 
possibly in the near future.77 The resonance was particularly powerful in France, and also 
in the Scandinavian countries.78 The Finns were encouraged to speed up their negotiations 
for a ‘military assistance treaty’ with the Soviet Union, suggested by Stalin to President 
Paasikivi on 22 February.79 And the Western press tended more and more frequently to 
make the Stalin-Hitler comparison.80 
That the Soviet Union could have regarded the Marshall Plan as a threat, on the other 
hand, seemed far-fetched to most Western observers. ‘No rational being, one would think, 
could see in the Marshall Plan a threat to Russian security.’ That, at any rate, was what the 
highly rational Manchester Guardian thought.81 
The coup suggested to Washington that ‘the Marshall Plan alone would not restore self- 
confidence in Europe; some form of explicit military guarantee would be needed as 
well’.82 The Times echoed this view in an editorial: ‘there could be no stronger argument 
than this new Czechoslovak tragedy for a prompt end to the inhibitions which have held up 
the unqualified collaboration of Britain, France and the other western countries in the joint 
work of European recovery.’83 To which the Manchester Guardian added: ‘it is a terrible 
warning to countries like Italy, Finland, Greece and even France, where there are 
substantial Communist parties’.84 Privately, Bidault was communicating precisely the 
same message to Marshall.85 
But the developments on the Western side did nothing for Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the 
United States could scarcely be said to have even had a policy towards Czechoslovakia. 
The principal historian of American-Czechoslovak relations of the period wrote that 
‘looking back on the last three years, it is next to impossible to discern any systematic or 
long-range approach to or any basic understanding of the problems of Czechoslovakia by 
the U.S. Department of State’.86 
The shock of the coup was heightened by Masaryk’s mysterious death on 10 March, 
after which the American Secretary of State ‘told reporters that Czechoslovakia was living 
under a reign of terror’. A few days later he told an audience at the University of 
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California, Berkeley, that the situation reminded him of the final days before the outbreak 
of the Second World War.87 Debate began precipitously in the US Congress on a 
reinstitution of conscription, and even representatives of the accommodationist left, like 
Max Lemer of the leftist newspaper PM, expressed their doubts about the possibility of 
working with the Soviet Union.88 Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, an opponent of the 
Marshall Plan, declared himself converted. 
George Kennan remembered the heightened anxiety of the next few months as 
constituting a real ‘war scare’.89 The New York Times took the most dire view of what 
might happen in Western Europe. The Italian election of 18 April was described by the 
New York Times as ‘Europe’s most fateful [...] since the war’, because of the possibility 
that Italy might choose to join the Soviet Bloc.90 
Shortly before his death, Masaryk himself is alleged to have said that the end of 
Czechoslovakia was coming, but he expected another eight months. In a remarkable aside 
to his interlocutor he was alleged to have said that he still hoped for intervention from the 
West and wished that ‘war would be here already’.91 
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16 Austria and the Bohemian Lands, 1945-49: 
The Two Paths of Two Neighbours 
Arnold Suppan 
The histories of the Austrian Second Republic and of the Bohemian Lands within the 
Czechoslovak Third Republic differ so greatly that we have to look back to before 1526 to 
find another period when the paths of the Austrian and Czech populations diverged to such 
a comparable degree. Since there has been no thorough study of the sources, and since this 
is still not possible in many cases, this chapter presents a brief outline of the problem. My 
interpretation will, of course, have to be verified. 
The two ‘areas’ began to diverge as early as May 1945 when Nazi rule collapsed, the 
Wehrmacht capitulated and the Gauleiter and the Gestapo disappeared. In the Bohemian 
Lands and the eastern half of Austria from the Muhlviertel to Upper Styria, the Red Army 
had contributed to this development, and the Communist commissars and the NKVD soon 
followed. At this point, different reactions could be observed. While the majority of 
Czechs welcomed the Red Army as liberators from the Germans and as the armed wing of 
their great ‘Slav Brother’, most Austrians did not associate this ‘liberation’ with freedom. 
There had been too much plundering, too many rapes and attacks on the civilian 
population for this to be the case. The flight and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, some 
250,000 of whom came to Austria, also contributed to the division between the Czechs and 
Austrians, as did the ‘return’ of some 20,000 Viennese Czechs in the years 1945-46.1 
However, the most important question with regard to the political system was whether 
Stalin would be able to implement the observation that he had made to Milovan Djilas, that 
the one who conquers a country can also force his own social system upon it. Superficially, 
the early party political system in Czechoslovakia and Austria appeared similar. The 
Kosice Programme of early April 1945 led to the creation of a National Front government 
consisting of Communists, Social Democrats, National Socialists, the (Catholic) People’s 
Party and, in Slovakia, the Democrats, Communists, the Freedom Party and the Labour 
Party. Although the left-wing Social Democrat Zdenek Fierlinger led this government, 
thirteen ministers out of a total of twenty-six were pro-Communist. Since the end of April 
1945, a government led by the right-wing Social Democrat Karl Renner in coalition with 
the newly founded middle-class and agrarian Austrian People’s Party (OVP) and the 
Austrian Communist Party (KPO) had governed Austria. The Socialist Party (SPO) had 
eleven ministers, OVP nine and the KPO seven, including the minister of the interior and 
the head of the police, as well as the minister of education. However, even in the first more 
or less free elections to be held in both states (the former National Socials — some 
500,000 persons were still ‘registered’ — in Austria and the former Agrarian Party in 
Czechoslovakia were excluded), the party political structures developed differently. In the 
first parliamentary election held in Austria on 25 November 1945, the OVP won 50 per 
cent and the SPO 45 per cent, while the KPO won only a disappointing 5 per cent of the 
1 Richard G. Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner, Arnold Suppan and Anna M. Drabek (eds), Nationale 
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vote. In the elections to the National Assembly held on 26 May 1946 in the Bohemian 
Lands, the Communist Party was far more successful, with 40 per cent of the vote, ahead 
of the National Socialists with just under 24 per cent, the People’s Party with 20 per cent 
and the Social Democrats with 15.6 per cent.2 
Since the KPO soon left the government, the ‘Grand Coalition’ party political system 
was created in Austria. This system has often been described as Proporzdemokratie, and 
Ernst Hanisch called it a ‘consensual democracy based on two pillars’ (versaulte 
Demokratie) in reference to the division of the state into two relatively independent 
spheres of influence, which in some respects continue to exist today. Thus the private 
sector, represented by the Chamber of Commerce and the Association of Industrialists, the 
agricultural sector, represented by the Presidial Conference of the Chambers of 
Agriculture, and the civil service employees, represented by the public servants’ union, are 
considered OVP supporters, while the nationalized industries, ‘Waldbrunner’s Kingdom’, 
Austrian Railways, as well as the now non-aligned Austrian Association of Trades Unions 
(OGB) and the Chambers of Labour are considered to be supporters of the SPO. 
Incidentally, the provinces of Vienna and Carinthia had absolute ‘Red’ majorities until the 
end of the 1980s, while absolute ‘Black’ majorities ruled Lower Austria, Upper Austria, 
Salzburg, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg and Styria. The ‘Grand Coalition’ which lasted from 1947 
to 1966 and once more from 1987 to the present day was based on the concentration of 
special interest groups, their co-operation with one another within the system of social 
partnership, the division of power in all important areas of national and social life, as in the 
case of the large banks, and, last but not least, on the custom of filling positions on the 
basis of party allegiance in the executive, in the high courts, and right down to district 
governors (Bezirkshauptleute) and school heads. The universities and the arts were the 
only areas that remained to some degree exempt. The Roman Catholic Church, however, 
retreated from party politics, and increased its overall influence on society as a result.3 
In spite of heavy war losses (247,000 Austrians had fallen in battle and 144,000 civilians 
had been killed, 65,000 of whom were Jews), Austrian society emerged from the 
catastrophe of National Socialist rule (in which a disproportionately large number of 
Austrians played a leading role, including seven Gauleiter, thirteen high ranking SS and 
police figures and 207 Wehrmacht generals), as a more homogenous society than it had 
been before 1938. This partly derived from the levelling process which had taken place 
since 1938 and which resulted in the murder or exile of parts of the landowning 
aristocracy, the entire Jewish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia and parts of the Catholic 
bourgeoisie and educated middle classes. On the other hand, the majority of the population 
had been put to work in a modem war economy. Since the targeted allied bombing attacks 
on Austria’s industrial towns and railway junctions in the summer of 1943 an ‘emergency 
society’ had developed which had then closed ranks even more tightly under the impact of 
defeat and liberation, or at least Allied occupation. This effect was increased by the pillage 
and rape in eastern Austria, and in spite of the existence of 1.6 million displaced persons in 
the summer of 1945 — some half a million of whom, particularly Sudeten Germans and 
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Volksdeutsche, remained in Austria. As the Soviet model of Society was hopelessly 
discredited as a result of the violence committed by the Red Army on citizens and 
property, the only alternative after 1945 was the Western community of values. Naturally, 
the Allies first demanded a de-Nazification process that led to 170,000 dismissals, 100,000 
fines and forty-three death sentences being imposed by the courts. However, these 
measures did not lead to public discussion about the National Socialist period. 
Nevertheless, leading Austrian politicians and civil servants could assert one moral claim 
vis-a-vis the Allies: they had been dismissed themselves in 1934 or 1938 and, in many 
cases, had spent several years in concentration camps, which had led to the development of 
the ‘spirit of the camps’ (Geist der Lagerstrasse). This made a rapid reconstruction of state 
structures possible.4 
Economic reconstruction initially proceeded more slowly, although the industrial 
structures in western and south-eastern Austria had improved during the Second World 
War as a result of relocations from Germany. Actual reconstruction only began with the 
nationalization of seventy companies and, in addition, three major banks which had been 
declared ‘German property’ and which the Potsdam Conference had planned as Austria’s 
share of compensation, and particularly with Austria’s inclusion in the Marshall Plan 
programme in the summer of 1947. On the one hand, the USSR incorporated 300 firms 
with 40,000 workers in its own USIA administration programme, including the valuable 
oil and natural gas fields in the Marchfeld area; on the other hand, the European Recovery 
Programme pumped $E6 billion into Austrian reconstruction, particularly in the Western 
zones of occupation. Five price and wage agreements between the government and ‘social 
partners’ ensured social stability, which was only temporarily disturbed by the 
Communist-led strike of October 1950. It is not yet clear whether political calculations on 
the part of Moscow played a role here. The start of the Korean War makes this appear 
unlikely; similar actions in East Central Europe since 1945, however, make it seem more 
probable. The enormous speed of reconstruction is illustrated by the fact that GDP was 
already higher in 1950 than in 1937 and 1913. There is no doubt that Austrian society had 
been taken over by unparalleled enthusiasm to work and increase its prosperity after 1947. 
This was true of all groups within an increasingly open Austrian society, from the new 
entrepreneurs to the new skilled workers, from the bureaucracy, which was now better 
trained, to the modernized school system, and even to higher education. Thus previous 
social or religious divisions disappeared. At the same time, young people in the 1950s 
became open to the new mass culture imported from America.5 
Austria’s situation with regard to foreign affairs, naturally enough, remained a problem. 
Although on 20 June 1949 the Allies had agreed on the Austrian borders of 1937, Austria 
was still faced with the threat of becoming a football between the two superpowers at the 
start of the Cold War. Strategically, the Soviet Union wanted to maintain a foothold in 
eastern Austria, while the USA wanted to control the route between Italy and Germany in 
the west. Thus solving the German question was of prime importance for both powers, 
whereby Stalin considered neutralizing Germany and Austria to strengthen the cordon 
sanitaire around the Soviet Union in East Central Europe. One of the main factors in this 
consideration was Stalin’s fear that Germany might regain its strength and achieve a 
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position where it would be able to take revenge. However, as far as Eisenhower was 
concerned, neutrality was more like an undermining of Western positions that offered the 
Soviets the possibility of gradual infiltration. At the beginning of 1954 the Soviet Union 
was not yet willing to withdraw the whole Red Army. It was only with the fall of 
Malenkov in January 1955 that Nikita Khrushchev became the undisputed leader in the 
Kremlin who could pursue a more open foreign policy. Therefore, when Chancellor Raab 
and Deputy Chancellor Scharf, foreign minister Leopold Figl and his deputy Kreisky went 
to Moscow in April 1955, permanent neutrality on the Swiss model became a key idea. 
Raab accepted the idea immediately — not least because of information that he had 
received from his brother in Switzerland — and Scharf agreed after being put under 
pressure by Kreisky. The USA had already demanded that neutrality must be both 
voluntary and armed, a fact often forgotten in later discussions. At any rate, the State 
Treaty of 15 May 1955 finally set the seal on Austria’s freedom and the withdrawal of all 
foreign troops, which until 1989 was a rare event in the world. However, since Figl was 
still able to negotiate away any responsibility on Austria’s part for the Second World War, 
the theory that Austria had been a victim was prolonged and only officially corrected after 
the Waldheim Affair in 1986.6 
In comparison to this rather straightforward Austrian success story, Czech political and 
social history after 1945 suffered at least three major breaches: 1948, 1968 and 1989. In 
the beginning, the Czechoslovak Republic was in a favourable position compared to other 
European states with regard to both immediate war losses and German property. However, 
the negative consequences of the murder of 77,000 Bohemian and Moravian Jews by the 
Germans and the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans by the Czechs 
themselves soon had a negative effect on Czech society. These effects were particularly 
noticeable in the greatly diminished number of entrepreneurs, particularly in the outlying 
border districts, which were largely abandoned and some of which then went into serious 
decline. On the other hand, the Communist Party used this ‘bourgeois haemorrhage’ 
quickly to increase Party membership and to strengthen its hold on social affairs. The new 
Communist minister president who took power after the elections in May 1946, Klement 
Gottwald, skilfully set about expanding his power base in both the executive and the 
propaganda and censorship apparatus, without President Benes and the conservative 
ministers noticing very much until the autumn of 1947. Nevertheless, the new government 
voted in favour of accepting the Marshall Plan at the beginning of July 1947. However, 
Moscow immediately signalled that this Western invitation should be rejected. In Moscow, 
the foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, heard threats of a second Munich because, after the 
French Communists had left the government of France, the situation was now ripening for 
confrontation with the West. And the chief Soviet ideologist Zhdanov set a more 
aggressive course for the sister parties in September 1947 with the creation of Cominform. 
The Czechoslovak Communist Party now started falsely ‘exposing’ political opponents as 
‘collaborators’ and fuelled their internal disagreements.7 
When opinion polls taken in January 1948 indicated that the Communists could now 
only expect 25 per cent support, the Party went on the offensive. A special department was 
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set up to infiltrate other parties and the minister of the interior, Vaclav Nosek, made 
personnel changes in the police corps. When the non-Communist ministers demanded that 
these measures be withdrawn on 12 February 1948, the Communists began to mobilize the 
Communist-controlled trades unions and other mass organizations. When, on 20 February, 
armed people’s militias were permitted, twelve non-Communist ministers resigned. Their 
intention was to force the creation of a new government without Communist participation. 
However, the demonstrations increased, openly supported by the Minister of Defence, 
General Ludvik Svoboda. The Soviet deputy foreign minister, Valerian Zorin, 
ostentatiously promised supplies of wheat, but also promised to prevent Western 
intervention. For this purpose, Red Army units went into readiness on the border. Thus, on 
25 February 1948, President Benes was forced to accept the new list of ministers presented 
by Gottwald. However, on 10 March Jan Masaryk was found dead under the window of 
his office in the Czemin Palais. The death looked like suicide, but today many still 
speculate that it was political murder. Without a doubt, the Communist take-over was 
cleverly arranged and the non-Communist ministers were no match for Communist 
deviousness. Moscow wanted to incorporate Prague into its sphere of influence, and 
Bohemia and Moravia were supposed to serve as socialist models for other sister parties — 
and for anti-colonial movements outside Europe. However, while Milovan Djilas (who 
travelled through Czechoslovakia in 1946) recognized that the wealth that still remained 
was not a fruit of a socialist economy, the majority of delegations who followed certainly 
did not recognize that.8 
The take-over in Prague shocked the government in Vienna as well as the entire Western 
world. The Arbeiter Zeitung, in particular, clearly recognized the decisive step taken away 
from democratic socialism to a Communist dictatorship. The fact that some 100,000 
people left Czechoslovakia, including the Czechs who emigrated in 1945-46, that the 
uniform list of the National Front had more than 89 per cent of the votes at the end of May 
1948, and that Benes had resigned on 6 June, before the signing of the Communist 
constitution, confirmed that external observers had judged the situation correctly. A 
nationalization law and other measures in June 1948 introduced the collectivization of 
agricultural land, as well as state control over the whole economy, education and the legal 
system; it also encouraged persecution of the Roman Catholic Church. In autumn 1948 the 
first Five-Year Plan was announced. At Stalin’s insistence, representatives of the USSR, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria created the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance on 25 January 1949. Thus began the economic incorporation of 
Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of influence.9 
A radical restructuring of Czech society and its structures of ownership, comparable to 
the restructuring after 1620, now also started to take place. Communist Party officials who, 
in many cases, had been trained in Moscow, now appeared as new elites accompanied by 
the left-wing intellectuals of the inter-war years and the ‘generation of Totaleinsatz \ those 
bom between 1921 and 1928 who had become socially and nationally radicalized by the 
negative experiences of occupation and being sent into the Reich as forced labourers. The 
first of the great show trials, this time against non-Communist politicians and intellectuals, 
took place between 31 May and 8 June 1950 to combat enemies of the state. Among those 
executed as a result were the National Social feminist functionary Milada Horakova and 
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the historian Zavis Kalandra. It was more difficult to explain away the former General 
Secretary of the Communist party, Rudolf Slansky, and the former foreign minister, Vlado 
dementis, at the end of November 1952, as trials against Trotskyists, Zionists, ‘bourgeois 
nationalists’ and Titoists. However, Stalin and the NKVD directed affairs from behind the 
scene.10 
In conclusion, I should like to emphasize three fundamental changes that took place 
within Austrian and Czech society which mark a clear contrast between the period after 
1945 and earlier periods. 
(1) As a result of the murder of one third of Austrian Jews and the majority of 
Bohemian-Moravian Jews by the Germans, as well as the expulsion of most of the other 
Jews, the Jewish middle class and the Jewish intelligentsia, who had played a major role in 
shaping economic, cultural and intellectual life, also disappeared from Prague and Vienna. 
Therefore, in these areas of social life, a strong trend towards bohemicization and 
Austrianism can be observed after 1945. 
(2) The flight and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, some 250,000 of whom ended up 
in Austria, increased this trend towards national homogenization. While this economically 
and culturally important population group was lost for the Bohemian Lands, it 
strengthened the Austrian population in the will to rebuild their country. In addition, 
another 250,000 German reftigees also came to Austria from Hungary and Yugoslavia. 
(3) This development, as well as other violent interventions during the Second World 
War (concentration camps, emigration, military service, resistance, executions and so 
forth) also changed the structure of the elites in Austria and the Bohemian Lands. 
Although the vast majority of the 1934 and 1938 political and administrative elites in 
Austria had returned, the academic and cultural elites had undergone massive changes. The 
economic elite had also suffered considerable diminution. 
Without a doubt, there was less continuity in the Bohemian Lands with regard to the 
political elite, since not all of the political actors of 1938 had survived the war or returned 
from exile. On the other hand, the Communist elite that had been trained in Moscow had 
returned to the country. However, the elites in the administration, the army and parts of the 
cultural sphere demonstrated an ability to adapt to the new regime. The economic elite was 
shattered, since, apart from the murdered Jews and the Germans who had been expelled, 
many investment leaders emigrated, industry and agriculture were extensively 
nationalized, and the Communist Party regime resulted in a high degree of social 
levelling.11 
By 1950 Austria was on its way to becoming a thinking Western economy, something it 
had never managed to become before the Second World War, where the once 
extraordinarily prosperous Czechoslovakia was well on its way to becoming (save the blip 
of 1968-69) one of the loyalest allies of the Soviets. In the year of Stalin’s death, the 
works of T. G. Masaryk and Benes were banned from bookshops and public libraries. 
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17 Chiliastic Factors in Post-war Czech 
Literature and the World of Jan Karafiat’s 
Little Beetles 
Vladimir Macura 
In 1947, the State Publishing House in Prague published the perhaps best-loved Czech 
book for children, Broucci (Little Beetles, 1876), by Jan Karafiat (1846-1929). This fact is 
hardly surprising: since its first publication it had seen numerous new impressions. But the 
1947 edition represented an unusual venture: the book was a Russian translation under the 
title Svetliachki: Skazka dlia malen'kich i bol'shikh detei. The text was translated by Amost 
Kolman and Ekaterina Kontsevaia and the author of the Preface was the cultural ideologue 
Zdenek Nejedly, at that time Minister of Labour and Social Security in Klement 
Gottwald’s cabinet. The Communist minister’s commendatory Preface was a clear signal 
of the importance of this publishing project. Of course, the book was intended as an aid to 
Russian-language learning. At the same time, however, it was much more than a practical 
manual. Moreover, it was everything but a belated ceremonial publication to mark the one- 
hundredth anniversary of the author’s birth. By no means could it be optimistically 
interpreted as a product of the abolition of Protectorate censorship, a sign of new times, 
when a child will ‘finally able to read freely, not what was imposed upon him or her as it 
was in the time of Hitlerite regime’, as Zdenek Nejedly puts it.1 
Svetliachki is not a straightforward Russian version of a famous Czech book for 
children; it is a cunning manipulation of it, a battle with its author’s attitudes and opinions. 
The book, written by a Calvinist priest, is marked by an expressly Christian moral 
message. His moral principles define all the components of the book: the plot, which is not 
based on the physical action, but submits humbly to the universal rhythm of birth and 
dying; the characters — the Tittle beetles’ (or more precisely, the fire-flies), who make for 
an allegory of life accepted as harmonious service to God; the narration marked by its 
formative, educative character. It presents a story of education and initiation into life 
through fulfilling duties to God and His Providence. 
Zden£k Nejedly’s Preface already destroys the original allegorical structure: Karafiat’s 
fire-flies are distanced from Christian symbolism and turned back to the pre-Christian 
folklore repertory as a supposed object of Ancient Slav worship. Nejedly makes the 
summer night the main scene of the children’s tale: in this way, the important position of 
the dark hibernal imagery, recalling the temporal limitations of earthly life in Karafiat’s 
work, is ostentatiously suppressed. The consistent Christian pathos of Karafiat’s text is 
completely re-evaluated by means of references to the Unitas Fratrum as the heirs of 
revolutionary Hussitism (‘the heirs of John Huss and the Czech Hussites, who as early as 
in the fifteenth century began their struggle for the better life against the feudal 
oppressors’).2 Zdenek Nejedly tries to explain the systematic changes in the text of the 
translation and interprets them as attempts at replacing the ‘evangelical aspect’ of the book 
by the ‘universal aspect’ of humanity. At the same time, he declares that all the changes 
leave the real meaning of the work untouched. 
1 Zdenek Nejedly’s preface to la. Karafiat, Svetliachi: Skazka dlia malen'kich i bol'shikh detei, 
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The opposite is true: the true meaning of the children’s book was radically deformed in 
the Russian translation. At the very beginning, the dedication of the book to Jane 
Dennistoun Buchanan of Auchentorlie is omitted. Jane Buchanan was Karafiat’s adviser 
and supporter, whom he met in Edinburgh in 1871, when he was there as a guest of the 
Free Church. This omission impairs the personal framework of the work; in a sense, the 
book has been ‘expropriated’ from its author. But the omission of any allusions to the 
universal order of God so typical of Karafiat’s work is even more destructive. The prayer, 
one of the leitmotivs of Karafiat’s book, is systematically replaced with a ‘song’; instead 
of the ritual praying in the original we find a ‘merry' singing’ in the translation: ‘Don’t you 
know what Daddy instructed you to do and why we pray every morning?’3 becomes ‘Don’t 
you know what Daddy instructed you to do? Have you forgotten the song we sing every 
morning?’4 
‘Godfather’ and ‘godmother’ (kmotncek and kmotricka), as notions connected with the 
rite of admitting a person into the Christian Church {krestnyi otets, krestnaia mat'), were 
replaced with the appellations diadiushka, tetushka). An important rite in the Church, 
deprived of prayers and sermons, has been turned into a monstrous and incomprehensible 
scene with singing, and the church is replaced with a ‘neutral’ school episode: ‘what was 
the sermon today about?’ (Cz, p. 52) becomes ‘what did they explain to you today in 
school?’ (R, p. 50). The logical construction of the original episode, where Pavel, a young 
priest giving his first sermon, talks about his wrongdoing in childhood, while his mother 
and sister are sitting in the last pew of the church, is entirely deformed. The presence of 
mother and sister at the school desk makes no sense in the Russian version. 
Above all, it is God who is ousted from the text. The word ‘God’ is systematically 
omitted (‘God will make you understand!’ [Cz, p. 46] becomes ‘You will understand some 
time’ [R, p. 46]); God is transformed into a simple salutation (‘God be with us and evil 
gone’ [Cz, p. 17] becomes ‘Good luck and may evil away’ [R, p. 19]). God can be replaced 
with a chaotic force of coincidence: ‘God cares about all obedient bugs and nothing nasty 
can happen to them, and if something happens nevertheless, it is all right’ [Cz, p. 28] 
becomes ‘everybody cares about the good bugs; nothing nasty can happen to them, and if 
something happens nevertheless, it does not matter!’ (R, p. 28). Sometimes — and this 
instance is particularly interesting — God is substituted by the terrestrial community of all 
the beetles and their solidarity: ‘Daddy interrupted them: “Do you really think, Beetleboos, 
that Joannie-Fly is alone there? No, God is there with her!”’ (Cz, pp. 27-28) becomes 
‘Daddy interrupted them: “Do you really think, Beetleboos, that Joannie-Fly is alone 
there? No, all the beetles are around her!”’ (R, p. 28). 
What is more, the text of the translation is divided into chapters — their added titles 
introduce into Karafiat’s narrative a new optimistic mood rooted not in Karafiat’s certainty 
of the endless pleasure of the final fusion with God’s plans, but only in the hectic 
swarming community of the microcosm of insects deprived of any higher, spiritual sense: 
‘Dreams and Plans under Snow’; ‘It Is Getting Better’; ‘A Happy Family’; ‘Happiness, 
Despite Hard Trials’; and ‘Everything Turns Out Well’. The sense of Karafiat’s narrative 
is thoroughly reformulated in this way: the consistent architecture of the author’s universe, 
where the microcosm also submits to the same laws of God, has been completely 
destroyed in the Russian version. The final triumph of Death, when all the beetles, the 
heroes of the book, die in winter, in a logical climax of Karafiat’s fiction — the motif of 
humble acceptance of one’s earthly fate reaches its culmination here: 
3 Jan Karafiat, Bruccipro male i velike deti, Prague, n.d. [1902], p. 11 (original hereafter referred 
to as Cz with page numbers in the text). 
4 Karafiat, Svetliachi, p. 14 (translation hereafter referred to as R with page numbers in text). 
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And winter came. Oh, it was a bad, cruel winter. All brooks were frozen to the bottom; birds 
were falling from the skies; oh, such a frost, a sparkling frost. And how is it with the beetles 
over there under the juniper, can they stand it? No matter. If they freeze to death, they die 
humbly. — And then spring returns. Everything, everything was in bloom, every-everything, 
and over there, under the juniper, twelve daisies were blooming, nine white as milk, and the 
other three flowers had red, blood-red edges. They are blooming there still now. (Cz, p. 120) 
An ending of this type would be impossible in the Russian version, which runs: 
And winter came. Oh, it was a bad, cruel winter. All brooks were frozen to the bottom; birds 
were falling down during their flight; oh, such a frost, a sparkling frost. And what about the 
beetles over there under the juniper, can they stand it? They will. Spring will come soon. 
Everything, everything will be in bloom, every-everything. And everything will be good. (R, 
p. 112) 
The heroes of the Russian version of Karafiat’s children book do not die, they live through 
the winter and the narrative ends not with a nostalgic scene of twelve daisies as an emblem 
of death (as it is in the original text) but, on the contrary, with an apotheosis of the coming 
eternal spring. 
The mechanism of the transcription of the Christian children’s book into a new shape is 
worth attention. In a pure form, the transcription contains, perhaps, all the features of the 
‘new culture’ of the post-Second World War era. Above all, it constitutes a denial of the 
‘old world’. The children’s book, generally accepted as a classic of the past, has been 
definitively re-coded: all the allusions to religion or to God, as the final point of 
intersection of all its narrative lines, have been pedantically removed. All the corrections, 
including the deletion of the noble addressee of Karafiat’s work, aim to ignore the whole 
‘world past’, the pre-war world. The spring, in Karafiat’s book only one of the returning 
seasons of a year over the period of time allotted by God to all living creatures, becomes in 
the Russian version a final stage of life, the era of everlasting and, of course, earthly 
happiness. The community of beetles, and, through this allegory, the human community 
itself, ‘the collective’ (‘all of us’), ‘the human masses’, become the supreme value, 
assuming God’s position in the destroyed world of Karafiat. Even the Russian language of 
the book is symptomatic: its use is not only a means of teaching a foreign language; 
Russian becomes one of the values aggressively intruding into the old scheme of values of 
Karafiat’s world. It embodies ideology instead of simply being language. 
This peripheral text is remarkably compatible with the processes taking place in Czech 
culture after the Second World War. Euphoria at the end of the war, together with the 
conviction that any return to the pre-war regime (suspected of being the cause of the 
collapse of Czechoslovakia) could be disastrous, helped to strengthen the chiliastic 
tendencies that had been accumulating in Czech culture for years. The most traditional 
components of these tendencies were the Revivalist ideas about the special Slav mission, 
about Slavdom as the power of the future, and left-wing and Marxist visions of the new 
world of justice to come. Socialist theories conventionally resulted in utopian models: they 
presupposed a final vision of a happy future as the last stage of human history. The official 
project of ‘scientific socialism’ was no exception to the rule, although it declared its 
radical abandonment of pre-Marxian socialist conceptions, labelling them ‘utopian 
socialism’. Despite its attempt to utilize some rational construction, to operate with 
‘logical’ systems of economic data, transparent and simple philosophy or statistics, the 
conception of the future, conveyed by an apparently rational structure, remained after all 
mythological and chiliastic. Utopia and science were supposed to fuse (‘Let Utopia drink 
from science’s fountains’, wrote Pujmanova).5 
5 Marie Pujmanova, Miliony holubicek, Prague, 1950, p. 51. 
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The ‘future happy age’ was perceived as something that had to come, something 
predicted and inevitable.6 The war, just finished, played the role of an initiator: it was 
viewed as the last struggle of the Apocalypse opening the door to the ‘new world’. In his 
Pet minutza mestem (Five Minutes Beyond the Town, 1940), the individual manifestations 
of Nezval’s scepticism towards modem civilization are connected into a universal system. 
His book of verse is an attempt at a final reckoning — with modem culture, with the 
author himself, with the status of the modem poet and, in this way, with his own style and 
poetics. On all levels of this absolute scepticism, the need of a new order is declared. Its 
germs are found in natural human values represented by idyllic emblems of village life, 
and (in opposition to the exclusive imagery of modem poetry) by the traditional 
symbolism of the National Revival. The ‘old world’ is presented as undermined by an 
inner crisis, afflicted by a catastrophe. The text of the poem abounds in warning symbols 
(the swarm of locusts, the dark wedding guest, the wolf and so on). It is a world 
irretrievably lost in the past. Through bizarre fragments of its former wholeness one can 
see new signals of the future universe: in the motif of a ‘new thirst’ (nova zizeh), for 
example: ‘Wailing tears pride lust self-tormenting/we have dmnk these drinks 
out/Poisoned by them we have a new thirst’7 The end of the old world is viewed here as 
something inevitable, not as the result of aggression from outside, but rather as a product 
of the crisis of Western civilization itself. Even the same poet’s stylization of the 
September 1938 days into an ‘historical picture’, constructed of archaic properties, was not 
dictated by the inertia of the norms and preferences of his recently abandoned Surrealist 
doctrine. More probably it was predefined by the interpretation of those norms, as well as 
those of the Decadent verse he cites, as definitely lost with the ruins of the old world. The 
motif of time, at the end of Nezval’s Historical Picture,8 does not promise a resurrection of 
the past: its phantom scenery is a constituent part of the message declaring the decline of 
the age. Bidding farewell to the old world means for Nezval bidding farewell to himself as 
a former poet of the Avant-garde: the status of modem poetry seems to him to be shattered; 
the lyrical ‘narrator’ of these poems, locating himself at the crossroads between the world 
of the past and the world of the future, explicitly abandons Modernism (‘Farewell, Pelican, 
you contorted bird [...]. For a long time now I have not liked the exotic’).9 
As early as the beginning of the 1940s, Nezval’s verse formulates the conflict that was to 
be extremely topical after the war. Frantisek Hrubin in Jobova noc (The Night of Job, 
1945) defines this conflict clearly as a fight between ‘the old land’ and ‘the new land’ and, 
following Nezval, connects it with the quest for a meaning and a message for poetry. The 
old land is characterized as ‘sickly’, ‘in decay’, driving everyone to live in loneliness. A 
representative of the ‘old land’, a ‘Decadent poet’, Job, a prototype of the modem poet, is 
as ‘sickly’ as the old land itself; ‘he is distilling poisons of loneliness’10 and ignores the 
suffering of the ‘crowds’. ‘He does not want to hear [their voices], this deaf poet Job’11. 
The ‘old land’ is confronted with a ‘new land’ clearly associated with Russia. This 
confrontation is supported by the opposition of Verlaine, mentioned in the description of 
the ‘old land’, and allusions to poetry of the Russian revolutionary poet Vladimir 
6 See Vladimir Macura, St’astny vek, Prague, 1992. 
7 Vitezslav Nezval, Pet minut za mestem, Prague, 1940, p. 105. 
8 Nezval’s Historicky obraz was first published as a poem in two cantos in 1939; its refrain and 
much imagery are based on the Decadent Karel Hlavacek’s Mstiva kantilena (Cantilena of 
Revenge, 1898). A new edition, with a third canto proclaiming Stalinist values, and lacking the 
Decadent intertext, was published in 1945. 
9 Nezval, Pet minut za mestem, pp. 105 and 108. 
10 Frantisek Hrubin, Jobova noc, Prague, 1945, p. 15. 
11 Ibid., p. 20. 
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Maiakovskii in the style of Hrubin’s verse, as a part of the picture of the ‘new land’. The 
loneliness of a Decadent poet (Job, Verlaine), is contrasted with the revolutionary poet, 
who is not only a speaker for the masses, but even their incarnation (‘And all of them, all, 
are poets/called Maiakovskii’.12 The Second World War was interpreted explicitly as the 
culmination of a long fight between the old and new worlds and thus as an immediate and 
logical continuation of the Russian Revolution of 1917.13 
The vision of the new world was closely connected with the idea of a ‘new man’: Nezval 
tries to treat this notion by neglecting the attributes of the ‘modem poet’: the ‘new man’ 
should be ‘unsophisticated’, ‘simple’, ‘ordinary’, belonging to all the others. All those 
motifs are to be found in Hrubin’s Jobova noc. Hrubin projects his ideal of the ‘new man’ 
onto the contrasting background of the ‘Decadent poet’. But this confrontation is 
connected in his poetry with a definite political conclusion — the apotheosis of Soviet 
man. 
In the same way, the search for the ‘new man’ is accented in Vladimir Holan’s poetry of 
1945. In his Panychida (The Memorial Ceremony), the poet asks a rhetorical question: 
‘Who will change the phantoms back into human beings?’. He declares the necessity of 
‘reaching the man,/whom we are approaching only through irony’.14 He expects to find 
this new man among ‘the poor’: there is no doubt that the postman with a peony or the 
‘bright tram-driver’ ‘salting his slice of bread’ in the finale of Panychida does not belong 
to phantoms.15 Projected onto the map of the world, this fact indicates the same orientation 
towards the east, towards Soviet Russia, as was the case in Hrubin. The portraits of the 
Soviet soldiers in Holan’s cycle Rudoarmejci (The Red Army Soldiers, 1945) constitute 
something like visions of the passage to this dreamed-of new world where nothing is left 
of the moments of crisis in modem culture. 
It is necessary to repeat that these sentiments were initiated by the experience of war and 
the collapse of the Czechoslovak state, as well as by the experience of the failure of 
Western civilization. Regardless of the formal restoration of Czechoslovakia, the past 
seemed to be unrestored. The only possible point of departure seemed to be beginning 
from zero. All this helped to create a suitable ‘messianic atmosphere’.16 However, the 
chiliastic moment of the ‘new empire’s’ coming was not accepted at this time as a 
specifically Czech problem; in the Bohemian Lands we do not meet any ‘Czech chiliasm’ 
or ‘Czech messianism’ such as existed in the nineteenth century. The messianic gesture 
was restricted to affiliation to foreign, Soviet, inspiration. The Soviet system, decorated by 
its ‘glorious victories’ in the war, seemed to offer a pre-fabricated variant of social 
development. After the war, many intellectuals in the Bohemian Lands were speaking of 
the necessity of an orientation towards socialism according to the Soviet model. The theme 
of ‘the East’, associated with Russia, is more or less generally bound to a picture of the 
rising sun as a metaphor of a new day, and to a symbol of the star over Bethlehem under 
which the Messiah was bom (‘Oh east of five-pointed stars’).17 The dreamed-of new world 
finds in Russia its true model. ‘Only socialism’, writes Jiff Weil, ‘is able to show mankind 
12 Ibid., p. 23. 
13 The notion that the Second World War was the culmination of the October Revolution was not 
restricted to Communist minds. It forms a recurrent motif of, for example, Edvard Benes’s 
Demokracie dries a zitra, London, n.d. [1942], a Tree [szc] translation’, "taking into 
consideration the Soviet Union’s entry into the war’, of the work originally published in 
English, Eduard Benes, Democracy Today and Tomorrow, London, 1939. 
14 Vladimir Holan, Panychida [1945] in Sebrane spisy, Prague, 8 vols, vi, 1976, pp. 159 and 167. 
15 Ibid., p. 177. 
16 See J. Ujejski, Dzieje polskiego mesjanizmu, Lemberg, 1931, p. 23. 
17 Frantisek Halas, Barikada, Prague, 1945, unpaginated. 
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a way from the stage of animality to the stage of humanity’.18 Here socialism means 
unequivocally socialism of the Soviet type. The art of ‘ivory towers’ is generally ignored 
and dozens of intellectuals call for a new, ‘people’s’, style. Journalists as well as writers 
search for a ‘new man’. ‘Every regime forms new faces’, comments Kulturnlpolitika on 
photographs of young men and women in 1945. The journal accepts as typical for the post¬ 
war times only faces ‘with open windows, communicating with the world outside, free of 
the cadaverous underworld of spirit’, faces which are ‘good material and a great 
responsibility for those who are going to work on it’.19 This pragmatic formulation will be 
typical for the years after the Communist coup in February 1948, but we find them very 
often even in the period immediately after 1945 — and not only in the Communist press. 
The ideal of the new man is the ideal of a man who is not individualized, who is defined 
exclusively by his adherence to a broader community, to a ‘collective’ (‘Me, nameless 
me,/me, a soldier of my people,/help me, Red Army,/help me, hear my misery’).20. In 
those times, the de-personalized T/me’ seemed to be stronger, seemed not to be dissolved 
in the loneliness of egotism as it had been in the ‘old world’: ‘Me, nameless me/I did not 
cry in vain/the Red Army/is now flying towards my voice [to relieve my misery]’.21 
In Czech culture after the Second World War, long before the Communist coup, utopian 
elements of this kind (a binary interpretation of social reality, a chiliastic vision of 
destruction of the old world, belief in the speedy advent of the new era, the ideal of a ‘new 
man’, a mythicizing of the Soviet Union and Stalin himself as the new Messiah and so 
forth) became dominant. These chiliastic tendencies often clashed with attitudes that would 
not accept this version of Utopia. At first, it was Catholic poetry that expressed a fervent 
opposition to this earth-bound chiliasm — it is telling that one of the components of the 
lyrical repertory of the Catholic poets was the symbol ‘old land’ (.stara zeme), an 
embodiment of traditional, archetypal values connected with tradition — Christian belief, 
God (Jan Zahradnicek, Stara zeme [The Old Land, 1946]). Strictly speaking, this fight was 
decided before it began: in the prevailing messianic atmosphere Catholic, or spiritual, 
poetry was viewed as a fading expression of the old, decadent world. 
After February 1948, the chiliastic euphoria engulfed all official culture in 
Czechoslovakia.22. The adored ‘happy age’, viewed simultaneously, almost 
schizophrenically, both as ‘coming’ and as already ‘reached’, was linked with the motif of 
immortality (‘After all, we shall reach our hands/into the most distant future/and we shall 
see that happy world/with the eyes of our grandsons’;23 ‘we have gained the right to live 
after death’.24 Death was cancelled in the ‘new world’: the new world was presented as the 
realm of life, happiness and joy. Everything was new in this empire: ‘new human beings’, 
‘new literature’, ‘new language’ (symptomatically, Ivan Skala speaks in almost Orwellian 
words of the ‘Czech newspeak of happiness [novocestina stestf]\25 
The translation of Karafiat’s Broucci into Russian, this new epoch’s prestigious language 
(which Ivan Skala’s ‘Czech newspeak’ wants to equal), in a rudimentary form, but 
distinctly, exposed what was to become taboo for this awaited new world. However, the 
expunging of the topic of death and dying, of religious belief, humility and God, as well as 
18 Jin Weil, ‘Byt clovekem’, Kulturnipolitika, 1, 1945, p. 16. 
19 [Anon.], ‘Lidska tvar’, Kulturni politika, 1, 1945, p. 16. 
20 Frantisek Hrubin, Chleb s oceli, Prague, 1945, p. 42. 
21 Ibid., p. 44. 
22 On ‘socialist’ messianism see B. Baczko, Wyobrazenia spoleczne: Szkice o nadziei i pamiqci 
zbiorowej, Warsaw, 1994, pp. 126-57. 
23 Pavel Kohout, Car lasky a bije, Prague, 1954, p. 112. 
24 Milan Lajciak, Verse, Bratislava, 1953, p. 101. 
25 Ivan Skala, Maj zeme, Prague, 1950, p. 35. 
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the replacing of God with society, completely destroyed the special, fascinating universe of 
Karafiaf s book. In spite of the concluding picture of triumphant spring, the exclusion of 
sacred values from Karafiat’s universe left behind only a sad and forlorn microcosm whose 
flat insect existence was brutally revealed. 
This insect existence was at the same time a depressing metaphor of human existence in 
this everlasting ‘happy age’ of the eternal spring to come.26 
26 This chapter constitutes one of the last papers Vladimir Macura presented. He died, at the age 
of fifty-three, almost exactly a year after he had delivered it, on 17 April 1999. He almost did 
not come to London to give the paper because he was feeling so ill. That he came demonstrated 
the personal courage and the love of literature typical of him. He had always been a courageous 
literary scholar as well, during Communism and afterwards. An obituary appeared in the 
Independent, 20 May 1999, Thursday Review’ section, p. 6. (R.B.P.) 
18 The Drama of Local Power: Theatre as 
Politics and Metaphor in Boleslaw Drobner’s 
Cracow 
Laurie Koloski 
For decades, official Polish historiography touted the Communists’ victory in the ‘battle 
for people’s democracy’. Emigre Poles and Western historians used military metaphors as 
well, to characterize the period and shape their analyses, and to construct an entire ‘Cold 
War historiography’. On both sides, hindsight — exultant or disillusioned, depending on 
the perspective — contributed to a simplistic view of the period and an analytical structure 
based on clear-cut winner-loser, perpetrator-victim dichotomies. Given historians’ 
emphasis on party politics, this bipolar opposition has persisted even beyond 1989. More 
and more studies based on previously unavailable documents tell us exactly who did what 
to whom when, though the prevailing view now demonizes rather than lionizes the 
Communists. Yet few scholars have attempted to reconceptualize the intellectual clothes¬ 
line on which they hang these documents out to dry, retaining instead the traditional Cold 
War dichotomies of coercive state versus passive society, collaborator versus resistor, us 
(the Poles, the non-Communists) versus them (the Communists, the Soviets). 
My attempt to ‘re-read’ developments outside the traditional sphere of central party 
politics has convinced me such dichotomies are of little use. Moving beyond Warsaw to 
Cracow and beyond party politics to the politics of culture, I explore early post-war art and 
theatre as fairly autonomous realms in which alternative ideological, social, and political 
models could emerge. In Cracow, non-Communist agenda signalled a continuing debate 
about old and new and a contest over differing visions of society and state-society 
interaction. Putting the Communist ‘new’ in place after 1945 was not just a matter of 
political repression. It was a lengthy process of socio-cultural negotiation, in which models 
of the Polish past were often more powerful than those of the Stalinist future. 
In this chapter, I present a story about a local politician’s use of theatre as a metaphor for 
a broader agenda of social and political autonomy. For Boleslaw Drobner, a lifelong 
socialist and consummate party politician, politics was what life was about. Yet in early 
post-war Poland, politics was not the only language he could use. Especially before 1948, 
Drobner used the language of theatre to promote a ‘third way’, an alternative agenda based 
on a vision of historically shaped and socio-politically unique constituencies, in this case 
his political party, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and his hometown, Cracow. Behind his 
support of these two concrete entities lay Drobner’s belief that Poland and the 
communities which comprise it must be defined not by post-war geopolitical dictates but 
by their historical legacies, not by the central authorities in Warsaw but by their own 
cultural traditions. 
Though the bulk of my chapter is devoted to Drobner’s post-war activities, the first 
section provides a biographical sketch, drawn largely from his own memoirs. Drobner was 
a contentious figure for much of his life, and contemporary Polish scholars generally 
dismiss him as a colourful figure of only marginal importance. My purpose here is not to 
raise Drobner above intellectual or political marginality, but to contextualize his post-war 
activities and persona. In a broader sense, my goal is to look beyond the surface of 
Drobner’s political tactics and persona (i) to his role as a symbolic proxy and (ii) to theatre 
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as metaphor in this process. It is possible that Drobner himself was something of a joke. 
But the myth he represented and promoted, the symbolic singularity of Cracow, was no 
joke at all.1 
Drobner’s Political Background and Persona 
Bom in Cracow in 1883, Drobner grew up under the Habsburgs, survived two world wars 
and witnessed the victories and disappointments of the Communist-dominated post-war 
regime.2 When he first joined the Polish Social-Democratic Party (PPSD) at the age of 
fifteen, the nineteenth century was just drawing to a close. Half a century later, the political 
ideals he had pursued seemed close to fruition. Drobner would, however, have to continue 
struggling for his ‘third way’ until he died in 1968. 
He had grown up in a town which prided itself on its uniqueness. Cracow had been 
Poland’s capital until 1572, and although the city’s political fortunes had declined 
thereafter it continued to play a leading role in culture, education, and religion. Its status as 
a free city between 1815 and 1846 helped foster its reputation as the guardian of Polish 
spiritual and national values.3 From the 1860s onwards, ‘Austrian’ Poles enjoyed far 
greater political and cultural autonomy than their counterparts in German- and Russian- 
held territories. This further consolidated Cracow’s status as the Poles’ symbolic capital.4 
In 1897, representatives of Galician socialist parties gained seats in the Reichsrat for the 
first time. One of these was Ignacy Daszynski, leader of the PPSD and an early political 
mentor to Drobner. Drobner had begun his political career at fourteen as a scout in 
Daszynski’s 1897 campaign. When he joined the PPSD himself the following year, he set 
about finding schoolmates willing to join him for clandestine study groups.5 
In his memoirs, Drobner is passionate about these experiences and about the family’s 
maid, from whom he heard the word ‘socialism’ for the first time at the age of seven.6 
Whether or not he embellished such stories for effect, Drobner identified himself as a man 
raised on socialism. Polish patriotism was only slightly less important for him. Though 
Drobner came from a family of assimilated Jews who had lived in Cracow for generations, 
he believed Jewishness was a bestowed identity, something to hold close on a personal 
level but to overcome on a social and political level. Polishness, by contrast, was 
something one earned through sacrifice and public social and political commitment. The 
best way for Jews to succeed in Poland, Drobner believed, was to become Poles.7 
At eighteen, Drobner went to study in Berlin, Lemberg and Zurich, where he forged ties 
with the international socialist movement. Still, like many Polish socialists, Drobner was 
1 What follows is an abbreviated version of ‘Taking Krakow’s Cue: Boleslaw Drobner and 
Theater as Politics’ in L. Koloski, Painting Krakow Red: Politics and Culture in Poland, 1945— 
1950, PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1998, pp. 38-99. 
2 Background material on Drobner is drawn mostly from the following sources: Drobner’s three- 
volume memoirs, Bezustanna walka: Wspomnienia, Warsaw, 1962-67; his collection of essays, 
Wspominki..., Cracow, 1965; Miroslaw Chalubinski, Boleslaw Drobner: Wybor prac i 
artykulow, Warsaw, 1980 (hereafter Boleslaw Drobner)', and Michal Sliwa’s biography, 
Boleslaw Drobner. Szkic o dzialalnosci politycznej, Cracow, 1984. 
3 See Jacek Purchla’s Matecznik polski: Pozaekonomiczne czynniki rozwoju Krakow a w okresie 
autonomii galicyjskiej, Cracow, 1992, pp. 36-38. 
4 See Jacek Wozniakowski, ‘Krakow: Miasto stare, nowa sztuka’, in Zbigniew Baran (ed.), 
Krakow: dialog tradycji, Cracow, 1991, p. 78. 
5 Drobner, Bezustanna walka, I, pp. 95, 96. 
6 Ibid., pp. 34-36. 
For Drobner’s views on assimilation, see ibid., pp. 45^19, and Drobner, ‘Wazne problemy’ in 
Drogowskazy, Cracow, 1946, pp. 91-93. 
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never a true internationalist. He did not sympathize with the Rosa Luxemburg view that 
independence would derail the proletariat’s international struggle, and when war broke out 
in 1914 he put aside politics and joined Jozef Pitsudski’s anti-Russian Provisional 
Commission of Confederated Independence Parties and its military wing, the Riflemen 
(subsequently reorganized as the Polish Legions under Austrian command). ‘There was no 
turning back’, he later wrote, ‘the only thing that mattered was to fight the Tsar, to fight for 
Poland’s independence’.8 
With independence virtually dumped into the Poles’ laps in 1918, Drobner and his 
fellow socialists could turn their attention elsewhere. Drobner himself set about building a 
Socialist Party which could meet workers’ demands in the newly democratic Poland. 
Drobner’s insistence that the PPS advocate a dictatorship of the proletariat proved too 
radical for many of his party colleagues, and he eventually broke with the PPS and 
founded an independent socialist party.9 (He rejoined the mainstream PPS in 1928.) He 
was sympathetic to the Communist cause, and spent time in the USSR in 1936. Not 
surprisingly, the authorities labelled Drobner a ‘crypto-Communist’, and he was arrested 
several times during the inter-war period and, indeed, once imprisoned for his advocacy of 
a united Socialist-Communist front and his ‘glorification’ of the Soviet regime in a series 
of public lectures.10 Nevertheless, Drobner was adamant that the differences between the 
Socialists and Communists were significant and that he would never abandon the 
Socialists. The Communists, he wrote in 1922, ‘were revolutionary maniacs’ and ‘showed 
an inability to understand life’s realities and the desire above all to copy the Soviets’ 
methods of revolutionary struggle’.* 11 What Poland’s workers needed, Drobner believed, 
was a party steeped in the workers’ own Polish experiences, a ‘third way’ between the 
political authoritarianism and social cowardice of the right-wing parties and the 
unrealizable pipe dreams of the left. 
Drobner gained as much notoriety outside the PPS as inside. He never missed an 
opportunity to join a worker’s strike, or to use a public platform or the courtroom to air his 
passionate views. He continued the work he had begun before the war with the Workers’ 
University Society (TUR), travelling throughout the region to give lectures to worker and 
peasant groups, and he built and led a youth group within the organization. He gained a 
seat on the city council in 1933, which he was to hold until his death. He was a skilled 
orator and a tireless self-promoter, but he was also an unyielding and contentious man. In 
addition to his political opponents, he alienated many allies. 
In September 1939, Drobner left Cracow and headed east to Lemberg. Although the 
Soviet invasion of Poland’s eastern territories on 17 September 1939, initially seemed to 
promise ‘freedom’, as Drobner notes in his memoirs, in 1940 he was one of some 1.2 
million Poles the Soviets deported to Siberia and a number of Central Asian republics.12 
Freed from a Siberian labour camp in 1941, Drobner was able to rejoin his family, which 
had been deported to Central Asia. Drobner’s memoirs are remarkably free of rancour for 
the Soviets. 
Drobner had a keen sense of the possible and the plausible, and by early 1943 he 
understood he would have to pursue his vision within a particular set of constraints. Soviet 
8 Drobner, Bezustanna walka, I, p. 330. 
9 The party was the Partia Niezaleznych Socjalistow (PNS), later renamed the Niezalezna 
Socjalistyczna Partia Pracy (NSPP): see Sliwa, Boleslaw Drobner, pp. 78-112. 
10 See Drobner’s Moje cztery procesy, Warsaw, 1962, for accounts of his trials, based on court 
transcripts. 
11 Boleslaw Drobner, ‘Do calej klasy robotniczej w Polsce!’ in Chalubinski, Boleslaw Drobner, 
p. 42. 
12 See Drobner, Bezustanna walka, ill, pp. 133-66 for his account of exile. 
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prisons and labour camps had no doubt reinforced Drobner’s scepticism about Communist 
tactics, but they had not impaired his commitment to ‘the struggle’ and his determination 
to realize his own vision of a socialist Poland. Eventually, Drobner joined forces in the 
USSR with Wanda Wasilewska’s Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP), an organization founded 
in 1943 to prepare a vanguard of Soviet-trained Communists who would move into 
positions of power once Poland was liberated. When the ZPP joined with the Polish 
‘home’ Communists to form a temporary government in July 1944, Drobner held one of 
the fifteen ministerial portfolios. 
Drobner’s post in this temporary government was as close as he got to the national 
political appointment he hoped to secure. In December 1944, he was not appointed to the 
provisional government, and instead of heading for Warsaw, he followed Soviet troops 
into Cracow in January 1945. There, he threw himself into the two roles which most 
clearly defined his early post-war persona: PPS leader and city council member. The 
Socialist Party was as large a part of Drobner’s life as it had been before the war, though 
he now found himself fighting different battles. He embraced the Communists as a co¬ 
operative partner but dismissed the possibility of merging the two workers’ parties. The 
PPS deserved equal influence. Of the three factions which took shape within the PPS, 
Drobner generally held the middle line, refusing to support those who advocated joining 
the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) against the Communists but disagreeing with those who 
advocated merging with the Polish Communist Party (PPR). The gap between the 
Socialists’ and Communists’ ‘different paths’ and ‘approaches’, Drobner believed, would 
no doubt diminish with time. ‘But for now’, he insisted, ‘we live separately’.13 
Conflicts between the PPS and the PPR emerged quickly, and the Communists in 
Cracow sought to isolate Drobner and prevent further factionalism within the PPS. 
Eventually, they were successful. Drobner was pushed out of his position as Cracow’s PPS 
leader just before the December 1948 merger of the PPR and PPS into the United Polish 
Worker’s Party (PZPR). Until mid-1948, however, the PPS was the largest and most 
influential party in Cracow, and Drobner was one of the city’s most visible politicians.14 
Political and ideological constraints probably led most monographs on post-war party 
politics in Cracow to marginalize Drobner. In one telling example, Kazimierz Cwik, who 
devotes an entire book to PPR-PPS relations in the Cracow region with virtually no 
mention of Drobner, remarks in passing that Drobner’s failure to appear at a joint PPS- 
PPR celebration in March 1948 signalled the downward ‘turning point’ for the Cracow 
Socialists.15 He did not depart without protest: ‘I’m not going to let myself be sold down 
the river! I’m not going to dig my own grave!’ Everyone understood and appreciated his 
determination, and even the cynical Jakub Berman said with resignation ‘The United 
[Worker’s] Party can afford to have one Drobner.’16 Nevertheless, when Drobner applied 
for PZPR membership in January 1949, local party officials turned him down. Only after 
he appealed to the party’s central authorities was he permitted to join the new party. 
13 The article was published in the Cracow PPS weekly, Naprzod: Bolestaw Drobner, "O jasnosci 
w naszej taktyce’, Aaprzod, 26 March 1946; reprinted in Chalubinski, Bolestaw Drobner, 
pp. 221,223. 
14 For more on PPR—PPS developments in early post-war Cracow, see Kazimierz Cwik, Problemy 
wspoidzialania PPR i PPS w wojewddztwie Krakow skim 1945—1948, Warsaw, 1974 (hereafter 
Problemy wspoidzialania)', Zenobiusz Kozik, Partie i stronnictwa polityczne w krakowskiem, 
1945—1947, Cracow, 1975; and Jan Tomicki, Polska Partia Socjalistyczna 1892—1948, 
Warsaw, 1983. 
15 Cwik, Problemy wspoidzialania, p. 237. 
16 Stanislaw Dobrowolski, ‘Boleslaw Drobner jakiego znalem’ in Sliwa, Boleslaw Drobner, p. 17. 
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Politics as Theatre, Theatre as Politics 
Drobner’s memoirs are nothing if not dramatic. This was a man for whom play-acting 
came naturally. In fact, he had also dabbled in theatre from childhood. Indeed, when still a 
child, he had performed bit parts at the Cracow Stary Theatre, and he remembered seeing 
his first production of Hamlet in 1893 at the newly finished municipal Slowacki Theatre.17 
Drobner continued acting through his university days, though he soon placed all his 
performance skills at the service of politics. He never lost his interest in the theatre, 
however. The municipally funded and managed Slowacki Theatre had been among 
Poland’s best during the inter-war period, at a time when the central government offered 
little support to culture.18 
While involved in the post-1945 political tussles between the PPS and PPR, Drobner 
also spent time on the city’s theatres. For Drobner, theatre was never only about plays. It 
was part of a larger vision about how people should organize their social, political, and 
cultural lives and who should be in charge of their endeavours. In 1930, Drobner and his 
PPS colleagues had sponsored a morality play about a political trial and then organized a 
mock trial of their own (Drobner played the prosecutor), relishing the public attention they 
gained as a result.19 That was politics as theatre. After 1945, Drobner’s role was more 
peripheral. Now, he was a politician using theatre to promote a broader social and political 
agenda. This was theatre as politics. 
Drobner had been elected to the city council in 1933, and was reappointed when he 
returned to Cracow in 1945. The pre-war city councils had been elected, autonomous 
bodies which worked with, but not at the behest of, the city ‘president’. The architects of 
Poland’s post-war institutions had intended the City National Councils (Miejska Rada 
Narodowa, MRN) to function more like soviets, with members appointed from 
‘progressive’ local organizations and their function limited to an advisory role.20 In fact, 
although the Cracow post-war City National Council did not correspond institutionally or 
ideologically to the pre-war councils, it was far more like them than the Communists had 
intended or wished to admit. Until 1949, when all private and municipal theatres were 
nationalized, the city council subsidized and managed two major theatres (the Stary and 
the Slowacki), often decided which of the city’s other theatres would receive subsidies, 
and had formal jurisdiction over all theatres within the city limits. As the chairman of the 
council’s Committee for Culture and the Arts throughout this period, Drobner had a good 
deal of influence— and he used it.21 
Documents from city council meetings in the late 1940s demonstrate Drobner’s skill in 
manipulating ostensibly apolitical issues to political ends. When Drobner brought a 
cultural matter to the council floor for debate he always pursued broader socio-political 
17 See Drobner’s essays on theatre in Wspominki...(sQQ note 1 above), pp. 78-87. 
18 Though the Polish government established a separate Ministry for Culture and the Arts in 1918, 
it lasted only until 1922, leaving local administrations and private entities to fill the support 
gap: see Joanna Pollakowna, ‘Ministerstwo Sztuki i Kultury’ in Aleksander Wojciechowski 
(ed.), Polskie zycie artystyczne w latach 1915-1939, Wroclaw, 1974, pp. 546-50. 
19 See Drobner’s account of the event in Wspominki..., pp. 97-99. 
20 For a detailed description of the councils’ changing jurisdiction and activities during this 
period, see Zygmunt Rybicki ‘Powstanie i dzialalnosc rad narodowych w latach 1944-1950’ in 
Anon, (eds). System rad narodowych w PRL, Warsaw, 1971, pp. 106—38. 
21 There was a two-month period in the spring of 1945 when Drobner left Cracow to serve as city 
‘president’ in Wroclaw: see his account ‘Zdobylismy Polskie Zlote Runo!’ in Mieczyslaw 
Markowski (ed.), Trudne dni (Wroclaw 1945 r. we wspomnieniach pionierow), Wroclaw, I, 
1960, pp. 75-106. He does not explain why he went to Wroclaw or why he returned to Cracow 
so quickly. 
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goals: the character that emerges from city-council debates is not gentle or particularly 
tolerant. 
Conflicts between Socialists and Communists were not uncommon at city council 
meetings, and Drobner took every opportunity to protect and promote his own party. In 
late 1946, Drobner launched a campaign to designate a former palazzo on the city’s main 
square, which the Red Army had taken over in early 1945, as a new community cultural 
centre. When PPR council members accused him of acting against the Soviets, Drobner 
used council time to recount his friendly conversations with the Soviet garrison 
commander (who had agreed to move his troops elsewhere) and to remind his opponents 
that he had been imprisoned for pro-Soviet activities. Although PPR members abstained 
from voting, other council members unanimously approved Drobner’s plan, and he used 
this to put across to the public the PPS’s role as a benefactor.22 Drobner engaged in other 
campaigns to promote the PPS’s role in culture such as promoting the interests of a PPS- 
sponsored workers’ theatre In 1946, Drobner and his PPS colleagues in the city council led 
a campaign to force the independent Stary Theatre to merge with the municipal Stowacki. 
The Stary had rented a city-owned building since the end of the war, but was fiscally and 
artistically autonomous. The Stowacki was subsidized and managed — which meant 
control over appointments and repertoire selection — by the city council. Drobner 
launched his offensive on more than one flank, noting allegations of fiscal improprieties by 
the Stary directors, the city’s need to reserve the building for official occasions, and the 
need to co-ordinate the repertoire of the city’s most important theatres. What was really at 
stake was the city council’s right to make its own decisions and to decide for the 
community as a whole. 
On one side of the Stary debate, the theatre’s directors and actors, the theatre union and 
provincial state officials lined up in favour of less city interference and the theatre’s right 
to autonomy.23 On the other side, the city council, led by Drobner, argued for tighter 
municipal control. In the end, Drobner won. Officials in Warsaw at the Ministry of Culture 
and the Arts sided with city officials, and from the beginning of the 1946^47 season, the 
Stary became the second of Cracow’s municipal theatres. What for Stary officials was a 
violation of artistic autonomy was for Drobner and other city leaders a victory for local 
autonomy. Individual artists and theatre management, Drobner clearly believed, should not 
take precedence over the interests of the wider community. 
Whether in the theatre or elsewhere, such institutional wrangling in early post-war 
Poland was about control — about who has the right to make decisions, spend money and 
exert power. The Stary’s directors appealed to Ministry officials in Warsaw, promoting 
themselves as creative and socially beneficial individuals in a bid for autonomy and 
protection. Drobner’s position suggests he was contemptuous of such ‘bourgeois’ attitudes, 
and in his determination to impose a notion of ‘collective’ priorities he was not very 
different from the Communist leaders in Warsaw.24 
By the beginning of the 1946-47 season, Drobner turned to other issues. The Cracow 
theatres were immensely successful during this period, and Drobner used their success as a 
Cracow, Wojewodzkie Archiwum Panstwowe (hereafter WAP), Miejska Rada Narodowa 
(hereafter MRN) 3, 'Prtokol posiedzenia MRN w Krakowie w dniu 1 pazdziemika 1946 r.’, pp. 
156, 210-16. See also WAP Kr, Komitet Wojewodzki PPR (hereafter KW PPR) l/VII/6, 
‘Sprawozdanie [Wydzialu Propagandy] z miesi^ca pazdziemika br. [1946]’, pp. 93, 94. 
23 See Emil Orzechowski, Stary Teatr i Studio, Cracow', 1974, pp. 29-40, 152-75. Orzechowski’s 
study is the only document-based account of the Stary’s first two years, and many of the 
relevant documents are cited at length or attached as appendices. 
24 See Orzechowski, Stary Teatr i Studio, and the following MRN reports: MRN 13 (2 May 
1946), p. 2; MRN 3 (8 July 1946), pp. 3-5; MRN 3(1 October 1946), pp. 189-90. 
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metaphor for the city’s prosperity, viability and long-standing institutional, fiscal, and 
political autonomy.25 Cracow’s local government had done a fine job of subsidizing and 
managing its theatres for decades, Drobner could brag —just one more way it had shown 
itself worthy of retaining its independent status. 
Compared to other Polish cities, Cracow received little in the way of central subsidies 
for its theatres, and Drobner went to great lengths to show that such funding was marginal 
to the theatres’ success and to point out the accomplishments of Cracow’s theatres 
compared to those of other cities. Cracow receives less from the central government, 
Drobner explained at a council meeting in May 1947, because it is capable of more on its 
own. Cracow was ‘a pioneering vanguard’, he claimed, which needed to defend its own 
interests, ‘giving Warsaw no peace so that we may have peace in Cracow’.26 There could 
be no question, he continued, that city leaders were pursuing the best path: 
It is correct to do things in this manner; it is right that we set our sights on the growth of 
culture and the arts. Our city can never become a major industrial centre, and we must move 
in the direction we are moving — not neglecting, of course, to work towards securing 
industrial institutions as well [...]. Above all, however, we must emphasize — and we rightly 
do emphasize — education, culture, the arts. We must give our schoolchildren the 
opportunity to see the monuments which constitute the enormous cultural and artistic legacy 
of the entire republic. That is why none of us is insulted when Warsaw jokingly calls us little 
culture-vultures [matymi kulturnikami\. This is our source of pride, of glory.27 
Drobner was not disputing the need for industrialization, but arguing that other cities — 
which had no serious cultural traditions of their own — should bear the brunt of it. Cracow 
was no place for a steel mill, he hinted. Cracow would help take care of the future by 
educating Polish society about the importance of its past. 
Time and again, Drobner returned to such issues at city council meetings. Theatres, 
claimed Drobner, ‘sustain the country’s culture as a whole’, and for that reason it made 
sense to subsidize them. Another benefit of municipal subsidies and management was 
particularly important to Drobner, namely, control. In late 1947, he addressed his 
comments beyond city council chambers when he spoke of the council’s ability to 
‘influence theatre repertoires’: 
Every play must be approved by the [city council’s] Commission on Culture and the Arts. 
The municipal theatre’s director came to us and said he wants to produce Kordian. The 
Commission approved the play. All of a sudden news comes from Warsaw that it was wrong 
to produce this play, that its protagonist is a typical Romantic, that such things are harmful. 
Well, the old character Wiarus in Warszawianka is a typical Romantic, too, but there is 
absolutely nothing here to be afraid of. What the play presents is the struggle against the 
Tsar, and there’s absolutely nothing harmful about that. You see, citizens, if our theatres 
were nationalized, we’d have no say at all.28 
25 Part of the reason Cracow’s theatres were so successful was that the city had escaped wartime 
destruction. Warsaw was almost entirely destroyed, and Lodz, which was a predominantly 
industrial city, was the only other major Polish city to avoid devastation. 
26 Cracow, Wojwodzkie archivum Panstwowe (hereafter WAP), Miejska Rada Narodowa 
(hereafter MRN) 4, ‘Protokol nr 4 posiedzenia budzetowego MRN w dniu 12 maja 1947 r’., 
p. 182: ‘my musimy bye niejako awangard^ pioniersk% ktoraby Warszawie spac nie dala i zyc, 
aby tez i Krakow mogl odpowiednio zyc’. 
27 Ibid. 
28 WAP, MRN 4, ‘Protokol nr 8 posiedzenia budzetowego MRN w dniu 20 grudnia 1947 r’., 
pp. 577, 578. Juliusz Slowacki wrote Kordian in 1834. In one scene, the title character joins a 
plot to kill the Russian Grand Duke Constantine. Stanislaw Wyspianski, a dramatist strongly 
influenced by another Romantic writer, Adam Mickiewicz, wrote Warszawianka at the turn of 
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Local control of Cracow’s theatres also meant being able to tell Warsaw’s Communist 
bureaucrats when they were being foolish. 
Polish Romanticism in these plays, he chided Warsaw bureaucrats and PPR dogmatists, 
was not to be equated with anti-Russian or anti-Soviet sentiment. It was to be celebrated as 
the Poles’ heroic struggle for independence from the tsars. Anyone who so wished could 
have detected a subversive message in Drobner’s rhetoric. By the end of 1947, Drobner 
was no longer using Cracow theatres to have his way in local politics. Instead, he was 
using them to proclaim the fundamental viability of local politics and to defend Cracow’s 
autonomy against Warsaw’s centralizing agenda. 
Conclusion 
In the end, Drobner saw his vision of a culturally and politically independent Cracow 
collapse. The year 1948 marked the beginning of Poland’s second early post-war 
revolution.29 Power in Warsaw had shifted, and with it the tactics used to encourage 
compliance. For Drobner, both personally and as a proponent of the cultural and political 
autonomy of Cracow, 1948 marked the onset of imposed Communist conformity. In mid- 
1949, not long after the Communists forced the PPS-PPR merger, the state nationalized all 
theatres and took away the cities’ right to manage them. Drobner mustered one last 
defence of Cracow’s theatres at an October 1949 city-council meeting, again citing 
attendance figures and ticket sales as if to prove that in the theatres if nowhere else, 
Cracow remained superior to Warsaw.30 In 1950, the Communists abolished autonomous 
local governments altogether, and although city and provincial councils remained in place, 
their ability to wield power had vanished. Drobner could continue to raise his voice at city- 
council meetings, but after 1950 he could not hope to accomplish much by doing so. 
Drobner was too strong a local and Polish patriot to condone the Warsaw Communist 
leadership’s Soviet vision of political and social change. In terms of his socialist ideals, 
Drobner professed to be an internationalist, yet when bringing those ideas to fruition he 
insisted on the freedom to do so within a local context. There was no ‘year zero’ for 
Drobner, no way to impose a ‘new’ set of ideologically-inspired institutions and dictates at 
the expense of decades of lived experience. He knew the Communists could not escape the 
past. He wanted to celebrate it. It is tempting to see Drobner’s early post-war stance as 
clear and simple resistance to the Communist agenda, and that may be true of the period 
after 1948. Earlier, however, Drobner had believed he could forge a separate path 
alongside the Communists, neither entirely anti- nor pro-Communist. 
In retrospect, Drobner’s story tells us as much about what the Communists could not 
crush as about what they could. Drobner himself remained active in Cracow, sometimes 
more, sometimes less politically. During the heady days of October 1956, he was even 
appointed first secretary of the provincial-level PZPR (a position he held only until early 
1957). Among the immediate changes he called for was the city’s autonomy within 
existing administrative structures.31 More important, even if Drobner failed to avert central 
the century. The character Drobner refers to is an old man who has joined with the forces of 
General Zymirski to fight the Russians in the 1831 Uprising: see Czeslaw Milosz, The History 
of Polish Literature, Berkeley, CA, 1983, pp. 232-43 and 351-58, for his discussion of 
Slowacki and Wyspianski. 
29 See Padraic Kenney, Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945-1950, Ithaca, NY, 
1997, p. 4. 
30 See WAP, MRN, ‘Protokol nr 9 posiedzenia MRN w Krakowie odbytego w dniu 3 i 4 
pazdziemika 1949 r\, pp. 26-28. 
31 Sliwa, Boleslaw Drobner, pp. 274—77. 
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control, he had succeeded in promoting and preserving a vision of Cracow which defied 
Warsaw’s monopoly on power. Cracow deserved better. It was a city with the legacy of a 
century’s self-rule, of which citizens of other Polish cities could only dream. True, it was 
not the capital, but it understood the relationship between the political centre and the 
peripheries upon which the centre relied for its power. If Cracow was not what 
Warsaw wanted, Drobner maintained, perhaps that was because of Warsaw’s shortcomings 
and not Cracow’s. Drobner reflected and helped perpetuate an idealized local identity 
which enabled many in Cracow to keep an intellectual and even concrete distance from 
Stalinist conformity. 
Debates — some friendly, some less so — over Cracow’s special place and the conflict 
between central and local authority continue even today. In December 1995, on the day 
Poland’s Supreme Court declared Lech Walesa’s loss to former Communist official 
Aleksander Kwasniewski, a handful of Cracow residents carted a hastily constructed guard 
booth and a red-and-white-painted stake to the historical border between Austrian Galicia 
and the Russian partition. The border and the election, it turned out, were closely linked. In 
the communities on the northern, ‘Russian’ side of the line, residents had voted 70 per cent 
in favour of Kwasniewski. Their neighbours to the south, in Galicia, had voted 70 per cent 
in favour of Walesa. Attired in nineteenth-century Austrian border patrol costumes, the 
Galician patriots stopped incoming vehicles long enough to present mock entry visas to 
their occupants, each carefully hand-lettered and bearing a facsimile of a Habsburg 
imperial seal. In a ceremony prepared specially for the occasion, ‘officials’ intoned the 
following: ‘Let this marker fill with new strength the hearts of the violated Galician 
minority; let it act as a border, separating us for centuries from the mental plague.’32 
In addition to laughs, the border crossing incident fuelled yet another round in the debate 
about Cracow’s autonomy and a lengthy article in the weekly Polityka entitled ‘Cracow 
Apart: The Long Shadow of His Majesty’s Royal Monarchy’. At the top of the article, the 
sentiments of a Cracow patriot and former centre-right senator stood in bold letters: ‘This 
is not any separatism towards the rest of Poland. The division is simply a real one, both in 
an historical and mental sense. We are different.’ Among the dissenters was a Cracow 
senator from Kwasniewski’s Democratic Left Party (SLD), who complained that ‘people 
who serve in Cracow’s local government seem convinced they have been called to express 
their opinions about Poland’s foreign affairs and the world’. Still worse, the senator added, 
these people promote the notion of Galician singularity: ‘The myth of Galicia, which is 
resuscitated these days with such pleasure, is fine within the confines of the cabaret, but 
taking it seriously in the political realm is very dangerous. [...] The danger of this Galician 
myth lies in its autonomous approach to the idea of Poland. It gamers no support in many 
regions of the country, and may in fact damage Cracow.’33 
Krzysztof Kozlowski, former Minister of the Interior in Tadeusz Mazowiecki’s 
government and a senator from Miechow, across the border in the Russian partition, is then 
introduced as a more objective observer than the two Cracow senators. ‘Cracow’s quarrel 
with Warsaw is, in its essence, about the shape of Poland’, Kozlowski observed. ‘It is 
about the choice between a Poland with autonomous regions and one which is centralized, 
in which those who control the money believe their rights are greater and that others must 
bow to their authority. Warsaw simply has no right to consider itself the hub of the 
universe.’34 Drobner could hardly have said it better — though he might have done so with 
a reference to cabaret. 
32 Mariusz Urbanek, ‘Osobny Krakow: Dlugi cien c.k. monarchii’, Polityka, 4, 1996, p. 24. 
33 Ibid., pp. 24, 26. 
34 Ibid., p. 26. 
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Radicals after the Second World War 
Attila Pok 
Historians working on Hungarian politics in the twentieth century face no difficulty in iden¬ 
tifying periods. In the first half of the century the country on two occasions found it 
necessary to start building a new political order: in 1918 and in 1945. The First World War 
brought defeat, and the Trianon Treaty left Hungary reduced to less than a third of its 
former territory and a little over two-fifths of its population. Territorial revision was the 
fundamental aim of all domestic and foreign policy over the next two decades. The Second 
World War once more brought defeat and the vanishing of any hope of undoing the Trianon 
Treaty. Nevertheless both 1918 and 1945 appeared to present chances for the creation of a 
new social order based on democracy. It was an obvious fact, though perhaps less so in 
1918 than in 1945, that the old social establishment was in ruins and that the country’s 
resurrection was possible only on the basis of a fresh start. The political force called the 
Hungarian Radicals was on both occasions closely associated with these attempts. 
The Radicals in 1918 and in 1945 
In 1918 the chance for the establishment of a democratic order was open only for a very 
short time: a couple of months in the immediate aftermath of the war. On 16 November, 
Hungary was proclaimed a republic. Universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, freedom 
of the press and other civil liberties were promised. The president of the republic, Count 
Mihaly Karolyi, a very rich aristocrat, parcelled out of some of his own estates among 
landless peasants. However, the loss of‘Historic Hungary’, the territorial question, sealed 
the fate of the first attempt to establish a democratic republic in Hungary. In March 1919 
Bela Kun’s Soviet Republic replaced the Karolyi regime. 
The year 1945 appeared at the time a more promising start. Seven months after the 
devastating war had come to an end, and in spite of the presence of the Red Army and the 
Soviet dominance of the Allied Control Commission, free general elections were held in 
November 1945. Multi-party parliamentary democracy replaced the traditional political 
system based on the ‘historical classes’. The features of the new society were, however, to 
say the least, not yet clear. In this chapter I discuss the character of a small group of 
Hungarian politicians, the Radicals, sometimes referred to as the ‘Hungarian Gironde’. The 
contemporary term to describe this group was ‘bourgeois [polgari] radicals’ or ‘radical 
democrats’. Most of them were bom in the 1870s, came from German or assimilated Jewish 
urban middle-class families, studied law and modem sociology and were in opposition to 
the pre-war Hungarian establishment. They criticized the system of huge latifundia, the 
narrow franchise, and were opposed to aggressive Hungarian nationalism. Democracy was 
the key concept in their ideology but they did not possess nor did they claim to possess the 
monopoly in that respect. The left wing of the Independence Party in parliament demanded 
the extension of the narrow franchise. Moreover, the successful lawyer-politician Vilmos 
Vazsonyi had launched the Party of Democrats in 1901. The franchise had been the centre¬ 
piece of their programme. The Radicals, however, went further: they demanded universal, 
equal and secret suffrage. Again, a major concern of Vazsonyi was state support for the 
urban small entrepreneur. The Radicals’ concern was the dismantling of class rule based on 
the latifundia; also they were eager to co-operate with the Social Democratic Party which 
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had acquired growing influence before and during the First World War.1 In contrast to 
Vazsonyi, who could not accept the Social Democratic programme of nationalization of the 
major means of production, the Radicals accepted the Socialist programme as a long-term 
aim and believed that ‘modem bourgeois democracy’ was the first step in that direction. 
The leading Radical Oszkar Jaszi defined the essence of radicalism as ‘the movement of 
the working middle classes directed at creating material, intellectual and moral goods. 
Politically it aims to support all efforts at developing and organizing productive forces and 
eliminating unearned income.’2 So in essence they were socialist. They could accept neither 
Bela Kun’s Soviet Republic nor the old social order restored under Admiral Horthy in 1920. 
Before 1918 the the Radicals were active in the Tarsadalomtudomanyi Tarsasag (Society 
of Social Sciences, founded 1901), the Polgari Radikalis Part (Bourgeois Radical Party, 
founded 1914) and the Galilei Kor (Galileo Circle, founded 1908). From 1907 to 1919 the 
periodical Huszadik Szazad (Twentieth Century, launched 1900), the first Flungarian 
monthly on modem sociology, was also associated with the Radicals. In the inter-war years 
they supported the periodical Szazadunk (Our Century). After 1945 they published a few 
periodicals and the Radicals always had a strong presence in the Masonic lodges. 
It was a younger member of this group, Imre Csecsy, who in a 1939 article first used the 
term ‘Flungarian Gironde’ for self-identification. With this reference to the more moderate 
grouping among the actors of the French Revolution he was trying to clarify the position of 
the group. The Right in politics — he argued — always tried to limit civil liberties whereas 
the Left struggled for the extension of the political and economic rights of the individual. 
Communism with its totalitarian state was closer to the extreme Right than to the Left. 
After 1945 the Girondists were part of the moderate Left, believing that social order ought 
to be maintained through consensus rather than by the authority of an autocratic state. 
Further, the democratic order could best preserve the country’s independence. 
The Radicals were inactive during the Second World War. In 1945, the Magyar 
Radikalis Part (Hungarian Radical Party), which was reorganized and became politically 
active once more, managed to recruit only few members. Perhaps they had between one 
and two thousand supporters, mostly in the professions: university teachers, doctors and 
lawyers. In November 1945 the Radical Party won 5,625 votes at the parliamentary elec¬ 
tions, which was not enough to get them a seat in parliament. The 1947 elections, due to 
the popularity of a Social Democrat old hand, Karoly Peyer, who had left his old comrades 
and joined the Radicals, brought them six seats. The Radicals’ newspapers and periodicals 
had a readership of not more than twenty to thirty thousand — mostly in the capital. 
There were many reasons for the very limited influence that the Radicals mustered in the 
country. People who in 1918 would probably have joined their ranks had at least six parties 
to choose from in 1945: the Smallholders’ Party, which had a ‘polgari’ (bourgeois) section, 
the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Peasant Party, the Polgari Demo¬ 
cratic Party, as well as the Hungarian Radical Party. Indeed, all these parties supported 
policies that were similar to those of the Radicals of the pre-1918 period. Differences among 
the parties involved means rather than ends. They all stood for land distribution, large-scale 
social reforms, and suffrage. In vain did the Hungarian Radical Party claim that it had 
advocated all these reforms before the others. Because it had played no part in carrying out 
these reforms it did not become a significant political force. The only thing it could do was 
to point to its unbroken consistency of principle, which, in itself, is not a winning political 
1 For a comparison of the different views on democracy see Attila Pok, A magyarorszagi 
radikalis demokrata ideoldgia kialakulasa, Budapest, 1990, pp. 14—15. 
2 Oszkar Jaszi, Mi a radikalizmus, edited by the Orszagos Polgari Radikalis Part (National 
Bourgeois Radical Party), n.d. Quoted by Janos Varga, ‘A Magyar Radikalis Part ujjaalakulasa 
1945-ben’, Tortenelmi Szemle, 1975, 1, p. 101. 
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programme and did not constitute a political alternative. The central figure of the party 
between 1945 and 1949 was Imre Csecsy, a writer and editor in his early fifties. Other 
leading figures in the group were the literary critic Marcell Benedek, the doctor and public 
health specialist Zsigmond Kende, and the publicist Bela Zsolt. The Radicals, conscious of 
the fact that there was no wider social class in the country to which they could appeal, 
claimed to be the party that represented the public interest. When Huszadik Szazad was re¬ 
launched with Csecsy as editor in 1947, he announced that the periodical wished to offer the 
educated reader facts instead of political slogans, independent criticism in well-researched 
articles instead of dogma. The three volumes of the new Huszadik Szazad, which appeared 
between 1947 and 1949, testified to the spirit of these promises. Yet their impact on the 
public was rather limited. This had much to do with the Radicals’ political philosophy. 
Enlightenment and Marxism 
The Radicals were a good fit in post-1945 politics. They were avowed egalitarians and 
many were socialists. They believed in co-operation with the Social Democrats; indeed they 
were influenced by Marxism, an ideology treated with respect. But the philosophy to which 
they were wedded from the time they appeared on the political scene before 1918 was 
Enlightenment rather than Marxist. Now, the Enlightenment, based on the omnipotence of 
reason combined with anti-clericalism and materialism, still had some appeal around the 
turn of the century. By 1945, however, the rationalist morality of the philosophes had 
largely lost its appeal even among the intelligentsia. The Radicals were not, however, con¬ 
cerned about their unreconstructability. Moreover, their moral sensibilities induced them to 
attack Hegelian-Marxian dialectics on a most sensitive point. This may have been tactically 
a political blunder, but it underlined their fierce opposition to politics which disregarded 
fundamental moral principles by reference to some dialectical historical process. 
In Vildgos pillanat (Luminous Moment), written during the war but published only in 
1945, Csecsy dismissed dialectics as an ideological method supporting the superiority of the 
German state. Csecsy and his friends’ ideal was not Hegel3 (or Marx) but Kant, whose cen¬ 
tral political conviction was that morality and politics must be related. That philosophy, he 
wrote, ‘some modem critics say, is mostly past history. Indeed, it is historic in its signifi¬ 
cance. Some parts of it may have proved mistaken, but by advocating the universality of 
human achievement and by demanding a strict self-control of reason it aimed to lead society 
to the right path. When and where did European thought go astray? Well, the rot set in with 
Hegel, I suppose.’4 This critical perception of post-Kantian German intellectual and politi¬ 
cal developments was the position from which the Radicals approached Marxism or 
historical materialism. Oszkar Jaszi, more explicitly than Csecsy, had summed up in an 
article commemorating the 100th anniversary of Hegel’s death in 1931 what could well be 
regarded as the credo of the Radicals: ‘the future of our whole civilization depends on 
whether or not mankind will be able to reconcile Hegel and Marx’s tremendously strong 
historical vision of what is and was with Rousseau and Kant’s deep moral intuition of the 
thing which ought to be’.5 
3 See, for example, Laszlo Szenczei, ‘A dialektika es az elme igazi forradalma’: “Dialectics, the 
core and driving force of German philosophical idealism and romanticism in the past century 
contains German counter-revolutionary spirit in such a dense form that not even Marx’s 
prophetic power was able to expel if {Huszadik Szazad, 1947, p. 305). 
4 Imre Csecsy, Vildgos pillanat, Budapest, 1946, p. 51. 
Oszkar Jaszi, “Hegel — a Hundred Years After’ in Gyorgy Litvan (ed.), Oszkar Jaszi: Homage 
to Danubia, New York, 1945, p. 52. 
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The other factor that influenced the Radicals’ attitude to Marxism was the principle that 
society should be organized on a rational basis, in which individual interests (mostly the 
small proprietors) are reconciled with those of the community. The Radicals’ vision was a 
Hungary which forged a bridge between Western and Eastern ideas of social organization 
and foreign relations. They accepted historical materialism as a method of social analysis 
but rejected Marxism as the ideology and programme representing a single class, the prole¬ 
tariat. ‘We recognize the great value of Marxian social criticism and we agree also with 
many elements of their economic theory; nevertheless Marxism could never become our 
Bible. We do not consider historical materialism (even in its improved version) the peak of 
science and philosophy, despite the various elements of truth it may have discovered.’6 
The radicals were engaged in a permanent debate over Marxist socialism in Haladas and 
Huszadik Szazad, and at meetings of the Masonic lodges. The Marxist method of social 
analysis, they argued, should be incorporated into a comprehensive ideology based on 
rational principles on which society, led by enlightened leaders, serving both individual and 
public interests, should be organized. This attitude did not attract much sympathy either on 
the Left or on the Right. The Radicals fell between two stools. 
Absence of ‘Bourgeois ’ Development 
Views about the national past have always been an indispensable source for establishing 
political credentials in Hungary. Both the Communists and the Radicals used history to 
explain their political aims. The Communists’ guiding principle was social progress 
attained through class conflict combined with the struggle for national independence: 
society moved inexorably from feudalism through capitalism to socialism. For the 
Communists 1848 had to be the Hungarian ‘bourgeois revolution’ in order to assert that 
after 1945 the socialist revolution was ‘on the historical agenda’. And revolution, as in the 
past, necessarily featured the ‘intensification of the class struggle’. This was clearly an 
assertion to prop up the Communist take-over. 
The Radicals believed in social progress no less than the Communists; likewise they 
accepted socialism. Yet they knocked the central contention out of the Marxist creed: the 
presumption that a ‘bourgeois revolution’ had already taken place in Hungary in order to 
justify the Communist take-over to introduce socialism. The Radicals’ concern was the 
backwardness of Hungarian society, the weakness of the urban middle classes, which they 
considered the most serious drawback for the attainment of progress. Csecsy wrote, ‘There 
has never been a bourgeois revolution in this country. In Hungary the transformation has 
not even begun which the West European countries went through between the seventeenth 
century and the middle of the nineteenth, leading to the French Revolution by which the 
bourgeoisie as a class and bourgeois mentality and lifestyle prevailed over the autocratic 
feudal system.’ It is true, Csecsy went on, that French revolutionary ideas reached Hungary 
but in 1848, when in France the lower middle classes were already challenging the 
bourgeoisie, in Hungary even the feudal forces were not broken. The revolution was not 
led by the bourgeoisie but by the nobility. When, later, the bourgeoisie developed it, it 
accepted gentry leadership and was largely concerned with the making of profit.7 
What the Radicals found wanting was not so much the bourgeoisie as the citoyen. 
Csecsy’s view about the helplessness and responsibility of the Hungarian bourgeoisie was 
criticized by the doyen of the Radicals, Oszkar Jaszi. Csecsy, he objected, had not 
recognized that ‘there is no unified middle class or bourgeoisie which, in fact, is composed 
6 Imre Csecsy, ‘Es megis tovabb’, Haladas, 10 November 1945. p. 1. 
7 Imre Csecsy, ‘Az oktoberi forradalom es a nepkoztarsasag’, Szazadok es tanulsdgoK 21, 1946, 
p. 331. 
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of different, even opposing elements’: the owners of the means of production or ‘banking 
capitalism’ and the citoyens, that is the working middle class. The latter did not come to 
power even in Western Europe and so ‘the great [...] spirit and the values of socialism 
originate mainly from the working middle class and the petty bourgeoisie’.8 
Csecsy accepted Jaszi’s distinction: ‘you are a bourgeois as far as you are independent, 
and a proletarian as far as you depend economically on others’. The idea that ‘a citoyen is a 
big-bellied bourgeois who does not do anything but exploit others’9 does not hold true. By 
the distinction between the bourgeoisie and the citoyen and by stressing the common 
interests of the latter with those of the proletariat Csecsy and his group adapted themselves 
to post-1945 political expectations. Significantly, the party’s new name, Magyar Radikalis 
Part, left out the epithet polgari (which could mean either bourgeois or citoyen's) in 1945. 
For the Radicals capitalism was still the mother of democracy, they maintained (in contrast 
to the so-called people’s democracy of Communist propaganda) which made the free devel¬ 
opment of the individual possible. Alas, the bourgeoisie was concerned only with profit, 
hence the necessity of society’s transition to socialism. The new order based on morally 
upright citizens would be superior to capitalism based on excessive competition and it 
would eliminate the threat of totalitarian dictatorship either of the Left or of the Right. 
Epilogue 
The political fate of the Radicals was sealed by the Communist take-over in Hungary in 
1948. Their party was never formally dissolved, but vanished in late 1948 or 1949. Although 
dispersed as a group, the Radicals were not influential enough to be crushed by their 
opponents. Many were allowed to survive in the professions under Rakosi’s dictatorship, 
such as Marcell Benedek, writer and professor of literary history, textile-engineer and 
factory manager Jozsef Litvan, or chemist Zsigmond Kende. The homes of such ‘Girondins’ 
were ‘magic islands’, ‘embassies of Europe’ in Communist-controlled Hungary. 
The Radicals’ attitudes to the regime veered from the stoic to the romantic. In February 
1950 Rezso Homolyai once more referred to the ‘Girondists’: ‘Our activities in the past 
were mostly directed at solving urgent social problems. [...] Today these problems are 
handled by the state and the only thing that remains for us is to polish the rough stone, 
shaping and refining the soul.’10 In contrast, Rusztem Vambery, in a premonition, recalled 
the attitude of the Girondists who had been in the forefront of the Revolution but did not 
refrain from turning against it as soon as they realized that it had been led into a cul-de-sac 
by the new leaders. ‘They went to the scaffold with a clear conscience singing the 
Marseillaise, the bridal march of the Revolution, even under the gallows.’* 11 
8 Oszkar Jaszi: ‘Leszamolas a Katasztrofa elotf, Huszadik Szazad, 1947, pp. 363-75. 
9 Imre Csecsy, ‘A polgar es a szocializmus’, ibid., pp. 355-62. 
10 Kelet, 7 March 1950. 
11 Rusztem Vambery (criminologist, son of Armin Vambery, the orientalist), writing in Vilag, 1 
March 1946, p. 1. Hugh Seton-Watson’s valedictory may be worth recording: ‘There was 
something very sad and moving to me personally in my visits in 1946 and 1947 to Hungary, 
about the spectacle of people from the generation of 1914, who in their young years had fought 
an uphill struggle against the semi-feudal regime; who for a very brief period had shown their 
heads above the surface in 1918 when that regime collapsed; played a role; had been knocked 
down first by the Communist dictatorship of Bela Kun and then by the regime of Horthy; had 
recovered by the late 1920s but again been pushed out by the Gombos regime and its wartime 
successors; and now again they came bobbing up to the surface full of hopes and enthusiasm, 
only to be finally submerged in the noisome flood let loose by Rakosi and his boys’, Hugh 
Seton-Watson, 'Thirty Years After’ in Martin McCauley (ed.). Communist Power in Europe 
1944-1949, Basingstoke and London, 1977, pp. 226-27. 
20 British Political Attitudes to Hungary through 
the Workings of the British Component of the 
Allied Control Commission, 1945—47 
Eva Figder 
In the aftermath of the Second World War relations between the United Kingdom and each 
of the small states of Central Europe were in vary ing degrees conditioned by British 
perceptions of Soviet power and intentions. There was already a tendency in the Foreign 
Office to regard much of the area as having fallen within the ‘Soviet sphere of influence’ 
where local Communist Parties could be used ‘as direct instruments of Soviet policy’.1 
Nevertheless, British officials did not exclude the possibility of continuing co-operation 
with Britain’s former wartime allies. One possibility for continued co-operation was within 
the Allied Control Commissions (ACC) to be established in Germany and former satellite 
countries like Hungary7. 
The tripartite Allied Control Commission was set up in accordance with the terms of the 
Hungarian armistice2 signed on 20 January 1945 and was stationed in Hungary between 
January 1945 and September 1947. Its primary purpose was to supervise the enforcement 
of the armistice terms with Hungary until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Since 
Hungary had been liberated by Soviet forces, Soviet leadership prevailed within the 
Commission, which also implied a restricted scope of activity for the other two members, 
the British and the Americans. The statutes of the ACC were drawn up to meet the 
conditions of war with the agreement of all three constituent members. However, these 
statutes were not detailed enough to be effective. For example, due to the insufficient 
clarity of wording, one of the most important paragraphs led to constant 
misunderstandings, misinterpretations and conflicts.3 * * * 
In early 1945 the British were committed to sending their political and military 
representatives to Hungary, which had never been a British sphere of interest. However, 
the geographical position that Hungary occupied in the context of the emerging bipolar 
division of Europe compelled the British to commit resources and attention to Hungary’s 
future. This chapter examines the changing British attitude towards Hungary in the early 
stages of the Cold War through the workings of the British component of the Allied 
Control Commission. Naturally, the Hungarian context will, from time to time, be 
expanded to include Great-Power relations in the European context. An understanding of 
the changes in British attitudes towards Central Europe, and Hungary in particular, 
between 1945-47 is relevant to present-day issues such as the enlargement of the European 
Union and Britain’s relations with Central Europe. 
Because of the partial inaccessibility of primary sources, the workings of the ACC in 
Hungary have not been completely revealed. This chapter therefore still constitutes a 
1 M. E. Pelly, H. J. Yasamee et al. (eds). Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 1, vol. 6, 
‘Eastern Europe August 1945—April 1946’, London, 1991, pp. 46-49. 
2 United Nations Treaty Series, no. 471, pp. 405-19. 
3 The paragraph reads as follows: ‘The Soviet Chairman of the ACC will give directives on 
questions of principle to the Hungarian Government after agreement to those directives by the 
British and American representatives.’ It proved difficult to define what ‘questions of principle’ 
meant, let alone ‘after agreement with the British and the American representatives’. 
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working paper. 
In late February 1945 the seventy-eight-strong British Mission arrived in Hungary, 
having obtained permission from the Russians.4 According to the political directive5 issued 
to members of the Mission, their main task was to ‘ensure, in the closest collaboration with 
your Soviet and United States colleagues, that the terms of the armistice with Hungary are 
strictly carried out’. It acknowledged the Soviet government’s principal role in enforcing 
the armistice because Hungary was a Soviet theatre of war.6 However, any Soviet attempt 
to encroach on Hungarian sovereignty or independence, warned the directive, should be 
resisted by the British. Although the British accepted the effective Soviet domination in 
enforcing the armistice terms, there was ‘no question of abdicating our claim to have an 
equal share at the peace settlement and in the post-war period in all questions affecting 
Hungary’. 
Hostilities had not yet ceased in Hungary and there was no representative government. 
Therefore the members of the Mission could not be instructed which political party or 
personality they should support. ‘Much will clearly depend’, continued the document, 
‘upon the Soviet attitude towards the present Government and regime’. 
The first few meetings with the members of the Hungarian government and the Russian 
representatives of the ACC convinced the British political representative that as long as the 
Hungarians obediently fulfilled Russian wishes, ‘the Russian policy will be one of 
liberality towards them’.7 One month had already passed, but no meeting of the ACC took 
place, and any initiative on the part of the British and Americans was obstructed by the 
Russians, which caused considerable frustration. Therefore the British were not surprised 
when it was deliberately secretly leaked from Hungarian government circles that 
Hungarian officials had been warned indirectly not to have close relations with the British 
and the Americans.8 The first major conflict arose in connection with the land reform 
which was introduced by an executive decree without the consent of the Hungarian 
Provisional National Assembly. It was obvious that the reform had been forced through by 
the Russians. The British argued that Marshal Voroshilov, the Russian Chairman of the 
ACC, was acting outside his remit as Chairman of the ACC because land reform was an 
internal affair for the Hungarian government.9 Further, both the British and the Americans 
should have been consulted in advance.10 The land reform was, no doubt, a cornerstone of 
post-war politics despite some of its weaknesses and, given the abortive land distribution 
in 1919 by Count Karolyi, it was inevitable. There was hardly any person or party who 
would have objected to this measure in principle, though a less drastic reform might have 
been carried out without Communist influence. Considering the messy internal political 
and economic situation, it could be argued that the way the reform was carried out was 
justified. Naturally, the Hungarian Communists exploited the reform in order to win 
favourable publicity and to increase sympathy for themselves and their Russian backers.11 
4 As severe fighting had been going on in the streets of Budapest, the British arrived at a 
provincial town in eastern Hungary, Debrecen, which also served as the seat of the Provisional 
National Government established in December 1944. 
5 Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), FO 371/48478. 
6 Hungary was finally liberated by the Soviets on 4 April 1945. 
7 PRO FO 371/48479. 
8 PRO FO 371/48467. 
9 Prior to the announcement of the decree, self-appointed committees started distributing land to 
the peasants throughout the country. 
10 Compare Article 18 of the armistice. 
11 Later on the decree was formally put before the National Assembly, which duly gave its 
consent. 
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The number of reports giving gloomy accounts of the lack of food-stocks, and projecting 
unusually low production that year, increased. Because it was the Hungarian government’s 
responsibility to feed the occupying Red Army, the Russian chairman often referred to 
Article 11 of the armistice and stated in no uncertain terms that the control of food supplies 
and related matters no longer constituted an internal affair. The Foreign Office thought that 
the severe shortage of foodstuffs would provoke political unrest in a country which was a 
‘breeding ground for Communism’.12 They also suspected that the Hungarian situation 
would help increase the impending famine in Europe. 
Subsequent to the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the need arose to reorganize the 
Control Commissions in the former satellite countries. This second period was to last until 
the conclusion of the peace treaties. At the time of the Potsdam Conference there was a 
frequent exchange of letters concerning the matter. In his minute to Winston Churchill, 
Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote the following: ‘We want nothing 
specific about Hungary at the present Conference, apart from the improvement of the 
status of our Control Commissions and the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on 
liberated areas.’13 In other minutes exchanged between senior FO officials two underlying 
issues were exhaustively discussed. One was the conclusion of peace treaties with the 
defeated countries and the replacement of ‘the present puppet governments’.14 By holding 
free and fair elections, the will of the majority of the people would inaugurate a democratic 
government; thereby the principles undertaken in the Yalta Declaration were to be 
fulfilled. Further, the victorious Western powers would be willing to sign the peace treaties 
with these new democratically elected governments. 
The Soviets also called for the reorganization of the Control Commissions. Their 
proposal differed in the case of Hungary, where directives were to be issued after they had 
been agreed to by the British and the Americans. In Hungary the chairman of the 
Commission had the right to decide on questions concerning members’ entering and 
leaving the country. In other countries where Control Commissions operated, directives 
were to be issued after preliminary discussion with the British and American represen¬ 
tatives. After some deliberation, the British decided that the Hungarian position appeared 
to be most satisfactory from their point of view. Eventually, the Allies agreed to the 
revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, Bulgaria, 
Romania and Hungary and accepted the Soviet proposal for Hungary as a basis.15 
British diplomacy in Eastern Europe was more usually handicapped by a lack of 
materials and of a physical presence with which to achieve its objectives than by an 
absence of formal rights. This was particularly apparent in the case of the former German 
satellites, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, from whose Soviet-sponsored regimes the 
British government continued to withhold diplomatic recognition, since it was unable to 
consider them ‘as representative or democratic within the meaning of the Potsdam 
decisions’. Nevertheless, Great Britain, like the United States, maintained political 
representatives in Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, in each of which cities an Allied Control 
12 A most surprising remark on Hungary. First, Hungarians have always regarded themselves as a 
rebellious nation under foreign rule. Moreover, fifty years of the Communist experiment 
proved unsuccessful, not only in fne end but throughout the period, to varying degrees 
Hungary’s dissent from mainstream communist ideas was always obvious. Secondly, in no 
other document produced by the Foreign Office that I have seen was there any such reference 
to Hungary. 
13 R. Butler and M. E. Pelly (eds), Documents on British Policy Overseas, series 1, vol. 1, 'The 
Conference at Potsdam’, London, 1984, p. 436. 
14 Ibid., p.762. 
15 Ibid., pp. 699-701. 
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Commission was established. The ACC, whose primary purpose was to supervise the 
enforcement of the armistice terms, provided the two Western powers with additional 
opportunities for influencing internal developments, and Ernest Bevin, the new Foreign 
Minister, thought it in Britain’s interest to ensure that their functions were not restricted 
and that, if possible, their competence should be extended to cover such matters as public 
security, control of demonstrations and censorship. At the same time he required that all 
three posts be kept informed of actions taken by the others.16 Their reports left him under 
the impression that in Bulgaria, as in Hungary, the Soviets were set upon manipulating 
elections in order to ensure the continuation of a ‘government completely subservient to 
Moscow’ and ‘to show the world that its government is representative’.17 According to C. 
A. Macartney, then a political adviser at the Foreign Office Research Department, Bevin’s 
statement that no peace treaties would be concluded and no diplomatic relations resumed 
with East European countries until a ‘representative’ government came into power, would 
discourage democratic elements in these countries; thus ‘the British are playing into the 
hands of the Communists’.18 Macartney suggested that Bevin’s remark be accompanied by 
a strong caution: elections alone would not make a government representative; the 
electoral law and the conduct of the elections had to be fair, too. 
The Bulgarian elections in August 1945 were rigged by the Soviets; a joint list was 
introduced in order to ensure Communist victory. Therefore the postponement of the 
Hungarian elections by two months was a much welcomed development. When in October 
municipal elections in Hungary resulted in a striking victory for the moderate 
Smallholders’, the Foreign Office saw this as an encouraging sign with regard to the 
results of the general elections to be held in November 1945. This victory, at the same 
time, was found surprising because an obviously peasant-dominated party could capture 
the majority of votes in Budapest, where the largest number of industrial workers and 
middle-class voters was concentrated. In a wider context, this was the first ‘encouraging 
sign’ that the Russian Bear might not necessarily dig its claws into all countries it 
liberated, and thus new democracies could spring up in the region, democracies deemed to 
be so by Western standards. A. D. F. Gascoigne, the British political representative in 
Hungary, was less optimistic. Hungarian government officials unofficially informed him 
that the Soviets were demanding that all parties should join in presenting a common 
electoral list. Gascoigne predicted that if the Smallholders’ refused, the Soviets would 
‘tighten the screw economically’, that they might ‘possibly arrange for further widespread 
outbreaks of unrest’, and that the Communists might try to stage an armed coup. He 
therefore cautioned Bevin against accepting an unofficial Hungarian representative in 
London as ‘it might be unwise to count our democratic chickens before they are hatched’. 
In the event, however, elections held on 4 November appeared to conform with democratic 
principles, and the Smallholders’ won 57 per cent of the votes polled.19 
The Foreign Office welcomed this satisfactory development which, two or three months 
before, they had not expected. Hungary became the second country under occupation after 
Finland to hold fair elections.20 Now an unofficial Hungarian representative as Minister 
Delegate could be received in London. However, the distribution of government portfolios 
was a great surprise as it did not reflect the result of the elections. According to Sir Orme 
16 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds), Documents in British Policy Overseas, ‘Eastern Europe August 
1945-April 1946’, pp. 40-42. 
17 PRO FO 371/48465. 
18 PRO FO 371/48465, Macartney’s memorandum of 21 August 1945. 
19 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds), Documents in British Policy Overseas, ‘Eastern Europe August 
1945-April 1946’, pp. 157—61, 199-201. 
20 PRO FO 371/48477. 
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Sargent, deputy under-secretary at the Foreign Office, indirect Soviet pressure nullified to 
a large extent the result of the elections. The Communists were allotted the Ministry of the 
Interior, with full control of the police and the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, there 
were Communist under-secretaries of state in all other ministries and in other key 
positions. 
Gascoigne was convinced that the Soviet authorities were seeking to use the Communist 
Party to impose their political will on Hungary. They seemed equally determined to take 
advantage of their military occupation of the country to maintain their economic pre¬ 
eminence there as elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A Soviet-Hungarian agreement of August 
1945 had provided for Soviet participation in almost every sphere of the Hungarian 
economy, and Stuart of the Foreign Office’s Southern Department was in little doubt that 
this would be ‘converted into domination’. Bevin was at first reluctant to accept 
Gascoigne’s similarly gloomy assessment of the implications of the agreement. He 
believed that Britain’s ‘strongest card to play with the Hungarians [was] the prospect of 
trade with the west’, and he wanted ‘to take no steps to make unnecessary difficulties with 
Russia’. But the Russians were unwilling to discuss the matter within the ACC, and the 
Hungarians, who whether reluctant or not lacked the courage to secure any satisfactory 
substitute from either the Americans or the British, eventually yielded to Soviet threats and 
ratified the agreement.21 By December it was only too apparent that in Hungary the 
meetings of the ACC did not match the requirements of the statutes agreed at Potsdam, and 
that, as Gascoigne noted, the Russians were formulating policy and carrying it out without 
any prior reference to the representatives of Britain and the United States.22 
The Board of Trade’s interest in establishing relations with Hungary may have resulted 
from the encouraging signs in Hungarian political life, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
from the need to penetrate the East European market, which entailed mild political 
penetration. British views concerning possible trade with Hungary varied. Letters sent 
from the Board of Trade to the Treasury emphasized the importance of establishing 
economic ties with Hungary mainly for two reasons. First, there were enormous stocks of 
British wool available for which they could not find a market. Secondly, this small amount 
of assistance would have helped Hungary to ‘keep a window open to the West’.23 The 
Foreign Office did not deny the political advantages in granting credit for the purchase of 
wool. However, as a result of a tentative credit to Hungary, they expected similar requests 
from Yugoslavia, Greece and other countries, which ‘might be difficult to refuse’.24 
Another view did not rule out the possibility of helping Hungary in a ‘modest way’ 
through the ACC, but noted that any concrete proposal had so far met with frustration in 
every case. Hungary was not considered as ‘a suitable object for [the] export drive’. Its 
public credit-worthiness was rated at zero and it could not offer anything which the British 
might want in exchange for their products. 
By the beginning of 1946 it was evident to the Foreign Office that its ability to influence 
events in those areas of central and south-eastern Europe that were under Soviet 
occupation was limited. This was just as clear in the economic as it was in the political 
sphere. A paper of 12 March 1946, the final draft of which was prepared by the Economic 
Relations Department, drew attention to the way in which the Soviets were seeking to 
exploit and remould the economies of the region. It was believed that the primary motive 
for this policy was the rapid reconstruction of the Soviet Union. They also thought that, by 
21 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds). Documents in British Policy Overseas, ‘Eastern Europe August 
1945—April 1946’, pp. 170-77. 
22 Ibid., pp. 220-25. 
23 PRO FO 371/48520. 
24 Ibid. 
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integrating the economies of the East European countries with its own, the Soviet Union 
would want to reinforce its domination and make it more difficult for them to function 
separately from the Soviet system. But harmful though Soviet policies might be to British 
economic interests, Britain’s pre-war investments in, and trade with, these countries were 
small. There was in any case little that Britain could do to prevent the Soviets from 
establishing an economic stranglehold over such countries as Bulgaria, Romania and 
Hungary, and at this stage Britain did not consider obtaining the financial support of the 
United States. There was ‘no striking panacea’ which could be applied to Eastern Europe. 
The Soviets were too close and the memory of their overwhelming physical strength too 
recent. Governments of the area could not be expected to take any step that might displease 
Moscow, and this made it essential that any British counteraction be unobtrusive and of a 
rather general character. ‘The best we can do is to hold a door open — or hold enough 
doors open — for the Eastern Europeans to catch frequent glimpses of a more attractive 
and prosperous world in the West and be encouraged, when the occasion offers, to pass 
through.’25 
In late March 1946 a British parliamentary' delegation was sent on a study tour to 
Hungary with the explicit objective of discovering areas of potential co-operation between 
the two countries.26 (The Hungarian Political Police, by then completely under the control 
of the Communist Party, attached so much importance to the visit that fifty of its agents 
closely followed the movements of the delegation.) During the ten-day visit their 
assessment of the political situation was as follows: ‘a sense of purpose and political 
awareness was shown by almost the entire population. This was undoubtedly due to the 
new democratic opportunities provided by the recent Electoral Law [...]. They were 
convinced that there were ‘now established in Hungary the seeds of a new democracy 
which, given encouragement and understanding to enable it to surmount present 
difficulties and evident “growing pains” may finally establish itself along Western 
parliamentary lines’. They believed that Britain could best show her sympathy by 
contributing in such tangible ways as were possible towards a just and lasting peace, not 
only in Hungary but in the whole Danube Basin. 
In March 1946 the British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee issued a revised report on 
‘Russia’s Strategic Interests and Intentions’,27 based on a careful study of the prevailing 
situation. It concluded that the short-term aim of the Soviet Union was to avoid war with 
the Western Bloc. Meanwhile, if any dangerous attempts were made to undermine the 
Soviet Union’s position in the countries which had been tacitly recognized as part of its 
sphere of influence, it would use any means it had to retaliate. In areas such as the 
Mediterranean, Turkey and Persia, where it was likely to face a strong combined Anglo- 
American resistance, it would extend its cordon sanitaire. It would extend its political 
influence wherever it was possible, for example, promoting Communist Parties in the 
West. Although the Soviet Union would try to avoid war in the near future, it was alarming 
that demobilization was slow, and Soviet forces and industry still operated on a wartime 
footing. ‘In brief’, the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee reported, ‘although the intention 
25 PRO FO 371/48520. 
26 PRO FO 371/59050. The visit took place between 23 April and 5 May 1946. Members of the 
mission: Richard Adams (Labour MP for Balham & Tooting), Stanley Evans (Labour MP for 
Wednesbury), John Haire (Labour MP for Wycombe; leader of the delegation), David Jones 
(Labour MP for Hartlepool), J. A. Lanford-Holt (Conservative MP for Shrewsbury), Hugh 
Linstead (Conservative MP for Putney), G. Wadsworth (Liberal MP for Buckrose), F. T. 
Willey (Labour MP for Sunderland). 
Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds). Documents in British Policy Overseas, ‘Eastern Europe August 
1945—April 1946’, pp. 297-301. 
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may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian 
leaders may misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with America and 
ourselves.’28 
By early 1947 the so-called salami tactics employed by the Communist Party was in full 
swing. It entailed the gradual elimination of political opponents. In mid-1947 the first 
democratically elected minister president of Hungary, Ferenc Nagy, was prevented from 
returning to Hungary after his holiday in Switzerland. The Political Police were using 
methods similar to those employed in the Soviet Union during the purges in the 1930s. In 
this atmosphere of terror Denis Healey visited Hungary to attend the annual congress of 
the ‘Social Democratic Party’. He went as Labour representative with a view to helping the 
Party to stay alive. He found that the ‘icy winter which gripped the country symbolised its 
politics’.29 At first glance the conference had a slight air of a Nazi rally given by the 
presence of attendants dressed sloppily in white shirts, red armbands and ties, and military 
hats. Otherwise it appeared orderly and democratic — more like an English than a French 
or Italian conference. He quickly perceived what the battle behind the scenes was:30 
questions of power and representation; on these issues the so-called right wing failed to 
hold the extreme left in check. 
As regards relations with the Communist Party, he felt considerable friction. First, the 
workers disliked the agreement by which leading factory positions were shared equally 
irrespective of the strength of the two parties. Secondly, fusion was not even considered. 
Contrary to the general view held by the British Legation, he thought that Soviet influence 
did not depend mainly on the Control Commission and the occupation troops, of whom 
there were only about 20,000 tucked away in a comer of Hungary. Consequently, it would 
not greatly diminish after the ratification of the peace treaty. Many Hungarians thought 
that the Soviets might ratify and fulfil the conditions within six weeks of signing. 
According to Healey, Soviet influence depended mainly on the Communist Party, on 
political and military policy, economic power, petty persecution and physical terror. 
He concluded that the ‘Social Democratic Party’ was a genuine and sincere party of old 
Socialists. It was, moreover, the only tolerable alternative to Communism in Hungary. The 
present tension between Socialists and Communists would grow. When the crucial 
decision was to be made, the Socialist leaders would be influenced by their estimate of the 
help which the Western parties would give them morally as a party and economically as a 
government. Unless Hungary received considerable credits from the West, a ‘Social 
Democratic’ internal policy would become impossible. 
Under the Communist Minister of the Interior, non-Communists were removed from the 
administration, and trials of war criminals and political opponents took place on a large 
scale in 1947.31 Nationalization of the economy was proceeding at full tilt. At the rigged 
general elections of 1947, the Communists gained a victory over the Smallholders’, though 
by no means a landslide victory.32 By then the non-Communist parties were disintegrating 
as a result of constant pressure. In 1948 the Social Democrats had no choice but to merge 
with the Communists; thus the one-party system, the final stage of Communist take-over, 
was firmly established, with the backing of the occupying Red Army. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life, London, 1990, p. 85. 
30 PRO FO 371/67191, Healey’s report dated 10 February 1947. 
31 On the pretext of a nationalist plot, the Communists successfully discredited some of the 
Smallholders’ leaders; thus the weakened Smallholders’ became increasingly vulnerable. 
32 The Communists gained 22.3 per cent as opposed to the Smallholders’ 15.4 per cent. 
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Conclusion 
In 1945 it was not obvious that the road to Communism was already being systematically 
built by the Soviets and their Hungarian stooges. The immediate pressure was mitigated by 
the fact that the Hungarian Communists were eager to outdo Soviet requests. They were 
meticulous political workers who, with perfectly tailored demagogy and timing, could win 
the support of large sections of the people. 
The Soviets slight improved conditions for the sharing of responsibility in the work of 
the Control Commission. Questions of policy remained in Soviet hands, but both the 
British and the Americans hoped to conclude peace treaties fairly soon. For that reason 
they lost interest in improving the status of their Missions. 
Documentary evidence seems to suggest that by early 1946 mutual hostility and mistrust 
prevailed in Anglo-Soviet relations. The British did not underestimate the possible threat 
that the Soviet Union posed. However, they were confident in believing that if they 
developed a firm political line, buttressed by American aid, an imminent war could be 
avoided and, at the cost of lack of commitment to Eastern Europe, their traditional spheres 
of influence could be retained. With regard to Eastern and Central Europe, the British 
undertook the implementation of the Yalta Declaration, which in Hungary’s case was 
fulfilled. The British political representative feared that Hungary would be sovietized due 
to the extent of direct Soviet intervention in Hungarian internal affairs. The Foreign Office 
doubted Soviet aspirations to sovietize Hungary and found the gloomy reports coming 
from Budapest exaggerated, and so they still emphasized the notion of collaboration with 
the Soviets. They wanted to conclude peace treaties quickly, recognized the Soviet need to 
build up buffer states, thus confirming that Hungary, together with other countries of the 
region, belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence. This was the price the British had to 
pay for keeping their traditional spheres of influence and maintaining their leadership in 
the Italian Commission. In addition, the British attitude was that, until Germany’s position 
was clarified, everything else could wait. 
Official Foreign Office thinking on the Soviet Union shifted substantially in 1946 
towards the views long held by the Chiefs of Staff. The result was a new Russia 
Committee to monitor Soviet conduct and publicity. One of the shapers of this policy was 
Sir Frank Roberts, then charge d’affaires at the Moscow embassy. He stated that Soviet 
security had become hard to distinguish from Soviet imperialism, and that it was 
questionable whether there was a limit to Soviet expansionism. However, it was not until 
the creation of the Cominform in October 1947 that Bevin and the Cabinet echoed the 
view of the Russia Committee. The aim of British policy should now be to ‘reinforce the 
physical barriers which still guard our Western civilisation of which we are the 
protagonists. This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western 
Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by America and the 
Dominions.’33 
Reports from the British Legation in Budapest regarding the internal political situation 
became gloomier by the day. S. D. Stewart, a senior member of the British mission, 
described it as follows. T do not know whether there can be such a thing as a premeditated 
and planned chaos. There are some who say that here we have the proof that there can be. 
But it is difficult to imagine even the most prolonged premeditation and the most detailed 
planning proving so utterly successful.’34 
On the other hand, the final report by the commissioner of the British component of the 
ACC, giving an assessment of their activities in Hungary, sounded a trifle more 
33 See Hugh Seton-Watson, The East European Revolution, London, 1950, pp. 169-71. 
34 PRO CAB 129/23; PRO FO 371/59010 
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optimistic.35 It did not deny the fact that Allied control had never really been on a tripartite 
basis. With one power in such dominant position, ‘it is difficult to see what one would 
expect, especially with the Soviet mentality.’36 Therefore, the British and the American 
components of the ACC had chiefly remained observers. Still, Major-General Edgcumbe, 
the British Commissioner, firmly believed that the British and Americans had a 
considerable influence within the Commission and had ‘acted as a brake on their Soviet 
colleagues’ since meetings were held on a regular basis and the agenda submitted by them 
enabled them to raise any questions they wished to discuss. However, he also admitted that 
their activities were restricted because the statutes of the ACC limited direct access on the 
part of the members of the Hungarian government to the Soviet representatives. Moreover, 
their freedom of movement in the country was often curtailed by the High Command of 
the occupying Soviet forces. 
As regards Hungarians, the British had taken special care to avoid making special friends 
with any particular political group or class of people. Thus cordial relations were 
maintained with everyone; so much so that two officers and twenty other ranks married 
Hungarians during those two and a half years. ‘Hungarians’, summed up the 
Commissioner, ‘are on the whole very pleasant people, and in many respects are highly 
cultured. They generally give the impressions of being efficient and hard-working. Apart 
from outside influences, if they could think less about politics and their past, they should 
be capable of becoming a true democracy.’37 
All in all, the British mission was considered to have fulfilled its function as 
satisfactorily as possible in relation to the Allied Control Commission, having regard to the 
situation in Hungary. Little though they could do to help Hungary remain neutral and 
democratic in the Western sense of the word, ‘the Mission has done its utmost to maintain 
British prestige’.38 
35 PRO FO 371/67209B, written by Major-General O. P. Edgcumbe, dated 15 September 1947. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
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Peter Bugge 
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Throughout his life the literary historian and critic Vaclav Cemy (1905-87) remained a 
controversial figure in Czech intellectual life. This was very much due to Cemy’s appetite 
and talent for polemics and to his eminently moralizing approach to art as well as life.* 1 The 
years 1945^48 formed no exception to this rule. After his release from a German prison 
and a brief spell of political activism in the Czech National Council Cemy returned to 
Prague University as professor of comparative literature. He also renewed his literary' 
journal Kriticky mesicnik (Critical Monthly, hereafter referred to as KM), founded in 1938 
and closed by the German occupation authorities in 1942. Cemy soon came to use KM as a 
platform for intense polemics especially with the Czech Communists. The strife turned 
into what might be described as a genuine ‘Kulturkampf, a struggle to define a doctrine 
for art and literature in a new socialist Czechoslovakia that culminated in the closing of 
KMm October 1948 and the imprisonment of Cemy for seven months in 1952-53. 
Cemy’s efforts have often been depicted as a fight for democracy and freedom against 
Communist authoritarianism,2 in which Cemy, like the ‘overwhelming majority of 
socialist-liberal democrats’, largely followed the political line of Edvard Benes and Jan 
Masaryk.3 Some have even interpreted Cemy’s activities as a ‘desperate attempt to save 
what could be saved’4 of the ideals of pre-war democratic humanism, that is, as a 
This chapter is a revised version of a paper, ’Vaclav Cemy aneb Zapad a Vychod’, presented at the 
conference ‘Vaclav Cemy — zivot a dilo’, Nachod 23-25 March 1995, and printed in Vera Brozova 
(ed.), Vaclav Cerny— zivot a dilo, Prague 1996, pp. 130-48. 
V 
1 Cemy’s autostylization as prosecutor and judge of Czech national weaknesses reached a climax 
in his memoirs (Pameti). The third volume in particular, covering the years 1945-72, is vitriolic 
in its verdicts on Czech society in general and its predominantly Communist cultural and 
academic elites in particular. 
2 Thus Vaclav Klaus found in these articles ‘a severe critique of the spiritual preparation of 
February 1948 and the admirable ability (and courage) of Vaclav Cemy to reveal the falseness 
of the at the time still seemingly democratic Communist ideologists.’ Vaclav Klaus, ‘Jeden z 
V w 
velkych Cechu’, Lidove noviny, 25 March 1995, p. 5. Cemy has generally had a very good 
press in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic since 1989, where he has been celebrated as a 
courageous anti-Communist moral and intellectual authority. 
3 R. Vevoda, ‘Vaclav Cemy jako “nepratelska osoba’” in Brozova (ed.), Vaclav Cemy— zivot a 
dilo, p. 337. One wonders what exactly a ‘socialist-liberal democrat’ stands for, but perhaps 
this terminological jumble is a fitting indicator of the ideological confusion among the non- 
Communist political elites in post-war Czechoslovakia. See Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, 
’Demokraten in der Sackgasse: Das Bild der kommunistischen Machtubemahme in den 
Memoiren besiegter tschechischer Politiker’ in the volume edited by her, Kommunismus und 
Osteuropa: Konzepte, Perspektiven und Interpretationen im Wandel, Munich, 1994, pp. 203- 
20. 
4 J. Homolac and P. Malek, ‘ 1945-1948 (I)’, Tvar, 8 1995, p. 16. See also M. Drapala, 
’Spisovatele na rozcestf, Soudobe dejiny, 4—5, 1994, pp. 450-62, and Peter Drews, ‘Zur 
Orientierungsdebatte in der tschechischen Kulturszene 1945-1948’ in Hans Lemburg (ed.), 
Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Pragung-Kontinuitat und Wandel in Ostmitteleuropa nach 
dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, Marburg, 1991, pp. 450-62. 
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predominantly defensive effort typical of the democrats as they were confronted with ever 
increasing Communist militancy after 1945. 
This last interpretation has, however, no support in Cerny’s own writings, neither then 
nor later. Cerny, like most of Czech society, had in 1945 no wish to return to anything pre¬ 
war. And, more important, Cerny saw his own activities not as defensive, but in a far more 
optimistic, forward-looking perspective. When a collection of his articles, Boje a smery 
socialisticke kultury (Struggles and trends in socialist culture), was published in 1946. 
Cerny wrote in the Preface: 
I am not proud that I have won the polemic about my thoughts ... I am just happy that I have 
helped with all my might to clarify the cultural situation here and that today opinions very 
close to the ones that I from the beginning fought for are suddenly being accepted as the 
basis of this life, shared by all who have a truly new life at heart, and also because those with 
whom I often had to fight about them — though without admitting it for God’s sake — 
tacitly accepted them and began to apply them.5 
With a certain tragic irony Cerny repeated this idea in one of his last articles in KM, 
published on 20 February 1948, a polemic with the Soviet critic R. Kuznetsova. Cerny had 
not, he claimed, subscribed as suggested by Kuznetsova to the cultural programme of the 
Communist Party. On the contrary some Communists (Vincent Kramar) had taken over his 
opinions as he had fought for them with the Communists. And, he added, ‘it has now been 
fought to victory here!’6 In his Pameti (Memoirs), written in the early 1970s, Cerny 
remained equally categorical: 
For nearly a quarter century it was the last big polemical campaign on the meaning of our 
culture in the history of our modem education and literature. We won it factually and 
morally, but it was, of course, beyond our powers to prevent the dusk and soon the complete 
night descending over our national cultural consciousness: a moral and cultural victory can 
never in itself prevent and atone for political defeats; a cultural authority cannot stand in for 
an incompetent politician.7 
V" 
Cerny defined the theme of this ‘campaign’ in general terms as the question of the 
creative and spiritual freedom of the Czech nation. But although his opponents received 
nothing but scorn in the Pameti, Cerny remained vague about the exact nature of his own 
victorious arguments and viewpoints. In the following I shall therefore take a closer look at 
Cemy’s discourse in these crucial years, focusing particularly on his definition of the 
historical role of the Czech nation, his attitude to the USSR, his conception of socialism — 
and his perception of his opponents. 
East and West 
Cerny found his starting point in the lively debate on the ‘Eastern’ or ‘Western’ orientation 
of Czech cultural life after 1945. This, he claimed, was not a genuine conflict, since 
historically the Czechs were chosen to be open to all sides or even to reach a synthesis of 
East and West: ‘East and West, so that we can be our own, ourselves, as much and as well 
as possible. East and West, since we should not refrain from considering ourselves a mirror 
5 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Tato kniha’ in Vaclav Cerny, Skutecnost svoboda, Prague, 1995, pp. 145-49 
(146). 
6 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Kritika z Moskvy a odpoved’ na ni’, in ibid., pp. 214-24 (220). 
7 Vaclav Cerny, Pameti III, Brno, 1992, p. 73. The ‘we’ of the quotation is a pluralis majestatis\ 
in spite of a brief word of thanks to Frantisek Kovama and Pavel Eisner (ibid., p. 74), Cerny 
refers only to his own contributions, sees the whole debate as his fight with the Communists. 
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of the whole world and the centre of the world.’8 Since the beginning of their history the 
Czechs had been a Western nation, Cemy tells us. But it had also often sought moral 
support from Russia, and Czech Russophilia was a ‘natural and unforced love, our ancient 
self-preserving instinctual drive towards the broader family’, Cemy stated, following a 
well-established formula in Czech self-perception of the nation’s westemness, its need of 
Slav reciprocity and its avant-garde position among the nations of Europe.9 
Thus far Cemy has been solidly embedded in the Czech tradition, but some of his 
accents were new. In his presentation, ‘East’ and ‘West’ were de facto reduced to Russia 
and France while the other Slavs as well as Britain and the smaller Western European 
countries were largely neglected. Only the Moscow-Prague-Paris axis counted. And, more 
fundamentally, on this axis the East had unequivocally been given priority. Cemy 
explained this not merely as an expression of gratitude towards the liberators but also as a 
consequence of a change in the ‘constellation of political power’ which made the ‘Russian 
orientation [...] absolutely necessary, vitally necessary, and advantageous’.10 
One might claim, as has often been claimed, that Cemy here sought a balance between 
East and West, but in reality the two concepts play very different roles: France (the West) 
represents the best of a proud cultural, literary and political heritage, that is, the past, while 
Russia represents the future, first of all in the political and social sphere, but also in its 
cultural policies. Cemy, for example, is full of admiration for Stalin’s contribution to 
popularizing Maiakovskii* 11 and he praises the USSR for having been until recently the 
only country where it was possible to do something concrete and constructive to bring 
great literature closer to the people.12 Cemy sees in this fundamental difference between 
the two sides a great advantage for the Czechs, offering far more than a mere balancing of 
Eastern and Western impulses: 
At this moment we are in the world in the position of a privileged nation, since we are — 
next to the dreadfully exhausted Poles — the only nation with a markedly Western culture 
entering now into the sphere of a decisive Russian politico-cultural influence. The question 
of the longed-for synthesis has been given, nay even committed to our care for us to solve as 
the first and, perhaps, to set an example to all of Europe.13 
The Untouchable USSR 
V 
In these years Cemy clearly considered it a privilege to belong to the Russian sphere of 
influence and what separates him from Julius Heidenreich-Dolansky, Ladislav Stoll or 
other radical ‘Easterners’ is more his insistence on Czech national uniqueness than his 
8 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, 3—5, p. 73. 
9 Ibid., p. 70. Cemy here takes up an argument from F. X. Saida’s ‘Cesstvi a Evropa’ (,Salduv 
zdpisnik, 7, 1935, 7-8, pp. 226-31). This line of argument can, however, be traced back at least 
to the Czech National Revival to Josef Jungmann, Jan Kollar and Frantisek (Franz) Palacky. 
The notion of the Czechs as a chosen people was at the centre of T. G. Masaryk’s Ceska otazka 
(1895); he put his ideas on the 'Czech question’ into a broader historical context in his Svetova 
revoluce (Prague, 1925, chapters. 117-19). On Cemy’s Slavophilia see Antonin Mest’an, 
‘ Vaclav Cemy a Slovane’, Brozova (ed.), Vaclav Cerny— zivot a dilo, pp. 156—68. 
10 Cemy, ‘Mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, p. 70. 
11 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Cesta literatury k lidu a lidu k literature’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1946, 14—16. 
p. 321. 
12 Ibid., p. 312. 
13 Vaclav Cemy, ‘JeSte jednou: mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, 6-7, 
p. 141. 
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attitude to the USSR, which Cerny in 1945 did not hesitate to call ‘the paragon and source 
of a moral example’.14 In fact, in the whole period Cerny did not allow for a single word of 
criticism of the USSR or Soviet policies, from himself or from colleagues.15 
In 1945 KM printed two articles by Karel Brusak on contemporary English literature, in 
which the author allowed himself to speak positively about social and cultural life in 
Britain and to recommend a Czech cultural orientation in this direction.16 Although the 
author only once briefly mentioned the USSR it clearly appeared that he was not among its 
admirers. This brought the young Communist critic Jin Hajek to attack Cerny vehemently 
for giving room to such ‘treacherous anti-Soviet agitators’ in his journal.17 Cerny did 
defend his author’s honour, but he remarked —contrary to the truth — that he did not 
know Brusak personally, that they had met only once, and that he had received the articles 
on Kamil Bednar’s recommendation,18 but he was equally specific about Brusak’s 
opinions: ‘some statements of Brusak [...] reveal an unfavourable political attitude to the 
Soviet Union. I categorically say that my attitude to the [Soviet] Union is the opposite and 
that it is necessary to refute Brusak’s as erroneous and harmful.’19 
Similarly, in his speech at the Congress of Czech Writers on 17 June 1946 Cerny did not 
hesitate to ridicule Andre Gide, whom he otherwise admired, and his ‘well-known little 
book’ (.Retour de I’URSS), which he had reviewed very favourably ten years before,20 for 
the manner, full of misunderstanding, in which he reacted to the cult with which the Soviet 
collective honours Stalin’s personality. This poet all his life proclaimed the greatness of 
the creative individual, indeed at times even the justification of the non-creative individual: 
but in Russia it suddenly causes him trouble to understand and accept the reality of a great 
personality, adored by the collective to the point of manifestations of childish devotion.21 
A final example can be found in Cerny’s reaction to Zhdanov’s attacks in the autumn of 
1946 on Akhmatova and Zoshchenko and thus on the few remnants of artistic freedom left 
in the USSR. One might expect a few words in the writers’ defence from Cerny, but he 
explicitly refused to do so for reasons imbued with political opportunism: ‘in the whole 
14 Ibid., p. 144. 
15 I thus cannot agree with the authors of the entry Kriticky mesicnik in Lexikon ceske literatury 
V 
2/II K-L, Prague, 1993, p. 981, when they claim that Cerny 'criticized the Zhdanovite official 
cultural-political programme and the cultural situation in the USSR’. 
16 See Karel Brusak, ‘Soucasna anglicka poesie’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, pp. 3-5, and Karel 
Brusak, ‘Anglicky roman za valky’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, pp. 6-7. 
17 Jin Hajek, ‘Doc. V. Cerny a Kamil Bednar’, Generace, 2, 1946, p. 287. Reprinted in Cerny, 
Skutecnost svoboda, pp. 286—88. 
18 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Hrst poznamek k polemice vecne i nevecne’, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 3, 
p. 71. As Brusak confirmed in London in April 1998, he and Cerny met regularly in Prague in 
1945 and had no need for intermediaries to hand over manuscripts. Eventually, Cerny, when 
editing the articles, weakened their criticism of Zhdanov. I am grateful to Karel Brusak for 
illuminating this incident. 
v r v 
19 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Utoky na mne aneb Trojsti kone bez Reku’, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, p. 159. 
Cerny certainly did not follow Brusak’s suggestions. In the years 1945-47 (I have not had 
access to the 1948 volume) not a single translation from English appeared in the KM. 
20 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Humanista Gide a stalinsky komunismus. Nad posledni Gideovou knihou’, 
Lidove noviny, 10 January 1938. Reprinted in Cerny, Tvorba a osobnost /, Prague, 1992, 
pp. 595-7. 
21 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Osobnost a kolektivum’, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 12-13, p. 278. Ten years 
before Cerny had written: ‘The ideal is here an absolute conformism, absolute impersonalis- 
ation; this is directly connected to the slavishly fawning cult of Stalin’s personality: Gide brings 
simply delightful examples of this.’ Cerny, ‘Humanista Gide a stalinsky komunismus’, p. 278. 
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world of today the Soviet purge is a most welcome titbit for the reactionaries. And this — I 
admit quite openly and I calmly risk my reputation on this declaration — is enough for me 
not to bring as much as a single little word of dissent in this matter.’22 Cemy further 
justified his attitude with reference to the inner needs of the Soviet state. Being unable to 
defend the purge from a cultural-policy perspective, Cemy sought instead to present Soviet 
behaviour as mere ‘political politics’, inspired not by a ‘definite view on the character of 
the artist’s work and being’ but by thought for the Soviet reader, who at that moment had 
to have defensive fighting spirit engraved in his mind. Cemy’s conclusion was: ‘I believe 
that the Soviet regime acts as it does in the spirit of a deliberate sacrifice, imposed upon it 
willy-nilly, and in no other spirit. And I assure you here, if you expect the the opposite, 
that no word will pass my lips that could belittle or defame the decision of the Russian 
Bolshevik party.’23 
The sacrosanctity of the USSR and its leaders was also used as a device in Cemy’s 
polemics with domestic Communists. Cemy constantly confronted the spiritual poverty of 
his local opponents with the greatness of the Soviet paragons, accusing the former of not 
knowing or understanding Soviet theory or practice. In questions of cultural politics and 
theory Cemy in these years quoted only five people (apart from the left-wing National 
Revivalist F. M. Klacel): Marx, Engels, Bakunin, Lenin and Stalin, with a preference for 
the last two. Also, the quotations always had the same function, to express an opinion or a 
rule with which the author identified.24 
‘We’ and ‘They’ 
In the polemics, the Communists may appear as Cemy’s great opponents, but this is true 
only in the sense that they are the addressees of much of his argument, the objects of his 
persuasion. And Cemy was in 1946 and again in 1948 quite convinced that he had 
succeeded in inducing them to accept his opinions. In Cemy’s discourse, the opposition 
Cemy-Communists was thus subordinated to a greater opposition of socialists on the one 
hand and the reactionaries on the other. ‘The morrow is ours’, Cemy proudly exclaims, 
and his ‘We’ are the builders of a new socialist culture, ‘the only rightful heirs to [...] the 
culture of former times’.25 Cemy often repeated that the Communists were an integral part 
of this team of socialists engaged in the ‘social restructuring and re-education of the people 
that is today our chief common task’,26 and in 1946 he stated that his relationship to the 
Communist Party7 of Czechoslovakia was ‘necessarily positive’27 since he accepted its goal 
of a Communist restructuring of human society in both its forms and its full extent. 
V 
22 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Sovetska cistka, ceska kocovina a leccos jineho, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 17- 
18, p. 386. 
23 Ibid., p. 387. 
V 
24 Cemy’s fervent enthusiasm for Lenin and Stalin goes far beyond mere time-serving lip-service 
or purely tactical manoeuvres to defend creative freedom by referring to authorities recognized 
even as its opponents, as suggested by Drapala in ‘Spisovatele na rozcesti’, p. 453. Nor can it 
be explained as merely a wilful use of the conventions of the day, as proposed by Vevoda in 
'Vaclav Cemy jako '‘nepratelska osoba”’, p. 338. See, for instance, Cemy’s devoted article 
'Lenin a literatura’, Kulturnipolitika, 14, reprinted in Skutecnost svoboda, pp. 54—58. 
25 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Basnikova tmita cesta do socialisticke spolecnosti’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, 
9-10, p. 240. 
26 Vaclav Cemy, 'Prvni cislo Generace\ Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, 9-10, p. 263. 
Vaclav Cemy, ‘Do sluzeb socialniho pokroku a lidske svobody’ in Kultura na prahu zitrka, 
Prague, 1946; reprinted in Skutecnost svoboda, pp. 53—54 (54). 
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In 1946, the attitude of the Czech Communists to the Soviet purge, or to the question of 
the necessity of similar steps in Czechoslovakia, aroused certain doubts in Cerny. A few 
months before he had claimed to ‘stand on the same side’28 as the Communists, now he 
greeted Vaclav Rezac ‘from the other side’.29 But Cerny continued to appeal to the 
Communists to understand that with their attacks on him they were only damaging their 
common Socialist cause and helping the reactionaries.30 Even after the unpleasant 
V V 
experience of this debate Cerny kept using a ‘We’ in this sense, and before 1948 Cerny did 
not abandon his conviction that he was basically at one with the Communists in his goals 
and ideals.31 
The big ‘They’ in Cerny’s universe were the reactionaries, a more or less demonic, never 
truly identified, group of people always waiting for their chance to abuse the weakness of 
the Socialists. Cerny was vitriolic in his onslaught on the enemies of his socialist 
dawnings, talking of their ‘profaned nudity’ and their abuse of ‘Western’ labels to hide 
their own ‘inner poverty, deprived of content, programme and good advice’.32 
Cerny never bothered to mention the domestic reactionaries by name, nor did he ever 
mention or discuss anything said or done in the few Czech non-Socialist journals of the 
time.33 He did, however, clearly link reactionaries to the bourgeoisie as a class, while 
insisting that the liberation of Europe from Fascism was solely the work of the proletariat 
and the USSR.34 And in one of his rare discussions of events abroad — in his article on the 
Soviet purges — he listed Churchill, de Gaulle and the Americans as the true villains 
behind Soviet defensive measures,35 albeit without informing his readers about the 
character or nature of their wickedness. 
Cerny s Socialism 
V _ . 
Cerny made no secret of his Socialist convictions, calling himself a ‘scientific socialist’.36 
But, one might argue, his Socialism was of a libertarian kind, inspired by French and 
Russian socialists and anarchists like Proudhon and Bakunin, and Cerny never hesitated to 
stress the need for creative freedom under socialism. This is true, and especially his article 
from January 1948, ‘Socialisticky rok 1848 a jeho dedictvf (The Socialist Year 1848 and 
its Heritage), is a courageous testimony to these convictions. Cerny here described the 
ideologies of Proudhon and Marx as complementary rather than antagonistic entities 
V 
28 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Literatura umelecka a literatura uzitkova’, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 1-2, p. 2. 
29 Cerny, ‘Sovetska cistka, ceska kocovina a leccos jineho’, p. 391. 
30 Ibid., p. 388. 
31 Or, one might well argue, in fact before 1969. See Cerny, Pameti III, pp. 508ff. 
32 Cerny, ‘Jeste jednou: mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, p. 145. One can find several further 
examples of the same kind in his writings from these years. 
33 In 1947, Cerny did submit one footnote to Ferdinand Peroutka’s Dnesek (‘Nemci v Penklubu’, 
Dnesek, 13, 1947; reprinted in Skutecnost svoboda, pp. 175-80). See also Pameti III, p. 63. 
This expulsion of the ‘reactionaries’ well over the horizon out of sight is perpetuated in his 
memoirs, with the exception of one noteworthy remark about Pavel Tigrid (ibid., p. 502). 
V 
34 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Par slov o kultumim ethosu’, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 3, p. 66. 
V 
35 Cerny, ‘Sovetska cistka, ceska kocovina a leccos jineho’, p. 386. In his report from the PEN- 
Club congress in Zurich from 1947 Cerny noticed with regret the absence of Soviet writers 
(without reflecting upon the reasons for it), who could best have defended their country against 
American attacks. In their absence, Cerny was proud to tell, the Czechs and the Poles had 
worked hard to stop any attempt to criticize or damage their ‘absent friends’, Cerny, ‘Nemci v 
Penklubu’, pp. 177 and 180. 
V 
36 Cerny, ‘Do sluzeb socialniho pokroku...’, p. 53. 
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within Socialism and portrayed the victory of the German, Marxian position and the 
exclusion of Bakunin from the International in 1872 as the root of and reason for 
Socialism’s present shape and faults: 
Marxism lacks [...] reflection upon the autonomy of man and the substance of the human 
personality; it lacks respect for their value and often even the awareness, originally self- 
evident, that the meaning of Socialism is not to take public power, control the state and exult 
in its own power, but immediately and without end to increase the sphere of that autonomy 
and the possibilities for the development of a free personality.37 
It would nevertheless be misleading to present Cemy’s socialism as a complete 
alternative to the Marxism-Leninism of the Communists or to juxtapose the two as 
opposites. First, Cemy himself strove hard to prevent any such juxtaposition, stressing 
again and again the complementary nature of these two sides of socialism, their shared 
ideals and goals.38 And secondly, Cemy’s own perception of socialism was deeply 
influenced by Marxist-Leninist thought. 
Thus he accepted Lenin’s theory of the state in both its fundamental dimensions: its 
notion of the nature of the state as a mere instrument of the ruling class,39 and its idea of 
the historically necessary withering away of the state after the victory of Socialism.40 His 
rejection of‘bourgeois democracy’ was therefore similarly uncompromising: 
We know that in a society based on the power of money and social inequality there cannot be 
real freedom, no more for the artist than for anybody else: the freedom of the artist in a 
capitalist regime is just a masked dependence, dependence on the buyer, on the financial 
supporter, on the corrupter, on the money-bags [...]. But right now we see this regime 
crumbling and making way for a new order.41 
The artistic freedom that Cemy called for was thinkable only within a socialist order, 
and Cemy even made it conditional on support of this order. Thus he referred to ‘Lenin’s 
perceptive statement about freedom, which may also mean the freedom to shout, lie and 
write whatever one likes’ and continued: ‘No, such a freedom is not what we crave!’42 
Elsewhere we read that ‘society has the right to demand a positive social attitude in 
individual creative works’,43 and that ‘there is not, there truly cannot be literature against 
socialism’.44 To save Valery and other French, as we are told, only seemingly bourgeois 
avant-garde writers for socialism Cemy therefore argues that, in reality, these authors 
37 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Socialisticky rok 1848 a jeho dedictvl’, Kriticky mesicmk, 9, 1948, 3-4; 
reprinted in Skutecnost svoboda, pp. 198-211 (210). 
38 Lenin became again the highest authority in this question, since he, as Cemy reminded, ‘in all 
his criticism of anarchist revolutionary methods, did not stop repeating that the ultimate 
meaning and goal of both anarchism and Communist revolutionary socialism is the same’. 
Cemy, ‘Osobnost a kolektivum’, p. 287. 
39 ‘Lenin’s theory of the state — always a class state and always an oppressor [...] I, too, support 
it.’ Vaclav Cemy, ‘Ma odpoved’ bude tentokrat jeste kratsi’, Kriticky mesicmk, 8, 1947, 9-10, 
pp. 237ff. 
40 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Stat a basnik’, Kriticky mesicmk, 7, 1946, 10-11, p. 215. 
41 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Pozdrav mrtvym’, Kriticky mesicmk, 6, 1945, 1, p. 13. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Cemy, 'Osobnost a kolektivum’, p. 279. He continues: ‘The demand for a positive social 
attitude in an artistic work is here just a kind of moral and legal expression of the fact that an 
artist without an audience is just an actor, playing or making faces in the solitude of his room 
before the mirror.’ Ibid. What can a ‘legal expression of a positive social attitude’ mean here if 
not a legal intervention into the freedom of expression? 
44 Cemy, ‘Jeste jednou: mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, p. 6. 
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belong to the revolutionary artistic left, and quoting Engels he blames the Communists for 
a poor understanding of the dialectic that can explain this.45 
This proximity to Leninist views resulted in a complete negligence of all the institutional 
dimensions of ‘bourgeois democracy’. As products of a rotten social order they spurred no 
sympathy and Cerny did not even see a political problem in this, since in his (as in 
Lenin’s) perspective the withering away of the state under socialism was also the death of 
politics, its transformation to pure technicalities: ‘With the introduction of an association 
that excludes the class principle, the reality and, indeed, the very concept of political 
authority dissolves and actual political power vanishes as an expression of class 
antagonism.’46 
The notion that the running of socialist society was a mere administrative or technical 
matter void of political content also affected Cerny’s lexis. We have already met the phrase 
‘re-education of people’ and Cerny could also describe the elevation of popular 
understanding for great art as a problem ‘from the domain of social technology’.47 In the 
V 
Soviet call for propaganda literature Cerny saw an appeal to the writer not as an artist (his 
sense of quality prevented him from accepting this primitive kind of Socialist Realism),48 
but as ‘technicians of convincing [...] professionals of persuasion’49 Cerny found such 
demands justified — a social service — if understood as a means in the period of fighting 
for Socialism and not as a part of its substance, and so he de facto accepted a 
postponement for tactical reasons of the realization of the principle of artistic freedom. 
This purely functionalist perspective acknowledging no contradictions within Socialism 
V 
also affected Cerny’s view on the relationship between the individual (the artist) and 
society. The whole conflict ‘is one of those antitheses that are not substantially given in the 
concept of humanity itself. Instead it dwindles away as development goes on in the 
harmony of a synthesis or higher integration, in which both poles do continue to exist, but 
supplementing and empowering each other instead of refuting each other’.56 Cerny thus 
envisaged a development that eliminated even the possibility of a fundamental opposition 
between artist and society. In fact, he saw in socialism the precondition for the 
45 Cerny, ‘Basnikova tmitacesta ...’, p. 239. 
46 Vaclav Cerny, ‘Stat a basnik’, Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 10-11, p. 215. For Cerny, politics 
thus becomes, here as in his memoirs, a mere question of the morality and character of political 
leaders, and the problem of how legally and politically to delimit and control their powers lies 
V 
beyond his horizon. According to Schmidt-Hartmann Cerny was, however, in this respect fully 
in accordance with the then prevailing political culture in his country: Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, 
‘Das Konzept der “politischen Kultur” in der Tschechoslowakei 1945-1948’ in Lemburg (ed.), 
Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Pragung, pp. 195ff. See also A. J. Polan, Lenin and the End 
of Politics (1984) for a brilliant interpretation of Lenin’s The State and Revolution. 
47 Cerny, ‘Cesta literatury k lidu...’, p. 323. 
48 Cerny rejected Socialist Realism as it appeared in Jan Drda’s Nema barikada (The Silent 
Barricade, 1946), but he did not discard the concept or idea of Socialist Realism as such; on the 
V 
contrary he tried hard to develop a meaningful definition of it (Vaclav Cerny, ‘Hrst poznamek k 
V 
socialistickemu realismu’, Kriticky mesicnik, 8, 1947, 15-16). This explains how Cerny in the 
V 
same article could both declare himself a critic of Socialist Realism (Cerny, ‘Kritika z 
Moskvy...’, p. 223) and exclaim: ‘The writers of Czechoslovakia [...] are able to distinguish 
the genuine method of Socialist Realism from different surrogates and [...] in their hands this 
method will become a powerful tool for the building of a new Czechoslovak culture, socialist 
and at the same time ours, original and growing from our traditions and needs.’ Ibid., p. 224. 
49 Cerny, ‘Literatura umelecka a literatura uzitkova’, p. 7. 
50 Cerny, ‘Osobnost a kolektivum’, p. 285. 
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disappearance of the individual and individualism as essentially bourgeois categories, 
which would be replaced by a ‘personality’ (osobnost) emancipating itself from the 
randomness of its given individuality.51 So like Lenin’s socialist utopia, Cemy’s also 
removed any space for a genuine conflict of interests,52 and thus for the very things that 
give life to social and artistic processes. 
The Absence of World Events 
Cemy insisted that the artist had a duty to engage in public life, now more than ever in 
Czech national history.53 And yet it is remarkable how little Cemy’s writings in KM in 
these years reflected or reacted to events in the social or political sphere, domestic or 
international. He responded promptly, willingly and with great polemical verve to every 
event in Czech cultural debates, but apart from that Cemy’s writings seem to have taken 
place in a strange no man’s land: there is not a word about the National Front and the 
struggles within it, about the elections in 1946 and their consequences, about Slovakia and 
Czech-Slovak relations, about the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.54 The only concrete 
criticism of specific government policies after 1945 concerned the publishing of KM, 
which brought Cemy to attack post-war printing restrictions and to suggest that he knew 
‘whose and which broader interests of power had had them enforced’.55 He abstained, 
however, from drawing any conclusions from this.56 
Similarly, the only foreign event that produced a response was the Soviet purge, which 
brought Cemy to stress the right of every country to choose its own road to socialism (the 
Party leader, Klement Gottwald, said the same at this time, but of course with less 
vehemence). Since socialism, Cemy claimed, had already won in Czechoslovakia in 
51 Ibid. Cemy’s rejection of individualism as a bourgeois concept seems to contain an anti-liberal 
element that was not totally compensated for by his theory of personality: ‘just as it is true that 
socialism is cold to the concept of the individual, it is true that it fully gravitates towards the 
V 
concept and the ideal of the personality’ (ibid., p. 286). Cemy’s thinking is generally 
characterized by a strong focusing on exceptional personalities, in culture as well as in politics 
(Lenin, Stalin). ‘Ordinary people’ play only a marginal role in his universe mostly as objects of 
V 
social ‘re-education’. Cemy’s terminological rejection of concepts related to the despicable past 
(especially ‘liberalism’) was again typical for the Czech post-war cultural public. See Drapala, 
‘Spisovatele na rozcesti’, p. 452, and Eva Hartmannova ‘“My” a, “Oni”: hledani ceske narodni 
identity na strankach Dneska z roku 1946’ in Strankami soudobych dejin. Sbornik stati k 
petasedesatinam historika Karla Kaplana, Prague, 1993, pp. 98ff. 
52 ‘I suggested rather talking about the harmonization of the personality with the community under 
V 
socialism.’ Vaclav Cemy, ‘Hrstka poznamek k sjezdove debate o osobnosti a kolektivu’, 
Kriticky meslcnlk, 7, 1946, 12—13, p. 300. 
V 
53 Cemy, ‘Do sluzeb socialniho pokroku...’, p. 53. 
54 A similar social and political vacuum prevailed on the pages of Peroutka’s journal Dnesek 
(Hartmannova, ‘“My” a “Oni”’). 
55 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Panu G. Baresovi, sefredaktorovi Rudeho Prava’, Kulturnl meslcnik, 7, 1946, 
1-2, p. 24. 
56 In his polemics with Raisa Kuznetsova Cemy came very close to admitting openly that the 
Communists were a serious threat to the freedom that he was fighting for: ‘I simply search for 
truth and honesty, in art as in life, and I fight for them. This can still be done freely in 
Czechoslovakia, outside the prescribed path: no bureaucratic form of artistic truth has been 
introduced and we therefore all seek it on our own and at our own risk. Far from hiding myself 
behind some solid wall, I am on the contrary one of those whom no wall protects.’ Cemy, 
‘Kritika z Moskvy’, p. 224. 
Vaclav Cerny 239 
1945,57 there was no need here for purges or any such defensive measures against the 
reactionaries. But Cerny hastened to assure his readers ‘that Russia will not and does not 
want to prescribe anything for us in this matter’58 and that ‘not even the Soviets claim that 
Soviet socialism is the only possible one’.59 During these years there seemed to be no end 
to his faith in the goodwill of the USSR. 
Conclusion 
It is thus hard to agree with Cemy’s own conclusion in his memoirs that his articles in KM 
from these years ‘do not, I think, leave any fundamental question about culture in the 
modem world and especially in the socialist world unanswered’.60 Read today, they appear 
as an amalgam of nationalist megalomania61 and socialist cliche bordering on newspeak, as 
Cerny tried to top the Communists with Communist terminology. 
One conclusion is evident: there is no foundation for seeing Cemy’s activities as one 
contribution among others in democracy’s fight with Communism about the shape of post- 
V 
war Czechoslovakia. Cerny did not see the conflict in these terms (in his eyes the real 
battle was between Socialism and reactionaries), and he had no interest in the preservation 
of any ‘bourgeois’ values, the virtue of which his Socialist convictions prevented him from 
understanding. Nor did he succeed in developing any libertarian socialist alternative. For 
that his thoughts conformed far too much to Leninism, and the nature of his writing talent 
was evidently more polemical than politically analytical. In another context Rupnik 
concludes: 
The victory and lasting power of Czech Stalinism (and on the other hand the weak resistance 
to it) cannot be ascribed only to the terror following 1948, but primarily to the fact that the 
57 The fact of socialist victory is in our country firm, beyond dispute and already materialized in 
laws, efficiently transformed into forms of our renewed social functioning. And the 
development will not even stop at the juncture reached today: it will go even further, that is, 
even further to the left, for Masaryk’s well-known saying has by no means lost its validity here. 
By the way [s/c], this coincides with the popular will.’ Cerny, ‘Literatura umelecka a literatura 
uzitkova’, p. 63. 
_ V 
58 Cerny, ‘Jeste jednou: mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, p. 143. 
59 Cerny, ‘First poznamek k polemice vecne i nevecne’, p. 300. 
60 Pameti III, p. 79. 
V 
61 A few examples have been given above. Cerny was convinced that ‘we are a nation with a key 
historical mission, with a most important current historical task, and [...] a great part of the 
world considers us to be this.’ (Vaclav Cerny, ‘O nasi modemi socialisticke tradici a co s ni 
souvisf, Kriticky mesicmk, 7, 1946, 8-9, p. 178.) From time to time Cerny did refer to 
universal values (though mostly in order to stress the unique Czech contribution to these), but 
in his argument actually only the Czech national interest counted. Cemy’s conception of the 
nation (narod) was clearly Herderian, ‘volkisch’ (as was Masaryk’s). This only added to his 
disregard for the state, in which he saw nothing but an instmment, be it of a class (see above) or 
V V 
of a given nation (Cerny, ‘Stat a basnik’, p. 216). Cerny also believed in stable national 
characters, and in his defence of anarchism he praised its Slav and Latin nature while 
denouncing dialectical materialism and Marxism as purely German (Cerny, ‘Osobnost a 
kolektivum’, p. 287; ‘Socialisticky rok 1848 ajeho dedictvi’, p. 210). Later, in his memoirs, the 
Jews were to replace the Germans as the prime alien evildoers to the Czechs. For an interesting 
V 
portrait of Cerny stressing his nationalism and the illusions that accompanied his political 
V 
ambitions, see Zdenek Urbanek, ‘O Vaclavu Cemem’, Lidove noviny, 12 April 1990, ‘Literami 
noviny’ supplement, p. 2. 
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Communists controlled more than the apparatus of power in the state; they also controlled 
the system of values, the symbolic structure of meaning in the eyes of individuals and of 
society as a whole.62 
One might question how far the whole of Czech society after the war actually was under 
this spell, but it seems evident that in 1945 Vaclav Cemy had succumbed to this symbolic 
structure or discourse, this system of values, and that essentially his writings consolidated 
its position and validity, rather than unmasking it.63 
In his memoirs Cemy wrote that ‘in 1945 the whole world had already long since been 
informed about the essence of Stalinism and become sceptical of its methods; the truth 
about the trials of the 1930s was clear; one knew generally about the labour camps, the 
prisons, the hecatombs of human lives’.64 If this were true — and Cemy had after all 
reviewed both Gide and Jin Weil in the 1930s65 — then why did Cemy himself so eagerly 
quote Stalin, why did he denounce Gide in 1946, and why did he defend the legitimacy of 
the Soviet purges? One might ascribe it to servility or to fear,66 but such explanations seem 
inadequate given Cemy’s courage in other situations during these years. 
More plausibly the war and liberation inspired a collective self-induced amnesia vis-a- 
vis Stalin, affecting also minds less radically inclined than Cemy’s such as Benes’s and Jan 
Masaryk’s, and resulting in struthious policies and wishful thinking. What is remarkable in 
Cemy’s specific case is the eagerness with which he sought to come to terms with Stalin’s 
proselytes in his own country, while simultaneously criticizing them vehemently. There is 
almost a schizophrenic touch to the way Cemy continued to court the Communists while at 
the same time refusing to go all the way, truly to join the ranks. But what Cemy seems to 
have sought — and what he continued to seek for twenty years after 1948 — was to be 
recognized by the Communists on equal terms.67 Cemy paid dearly when their rejection of 
him became definitive in 1969, but in retrospect probably the only worse thing the regime 
could have done to him would have been to make him its accomplice. 
62 Jacques Rupnik, ‘Intelektualove a moc v Ceskoslovensku’, Soudobe dejiny, 1, 1994, 4-5, 
p. 541. 
63 Pavel Janousek claims that, although Cemy did speak in a language ‘that today looks almost 
identical with the language of his Communist opponents [...] both he and his contemporary 
opponents very precisely noticed the differences and shifts in accents that gave their statements 
quite different semantic dimensions’. Pavel Janousek, ‘{Conference o nas (a Vaclavu Cemem)’, 
Tvar, 8, 1995, p. 11. This is a pertinent observation, but one must then ask why this 
‘Communist’ discourse was so hegemonic that dissent could be expressed only ‘in code’, and 
also what consequences this hegemony had for the possibility of articulating genuine 
alternatives to the Communist symbolic order. 
64 Cemy, Pameti III, p. 294. 
65 That is, Weil’s very critical novel from 1937 about life in the USSR, Moskva — hranice 
(1937); see Vaclav Cemy, ‘Rusko cistek v ceske beleterii’, Lidove noviny, 10 March 1938, the 
‘Literami pondelf supplement, p. 4; reprinted in Cemy, Tvorba a osobnost, I, Prague, 1992, 
pp. 595-97. 
66 Vevoda, ‘Vaclav Cemy jako “nepratelska osoba’”, pp. 337ff. 
67 Cemy’s efforts in this direction in the late 1950s, which included attempts at academic as well 
as political rapprochement are discussed in Mojmir Grygar, ‘Vaclav Cemy a marxismus’ in 
Brozova (ed.), Vaclav Cerny — zivot a dilo, pp. 313ff, in Vevoda, ‘Vaclav Cemy jako 
'‘nepratelska osoba’”, pp. 332ff, and in Karel Kaplan, ‘OpozdSne zverejneni dopisu Vaclava 
Cemeho’, Literarni noviny, 14, 1998. 
22 ‘Verachtet mir die Meister nicht’: The 
Furtwangler Case 
Richard Aczel 
‘Wo ist mein Deutschland?’ Yehudi Menuhin recalls overhearing this cri de coeur from 
the great German conductor Wilhelm Furtwangler during a rehearsal in Berlin in 1947.1 
Today such a phrase, when associated with a man whom Goebbels could call at once a 
childish primadonna and a pillar of the cultural policy of the Third Reich, cannot but 
resonate with overtones of bathos and undertones of repellence. That it does so is itself an 
index of the transition that took place in the assessment of German culture and identity, 
both in and outside Germany, after the Second World War. Deutschland in the possessive, 
together with such collocations as deutsche Seele (German soul), deutsche Tiefe (German 
profundity) or even the term Deutschtum (Germanness) itself — once part of the staple 
vocabulary of a tradition that reaches from Goethe and Schiller, through Lagarde and 
Wagner to figures as ideologically far apart as Ernst Junger and Thomas Mann — have 
become tarred beyond recognition or retrieval with the brush of National Socialism. As the 
music historian Joachim Kaiser has put it: ‘One may no longer use the word deutsch in 
connection with elevated abstractions.’2 What did Wilhelm Furtwangler mean by his 
Germany, and what part did he play, both in and after the Third Reich, in making this and 
related nationally specific abstractions ‘unusable’? After the war, Furtwangler himself 
repeatedly insisted on a distinction between ‘his’ Germany and a Germany ruled by the 
Nazis. The ‘Case of Furtwangler’, as seen (and thus referred to) not only by the likes of 
Goebbels and Goring, but also by the de-Nazification Commission the conductor faced in 
December 1946, and thereafter by such critics as Bruno Walter and Thomas Mann, was 
always a case of distinguishing between two notions of Germany entangled in a complex 
web of collaboration and resistance. I am interested not in the question of whether or not 
Furtwangler was a Nazi collaborator — although the question will inevitably be touched 
on several times in this chapter — but rather on how his activity during and after the Third 
Reich contributed to the very conflation of the two sets of values he sought to separate and 
whose conflation has had such far-reaching consequences for the transition of post-war 
German culture. 
When the Nazis came to power in January 1933, Furtwangler was forty-seven years old 
and at the very top of his profession. Eleven years earlier he had succeeded Arthur Nikisch 
as director of both the Berlin Philharmonic and the Leipzig Gewandhaus orchestras. In 
1927 he became chief conductor of the Vienna Philharmonic and in 1928 was appointed 
General Music Director of Berlin.3 In the last days of the Weimar Republic he signed a 
contract as director of the Staatsoper in Berlin. In Germany he was revered as a musical 
authority and worshipped as an interpreter of the German classics. Celebrated throughout 
1 Yehudi Menuhin in his Foreword to Hans-Hubert Schonzeler, Furtwangler, London, 1990, 
p. vi. 
2 Joachim Kaiser, ‘Politische Biographie eines vermeintlich Unpolitischen’ in Gottfried Krauss 
(ed.), Ein Mafi, das heute fehlt, Salzburg, 1986, p. 124. 
3 In 1928 Furtwangler left the Gewandhaus orchestra to concentrate on his work with the Berlin 
Philharmonic. Similarly, he left the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra after two years because of 
his commitments in Berlin. He continued, however, to perform regularly with the Vienna 
Philharmonic and became musical director of the orchestra again in 1939. 
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Europe, with three successful tours of the United States behind him, he was a cultural asset 
the Nazis were bound to take seriously. Moreover, Furtwangler was not initially without 
enthusiasm for the National Socialist movement and its emphasis on German tradition. 
Although Furtwangler by no means ignored the work of contemporary composers — he 
gave the world premiere of Arnold Schoenberg’s first full orchestral piece based on the 
twelve-tone system, ‘Variations for Orchestra, Op. 31’, in December 1928 — he was 
concerned that ‘modem’ music had begun to endanger the direct, living relationship 
between artist and public which was to prove one of the cornerstones of Furtwangler’s 
music ideology. The Nazis at least appeared to attribute a central role to the Volk in their 
cultural ideology: ‘It is a decisive merit of National Socialism, which none of its opponents 
can deny, that it has determinedly revealed to the whole world how today the very core of 
the relationship between creator and perceiver, artists and audience, art and people is 
endangered.’4 
Differences of interest and opinion between the conductor and new regime, however, 
were very quick to appear. On 11 April 1933 Furtwangler published an open letter to 
Goebbels criticizing the Party’s racial policy. The letter anticipates the awkward hybrid of 
dissension and concession that was to characterize Furtwangler’s relations with the regime 
for the next twelve years. Writing ‘entirely as an artist’, Furtwangler begins by drawing the 
minister’s attention to developments in German musical life which, in the conductor’s 
opinion, ‘cannot definitely be seen as helping that restoration of our national dignity which 
we all so joyfully and gratefully welcome’.5 After this cautious beginning, Furtwangler 
goes on to insist that the function of art is to unite, not to divide: as an artist, the only 
division he can recognize is that between good and bad art. When applied to artists, the 
distinction between Jew and non-Jew is not only beside the point, but ‘not in the interests 
of cultural life’. Fie continues, in the most unambiguous statement of an otherwise 
tortuously formulated text: ‘It must therefore be clearly declared that men like Walter, 
Klemperer, Rheinhard and others will in the future also have to have their say with their 
art.’ Having said this, Furtwangler immediately reverts to a more concessive (and 
compromised) tone. He concludes: 
Our struggle is against the rootless, degenerating, enfeebling, destructive spirit, but not 
against the real artist, who, however one may judge his art, is in his own way a shaper and as 
such has an edifying effect. 
With this in mind, I appeal to you in the name of German art not to allow things to happen 
that, perhaps, could never be put right.6 
The use of the first-person plural and of unmistakably Nazi vocabulary certainly seem to 
justify Thomas Mann’s somewhat wry and bitter (13 April 1933) diary allusion to 
‘Furchtwangler’s [s/c] letter on culture to Goebbels which, though accommodating Nazi 
ideas, was nevertheless a warning’.7 But in what other terms would it have been feasible to 
address a public criticism of Party policy to the Minster of Propaganda in 1933, and who 
else in the musical sphere would take a similar stand for his or her persecuted colleagues? 
One wonders whether the ‘Our struggle’ is the language of tactics or of conviction. The 
question raises itself again in connection with the letters and memos Furtwangler wrote in 
preparation for his first ‘audience’ with Hitler on 8 August 1933. These writings clearly 
4 Unpublished notebooks for 1933, cited in Fred K. Prieberg, Kraftprobe: Wilhelm Furtwangler 
im Dritten Reich, Wiesbaden, 1986, p. 54. 
5 Reprinted in Wilhelm Furtwangler, Ton und Wort, Wiesbaden, 1955, p. 70. 
6 Furtwangler, Ton und Wort, p. 71. 
Thomas Mann, Tagebiicher 1933—4, Frankfurt on Main, 1977, p. 47. The word-play Furcht — 
instead of Furt-alludes to the musician’s cowardice; Furcht = fear. 
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show that the conductor still believed at this point that he could directly influence Party 
policy, at least in assisting Jewish musicians. Appealing, in a letter to Hitler of 4 July 1933, 
to the international reputation of figures like the violinist Carl Flesch and the composer 
Arnold Schoenberg, he insists that ill-treating them will only damage Germany’s image 
abroad. For this reason, he argues: ‘it is desirable that such special cases should, perhaps, 
be settled by the Herr Reich Chancellor himself, not considering the legal side and the 
bureaucracy, because of their significance for [Germany’s] international standing’.8 There 
are other statements, however, where the tactical rhetoric is much more ambiguous. In a 
memo marked as addressed to the Fiihrer Furtwangler remarks: 
It is in foreign relations that politics must come in, in foreign relations that one must formally 
offer compromises, but in fact not surrender anything of the cause. Sauviter in modo, to that 
musical relations are particularly suited. In the whole Jewish question we must above all 
beware of allowing ourselves to be pushed to the wrong front. Propaganda concerning the 
Jewish question must lose its opaque and blind [sic] character. Insofar as the Jew is a 
spiritual enemy, one must fight him with spiritual weapons [...] one cannot solve spiritual 
questions only biologically.9 
In the context of a memo to Hitler, this statement is more likely to represent a tactical 
move in Furtwangler’s overall campaign to defend Jews in musical life — and above all 
the Jewish members of the Berlin Philharmonic — than to constitute a genuine tactical 
contribution to the Party’s Aryan policy. But the line between the two is perilously thin, 
especially when Furtwangler’s own initial attitude to the new regime was one of qualified 
support. In an undated notebook entry from the same period he notes: ‘I am a supporter, 
not a member, since I am an artist and, to my knowledge, not a politician.’10 
Furtwangler never joined the Party — unlike the man who would later become his 
greatest rival in the Reich, Herbert von Karajan, who joined twice, early in 1933 (once in 
Austria and then in Ulm).* 11 This did not prevent the Nazis, however, from seeking to 
commandeer him for their other institutions. His new boss at the Berlin Staatsoper, 
Hermann Goring — who as Minister President of Prussia was directly responsible for all 
Prussian theatres — appointed him Staatsrat in July 1933, a position he was to share with 
the likes of the opera director Heinz Tietjen and the actor Gustaf Griindgens, and in 
September of that year Goebbels made him Vice-President of the Reichsmusikkammer. 
Though these were honorary titles rather than positions of power or influence, they did 
reflect the seriousness with which Furtwangler was taken by the Reich as an international 
advertisement for German culture at a time when the ‘aryanization’ of culture was already 
exciting widespread condemnation. Yet there were limits to how far Furtwangler could go 
in defending the ‘enemies’ of the new regime, as the ‘Hindemith Case’ was to demonstrate 
at the end of 1934. 
Although he must have been aware of Hitler’s dislike of the composer, Furtwangler had 
scheduled a premiere of Paul Hindemith’s new (and as yet unfinished) opera, Mathis der 
Maler, with the Berlin Staatsoper for the 1934/35 season. Goring immediately removed the 
work from the programme and, when Furtwangler protested, insisted that the opera could 
not be performed without the Fiihrer's personal approval. A campaign against Hindemith 
ensued in the Nazi press — concerning the composer’s ‘spiritual decadence’ and ‘Jewish 
8 Cited in Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 142. 
9 Ibid., p. 145. 
10 Ibid., p. 144. 
11 On Karajan’s relations with the Nazi regime see Robert C. Bachmann, Karajan:Anmerkungen 
zu einer Karriere Diisseldorf, 1983, pp. 60-162. 
244 The Phoney Peace 
connections’12 — and before the matter of this premiere had been decided, Furtwangler 
gave a world premiere of Hindemith’s symphonic version of three orchestral interludes 
from the opera with the Berlin Philharmonic on March 11 1934. The performance was 
greeted with rapturous applause, both as a musical triumph and as an act of political 
defiance, and Furtwangler was emboldened to take further steps in his defence of 
Hindemith. When, by the autumn, he had still not received permission to perform Mathis 
der Maler at the Staatsoper, Furtwangler published an article in the Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung with the Nietzschean title ‘Der Fall Hindemith’ (The Hindemith case) insisting 
that the public and not the State should have the right to judge the value of new works of 
art. Predictably, the article, which appeared on the front page of the Sunday edition of the 
DAZ for 25 November 1934, caused a sensation: the edition sold out immediately and had 
to be reprinted. When Furtwangler conducted Tristan at the Staatsoper the following 
Sunday a full house erupted in thunderous applause as soon as the conductor appeared and 
again before Acts two and three of the opera. Goebbels and Goring were both present and 
did not fail to understand the significance of the demonstration. ‘Der Fall Hindemith’ had 
become ‘der Fall Furtwangler’ and it was now the conductor who became the target of a 
savage campaign in the Nazi press which would ultimately lead to his resignation from all 
public posts on 4 December 1934. 
Furtwangler’s resignation had disastrous financial consequences for both the Staatsoper 
and the Berlin Philharmonic, and Goebbels was fully aware that the situation was equally 
detrimental to his own cultural propaganda. At the end of February 1935, the minister 
reached a compromise with Furtwangler, according to which the latter would, in return for 
a public declaration of acceptance of the fact that ‘the determination of Reich policies [...] 
lies solely in the hands of the Chancellor-Fw/trer and the ministers he assigns such 
duties’13 be allowed to resume his musical activities as a freelance guest conductor and as 
an independent, ‘apolitical artist’. The terms of this ‘independence’ were never articulated, 
but what it would amount to in practice was that the Nazis, more often than not, tolerated 
Furtwangler’s refusal to conduct the ‘Horst Wessel-Lied’, to give the Nazi salute even 
when Hitler was present in the audience, to conduct at state functions and, during the war, 
to conduct in the occupied territories.14 In April 1935, Furtwangler was again conducting 
his Philharmonic in Berlin and Goebbels could comment with satisfaction in his diary: ‘A 
great moral success for us. These artists are the most extraordinary little people in the 
world. Politically utterly dull’ (2 March 1935).15 
After his return to musical life in April 1935, Furtwangler’s relations with the Reich 
become somewhat harder to document. There are no more public scandals like the open 
letter to Goebbels and the Hindemith affair. Those who try to defend Furtwangler as an 
heroic opponent of the regime are generally fairly quiet about the years 1936-45, pointing 
12 Among other things, Hindemith was criticized for making a recording of his ‘String Trio No. 2’ 
with Furtwangler’s Jewish concert master, Szymon Goldberg and the cellist Emanuel 
Feuermann in London in January 1934. 
13 Report of the agreement in Die Musik, March 1935, cited in Bemd Wessling, Furtwangler: 
Eine kritische Biographie, Stuttgart, 1985, p. 293. 
14 Furtwangler did, however, perform in occupied territories three times during the war, twice in 
Copenhagen (in 1942 and 1943) and once in Prague in 1940. The Prague concert took place in 
connection with Goebbels’s ‘atonement’ visit in early November 1940. Goebbels’s note in his 
diary for 5.10.40 that Furtwangler: ‘is very obliging and is offering to join with the 
Philharmonic on a visit to Prague. This visit must crown our work in making [them] content 
[there]. I shall organize it all very cleverly.’ 
15 All references to Goebbels’s Diaries are based on the twenty-volume edition by Elke Frohlich, 
Die Tagebiicher von Joseph Goebbels, Munich, 1987-94. 
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only to his efforts to avoid state occasions and concerts in the occupied territories. Even 
Prieberg’s Kraftprobe, the best researched book to date on Furtwangler’s relations with the 
Nazi regime, devotes almost 350 pages to the first six years of the Reich and fewer than 
ninety to the second.16 Although Furtwangler no longer offers any major public statements 
in the press after his ‘rehabilitation’, convincing testimony to his continued tightrope walk 
between resistance and collaboration is to be found in Goebbels’s Diaries. Between 1933 
and 1945 there are over ninety entries on the conductor, and most of these are more than 
passing references to concerts the minister has attended. Nearly all of them document 
Goebbels’s high regard for Furtwangler as an artist and show that the minister fully 
recognized both the conductor’s enormous popularity — ‘Furtwangler is respected like a 
god’ (11 February 1937) — and his value for the regime — ‘Discussed the Furtwangler 
case with Goring. Not to be allowed to go abroad’ (25 December 1934); ‘we can make 
good use of him’ (9 January 1940). The early entries confirm the well-documented fact 
that Furtwangler frequently intervened on the behalf of Jewish musicians (‘As always 
Furtwangler on the Philharmonic and the Jewish Question’ (7 July 1933). After the 
compromise of February 1935, Goebbels is pleased to note that ‘Furtwangler has greatly 
changed’ (22 July 1936) and in 1936 there are two entries which confidently state that the 
conductor is ‘now entirely with us’ (27 July , and 11 December 1936). There are, however, 
still conflicts. When at the end of June 1936, Goebbels congratulates himself on the 
FuhreFs acceptance of his prohibition of public criticism of the arts, he is forced to 
concede that ‘Only Furtwangler is still unsatisfied.’ He is, however, quick to add that ‘it 
does not help him any longer’ (27 November 1936). In 1937 there are further references to 
Furtwangler’s recalcitrant position on the ‘Jewish Question’, and the extent and vigour of 
Furtwangler’s resistance to Nazi policy in this area is documented by an entry for 3 August 
1937: ‘There are still some half-Jews in the Philharmonic. I shall try to get rid of them. It 
will not be easy. Furtwangler does everything in his power to keep them.’ By the end of 
the year Goebbels is again complaining of the conductor’s ‘daily new demands’ (7 
December 1937). In July 1938 there is a reference to Furtwangler’s reluctance to 
participate in Party and State functions. He had been asked to conduct a performance of 
Wagner’s Die Meistersinger on the eve of the Party Congress in Nuremberg in September: 
‘Furtwangler does not want to conduct in Nuremberg. For decency’s sake. That is 
nonsense. He should not be so cautious. I am exerting pressure on him’ (2 July 1938). 
Goebbels’s pressure achieved the desired result: Furtwangler did conduct, and the baritone 
Rudolf Bockelmann, who sang Sachs, commented in his diary: ‘One cannot imagine 
greater enthusiasm than after the last curtain, when two leaders of the nation met with a 
storm of joy from the festive audience. Two true, significant leaders with their sights set on 
eternal values: Adolf Hitler and Wilhelm Furtwangler!’17 
After the entry for 2 July 1938, and with the coming of war, there is a striking change of 
tone in Goebbels’s diary references to Furtwangler. On 22 November 1938, Goebbels 
remarks that Furtwangler ‘has again performed great services for us abroad’. This is 
probably a reference to a successful concert with the Tonhalle Ochester in Zurich on 
14 November, but it should not be forgotten that earlier in the year the French had awarded 
Furtwangler the Legion d’honneur — an international propaganda coup for the Nazis, even 
if Hitler did not want the news made public at home. In April 1940, Furtwangler is in 
Copenhagen during the German occupation. Goebbels is pleased to be informed by the 
conductor that ‘Our soldiers’ behaviour was exemplary, which contributed a great deal to 
16 In addition to Prieberg, Kraftprobe, and Schonzeler, Furtwangler, see Elisabeth Furtwangler, 
Tiber Wilhelm Furtwangler, Wiesbaden, 1979 and Sam H. Shirakawa, The Devil's 
Musicmaster: The Controversial Life amd Career of Wilhelm Furtwangler, Oxford, 1992. 
17 Cited in Wessling, Furtwangler: Eine kritische Biographie, pp. 24-25. 
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the peaceful accomplishment of the matter’ (17 April 1940). In the same entry Goebbels 
notes that Furtwangler is interested in succeeding Peter Raabe as President of the 
Reichsmusikkammer:18 ‘It would be good’, the minister remarks. Two months later the 
minister notes: ‘He has become a real chauvinist. I am very pleased’ (20 June 1940). By 
the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, Goebbels is able to congratulate himself on 
Furtwangler’s apparent conversion: 
I am pleased that I have succeeded in making Furtwangler hold such a positive view of the 
State and the Reich. It cost a lot of effort, but still he is with us now, and I prefer a 
Furtwangler who causes one work as a citizen of the Reich to a Toscanini who causes one no 
work, but sits abroad as an emigre and can be used against Italy. (28 November 1941) 
Furtwangler is visiting me. He has made a journey through Sweden and Denmark and is 
positively exuberant in his national enthusiasm. This man has been through a change that 
gives me an extraordinary amount of joy. For years I have fought to win him and now I can 
see success. (28 February 1942) 
By June 1943 Goebbels is delighted that ‘the Fuhrer has so positive an attitude to this 
great conductor. Furtwangler is one of our greatest assets in our whole cultural policy’ (10 
June 1943). The entries on Furtwangler for 1944 are full of Hitler’s praise for the 
musician. On 25 January 1944 Goebbels writes that Furtwangler ‘has done wonderfully, 
and the Fuhrer has given me the task of confirming that to him and of adding that we shall 
never forget what he has done in the future’. The conductor has become so precious to the 
Reich that Hitler cannot bear the thought of losing him in an air-raid and wants to build 
him a personal bunker (4 March 1944). Furtwangler’s defenders make much of the fact 
that the conductor turned the FiihreF s offer down. The reasons Furtwangler expressed in a 
letter to Hitler of 21 May 1944 could only have added to the conductor’s patriotic esteem: 
‘At a moment when every German has the duty to play his part in the war, and when I 
neither can nor will withdraw from mine, such a large building project just for me and my 
family seems certainly too pretentious, especially given the unlikelihood of such danger 
here in the country.’19 As Goebbels wrote of Furtwangler in his diary for 24 March 1944: 
‘He is an upright patriot and a warm supporter and advocate of our politics and war- 
leadership. Nowadays one only needs to intimate a desire and he fulfils it immediately.’ 
What was responsible for the ‘transformation’ that Goebbels believed Furtwangler to 
have undergone after the middle of 1938? On the one hand, it is undoubtedly the case that, 
as the regime gathered confidence and its grip over every aspect of cultural life tightened, 
Furtwangler was forced to recognize that the type of open resistance he had practised in 
the early days of the Third Reich was no longer possible. Even two weeks before the 
publication of his defence of Hindemith in November 1934 he could write to his former 
teacher and life-long friend, Ludwig Curtius: 
Above all, it is my firm opinion that the present regime in Germany will not ‘collapse’ as 
foreigners wish and believe. Not even if the imposed autocracy led to the greatest 
impoverishment [...]. Therefore every German who has a position today is faced with the 
question, whether he wishes to keep and fulfil the duties of that position or not. If he does 
want to, he must come to some practical modus vivendi with the ruling party. On the other 
18 The first president of the Reichsmusikkammer, directly responsible to the Reichskulturkammer 
presided over by Goebbels, had been Richard Strauss. Furtwangler had been vice-president 
until his resignation from all public positions in December 1934. He did not take up this office 
again on his return to musical life in the spring of 1935. 
19 Cited in Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 404. 
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hand, if he wants to give it up, that is something else [...]. To pursue the sentiments of 
humanity and decency here is sheer romanticism.20 
Clearly referring to his coming public intervention on Hindemith’s behalf, Furtwangler 
goes on to write that the question of his own remaining in Germany is about to be decided. 
He is fully aware that ‘the possibility of departing from Germany forever exists, for me 
too’.21 Furtwangler’s assessment of his situation was accurate. After the publication of 
‘Der Fall Hindemith’ and the conductor’s subsequent resignation, Goebbels did tell him 
that he if he left Germany now, he would be leaving Germany for good. This Furtwangler 
could not do in 1934, still less after coming to his modus vivendi with the regime in 
returning to musical life in the spring of 1935, and still less with the coming of war. 
The war played a central role in Furtwangler’s apparent rapprochement with the regime, 
especially when a German defeat became increasingly likely. Goebbels himself remarks 
that: ‘There are people who find their way back to themselves only at a time of crisis. 
Furtwangler is also one of these. Earlier, when things were going well, he could not stop 
criticizing this or that. Now that we are in a state of need and misfortune, he is one of the 
most energetic and firmest defenders of our rights and our fight for life’ (3 November 
1943). By the beginning of 1944 he could add that: ‘the worse it goes for us, the more 
[Furtwangler] closes ranks with our regime’ (13 January 1944). Even at the beginning of 
the war, however, Furtwangler was not unenthusiastic. In an undated notebook entry for 
1939 he writes: 
Why will Germany win in this war? Why will, with the passing of time, the authoritarian 
system necessarily be successful? It is of the essence of man, that he cannot endure 
unbounded freedom, or just too much freedom. That is just as clear in art. Reger and Strauss, 
not to mention the atonalists, represent this state of freedom. They are now old-fashioned and 
done for. What is necessary is a new kind of fulfilment of the law.22 
This is an extraordinary statement. That an ideologically motivated and drastically 
oversimplified perception of modem music should serve as a parallel to, if not justification 
for, the belligerence of the authoritarian state is an indication not only of the political 
naivety Goebbels recognized in Furtwangler, but also of the absurdity of the conductor’s 
overestimation of his own aesthetic ideology. ‘Gesetz’ (law) is clearly a key term here, and 
one which lies at the heart of Furtwangler’s thinking. That it occurs most frequently in 
Furtwangler’s writings in a music or literary historical context is itself an illustration of the 
degree to which the ‘apolitical’ artist’s politics was grounded in his aesthetics. Thus in an 
article on Beethoven from 1942 we read: ‘What strikes one most about Beethoven and 
what has a greater effect in him than in others is what I should like to call the “law”. Like 
no other he achieves natural accordance with the “law”, the definitive, and from this comes 
the extraordinary clarity that characterizes his music.’23 This ominous forging of the 
‘lawful’ and the ‘natural’ helps explain Furtwangler’s hostility to the (highly rule-bound) 
dodecaphonic music of the Second Viennese School and its followers. For Furtwangler, 
the ‘laws’ of twelve-tone composition are to be rejected because, unlike those of the 
European ‘tonal’ tradition, they are artificial rather than natural laws, and are therefore, in 
a phrase the conductor can, remarkably, still use in 1947, ‘biologically inferior’.24 This 
20 Letter to Ludwig Curtius, 10 September 1934, in Wilhelm Furtwangler, Briefe, ed. Frank 
Thiess, Wiesbaden, 1964, p. 77. 
21 Ibid., p. 77. 
22 In Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 361. 
23 ‘Die Weltgiiltigkeit Beethovens’ in Furtwangler, Ton und Wort, p. 184. 
24 ‘Essay liber tonale und atonale Musik’ (1947) in Wilhelm Furtwangler, Gesprache iiber Musik, 
Mannheim, 1983, p. 105. 
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association of law and nature returns in an essay on Mendelssohn, also from 1947, in 
which Furtwangler praises the composer’s championship of Beethoven and Bach and 
speaks of Mendelssohn’s ‘Leipzig school’ as ‘a school of laws’: ‘The property of 
Mendelssohn’s law is something that has been lost today, something I would call “the 
category of naturalness”.’25 In the same article ‘law’ is also tradition, which, while the 
product of great individuals, goes beyond individualism: ‘This law, this tradition is, above 
all, a repudiation of individualism, a real repudiation.’26 Perhaps the clearest explanation of 
Furtwangler’s notion of ‘law’ can be found in a notebook entry on Goethe from 1939 
where again the aesthetic and the political are conflated: 
Why did Goethe not like the French Revolution? Why was he not at all a revolutionary? 
Because he saw the restrictions as well as the freedoms, that is, together with the freedoms. 
He had a total view of the world before him, knew that restriction, the law came from 
freedom and freedom from the law. And that anywhere where there is life. Anyone who has 
adopted this total view like Goethe, who seeks it everywhere like Goethe, is saved forever 
from any revolution, any propaganda.27 
This is a simplification of Goethe. Where Goethe treats freedom and law in social terms 
they are generally seen as the poles of a conflict — as in the struggle between the poet- 
genius and the court in Torquato Tasso, a play which raises questions particularly pertinent 
to the role of the artist in society, a theme which so preoccupied Furtwangler. In a more 
limitedly aesthetic sense, however, Furtwangler’s statement is a direct echo of Goethe’s 
famous sonnet on ‘Natur und Kunst’ (Nature and Art): ‘In der Beschrankung zeigt sich erst 
der Meister,/Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben’ (The master shows himself truly 
when he is set limits,/And only the law can give us freedom). It is one thing, however, to 
appeal to the liberating (creative, inspiring) potentiality of strict regulations in a manifesto 
for the sonnet — as Wordsworth was to do in one of his defences of the form (‘the prison, 
unto which we doom/Ourselves no prison is’) — and another to use such an artistic credo 
as a justification for an authoritarian and aggressive political regime. Furtwangler’s 
notebooks for 1939 contain a defence of the ideological principles of National Socialism 
which cannot but sound perverse alongside the appeal to Goethe: ‘As far as Fascism, 
revolution, etc., are concerned, their ideas are transitory. If they also include the law, that 
is not so. In spite of its mass character — significant and vital. There is truly something 
new, unknown to the world in this and in National Socialism.’28 One is tempted to reply 
with Goethe’s injunction, which Furtwangler himself was later to quote in his notebooks: 
‘Bilde Kunstler, rede nicht!’ (Artist, create, don’t talk).29 
The ‘transformation’ Goebbels begins to notice in Furtwangler after the middle of 1938 
cannot, however, be solely explained either on the basis of a pragmatic recognition of the 
futility of resistance or of an apparent ideological rapprochement between minister and 
conductor. Furtwangler had a more personal motive for seeking to keep in the minister’s 
good books by the end of the 1930s. This motive was the rise of a serious rival, Herbert 
von Karajan. On 22 October 1938 the Berliner Borsen-Zeitung am Mittag carried a 
glowing review by Edwin von der Null of a perfomance of Tristan under the baton of a 
thirty-year-old ‘conducting sensation’ who had much to teach his fifty-year-old colleagues 
(a reference to Furtwangler). The review bore the title ‘Das Wunder Karajan’ (The Karajan 
“Mendelssohn, zu seinem lOOjahrigen Todestag, 1947’ in Wilhelm Furtwangler, Vermachtnis, 
Wiesbaden, 1956, pp. 116-17. 
26 Ibid., p. 117 
Wilhelm Furtwangler, Aufzeichnungen 1924-1954, Zurich and Mainz, 1996, pp. 183-84. 
28 Unpublished notebooks, cited in Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 361. 
29 Furtwangler, Aufzeichnungen, p. 284. 
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Wonder). Behind the article stood Goring, who could no longer tolerate Furtwangler’s 
antics at the Staatsoper, and who, as the man in charge of all Prussian theatres with the 
Berlin Staatsoper the jewel in the Prussian theatrical crown, had been engaged in a bitter 
rivalry with Goebbels and his Reichskulturkammer from the beginning of the Third Reich. 
When Furtwangler had resumed his musical activities in 1935 he had attempted to 
dictate to Goring the terms of a new contract with the Staatsoper which would give the 
conductor full artistic authority. Goring, who had just signed a twelve-year contract with 
the conductor Clemens Krauss, was probably relieved when Hitler, still smarting from 
Furtwangler’s direct challenge to the FiihreFs musical judgement in the Hindemith affair, 
refused to agree to Furtwangler’s new proposals and insisted instead that the musician be 
given in the first instance only a guest-conductor’s contract for ten performances. In the 
event, this guest contract did not come into effect until the beginning of the 1937/38 
season, by which time Krauss had left the Staatsoper and had been replaced as overall 
director by Heinz Tietjen. Furtwangler and Tietjen did not get on, and by the middle of 
December 1937 Furtwangler wrote to Goring asking to be released from his duties at the 
Staatsoper. Goring’s impatience with the conductor is quite clear from his reply of 16 
December 1937: 
I received your letter from Vienna. It was probably once again time for me to be visited by 
difficulties created by you. For everything has gone smoothly for almost three months [...]. 
But it is doubtless also of value to you that your reputation does not seriously suffer as a 
result of the continuing inconveniences you have, now here, now there, whether it should be 
Berlin or Bayreuth, the Opera or the Philharmonic. I have felt obliged at last to say that to 
you quite openly so that you are able fully to realize your situation. As it is with all of us, 
your duty, too, is in the first place to Germany. But you absolutely cannot demand of me that 
I should have a Furtwangler Case in the Staatsoper regularly every year.30 
That the Prussian Minister President and commander of the Luftwaffe should express his 
irritation with a musician in such a manner is not only a reflection of Furtwangler’s 
peculiarly ambivalent position in Nazi Germany, but also of the mixture of cultural 
snobbery and personal intrigue that characterized a regime that was already brutally and 
impersonally engaged in a project of mass murder. Furtwangler’s reply is no less 
remarkable in its self-assurance. The whole matter, the musician reminds the minister, 
could have been avoided had Goring accepted Furtwangler’s proposed contract in 1935: 
At that time I was entirely willing to devote my best efforts to the Staatsoper. You made no 
use of my willingness. You were evidently thinking for your institution (just like Frau 
Wagner in Bayreuth), not thinking about Furtwangler the artist as a total personality who was 
ready to assume shared responsibility for the leading opera house and, thus, for the standards 
of all musical life in Germany, but instead thinking about only the popular conductor.31 
The arrogance reflects Furtwangler’s own view of both his potential and purpose, the 
mission, he would later insist, he had stayed in Germany to fulfil. This was more than 
Goring could take, and when the no less disgruntled Tietjen came up with the idea of 
‘discovering’ a young, star conductor to undermine Furtwangler’s position as the 
uncontested master of German musical interpretation. Goring gave him all the support he 
needed. Karajan, until then musical director of the relatively low-profile Opera in Aachen, 
was to be celebrated in the press, where possible to the detriment of the older conductor. 
Furtwangler, a vain man by nature, was devastated by the campaign. ‘The Karajan Wonder 
[Wunder]' became ‘the Karajan wound [WundeY. 
30 Cited in Wessling, Furtwangler: Eine kritische Biographie, pp. 325-26. 
31 Ibid., pp. 326-27. 
250 The Phoney Peace 
This new ‘conspiracy’ sent Furtwangler running to Goebbels, who at first responded 
supportively. A telegram was sent to the BZ am Mittag complaining about the tone of von 
der Null’s review. By 1940 there are repeated references in Goebbels’s diaries to 
complaints by Furtwangler about the ‘deification’ of Karajan in the press. At this stage 
Goebbels continues to support him: ‘Furtwangler furious about Karajan. Karajan becoming 
too celestial in the press. Furtwangler is right there. After all, he is a world star. I shall stop 
it’ (22 December 1940). Less than a month later Goebbels speaks of a ‘hot dispute’ with 
Furtwangler over the freedom of newspaper critics. In an obvious reference to the Karajan 
affair, the minister is quick to point out the conductor’s inconsistencies: ‘He wants 
freedom for newspaper critics, but when it touches him a bit too closely, he runs to me for 
help. I tell him that quite openly, too’ (15.1.41). By the end of 1942 Goebbels is becoming 
perceptibly impatient with Furtwangler’s petty and self-contradictory behaviour in 
connection with Karajan: 
A new conflict is brewing between Furtwangler and Karajan. Furtwangler is extraordinarily 
short-sighted and petty in dealing with Karajan, though he has no need to be. He likes to call 
on the powers of the National Socialist state at his disposal for himself when they can serve 
his purpose. I am, however, not in the position to allow that such a rising talent as Karajan be 
silenced by Furtwangler’s rather tough methods. (17.12.42) 
By July 1943 Goebbels has had more than enough and records his fairly telling 
impression of the two conductors: 
The row between Furtwangler and Karajan continues its unswerving course. These over-vain 
conductors, who behave like prima donnas, are beginning to get on my nerves. One may not 
judge them from a political point of view; they are like children, and they perform 
extraordinary things in their own field, music. (13.7.43) 
Both Furtwangler and Karajan had to face de-Nazification trials after the war. By 
January 1946 Karajan was free and conducting again. Furtwangler had still not been given 
a date for his trial and only in December 1946 was his case finally heard. It lasted two 
days, and certainly only skimmed the surface of the conductor’s involvement in the Third 
Reich. The Commission’s preliminary investigations had shown that Furtwangler had not 
been a member of the Nazi Party, that he had helped individuals persecuted on racial 
grounds and that he had avoided giving the Hitler salute. He was not therefore being tried 
as a Nazi, but, in the first place, as someone who had ‘served the Nazi regime’. The 
vagueness of the accusation did much to predetermine the inconclusiveness of the trial. At 
one point, for example, Furtwangler was accused of having conducted the Berlin 
Philharmonic at the Nazis’ Nuremberg Rallies. Furtwangler replied that he had conducted 
a performance of Die Meistersinger with the Vienna Philharmonic in Nuremberg in 
September 1938, but that the performance took place the day before the rallies and was 
thus not part of the official celebrations. There were simply no criteria available by which 
to judge the degree of‘complicity’ represented by such an act, and the matter was dropped. 
The trial was paralysed by the same lack of criteria throughout, and Furtwangler was 
acquitted on 17 December 1946. At the end of the trial Furtwangler read out a short 
declaration. In it he claimed: 
It is the political function of art, in our times in particular, to be above politics. Thus, if I 
remained an apolitical artist above politics in Germany, by so doing I was indulging in active 
politics against National Socialism. For National Socialism recognizes only politicized art. 1 
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know that Germany was in a terrible crisis. It was my task to help German music, for which I 
felt responsible, get over this crisis with all the feeble strength I had.32 
The ‘crisis’ in German music — or of the German music and German culture that 
Wilhelm Furtwangler stood for — did not come to an end with the collapse of the Third 
Reich and the end of the Second World War. No sooner had he conducted his first concert 
in post-war Berlin, than Furtwangler had to realize that the real trial was just beginning. 
The concert itself, on 25 May, was an overwhelming success. Long after it had been 
announced that the concert was completely sold out, streams of enthusiastic Berliners 
turned up at the box office with vases, paintings, coffee, cigarettes and even pairs of shoes 
in the hope of acquiring a ticket.33 Furtwangler conducted an all Beethoven programme — 
the ‘Egmont Overture’, the ‘Fifth’ and ‘Sixth’ symphonies — to a packed house which 
greeted him with tumultuous applause when he appeared on the podium and gave him 
sixteen curtain calls and a fifteen-minute ovation at the end of the concert. The reviews of 
the concert were also enthusiastic, except for one, which particularly wounded 
Furtwangler. The author was Thomas Mann’s daughter, Erika, who in a report for her 
American newspaper, The New York Herald Tribune, telegraphed from Zurich on 31 May, 
described the concert as a pro-Nazi demonstration celebrating the triumphant return of 
‘Hitler’s favorite maestro and music propagandist abroad’ from the clutches of the 
unpopular de-Nazification commission. Furtwangler responded, not to Erika Mann, but to 
her father, who had already publicly criticized the conductor, and to whom Furtwangler in 
a previous letter had suggested the idea of a meeting in Switzerland to discuss ‘German 
questions’.34 Mann had turned the musician down, reiterating his disapproval of 
Furtwangler’s involvement in the Third Reich and seconding his daughter’s objections to 
the May concert in Berlin. Furtwangler’s reply to this letter is among the conductor’s 
fullest post-war statements of his own perception of his conduct during the Nazi regime. 
First, he strongly denies having collaborated with the Reich: ‘Everyone in Germany knew 
and knows that more than any other musician who remained there, I resisted in matters 
great and small at the risk of my life, untainted by the fact that I was exhibited and 
photographed by Hitler’s propaganda machine.’35 
Then, he directly challenges Mann, who, in his Washington speech on Deutschland und 
die Deutschen, had rejected any notion of there being two Germanies, one true, the other 
false and wicked. To Mann’s claim that a work like Beethoven’s Fidelio should never have 
been performed in Himmler’s Germany, Furtwangler objects, using an argument to which 
he would frequently return in the post-war years: ‘There never was a Himmler’s Germany, 
only a Germany raped by Himmler. It would be more than silly if such a very German 
work were not to be put on — when would any other nation have found the inner potential 
to produce such a work?’.36 
Finally, with characteristic naivety, self-assurance and self-righteousness, Furtwangler 
reminds Mann of his duties as a German: ‘You have exceptional possibilities, and thus to a 
degree also the obligation, to help Germany — it is quite immaterial how the Germans 
would judge it.’37 
Even in 1947, and writing to a patriot who had been driven from his homeland in great 
bitterness by a regime that had branded him a semi-Bolshevik and confiscated his property, 
32 Ibid., p. 379. 
33 See the account given by Klara Hooker in Die nie vergessenen Klange: Erinnerungen an 
Wilhelm Furtwangler, Berlin, 1979, pp. 95-98. 
34 Furtwangler, Briefe, p. 165. 
35 Ibid., pp. 166-67. 
36 Ibid., p. 168. 
37 Ibid., pp. 168-69. 
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it did not cross Furtwangler’s mind to question the assumption that two serious German 
artists would automatically share a sense of duty towards ‘their’ nation. Mann did not reply 
to Furtwangler’s letter; he merely noted in his diary: ‘A long letter from Furtwangler. 
Foolish.’ 
Another important German artist who entered a critical exchange of letters with 
Furtwangler in the late 1940s was the conductor Bruno Walter. Furtwangler approached 
Walter at the beginning of January 1949 after an invitation to guest conduct the Chicago 
Symphony Orchestra had led to an outcry in the American press. Walter was one of the 
few prominent musicians who refused to take part in a boycott of Furtwangler and made 
this clear to the latter in a telegram. Furtwangler sent a telegram in return expressing, in 
addition to his gratitude to Walter, his astonishment that there should be a protest against 
him of all people (‘who, of all the musicians in the Third Reich, had done most to help 
Jews’), and his hope that men like Walter and himself, ‘who come from the same cultural 
sphere and, actually, share the same views on art and its mission, would become more 
conscious of what they had in common in a so completely changed world’.38 
Like Thomas Mann, Walter was appalled by Furtwangler’s complete lack of self- 
criticism and his complacent assumption of common ground between a celebrated 
figurehead and a persecuted outcast of the Third Reich. Walter replied somewhat angrily, 
and accused him: 
That your art was for years and years used as a particularly effective means of foreign 
propaganda for the devils’ regime, that you performed valuable services to this regime 
through your personality and great talent, and that the presence and activity in Germany of an 
artist of your rank of itself helped these terrible criminals to cultural and moral credit, or at 
least did a great deal towards that credit.39 
Furtwangler had lived for twelve years, Walter went on, in a regime of terror without 
having to experience fear or horror himself. In the light of all this, Walter wondered, how 
significant the fact was that Furtwangler had helped a handful of individual Jews? 
In his reply Furtwangler probably imagined that he was making considerable 
concessions, but in fact he remained characteristically stubborn and unrepentant. If the 
self-righteousness of Furtwangler’s letter to Thomas Mann had struck the latter as merely 
‘foolish’, his reply to Walter can hardly be called less than contemptible: ‘I can quite 
understand the Jews’ feelings about the Germans, particularly if they had something to do 
with Nazi Germany, but is it not far more terrible to be oppressed, terrorized and finally, 
with more or less justification, pilloried by one’s own people, as happened to us Germans 
who stayed behind?’40 Furtwangler was very probably precisely the vain, unself-critical, 
and politically naive artistic genius Goebbels so effectively describes in his diaries. But, in 
addition to his art, which has, through countless recordings, survived the personal and 
political trial of the artist, Furtwangler’s ‘case’ remains an important chapter in the 
perennial debate about the relationship between artist and society, and, more important, a 
chapter whose pages extend significantly beyond ‘Music in the Third Reich’. I should like 
to close by addressing the question of how, or rather on what level, it is possible to 
separate Furtwangler’s aesthetic ideology from that of the masters he served in the Nazi 
era, and of what, at the end of the day, we are to make of Furtwangler’s post-war claims 
for ‘another Germany’, ‘the real Germany’, ‘the true Germany’ to which the musician so 
frequently returns in his notebooks, and which, in his mind at least, could, as late as 1949, 
38 Furtwangler to Bruno Walter, 1 January 1949, in ibid., p. 188. 
39 Walter to Furtwangler, 13 January 1949. Cited in Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 15. 
40 Furtwangler to Walter, 22 January 1949, in Furtwangler, Briefe, pp. 191-92. 
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still serve as the basis for a common heritage and mission uniting him with the Jewish 
emigre Bruno Walter. 
From Furtwangler’s notebooks it becomes clear that even for him the two Germanies are 
not as separable as he would sometimes have chosen to imagine: 
I know what the system based on violence and terror really could and had to achieve, in any 
human being, in any nation. And I know too how far the German nation was in reality from 
this terrible phenomenon that rose up from its own womb.41 
The decisive question is: how could National Socialism deceive the whole world, indeed 
even the Germans, that it was Germany, while it was not Germany, but the opposite or, at 
least, an inwardly misunderstood Germany?42 
To insist on a clearer separation than this — either on the level of historical description 
or moral prescription — is most probably ‘sheer romanticism’, and at least these statements 
come closer to the middle ground between distance and proximity which characterized 
Furtwangler’s own stance during the Nazi regime. It is precisely in Furtwangler’s own 
sense of his place and function in this middle ground that his ‘case’ takes on its full 
significance in the wider — if still essentially German — context of the role of the public 
artist as an intermediary between ‘art’ and ‘people’, and between the claims of artistic 
freedom and of social ‘law’. 
The programme of Furtwangler’s first concert in Berlin after his ‘de-Nazification’, on 25 
May 1947 — Beethoven’s ‘Egmont Overture’, the ‘Pastoral’ and ‘Fifth’ symphonies — 
has a double significance. On the one hand the political implications of Beethoven’s 
incidental music to Goethe’s drama were not lost on Furtwangler’s audience. Goethe’s 
Egmont is the hero who does not abandon his people, who stays behind to face the dictator 
when all others have flown. The parallel, of course, is somewhat thin and dubious: the 
Duke of Alba is not only the representative of a foreign power, but he also has Egmont put 
to death, while Hitler was so concerned for Furtwangler’s safety that he offered to build 
him a bunker. This did not seem to deter Furtwangler’s enthusiastic public, who greeted 
their ‘Egmont’ on his appearance in the concert hall not only with thunderous applause, 
but also with repeated cries of‘Remain here! Remain here!’ The deeper significance of the 
programme, however, lies in the fact that it was an exact replica of the first concert 
Furtwangler gave in Berlin after his resumption of conducting duties in April 1935. Then 
too ‘Egmont’ stood before his applauding ‘people’ and was greeted with cries of ‘Remain 
here! Remain here!’ The wife of the pianist Adrian Aeschbacher wrote of the event in a 
letter to her mother in Zurich: 
Yesterday was a great festival for us. Furtwangler’s return was met with a veritable tempest 
of joy [...]. I have never experienced such ovation, such enthusiasm, such a manifestation of 
emotions. Everything that people may not say today, that, for the long period of privation, 
they simply had to smother, was here expressed in jubilation that gave free run to the heart43 
Furtwangler was called back twenty times and the ovations ‘would not stop’. The Manns 
were surely wrong to see the response to the May 1947 concert as a pro-Nazi 
demonstration. Applause for Furtwangler was by no means synonymous with applause for 
the Nazi regime. As Boleslav Barlog, director of the Schiller Theater in Berlin, argued on 
the second day of Furtwangler’s trial: ‘For me Furtwangler was the reason for remaining 
alive for the duration of the Third Reich. Every four weeks a Furtwangler concert — when 
41 Furtwangler, Aufzeichnungen, 1945, p. 252. 
42 Ibid., p. 263. 
43 Cited in Elisabeth Furtwangler, Uber Wilhelm Furtwangler, p. 124. 
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they happened, one did not need to despair entirely.’44 Or in the words of Count Gerhard 
Kanitz, in the Furtwangler concerts we are one single family of resistance!’45 
Undoubtedly one must treat such statements with caution, and there were certainly 
Furtwangler concerts which would be difficult to interpret as acts of resistance, such as the 
performance of Beethoven’s ‘Choral Symphony’ he was forced into giving in the presence 
of the Fiihrer on the latter’s birthday on 19 April 1942. The following day Goebbels 
commented in his diary: ‘I have never heard it so fervently performed as this time. The 
audience is most profoundly enthralled. Tears flood the eyes of the workers and soldiers 
sitting next to me’ (20 April 1942). 
Even here, however, it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions about the relationship 
between the character of the performance itself and the ideology which in this instance it 
was clearly intended to serve. A Furtwangler performance of the same symphony from 
March 1942 has survived on record, and is held by most critics to belong to the greatest 
and most thrilling of Furtwangler’s recordings. Listened to with the birthday concert and 
the whole background of the war in mind, it is difficult not to be discomfited when the 
male voices of the choir sing ‘Run your course, brothers, joyous like a hero on the way to 
victory’ in the Allegro assai vivace of the last movement. The tone is brazenly military, but 
then the section is marked ‘Alla Marcia’, and the extraordinary orchestral fugue, played at 
breakneck speed, may well be felt to evoke the madness of human conflict, rather than 
faith in victory. Also, the full choir’s rapt ‘he must live above stars’ in the closing bars of 
the Adagio ma non troppo, ma divoto section is far more an anguished, if not desperate 
appeal to a Christian God to show himself to the ‘fallen millions’, than a celebration of a 
‘superhuman’ hybrid of Charlie Chaplin and Joan of Arc, as Furtwangler described Hitler 
after their first meeting.46 
While any attempt to read a musical performance ideologically is bound to be 
questionable, one is on safer ground in interpreting musical occasions as instances of 
political collaboration or resistance. In this sense, both the premiere of Hindemith’s Mathis 
der Maler which Furtwangler gave with the Berlin Philharmonic on 11 March 1934, the 
Tristan performance at the Staatsoper after the publication of ‘The Hindemith Case’ on 25 
November 1934, and Furtwangler’s first Berlin concert (26 April 1935) after his 
resignation over the Hindemith affair are of crucial importance in understanding the 
musician’s political role. The massive ovations the conductor received on all three 
occasions obviously both flattered and fired his personal vanity. But they also meant more 
to Furtwangler than that. For the conductor, the ultimate test of the value of a work of art 
lay in the response of the public, not in the reactions of critics or state organizations. This 
had been one of the central theses of his defence of Hindemith. In the month after his 
resignation, Furtwangler developed this idea in a number of drafts of memos intended for 
Goebbels. In one such draft, with the title ‘Problems of German Music’, and dated 17 
December 1934, Furtwangler argued that the public should be actively involved in the 
judgement of works of art because: 
The people is the actual 'other partner’ of the artist’s to whom he turns, indeed whose tacit 
co-operation as a judging and evaluating factor in the birth of the work of art is absolutely 
indispensable [...]. Therefore one can say that every artistic decision is a matter of a sort of 
people’s decision in miniature. To forestall this through the authoritarian means of the state 
44 Cited in Curt Riess, Furtwangler: Musik und Politik, Berne, 1953, p. 292. 
45 Cited in ibid., p. 241. 
46 See, among others, Schonzeler, Furtwangler, p. 50. 
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(in so far as it is not a matter of blatant cases of trash or kitsch on the one hand, or of cultural 
Bolshevism hostile to the state on the other) means simply postponing the real decision.47 
The parenthetic proviso about kitsch and cultural Bolshevism constitutes primarily a 
concession to the idiom of the Party. Furtwangler was convinced that art could exist only 
within and for a given community, and his performances of pieces by modem composers 
of whose work he did not fully approve, such as Schoenberg, Bartok and Stravinsky, 
proves that he was willing to put his principles to the public test. In the same memo, 
Furtwangler points out that while the people or nation (das Volk) is represented in musical 
life by the public, the two terms are not identical. This is a distinction the conductor 
appears all too frequently to have forgotten. As his letters to Mann and Walter suggest, 
Furtwangler gave little thought to what was happening in Germany beyond the confines of 
the concert hall. When he talks about his commitment to ‘the common people’ or even to 
‘the true Germany’, he has above all his applauding public in mind. 
Furtwangler’s view of the relationship between the artist and the people draws directly 
on his reading of Richard Wagner’s Die Meistersinger. In Wagner’s opera, Walter von 
Stolzing — for Furtwangler the artistic natural genius — seeks to join the guild of the 
mastersingers in order to be able to take part in a singing contest, the prize of which is the 
hand of his beloved, Eva. Walter sings before the masters, but as his song does not 
conform to their strict rules, they fail, with one exception, to understand his music and he 
is rejected. The one exception is Flans Sachs, who recognizes Walter’s genius in spite of 
the unfamiliarity of his art. On the day of the contest, Sachs has Walter sing before the 
people of Nuremberg, who — not poisoned by artistic prejudice and personal interest like 
the masters — he is confident will intuitively understand Walter’s song and give him their 
full support. The people, including Eva, react with such enthusiasm to Walter’s art that he 
not only wins his prize, but is at once invited to join the mastersingers. When Walter 
angrily rejects this invitation, Sachs steps in once again to warn Walter not to scorn the 
mastersingers and to honour their art (‘Verachtet mir die Meister nicht/und ehrt mir ihre 
Kunst’ [Do no despise the masters, but honour their art]). The mastersingers are the 
upholders of tradition, and without them all that is ‘German and genuine’ will disappear 
for good. In an essay of 1944, ‘Flans Sachs wies den Weg: Gedanken liber Kunst und 
Volk’ (Hans Sachs Showed the Way: Thoughts on Art and the Nation), Furtwangler 
clearly uses Die Meistersinger as a parable for his own time. The mastersingers are 
referred to as the ‘Meistersingerorganisation’: a group of essentially ‘mediocre’ artists who 
know ‘what profit the individual derives from belonging to an organization’. In contrast to 
this organization are the ‘real’, the ‘bom’ artists, Walter von Stolzing and Hans Sachs, who 
are more or less distant from the ‘Meistersingerorganisation’. And finally there is das Volk 
— ‘free of prejudice and false knowledge’ and ‘free of the spirit of intrigue’. The real 
drama of the opera, for Furtwangler, lies in Sachs’s attempt to bring ‘genius’ and Volk 
together as ‘two compounds which belong together’. What is at stake here is, for 
Furtwangler, nothing less than one of the fundamental conditions of art itself: ‘Only 
natural genius and Volk in their vital interaction create the whole reality of art.’ But for its 
survival, art also requires the assistance of the organization: ‘Wagner-Sachs, the 
understanding one, the one with the overview, knows very well that an organization, even 
though in this case it appears as the representative of the mediocre, of the average artist, 
does have its significance and function in the history of art.’48 Hence the significance of 
Sachs’s final warning ‘Verachtet mir die Meister nicht’. Even the genius must recognize 
his debt to the masters: ‘Even the greatest cannot sow in uncultivated land, nor produce, 
47 Cited in Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 203. 
48 ‘Hans Sachs wies den Weg’, in Furtwangler, Ton und Wort, p. 196. 
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nor harvest. Seen thus, organizations also have their sense, indeed are necessary on the soil 
of art.’49 The parabolic parallel with Furtwangler’s sense of his own role in the Third 
Reich is unmistakable, and the writer was surely taking a considerable risk in associating 
the (state) organization with mediocrity. Furtwangler himself is Hans Sachs bringing the 
genius of German music to its rightful partner, das Volk. As an intermediary, he may not 
be the ‘artistic natural genius’ himself, but, like von Stolzing, he is a bom artist and is 
‘more or less distant’ from the organization. He cannot reject the organization altogether, 
because it stands for tradition, which for Furtwangler is at least partly synonymous with 
‘law’. But nor does he give the organization the last word. Wagner’s opera may end with 
Sachs’s appeal ‘honour your German masters’, but this is only a coda to the real drama: 
‘The saving of the masters’ honour does not come until the end of the work, after the real 
drama is over.’50 
Furtwangler had his reservations about the music of Hindemith and certainly did not 
consider him an ‘artistic natural genius’ like Wagner’s von Stolzing (or his creator). That 
he none the less saw in his own role in the Hindemith affair a parallel with that of Sachs in 
Die Meistersinger is more than probable. He even makes a direct reference to Wagner’s 
opera in a memorandum, probably intended for either Hitler or Goebbels, that he wrote 
early in 1935, which criticizes the ‘complete organization of cultural life by the Party’.51 
And one further connection between the issue of ‘art and Volk’ in Die Meistersinger and 
Furtwangler’s defence of Hindemith’s Mathis der Maler can be identified in one broad 
thematic parallel between the two operas. Like Wagner’s Sachs, Hindemith’s Mathis, 
based on the early sixteenth-century German painter Matthias Griinewald, finds himself 
standing between state and Volk: dependent as an artist on the Archbishop of Mainz, he 
none the less supports the cause of the peasants in their revolt. 
If Furtwangler did identify himself with Sachs, he ought to have reminded himself that 
Wagner’s cobbler may have been at odds with the ‘Meistersingerorganisation’, but he was 
still a leading and respected member of the guild, rather than being ‘more or less distant’. 
Listening to the closing words of Wagner’s opera (‘Heil Sachs! Heil Numbergs teurem 
[precious] Sachs!’ in the 5 September 1938 Nuremberg recording under Furtwangler, it is 
all too easy to picture Rudolf Bockelmann’s ‘two leaders of the nation’. Both Hitler and 
Furtwangler, ironically enough, were probably imagining they were Hans Sachs. I believe 
one can conclude with some confidence that their reasons for doing so would have been 
substantially different. 
49 Ibid., p. 196. 
50 Ibid., p. 197. 
51 See Prieberg, Kraftprobe, p. 192. 
23 Surrealism and the Catholic Moderna in 
Slovakia, 1945-48 
Ludwig Richter 
Introduction 
Surrealism is the decisive avant-garde trend in Slovak literature that developed almost 
simultaneously with the so-called Catholic Moderna in the mid-1930s. Unlike the Catholic 
Moderna, however, the Surrealist group maintained its cohesion not only during the war 
but also beyond. Surrealism assimilated impulses from both the French epicentre and, 
especially conceptually, from the Prague variety of the movement.1 
Slovak Surrealism 
The foundations of Slovak Surrealism lie in Rudolf Fabry’s Ut’ate ruky (Severed Arms, 
1935); subsequently. Surrealism developed into a nationally important trend in the late 
1930s when it received theoretical support from the Vedecka synteza (Scientific Synthesis) 
group (1937-43) which was associated with the Formalist School and the Prague 
Linguistic Circle. The Slovak Surrealists sought a new poetics (for example, free verse and 
a positive effulgence of metaphors). They did not, however, seek to escape into ‘unreal 
worlds’; on the contrary, they sought an authentic approach to the ‘most burning reality’.2 
They rejected the utilitarian notion of poetry’s commitment to the service of the nation, but 
they acknowledged the poet’s historical responsibility. In his collection, Vodne hodiny 
hodiny piesocne (Water-clock Hourglass, 1938), Fabry conjures up the horrors of war in 
apocalyptic visions and expresses the hope that mankind may be saved by ‘changing the 
world’. The Slovak Surrealists (they called themselves nadrealisti — ‘super-realists’ — to 
indicate their difference from the Paris and Prague schools and better to describe their 
aims) published several anthologies containing, apart from poems and theoretical essays, 
reproductions of modem painting: A no a nie (Yes and No, 1938), Sen a skutocnosf (Dream 
and Reality, 1940), Vo dne a v noci (By Day and Night, 1941) and Pozdrav (Greeting, 
1942). These provoked fierce public debate. 
Slovak Surrealism was syncretist in character; it increasingly diminished its 
programmatic rigour and began building bridges to the earlier trends — to Symbolism, 
Impressionism, Czech Poetism and, above all, to Romanticism; indeed with its religious 
symbolism it built a bridge as far back as the Baroque.3 Attempts to pursue ecriture 
automatique were only partial. ‘Critical-paranoiac activity as a spontaneous method of 
irrational cognition’, developed by Dali, ‘based on the critically interpreting association of 
insane phenomena’,4 was not accepted. The Slovak Surrealists shared common ground 
with the French Surrealists primarily in what they were against; the bourgeois culture 
1 On the analogies and differences between the Slovak and French Surrealist movement see 
Ludwig Richter, ‘Wesensziige des slowakischen Surrealismus im nationalliterarischen und 
intemationalen Kontexf, Zeitschrift fur Slawistik, 33, 1988, 2, pp. 212-22. 
2 Mikulas Bakos, Avantgarda 38, Bratislava, 1969, p. 65. 
3 Michal Povazan, ‘Co je nadrealisticka poezia?’ in Povazan, Novymi cestami, Bratislava, 1963, 
p. 178. 
4 Compare Dali’s definition in ‘La Femme visible’ (1930), quoted by Karl-Heinze Barck, 
Surrealismus in Paris 1919-1939, Leipzig, 1986, p. 672. 
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industry was not seriously challenged (it had barely developed in Slovakia), but uneasiness 
was articulated as far as the state of literary life was concerned. The anarchic revolt against 
the conventions of bourgeois life did not prove that radical either. The struggle against all 
forms of institutional oppression, above all against nationalism and clericalism and finally 
against Fascism was waged with such force that the Slovak Surrealists made it impossible 
for themselves to hold any public office. From this point of view the Surrealists constituted 
a small, but intellectually sophisticated, opposition in the Germ an-sate llite Slovak 
Republic. Slovak Surrealism continued to exist as an intact movement until 1948, which is 
remarkable from an international point of view if we look at the fates of the original 
Surrealist groups in Czech, Hungarian, Romanian and Serbian literature. In those cultures 
Surrealism existed for shorter or longer periods, but that existence was not continuous. 
In the years immediately after the war, however, it underwent a far-reaching change 
which gradually entailed an erosion of the formal principles of Surrealism, for its 
representatives now wanted to escape ‘compulsory banishment from life’ and become ‘co¬ 
creators of a new life, architects of a better future’.5 Now they replaced their ‘cry of 
protest’ with ‘a hymn to the beauty of the whole of great, creative, rich life’.6 Such an 
alternative artistic objective held the danger that the differentiated old would be replaced 
by the undifferentiated new, that the former catastrophist visions would turn into utopian 
social illusions about the future. As a result of discussions among themselves and with 
their public, they decided to bring the creators of art closer to its recipients. They did, 
however, reject easy comprehensibility at all costs, felt committed to the aesthetic standard 
they had achieved. They considered that ‘the cultural level of wide sections of the reading 
public should be raised’, as Pavel Buncak asserted.7 Thus they rejected the vapid didactic 
conception of literature for the people that was being officially promoted. But, then, the 
Surrealists had always had to justify themselves amongst the Slovak intelligentsia, who 
had been brought up on the notion that Slovak literature was a national literature and thus a 
people’s literature. Nevertheless, they had clearly committed themselves politically to 
contributing to the ‘establishment of a society which will gradually get rid of all the 
attributes of the capitalist system’.8 
In the immediate post-war years relations with the French Surrealists began to be 
revived. Translations were published of Breton's assessment of the Surrealistic movement 
in the 1920s and 1930s La Situation du surrealisme entre les deux guerres (1942),9 of 
Eluard's pamphlet Poesie et verite (1942),10 and of Tzara's collection Terre a terre 
(1946).11 Through Vladimir Reisel, who was press attache at the Czechoslovak Embassy in 
Paris from 1945 to 1949, close contacts developed with Eluard and Tzara ‘in the name of 
everything that unites us: the clear hope for a happy, free and unaffected man’, as Eluard 
assures his ‘Slovak brothers’ in 1946.12 On 11 April 1946, Eluard spoke in Bratislava on 
poetry in the service of truth, and on 14 December, Tzara spoke there on the revolutionary 
sources of French poetry. Both poets confirmed the Slovak Surrealists in their endeavour 
to be co-creators of a world of peace. They did not consider this a break with Surrealism 
but as evidence of Surrealism’s ability to change on the basis of new experience. 
5 Vladimir Reisel, ‘Spisovatel’ a dnesok’, Nove slovo, 2, 1945, 6, p. 15. 
6 Vladimir Reisel, ‘1. Maj kultumych pracovnikov’, Pravda, 1 May 1945, p. 1. 
7 Pavel Buncak, ‘K otazke dnesnej umeleckej tvorby’, Nove slovo, 2, 1945, 2, p. 14. 
8 Reisel, ‘Spisovatel’ a dnesok’, p. 15. 
9 Andre Breton, ‘Situacia surrealizmu medzi dvoma vojnami’, Slovenske pohl’ady, 62, 1946, 11- 
12, pp. 642-53. 
10 Paul Eluard, Poezia a pravda, Bratislava, 1946. 
11 Tristan Tzara, Zem na zemi, Bratislava, 1948. 
12 See facsimile in Bakos, Avantgarda 38, p. 235. 
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Although they emphatically declared their belief in the new ‘reality’ they would not 
completely relinquish their Surrealist code; they would just ‘do away with certain 
requisites in order to find a new guiltless and unspent artistic basis’, as Rak put it.13 The 
literary critic and formulator of the Slovak Surrealist programme Michal Povazan tried to 
underline the significance of the group in a national-literary context, to emphasize its 
contribution to the moulding of the socialist man in articles such as ‘Cudove zaklady 
slovenskej literatury’ (The Popular Bases of Slovak Literature, 1948): ‘After a period of 
interesting experiments the Surrealist poets gradually produce works which contribute to 
the colourfulness and variety of poetic expression. Each of these poets is an individual 
personality, which will be confirmed in the near future.’14 But this did not help. The 
acceleration of the construction of a ‘socialist national culture’ after the Communist take¬ 
over in February 1948 and in the light of the general East European debate on ‘formalism’, 
the end of Surrealism became inevitable. In the early 1950s it was classified as belonging 
V 
to that ‘decadent’ literature hostile to the common people. It was Juraj Spitzer who 
announced the apodictic Party verdict ‘Surrealism is an off-shoot of cosmopolitanism, is a 
world-view militantly opposed to Marxism-Leninism, to art altogether; its art leads to 
extinction.’15 Surrealists felt obliged to revise their creative principles and they began to 
indulge in public self-criticism, as Marencin said in his account of the movement’s death- 
agony.16 Povazan simply accepted all Stalinist accusations and labelled Surrealism and, 
indeed, Structuralism ‘typical bourgeois literary theories, which again developed the 
dualism of life and literature in order to lead young people astray’.17 Attempts to restore 
Surrealism in the 1960s failed, but some Slovaks, like Albert Marencin and Karol Baron, 
joined the Prague Surrealist group of Vratislav Effenberger. Thus a Czechoslovak 
Surrealism developed in underground, unsanctioned literature.18 
The Catholic Modema 
The Slovak Catholic Modema developed at the time when (Czech) Poetism, Surrealism 
and the Lyrical Prose school dominated the Slovak literary environment. Like Surrealism, 
it manifests syncretist features. Through their creative reception not only of Bremond and 
Claudel but also of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Breton and above all of Rilke as well as through 
their own lyric works the Catholic Modema makes its contribution to the ‘modernization’ 
of Slovak literature in the second half of the 1930s and in the 1940s. 
In the programmatic poem ‘Co som chcel v Parizi’ (What I Wanted in Paris) by Rudolf 
Dilong it becomes particularly clear that the Catholic Modema's declaration of its belief in 
modem, experimental lyric verse goes beyond a literature explicitly linked with one 
Christian denomination: 
S Hlbinom hPadim na tu polnoc prostu, 
jak Rimbaud driemem pod oblakom mostu 
druh jeho Verlaine za 5 frankov pije 
ale druh jeho Verlaine nemocny je 
13 Jan Rak, Tomer dnesneho basnika k mase\ Pravda, 20 May 1945, p. 3. 
14 Povazan, Novymi cestami, Bratislava, 1963, p. 40. 
15 Quoted by Michal Feodor, Slovensky nadrealizmus. Anotovana bibliografia, Martin, 1968, 
p. 76. 
16 Albert Marencin, ‘Tazky zivot a l’ahka smif slovenskeho nadrealizmu — alebo naopak’ in 
Marencin, Nikdy a Navraty na Muran, Bratislava, 1996, pp. 169—81. 
17 See ibid., p. 179. 
18 Heribert Becker (ed.), Aus den Kasematten des Schlafs. Tschechoslowakische Surrealisten, 
Munich, 1980, p. 21. 
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pan abbe Bremond hl’adi spoza chmary 
ten abbeovsky klobuk vas je stary 
vravte ste basnik, je to epiteton 
ako sa mate majstre Andre Breton? 
[With Hlbina I look at midnight’s sky/like Rimbaud under bridges I dozing lie/for five francs 
his friend Verlaine drinks many a glass/but his friend Verlaine is ill, alas/Abbe Bremond 
looks through a threatening cloud/his abbe's hat is old and wom-out/say poet, this is your 
epitheton/how are you, my dear Andre Breton?] 
Elsewhere Dilong formulated his own programme thus ‘my poetic creed; to create a new 
poetry (we call it “poetry of a new vision”). What does that mean?... A new strength of 
expression, a new semantic burden for the poetic word, new, unimagined, unforeseen 
poetic experiences’.19 Then Dilong adds pointedly: ‘Let one poet do it through a Surrealist 
structure, or an old Romantic structure, or one could choose Futurism, that does not matter. 
[...] A poem may have many kinds of mission. This could be an attempt to articulate one’s 
own pain or defiance, or a certain order. The mission of poetry may also be to entertain, to 
distract, or to express a full enjoyment of life’.20 In this statement we see elements of 
Poetist and of Surrealist designs. And that is not chance. Pavel G. Hlbina's early works 
Harmonika (1935) and Duha (The Rainbow, 1937) are strongly influenced by Poetism in 
the pictorial quality of their poetic language, and in the rhythmic and euphonic structure of 
the poems. The same can be said about the lyric works of Pal’o Usak-Oliva, as Viliam 
Turcany has shown in his analytical readings.21 And when we read Nezvalesque phrases 
like ‘poetry of a new vision’ in Dilong's credo, the programmatic borrowings from the 
Surrealist Vladimir Reisel are self-evident. Both Dilong and Hlbina repeatedly turn to the 
poetics of Surrealism in general and of Slovak Surrealism in particular. Their aim 
throughout is to combine a Surrealist poetics with the mystical. 
This led the Surrealists to write of the ideological discrepancies between them and the 
Catholic Moderna. Fabry's article ‘Surrealismus a krest’anstvo’ (Surrealism and 
Christianity) is a graphic testimony to that. Whereas in the wartime Slovak Republic the 
Surrealists constituted a left-wing opposition, various representatives of the Catholic 
Moderna made nationalist statements in public so that they became to a degree 
representatives of the ideology of the state headed by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef 
Tiso. For this very reason and because as clergymen they feared persecution by the 
Communists, most of them emigrated to the West in 1945. Among them were outstanding 
personalities who had a formative influence on poetry like Rudolf Dilong himself, or 
Mikulas Sprinc or Karol Strmen. Thus the group was split and henceforth its members 
continued their writing in different conditions, which led to conflict between the poet as 
poet and the poet as priest, between the abstract-spiritual and the concrete-sensual 
elements that reflected the lyrical subject’s striving for spiritual harmony.22 
Not all the representatives of the Catholic Moderna were priests. The Moderna priests’ 
aesthetic innovation also cast its spell on authors who did not feel strong denominational 
19 Quoted by Jozef Melicher, ‘O katolickej modeme vecne i kuriozne’, Literika. Literarnokriticky 
kvartalnik, 1, 1996, 3-4, p. 21. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Viliam Turcany, Rym v slovenskej poezii, Bratislava, 1975, pp. 210-20. 
22 For different views on the Catholic Moderna in Slovak literary history see Maria Batorova, 
Roky uzkosti a vzopatia, Bratislava, 1992; Batorova, ‘Katolicka Moderna’ in Jozef Hvisc, 
Viliam Marcok, Batorova and Vladimir Petrik, Biele miesta v slovenskej literature, Bratislava, 
1991, pp. 43-60; Pavol Winczer, Slovenska literatura, 38, 1991, 2, pp. 132ff; Jan Fratrik, 
Slovenska katolicka moderna vpremenach casu, Zilina, 1994. 
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ties. Among them were the poets Miroslav Valek and Vojtech Mihalik, who as 
Communists dissociated themselves from the postulates of the Catholic Modema, but who 
in their early work made use of the group’s poetics. Mihalik's first collection of poetry, 
Anjeli (Angels, 1947), was referred to by contemporary critics as Catholic lyric verse. 
Even the young Valek (later a senior cultural politician), discerned his basic topic to be 
‘clovek, dusa, Boh, laska’ ( Man, soul, God, love). After all, even after 1945, there was at 
first still a certain scope for religious literature as, for example, the journal Verbum and the 
editions associated with it, ‘Lux’, ‘Opus’ and ‘Vita’, demonstrate. After 1948 the Catholic 
Modema was administratively disposed of. Nevertheless some of those who had not 
emigrated tried somehow or other to adjust themselves to the changed circumstances 
prevailing after 1945. So Janko Silan in his collection Uboha dusa na zemi (Poor Soul on 
Earth, 1948) could still publicly profess his faith in God and declare himself to be a priest 
and poet: ‘And so I, Janko Silan, a priest,/smile and say:/All that remains is love and its 
glow/and the goodness of God whom I celebrate.’ Then, however, he had to leave 
sanctioned literature. He continued to write, but until the 1960s he could publish only a 
few bibliophile collections. With the volume Oslnenie (Dazzling, 1969), he even returned 
to the status of officially discussed poet for a short time. In samizdat he published his 
diary, Dom opustenosti (The House of Loneliness), which recounts something of the 
difficulties of living as a Christian in a totalitarian atheist society. 
On the other hand, Hlbina articulated his commitment to ‘peace’ in three collections of 
poems without shedding the religious aspect of his poetry; he even expressed 
apprehension. In ‘Studnicka’ (The well) from the collection ‘Podobenstva’ (Parables, 
1947) his foreboding is clear 
Studnicka v poli bola cista, 
dnes rano zakalil ju vietor casu, 
pili z nej kone apokalypticke 
s tajomnou hviezdou na cele. 
Nemame jazdca, ktory by ich skrotil, 
co by sa na nich ozaj niesol. 
Vsetci sme padli pod kopyta 
tych koni, ktore nikto nevidel. 
Ich dupot vsetkych nal’akal, 
mnohi su raneni a mnohi mrtvi... 
[The well in the fields was clear,/the wind of time muddied it this moming/the horses of the 
Apocalypse drank from it/with mysterious stars on their brows./We do not have a horseman 
who could break them in,/who could actually ride them./We all fell under the hooves/of these 
horses, which no one had seen./Their galloping frightened everyone; many are injured, many 
dead...l 
Later on in works like Ozvena slnka (Echo of the Sun, 1950) or ‘Mierove rano’ (Peace 
Morning, 1952), Hlbina tries to meet the postulates of Socialist Realism, but after the 
publication of the collection Ruze radosti (Roses of Joy, 1955) he fell silent. 
One could no longer think of the continued existence of the Catholic Modema. The 
emigration of leading members of the group and the limits to religious freedom imposed 
by the regime meant that anyone who wanted to continue writing poetry in the mode of the 
group’s original intentions could do so only outside sanctioned literary life. One of those 
who ‘wrote for the drawer’ was Jan Motulko, whose collection Cas Herodes (Herod Time, 
written 1948^19) became available in extracts only after 1989; this verse was felt by 
readers to be simply ‘a distant echo of a cruel reality’.23 Svetoslav Veigl, shocked at 
23 Quoted by Jozef Melicher, see note 19. 
262 The Phoney Peace 
dissolution of monasteries and convents stopped writing for thirteen years and took up his 
pen only after the assassination of Kennedy in 1963 to commemorate the American 
president in Zo studha uzkosti (From the Well of Anxiety) which remained in manuscript. 
In the eased cultural and political atmosphere of the Prague Spring, Veigl published Mesto 
na navrsi (The Town on the Hill, 1968). At intervals of ten years this was followed by 
selected poems in the periodical Slovenske pohl’ady (1978), and a selection of his verse, 
Pred ruzou stojim nemy (I Stand in Silence Before the Rose, 1988). These were signs of 
the gradual reintegration of this Catholic poet into Slovak literary life even before 1989. 
This chapter has, then, surveyed two trends in Slovak literature that were virtually 
annihilated by Socialism. The period of transition, 1945^18, became a period of last 
flickering, in which the Surrealists had, to a degree, compromised their aesthetic, though 
not actually their politics. One of the two poets I mentioned as coming strongly under the 
influence of the Catholic Moderna in his early days, and occasionally later, Vojtech 
Mihalik turned fully to Socialist Realism. Today both trends are being treated more 
seriously by Slovak literary scholars than they ever were in their own time. 
24 ‘National Revival’: The Programme of a 
Newspaper 
Petra BombikovA 
The period of Slovak history between 1945 and 1948 represents an interlude between two 
totalitarian regimes. It was a period of relatively free speech in which a first and 
unsuccessful attempt was made to define a position of equality for Slovakia within the 
constitutional organization of Czechoslovakia. It was also a period in which new potential 
representations of‘Slovakness’ were formulated. These new ideas of Slovakness were, for 
the most part, advanced in daily newspapers whose explicit purpose was to influence the 
development of events in Slovakia. 
Of the 553 Slovak magazines and newspapers which were published between 1939 and 
1944, only twenty or so continued to appear after 1945. These were mostly long- 
established, specialist publications. Concomitant with the social and economic changes 
after 1945, however, a number of new periodicals and newspapers sprang up. Many of 
these only survived in their original form until the beginning of 1948.1 
The defining event which shaped the immediate post-war development of Slovakia was, 
at least in the eyes of Slovak political leaders, the Slovak National Uprising of August 
1944. Slovak political and social structures continued to draw their legitimation from their 
relationship to the crucial phenomenon of the Uprising. Thus, the Slovak National Council 
(SNC) — an institution which declared itself to be the ‘bearer of legislative, governmental 
and executive power’ — came into being during the preparations for the Uprising. In the 
territory controlled by the insurgents during the war, all the structures of an independent 
state were established in parallel to those of Bratislava which were linked in to the Third 
Reich. The Slovak National Council gradually took control of those areas liberated by the 
Red Army. On 1 February, 1945 in Kosice, the delegates of the SNC began to take 
responsibility for these areas, and gradually the system of deputies and an assembly of 
deputies were re-established. In March 1945, the leaders of the SNC, as representatives of 
the Slovak part of the republic, took part in negotiations in Moscow with representatives of 
the Czechoslovak govemment-in-exile concerning the future organization of 
Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Uprising became the central element in the official 
post-war conception of nationhood and the cornerstone of a new national tradition. 
On 1 February, 1945, a few days after the opening of the first sitting of the Delegates of 
the Slovak National Council, the first newspaper aimed at the civilian population began to 
appear in liberated Kosice: Narodna obroda (National Revival), and it bore the subtitle, 
‘Organ of the Slovak National Council’. At first, it appeared three times a week, but, 
following its move to Bratislava, from 20 May 1945, it came out daily with the exception 
of Monday. Not long after the appearance of Narodna obroda, the first editions of two 
other papers appeared in Kosice. Both of these belonged to political parties: Pravda,2 to 
1 See M. Fedor, Bibliografia periodik na Slovensku v rokoch 1939-1944, Martin, 1950; and M. 
Bahulova et al., Bibliografia novin a casopisov vychadzajucich na Slovensku v rokoch 1945- 
1960, Martin, 1995. 
2 Pravda was published three times a week in Kosice from 6 February 1945, and then daily from 
13 April 1945 in Bratislava. 
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the Communist Party of Slovakia, and Cas3 (Time), to the Democratic Party. Over the 
subsequent months, many other publications started up. This raised the question at the end 
of 1945 whether publication of Narodna obroda should cease, as ‘normality’ had returned 
to political life, meaning that each political party had its own organ. The editors of the 
paper, however, decided that Narodna obroda should remain as a unique expresion of the 
united ‘voice’ of the Uprising generation. Thus until its closure in May 1948, Narodna 
obroda remained unique as the only officially independent daily, although especially after 
the parliamentary elections of May 1946, it tended, for the most part, to toe the line of the 
Communists.3 4 
The newspaper followed the programme of the SNC in so far as it was responsible for 
publishing all the official documents of the SNC. From today’s perspective it is interesting 
to note the extent to which Narodna obroda, which considered itself able to form opinion, 
was indeed capable of influencing social change, although it was dependent for its very 
existence on the political changes then taking place in Slovakia, and Czechoslovakia as a 
whole. 
Besides the position of the Uprising in official ideology, another important aspect of 
cultural change in Slovakia was the notion of national rebirth or the revival of Slovak 
society which Narodna obroda presented to its readers, particularly in the first period of its 
existence. The paper attempted not to comment on events, but rather to provide the public 
with information and a non-party-political view of the situation. Nevertheless, on the 
evidence of the material provided by editorials, feuilletons, and particular columns, it is 
possible to discern the ideological position of the newspaper and of those behind it. 
Its choice of name is itself an unambiguous sign that the newspaper’s primary function 
was to represent the formulation and dissemination of the idea of a revived, renewed 
nation. In its first few months, the paper also saw its function to be to support the 
rebuilding of a state destroyed by war, its economy, and transport system, and as playing a 
role in the normalization of post-war life. In the first issue, the editor-in-chief, the 
Communist Ladislav Novomesky, the Commissioner for Education and Culture and a 
respected poet, gives the following explanation: 
It is not by accident that we have chosen this name for the newspaper of the Slovak National 
Council. The rebirth of our nation is the common programme of all the factions which make 
up the Slovak National Council, the publisher of Narodna obroda. We have witnessed the 
need for the revival of our nation in the many difficult and bitter experiences of our past, the 
recent past included. 
A practical expression of the revival of our nation will be achieved when the true core of 
the nation becomes its leading element; that is to say, the peasants, workers and, of course, 
the Slovak intelligentsia who are linked with them. Our national politics will be dictated by 
the economic, social and cultural interests of these classes — not by individuals belonging to 
these classes, but by entire classes.5 
This editorial also commented on the Manifesto of the SNC which was published in the 
same edition. This Manifesto, addressed to all Slovaks, ‘Slovaci a Slovenky!’, gave an 
outline of the basic principles of the SNC’s programme. One of its main pillars was a 
3 Cas started as a daily on 19 April 1945 in Bratislava. After raids on its offices publication was 
abandoned on 23 February 1948. 
4 The leader of the winning Democratic Party, Jozef Lettrich, accused the paper of 
partisanship. Hence the newspaper had to remove its subtitle ‘Organ of the SNC’ from June 
1946. In February 1948 Narodna obroda adopted a new subtitle ‘Independent daily’, stating 
clearly its position in the changing times. 
[no title], Narodna obroda, 4 Feburary 1945, p. 1. Henceforth I shall refer to articles in 
Narodna obroda by date and page number following the quotation. 
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declaration of support for the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and an 
outline of the form which this future state should take: ‘The fruit of our nation’s struggle 
will be a new Czechoslovak Republic, which shall be a people’s republic of Slav nations.’ 
The text goes on to explain: ‘In agreement with the leaders of the Czech nation, we shall 
establish the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks in the new Czechoslovakia on the 
basis of complete equality of rights, in such a way that Slovaks will govern their affairs in 
Slovakia and Czechs will do likewise in the Bohemian Lands’ (4 February 1945, p.l). 
The programme of the SNC, indeed, of the entire generation following the Uprising, did 
indeed declare its allegiance to a re-established Czechoslovakia. At the same time, 
however, on the question of the organization of government, it supported the principle of 
Slovakia as an equal partner of the Czechs. This was the federal principle, equal with 
equal, formulated by representatives of the SNC at the end of 1943 as one of the key goals 
of the Uprising. This programme was then presented during the first negotiations with the 
Czechoslovak exiles in London and Moscow in March 1945 by members of the SNC, 
acting as recognized spokesmen of Slovak national interests. After six years of a 
theoretically independent Slovakia, this demand was an unavoidable prerequisite if the 
programme of the SNC was to appeal to a broad cross-section of the Slovak population. If 
the six years of the existence of the wartime Slovak state had had any not entirely negative 
effect, it was in a strengthening of Slovak national consciousness. Just as the political 
leadership of the Slovak Republic had done, so the political generation which emerged 
from the Uprising put forward a notion of Slovak nationhood based on national self- 
determination. The SNC attempted, however, to redefine this notion in order to bring it 
into line with its own political purposes, and to accomodate the realities of post-war 
circumstances. It was necessary to find a new definition of Slovakness, and simultaneously 
to preserve continuity with the conventional understanding of Slovakness in order to gain 
as much support as possible from the populace. It had to be demonstrated that it was not 
the Slovakness of the wartime Slovak state, but the Slovakness of the Uprising that 
represented the ‘true’ pedigree of the Slovak national tradition. The Slovaks had to be 
persuaded that the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic did not threaten Slovak 
national interests. 
A natural part of this process was an appeal to a symbolic vocabulary accepted by the 
largest possible section of the population, and a re-interpretation of a range of historical 
figures and events. It is typical of the twentieth-century history of the Slovaks, particularly 
at crucial moments, that practical politics as expressed in propaganda is intertwined with 
the re-interpretation of history: politicians seek in the past arguments with which to 
legitimate themselves and their ideology. As Ivan Kamenec writes in his article on 
stereotypes in Slovak history and historiography: ‘The frequent and unfortunately not 
always positive political changes in Slovakia have resulted in the continuous re-evaluation 
of history according to the ideological model current at the time.’6 
The very term obroda, revival, used in the title of the newspaper, has the association of 
‘National Revival’.7 This suggests a continuity with the process of formulating and 
creating a new democratic Slovak nation. The link to an older tradition is strengthened also 
by the name given to the assembly and the organization which published the newspaper. 
The Slovak National Council is a direct reference to the tradition of the Slovak Awakener, 
6 Ivan Kamenec, ‘14. marec a 29. august’, Obcianska spolocnost\ 1998, 3, p. 3. 
7 It is particularly associated with T. G. Masaryk, who had renamed the Czech probuzeni 
(awakening) obroda (revival) in his Ceska otazka (1895). Furthermore, Masaryk regarded 
himself as part of the obroda, which only came to an end with the declaration of Czecho¬ 
slovak independence in 1918. The term ‘national revival’ was also used by other Central 
European nations, like the Germans or Slovenes in the nineteenth century. 
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Cudovit Stur, and the first SNC which was linked to the first armed uprising of Slovaks in 
1848. The second SNC was a temporary institution founded in October 1918, set up so that 
the Slovaks could express their agreement with the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic 
and with the inclusion of Slovakia in the new state. 
The fundamental characteristics of Slovakness as presented in the editorials of Narodna 
obroda were antifascism, allegiance to the spirit of Uprising, Slav orientation, support for 
the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and the principles of people’s 
democracy. The choice of historical events to be included by these authors of a new 
conception of nationhood can be seen in the occasional editorials written mostly by the 
editor-in-chief, Ladislav Novomesky, or by Gustav Husak, especially after Husak had 
become chairman of the Board of Commissioners. The first piece of evidence, however, 
can be seen in an early issue of the paper, on the sixth anniversary of the establishment of 
the Fascist Slovak state. Here the author of the editorial, Jan Pull, explicitly contrasts this 
anniversary of the 14 March 1939 with the date of the beginning of the Uprising on 29 
August 1944: ‘The Fourteenth of March is dead. Its architects are packing their bags and 
are getting ready to flee to Germany. The Twenty-Ninth of August lives, and its spirit will 
rule Slovakia and soon, we hope, the whole of Czechoslovakia’ (14 March 1945, p. 2). 
It was in this spirit that the Uprising became an event to which the paper devoted 
particular attention. Thus, for example, the special issue of the paper which came out in 
1946 to celebrate the second anniversary of the Uprising consisted of fifty-six pages as 
compared with the usual four. Beside the Uprising, Narodna obroda celebrated the end of 
the war (9 May),8 major Church festivals such as Christmas and Easter, May Day, but also 
the 28 October, the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia, and the birthdays of T. 
G. Masaryk and Benes. One new holiday was added which received particular attention — 
the Day of the Slavs, 5 June, the feast of SS Cyril and Methodius.9 Most of the holidays 
which had already existed gained a new significance, not only as a result of the 
interpretations given to them in the special editorials, but also thanks to specific political 
events. For example, 28 October was celebrated not merely as the anniversary of the 
founding of Czechoslovakia, but also as the Day of Nationalization (the programme of 
nationalization had been announced on this date in 1945) and as the day of the 
announcement of the two-year plan in 1946. Thus we read: ‘Our freedom, which was won 
twenty-eight years ago, shall be ensured by the great national achievement of the two-year 
plan’ (announcement of the National Front concerning 28 October; 13 October 1946, p. 1). 
Similarly, new interpretations were given to the deeds and merits of individual historical 
figures. Amongst these was Milan R. Stefanik. Although there was no doubt that, as co¬ 
founder of the Czechoslovak state, a place in the ‘national pantheon’ was his by rights, 
Stefanik’s unambiguously negative attitude towards Russia and the October Revolution 
was problematic for a post-war generation which was explicitly pro-Russian and pro- 
Soviet. Novomesky, the author of the editorial to the special edition which appeared to 
mark the anniversary of Stefanik’s death in an air-crash asks the following question: 
‘Would M.R. Stefanik today, during this war, still hold the to the opinions which he 
8 Whereas in the rest of Europe the end of the war was traditionally regarded as falling on 7 May 
(Germany’s unconditional surrender), in Czechoslovakia (as in Poland), until after the fall of 
Communism, it was 9 May, since that day allegedly marked the end of fighting on 
Czechoslovak soil. In fact 9 May was simply the date of Marshall I. S. Konev’s ‘liberation of 
Prague’. The leadership of the Prague Uprising had come to an agreement with the Germans on 
8 May, when they started leaving Prague; furthermore the last serious military action took place 
on 12 May in Milin near Pribram (Bohemia). 
9 After the fall of Communism this day was made a public holiday in both ‘halves’ of 
Czechoslovakia. 
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expressed whilst he was alive?’ The answer, we are told, is to be found in a statement 
made by Stefanik himself where he claimed he had denied his belief in Slavdom only to 
the Western Allies in the interests of the creation of Czechoslovakia. Novomesky goes on 
to state that ‘Stefanik’s belief in Slavdom, which was as ardent as his belief in Slovakness, 
was, at that time [that is 1914-18], possible only as an illicit, unexpressed allegiance, a 
hidden faith’ (‘Logika Stefanikovho odkazu’, 4 May 1946, p. 1). 
The idea of belonging to Slavdom was of particular importance in post-war 
Czechoslovakia. The emphasis on the position of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia in the post¬ 
war world as belonging to a community of Slav nations had a significance which reached 
beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia. Panslavism had a particularly long tradition in 
Slovakia; from the publication of Stur’s Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft (in 
Russian translation 1867, German original, 1931), representatives of this tradition had 
advocated not only a cultural alliance with the other Slavonic nations, as had Kollar, but 
also a political alliance with Russia at its heart. This latter idea was incorporated into the 
ideological repertoire of the members of the Slovak Communist left, particularly the 
members of the DAV group10, with the difference that they considered the historical 
mission of the Slavs to be the realization of socialist revolution — yet another example of 
the ‘re-evaluation of values’. As Novomesky put it in the editorial of Narodna obroda on 
the occasion of the celebration of the Day of the Slavs in 1946: 
now after the Second World War, the Slavs are a real force. This is no longer a dream dreamt 
by poets, not a philosophical idea or political goal, but a political and military fact as 
represented by the Red Army [...]. The Slav world has come of age and lived to see victory 
against the most powerful threat to the Slavs which history has ever known. The Slavs are 
destined to play an exceptional and positive role in the interests of humanity. (‘Slovania v 
dnesnom svete’, 5 July 1946, p. 1). 
This ‘positive role’ clearly means the creation of ‘socialist society’ and of a socialist 
Slav bloc of states. The editorial which appeared on the occasion of the celebrations of the 
Bolshevik Revolution makes this explicit: ‘It is enough to remember the fact that, thanks to 
the victory of the October Revolution, the Slavs have embarked upon their historic 
mission’ (7 November 1946, p. 1) 
The post-war orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, 
confirmed as it was by the outcome of the war, had, of course, a far more material 
foundation than that provided by the ideology of Slovak Communists. This would later 
result in quite different forms of co-operation between the ‘brother Slavs’. One such 
example is the agreement on the status of the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine* 11, as interpreted by 
10 DAV was the name of a periodical and of the group of left-wing and Communist writers it 
represented. The periodical appeared irregularly between 1931 and 1937. The title is based on a 
word-play; dav means ‘masses, mob’ and is made up of the Christian names of three of the 
group’s leaders, Daniel Okali, 4ndrej Siracky and Fladimir dementis. The two best known 
editors of DAV, the Communists Clementis and Novomesky, were arrested in 1951 and put on 
trial, as was Gustav Husak, for ‘bourgeois nationalism’. Clementis was executed in 1952, 
Novomesky and Husak given long prison sentences in 1954. 
11 The Sub-Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia) had been part of the First Czechoslovak Republic. As a 
result of Soviet manipulation, the first Congress of National Committes of the Sub-Carpathian 
Ukraine met in Mukacevo on 25 and 26 November 1944. The Congress elected a National 
Council, to be led by the Communist I. I. Turjanica, which welcomed the proposal contained in 
the manifesto, ‘Towards a Re-unification of the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine with the Soviet 
Ukraine’. The National Council refused to communicate with the representative of the 
Czechoslovak govemment-in-exile. The Congress marked the de facto secession of the region 
from Czechoslovakia; it became a part of the Soviet Union on 29 June 1945, when 
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dementis: ‘It can be said that, with the agreement on the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, we 
have written a unique chapter in history’ (5 July 1945, p. 2). 
The pro-Slav orientation of post-war Czechoslovakia did not find its expression only in 
positive pro-Soviet sentiment. It also comprised antipathy towards the various non-Slav 
national minorities in Slovakia, particularly towards the Hungarians the expulsion of 
whom (later the process was renamed ‘exchange’) received particular attention in the 
editorials of Narodna obroda. Anti-German and anti-Hungarian attitudes formed part of 
official ideology, and the expulsion of non-Slav minorities from the territory of the 
republic was one of the central demands of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Paris peace 
conference. Narodna obroda followed the negotiations in detail, and published daily 
reports written in the following tone: 
The applause which greeted the speech of the Czechoslovak delegation meant a number of 
things; from our perspective, however, we have particular reason to read into it international 
agreement with the decision of the Czechoslovak Republic not to tolerate the existence on its 
territory of colonies of minorities. (4 August 1946, p. 1) 
The speech in question was given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk. 
Given the bitter conflicts that had existed within Slovak society and which had reached a 
climax with the Slovak National Uprising, Narodna obroda attempted to have a unifying 
effect on Slovak society. This involved using all possible means to find negative elements 
around which the Slovaks could unite positively. Hence, the attempt to find ‘enemies of 
the Slovak nation’, be they internal enemies, the allegedly small group of ‘usurpers’ who 
took power in 1939, and tried to ‘seduce’ the nation onto the wrong path, or ‘external’ 
enemies, who, in the period 1945^48, were the alien Germans and Hungarians. Narodna 
obroda devoted close attention both to the expulsion of minorities and to the trials of the 
leaders of the wartime Slovak state. 
The years 1945 to 1948 were exceptionally dynamic. The attempt of Slovak politicians 
to achieve a constitutional organization of Czechoslovakia on the basis of the equality of 
Czechs and Slovaks failed. By 1947, after the signing of the Third Prague Agreement,12 it 
was clear that this problem would remain unresolved. As the position of the Communist 
Party grew more secure, the interpretation given to the Uprising itself began to change. In 
1945, on the first anniversary of the Uprising, articles in Narodna obroda had stressed the 
‘purity’ and almost sacred function of the Uprising. In the words of the writer Alfonz 
Bednar: ‘The world will not recognize or accept a collective whose altar-cloth has not been 
bloodied, and whose history flows past unnoticed. The sacrifice was great, yet the Slovak 
nation made it to cleanse itself of its shame’ (‘Slovenske narodne povstanie a dejiny’, 29 
August 1945, p. 7). A year later, however, this same event is put into a different context. 
Merely the fact that on the second anniversary of the Uprising Narodna obroda published 
an interview with the Czechoslovak Prime Minister indicates the changed view of this 
event; once an event of Slovak self-expression, it had now become a part of official state 
ideology. Gottwald, for example, stated: ‘Loyalty to the legacy of the Uprising today 
means loyalty to the government programme of building socialism; it means enthusiastic 
Czechoslovakia signed an agreement with the USSR; the secession became valid de jure when 
the National Assembly ratified the agreement on 22 November 1945. 
12 The Third Prague Agreement was ratified by the SNC on 16 July 1946. It was designed by the 
Czech Communists to remove all power from the Democratic Party which had so successfully 
trounced the Slovak Communists in the May elections. It made the Slovak Board of 
Commissioners, who were the de facto government of Slovakia, subordinate to the 
Czechoslovak government and gave the central government the power to impose legislation on 
Slovakia. 
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and diligent work to make socialism real’ (‘K druhemu vyroci Slovenskeho narodniho 
povstanf, 29 August 1946, p. 1). From this point on, the tradition of the Uprising is treated 
just as any other political event, according to the particular political and ideological needs 
of the moment. 
The newly appropriated ‘tradition’ of the Uprising was used to deny the need for a 
solution to the question of constitutional organization; with the ascendency of the 
Communists, the Party began to emphasize the fact that the development and prosperity of 
Slovakia were in any case guaranteed. ‘The political forces which are now in power are a 
guarantee that Slovakia is threatened by neither bureaucratic centralism nor social 
pressure, let alone the prospect of being marginalized economically. These issues belong to 
the past, and what remains is only the problem of Slovak society’ (Milos Marko, Stav 
poverenikov do noveho udobia, 17 August 1946, p. 2). 
The last number of Narodna obroda appeared on Sunday 30 May 1948. It stated that 
Narodna obroda had completed its mission since the general principles of the Uprising had 
been enshrined in the constitution of the re-established republic. The following serves as a 
farewell: 
At that time [when the newspaper began to appear] the Slovak National Council was still 
recognized as the creator, expression and representative of a true Slovak and Czechoslovak 
unity — not a unity of coalition which is superficial and depends on special circumstances, 
but a real unity in both short and long-term aims such as was created during the years of 
preparation for our National Uprising and later during the Uprising itself amongst our unified 
people. The preservation, cultivation, development, and forging of this political unity in the 
renewal of our nation was one of the main aims of the mouthpiece of the SNC, which our 
newspaper has been. (30 May 1948, p. 1) 
30 May, 1948 was the date of the first entirely unfree Czechoslovak elections, in which 
the National Front list won 89.3 per cent of votes (70 per cent Communists, 19.3 per cent 
the rest). Such was the death of Narodna obroda that, as late as 1984, it still had not earned 
a place in the articles on Slovak newspapers and periodicals in the standard companion to 
Slovak literature (Encyklopedia slovenskych spisovatel’ov). The official attempt to erase the 
newspaper from history could be seen in the official biographies of officially approved 
figures which made no mention of their involvement with Narodna obroda. Yet despite the 
newspaper’s erasure from official history, it had made sufficient impact on unofficial 
consciousness that in 1990 when a new newspaper came into publication, seeking to be 
once again the genuine voice of a nation, it took the name Narodna obroda, with the 
subtitle ‘the independent daily for Slovak citizens’. 
25 Panslavism in the Work of Czech Writers in 
Wartime Exile 
Vladimir Papousek 
Attempts of Czech intellectuals in the immediate post-war period to come to terms with the 
new political status of the Soviet Union and to look positively on links with the Eastern 
cultural tradition were frequent and unsurprising. In left-wing intellectuals one could 
understand it as a culmination of the glorification of the ‘Russian miracle’. This 
glorification had continued from the 1920s to the end of the 1930s in polemics both with 
opponents of the exporting of revolution to central and western Europe and with difficult 
customers within the ranks of the left-wing who sought a critical analysis of the realities of 
the new Soviet state.1 Amongst liberals, including socialists with a non-Communist 
orientation like, for example, Vaclav Cemy2, one may understand the coming to terms with 
the Soviet Union as the expression of a simple intellectual need to react to a new state of 
affairs3 and as a means of overcoming the shock of rejection most western-orientated 
intellectuals had experienced after the Munich Agreement.4 
The frequency with which this coming to terms exploited the Panslav myth, the notion of 
a single mighty united Slav nation is, perhaps, remarkable. Russia is interpreted as the 
unifier of the dispersed nation and universal saviour. Contributions to the resuscitation of 
this myth were, strange as it may seem, also made by Czech writers in exile in the West. 
They went as far as supporting Soviet ideological interventions in the Slav states that were 
in the Soviet sphere of influence. 
One of the first Western centres of exile was Chicago, where liberal exiles were 
concentrated around Edvard Benes who, since his resignation on 5 October, 1938, was 
lecturing at the University.5 Panslav feeling was clearly perceptible in the circle around 
Benes, in Benes himself and in his ideological fellows, of whom the most significant was 
the Protestant theologian, Josef Lukl Hromadka who during the war published in Chicago 
the periodical Husiiv lid (The People of [Jan] Hus). 
Chicago was an apt location, since the expatriate community had an old ‘Slav’ tradition. 
The Panslav idea had come over with the first Czech settlers in the Midwest around the 
middle of the nineteenth century. During the time that Vojtech Fingerhut/Naprstek was in 
America (he escaped Vienna, having been politically active in the 1848 revolution), he and 
his fellows were considering transferring new Czech immigrants from St Louis to Russia, 
where a Czech colony called Nova Cechie was to be established on the River Amur. An 
expedition set out for Russia, led by Naprstek’s friend, Vojta Masek, who was to negotiate 
the matter with the imperial government. Because the Russians were unwilling to come to 
a decision on the colony, in the end this utopian project did not come to fruition; it simply 
1 See, for example, S. K. Neumann, Anti-Gide, Prague, 1937, or Karel Teige, Surrealismus proti 
proudu, Prague, 1938. 
V 
See Vaclav Cemy, ‘O komunistickem kultumim programu a budovatelskem optimismu’, 
Kriticky mesicmk, 8, 1947, pp. 163-74. 
3 For example, Jindfich Chalupecky, ^Konec modem! doby’, Listy, 1, 1946, pp. 7-22. 
4 See Edvard Bene§, Sest let exilu a druhe svetove valky, Prague, 1946. 
5 He arrived there in February 1939 as a visiting professor at the University of Chicago. 
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remained a matter for discussion in the periodical Slavie.6 Even after this, however, the 
Panslav tradition survived as an important element of the expatriate community’s self¬ 
definition in a predominantly English-speaking environment. On the eve of the First World 
War the most influential poet among the Czechs, both Roman Catholics and freethinkers, 
was the neo-Revivalist Svatopluk Cech.7 
Cech’s ardent enthusiasm for national ideals and his romantic visions of Slav unity aided 
Czech Americans of various clubs and fraternities to justify their exclusivity in the ever 
more self-confident ‘Anglo-Saxon’ American society.8 Czech-American periodicals like 
Svornost (Concord) in Chicago maintained Panslav consciousness right up to the 
beginning of the Second World War.9 At that time there was already a Communist 
periodical in Chicago, Nova doba (New times), which consistently toed the Comintern line 
of Stalin, who exploited the Panslav idea as a propaganda tool to encourage pro-Soviet 
sentiments. Nova doba's duty to fulfil Comintern instructions sometimes led to predictably 
comic tergiversation in editorial opinion. For example, articles violently attacking pro- 
Benes exiles appeared in the number for 24 November, 1939. Jan Masaryk was bitterly 
criticized in an article headed ‘Neni syn jako otec’ (His Father’s Footsteps?); in ‘Churchill 
nalfcil past’ (Churchill Set a Trap) the British Prime Minister is described as a warmonger. 
Once the Germans invade the USSR, Nova doba lauds Benes, Churchill and Jan Masaryk 
as friends.10 Now articles begin to appear which portray the Soviet Union as Slavdom’s 
martyr and employ the Panslav myth to legitimize Stalin’s regime. One may compare this 
with the article published as late as 18 July 1941 under the title ‘Nechte spat mrtvolu 
panslavismu’ (Let the Corpse of Panslavism Sleep), which also attacks New-Yorske listy 
for the view that Benes was close to realizing his greatest dream, Panslavim. Nova doba 
rejects the notion that the Soviet Union was reviving the Panslav myth. A few weeks later, 
Nova doba became an ardent supporter of Panslavism. The Clevelandsky obzor (Cleveland 
Survey), two pages incorporated in Nova doba, started to publish entirely in the spirit of 
Slav Reciprocity and to abound in invitations to Panslav occasions.* 11 The Nova doba of 18 
May, 1943 brims with pieces devoted to the Panslav Congress in Moscow.12 
Soon after the German invasion of the USSR, Nova doba began to pretend to be non- 
ideological, to support democracy and national ideals. Thereby it attracted to its columns 
liberal exiles like the actor Jiff Voskovec, the writer and cartoonist Adolf Hoffrneister, or 
the novelist Egon Hostovsky. In the last case, by contributing to Nova doba the novelist 
was demonstrating that he did not share the views of the New York circle around the 
journalist Arne Laurin and New-Yorske listy.13 Another occasional contributor to Nova 
doba was the chairman of the (Czechoslovak) National Council in the USA, Josef 
V 
6 See TomaS Capek, 50 let ceskeko tisku v Americe, New York, 1911, and R. Bubenidek, Dejiny 
Cechii v Chicagu, Chicago, IL, 1905. 
7 See J. H. Zachar, Echa prerii a babylonskych vezi, Prague, 1916, and J. Vranek, Na pude 
americke, Chicago, IL, 1905. 
8 J. Martinek, One Hundred Years of the CSA, Cicero, IL, 1955. 
9 Articles exhibiting the Slav idea will be found in Vek rozumu as well as Svornost from 1938- 
40. 
10 This applies to numbers of Nova doba from 22 June 1941 onwards. Nova doba is held by the 
University Library at Chicago in the ACASA special collection. 
11 Panslav thinking remained part of Nova doba policy for some time after the war. For example, 
an article headed ‘Spojme se v nedeli s ostatnimi Slovany’ (On Sunday Let Us Join with Other 
Slavs) on 1 September 1949. 
12 One example with an esoterically bilateral title is ‘Pozdrav Churchillovi ci Slovansky kongres 
zdravi FDR’ (A Greeting to Churchill, or: The Slav Congress greets FDR). 
13 Jiff Brabec, ‘Konfliktni prijeti Hostovskeko romanu Sedmkrat v hlavni uloze\ Kriticky sbornik, 
8, 1993, pp. 41^14. 
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Martinek. Martinek distanced himself from Panslavism, which in 1945 led to a rift 
between him and Nova doba and the Panslav, pro-Soviet National Association and its 
chairman, Adolf Kacer.14 Martinek, together with Josef Falta,15 represented the Social 
Democrat wing of the expatriate community. Falta’s scepticism about Panslavism is 
evident from his 1942 series of talks on the wireless, ‘Russia as an American Ally 
Yesterday and Today.’16 Nevertheless, he remained in the National Association until the 
Communist take-over. On the whole one may say that Social Democrats rejected the 
Panslav myth. On the other hand those who claimed to be maintaining the tradition of T. 
G. Masaryk like Benes and Hromadka shared much with the Panslav views propagated by 
the Communists. 
The former Czechoslovak premier Milan Hodza was fully aware of the dangers inherent 
in this fusion of ideas, as we see from a quaintly nationalist memorandum from 1944: 
The basic point, however, is that the Slav conception of civilization was bom of, and 
survived on, ideals like ‘humanitist’ democracy, the freedom of individuals and nations, 
freedom of conscience and thought. Many Czech thinkers from Jan Hus, to Comenius, to 
Palacky and Masaryk devoted their lives to these ideals. Moscov’s Slavness is of a somewhat 
different nature. Tsarist diplomats used Slav romanticism as propaganda. It is the same 
today. But propaganda is not constructive politics.17 
Hodza was one of Benes’s greatest critics. What we do not know is whether Benes and 
his circle did not realize that Russian Panslavism was simply propaganda, or whether they 
simply wished to conceal that knowledge in the interests of their political goals, especially 
during the period of negotiations of the new Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact. In any case, for 
many Czech intellectuals Panslav thinking in considering future relations with Moscow 
and Moscow’s future role in Central and Eastern Europe seemed legitimate, given the 
Soviet Union’s role of saviour in the current crisis of European civilization. These 
intellectuals imagined that war-tom Russia was going through a major political and 
ideological change in which its awareness of its responsibility to the Slav world and to the 
defence of the Slav world against Pan-Germanism played a fundamental role. 
After the signing of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact on 21 December 1943, Benes 
declared in an address broadcast from Moscow: 
Dearest Czechoslovak citizens, you must understand my journey today in the spirit of our 
national history over the last two centuries. It reflects what our great National Revivalists 
V 
saw in the Russian nation, how Dobrovsky, Kollar, Palacky, Safarik saw Russia in the spirit 
of the future development of our people’s relationship with the Russian people, what our 
great democrat Havlicek, what our Palacky and Rieger, expressed with their journeys to 
Russia, how Masaryk saw Russia, how Zdenek Nejedly has understood and understands 
Russia here in Moscow, and how I understood and defended Russia on my journey here in 
14 As chairman of the National Association (CNS), Kacer was hostile to representatives of Benes 
policies like Martinek and J. Papanek. After the 1945 rift, when the CNS refused to co-operate 
with the National council (CNR), Kacer’s conflict with Martinek led to a court case. The CNS 
had a positive approach to Gottwald’s government and continued to provide financial support 
to Czechoslovakia, as we learn form Frantisek Kozumplik, Adolf Kacer, Chicago, IL, 1956. 
15 As we gather from Martinek’s correspondence, deposited in the ACASA special collection, he 
regarded Falta as a supporter of Kacer, since Falta worked in the leadership of the CNS. 
Martinek changed his opinion only after Falta’s public departure from Kacer’s camp over his 
condemnation of the 1948 Communist take-over. 
16 Subsequently published, Josef Falta, Rusko — spojenec Ameriky, vcera a dries, Chicago, IL, 
1942. 
17 Robert B. Soumar, Hodzova politicka koncepce za druhe svetove valky, Chicago, IL, 1954, 
p. 11. 
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1935 as Czechoslovak foreign minister and as a defender of the new Slav, democratic, 
people’s politics.18 
One has to assume that this visible confusion of various Czechs’ and Slovaks’ views on 
Russia derives partly from the needs of pro-Soviet propaganda, partly from a life 
surrounded by nationalist cliches, and partly from either dishonesty or a lack of education. 
Dobrovsky and Safarik’s views were largely those of philologists and, a little later, at least 
in the case of Safarik, romantic Slavism. Kollar liked Russia as the great, free Slav brother, 
but saw in the empire an equal partner with other Slavs in his scheme of Slav Reciprocity. 
For most of his career Palacky saw Russia as a dangerous autocracy; only at the end of his 
life when he had turned against Austria, did he hope for help from Russia for the Czech 
cause and he was disappointed. Havlicek’s journey to Russia cured him of Panslavism and 
inspired a hatred of the whole Russian set-up. T. G. Masaryk was very suspicious of 
Russia’s ‘oriental’ nature and he loathed Bolshevism. Rieger had, perhaps, a somewhat 
romantic attitude to Russia like the senescent Palacky. Nejedly was a Stalinist. One notes 
also Benes’s peasantish nineteenth-century nationalist ‘our’ in ‘our Palacky and Rieger’. 
Benes later interprets his journey to sign the pact as the result of the natural evolution of 
Czechoslovak politics over the previous fifty years, a result of a tradition firmly rooted in 
the national consciousness. The change he sees in Russia’s European role is more or less 
explicit. The Soviet Union is no longer predominantly the engineer of world revolution, 
but the defender of Slavdom: ‘the Soviet Union will never allow any German Drang nach 
Osten in the future’.19 Even given the emotionality naturally inspired by the state of war, 
Benes’s glorification of the USSR is hyperbolic, mythicizes: ‘It is a massive, strong, 
consolidated state, now militarily invincible, economically fully prepared to wage this war 
to its victorious end, has inexhaustible material reserves.’20 Benes appears sincerely to 
have believed that the Soviet Union was changing fundamentally, as is clear from words 
he wrote a few months later, on 3 February 1944, in the essay ‘Na ceste k vitezstvi’ (On 
the Path to Victory): ‘[Russia’s] new attitude to the Orthodox Church, to religion 
altogether, its incredibly lively and profound cultural, artistic and literary life, its profound 
Soviet patriotism and new national feeling, its favourable stance towards the so-called Slav 
policy.’21 Benes clearly believes that the spirit of change is permanent: ‘the Soviet Union 
has changed essentially since its beginnings and it will be forced to continue changing’.22 
It is not the aim of this chapter to determine to what degree the isolation of exile, the 
success of Communist propaganda or the latent Panslav enthusiasm of Czech expatriates 
formed Benes’s thinking, but rather to establish the existence of various Panslav models 
being propagated in the West during the war, models that would then fuse with the model 
of the Czech Communists in exile in Moscow, and form a large part of the basis of the 
Third Republic ideology that soon led to the Communist take-over. 
A major contribution to exile Panslavist thinking was made by J. L. Hromadka. During 
the war he worked at Princeton and his periodical, Husuv lid provided him with a platform 
for expressing his political views. He also, together with the historian Otakar Odlozilik, 
published the most significant Czechoslovak exile cultural magazine in America, Zitrek 
(Tomorrow). A fervent Benesite, Hromadka went into exile, a believer in Masaryk and 
Radi’s conception of Czech history as linked with the Western Christian tradition and its 
religious and social reformism. In 1950, Vojta Benes wrote that Hromadka ‘betrayed his 
18 Benes, Sest let exilu a druhe svetove vdiky, p. 217. 
19 Ibid., p. 218. 
20 Ibid., p. 221. 
21 Ibid., p.366. 
22 Edvard Benes, Pameti, Prague, 1947, p. 420. 
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teachers Masaryk and Radi as Judas betrayed Christ’.23 This emotional condemnation, a 
reaction to Hromadka’s willingness to collaborate with the Communist regime, is entirely 
understandable in the context of the beginnings of the Cold War. One does wonder, 
however, whether Hromadka’s ‘betrayal’ did not constitute something more like an over- 
zealous fidelity to Edvard Benes’s wartime Panslav idealism or, indeed, even camouflage 
for the sake of his faith, given that by February 1948 it was perfectly clear what Stalinist 
Panslavism actually entailed. 
After the war, Hromadka published the essays that had appeared primarily in Husitv lid 
and Zitrek, in the two volumes, Mezi vychodem a zapadem (Between East and West) and S 
druheho brehu (From the Other Shore).24 In some of these essays he considers the 
relationship of Czech culture, and Czechs altogether, to Russia and imagines the future 
relationship of the Soviet Union to Central Europe. Similarly to Edvard Benes, he starts 
from the premiss that fundamental ideological, cultural and social changes were taking 
place in the Soviet Union. 
In the preface to Mezi vychodem a zapadem, Hromadka considers the Soviet Union’s 
potential contribution to the post-war era, which he maintains lies chiefly in a social 
experiment which gives a new context to the concept ‘democracy’: social security, a 
passionate regard for the weak and oppressed, tender-heartedness and the mighty tradition 
of Russian Christianity and Russian literature.25 Hromadka is here and elsewhere in his 
essays trammelled up in conventional representations of the Russians that had existed for a 
good hundred years in the central European Slav mind. Russia is still Mother Russia under 
whose wings it is possible to find clucking safety from non-Slav aggressors, and Russia 
itself is still peopled by Tolstoyan muzhiks. Hromadka seems to have forgotten or wanted 
to ignore Masaryk’s comments on this image of the simple Russian.26 Another sentence 
from this preface, ‘Czechoslovakia is beginning a new historical epoch closely linked with 
the Soviet peoples’,27 no doubt implies the simple Russian people he knows from Tolstoi 
and Dostoevskii, as well as the fulfilment of the Panslav dream. One could attribute such a 
conception of history to the euphoria of the period, but actually we see in it not only a link 
with the discourse of Edvard Benes, but also something like a culmination of ideas present 
in earlier works by Hromadka. 
In the article ‘Evropa a Amerika pod kfizem’ (Europe and America under the Cross, 
1942), Hromadka gives Russia a defining role in the future, sees in Russia hope for 
European social and moral reform, essentially hope for socialism in Europe. ‘The 
participation of Soviet Russia, together with the profound social changes that are taking 
place in all countries in Europe, including Great Britain, are a challenge for us to think 
about, a challenge to examine our own views on all basic questions: the relationship 
between employers and workers, and between various social strata, and who should be in 
charge of large-scale capital.’28 Like Benes, Hromadka clearly starts from the premiss that 
Western democracies are suffering general moral degeneration, This premiss indubitably 
derives from the shock of Munich. It presupposes the need for a moral renewal — to use 
Masaryk’s phrase — that will affect the whole of Europe. The guarantor of this renewal is 
to be the Soviet Union; evidently because it has demonstrated through its self-sacrifice in 
the war its moral purity and legitimacy, Soviet Russia was to become not only the military, 
23 Vojta Benes, Poslani ceskoslovenskych krajanu v Americe, New York, 1950, p. 20. 
24 J. L. Hromadka, Mezi vychodem a zapadem, Prague, 1946; J. L. Hromadka and O. Odlozilik, S 
druheho trehu, Prague, 1946. 
25 Ibid., p.8. 
26 See Karel Capek, Hovory s T. G. Masarykem, 3 vols, Prague, 1928-35, II, pp. 36-37. 
27 Hromadka and Odlozilik, Y druheho brehu, p. 8. 
28 Ibid., p. 56. 
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but also the moral saviour of Europe. At the end of his essay on Rostovsky’s novel 
Sedmkrat v hlavni uloze (Seven Times in the Leading Role, 1942), Hromadka asks some 
almost grand theology-tinged questions: ‘When we have slept it all off at home by the 
dung heap, what will we do? Will the common people to whom we shall be returning give 
us a vision of truth and the strength to live? For whose image will we build a new church? 
What sort of altar will we place in it? Before whom will we bow our heads?’29 On the one 
hand, Hromadka is alluding to Hostovsky’s novel in which characters fall under the spell 
of the charismatic writer Kavalsky, who becomes their false messiah and the ideological 
leader who brings about their disasters. On the other hand, it is clear from Hromadka’s 
essay that these questions have a more general meaning relating to the need for a new 
ideology for the Czech nation. One notes that it appears that the Czechs will find this 
ideology in something external, not in the re-evaluation of their own ideas. One sees here, 
too, that some yearning for an ideal and national redemption prevails over critical thinking. 
It is not without interest that a parallel yearning for salvation is evident in several works of 
Czech fiction from the 1940s, where a weak, helpless main character tries to resolve the 
hopelessness of his life by devoting himself to some divinity or ready-made ideal. One 
thinks of Miroslav Hanus’s Menecennost (Inferiority, 1942) where the main character 
saves himself by joining a religious sect, Bohuslav Brezovsky’s Clovek Bernard (A Man 
Called Bernard, 1945) has a similar conclusion, and in Hanus’s biblical travesty, Legenda o 
Tomdsovi (Legend of Thomas, 1947) the saviour is named: the worker bringing the people 
a vision of a just Communist system. One may see such a search for an external saviour as 
representing the behaviour of a nation that considers itself ‘small’ (smallness has, of 
course, very little to do with the number of people who count themselves members of that 
nation). Escape under the wing of a strong saviour suggests not only the sense of 
inferiority in a ‘small’ nation, which will be used to always seeking protection in a strong 
nation, but also an unwillingness to sacrifice itself since it is more comfortable to follow 
someone else’s powerful idea. If we look at Benes and Hromadka in this light, it is easier 
to understand why they should follow dead, or warmed-up, myths. 
In his collection of wartime essays, Mezi vychodem a zapadem30 Hromadka frequently 
lays stress on the notion that the USSR is a shield for Europe. In ‘Rusko a zapad’ (Russia 
and the West), he expresses the hope that ‘the present war will in a sense create a synthesis 
between the Soviet Union and Europe’.31 Hromadka is well aware of the social and 
cultural differences between the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe, and his interpretation 
of them is based on Masaryk’s in Rufiland und Europa. When in these essays he forgets 
Masaryk and attempts to create models of how these differences may be overcome, he 
often wanders off into realms of fantasy. What he writes about the October Revolution has 
a great deal of truth in it, though he appears to consider the extreme interpretation of 
French and German ideas embodied in the Revolution positive, and to forget the realities 
of it: ‘ The West was victorious in Russia. But it was the West conceived of in its most 
radical philosophical and social ideas. This victory frightened Europe.’32 
In these essays, Hromadka sees the USSR becoming ever more Western. He sees that in 
the country’s growing interest in its own history, in the cultural and social traditions of 
Russia.33 He understands Stalin’s increasing interest in pre-Soviet traditions, actually an 
attempt to gain the widest possible sympathy for the war among Soviet citizens, as a 
29 Ibid., p. 126. 
30 The essays were originally published in periodicals between 1940 and 1945. 
31 Hromadka. Mezi vychodem a zapadem, p. 48. 
32 Ibid., p. 49. 
33 Ibid. 
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rational corrective of a system that has matured to greater wisdom, as a proof that Russia is 
westernizing itself.34 
No doubt that, too, is linked with Hromadka’s generally romantic perception of Russia. 
After all, he considered the real reason behind the Bolshevik Revolution to lie in the 
idealism of the Russian nation: ‘Behind the Russian social experiment one can hear that 
mighty Russian yearning to help the weak and to create a brotherhood of humanity.’35 The 
notion of Russians having idealism at the centre of their ‘national character’ goes back to 
the National Revival, to Safarik and Fingerhut/Naprstek, and to the neo-Revivalist Cech, 
and even the Russophil first premier of the Czechoslovak Republic, Karel Kramar. In this 
tradition, Russia is a sleeping giant who, once awakened, will be the last hope for 
European civilization, Naturally, this line of Czech nationalist Panslav thinking actually 
goes back to a German, Herder. 
In his essay, ‘Duse Ameriky’ (The Soul of America), Hromadka refers to the Revivalist 
tradition by quoting a saying of Kollar’s, a saying conventionally attributed to the 
influence of Herder: ‘When you say “Slav”, may you hear “human being”.’36 So too he 
echoes the Herderian Humanitat so beloved of Masaryk when he writes in the same essay, 
‘Czechness and Slavness have remained subsidiary to humanity.’37 As for Kollar, 
however, for Hromadka the Slavs clearly represent a zenith of humanity. All Slav deeds 
are sanctified by this humanity, and thus all Soviet deeds, too. He may have forgotten 
Masaryk (who had also admired Kollar), but he certainly remained loyal to Benes. 
Not all exile Panslavism arose in the Benes-Hromadka camp. Vladimir dementis, in 
exile in London, a Slovak taking instructions from Moscow, was among Benes’s 
opponents at the beginning of their exile, when he was interned, first by the French, and 
then by the British. Once the Communist line changed in 1941, and the British had 
released him, dementis worked with Benes, like other members of the Party. The Panslav 
ideas we find in dementis’s work are rather different from Benes’s but certainly he does 
not employ them cynically like the propagandists of the Chicago Nova doba. Unlike 
Hromadka and Benes, dementis neither imagines nor desires westernizing changes in 
Soviet Russia, His vision of the USSR seems to come even closer than theirs to the 
romantic Panslavism of a Safarik or Naprstek. He harbours a naive faith in the eastern 
empire of free Slavs apparently similar to that of Vojta Masek and his fellows dreaming of 
a new home on the River Amur. It was also not a matter of a wartime resuscitation of 
slumbering patriotic sentiment in dementis; even before the war, in an article from 1937 
headed ‘K dvadsiatemu vyrociu Oktobrovej revolucie’ (On the Twentieth Anniversary of 
the October Revolution), he wrote: ‘In the nationalities question and other social questions 
I see the Soviet Union as having realized the endeavours proclaimed by the best 
representatives of mankind in the past.’38 For the Slovak dementis, the USSR was 
primarily a model for the solving of the nationalities question in that every nationality in 
the Union, in theory, had the right of self-determination. Similarly he writes elsewhere: 
‘Today we no longer have to theorize about what socialism means for small nations. Today 
we can proudly, and objectively, point to the lives of small nations in the Soviet Union.’39 
34 Ibid., p. 50. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Quoted in J. L. Hromadka, ‘Duse Ameriky’, Zitrek, 3, 1944, p. 132. 
37 Ibid. 
38 This article was first published in the commemorative volume, Ceskoslovensko sovetskemu 
svazu k dvacatemu vyroci (Prague, 1937), then reprinted in the posthumous collection 
(Clementis had been executed by his fellow Communists), Vladimir dementis, Vzduch nasich 
cias, Bratislava, 1967, p. 384. 
39 Slovenske zvesti, 1, 20 May 1936, p. 2. 
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Quite apart from his book, ‘Panslavizmus’ kedysi a teraz (‘Panslavism’ in the Past and 
Now, 1943), dementis frequently touches on Panslavism during his time in London. 
He notices, for example, how the Slovak Fascist state is abusing Panslav ideas. In his 
article, ‘Narodosocialisticky panslavismus’ (National Socialist Panslavism) from 
September 1942, he attacks a Slovak academic journalist, Stanislav Meciar, who had 
suggested replacing the term ‘Panslav’ with the term ‘National Socialist’:40 ‘we may judge 
that the Slovak Slavophil tradition is alive and well, in the good sense of the word, if 
regime people like Meciar have to turn to such contortionist methods’.41 He returned to the 
same matter in his broadcast entitled ‘Slovenska literatura zaluje’ (Slovak Literature 
Accuses) from 10 December, 1942.42 dementis appears to consider the Panslav tradition 
so much part of every Slovak’s make-up that not even Fascism can seriously deform it. 
That is evident also from another broadcast, ‘Vyst’ahovanie Cechov zo Slovenska’ (The 
Expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia); dementis’s playful distortion of the title of the 
mid-nineteenth-century Slovak Awakener, Ludovit Stur’s Das Slawenthum und die Welt 
der Zukunft (Slavdom and the World of the Future), which had recently (1931) been 
published for the first time in the original may also be pertinent to this chapter: in this 
V 
work Stur writes of a decadent West and a healthy Russia with a lovingly dictatorial 
regime such as was appropriate for the greatest Slav nation, dementis writes: ‘You know 
how they vetted those whom they sent to the front, to make sure they were not nationally 
conscious Slovaks brought up in the Slovak tradition, but still good news is constantly 
coming in about the best of them, now their Slovak and Slav hearts are awakening in them, 
how in their deeds had spoken the spirit of Stur, who dreamt of a “Slavdom of the future 
world”.’43 By ‘Slovak and Slav’, dementis suggests that an intensely felt brotherhood for 
all Slavs is fundamental to the Slovak national character. Thus the Slovaks’ relationship to 
the Russians is to a ‘fraternal nation.’44 An orientation towards the East and the conviction 
that only the Soviet Union as leader of Slavdom could ensure the future stability of 
Czechoslovakia are, apparently, a logical consequence of this national Slavophilism;45 here 
the liberal Benes, whose Panslavism was to a great degree a result of the lack of success he 
had had with his pro-Western policy, meets with the Communist dementis, who puts 
traditional Panslavism above Communist internationalism. He also shares with Benes the 
conviction of the coming final reckoning with non-Slavs’ oppression of the Slavs. In his 
article ‘Nove Mad’arsko’ (The New Hungary), published in the London exile periodical 
Cechoslovak on 5 January, 1945, dementis manifests a Slovak nationalist reaction to the 
Red Army’s entry into Hungary: ‘This time it is the armies of the largest Slav nation, 
Russian armies, that have put an end on the age-old Magyar policies which were directed 
against the Slav nations and, above all, against us Slovaks.’46 Thus, where for Benes 
Soviet victory meant an end to the German Drang nach Osten, for dementis it meant the 
end of the marginalization of Slovaks. 
The romanticizing Panslav sentiment expressed by Czech and Slovak writers of various 
political hues was influential during the war and even more so immediately after the war. 
Certainly the Communists used and abused it, but it also persuaded large sections of the 
public that liberation by the Red Army (the fact that Western Bohemia was liberated by the 
40 
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Meciar was referring here to Svetozar Hurban Vajansky’s article, ‘Kde sila’ (1888) which was 
devoted to the Panslav tradition among the Slovaks. 
Vladimir dementis, Odkazy z Londyna, Bratislava, 1947, p. 347. 
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Americans was usually conveniently forgotten in Prague, even before the Communist take¬ 
over) took on the aspect of a Fate-driven natural conclusion to patriotic dreams. For all the 
raping and pillaging of Soviet soldiers, the Soviet Union remained, for a while, old-world 
Russia rather than a totalitarian state with imperial ambitions. No doubt Hromadka and 
Benes’s view that major ideological and cultural changes had taken place in the Soviet 
Union during the war also played its role. After all, in the first edition of the teetotal 
Benes’s book on alcohol and alcoholism, published just before the First World War, the 
Russians had been hopelessly hard drinkers; in the second edition, published after the 
Second World War, Russians are particularly sober, only drinking at times of great stress, 
for example during wars. 
On the other hand, one may not blame those like Hromadka and Benes for all the abuse 
of Panslavism that followed the war. That did have its sources in Moscow, where a 
Panslav Committee had been established in 1942, and had been greatly fostered by Zdenek 
Nejedly there and would continue to be so in liberated Czechoslovakia. An extreme 
example of that is the way he reinterpreted the Slovak Jan Kollar’s cycle of narrative 
sonnets, predominantly from the 1830s, into a prophecy of Soviet liberation of the Slavs. 
Slav Committees were set up in the Slav countries liberated by the Red Army, and the 
constitutive meeting of the Czechoslovak Slav Committee took place on 4 September, 
1945; the chairman of this Committee was Nejedly. At the end of 1947 a political 
anthology, with prefaces by Benes and Jan Masaryk appeared with the title Jednotou 
Slovanstva k miru (Towards Peace through Slav Unity). Perhaps the most poignant 
contribution to this volume was that of the politician and social worker Milada Horakova, 
who had been in German prisons and camps, and who was shortly, like dementis, to be 
executed by the Communists. Her words remind us of what Hromadka and Benes, and 
dementis, had been writing during the war, for example, the glorification of the Soviets: 
‘Our Soviet sisters, happy in that they could fight actively, played a role in the Patriotic 
War which history will some time best evaluate. Their work in factories, in the fields, 
behind the lines, constituted a firm battlement on which the brilliant victories of the Red 
Army could lean.’ In the prisons and camps, Slav women excelled women from all other 
nationalities because they had far better health and far more resistant bodies. In the ‘fight 
for peace’ the main task was to keep under control ‘the age-old enemy’ of the Slavs, the 
Germans. Czech and Slovak women now see ‘as their first duty to build close, warm links 
with the women of Slav nations led by the women of the USSR’.47 As Antonin Mest’an has 
pointed out, official effusions of Slav feeling were soon suddenly to come to an end. When 
they had served their Soviet propaganda purpose, in February 1948.48 
47 Milada Horakova, 'Slovanka idea a ceskoslovenske zeny’ in [editor not given, editor of literary 
anthology given at end as Milos Vacik], Jednotou Slovanstva k miru, Prague, 1947, pp. 151-52. 
48 See Antonin MSst’an, ‘Slovanstvi a Slovane v ceske kulture v letech 1945-1948’ in Petr Hruska 
(ed.), Rok 1947. Ceska literatura, kultura a spolecnost v obdobl 1945-1948, Prague, 1998, 
pp. 106-11. 
26 Catastrophe and Renewal: On the Post-War 
Situation of German Literature 
David Midgley 
Let me begin by sketching the familiar historical background to cultural developments in 
Germany during the period which this volume concerns. Germany came under four-power 
occupation at the end of the Second World War. Negotiations between the Allies in the 
course of 1943 and 1944 had led to agreement on three zones of occupation initially, with 
the north-west allocated to Britain, the south to the USA, and the area that was later to 
become the German Democratic Republic to the Soviet Union. Four-power control of 
Berlin, involving France, was also agreed; and following the Yalta conference of February 
1945, an area in the south-west comer of Germany was assigned to French occupation. 
Practical difficulties arising from economic dislocation, including serious shortages of 
food and fuel, led the British and American administrations to co-operate in the formation 
of Bizonia by the end of 1946, and France, while suspicious of the potential emergence of 
a strong political unit in western Germany, acquiesced in this development. In the course 
of 1947, the Western Allies abandoned earlier plans for radically decreasing German 
industrial production, and agreed instead to the Marshall Plan for the economic revival of 
western Europe, and to implement a currency reform in Germany in the spirit of that plan. 
In the Soviet zone of occupation, meanwhile, measures were already well advanced to 
reorganize political life in ways which effectively ensured Communist dominance through 
the newly formed Socialist Unity Party (SED), and to reform the ownership of land and 
industry in line with Marxist thinking. In retrospect, as government papers from the 1940s 
have increasingly been made available to researchers, it has become possible to see how 
the antipathies which were to characterize the Cold War period were already affecting 
policy formation before the end of the Second World War,1 and Winston Churchill made 
his ‘iron curtain’ speech in Fulton, Missouri as early as March 1946. But the event which 
publicly signalled the parting of the ways for the eastern and western zones of Germany 
was the Soviet decision in June 1948 to exclude the western currency reform from its zone 
of occupation and to cut off overland communication routes between Berlin and the West. 
For the next eleven months, West Berlin was supplied from the western zones by means of 
the famous airlift. At the end of that period, in May 1949, the Basic Law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany was brought into effect. The German Democratic Republic was 
founded in October of the same year. 
The political division of Germany that came about in this way was to remain a 
seemingly intractable feature of European political and cultural life for the next forty years, 
and it therefore takes an effort of the imagination to reconstruct a situation in which that 
division did not yet appear inevitable, and it still seemed to make sense to speak in terms 
of German culture as a unified phenomenon. What I want to do in this chapter is, first, to 
give a brief indication of the practical relationship between culture and politics in occupied 
Germany in the period 1945-49, and, secondly, to consider, with reference to two 
prominent literary writers, the sense in which a cultural transition was occurring at that 
time which needs to be understood in terms that are distinct from developments in the 
political sphere. If I appear to be neglecting developments in the British zone of 
1 A. Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the 
Cold War, Oxford, 1990, pp. 16ff. 
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occupation, this is because the most significant cultural activities nurtured there had a 
long-term impact on the German media — radio and television as well as the press — 
rather than on literary writing.* 2 
For all the obvious political differences between the occupying powers, one common 
aim on which they could agree was the need for ‘re-education’. When a list of German 
publications that were to be removed from circulation was issued in the Soviet-occupied 
zone in April 1946, it met with uniform approval from the other allied administrations and 
from all German political parties.3 The German writers who spearheaded campaigns of 
cultural renewal at the time similarly voiced their unequivocal revulsion at all that the Nazi 
regime had perpetrated, and saw it as their prime task to provide intellectual leadership and 
to fill the ‘vacuum’ left by the suppression and banning of cultural products, both German 
and international, during the twelve years of the Third Reich. Their efforts to define 
German cultural goals for the future were, however, undeniably circumscribed by the 
policies of the occupying powers, as the history of the cultural journals licensed in the 
various zones clearly shows. 
The two most influential and most widely circulated journals were Der Ruf which was 
based in Munich, and Aufbau, which was based in the Soviet sector of Berlin. Der Ruf 
provided an initial rallying point for the two figures who were to give the lead to West 
German literary writing in the post-war years through the Gruppe 47, Hans Werner Richter 
and Alfred Andersch. This publication had originally grown out of the campaign of 
political re-education in American prisoner-of-war camps, and its editorial operations were 
transferred to Germany in the course of 1946. But the insistence with which Andersch and 
Richter sought to promote the idea of an independent, united and socialist Germany led to 
the American administration demanding their removal as editors in April 1947 as a 
condition for the continuing publication of the journal.4 Aufbau was the journal of the 
Kulturbund zur demokratischen Emeuerung Deutschlands (Cultural Union for the 
Democratic Renewal of Germany), an organization which was formally independent of the 
Communist Party, but whose history shows how susceptible cultural policies in the Soviet- 
occupied zone were to political pressures from within the Soviet Union. 
The Kulturbund, like Der Ruf had grown out of attempts from 1943 onwards to re¬ 
educate German prisoners of war in preparation for the establishment of an anti-Nazi 
regime at the end of the war. What gave it an organizational advantage over other German 
attempts to initiate cultural renewal after 1945 was the fact that literary figures who had 
gone into exile in Moscow — Johannes R. Becher and Willi Bredel, as well as the critics 
Georg (Gyorgy) Lukacs and Alfred Kurella — had become closely involved in the 
publishing activities of the Communist movement, and thus returned to Germany with a 
ready-made set of influential contacts, and with well-prepared proposals for cultural 
organization. The activities of the Kulturbund were initially consistent with the attitudes of 
the Popular Front period; that is, it sought to nurture broad support from intellectuals in the 
struggle against Fascism and militarism; only as the Soviet leadership gradually lost 
interest in seeking to influence developments outside their zone of occupation (the Berlin 
Blockade of 1948 was a clear sign of this), did the narrower cultural policies associated 
See A. Bance, (ed.), The Cultural Legacy of the British Occupation in Germany: The London 
Symposium, Stuttgart, 1997. 
3 B. Adam and D. Muller, 'Amerikanische Literaturpolitik und Literatur’ in G. Hay (ed.), Zur 
literarischen Situation 1945-1949, Frankfurt on Main, 1977, pp. 147ff. 
4 V. C. Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt. Uber die Konstituierung der deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur 
(1945-1948), Stuttgart, 1971 (hereafter Der Nullpunkt)’, R. W. Williams, 'Alfred Andersch and 
the Cold War’ in R. W. Williams, S. Parker and C. Riordan (eds), German Writers and the 
Cold War 1945-61, Manchester, 1992, p. 226. 
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with the conception of Socialist Realism come to dominate in the Soviet zone, culminating 
in an official campaign against Western ‘formalism’ and ‘decadence’ in the early 1950s, 
after the foundation of the GDR.5 In the situation of 1945, Soviet policy towards the 
reform of their zone of occupation not only led to the sanctioning of political parties at an 
earlier stage than in the West,6 but also to the positive encouragement of diverse cultural 
activity. Aufbau was granted a publishing licence in the Soviet zone as early as June 1945, 
and in its first few years it circulated widely throughout Germany and carried a prestigious 
list of broad-left contributors.7 While the journal faded out in the course of the 1950s, the 
publishing house of the same name continued as the chief literary publisher of the GDR; it 
provided the major outlet inside Germany for exile authors during its early years, and 
survived the collapse of the SED regime in 1989-90 because of its legally independent 
status. 
The brief history of another journal published in East Berlin illustrates more poignantly 
how the attempt to build cultural bridges between East and West was rapidly undermined 
by international political developments. Ost und West was a valiant attempt by a lone 
intellectual, Alfred Kantorowicz, to establish a forum for cultural debate across the zones 
of occupation, and for a brief period in the late 1940s it perhaps came closest to providing 
a form of intellectual leadership that was truly independent of the occupying forces. But it 
was a late-comer to the scene, starting publication only in July 1947; it had the misfortune 
to be granted a licence only in the Soviet zone; and following the foundation of the two 
German states in 1949 its independent line was rapidly overtaken by the hardening of Cold 
War antagonism. Indeed, by the end of 1947 Kantorowicz already found himself faced 
with Communist pressure to exclude renegade intellectuals from his list of contributors on 
the one hand, and the embarrassment of having to respond to the banning of Kulturbund 
activities in the American zone on the other.8 Another ambitious single-handed attempt to 
influence the development of post-war German literature occurred in the French zone. 
Alfred Doblin — the only author of stature from the 1920s who attempted to settle in 
western Germany after the Nazi period — returned to Germany as a French citizen and a 
recent convert to Roman Catholicism. Fie was able to launch his periodical Das Goldene 
Tor in September 1946 and to maintain it with a very large measure of editorial freedom 
until 1951, when the French authorities withdrew funding to such cultural ventures.9 All 
these journals were conscious attempts to influence cultural attitudes inside Germany, but 
as research into the history of each one of them has shown, they encountered a public 
mood which was hesitant in its cultural choices and deeply sceptical towards any form of 
ideology whatsoever in the light of the disasters into which the Hitler regime had led the 
German nation.10 A common perception among German writers who sought to contribute 
5 A. Stephan, Die deutsche Exilliteratur 1933-1945. Eine Einfiihrung, Munich, 1979, pp. 221ff; 
V. Wehdeking and G. Blamberger, Erzahlliteratur der fruhen Nachkriegszeit (1945-1952), 
Munich, 1990, pp. 32ff. 
6 Mary Fulbrook, The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918-1990, Frankfurt on Main, 
1992, pp. 136ff. 
7 H. Engelbach and K. Krauss, ‘Der Kulturbund und seine Zeitschrift Aufbau in der SBZ’ in Hay 
(ed.), Zur literarischen Situation 1945—1949, pp. 169ff. 
8 C. Heinschke, ‘Ost und West oder die Eintracht der Literaten’ in ibid., pp. 199ff. 
9 A. Birkert, ‘Das Goldene Tor. Alfred Doblins Nachkriegszeitschrift (Rahmenbedingungen, 
Zielsetzung, Entwicklung)’ (hereafter ‘Das Goldene Tor’), Archiv fur Geschichte des 
Buchwesens, 33, 1989, p. 239. 
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to the process of cultural renewal in the period 1945^19 was that German culture in the 
wake of the collapse of National Socialism was experiencing an ‘interregnum’.11 
Licensing procedures, censorship, and the control of paper supplies all contributed to the 
sense that truly independent cultural activity was not yet possible.12 But the practical 
constraints on literary communication were not exclusively attributable to political factors. 
Recent detailed research into the operation of Doblin’s journal sheds light on the specific 
difficulties experienced by such ventures. Doblin did encounter a suspicion among 
potential German contributors that his efforts would be too closely controlled by the 
French censors, but he was able to use that experience to increase his own editorial 
freedom.13 Das Goldene Tor was banned on one occasion in the Soviet zone in early 1948 
when it carried an article overtly critical of the Soviet administration, but otherwise it 
circulated freely in all four zones, even though its editorial policy was clearly not pro- 
Marxist.14 In common with other publishing outlets, Doblin’s journal encountered the 
difficulties that arose from differences in licensing policy among the zones and from 
uncertainties about the treatment of copyright under these circumstances: it was not 
uncommon for material that had been legitimately published in one zone to be reprinted in 
another zone without the author’s permission, and by implication, without payment. The 
uncertain financial climate in any case created incentives for writers to publish in daily 
newspapers rather than in more serious intellectual journals. Unreliable postal contacts 
made it very difficult for Doblin to bolster his journal with the contributions he would have 
liked to elicit from prestigious exile writers, with the result that he found himself having to 
turn to the well-established network among both Communist and non-Communist authors 
that existed in the Soviet zone.15 These mundane factors, as well as the increasingly 
manifest political pressures of the late 1940s, placed limitations on the ability of such 
journals to realize their cultural aims. 
When we look at the cultural programmes that Doblin and the other journal editors 
sought to promote, we find a large measure of agreement. When Doblin, in his first 
editorial for Das Goldene Tor, speaks of wanting to throw open a ‘window on the world’, 
or when he invokes the notion of ‘injecting’ new cultural bacilli into the German body 
politic,16 his approach does not differ greatly from that of Der Ruf, or Ost und West, or 
Aufbau. All of them were concerned to introduce German readers to the foreign literature 
they had missed out on since 1933,17 to help them rediscover the German classics in forms 
untainted by Nazi misrepresentation, and to recover the ‘other Germany’ that had been 
driven out or driven underground by the Nazi regime. The spirit of reconciliation among 
all writers who had not been directly associated with that regime was particularly manifest 
at the First German Writers’ Congress held in Berlin in October 1947, even if the 
contribution from Stephan Hermlin on that occasion, which was sharply critical of the 
‘inwardness’ and metaphysical concerns of Western writing, has been seen as signalling 
the onset of hardening attitudes in the Soviet zone.18 Writers from all four zones were 
welcomed by Ricarda Huch (a member of the Kulturbund, but anything but a Communist), 
who invoked the unifying potential of the literary language; contributions published in Ost 
11 G. Boehringer, ‘Zeitschriften der jungen Generation’ in ibid., p. 101; Wehdeking, Der 
Nullpunkt, p. 127. 
12 See Adam and Muller, ‘Amerikanische Literaturpolitik und Literatur’, pp. 149ff. 
13 Birkert, ‘Das Goldene Tor’, pp. 226 and 229ff. 
14 Ibid., p. 234. 
15 Ibid., pp. 240-46. 
16 Alfred Doblin, Schriften zu Asthetik, Poetik und Literatur, Olten and Freiburg, 1989, p. 388. 
17 Adam and Muller, ‘Amerikanische Literaturpolitik und Literatur’, p. 155. 
18 Wehdeking and Blamberger, Erzahlliteratur der friihen Nachkriegszeit (1945—1952), pp. 40ff. 
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und West included Elisabeth Langgasser on writers under the Nazi dictatorship and Alfred 
Kantorowicz on German writers in exile. Doblin, admittedly, stayed away, suspicious of a 
congress which had been organized from within the Soviet sector of Berlin and without 
wider consultation.19 There were manifest differences between Doblin and Andersch over 
how warmly to welcome writers of the so-called innere Emigration into the post-war fold, 
particularly in such cases as Ernst Jiinger and Gottfried Benn, whose writings had 
contributed to the Modernist ferment of the 1920s, but who had also identified themselves 
strongly with the Fascist outlook in the early 1930s.20 But what stands out above all in the 
programmatic writings of the immediate post-war years is the common interest in 
recovering a heritage that had been expunged from public awareness, in providing the 
impulses which might in due course lead to cultural regeneration. 
Both for those who were returning from exile and for those who were keen to welcome 
the exiles back, it was natural that comparisons should be made with the literary situation 
in 1933, that is, with the cultural ferment that had existed immediately before the impact of 
National Socialism. But both groups were also quick to see that that situation simply could 
not be restored. Doblin is explicit on that point in his essay, ‘Die literarische Situation’ of 
1947;21 Alfred Andersch, in his lecture ‘Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung’ of 1948, 
expresses the hope that the exiles will indeed return (he is thinking particularly of Thomas 
Mann, who never did resettle in Germany after 1945, and Bertolt Brecht, who did not take 
up the invitation to settle in East Berlin until 1949), but also makes it plain that what 
matters even more is the reception of their works as models and stimuli for younger 
German writers.22 Hans Werner Richter is quite explicit in an early essay in Der Ruf, 
‘Warum schweigt die junge Generation?’ (Why Is the Young Generation Silent?) of 
September 1946, that both the physical devastation of Germany in the closing stages of the 
war and the intellectual devastation caused by twelve years of National Socialism make it 
quite impossible to reassemble the cultural constellation that was dispersed in 193 3.23 A 
study conducted in the mid-1960s showed, moreover, that the younger generation of the 
1940s, including Richter and Andersch themselves, lacked the reading experience and thus 
the linguistic skills that would have enabled them to shake off the cliched manner of 
expression with which they had grown up under the Nazis.24 
It is necessary to distinguish between the will for a new start in literary writing after 
1945 on the one hand and the practicalities of developing the literary techniques which 
would do justice to the terrible experiences of the Nazi period and the perspectives of a 
post-war reading public on the other. The desire for a ‘Kahlschiag’ — a tabula rasa 
approach to writing, an attempt to strip away the ideological connotations with which 
many items of German vocabulary had become tainted under the Nazis — is already 
clearly apparent in the critical and programmatic writings of Hans Werner Richter in 
1945-46, and becomes sloganized in an anthology of new writing published by Wolfgang 
Weyrauch in 1949.25 But in practice, the efforts of the young to give voice to their 
immediate experiences as the war came to an end proved, with one or two notable 
19 Birkert, 'Das Goldene Tor’, p. 228. 
20 See Hay (ed.), Zur literarischen Situation 1945-1949, pp. 9 and 192ff., and Birkert, ‘Das 
Goldene Tor’, p. 270. 
21 Doblin, Schriften zu Asthetik, Poetik und Literatur, pp. 409ff. 
22 Hay (ed.), Zur literarischen Situation 1945-1949, p. 9. 
23 H. Vormweg, ‘Deutsche Literatur 1945-1960. Keine Stunde Null’ in M. Durzak (ed.), Die 
deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 19. 
24 U. Widmer, 1945 oder Die ‘Neue Sprache’. Studien zur Prosa der ‘Jungen Generation’, 
Dusseldorf, 1966. 
25 Ibid., pp. 13ff., and Wehdeking, Der Nullpunkt, pp. 122ff. 
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exceptions such as Heinrich Boll, to be short-lived, and the German publishing market of 
the late 1940s remained dominated by works of older writers from the innere Emigration, 
whose careers apparently continued largely uninterrupted.26 It might be objected that 
Vormweg’s account of the literary situation after 1945 as anything but a Stunde Null (fresh 
start) is coloured by a sense of how little sign there had been in the post-war period of a 
literary response to the full horrors of the Nazi period (Carl Zuckmayer had presented the 
ethical dilemmas of a military figure serving under Hitler in Des Teufels General in 1946, 
but Peter Weiss’s dramatization of the Auschwitz trials in Die Ermittlung did not come 
until 1965). And Widmer’s study of the language of young authors in the late 1940s might 
appear hypersensitive towards particular items of vocabulary — Bewegung, Raum, Bereich 
— which had been loaded with ideological connotations under National Socialism, but are 
in themselves inescapably banal. However, the significant point that both Widmer and 
Vormweg bring out is that a stylistic analysis of post-war German writing reveals the sheer 
ineptitude of a generation that had been brought up with the vapid phrases of the Nazi 
dictatorship ringing in their ears. A pragmatic view of how German literature developed 
after 1945 would therefore be bound to conclude that an eclectic period of assimilating the 
expressive potential of modem literature was necessary before writers could achieve the 
stylistic competence to address the realities of the recent past with a vigorous and 
independent voice. That process took a full decade in East as well as West: it is not until 
the late 1950s and early 1960s that we encounter the early works of Gunter Grass, Uwe 
Johnson, Heiner Muller, and Christa Wolf — or indeed the first novel of Alfred Andersch, 
Sansibar oder Der letzte Grund.27 
But there is another perspective that I would like to place alongside this pragmatic 
interpretation of the literary situation in Germany in 1945-49. We can bring this 
alternative perspective into focus by drawing a comparison not with the situation in 1933, 
but with the situation in 1918. At that time, notwithstanding the carnage and the 
depredations of the First World War, German literary writing was buoyed up by a strong 
mood of activism. It was at this time that Expressionist writers were turning from the 
representation of individualistic revolt to the invocation of utopian visions for the social 
world. This was essentially the literature of a generation in revolt against what it sensed to 
be the mechanisms of modem society, but within a framework of institutional continuity 
— the theatres, even if some of them had been converted from court theatres into state 
theatres, were still there to nurture and to provide the audiences for new cultural trends. In 
1945, by contrast, we have a moment of radical institutional discontinuity (the discrediting 
of the defeated regime and the administration of Germany by foreign powers), in which the 
dominant literary voices appear to be those of tradition — conservative in the West, 
socialist in the East. Recent investigations into the history of German literature between 
1918 and 1945 have emphasized two features which should make us cautious about 
ascribing the major changes in cultural activity to the direct influence of political events. 
First, the underlying utopian thrust of Expressionist literature is carried forward into the 
avant-garde culture of the 1920s with its ambitious projects for influencing the political 
character of society (Brecht and Piscator on the left, Jiinger and the writers of the 
Conservative Revolution on the right) — even if, within the more practically orientated 
climate of the 1920s, the intellectual comes to see himself as a catalyst in the collective 
processes of society rather than as a prime mover in changing the world. Secondly, the 
retreat from activism into heroic pessimism and the pursuit of metaphysical interests does 
not only set in with the advent of Nazi rule in 1933, but is discernible from about 1930 
26 Vormweg, ‘Deutsche Literatur 1945-1960. Keine Stunde Null’, p. 16. 
27 See ibid., p. 14, and C. Smith, ‘All Quiet on the Eastern Front?’ in Williams, Parker and 
Riordan (eds), German Writers and the Cold War 1945-1961, p. 22. 
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(with the onset of the Great Depression) and can be seen to manifest itself among German 
left-wing exiles as much as among writers who stay in Germany.28 
There is no scope in a short chapter like this to explore the implications of these 
historical perspectives in depth, but what I should like to do in the space available is to 
illustrate their relevance to the situation in 1945-49 with reference to two novels by 
authors who may fairly be regarded as contrasting representatives of German Modernist 
writing. Thomas Mann is commonly thought of as having consolidated the bourgeois 
Realist tradition in narrative fiction with his early novels Buddenbrooks (1900) and Der 
Zauberberg (The Magic Mountain, 1924), and Alfred Doblin, chiefly remembered for the 
innovative montage effects of Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), is seen as a self-consciously 
radical experimenter. They were certainly viewed as opposing models for narrative writing 
in the 1920s, and there is clear evidence that the differences between them sharpened into 
strong antipathy, particularly on Doblin’s part, by the 1940s.29 But when we look at the 
novels these two authors were writing around the time that the Second World War came to 
an end, then we may well be struck by the affinities rather than the differences between 
them. 
In Doktor Faustus, written in 1944-45, Thomas Mann works with his characteristic 
blend of realism and symbolism to present Germany as the site of a doomed culture. In the 
figure of the composer Adrian Leverkiihn he constructs an emblem of a Modernist culture 
which has advanced to an extreme historical self-awareness with regard to techniques of 
musical expression developed in the past, and which then seeks to surpass that self- 
awareness by developing twelve-tone music, a mode of composition which releases the 
harmonic relations between notes from past systems of tonality, and binds them into a new 
discipline of sequence instead. The model for Leverkiihn’s technical innovation is, of 
course, Schoenberg, or more precisely, the historical significance of Schoenberg’s 
development of modem music as interpreted in the philosophy of Adorno; and the Faust 
legend invoked in the novel’s title hints at a wealth of suggestive connections to the 
cultural history of Germany since the Reformation. But far from depicting Leverkiihn’s 
contribution to modem culture as a triumph of historical and intellectual insight, Mann 
presents it as a manifestation of inhumanity accompanied by a descent into illness, 
isolation, and death. He does so by constructing Leverkiihn’s story primarily out of motifs 
taken from the biography of Nietzsche (including the notion that the mental disorder to 
which Nietzsche succumbed at the age of 44 was the result of a syphilitic infection) and 
mapping these onto the history of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Characteristically, Mann presents these associations at an ironic distance, allowing the 
story to be told by a first-person narrator who himself incorporates the ineptitude of a 
fading bourgeois humanism, Leverkuhn’s erstwhile school-friend, Serenus Zeitblom. But 
that device in itself lends emphasis, as well as poignancy, to the sense that the 
acknowledged power of Leverkuhn’s music is derived from the abandonment, not only of 
the values of humanist tradition, but of all humane principles. 
In Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus (an account of the circumstances in which the 
novel came to be written, published in 1949), Mann notes with approval a comment by 
Lukacs on his pre-1914 work Der Tod in Venedig (Death in Venice) as signalling the 
presence of ‘a barbaric underworld within modem German civilisation’, and 
28 H. D. Schafer, Das gespaltene Bewufitsein. Uber deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 
1933-1945, Munich, 1981, pp. 55ff; M. Lindner, Leben in der Krise. Zeitromane der neuen 
Sachlichkeit und die intellektuelle Mentalitat der klassischen Moderne, Stuttgart, 1994, 
pp. 142 ff. 
29 J. Meyer, Alfred Doblin 1878-1978 (Exhibition catalogue of the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 
Marbach), Munich, 1978, pp. 406ff. 
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enthusiastically applies Lukacs’s point also to Doktor Faustus30 If we draw out the 
comparison between these two works of Thomas Mann’s, then we may easily recognize 
the sense in which the later work represents an elaborate leave-taking from the vitalist 
world-view which had largely characterized Mann’s earlier writings, and which owed its 
intellectual foundations precisely to Nietzsche. For its time, Der Tod in Venedig was a 
radical, as well as an exquisitely controlled, experiment in the depiction of the life-forces 
at work behind the processes of artistic production according to the ideas contained in 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy. The narration maintains a delicate balance between revealing 
the self-abandonment of the protagonist, a famous writer, to Dionysian intoxication, 
infatuation, and self-indulgence on the one hand, and allowing him the continued dignity 
of Apollonian pretence on the other. The pertinence of Lukacs’s comment lies in the way 
the story reveals a realm of passion and (from the point of view of social convention) 
incipient depravity which is at work in the generation of art, but is simultaneously 
concealed behind the cultured appearance of art. Doktor Faustus continues to work with an 
expressive vocabulary which is essentially similar to that of Mann’s early writings: it 
generates its play of tensions by confronting an inherited conception of cultural forces as 
life-enhancing (but illusory) with a sense of historical development dominated by an 
undeluded, but inherently inhumane intellectualism. Thomas Mann’s indebtedness to 
Nietzsche’s critique of modem culture remains apparent in the novel’s evocation of the 
subordination of human culture to the process of intellectualization; his repudiation of the 
very intellectual culture that Nietzsche had engendered is apparent in his association of it, 
through the story of Leverkiihn, with the German nation’s descent into inhumanity. 
The novel that Doblin was writing in 1946—47, Flamlet oder Die lange Nacht nimmt ein 
Ende, also shows an intimate connection with themes he had developed at an earlier stage 
of his career. Vitalist motifs of catastrophe and regeneration had characterized his major 
works of the period after the First World War. In Berge Meere und Giganten (Mountains, 
Seas and Giants, 1924) he had imagined a future in which humanity’s drive for 
technological power had led to increasingly severe political conflicts and ecological 
disasters, until small surviving communities return to a life disciplined by the veneration of 
natural forces; and the personal story at the heart of Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929) could be 
summarized as the struggle between the protagonist’s internal impulses and the unrelenting 
forces at work in his external environment, until his personality is finally reduced to a vital 
core from which a new social identity can grow. In Flamlet, Doblin imagines the situation 
of a young Englishman, Edward Allison, who has returned severely injured from the 
Pacific War. Edward’s father is presented as a famous writer who has warded off the major 
catastrophes of the twentieth century by persuading himself that war is a natural 
occurrence. Edward himself is looking for someone or something to blame for the injury 
done to him. The text of the novel is largely composed of the stories told by members of 
the family and their circle of friends, as they try to come to terms with their situation, and 
the effect of the story-telling is both to expose unpalatable truths about the personal 
relationships within the family and also to keep open the question about how honest any 
one of them is being about the nature of humanity’s fundamental impulses. 
The father begins with what is apparently intended as a diversion from the distressing 
circumstances of the present, telling of the troubadour Jaufre Rudel and the cult of courtly 
love — but his version, which purports to bring out the truth behind the legend, turns into a 
starkly grotesque account of erotic domination exercised by the Princess of Tripoli to 
whom Jaufre addressed his songs, and of the brutal revenge eventually exacted upon her. 
The story of King Lear is similarly reinterpreted in such a way as to give it the character of 
30 Thomas Mann, Rede und Antwort, Frankfurt on Main, 1984, p. 226. 
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a struggle for sexual dominance between the ageing king and the woman at whose hands 
he has experienced humiliation. Artistic creativity as a means of sublimating the 
overpowering desire for love is evoked through the person of Michelangelo, and the 
unremitting demand of spiritual love is shown through a tale of medieval Mariolatry. 
Edward’s mother finds the destructive sensuality of Salome intruding upon her pursuit of 
pious thoughts, and the story she tells about a woman from ancient Alexandria illustrates 
the potential for personal identity to become suppressed in relations between the sexes: it is 
the story of a woman who rediscovers her husband after believing him lost at sea and after 
adapting to the life of the bon-viveur who has meanwhile wooed her, and who opts for 
death in the desert, unable to resolve the tensions between her present self and her former 
self What Doblin achieves with this complex interweaving of narrative threads is a 
reflection and extemalization of various latent aspects of personal relations in the 
contemporary world through the imagery of legend. The mystery revealed to young 
Edward as he probes, Hamlet-like, into the true nature of his situation is that the source of 
aggression lies within the self, and particularly within the sexual self: he is the son of 
parents whose relationship has been marked by precisely such conflicts as have been 
illustrated in the story-telling. This Hamlet novel ultimately serves to repudiate the faith in 
processes of organic renewal which had characterized Doblin’s major works at the height 
of his writing career, and to emphasize instead the potential destructiveness of forces 
inherent in human nature. The outcome he envisages for Edward in the version of the 
ending he originally wrote (although he obligingly provided a secularized conclusion for 
the version which was actually published, in East Germany, in 1956) is a retreat into a 
monastery. 
Within the scope of this chapter I have been able to discuss only two novels, albeit by 
authors who are both representative of the Modernist movement in German literature and 
illustrative of the diversity within that movement. What I have sought to highlight with this 
choice of works, however, is the evidence they contain of a melancholy and valedictory 
turn within the very Modernist literature that the pioneers among the younger generations 
of German writers in the period 1945-49 were hoping to emulate. Both Doblin and 
Thomas Mann are presenting the organic imagery that had earlier been their stock in trade 
in a negative, repudiatory light. I would suggest in the light of that evidence that the sense 
of emptiness and disorientation we find in German literature in the immediate post-war 
phase is not just a consequence of the way Modernist literature had been denied to those 
younger generations; it is also related to the fact that the characteristic discourse of that 
Modernist literature had itself entered a phase of exhaustion and renunciation. The 
question of how the themes and techniques of Modernist writing were in fact absorbed into 
the German literature that younger authors went on to write in later decades, or whether 
these new authors can be said to be operating within a recognizably different paradigm, is 
one that still calls for further investigation. 
27 Austria’s Second Coming: The Literary 
Response to a Restored Austria in the Early 
Years of the Second Republic 
Anthony Bushell 
Although the concept Mitteleuropa might be considered in large measure to be an Austrian 
invention, Austria itself fits but awkwardly into the pattern of Eastern and Central 
European history for the immediate post-war period. Austria’s final attainment of 
sovereignty in 1955 left the country looking very different from most states discussed in 
this volume. By 1955 Austria was to witness the Soviet Army leave voluntarily along with 
the other occupying forces of Britain, France and the United States; its territorial integrity 
was to be restored to that of its pre-war position; the country stood outside the two major 
military alliances and its economy was set, if at a somewhat slower pace than that of West 
Germany’s, on a course that was to lead it to unparalleled economic prosperity and to an 
institutional stability it had not experienced throughout the years of the First Republic, that 
unplanned-for state created in the aftermath of the Habsburg Empire in 1918. 
The year 1949 may be invoked as a marker in one significant, if negative, respect as a 
defining moment in post-war Austrian history. By then the Austrian Communist Party had 
been rejected unreservedly by the Austrian electorate in two general elections for the 
Nationalrat. In December 1945 the KPO had polled only 174,257 votes — this at a time 
when the Americans were so fearful of the perceived Soviet and Communist grip over 
Vienna and eastern Austria that they had at one point considered creating Salzburg as the 
capital of their own, alternative, Austria. At the next parliamentary elections in October 
1949, when conditions and the electoral roll had become slightly more stable, the 
Communist vote rose to 213,066, but by this time the party had already fallen to fourth 
position, receiving fewer than half the votes of the party now occupying third place, the 
WdU (Wahlpartei der Unabhangigen, the Independents), the forerunners of the Freedom 
Party.* 1 Also by 1949 a clear electoral pattern had been established between the two 
principal parties, the conservative OVP and the socialist SPO, who commanded almost 
equal support amongst the Austrian electorate, thus setting up a tradition of Grand 
Coalition government that has lasted almost without interruption for the entire life of the 
Second Republic. Coalitions, and especially grand coalitions, naturally demand a large 
element of compromise. And there remains the question, or rather the concept, of transition 
in the case of Austria. Transition requires movement from and to different places or 
different states. The movement may not always be intentional, voluntary, planned or 
coherent. There may be no clear idea of where the movement will lead and when that 
phase of transition will be completed. But usually there can be some agreement about the 
starting point in any journey. In the case of Austria, however, for the key political players 
in the immediate post-war period there was no agreement about the point of departure, an 
uncertainty that was also reflected in the attitude of the occupying forces. 
With the exception of the Communists, the impetus behind much political activity was 
not for a simple transition towards new terrain; there was a desire, in part, to return to 
The author wishes to acknowledge the support of the British Academy. 
1 W. Oberleitner (ed.), Politisches Handbuch Osterreich 1945-1972, Vienna, 1972, p. 18. 
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some form of the status quo before the Anschlufi, Germany’s annexation of Austria, and to 
the reassertion of Austria’s territorial integrity. To that extent the double-headed eagle of 
the defunct Habsburg Empire rather than the single-headed eagle of the Second Republic 
served as a fitting image for what was taking place in post-war Austria: the gaze was not 
set exclusively on the future; it was rather a Janus stance, with as much regard to the past. 
Not for Austria the well-established, if ultimately unsustainable, idea of a tabula rasa, a 
Kahlschlag or a Stunde Null that characterized discussion of the nascent West and East 
German states in this period. The Austrian perspective was rooted both in law and 
sentiment. To have abandoned all concept of restoration in favour of a completely new 
order or fresh beginning would be to acknowledge both the impact of the Anschlufi and to 
throw into doubt the status of the First Republic. Were a wholesale replacement of 
institutions to have been accepted it would have acknowledged openly the bankruptcy of 
pre-war Austrian life at all levels. In detaching itself from the part that individual Austrians 
played in the Third Reich, it seemed essential to Austrian politicians after 1945 to interpret 
— and to ask the outside world to interpret — the years Austria was incorporated into the 
German Reich as an aberration and nothing but a most unpleasant interregnum in the 
history of modem Austria. Thus establishing continuity rather than embarking upon 
transition was in many ways the more urgent task. The whole process, however, was 
blurred by two factors: the length of the Allies’ occupation of Austria and the Allies’ own 
uncertain attitude to post-war Austrian reconstruction. For as long as the Austrians could 
not be sure of the Allies’ approach to their country there was a general consensus to rock 
the boat as little as possible by internal dissention. 
The idea of restoration was not, however, without considerable problems. Which Austria 
was to be restored in 1945? The question bedevilled the main political parties for it 
threatened to open up old wounds and antagonisms. To claim post-war Austria was a 
continuation of the Austrian state that had disappeared in March 1938 would be an 
endorsement of Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg’s Austria, in which Communists and 
Socialists alike had been driven underground, yet it was only in the dying days of the 
Standestaat, the corporate state, that a concerted effort at the creation of an Austrian 
identity had been belatedly attempted. Yet it was difficult to find a suitable alternative 
point at which the Second Republic could be grafted back emotionally onto the First 
Republic. To summon up the Austria immediately before the creation of Chancellor 
Engelbert DollfuB’s corporate state was to evoke the period of the civil war, whilst to 
appeal to the spirit of the very early days of the First Republic would be a reminder of 
those years when the Austrian Socialists, in particular, had clamoured for union with 
Germany. 
The task facing Austrians after 1945 was to find some form of consensus on the notion 
of what constituted Austria, but at the same time to avoid too great an insistence on 
specific detail, for this would inevitably highlight those bitter divisions that had left 
Austria with too weak a conception of itself to resist the Nazi take-over. As far as the 
matter of compromise is concerned, the sharing of power after 1945, including cabinet 
portfolios, the apparent lack of any possibility of one party gaining absolute power and the 
need not to offend the occupying powers combined to convince Austrian politicians not to 
relive old battles. They had other calculations to contend with, including an awareness that 
at some point in the future many of the minor and now disenfranchized Nazi functionaries 
would have the right to vote returned to them. It would not pay politically to pursue the 
past too vigorously for fear of alienating this significant minority within the Austrian 
electorate. The importance of not antagonizing this sector of the electorate far outweighed 
the significance given to those who formed such a characteristic aspect of any discussion 
of Central Europe in this transitional period, namely the men and women who had spent 
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the preceding years in exile and who were now returning or considering returning to the 
countries from which they had fled or been expelled. In Austria there was little general 
enthusiasm to make room for those who had spent the Anschlufi or earlier years abroad. 
And since the Allies in their Moscow declaration had given Austria victim status, those 
who had remained in the country throughout the war years had less incentive to show 
deference to those who had suffered the privations of exile. An important contrast to many 
other countries in this transition phase had been the absence of an Austrian government in 
exile during the war years. This absence did little to raise the status of those individual 
Austrians who had fled abroad and amongst whom there were few common denominators, 
for whilst some had fled Nazi Austria, others had escaped persecution from their fellow 
Austrians in the corporate state of DollfuB and Schuschnigg. 
And it seems as if post-war Austrians could also live with other irreconcilables, no more 
so graphically illustrated than by the person with ultimate responsibility for overseeing the 
rebirth of an independent Austria, Karl Renner. He was to be the first Staatskanzler and the 
first Bundesprasident of post-war Austria. As a leading Socialist in the immediate days 
following the First World War, Renner had been a vociferous champion of Austria’s union 
with Germany. He had subsequently endorsed the Anschlufi after Hitler had marched into 
Austria. Yet in 1945 he set about the task of restoring an independent Austria. Renner’s 
case is only the most striking example amongst a widespread pattern of key individuals 
and whole classes of functionaries and civil servants taking up posts they had held before 
the Anschlufi. 
While the Allies remained as occupying forces within Austria, the Austrians themselves 
had only limited room for manoeuvre, yet it was precisely this limited scope in the exercise 
of power that helps explain the importance of culture in the emergence of the Second 
Republic. It is worth recalling how fragile the idea of Austrian nationhood has been 
throughout the twentieth century. Even as late as 1965 fewer than half (48 per cent) the 
respondents to a survey believed that Austrians were a nation. By 1977 this figure was still 
a modest 62 per cent.2 
The principal challenge in the early post-war years was to disentangle Austrian identity 
from that of Germany, and culture was to be enlisted as a major instrument in that task. 
The incentive to achieve this separation was naturally very great indeed. With the 
inevitable question of war guilt and reparations on the agenda of the occupying Allies, it 
was in Austria’s interest to distance itself from all that was German. The experience of life 
in the Greater German Reich had also turned sour following the destruction and suffering 
that had ultimately visited Austria, and in that regard the situation in 1945 was markedly 
different from that of 1918; it was therefore not mere opportunism that lay behind the 
change of position held by many politicians who had once been champions of union with 
Germany. But this willingness to dissociate would not of itself guarantee the creation of a 
clear Austrian identity. The First Republic had been too short-lived and too unstable for its 
simple evocation to guarantee acceptance of the Second Republic. A whole generation of 
young Austrians had been educated under the Nazis when the idea of Austria had been 
systematically eradicated, while many older Austrians predated the First Republic, and it is 
understandably difficult to feel a sense of veneration for institutions younger than oneself. 
Attempts to evoke an Austria before 1918 and the imperial grandeur of the Habsburgs 
constituted a real problem, yet, as the work of Joseph Roth in particular illustrated, the 
sense of loss with the passing of Empire was a very potent strain in the work of some 
writers after 1918. The problem was that any evocation of a point in history before 1918 
would be to endorse pre-republican Austria. Had Austria’s post-1918 history been happier, 
P. Dusek et al., Zeitgeschichte im Aufrifi, Vienna, 1988, p. 337. 
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this may not have been a dilemma, yet the First Republic was too weakly established in the 
minds of many; it could offer few endearing memories for Austrians of all classes: the 
professional classes had experienced hyper-inflation particularly keenly and the collapse of 
banking institutions; the Communists and Socialists had been persecuted by their fellow 
Austrians; it had been a time of Schattendorf street unrest and eventually of civil war. 
Voltaire was the first modem European to appreciate fully the link between a nation’s 
history and a nation’s literature, seeing in literature ‘a constitutive element for the 
existence of nations’.3 Yet Austrian literature of the immediate post-war period, and indeed 
well beyond the period under discussion in this volume, displayed a remarkable reluctance 
to engage either with the concrete details of day-to-day reality in Austria immediately after 
1945 or in discussing the uneasy history of Austria between the wars. A sympathetic 
reader might feel that it was an unnatural expectation for Austrian literature to come to 
terms with the post-1945 situation when it had yet to demonstrate it had absorbed the 
tremendous upheavals that had followed the Treaty of St Germain after the First World 
War. Yet many literary scholars have noted the absence of that Trummerliteratur (literally, 
literature from the ruins) which was such a strong feature of West German writing after the 
war: ‘To a large degree [Austria] did not have writers like Borchert, Boll, Nossack, who, 
tom between radical despair and hope for a radical new beginning, provided the decisive 
features to the face of immediate post-war German literature’.4 It has taken all the 
analytical skills and a bravura performance by Austria’s most distinguished scholar of 
contemporary Austrian literature to repudiate the idea that post-1945 Austrian literature 
has been politically supine.5 
But for politicians on the right and left the need for an affirmative Austrian identity was 
an essential element in securing future political goals as well as finding the way back to 
that hypothetical Austria from which the nation had been violently derailed by the German 
occupation. Until this could be achieved through tangible political institutions, an identity 
would have to be constructed and transmitted by cultural, including educational, means. In 
June 1945 the People’s Party (OVP) issued fifteen guiding principals, the eighth of which 
called for the conscious cultivation of the Austrian spirit and culture.6 And the 
Communists, too, accepted that any idea of internationalism would have to wait until an 
Austrian identity had been firmly established. Ernst Fischer, the leading Austrian 
Communist thinker and first education minister in Renner’s post-war cabinet recognized 
that the antidote for a workforce corrupted by years of Nazi propaganda would be a sense 
of Austrian patriotism. 
He and the subsequent ministers for education, Felix Hurdes and Ernst Kolb, both 
conservative OVP men, placed particular emphasis on textbooks and the school syllabus in 
the task of creating an Austrian identity. In recent years it has become a commonplace of 
Austrian literary history — but no less true for being so — that early post-war literature 
was remarkably conservative and hostile to innovation. Young authors and those writers 
who had gone into exile were to experience particular difficulty in finding an outlet for 
their work or a sympathetic critical reception, and this no doubt explains in part the intense 
bitterness of the delayed response to all things Austrian when it finally expressed itself 
more fully in the 1960s. Many voices were to be lost altogether. Peter Eppel, for example, 
3 W. Krauss, Grundprobleme der Literature issenschaft, 4th edn, Reinbeck, 1973, p. 26. 
4 W. Weiss, ‘Die Literatur der Gegenwart in Osterreich’ in M. Durzak (ed.), Deutsche 
Gegenwartsliteratur, Stuttgart, 1981, p. 602. 
5 W. Schmidt-Dengler, ‘Von Sturm, Gewitter, Windstille und Frost oder: Mein Gedicht ist mein 
MesserF in H. Seuter (ed.). Die Feder, ein Schwert? Literatur und Politik in Osterreich, Graz, 
1981, pp. 162-69. 
6 K. Berchtold, Osterreichische Parteiprogramme 1868-1966, Munich, 1967, p. 377. 
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established the names of 121 Austrian authors who had gone into exile in the United 
States. Ninety of these (74 per cent) were to remain in America and only twenty (16.5 per 
cent) were to travel back to Austria permanently.* * 7 
Modem, avant-garde literature, from the politicians perspective, was an unsuitable 
instrument for creating a national identity amongst a broad reading public. In post-war 
Austria there was, in addition, little enthusiasm amongst the professional literary and 
academic establishment for encouraging modem writing, despite the efforts of H. C. 
Artmann, Oswald Wiener, Friedrich Achleitner and other writers associated with the 
Wiener Gruppe. (The Vienna Group’s initial name, ‘Exil’, clearly betrayed the attitude 
many young and experimental writers felt towards the state of Austria.) Many of the 
leading critics and literary scholars from the Anschlufi era survived well into the Second 
Republic: Josef Nadler, Norbert Langer, Heinz Kindermann and Adalbert Schmidt. In their 
works they were simply to ignore the Nazi years and in their treatment of writers who had 
continued to publish throughout the Nazi period they often withheld biographical 
information that related to that period. By abandoning a chronological approach to literary 
history in favour of a somewhat vaguely formulated appeal to the Austrian tradition, it was 
possible to present Austrian writing as uncontaminated by Austria’s contact with Hitler. 
There were writers, both of socialist and conservative persuasion, who did attempt to 
engage with Austria’s inter-war history, men such as Rudolf Kreutz, Ernst Lothar, Fritz 
Habek, Wilhelm Waldstein, Rudolf Brunngraber, Franz Hollering, Reinhard Federmann, 
Franz Kain and Alois Vogel, yet even in these instances there was much ill-ease at direct 
engagement with the disintegration of the First Republic and Austria’s move towards 
National Socialism. The conservative writers in particular looked more towards the last 
phase of an independent Austria than to the years of the civil war. And for many writers 
Austria’s recent history represented predominantly a back-cloth for the telling of stories 
about individuals or individual families than for large-scale historical or social analysis. As 
for the years immediately after 1938, there were attempts to deny they had any impact at 
all on Austrian literature. Typical of such a stance was that of Alexander Lemet-Holenia, 
the epitome of Austrian literary conservatism and a subsequent president of the Austrian 
PEN-Club. In 1946 he wrote an article in the journal Geist und Wort in which he argued 
that the unwholesome impact of Germany upon Austria’s cultural life in the immediate 
past should not be overestimated: Tt is probable that Austrian writing would be 
approximately where it is now, even without the political events that tried for a time to 
drive it off its track’.8 Such a view suggested that Austrian literature after 1945 had 
leapfrogged over the Nazi years and taken up where it had left off in the 1930s and earlier. 
If post-war cultural life could ignore the impact of the years under National Socialism, it 
followed that it could also afford to ignore what individual artists had done during that 
time. As a result many writers of what is known as Ostmark-Literatur, that is, works and 
anthologies avowedly in support of an Austria absorbed into Greater Germany, found little 
impediment to continuing work after the war or having earlier work reproduced if in that 
earlier work patriotic Austrian sentiment could be clearly distinguished. (Just how quickly 
the past could be forgotten is illustrated by the fact that by 1953 Josef Nadler could 
undertake an edition of the collected works of Josef Weinheber for the Salzburg publishing 
house of Otto Muller.) 
P. Eppel, 'Bemerkungen zur Frage der Ruckkehr osterreichischer Emigranten aus den USA’ in 
Johann Holzner et al. (eds), Eine schwierige Heimkehr. Osterreichische Literatur im Ejcil 1938- 
1945, Innsbruck, 1991, p. 112. 
8 J. McVeigh, Kontinuitat und Vergangenheitsbewaltigung in der osterreichischen Literatur 
nach 1945, Vienna, 1988, p. 93. 
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Despite energetic and pioneering work in a number of literary journals emerging after 
the war striving to make contact with world literature, the general direction of the cultural 
response to a restored Austria could best be described as the search for timelessness: 
Austrian literature was to be Dichtung untainted by base day-to-day politics, conveying a 
picture of intact Austrian values. In a 1946 edition of the journal Plan, Hans Weigel, the 
influential Jewish writer and critic recently returned from exile, noted with alarm 
Austrians’ willingness to isolate themselves even from the best in German culture. 
It is tempting to say that Austrian literature was doing nothing new. The retreat from 
political reality had also marked the literary response to 1848, as demonstrated by 
Austria’s greatest prose writer of the nineteenth century, Adalbert Stifter, that ‘mild and 
timid liberal’9 who had evoked a world where individuals matured and fulfilled themselves 
outside social and political engagement, but here I touch on elements in Austrian cultural 
life that go well beyond the chronological parameters of my theme for, as one cultural 
historian has commented, ‘the militant Counter-Reformation had virtually isolated the 
Habsburg monarchy [from the rest of Europe] in the seventeenth century’.10 When the day 
of reckoning with the Second Republic finally did begin to take place in Austrian literature 
from the 1960s onwards and in the works of such writers as Hans Lebert, Franz Innerhofer, 
Thomas Bernhard and Peter Handke, it was to emerge out of the most unlikely and 
unexpected context for genuine upheaval, namely a period of political stability and 
economic prosperity, by which time Austrian public memory had compounded its 
problem: for if Austria immediately after 1945 was exposed to the charge of having 
promptly forgotten its recent past, by the 1970s voices could be heard lamenting the fact 
that memory of those difficult early post-war years after 1945 was also on the verge of 
disappearing. Austria, it could be claimed, had itself entered comfortably into that post- 
historical world it had wished to create in its literature and was, according to the former 
editor of Die Presse, a nation that had put its own history behind itself and was now taking 
it easy in the warm autumn sunshine, resting against the wall of its house, sheltered by 
hedges from any cold winds that might still be blowing.* 11 
The Austrian historian Anton Pelinka is right in claiming that the taboos and other acts 
of self-deception developed by the Second Republic had a protective function, for they 
created the space in which the healing process of a fragile nation could begin.12 Such 
taboos, however, are, as he reminds us, of only limited effectiveness. They may have 
rendered service to the transitional Austria of the immediate post-war period, but they left 
those acts of literary and cultural maturation associated with a truly confident and secure 
nation to a later generation. 
9 Roy Pascal, The German Novel, London, 1965, p. 53. 
10 E. Wangermann, The Austrian Achievement 1700-1800, London, 1973, p. 19. 
11 O. Schulmeister, Der zweite Anschlufi. Osterreichs Verwandlung seit 1945, Vienna, 1979, 
p. 12. 
12 A. Pelinka, ‘Taboos and Self-deception: The Second Republic’s Reconstruction of History’ in 
G. Bischof and A. Pelinka (eds), Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity, New 
Brunswick, NJ and London, 1996, p. 100. 
28 The Rise and Fall of Bourgeois Literature in 
Hungary, 1945-49 
MihAly Szegedy-MaszAk 
The origins of the literature of the Hungarian bourgeoisie can be traced back to the 
Freemasons of the late eighteenth century who tried to liberate themselves from the 
constraints of feudalism. Their initiative was continued by intellectuals of humble origin 
who could profit from the social mobility of the Age of Reforms that culminated in the 
revolution of 1848. Although the rise of bourgeois culture suffered setbacks in 1849 and at 
the end of the First World War, such temporary declines were far less serious than the 
damage caused by the German occupation of 1944. At the end of that year the chances for 
some continuity were so slim that it was an open question whether recovery was possible. 
Hungary suffered serious military, material, civilian, and intellectual losses in the 
Second World War. Some 800,000-900,000 people were killed in the war and 40 per cent 
of the national wealth of 1938 was destroyed. About 450,000 Jews perished in the Shoah. 
Political and social changes were inseparable from a large-scale migration that affected 
between 450,000 and 550,000 people. Between sixty and eighty thousand ethnic 
Hungarians fled to Hungary from neighbouring countries; 170,000-180,000 ethnic 
Germans were forced to leave. Owing to a Czechoslovak-Hungarian population exchange 
scheme, 90,000 ethnic Hungarians left Czechoslovakia for Hungary and 60,000 Slovaks 
left Hungary and settled in Slovakia. In 1949 the population of the country was 9,200,000. 
Of this number, 376,173 were bom outside Hungary. Economic factors made it very 
difficult for the country to recover after the end of the war. In 1938 the per capita national 
income amounted to SI20, which was 60 per cent of the European average. The Second 
World War and its consequences led to a rapid decline, and the 1938 income level was not 
reached again until 1950. 
In short, the period 1945-49 was marked by an increasingly backward economy and 
serious intellectual losses. The poets Miklos Radnoti and Gyorgy Sarkozi, the short-story 
writers Karoly Pap and Andor Endre Gelleri, the essayists Antal Szerb and Gabor Halasz 
died in forced labour camps. No fewer eminent writers were killed by the Communists in 
1945. The philosophers Tibor Joo and Jozsef Revay, and the short-story writer and critic 
Istvan Orley were among them. Continuity was broken also by the arrival of a group of 
Communists from Moscow. The film critic and writer Bela Balazs, the philosopher Gyorgy 
Lukacs, the journalist Andor Gabor, and the critic Jozsef Revai belonged to a generation 
active since the early twentieth century. Like the somewhat younger novelists Bela Illes 
and Sandor Gergely, they lived in the Soviet Union before and during the war. Largely 
ignorant of conditions in Hungary, they made an immediate attempt to force the Soviet 
system on the country. What the American historian John Lukacs wrote about his 
namesake, recalling their meeting shortly after the philosopher’s return to Budapest may 
give some idea of the distance between a Communist leader who had spent long years in 
Moscow and the experience of someone who survived the Shoah and the siege of 
Budapest: ‘His conversation, or what I remember of it, consisted mostly of tired 
Kaffeehaus witticisms with which he tried not only to lighten the customary Marxist 
platitudes but also to cover up the condition that he knew remarkably [...] little of what 
Hungary had lived through and what Hungarians were thinking’.1 
1 John Lukacs, Confessions of an Original Sinner, New York, 1990, pp. 97-98. 
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In spite of the lack of material resources and the presence of Soviet troops, the Moscow 
Communists met with considerable resistance. The surviving representatives of the 
literature of the inter-war period tried to restore the continuity broken by the German 
occupation which had started on 19 March 1944. In April 1945 the journal Magyarok was 
set up with the idea of preserving the tradition of Nyugat, the organ of the liberal 
bourgeoisie and the most important literary journal of the first half of the century. The next 
autumn Valasz, the periodical of the Populists, began appearing. Lajos Kassak also made 
an attempt to continue the activities of the literary and artistic avant-garde by publishing 
Kortars (1947-48). In 1946 members of the younger generation, the poets Sandor Weores, 
Janos Pilinszky, Agnes Nemes Nagy, and others also decided to start a monthly. By 
adopting the title of a collection of poems by Radnoti, published in 1935, Ujhold openly 
referred to the tragic experience of the Shoah. The same year saw the publication of 
Radnoti’s posthumous volume, containing the poems composed in a forced labour camp 
that are justly regarded as this poet’s most significant contribution to Hungarian literature, 
texts which have an additional documentary value by representing an unexpected legacy 
from the dead. Since my assessment of Radnoti’s late works, together with a critique of 
their English translations, has been published with some other papers of the Radnoti 
Memorial Conference,2 in this chapter I merely state that this posthumous publication 
served as a starting-point for Pilinszky, the most important Hungarian poet to emerge in 
the years following the end of the Second World War. Trapeze and Parallel Bars (1946) 
represented a new start: identifying himself with the fate of the victims of the Shoah, the 
young Catholic poet focused on a cosmic homelessness and created a language of great 
complexity in short and cryptic pieces. His influence was felt even in the work of Weores, 
an outstanding poet of the previous generation, who with The Colonnade of Teeth (1947) 
published a series of one-line poems. 
The movement represented by Pilinszky and others, sometimes characterized as a form 
of Central European ‘catastrophism’, was at odds with the propaganda literature written in 
the spirit dictated by the Moscow Communists. Its first product was an anthology entitled 
May Choir, 1945, which contained poems by Tibor Meray, who is known in the West as 
the co-author of a book on the uprising of 1956. For Gyorgy Lukacs and Jozsef Revai, the 
chief architects of the culture controlled by the Hungarian Communist Party, the 
immediate purpose was to establish the political grounds of the ideology of what Matyas 
Rakosi was to call ‘salami tactics’. The first step towards this goal was made by Revai, 
who in Marxism and Populism, published in Moscow in 1943, proposed a popular front. 
There are two radically different interpretations of the years 1945-9. Some argue that, 
after the end of the war, Hungary had a better chance for democracy than in previous times 
and the high hopes of the Hungarian intelligentsia were lost only because of the 
Communist Party take-over. Others believe that the fate of the country was sealed from the 
beginning of 1945. It is difficult not to find the topic depressing and controversial. Some 
of the documents are still not accessible and may prove to have been lost. Popular beliefs 
notwithstanding, the post-war years cannot be called a closed chapter. Surprisingly little 
has been written on this period since 1989. There are some survivors with painful 
memories and any interpreter may hurt personal feelings. As my field is limited to the 
sphere of literature, I cannot claim to make a general statement. All I can suggest is that 
the plan to have full control over literature was made by a group of Communists in 
Moscow, before the Soviet troops reached Hungarian territory 
2 See, for example, Mihaly Szegedy-Masak, 'National and International Implications in 
Radnoti’s Poetry’, Hungarian Studies, 11, 1996, pp. 13-28; George Gomori, ‘Miklos Radnoti 
and the Bible’, ibid., pp. 3-12; and Z. Ozsvath, ‘From Cain to Nahum’, ibid., pp. 29-44. 
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In 1945 Revai and Lukacs were given roles that suited them well. Revai’s task was to 
take measures against ‘the enemies of the people’, while Lukacs was expected to provide a 
theoretical framework for the campaign against bourgeois culture. One of the lessons the 
Hungarian Communists had learned after the failure of the 1919 Commune was that a one- 
party system could not be introduced without the support of some spokesmen of the rural 
population. In the 1930s Revai worked out an ideology for a popular front. After his return 
to Hungary his chief objective became to strike a deal with some members of the 
bourgeoisie and some writers who claimed to have represented the interests of the 
peasantry in the inter-war period. Underground Communists in both groups were eager to 
help him. The others had to make a quick decision. Since we are talking about a period that 
calls for a drastic reinterpretation, it is still not easy to make generalizations. 
In 1945 it was stated by the new political leaders of Hungary, the members of the 
coalition government that included Communists, that no one was immune from 
accountability for personal conduct. To avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to emphasize 
that it is not my intention to suggest that more people should have been punished. 
According to independent (Western) estimates over 250,000 people were deported to 
forced-labour camps in the Soviet Union after the end of the war, and between January 
1945 and March 1948 there were almost 40,000 political legal prosecutions which resulted 
in over 20,000 people being sentenced.3 Hungarian intellectual life was, then, manipulated 
from the very beginning, so that the chances for the development of a democratic system 
were very slim. Some urban intellectuals were tolerated although their totalitarian or 
gratuitously opportunistic inclinations were already apparent in the 1930s, and some 
Populists were accepted as representing a ‘progressive’, democratic movement, while the 
questionable elements in their ideology were ignored. 
Revai decided to have the poet and prose writer Gyula Illyes as an ally. In March 1945 
he compared Illyes to such ‘progressive’ figures in history as Ferenc Rakoczi II, Lajos 
Kossuth, and Sandor Petofi. Illyes responded by arguing at a meeting of the National 
Peasant Party that ‘the Communists have gone much further in guaranteeing freedom for 
writers than we expected. We have to appreciate this’.4 It is far from easy to define the role 
played by Illyes in the period. On the one hand, he is still respected by many Hungarians; 
on the other, it is undeniable that his artistic and political reputation has declined since the 
1980s. Older people maintain that he saved some intellectuals, in a literal or metaphorical 
sense, while the younger generations blame him for never opposing the political 
establishment. It is true that he was awarded the Kossuth Prize in 1948 and 1953, and 
never stopped publishing in the early 1950s, when almost all Hungarian writers of 
distinction lived in internal exile. It cannot be forgotten, however, that as a shrewd 
tactician he often outwitted the authorities and in 1950 he composed One Sentence on 
Tyranny, a poem that later became associated with the 1956 uprising. 
In more general terms, there may be several open questions concerning the position of 
the Populists in intellectual history. The only book available on the subject was written in 
the West. While it is reliable in most respects, it fails to address the question of 
antisemitism. The following statement may be open to criticism: ‘As for the Jewish 
question and the interpretation of antisemitism, the Populist writers were balanced, good- 
natured, and humane; they condemned the discriminative measures, the persecution and 
extermination of Jews, and they regarded antisemitism as useless and detrimental’.5 
3 J. K. Hoensch, A History of Modern Hungary 1867-1986, London and New York, 1988, 
pp. 161 and 178. 
4 E. Standeisky, A Magyar Kommunista Part irodalompolitikaja 1944-1948, Budapest, 1987, 
p. 29. 
5 G. Borbandi, A magyar nepi mozgalom: A harmadik reformnemzedek, New York, 1983, p. 390. 
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At the present stage the only hypothesis I can formulate is that Hungarian Communist 
Party leaders sometimes tolerated writers who had compromised themselves in the 1930s 
or during the Second World War. My example would be Jozsef Erdelyi, whose volume of 
poetry Violet Leaf (1922) may be regarded as representing a paradigm shift in Hungarian 
literature by heralding the Populist movement that was to play a decisive role in the 
political, social, and intellectual life of the inter-war decades. Erdelyi was an 
unquestionably talented poet of half-Romanian origin whose ideology was strikingly 
similar to that of Octavian Goga and Lucian Blaga, or the young E.-M. Cioran and Mircea 
Eliade. 
For an understanding of the antisemitic elements in the ideology of the Hungarian 
Populists, it is necessary to refer to an incident in the nineteenth century. On 23 May 1882 
an antisemitic member of the Hungarian parliament reported the disappearance of a 
peasant girl, Eszter Solymosi, from Tisza-Eszlar, a village in eastern Hungary, just a week 
before Passover.6 A ritual-murder allegation was made and another member of the Lower 
House, Gyozo Istoczy, who modelled his activities on those of Wilhelm Marr and made a 
speech in the Hungarian parliament on 25 June 1878 with the title ‘Jews, the Iron Ring 
Around Our Necks’,7 appeared with a portrait of the alleged victim at an international 
antisemitic congress held in Dresden. The Tisza-Eszlar affair resulted in a trial and the 
fifteen defendants were acquitted. The defence was represented by Karoly Eotvos, a 
Liberal member of the parliament who was also well-known as a writer. His account, The 
Great Trial That Started a Thousand Years Ago and Is Still Not Over (1904), published in 
three volumes, was widely considered a document on the triumph of liberalism over 
superstition, still at the time when Jozsef Erdelyi composed a poem entitled The Blood of 
Eszter Solymosi (1937), suggesting that the verdict should be reversed, because the girl had 
been a victim of ritual murder. In post-war Hungary Erdelyi was brought to justice. After 
spending almost three years in prison, he could make a new start as a poet. His collection A 
Return (1954) contained poems written between 1945 and 1954. 
My intention is not to find fault with Erdelyi or other such Populists as Istvan Sinka, 
Peter Veres or Janos Kodolanyi, who expressed similar antisemitic views, but to suggest 
that such prominent Communists as Lukacs or Revai were responsible for not only a large 
decrease in personal liberty in the years following 1945 but also for the survival of 
antisemitism. 
Instead of passing a moral judgement on some Populists, it needs to be pointed out that 
in their works antisemitism was not simply closely linked, but even subordinated, to anti¬ 
capitalism. Historians are divided in their assessment of the role played by the industrial 
magnates who were largely responsible for the economic growth of Hungary around 1900. 
On the one hand, for example, Manfred Weiss, the owner of the factories of Csepel, made 
a very important contribution to the rise of Budapest; on the other hand, his success was 
partly due to his significant involvement in the arms industry in the years 1914-18. Some 
Populist writers were uneducated and their antisemitism was largely based on emotional 
folklore. The other side of the coin is that several Hungarian Communist leaders who had 
important functions in the years following 1945 came from families closely associated 
with capitalism. Because of their social background, they felt vulnerable to the criticism 
levelled at capitalist exploitation of workers and agricultural labourers, and tolerated the 
antisemitism of some Populists. They may have been taken by surprise by the fact that the 
most sophisticated analysis of antisemitic feelings came from Istvan Bibo, a political 
6 G. Istoczy, Orszaggyulesi beszedei, inditvanyai es torvenyjavaslatai 1872-1896, Budapest, 
1904, pp.'l 18-25. 
7 R. S. Levy (ed.), Antisemitism in the Modern World: An Anthology of Texts, Lexington, MA, 
1991, pp. 100-03. 
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scientist associated with the Populists. His long essay The Jewish Question in Hungary 
After 1944 was published in the Populist journal Valasz, in October and November 1948, 
shortly before he was silenced by the Communists. 
It is almost certain that the reason the Populists were favoured by the Hungarian 
Communist Party was political. The first issue of Ujhold appeared in July 1946. Shortly 
afterwards, the Communist Party monthly Forum appeared, edited by Gyorgy Vertes, 
Gyorgy Lukacs and two intellectuals who had been called fellow-travellers by some 
historians. The term is somewhat misleading, since both had joined the Communist Party 
in the 1930s and had been given the task of undermining other political parties. Officially 
the folklorist Gyula Ortutay was a member of the Smallholders’ Party, while the fiction 
writer Jozsef Darvas belonged to the National Peasant Party. The first issue of Forum 
contained an article by Lukacs attacking Ujhold. A few months later Valasz appeared 
almost simultaneously with an essay by Lukacs in Forum that praised the Populist journal 
edited by Illyes. 
The discrimination was obvious. In his opening statement Illyes claimed that in politics 
the working-class, in literature the peasantry, was destined to lead. This division of labour 
was tacitly accepted by Lukacs. There is every reason to believe that the philosopher 
regarded the pact with some Populists as temporary. After twenty-five years spent abroad, 
Lukacs badly needed disciples. Among the first of them were the philosopher Jozsef 
Szigeti and the literary critic Istvan Kiraly. Szigeti’s attack on the bourgeois decadence and 
irrationalism of the poetry of Weores, in his essay ‘Hungarian Lyric Verse in 1947’, 
published in the October issue of Forum, was followed by the banning of Ujhold. Kiraly 
was rumoured to have been affected by right-wing ideas, so his sudden conversion to 
Marxism may have been influenced by a desire to make people forget his earlier activity. 
In October 1946 he published a long article on Laszlo Nemeth, in which he maintained that 
this author’s essays were greatly inferior in significance to his fiction.8 This text signalled 
the intention of the Communist Party to put political pressure on the representatives of 
what it considered the most important intellectual movement of the inter-war years. 
Nemeth was known to have a strongly anti-Communist ideology. Before the war he 
published a lucid analysis of Stalinism and insisted that Hungary was part of the Western 
world. At the same time, he had one important advantage over the urban intellectuals: he 
paid serious attention to the other nations of Central Europe. Although what he called ‘the 
revolution of quality’ was conceptually unclear, it implied a rejection not only of Western 
capitalism but also of Eastern Bolshevism. By defending Nemeth, Kiraly set himself the 
task of manipulating him. Although in the immediately post-war period Nemeth refused to 
make concessions and his novel Revulsion (1947) is free of any Communist influence, 
other Populists proved to be less independent. They paid a heavy price for their survival: 
they became compromised in the eyes of the later generations. 
It has to be added that Social Democrats and bourgeois Radicals expressed discontent 
with the compromise between the Communist Party leaders and the Populists. Moreover, 
by 1947 even some Communists thought it was time to end the alliance with the 
spokesmen of the rural population. On 16 February Geza Losonczy — who died in prison 
after 1956 — condemned the pessimism of Illyes in an article published in the daily of the 
Communist Party, and in June Laszlo B. Nagy, a young Communist bom in 1927 who 
committed suicide in 1973, harshly criticized the Populists and attacked Bibo as the 
architect of their reactionary ideology.9 
8 I. Kiraly, Irodalom es tarsadalom: Tanulmanyok, cikkek, interjuk, kritikdk 1945-1975, 
Budapest, 1976, pp. 339-52. 
9 Laszlo B. Nagy, ‘A Valasz utja’, Valosdg, 3, 1947, pp. 446-70. 
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By this time the goals of the campaign against bourgeois values were largely 
accomplished. After a considerable number of articles and books attacking contemporary 
writers associated with these values, the next task was rewriting the past. A new canon had 
to be established and institutionalized. During their years spent in Moscow Lukacs and 
Revai interpreted works on the basis of a dichotomy: progressive traditions were opposed 
to reactionary trends. Sandor Petofi and Endre Ady were regarded as representing the 
mainstream of Hungarian literature. After 1945 a third name was added, that of Attila 
Jozsef, mainly because of an initiative taken by Marton Horvath. A drastic selection of the 
texts by these three poets was made with official interpretations attached to them. Later the 
most trustworthy literary historians were commissioned to write books on the three poets. 
The task of Pal Kardos (Pandi) was to develop Marxist interpretations of the poetry of 
Petofi that could replace the highly influential book published in 1922 by Janos Horvath, 
who was to be forced to give up his position at the university, together with other 
bourgeois scholars. Istvan Kiraly, the son of a Calvinist priest, was asked to find an 
explanation for Ady’s attachment to Socialism and Calvinism, and Miklos Szabolcsi, a 
well-educated critic with a special interest in twentieth-century French literature, was 
destined to discuss the poetry of Attila Jozsef, which had obvious links with the 
international and Hungarian Avant-garde. 
The consequences of this canon formation were far-reaching and sometimes damaging. 
At a conference celebrating the 175th anniversary of the birth of Petofi, held at the 
beginning of April 1998, several participants spoke of a general lack of interest in the 
works of this nineteenth-century author, and in February 1998, at a colloquium devoted to 
the activity of Ady, most of the papers addressed the issue of the decline of this poet’s 
reputation. As for Jozsef, in recent years documents concerning his conflict with the 
Communists were published, and the interpretation of his works has changed radically 
since the immediate post-war years. 
Some poems by Petofi, Ady and even Jozsef seem unreadable today. Teachers do not 
know how to handle them, and they are usually avoided by the authors of dissertations. By 
contrast, the young critics of the 1990s are avid readers of works by the authors who were 
dismissed by the Marxists in the late 1940s. In June 1998 a collection of essays, mainly by 
scholars in their twenties, appeared, testifying to the high reputation of Dezso Kosztolanyi 
(1885-1936). In the years following 1945 this middle-class writer was the main target of 
the Communists. In March 1947 Arpad Szabo, now emeritus professor of Classics and a 
prominent member of the Calvinist Church, published an essay in which he condemned 
Kosztolanyi as a ‘Fascist’: T belong to that part of the Hungarian intelligentsia’, he wrote, 
‘which needs Kosztolanyi to be aware of what we wish to eliminate for the sake of the 
future’.10 The essay appeared in Valosag, a monthly edited by Sandor Lukacsy, who later 
was at least partly responsible for the abolition of the Eotvos College, the equivalent of the 
Ecole Normale Superieure, founded in 1895, and for making a long list of books that the 
Communist Party wished to destroy.* 11 
Szabo’s article was part of a large-scale campaign led by Lukacs and Revai with the 
purpose of restructuring the canon of Hungarian literature. Lukacs was consistent in the 
condemnation of certain representatives of the bourgeois tradition and expected his 
disciples to support him. In 1957, when he was afraid of a revival of the legacy that has 
been virtually eliminated in the late 1940s, he urged a former student of his to repeat the 
attack on Kosztolanyi. The main thesis of the book entitled The Disintegration of Ethical 
Norms by Agnes Heller, currently professor at the New School for Social Research and a 
10 Arpad Szabo, Trastudonak’, ibid., p. 220. 
11 Sandor Lukacsy, ‘Boldogult funkcikoromban’, Negy evszak, 9, 1984, 9, pp. 10-18. 
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member of the Hungarian Academy, is but a variation on the line of argument followed by 
Szabo ten years earlier. 
Szabo and Heller’s works are indebted to the articles Lukacs published between 1939 
and 1941 in Uj Hang, the organ of the Hungarian Communists who lived in Moscow. In 
1945 these pieces appeared in Budapest with a twenty-page preface, still written in 
Moscow, in March 1945, which set out to herald a new era marked by ‘the annihilation of 
the relics of feudalism, the creation of Hungarian democracy, and the defence of the 
independence of the Hungarian people’.12 Since Lukacs was convinced that greatness in 
literature could be achieved only by serving social progress, writers who did not seem to 
have an unqualified belief in progress were dismissed as inferior. Lajos Kassak, a free- 
verse writer and Constructivist painter who in 1919 refused to subordinate his creative 
activity to the principles laid down by the Communist Party, was rejected for ‘having 
obscured the real interests of the workers’, and Kosztolanyi was called ‘a conscious, 
malicious reactionary’.13 
On 20 and 21 May 1945 the Hungarian Communist Party held a conference. There were 
long and passionate debates over the tactics to be followed. On 31 May, Marton Horvath, 
the editor of the Communist Party daily Szabad Nep, launched a campaign against 
bourgeois culture in a summary of the conclusions of the conference entitled The Death 
Mask of Babits. His main target was Sandor Marai, who was widely regarded as the most 
celebrated representative of the bourgeois liberal tradition of Mihaly Babits and Dezso 
Kosztolanyi. 
One of the most important books published in Hungary in 1945 was the diary Marai kept 
during the German occupation. This work was characterized as reactionary by Lukacs in a 
lecture he gave in December 1945. ‘The Hungarian middle class is so rotten that it still 
does not want and has no courage to face reality’, wrote Marai in 1943 about those who 
believed in a German victory.14 After 19 March 1944 he lived in internal exile, and when 
the persecution of the Jews started, he identified himself with the victims. ‘I cannot expect 
anyone to forgive me that 1 was alive, writing novels while (s)he was in a labour camp.’15 
To my knowledge no one formulated a conclusion comparable to the following: ‘Although 
we all suffered much, we are all guilty’.16 
Lukacs made his unfavourable interpretation from the perspective of partkolteszet, a 
term denoting a strong political commitment, defined in the following manner: ‘to give a 
wide, profound, and all-embracing picture of the development of social life. To fight for 
the progress of mankind, for a higher development by revealing the direction of such a 
progress, the driving forces behind it, and the interior and exterior powers that try to block 
it. The true and faithful reflection of social life is the main instrument that can be used to 
exert an influence on the people.’17 
Since Marai was the most important writer driven to leave Hungary by the Communists, 
his case might help us understand their cultural policy. Bom in Kassa (Kosice) in 1900, he 
came from the ‘Saxon’ bourgeoisie of what was Upper Hungary until 1920.18 His original 
name was Grosschmid, but he adopted the name of one of his Hungarian ancestors at the 
r 
12 Gyorgy Lukacs, Irastudok felelossege, Budapest, 1945, p. 4. 
13 Ibid., p. 11. 
14 Sandor Marai, Naplo (1943-1944), Budapest, 1945, p. 4. 
15 Ibid., p. 231. 
16 Ibid., p.462. 
17 Gyorgy Lukacs, Irodalom es demokracia, 2nd edn, Budapest, 1948, p. 119. 
18 Today’s Slovakia was confirmed as part of Czechoslovakia only on 4 June 1920 by the Treaty 
of Trianon. For Czech and Slovak historians Slovakia had been part of the new state since 
October 1918 (editor’s note). 
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very beginning of his career. His first book, a collection of verse, was published in 1918. 
Although he was a non-Communist, after the fall of the first Hungarian Commune of 1919, 
he left Hungary because he disapproved of the right-wing regime. In the Weimar Republic 
he became a respected journalist and published fiction, drama, and essays in German. In 
1923 he married the daughter of a Jewish merchant. Having spent the years 1923-28 in 
Paris, where he was associated with the international Avant-garde, he returned to Hungary. 
The motive behind this move was simple: he loved the Hungarian language and wished to 
continue the tradition of Dezso Kosztolanyi and Gyula Krudy, the leading prose writers of 
the early decades of the century. 
In Search of Gods: The Novel of a Journey (1927), written at the end of the author’s first 
period of exile, provided a shrewd analysis of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Near 
East. As a publicist he wrote a series of articles from 1933 onwards attacking Hitler. His 
two-volume autobiography, The Confessions of a Citoyen (1934-35) was received by 
many as an imaginative characterization of the life of the Hungarian liberal bourgeoisie. 
By the end of the 1930s he developed a considerable reputation as novelist, short-story 
writer, essayist, playwright and poet. Because of his opposition to the Nazis, after 19 
March 1944 he had to seek refuge in a village north of Budapest and could not return to the 
capital before the Soviet occupation. 
Marai was described by Lukacs in his December 1945 lecture as representing ‘vulgar 
bourgeois individualism’,19 the opposite of a progressive writer who ‘never stops singing 
of the great national humanist mission of the party that plays its role in world history’.20 As 
for world history, Lukacs asserted it was dominated by such great individuals as 
Cromwell, Marat, Lenin, and Stalin, ‘who could unite their individual strengths with the 
task given them by the party in a higher synthesis that is new, exemplary, and had the 
status of the Classics’.21 
In April 1947 Lukacs placed the text of this long lecture in a larger context, in a volume 
called Literature and Democracy. To promote Realism, the author asked for the 
introduction of tighter controls and outlined a programme aimed at ‘destroying the 
reactionary thought of imperialism’.22 In the introduction Lukacs specified the following 
features of the culture that was to be rejected: ‘aristocratism, the rejection of equality, a 
contempt for the masses, the underestimation of economic, political, and social motives, 
the cult of irrationalism and myth, an emphasis on the vanity of life, a distance from life, 
and a focus on the psyche’.23 Assuming that after the 1848 revolutions the bourgeoisie 
ceased to be a progressive force in European history, Lukacs argued that in the twentieth 
century bourgeois writers could produce either so-called pure literature, dominated by the 
cult of the ivory tower, or works of kitsch. Both these weaknesses were detected in the 
works of Marai. According to the deal struck with the Populists, great art was defined as 
inspired by peasant or working-class culture. Marai had no place in the literature of post¬ 
war Hungary. 
In May 1947 the younger members of the Communist Party started new journals. 
Emberseg was edited by Imre Keszi, Tamas Aczel, and Tibor Meray, while one of the two 
editors of Tovahb was Geza Losonczy. Supported by the daily Szabad Nep and the 
periodical Forum, they urged writers to follow the instructions of Zhdanov and the 
example of Fadeev, the main representative of Socialist Realism. Marai’s comment on one 
of these journals was not published until 1993. He called Tovabb ‘a perfect copy of the 
19 Lukacs, Irodalom es demokracia, p. 126. 
20 Ibid., p. 128. 
21 Ibid., p. 127. 
22 Ibid., p. 7. 
23 Ibid., p. 10. 
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Fascist Egyedul vagyunk in typography, setting, spirit and tone’, and gave the following 
characterization of the antisemitic articles that appeared in the Communist weekly: ‘The 
photographs of Jewish bankers appear with a text entitled “We have worked for such 
people”. This is what the Fascist newspaper did three years earlier. The only difference is 
that in the past the attacks on Jewish capitalists were made by blackmailing Christian 
journalists, whereas now the authors of similar articles are blackmailing Jewish 
journalists’.24 
In the September-October issue of Emberseg Imre Keszi demanded ‘the art of the rising 
workers’ and condemned ‘the trends serving the taste of the old ruling classes’.25 By that 
time Rakosi, whose desire was to be called ‘the Wise Leader of the Flungarian Nation’, 
could boast that he had ‘sliced off like salami’ most of the parties and factions other than 
his own. After the expulsion of those from the Smallholders’ Party who spoke about 
Communist Party malpractice, the revelation of an alleged ‘counter-revolutionary 
conspiracy’ led to the arrest and deportation of Bela Kovacs, Secretary of the 
Smallholders’ Party, by the Soviet military police. A great flow of refugees began. After 
Ferenc Nagy, the Smallholder prime minister, the Roman Catholic priest and speaker of 
Parliament Bela Varga, and Imre Kovacs, one of the leaders of the National Peasant Party 
had left, it was the turn of Social Democrats to be liquidated. In October 1947 Kortars was 
started. Edited by Kassak, it was a last attempt to preserve the tradition of the socialist 
Avant-garde. On 16 December Geza Losonczy dismissed Kassak’s movement as 
representing ‘anti-Realism’ and the contributors to his periodical as the most consistent 
enemies of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. At the same time, the first issue of Csillag 
appeared. This monthly would determine the ideological principles for Hungarian culture 
until 1956. 
One of the functions of Csillag was to strengthen links with Soviet culture. In this 
respect the activity of Bela Illes, a Soviet major and editor of the Red Army’s Hungarian 
journal Uj Szd, must be mentioned. In 1947 he published a story The Gusev Affair with the 
purpose of setting the tone for the centenary of the 1848 revolution. To play down the 
Russian invasion that quelled the 1848-49 Hungarian war of independence, Illes decided 
to give publicity to the merits of a previously unknown lieutenant. Gusev was said to have 
revolted against the Tsar in support of the Hungarian revolution. A street in the centre of 
Pest was named after him, and an abridged version of the story was included in the 
textbooks published for primary schools. In recent years the street had its original name 
returned, since Gusev proved to have been invented by Illes, an author whose works are 
entirely forgotten today. 
In Communist Party historiography 1948 was called the ‘year of the turning-point’, 
which transformed the country into a people’s democracy. On 12 February the Politburo 
made a decision to establish ideological unity. In his speech ‘The Analysis of Literary Life 
in Hungarian Democracy’, published in the March issue of Csillag, Marton Horvath 
condemned writers as different as Kassak and Marai, Nemeth and Weores, and associated 
even Illyes with ‘anti-democratic’ forces. On 7 March the leader of Szabad Nep, written by 
Rakosi himself, called for an improvement in the theoretical activity of the Communist 
Party. A Committee of Cultural Policy was set up with the aim of defining the norms that 
artists and writers should respect. All cultural institutions were to be subordinated to the 
Committee that had four members, including its chairman Marton Horvath. Otto 
Klemperer, the artistic director of the Budapest Opera, was sacked on the grounds that he 
24 Sandor Marai, Ami a Naplobol kimaradt 1947, Budapest, 1993, pp. 209-10. 
25 Imre Keszi, ‘Buta, de tehetseges’, Emberseg, 1, 1947, p. 298. 
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was an American citizen of German birth and conducted works by Wagner. Painters were 
commissioned to work for a project called ‘The Portrait Gallery of the Heroes of Labour’. 
The first draft of the declaration of the Hungarian Workers’ Party was published in 
Szabad Nep on 9 May. At the first congress of the ‘new’ party, held in June, Lukacs spoke 
of the liberation of creative activity from the pressure of capitalism, the end of reification 
and alienation, the triumph of realism, and the supreme value of the Soviet experience. 
What followed was the darkest period in the history of Hungarian culture, dominated by an 
extreme form of censorship. 
After the Hungarian Communist Party merged with the Social Democratic Party, several 
books were banned. One of these was the fifth volume of Marai’s roman-fleuve, The Work 
of the Garrens, containing a visionary presentation of a ‘Leader’ addressing a public 
demonstration and the narrative of a meeting of the autobiographical hero Peter Garren 
with the famous writer Berten, who has been placed under house-arrest. Although these 
parts were based on Marai’s article about Hitler’s 1933 speech in the Berlin Sportpalast 
and on his interview with Gerhart Hauptmann, retrospectively it is possible to assume that 
the Communist authorities saw in the book a general criticism of totalitarian systems. The 
scene in which the ‘Leader’ succeeds in manipulating his audience concerns fanatics who 
lose their personalities and are controlled by the ‘centre’, a small group which has power 
and is alienated from the community. The general import of the meeting of the two writers, 
the young Peter Garren and the old Berten is no less obvious. Berten’s hypothesis is that 
only communities with discontinuous memory can be manipulated from above. In other 
words, despotism is made possible by the destruction of historical consciousness, the 
distortion of collective memory. 
Other works by Hungarian writers had a similar fate in 1948. A volume of poetry 
entitled A Dream, by the Transylvanian-born Zoltan Jekely, was printed but not published. 
From 1949 onwards many writers were forced to fall silent, including the avant-garde poet 
Kassak, the Roman Catholic Pilinszky and the Populist Nemeth. In 1948 the 
Geistesgeschichte philosopher Lajos Prohaszka was expelled from Budapest University, 
and during the next two years a great number of scholars lost their positions at the 
universities or at the Academy of Sciences. 
To my knowledge Marai’s diary and his memoir Land, Ahoy! (1972) represent the only 
account of the years 1945^18 that can claim credibility. Ironically, his diary was not made 
accessible in its entirety until the 1990s. Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, a Smallholder, made a 
drastic selection when he published the diary covering the years 1945-57 in Washington, 
DC in 1968. As he told me some years ago, he refused to include those passages in which 
Marai called the Populist writer Gyula Illyes an ‘opportunist’. Other parts were excluded 
because of the strong opinions the author had on sensitive issues. An entry from 1946 will 
serve as an example: ‘The problem with Jews is not that they failed to learn anything from 
suffering and misery. Who would have been different from them in this respect? The 
problem is that they have learned to continue Fascism in their own style.’26 
It is not easy to generalize about why so many writers renounced their past in the years 
following the end of the Second World War. Except for Marai, no one is known for having 
expressed strong reservations about the behaviour of the Soviet soldiers, and no other 
writer questioned the lawfulness of the expulsion of Germans. By 1948 Marai became 
increasingly isolated for two reasons: he was unwilling to accept Communist black-and- 
white judgements and refused to assume any political function. He asked for 
discrimination between Germans who supported and those who opposed Nazi Germany: 
‘It is hard to win and hard to be defeated. It is hard to be Russian and to be human’, he 
26 Sandor Marai, Ami a Naplobol kimaradt 1945-1946, Budapest, 1992, pp. 131-32. 
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wrote in the summer of 1945,27 and later made the following observation about the Soviet 
soldiers he met: ‘Their aim was to give up their personality [...]. I as a Western man 
cannot accept this argument. Giving up my personality, this crazy ideal, would mean 
giving up my attachment to life’.28 
In a period when many of his colleagues modified their views under political pressure, 
Marai was consistent: throughout his life he approved of socialism but he never renounced 
his individual freedom. ‘My experience is that writers lose as much of their artistic and 
moral integrity as they gain in political significance’, he remarked in 1945,29 and two years 
later he expressed his disgust when he witnessed manipulation and corruption: ‘Elections. 
[...] It is no solution to keep silent in the midst of idle talk. Not to respond from the inside, 
not to listen — that is the real task.’30 He regarded radical land reform as ‘the greatest 
event in the life of the Hungarian people’31 and held the whole nation responsible for the 
massacre of Jews but described the Soviet soldiers’ idea of the bourgeois as ridiculous and 
felt contempt for those who enjoyed the executions. ‘It is not enough to like what they like; 
they expect you to hate what they hate. There we drift apart’, he declared about the 
Communists.32 
In the summer of 1947 Aragon and Elsa Triolet visited Budapest. In his public lecture, 
Aragon attacked those who lived in an ivory tower and called Paul Valery a Nazi 
sympathizer who admired Petain and Salazar. Marai wrote about Aragon’s visit with 
contempt. For there was an unbroken continuity between the German and Soviet 
occupations. He refused to distinguish between class-hatred and racism. No one had the 
inclination or the courage to share this view. The first sign of his alienation from a country 
living in fear was that on the Day of Hungarian Books, in the summer of 1946, Ferenc 
Nagy, the Smallholder minister president, avoided him. ‘I cannot side with the left’, he 
confessed one year later, ‘because it would be moral suicide to leave my class. I can 
criticize it from the inside, but do not wish to be treacherous. Nor can I make a single step 
towards the right, because I am not willing to support the Fascism that may be hiding 
behind honest right-wing people’.33 
Although feudalism had been abolished in Hungary in 1848, the rise of bourgeois culture 
was aborted by Communism. This was the conclusion Marai reached in 1948, shortly 
before he left the country: ‘In Hungary two types of man could play a full role: the 
aristocrat and the peasant. What stood between them had to step down before it could fulfil 
its function in history.’34 
One of the cliches of Marxist historiography is that Hungary never had a bourgeoisie. 
One of the worst consequences of the impact of the works of Lukacs and Revai was the 
transformation of Hungary into a country with a history of backwardness. In 1948 Marai 
was forced to emigrate. A sense of foreboding haunted him, and his predictions proved to 
be correct: the persecution of kulaks, the nationalization of Hungarian industry, the 
banking system and education were followed by the trials of Cardinal Mindszenty and the 
Communist Rajk in 1949 and by the large-scale deportations of ‘class-enemies’. Gyorgy 
Lukacs himself was subject to criticism. On 29 April 1949 Rakosi received a long essay 
from Laszlo Rudas, an arch-enemy of the philosopher, in which Lukacs was attacked for 
27 Sandor Marai, Naplo (1945-1957), Washington, DC, 1968, p. 15. 
28 Sandor Marai, Fold, fold!... Emlekezesek, Toronto, 1972, p. 78. 
29 Marai, Naplo (1945-1957), p. 17. 
30 Marai, Ami a Naplobol kimaradt 1947, p. 152. 
31 Marai, Naplo (1945-1957), p. 46. 
32 Ibid., p. 57. 
33 Marai, Ami a Naplobol kimaradt 1947, p. 147. 
34 Marai, Naplo (1945-1957), p. 64. 
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viewing Hitler as a tragic figure in history. Although the essay was not printed without 
significant changes in Tarsadalmi Szemle, the political-theory journal of the Hungarian 
Workers’ Party, others joined in the debate. On the 25 December Szabad Nep contained an 
article in which Marton Horvath blamed Lukacs for degrading Socialist Realism to ‘an 
obscure generalization that can be approached with the help of abstractions rather than 
with that of the living reality of Soviet literature’.35 The philosopher had to indulge in self- 
criticism. Ironically, the main target of his opponents was Literature and Democracy, the 
book which was largely responsible for the fall of bourgeois literature. 
By this time, most of those he attacked between 1945 and 1948 were involved in writing 
fairy-tales for children or translating from Russian. The only major exception was Marai, 
who was facing poverty in exile. The rest of his life demonstrates how difficult it had been 
for him to leave his country and can be interpreted as a sad epilogue to the history of 
bourgeois literature in post-war Hungary. For forty years he continued to write and publish 
in Hungarian, but his works were inaccessible in his native country. The reason for this 
distortion of the past was obvious: those historians and critics who identified Hungarian 
culture with the traditions of the gentry could not find a place for a writer whose works 
contradicted their ideological assumptions. 
‘Darkness surrounds me and I can see only one goal: I have to write in Hungarian as 
long as I can. This is the only task that is still meaningful. I have signed a contract with 
this language; this is the destiny I can never forget.’36 These words were written in 1947, at 
a time when many Hungarian writers denied their attachment to the bourgeoisie. Marai had 
expressed many reservations about his class throughout his career, but remained 
committed to its values to the very end. One of the reasons for his decision to commit 
suicide in San Diego (California) on 21 February 1989 was that he saw no chance for the 
recovery of bourgeois literature in Hungary. After forty years of Communism those 
chances still remain very much in doubt. 
r 
35 K. Urban, ‘A Lukacs-vita. Ujabb adalekok az 1949-1950-es vita hatterehez’, Tanulmanyok a 
magyar nepi demokracia negyven everol, Budapest, 1985, p. 174. 
36 Marai, Ami a Naplobol kimaradt 1947, p. 107. 
29 Transition in the Work of Vaclav Rezac 
Alena PribAnovA 
Since the fall of socialism, the discussion of the relationship between literature and 
contemporary socio-political circumstances has been a subject of much discussion.1 The 
tendency to separate historical circumstances from literary reflections is an understandable 
and predictable reaction to the years literary criticism suffered from the persistent 
application of extra-literary criteria to works of literature. During this period literature was 
interpreted and evaluated mostly from the perspective of the functions it performed or was 
supposed to perform in society. Sanctioned critics understood literature primarily as a 
device for ideological education; nevertheless the sociological and instrumental approach 
to the literary text prevailed also among opposition critics, and, first and foremost, among 
readers. Political events (the beginning of the Second World War, the end of the war, the 
beginning of the Communist regime, the ‘Velvet Revolution’, and sometimes even Stalin’s 
death or Khrushchev’s speech at the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party) 
were more or less generally accepted as turning-points that delimited literary periods: we 
did not speak of the literature of the 1940s, 1950s, 1970s, or 1980s, but of literature after 
1939, after 1945, after 1953, after 1956, Normalization literature, literature before 1989 
and after 1989.2 These dates were (and very often still are) considered as turning points in 
literary history and in the development of individual authors, the work of whom was thus 
divided into several phases alternately praised or criticized according to the political 
sympathies of the critic. The fiction writer Vaclav Rezac (1901-56) is one of those authors 
remembered by both sides as a writer whose work changed radically under the influence of 
the political changes that took place during the 1945^18 ‘transition period’. 
In 1944 Vaclav Rezac published Rozhrani (Border-line). It was his fifth novel (I except 
three works for children) and it concluded a series of three psychological analytical novels 
opened by Cerne svetlo (Black Light, 1940) and followed by Svedek (The Witness, 1942). 
He had the reputation of being an author of deep psychological insight, a major repre¬ 
sentative of a great wave of psychological analytical novels that had appeared in Czech 
literature in the 1930s that comprised authors like Egon Hostovsky, Jaroslav Havlicek and 
Vladimir Neff. In 1948, Rezac started writing a new novel which he published in 1951, 
Nastup (Falling In), a work that became one of the classics of Socialist Realism — a 
panoramic view of Czech colonization of the Sudetenland and the expulsion of the Germans 
in 1945^16. Contemporary reviewers greeted the novel as Rezac breaking free from 
‘individualistic psychologism’; they rejected his earlier work as a relic of old times.3 
Frantisek Burianek and Frantisek Gotz, literary critics who analysed Rezac’s work in 
1 Petr A. Bilek, ‘Prolegomena k dosud ne(na)psanym Dejinam ceske literatury’, Tvar, 7, 1996, 
14, pp. 1, 4, 5. 
2 This approach distributed writers and texts into more or less definite categories, which nar¬ 
rowed and deformed the view of literary context (as Zdenek Kozmin and Jin Travnicek show in 
Ceska poezie od 40. let do soucasnosti, Bmo 1994), discovering new connections between 
wartime and post-war poetics that had been ‘invisible’ from the traditional perspective). 
3 Jan Stem, ‘Roman o nastupu lidove demokracie’, Tvorba, 20, 1951, pp. 459-60; Jin Hajek, 
'Nastup k novemu zivotu nasi zeme’. Rude pravo, 24 June 1951, p. 5; Pavel Reiman, ‘Rezacuv 
Nastup\ Lidove noviny, 10 June 1951, p. 4. 
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context,* 4 were not as strict in their judgement, but still they regarded the earlier works as a 
preparatory phase of his development towards the large-scale social novel. Vaclav Rezac 
himself contributed to this perception of his work by exaggerated self-criticism.5 In several 
interviews in the early 1950s he interpreted his wartime novels as an allegorical protest 
against Fascism and defended his psychological analytical approach as a necessity imposed 
by circumstances. At the time Rezac also became active in discussions on the role of art in a 
‘democratic society’ as a defender of the concept of Socialist art serving the masses.6 He 
started to publish widely in Communist-orientated newspapers (for example, Prace, Rude 
pravo, Obrana lidu); this contributed to his becoming established as a regime author; it also 
supported the notion of his 1945 instant conversion to Communist ideology (before 1945 he 
belonged to the circle of the writers around Lidove noviny, and became one of Karel Capek’s 
successors as a columnist;7 after 1940 he worked on the editorial board of the same news¬ 
paper; in the 1930s he neither worked for left-wing periodicals nor was a member of the 
Communist Party, though he voted for it). Rezac’s conversion was usually explained as a 
reaction to the radical changes that took place in society between 1945 and 1948.8 However, 
if we focus on his novels and do not set up the ‘psychological’ and ‘social’ parts of Rezac’s 
work as opposites, his development does not seem to be either surprising or inconsistent. 
The main character of Rozhrani, the just middle-aged Jindrich Aust, after years of toying 
with literature sets about writing a novel to prove to the world and to himself that he is 
capable of a significant achievement. He has to give up the limited but safe comfort of life 
as a secondary-school teacher and to overcome financial difficulties. He struggles with his 
doubts about himself and with his book. Work on the novel makes him face questions 
about the writer’s craft and the function of literature. From the idea of literature as a way 
of self-presentation he comes to the concept of literature as a complex phenomenon, the 
main task of which is service to society. Literature must reflect real life — Aust 
continually measures the quality of his novel by its ability to depict the characteristic 
features of life: fictional situations are ‘good’ when they are ‘true’, when they can be 
verified by reality (Aust becomes satisfied with the crux of his novel when he learns that a 
similar story happened to the editor of the magazine he writes for; Jarmila, Aust’s 
girlfriend, starts to believe in his talent when she meets a publican who behaves exactly 
like the publican in his novel, and so on). 
Rozhrani is probably the most autobiographical of Rezac’s novels. Like Aust, at the 
beginning of his career Rezac made a living writing short stories for a popular magazines, 
and his love of theatre and experience as a critic explain the theme of Aust’s novel. But 
more important, similar views on literature to those expressed in Rozhrani are less 
V 
explicitly present in Rezac’s reviews from the beginning of the 1930s, in which he 
demanded that art should offer a typical picture of contemporary life,9 and in the 
W' \/ 
4 Frantisek Gotz, Vaclav Rezac, Prague, 1957; Frantisek Burianek, ‘Nad dilem Vaclava Rezace’, 
Literarni noviny, 6, 1957, 25, p. 5; idem., Soucasna ceska literatura, Prague, 1960, pp. 96-99. 
5 Panorama, 25, 1950, pp. 56-57; Lidove noviny, 6 May 1951, p. 4; Host do domu, 1, 1954, 1, 
pp. 28-30. 
6 In his article ‘O novy realismus’, Prace, 2 June 1945, p. 2, written in reaction to a lecture by 
Zdenek Nejedly, ‘Za lidovou a narodni kulturu’ (Towards a People’s National Culture, 29 May 
1945), but in fact in most of his reviews published in Prace and Rude pravo. 
7 His columns from the years 1941—43 were collected and published in Stopy v pisku, Prague, 
1944. 
8 See Jin Holy, Ceska literatura od roku 1945 do soucasnosti (2. polovina 20. stoleti), Prague, 
1996. 
9 Rezad’s critical work in analysed in Gotz, Vaclav Rezac, pp. 18-30; this problem is also 
mentioned in an article by Miloslav Nosek, ‘K otazkam typisace ve vyvoji Rezacovy prozy’, 
Ceska literatura, 4, 1956, 3, pp. 236-63. 
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theoretical texts that he continued to write throughout his life, but especially in the period 
1945-48. 
Jin Opelfk, who has written about Rezac’s work and prepared editions of it,10 points out 
in his doctoral thesis* 11 that the autobiographical elements are one of the features shared by 
all the writer’s wartime novels (according to Opelik, another feature linking them is that 
they can all be interpreted as more or less open contemplations on the role of the artist in 
society). His first novel, Vetrna setba (Sowing by the Wind, 1934), narrating the story of a 
poor student coming of age in the harsh times of the First World War, also has a strong 
autobiographical streak. However, we can find more links between Vetrna setba and the 
‘wartime trilogy’ than autobiographical features: in all four attention is focused on a single 
character and stress is put on the individual psychology of complex characters. Rezac’s 
heroes are far from positive figures, but unlike writers in the mainstream of psychological 
'W' 
analytical fiction (Havlicek, Neff) Rezac does not pick exceptional or deformed 
individuals to show the complexity of the human psyche; he attempts to show the way of 
thinking of typical representatives of various social groups. This agreed with the way he 
reflected the method of psychological introspection at the time: as a device by which to 
depict objectively characteristic aspects of his age.12 His own experience seems to function 
as a store of verified facts lending legitimacy to his fiction. 
In his post-war novels Nastup and Bitva (The Battle, 1954; another novel based on the 
V 
same realia, written after the success of Nastup), Rezac evidently turned to other means. 
Having published Nastup, he explains in an interview, he realized that he was ‘writing an 
historical novel that like a magnifying mirror was meant to reflect the complicated political 
reality in our country’ and that he had ‘wanted to follow the changes both in industry and 
in agriculture’.13 Rezac tended to more general testimony and felt it must be backed by 
‘external’ evidence: he spent three years travelling in the border areas and collecting 
material14 — it seems that he came to the conclusion that individual experience was not 
sufficient for the ambitious project. In his study ‘Promeny Rezacovy metody’ 
(‘Transformations in Rezac’s Method’), Opelik compares one of the episodes of the novel 
with the short story ‘The First Day’,15 written in 1948. (According to Rezac’s wife, the 
short story was originally written as an exposition of the novel, but later Rezac decided to 
change the conception and used the situation described in the short story as an episode.) He 
demonstrates that in the novel Rezac deliberately eradicated everything accidental or 
individual and replaced it by the typical. The main character in the short story Jan Teska, a 
paviour from Prague who goes to Potocna (the setting of the novel, previously Grtinbach) 
10 ‘Promeny Rezacovy metody (Od Rozhrani k Nastupu)\ Ceskd literatura, 10, 1962, 1, pp. 1-22; 
‘Povidky Vaclava Rezace’, Host do domu, 3, 1956, 9, pp. 407-08; ‘O autorovi Rozhrani’, 
Introduction to Rozhrani, Prague, 1961, pp. 391-94; ‘O Vaclavu Rezacovi’, Afterword to 
Cerne svetlo, Prague, 1961; ‘Vyslovit pravdu sveho casu’, Kultura, 5, 1961, 18, p. 6; Afterword 
to Slepa ulicka, Prague, 1972; Opelik also edited and annotated a book of Rezac’s theoretical 
thinking: Opravde umeni a pravde zivota, Prague, 1960. 
11 Jin Opelik, ‘Romanove dilo Vaclava Rezace’, unpublished PhD dissertation. University of 
Bmo, 1961. 
12 ‘We want to see what happened inside us, not around us — because it is what we understand 
and what does not puzzle us’ (1930): quoted in Opelik, ‘Promeny Rezacovy metody’, p. 4. 
13 ‘Vaclav Rezac o svem novem romanu’, Literarni noviny, 1951, 3, p. 40. 
14 He started to travel to the border areas as early as in May 1945 and was so well informed about 
the situation in the regions that he was asked to draw up a secret report for the Ministry of 
Information. From August to September 1946 (16, 23 and 25 August and 1, 7 and 28 
September, all p. 5) he also published a series of reportages in Prace, in which we recognize 
situations and realia we know from the novel. 
In Vaclav Rezac, Tvari v tvar, Prague, 1967, pp. 167-75. 15 
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by accident, is replaced by Vincent Postava, an ideologically more suitable farm hand who 
goes there because he no longer wishes to work for others. Evidently, Rezac intentionally 
avoided anything autobiographical. In this respect, the replacement of the name Teska by 
Postava is illustrative (Rezac used the name Teska several times in his unpublished works 
for the characters of straightforward, hardworking men; the name is linked with Rezac’s 
life — Karel Teska was a schoolmate).16 
Autobiographical elements in Rezac’s work were connected with the psychological 
analytical method and the monographic character of his novels. The retreat from 
autobiography is attended by a tendency to an ‘external’ perspective and an effort to 
produce a social panorama. Nevertheless, these features, often mentioned as characteristic 
of the writer’s post-war work, can be seen to be developing in one novel written before the 
Second World War, namely Slepa ulicka (The Dead End, 1938). As in Nastup, here Rezac 
also leaned on ‘external’ evidence and exploited concrete statistical data on the state of 
Czechoslovak industry during the Depression which he collected over several years when 
working for the State Statistics Office. Originally he intended to tell the story of a family 
of manufacturers, placing at the centre of attention a single character, the young lupine 
inheritor of the family business; in 1937, probably under the influence of Pujmanova’s 
Lide na krizovatce (People at the Crossroads, 1937) and the critical response to it, he 
rejected the first version, Michal Gromus, and its monographic approach and started to 
work on the definitive text that portrays the 1930s in terms of the confrontation of 
characters representing various classes. Slepa ulicka, Nastup and Bitva are the only novels 
set at a specific historical time; in other novels we may detect the period they are set in, but 
the period is irrelevant to the plot. 
For Rezac this method was artistically problematic: he was a master in the portrayal of 
detailed scenes, not of panoramic pictures. His attempts to draw a map of contemporary 
reality in Nastup and Bitva led him away from detailed psychological analysis to depicting 
model situations; detailed portraits of characteristic figures are replaced by simplified, 
schematic characters acting the way the author imagined they would act as representatives 
of their classes. The novels are overladen with explanations of the characters’ views and 
convictions, excessive description and didacticism, something that Rezac himself 
identified as deleterious to a literary work.17 Nevertheless, we can hardly say that these 
problems appear in Rezac’s work as a result of his search for a completely new style that 
would be more politically acceptable (in connection with Slepa ulicka, Burianek had 
already criticized Rezac’s effort to balance the number of representatives of individual 
classes in the novel).18 From the fragment of his last novel Piseh o vernosti a zrade (A 
Song of Fidelity and Betrayal, 1956) we see that he was fully aware of the flaws of his 
post-war novels. 
His attempt to write ‘an historical novel about his own time’19 was evidently motivated 
by the social changes that followed the war but cannot be explained simply by his desire to 
hop on the political bandwagon after 1945 or 1948: the roots of the method he tried to 
exploit reach deeper into the past. Both his psychological and social novels are written 
from the position of a writer who regarded literature as a report on his times and 
understood the role of the writer as that of a witness. 
16 An introduction to a fragment of Rezac’s novel Stary dym (unfinished, probably written shortly 
before Cerne svetlo), Plamen. 2, 1960, 12, p. 165. 
17 Vaclav Rezac, ‘O noveho cloveka’, Lidove noviny, 21 March 1948. 
18 Burianek, Soucasna ceska literatura, pp. 98-99. 
19 Jin Opelik used this term in connection with Nastup in the study ‘Promeny Rezacovy metody’, 
p. 4. 
30 Stanislaw Dygat and the ‘Re-evaluation of the 
Intelligentsia’ in Polish Fiction, 1945-49 
Hans-Christian Trepte 
The Dilemma of the Intellectuals 
The end of the Second World War brought a fundamental change for European culture, 
and Polish culture was no exception. The years 1945-49 constituted a transition from war 
to peace and from chaos to a new social and political order. In these years fundamental 
changes took place in Polish cultural life. The cultural transition had six aspects: (1) A 
fairly soft ideological transition to Marxism as the philosophical base of the new cultural 
ideology and policy, a ‘soft cultural revolution’ (lagodna rewolucja kulturalna); (2) a 
cultural transition to a homogeneous national culture and literature (that is, a change of 
dominant historical conceptions from the tradition of the Jagiellonians to that of the 
Piasts); (3) a transition in poetics to a new literary method and literary criticism to comply 
with the demands of the new society. (The Fourth Congress of Polish Writers in Szczecin 
in 1949 meant the victory of the Soviet cultural and literary model in Poland); (4) a 
transition to a new function of literature, directed to a new mass reader; (5) a transition to a 
new relationship to the ‘national’ cultural heritage (a preference for ratio as against 
emotio: Enlightenment, Positivism, Realism; and (6) a transition to a type of new fictional 
character (originating from the new ruling class). 
How did literature, especially fiction, react to and interact with these transitions and 
changes? Writers who did not leave the country had to come to terms with the rules of the 
new regime and the new cultural policy. Under the pressure of historical, political and 
ideological events a few authors even started changing their traditional topics, and their 
poetics. For them the war and the occupation became ever increasingly the dominant 
literary themes. 
The literature of the 1940s did not yet, however, reflect problems desired for artistic 
treatment by the newly proclaimed ruling class. The new character, demanded so 
insistently by left-wing critics, remained wishful thinking. Indeed, Polish fiction, published 
in the transitional period of the 1940s, hardly ever met the new prescriptions, which had 
been fulfilled by some poets. While war and occupation meant a new beginning for poetry, 
fiction demonstrated a notable continuity of tradition. Many writers simply resumed their 
literary work, treating similar themes to those they had treated in the pre-war Polish 
republic. The new values, first of all propagated by Kuznica (Smithy), a left-wing cultural 
periodical, remained alien to them. In re-evaluating the past, those fiction writers did not 
change their aesthetic mode of production, but continued to exploit their own experiences, 
emotional and physical. Their novels did not try to present a broad panorama of the current 
thinking on the basis of authentic facts and their analyses of the conscience of the 
intellectual concentrated on limited Modernist perspectives of observation. Reality was 
disguised and characters often resembled living masks. Nevertheless these works were 
used as weapons in contemporary discussions on the role, and the new tasks, of the Polish 
intelligentsia, because they seemed to disqualify the traditional Polish intelligentsia from 
intellectual leadership in the new post-war society. 
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In 1946 the journal Pokolenie (Generation) published Bratny’s article, ‘Proba rachunku’ 
(An Attempt at Re-evaluation),1 in which the writer expresses his disgust at the Polish 
‘cultural conspiracy’ with the new political and cultural realities. At the First Congress of 
the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) in December 1945, the party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka 
introduced the party’s new attitude towards the Polish intelligentsia: ‘We as the Workers’ 
Party, as the leading party, must help these intellectuals overcome their doubts [...]; the 
general trend should be to use different ways to attract these people to us.’2 But the main 
debates focused on the appropriate choice of literary tradition. The left propagated a clear 
preference for Realism and the treatment of the new realities of everyday Polish life. 
Realism was demanded by Wladyslaw Gomulka in his speech in the Academy of Polish 
Culture in Wroclaw on 9 June 1945: ‘Give the people a culture that has grown out of 
Polish reality.’3 The future Stalinist ruler of Poland, Boleslaw Bierut, was even more 
radical in his views on tradition. When he opened the new broadcasting station in Wroclaw 
he spoke about the future role of young workers and farmers, the new artistic values which 
arose from the new Polish reality and demanded a selective and ideologically filtered 
choice of the best in the Polish tradition: ‘From historical Romanticism we took what 
suited us ideologically. Realism was our slogan; its contents took only selected elements 
from the past. Everything that came from the literary heritage was filtered through our 
world-view.’4 Polish Romanticism, especially, gave rise to sharp controversies. There were 
voices that demanded a complete rejection of Romanticism and an emphasis on the 
Positivist tradition (what Poles conventionally call Positivism is what Western Europeans 
conventionally call nineteenth-century Realism). The critic Jerzy Borejsza wrote at that 
time in Kuznica: ‘Our age is apparently meant to be a negation of Romanticism and a 
thorough approval of Positivism.’5 
Bierut himself reminded his audience of the positive, mobilizing role which 
Romanticism had played in Polish history and society: ‘An adequate example would be to 
recall how great a role was played by Mickiewicz and Slowacki in all Polish society in the 
period of servitude. Our artists sought to remember that they are obliged to mould their 
work in such a way as to cultivate and enthuse the nation.’ Gomulka agreed with Bierut 
and emphasized the importance of Romanticism for the development of the Polish nation: 
‘The Romantic trend, which emerged after the fall of Poland, made it easier for us not only 
to preserve our national features, but also, despite the loss of independence, drove the 
nation down the path of development.’6 Polish exile circles, primarily representatives of 
Polish emigre literature like Witold Gombrowicz, were sceptical about the postulates of 
the new cultural policy and the narrow, dogmatic conception of a ‘Realist’ Polish 
literature. In an open letter Gombrowicz supported pluralist, democratic structures in 
politics and culture.7 8 
Marxist critics of Kuznica disqualified novels reflecting the experiences of intellectuals 
in the past as ‘intellectual’s acts of penance’ (kajanie siq inteligenta).s The literary scholar, 
1 Roman Bratny, ‘Proba rachunken,’ Pokolenie, 1946, p. 1. 
2 PPR. Odezwy, rezolucje, instrukeje i okolniki KC 1944—45, Warsaw, 1959, p. 161. 
3 J. K^dzielski, O problemie modelu rewolucji kulturalnej, Warsaw and Lodz, 1959, p. 14. 
4 H. Gosk, Krytyka w poszukowaniu bohatera: W krqgu Kuznicy Dyskusja krytycznoliterackie 
lat 1945-1948, Warsaw, 1985, p. 122. 
5 Jerzy Borejsza, ‘Obrachunki na w^zlowej stacji’, Kuznica, 2, 1946, 50, p. 6. See also Gosk, 
Krytyka w poszukowaniu, p. 126. 
6 Kazimierz Wyka (ed.), Zagodnenie polityki kulturalnej PRL. Wybor tekstow, Warsaw, 1969, 
p. 2. 
7 Witold Gombrowicz, ‘List do ferdydurkistow’, Nowiny Literackie, 6, 1947, p. 6. 
8 Jan Kott, ‘Zoil albo o powiesci wspolczesney’, Odrodzenie, 2, 1947, p. 35. 
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Kazimicrz Wyka, replaced this pejorative expression with the less ideologically loaded 
description 4obrachunki inteligenckie’ (a re-evaluation of the intelligentsia). He used this 
term to characterize a more or less homogenous group of novels, including, Drewniany 
koh (The Wooden Horse, 1946) by Kazimierz Brandys, Jezioro Bodehskie (Lake 
Constance, 1946) by Stanislaw Dygat, Sedan (1948) by Pawel Hertz and Sprzysiqzenie 
(The Plot, 1947) by Stefan Kisielewski.9 
Wyka’s diagnosis was discussed in connection with the controversial article on the 
genealogy of the Polish intelligentsia published by the sociologist Jozef Chalasinski in 
1946.10 Chalasinski stated in his article that the Polish intelligentsia did not come into 
being as a result of social progress but as part of the process of social degradation in the 
Polish gentry (especially after the Partitions). Therefore representatives of the Polish 
intelligentsia had their own specific intellectual attitude towards life and work: they tended 
to feel superior, to isolate or ghettoize themselves, and to treat representatives of other 
social strata with contempt. 
The critical attitude towards intellectuals, reflected in the novels by Brandys, Dygat, 
Hertz and Kisielewski, was not imposed on literature by reviewers and representatives of 
the new cultural policy. On the contrary, it reflected the frustration and disillusion of the 
authors themselves. First, the authors clearly considered that writing should help liberate 
the psyche both from the nightmares of war and from accepted but ever more questionable 
social and cultural norms. In this respect these novels could be regarded as ‘therapy’ for 
lost intellectuals. Secondly, from a sociological point of view, this fiction resulted from a 
fundamental revision of a previous world-view, which had not been the subject only of 
literature. As a result of the liberal autumn of 1956 these novels ‘re-evaluating the 
intelligentsia’ experienced another renascence. They were not only republished, Brandys’s 
in 1958, Dygat’s in 1956 itself, Hertz’s a little later, in 1966, and Kisielewski’s in 1957, 
but also interpreted and discussed in a now changed political and cultural context. This 
time the forlomness and isolation of the intellectual was interpreted in categories of 
Existentialism. This interpretation seemed more appropriate. It liberated these literary 
works from the narrow, political restrictions of the time when they were published. A new 
approach towards literary characters was possible as was demonstrated by the scholar 
Helena Zaworska who focused her contribution to the discussion on the decline of 
intellectual myths.* 11 The identification of ‘Polishness’ with a particular social group like 
the gentry and the intelligentsia had been rousing suspicion and ridicule since the end of 
the nineteenth century as, for example, in Stanislaw Wyspiariski’s ‘mocking morality play’ 
Wesele (The Wedding, 1901). Konstanty Ildefons Galczynski made fun of the ‘dying 
nation’ of Polish intellectuals.12 Gombrowicz presented a compromised representative of 
the new intelligentsia in his novel Ferdydurke (1937), and Witkiewicz stated that the 
average Polish intellectual was just nasty and disgusting.13 
The ‘vivisection’ of intellectuals in the prose of the 1940s was, then, nothing new in the 
history of Polish literature. In spite of all the cataclysms Poland had endured these novels 
demonstrate a remarkable continuity in the literary tradition from Karol Irzykowski 
(1873-1944) via Zofia Nalkowska (1884-1954), Stefan Zeromski (1864-1925) and 
9 Kazimierz Wyka, Pogranicze powiesci, Warsaw, 1974, p. 137. 
10 Jozef Chalasinski, ‘Inteligencja polska v swietle svej genealogii spolecznej’, Kuznica, 4, 1946, 
pp. 36-38. 
11 Helena Zaworska, To upadku mitow inteligenckih. O prozie tzw. Obrachunkow inteligenckich 
w latach 1945—1949’ in A. Brodzka and Z. Zabicki (eds), Z problemow literatury polskiej XX. 
Wieku, vol. 3, Warsaw, 1965, p. 96. 
12 Konstanty Ildefons Galczynski, quoted in Gosk, Krytyka w poszukowaniu, p. 228. 
13 See ibid., p. 304. 
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Tadeusz Breza (1905-70), to Gombrowicz. For example Dygat’s Jezioro Bodehskie 
followed on from Gombrowicz’s avant-garde Ferdydurke. The outbreak of the Second 
World War had, however, postponed Dygat’s debut (actually Dygat’s real, and now 
forgotten, debut was a grotesque short story Rozowy kajecik [The Little Pink Exercise 
Book, 1938]). ‘The outbreak of war in 1939 drove different people with different 
experiences into strange places and circumstances. I also drove my debut forward in years, 
and formal pretexts actually had nothing to do with it.’ 14 All four novels I am concerned 
with here, Brandys’s, Dygat’s, Hertz’s, Kisielewski’s, have a hybrid character. They used 
different poetics and literary conventions, and a strong continuity was appreciated as a 
precondition for the health of Polish fiction after the war. Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz was 
impressed by this continuity: ‘There would have been no Dygat without Gombrowicz, no 
Breza without Kaden [...] the indubitable blossoming of Polish fiction [...] is a positive 
product of the work of 1920s litterateurs,’15 
We may, indeed, state that the year of the gradual liberation of Poland, 1944-45, was an 
historical and political caesura, but have to be wary of stating that the year constituted a 
cultural, or literary, caesura. In the post-war period of transition two dominant literary 
models coexisted, litterature engagee, which served the (new) state and society, and a 
literature concentrated on the past and on its own literariness. The latter followed 
traditional narrative convention in having a specific narrator, but it also gave rise to a 
particular literary figure, the sensitive Polish intellectual, introverted, immature, impotent 
(often also psychologically) who is situated between two political and cultural systems and 
Gesellschaften. He still has his roots in the old pre-war society but is expected to assess 
new post-war realities. These intellectuals are aesthetes. Familiar with European culture, 
they often view the outside world through the prism of art. International contacts, family 
ties and long journeys helped them achieve supranational attitudes and sentiments. 
Especially the literary figures portrayed by Dygat and Hertz manifest cosmopolitan 
experience, broad geographical and intellectual horizons. The authors used the attributes to 
demonstrate the specific exotic features of their characters’ ‘European’ relatives — 
aesthetic fastidiousness, intellectual voyeurism, political escapism and cultural 
sophistication, which contrasted with Central European egocentric patriotism. The 
politically inspired switch from the multicultural heritage of the Jagiellonians to the local 
(and, indeed, geographically inspired, given that the westward translation of Poland placed 
the country more or less where it was in past times) heritage of the Piasts was not realized. 
The figures in these novels did not meet the new criteria either, and their themes and 
aesthetic methods were regarded as old-fashioned.16 The choice of characters from the 
Polish intelligentsia had focused the attention of the authors on three main problems: first, 
the inability of the individual to free himself from his social environment; secondly, the 
relationship between the individual, the nation and its ‘tradition’; and thirdly, the problem 
of the social consequences of the intellectual’s cosmopolitanism and hence the question, 
Who was responsible for the dilemma Polish intellectuals found themselves in?17 The third 
problem became the leitmotiv of this fiction. 
Stanislaw Dygat 
I take as my example of an exponent of this fiction Stanislaw Dygat (1914-78) who 
studied architecture and philosophy in Warsaw and who was one of the most gifted writers 
14 Stanislaw Dygat, Jezioro Bodehskie, Warsaw, 1976, p. 7. 
15 Gosk, Krytyka w poszukowaniu, p. 211. 
16 See ibid., pp. 227-48. 
17 See Zaworska, ‘Po upadku mitow inteligenckih’, p. 96. 
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of the ‘re-evaluation of the intelligentsia’ group. Because he had a French passport (he was 
partly of French descent), he was interned in a camp located in a school in Constance. His 
fairly strongly autobiographical Jezioro Bodehskie is a unique, and entertaining (self-) 
criticism of ‘eternal’ Polishness. It without doubt represents the greatest literary 
achievement of the four novels in the group. Dygat’s novel was first interpreted 
particularly narrowly as an attack on the Polish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Although it 
did not meet the demands of the new cultural politics it was universally acclaimed and 
awarded prizes. (An interview with Dygat was published entitled ‘Writers together with 
the people struggle for a socialist Poland.’)18 
Although published in 1946 the novel recounts little of the horrors of war. War and 
history form a distant background. The isolated prisoners seem to live in a huge glass ball 
which distorts them into caricatures. The closed space of the prisoner-of-war camp 
generates discussion, play-acting and outright performance. A whole range of eccentrics of 
different national origins had been interned here in 1941. Conditions in this camp are 
rather comfortable; the internees have to endure nothing but their boredom as they wait for 
the end of the war and their liberation. Dreaming and play-acting formed the creative and 
individual side of Dygat’s strange, egoistic hero. By means of provocation and 
scandalization he tries to liberate himself from form and convention. Day-dreams, escapes 
into another world, deliver him from his unpleasant duties in a grey, tedious life. The 
isolated co-existence with representatives of other nationalities and cultures provoked 
particular forms of play-acting. All gestures and roles are acted out in the imagination of 
the character first. Play-acting becomes his second nature, forced on him by the alien 
reality of the camp. His roles and masks are lifted from the old familiar world, which had 
existed before the war. They were to help him hide his true feelings. Faced with an 
international auditorium, Dygat’s anonymous ‘hero’ begins to present himself as a Pole. 
Therefore he assumes romantic gestures and attitudes, reminiscences from Polish liter¬ 
ature, to demonstrate his Polishness. Like Konrad in Mickiewicz’s Dziady (Forefathers’ 
Eve, 1823-32), he tries to leave his prison, to perform something impressive. Like Rafal 
Olbromski from Zeromski’s historical novel Popioty (Ashes, 1904), he leaves the school- 
prison to join a Polish legion. But he remains in a state like catalepsy, a state of weakness 
typical of Slowacki’s Kordian (1834) but also of some of Wyspianski’s characters in 
Wesele. Especially in the scene where the ‘hero’ prepares himself for action, Dygat makes 
creative intertextualizing use of Wyspiariski’s play. 
Stagnant time linked with aimless motion in a closed space form a circle symbolizing 
absurd and hopeless situations as such. The whole construction of the novel, with 
daydreams interspersed with mental journeys and escapes, represents the structure of a 
closed space, a circle. Thus the novel begins and ends with the same statement (and 
justification), which explains a hopeless situation: ‘In the meantime war had broken out’. 
Exploiting the Polish literary tradition, Dygat adopts traditional symbols — such as the 
image of the dance, much employed in Polish literature of Romanticism and the Fin-de- 
siecle (Young Poland), Mickiewicz’s last polonaise from his poem Pan Tadeusz (1834) 
and the chochol-dance from Wyspiariski’s Wesele. Like Wyspiariski’s characters, the Poet 
and the Host, Dygat’s ‘hero’ starts lamenting about his inactivity and weakness. Infected 
with the bacillus of Polish Romanticism by his reading of the ‘poet-prophets’, he plays the 
role of a martyr and begins suffering for his people and for other nations. He escapes to 
Switzerland to become the leader of a Polish legion, in order to liberate Poland and the 
world. But finally he doubts his own power to carry out his plans. He leaves his 
18 ‘Pisarze id? wraz z ludem do walky o Polsk? socjalistycznq,’ see Gosk, Krytyka w 
poszukowaniu, p. 240. 
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compatriots and returns to the internment camp voluntarily, justifying his decision with the 
ridiculous statement that he has to finish reading Slowacki’s Kordian first. Thus another 
circle is closed. But suddenly he hears the mocking song of Chochol from Wyspianski. 
‘Fool, you once had a golden horn’ which encourages him to another heroic deed. But 
when he is about to attack a German guard impotence comes over him again. As in 
Wyspianski’s Wesele, a cock crows and dawn breaks. When he finally wakes up out of his 
adventurous dream, he is relieved to ascertain that there is no way out of the camp. The 
performance of Chopin’s ‘Polonaise’ in A flat major in the camp constitutes another 
grotesque scene that demonstrates the symbolic Polish dance as a circle. All Poles situated 
in the camp suddenly start dancing and hugging each other, emphasizing thus their 
Polishness and the Polish avowal of friendship taken from Mickiewicz’s ‘Kochajmy sie’ 
(Let Us Love One Another) from Pan Tadeusz, which has the status of ‘the national 
poem’. But the magic of Polish Romanticism affects even non-Polish prisoners-of-war. 
Two reserved Englishmen suddenly start hopping to the rhythm of the Polish oberek, and 
even a German guard cannot restrain himself. The assembly hall of the school changes into 
a whirling ballroom: ‘Let us love one another [...]. You Englishmen and a Pole, let us love 
one another.’19 
Dygat’s main character uses different masks and disguises not only in his social contacts 
but also in his love affairs. Love is no longer genuine; it is artificial, a game. To conquer 
the French Suzanne he uses the mask of the amorous Pole of Romanticism. In his 
relationship with the British girl Janka Birmin he puts on the mask of a stiff-upper-lipped 
charmer. To make an impression on another young woman, Renee, he tends to be a cynical 
clever-dick. 
In his play-acting, ‘patriotic’ feelings and national masks can be exchanged. Dygaf s 
‘hero’ can even put himself into the position of a German: Tch liebe Deutschland — I sigh 
to myself and see a beautiful, spreading country full of tidy, clean towns, charming nooks 
inhabited by the beauty of the greatest musicians. I feel contact with the old myths, the 
gods of Walhalla and the whole fairy-tale world around the Rhine.’20 
The highlight of all his ‘national performances’ is the grotesque lecture ‘My Nation and 
I’ (Ja i moj narod), delivered by the narrator, a brilliant satire on Mickiewicz’s lectures on 
Slavonic literature at College de France in Paris (published as Les Slaves, 1849). Dygaf s 
‘hero’ tries to start another Polish dialogue with the ignorant West. (The West confuses 
different countries like Poland and Russia and cannot distinguish between the Polish and 
Czech languages.) But in vain; the spectacle ends in a scandal. 
Dygat’s novel Pozegnania (Farewells, 1948), continues to treat the problems at the 
centre of Jezioro Bodehskie. This time, however, the intellectual is placed in the bourgeois 
milieu of pre-war Warsaw society. This character is also bored and frustrated. He, too, tries 
to escape from an unpleasant reality into an emotional, mental reality, which is to liberate 
him from tiresome conventions. But the escape turns out to be just a Sunday escapade, 
because he lacks the courage to renew his life. War and occupation, and the tragic defeat of 
the Warsaw Uprising had destroyed his familiar environment, liberated him from the pre¬ 
war conventions against which he had revolted in vain. History had done the job for him. 
Waiting together with other weird refugees and other lost souls in a Warsaw suburban 
house, he nourishes the stubborn hope that the battle-front and the fast-approaching final 
catastrophe might cure him of his inactivity, allow him to begin a new but uncertain life. 
This novel is a witty critique of bourgeois conventions and habits. But it also quite 
evidently constitutes the author’s critical appraisal of himself as artist, such as would 
19 Dygat, Jezioro Brodehskie, p. 106. 
20 Ibid., p. 97. 
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become typical of the Stalin period at the beginning of the 1950s. If we look at Pozegnania 
as a further instalment of Jezioro Bodehskie, we notice important changes in construction 
and message. The ending of the novel, especially, artificially appended to a literary whole 
(a not uncommon habit of writers at the end of the 1940s), demonstrates a clear ideological 
intention. The approaching Soviet tanks and soldiers, with red stars on their caps, meant 
the end of an historical period and a dubious liberation of the country, its people and the 
main character of the novel. Most of the novels about intellectuals I have mentioned do not 
suggest any solution to the circle. But Pozegnania does break it. The author seems to be 
suggesting that History has taught him a lesson. The ending marks the end of an 
intellectual attitude. It marks a clear transition into a literature of black and white values, a 
literature that increasingly sought to fulfil Stalinist demands, and that soon produced a new 
hero of its own. But even during this dour period ‘progressive’ representatives of the 
‘humanist intelligentsia’ were to be incorporated into the new socialist society. Conditions 
in Poland were different from those in the other countries of the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless 
the ‘old’ Polish intelligentsia was even in Stalinist times not ‘decapitated’, as in the Soviet 
Union, nor was it deprived of power, as in East Germany or Czechoslovakia, where new, 
socialist intelligentsias were cultivated. Polish culture went through a rocky period, 
especially in the first years of Communist rule, but it never collapsed, however many of its 
major scholars and writers defected to the West. 
31 Days of Judgement: Egon Hostovsky and the 
Period 1945-48 
Radojka Miljevic 
The term ‘transition’, if it has any meaning, given that every culture and every living thing 
is always in a transition of kinds, must connote the change from one state to another, the 
departure from and ending of one thing, the arrival to and beginning of another. Through 
the works and correspondence of a Czech writer, Egon Hostovsky, 1 shall examine the 
eschatological aspect of transition and approach the years 1945-48 as a period of 
incrimination, as an inexorable progress towards disillusion, and as an awakening of the 
desire for a lost mythic unity. 
Hostovsky was bom to a Jewish Czech family on 23 April 1908. In his late twenties and 
early thirties he began to establish himself in Czech literature as one of its foremost 
exponents of psychological ‘analytical’ prose. Supporting his writing career variously 
through work as an editor, translator and, later, as an administrative clerk in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, he found himself cast into exile — accidentally, as it were — by the 
German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia shortly after his arrival on a lecture tour in 
Belgium, at the behest of the Belgian PEN club, on 15 March 1939.1 He chose not to return 
home, fearing that, as a Jew, a grisly fate would await him; indeed, he alleges that he later 
learned that the Gestapo were looking for him as early as 16 March 1939.2 Hostovsky’s own 
experience of this period, even before Occupation, was clearly one of immense fear, 
bordering on paranoia: the poet Ivan Jelinek recalls in his memoirs Hostovsky’s comments 
on meeting him in Prague: “‘I must get away, away!” he repeated, “I am a Jew, and, what’s 
worse, a Czech Jew [...] I shall be among the first whom they will kill”,’3 and Jelinek 
remembers how ashamed he felt for Hostovsky, ‘who jerked with every approaching step, 
every rustle of paper, every waft of wind. He truly imagined that we were being followed, 
that somebody was listening to us.’4 After having spent periods of time in Belgium, then 
France, Spain and Portugal, Hostovsky accepted the offer of work from the Czechoslovak 
consulate in New York, and spent the remainder of the war there. During this period he 
published three works, Listy z vyhnanstvi (Letters from Exile, Chicago, 1941 ),5 Sedmkrat v 
1 According to Hostovsky himself, he hesitated in accepting the offer since he blithely believed 
that nothing worse could happen to the Czechs after the Sudetenland had been ceded by the 
Czechoslovak government to Germany on 30 September 1938. He finally made up his mind to 
leave when an old friend, a Catholic poet, came to visit him to instruct him to leave, claiming that 
Hostovsky was one of the few Jews worth defending and that he hated all other Jews and thought 
them responsible for all the country’s woes (see Hostovsky’s interview with Antonin J. Liehm in 
Liehm, Generace, Cologne, 1988; the edition referred to here is Prague, 1990, p. 376). 
2 See Hostovsky’s interview with ‘mt’ [Michal Topol’sky?], ‘Hovorime se spisovatelem Egonem 
Hostovskym’ in Svobodne slovo, 2, 20 June 1946, no. 141, p. 7. 
3 Ivan Jelinek, Jablko se house, Prague, 1994, p. 350 (Jelinek does not record the date of this 
meeting). 
4 Ibid., p. 351. 
5 The work was translated into English by Ann Krtil as Letters from Exile, London, 1942. 
Apparently the Czech collection was sold out within three weeks of being published (see Hana 
Weislova’s piece on Hostovsky, ‘Egon Hostovsky za valky’ in Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, 1/2, 
pp. 44-45). 
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hlavni uloze (Seven Times in the Leading Role, New York, 1942)6 and Ukryt (The Refuge, 
New York, 1943), which were received favourably, on the whole, by American and English 
critics, and which were published in Czechoslovakia in 1946. 
These wartime works are studies of betrayal; they reflect an almost censorious 
disposition towards the consequences of withdrawing from life and retreating into 
aestheticism and games, and a less than indulgent examination by Hostovsky of the figure 
of the dreamer. On the international scale, the collapse — or rather, according to 
Hostovsky’s depiction, the capitulation, and therefore betrayal — of France7 8 in the face of 
the German threat is treated by him as arguably a more significant turning-point than the 
Munich Agreement. Listy, for example, was described by one critic as a portrait of exiles 
waiting in vain for French force majeure,s and it cannot be coincidental that the Book of 
Revelation constitutes one intertext for these works; indeed, one might view the whole of 
Hostovsky’s post-war work as reverberating with the after-shock of this ‘apocalyptic’ 
event. Paris is always the destination of the betrayer, and the Frenchman often, although 
there are exceptions, the embodiment of betrayal. In the short story ‘Zapisky Bedricha 
Davida o velke nevere’ (The Notes of Bedrich David on the Great Unfaithfulness), which 
monitors the progress of a small group of exiles from France to Portugal, a mysterious 
Belgian is suspected of being a German spy by the narrator and is accused by him of 
planning to betray the three Czechs, to which the Belgian responds: ‘We have been tricked 
a thousand times. What happened in France? Unfaithful soldiers, unfaithful generals, 
unfaithful ministers, unfaithftil priests. We belong to each other; how could I betray you 
even if I wanted to? Why, you have been betrayed [...] long ago!’9 When the exiles 
encounter a group of French soldiers in the countryside, they are shocked to discover that 
the Frenchmen have no intention of returning to fight, but have in fact deserted the army in 
order to while away their last few hours in the company of women. The narrator is arrested 
as a suspected enemy parachutist and is saved by an old friend, the Frenchman Baron 
Loiseau, but even the Baron turns out to be a willing collaborator with the Germans. 
In Sedmkrat v hlavni uloze Hostovsky metaphorizes the figure of the Frenchman, 
Professor Marcel, as French nationhood. When the first-person narrator (Jaroslav Ondrej) 
first meets the professor, Marcel brings them French wine to drink together and Ondrej’s 
description of the wine serves as an intimation of the impending betrayal of Europe by 
France, ‘that wine with the taste of a mistress’s breath, [...] with the taste of a crop which 
has become overripe, with the taste of power, which has fallen asleep, with the taste of 
riches, which do not belong to you’.10 Professor Marcel is satirized by Hostovsky as the 
epitome of French immorality and irresponsibility. Marcel’s world-view is grounded on 
selfish principles: man lives for himself alone and his only duty in life is to observe. He is 
initially positive about the prospects for France in its armistice with Germany, contenting 
himself with the thought that France and Germany as large nations are like grown-ups who 
do not need the consent of children (that is, Czechoslovakia) to come to a satisfactory 
6 Both this novel and Ukryt sold so well that second editions were published. Sedmkrat was also 
dramatized for radio, with Arnold Moss in the leading role. See ibid. Sedmkrat was translated 
into English by Fem Long as Seven Times the Leading Man, London and New York, 1945; 
Ukryt was translated into English, again by Fem Long, as The Hideout, New York, 1945. 
Indeed, in an interview on the occasion of Hostovsky’s first (and brief) return to 
Czechoslovakia after the war for a meeting of writers, Hostovsky alleges that most of the 
Frenchmen whom he met in France did not even know where Czechoslovakia was (see ‘Dnesni 
Amerika ocima Prazana’ in Mlada fronta, 2, 2 July 1946, p. 5). 
8 ‘j§k’ [J. S. Kvapil] in Nose doba, 53, 1946-7, p. 43. 
9 Egon Hostovsky, Listy z vyhnanstvi, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946 (hereafter Listy), p. 110. 
10 Egon Hostovsky, Sedmkrat v hlavni uloze, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 142. 
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agreement. He is subsequently embarrassed by his warm feelings towards Germany after a 
chance meeting with a Nazi at a party, where the German voices his hopes for France to be 
the German nation’s prostitute. 
More generally, however, we identify betrayal in either one of tw o extremes: in an 
exclusively intimate sphere — betrayal of one’s spouse, one’s family, one friends, one’s 
self, even — or in the public sphere, in the individual’s relationship to the abstract entities 
of nation or state. In the short story ‘Prizraky’ (Phantoms), essentially an exemplum]] 
concerning the individual’s negation of his own desires and his assumption of 
responsibility for the downtrodden, Hostovsky pits one form of betrayal against the other. 
Barely any significant action takes place: a man from Prague appears at the narrator’s flat, 
tells the narrator of his moral dilemma; they go to a bar frequented by emigres; the narrator 
leaves in horror at the vision of people sinking inexorably into various states of 
degradation and immorality; the man pursues the narrator and reveals how he has finally 
resolved his dilemma as they part. The man’s dilemma is posed as a choice between 
betraying his lover (a Jewess who has had to flee to Switzerland and to destitution) and 
betraying his country — he has been entrusted with an important message, indirectly 
perhaps from the govemment-in-exile, to take to Prague, but a coded telegram from home 
suggests that he will be killed on his return. The solution of the dilemma resides in its 
ambiguous dissolution, as the man states that: ‘A man cannot betray his country, nor his 
only love; he cannot live by such actions. A man can betray no one, can betray nothing, 
only [...] Jesus Christ!’12 Elsewhere in Hostovsky’s wartime work personal responsibility 
is paramount: every deed has political implications. Betrayal in the personal sphere 
becomes tantamount to betrayal in the political. The war becomes a symbolic 
representation of the consequences of an amalgam of individuals’ guilt, ‘because each of 
us loved someone and something which we were forbidden to love’.13 
Betrayal is also a theme, however, in the reception of one of these wartime works. 
Sedmkrdt treats the intelligentsia’s collusion in the rise of Fascism through a study of the 
behaviour of a clique of seven hangers-on (six Czechs and the Frenchman Marcel) grouped 
around the Russian poete maudit, Josef Kavalsky, who are drawn together by their 
common weakness and immorality during the period immediately preceding and following 
the Munich crisis. The novel provoked a scandal among the Czech emigre community in 
America when it was first published, for the litterateurs and critics — drawn to a literal 
interpretation of the text — seized on it with nationalist fervour as treacherously anti- 
Czech in its depiction of the Czech intelligentsia. One critic called for a people’s tribunal, 
and the Czech emigre press incriminated Hostovsky as a traitor of the people with veiled 
comments about his involvement in some kind of financial transaction.14 Roman Jakobson, 
internationally renowned for his role in Formalism and the Prague Linguistic Circle and 
for his leading part in establishing Structuralism as a critical approach, was the chief 
instigator of the vilification campaign against Hostovsky. 
Jakobson begins attacking Hostovsky indirectly even before the publication of the novel. 
In August 1942, while Jakobson was teaching at the Free French University in New York, 
he wrote an article for the emigre newspaper New-Yorske listy, concerning the role of 
11 V. Kocourek comments also on the lack of action in the stories, which he thinks sometimes 
resemble a causerie or a feuilleton: ‘rek\ reviewing Listy in Rude pravo, 25 June 1946, 146, 
p. 4. 
12 Listy, p. 56. 
13 Egon Hostovsky, Ukryt, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 58. 
14 Pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi [Museum of National Literature], Prague (hereafter PNP), 
Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 27 April 1946. 
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European emigrants in, and their impact on, both American and European culture.15 The 
rather bland title of the article belies its venomous and polemical import. Jakobson outlines 
a special role for European academics in America to be relentless in their exposure of Nazi 
contraband in international academic studies; he exhorts other academics to ideological 
warfare and to a witch-hunt to root out any traitors or fifth column in their midst. Jakobson 
warns his readers that they may find Nazi watchwords where they least expect them, and 
he chooses Hostovsky (identified only as a well-known Czech novelist) as his paradigm. 
Jakobson’s venom is not reserved for those he considers merchants of Nazi ideology alone, 
but rather for all those involved in German academic research, and, one might add, for all 
Germans. He bombastically charges European (and especially Czech) intellectuals to 
demonstrate that the bloodthirsty Germans of today are no different from their forefathers. 
Hostovsky’s novel was published in New York in December 1942. According to Jin 
Brabec, on 25 February 1943 Jakobson gave a lecture on Czech novels from abroad, in 
which he concentrated almost exclusively on Hostovsky’s new work;16 furthermore, the 
contents of his lecture concurred in certain points with a review of Hostovsky’s novel 
which had appeared a month earlier, 24 January 1943 — written by a close friend of 
Jakobson’s, Stanislav Budin.17 From its outset Budin’s review sketches political 
parameters in which to read Hostovsky’s novel: Hostovsky has the advantage of writing 
freely, unlike those writers living in a ‘Nazi hell’, thus it is incumbent upon the author to 
deliver something appropriate. The characters are, however, liars and swindlers (whom 
Budin interprets as Hostovsky’s representation of the Czech intelligentsia); Hostovsky 
further compounds his crime, in Budin’s view, by forging most of the characters as active 
traitors. Budin thus allows himself to stage his outrage as he unleashes a patriotically 
sentimental series of counter-examples to compare with one of Hostovsky’s notional 
characters: Karel Capek, ‘whose heart broke with grief over the national catastrophe’; 
Vladislav Vancura, ‘who died a martyr’s death in the combat front lines of the people’; and 
all the writers ‘who are today tortured in German concentration camps’.18 
In Hostovsky’s correspondence of 1945 and 1946 with his friend Josef Trager, the main 
editor of Melantrich who was responsible for the re-issuing of Hostovsky’s wartime works, 
the author’s anxiety concerning the novel’s imminent reception is a recurring motif.19 
Hostovsky writes to Trager, as though to warn him in advance, that there had been a great 
campaign against the novel in America,20 with public meetings organized against him by 
such critics as Jakobson and Budin: ‘1 was supposed to be destroyed morally and 
politically. Taking part in the campaign were also high-ranking dignitaries from London21 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Roman Jakobson, NedelniNew-Yorske listy, 52, 9 August 1942, no. 32. 
See Jin Brabec’s “Konfliktni prijeti Hostovskeho romanu Sedmkrat v hlavni uloze’ in Ndvrat 
Egona Hostovskeho: Mezinarodm vedecke sympozium o zivote a dtte Egona Hostovskeho, 
Hronov 21.-23. kvetna 1993, Prague, 1996, pp. 7-12. 
See Stanislav Budurs piece in the New-Yorske listy, 12, 24 January 1943, no. 6, 'Roman “o 
zrade” ceskych vzdelancu’. 
Ibid. 
See, for example, PNP, Letters from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 30 November 1945 and 
15 September 1946. 
PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 16 October 1945. 
According to Hostovsky, the envoy/minister Sejnoha sent ‘secret’ material about Hostovsky to 
his boss, Papanek, in London — the material seems to have been some kind of evidence 
proving Hostovsky to be mad — with the response from Papanek that he could not yet publish 
the article because there was a strong feeling of sympathy for Hostovsky in America at that 
time, but that he would save the material for a more propitious opportunity. Hostovsky terms 
these activities, with irony, as the ‘resistance abroad in the West’ (PNP, Letter from Egon 
Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 27 April 1946). 
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[...]. Jakobson and Budin went as far as to accuse me of national betrayal, of being a right¬ 
winger and of pedalling Nazi ideology.’ Various prominent Czechs, such as Jiri Voskovec, 
Jan Werich and Otakar Odlozilik, as well as the newspapers of the extreme left, defended 
Hostovsky, but he complains that no one from London contacted him and no one 
denounced the campaign, ‘Today the originators are ashamed of their actions. I was, at that 
time, forced to go on unpaid leave. I returned only through the efforts of Jan Masaryk.’ On 
27 April 1946 Hostovsky clearly forgets that he has already informed Trager of the public 
meetings organized against him, mentioning them again, and adding the fact that his 
countrymen spat in front of him, and that he was threatened that ‘people of my kind back 
home’ would end up being executed. 
The immediate post-war reception of Hostovsky’s wartime work, apart from reflecting 
one facet of the culture of transition, is important also as a further commentary on this 
accusation of betrayal. While the Czech reception, in 1946, was on the whole positive, 
there are some notable exceptions. 1 cite briefly a few examples as representative of this 
critical reception, and as indicators of the political atmosphere in Czechoslovakia at the 
time. Among those critics who appear critically objective and genuine are Jan Grossman 
and Frantisek Gotz. Grossman describes Sedmkrat as a portrait of the intellectual crisis of 
the century: as modem man is increasingly confronted by the multiformity and relativity of 
reality, he correspondingly loses his ability to occupy a firm standpoint and participate in 
life by action.22 Gotz attempts a serious interpretation of the novel, arguing that Hostovsky 
was transposing his vision of pre-war France onto Czechoslovakia, which in the light of 
Hostovsky’s preoccupation with the French (and in particularly the Frenchman Marcel in 
the novel) may be an acute observation.23 Behounek welcomes Hostovsky’s work as an 
unencumbered view of the war from outside,24 and appears to defend Hostovsky from the 
allegations of treachery against him.25 One strand, which denigrates Hostovsky’s work for 
its lack of realism,26 may be motivated by the (at that time) fashionable rejection of the 
psychological approach to the novel. Another is politically orientated in understanding 
Hostovsky’s advocacy of action as the hallmark of a ‘new’ society.27 Frantisek Jakubuv, 
however, exemplifies the Czechocentricity, and the slightly more pernicious approach, of 
22 Jan Grossman in Lidova kultura, 2, 5 December 1946, no. 43, p. 6. 
23 See ‘G’ [Frantisek Gotz], ‘Romanova apokalypsa Egona Hostovskeho’ in Narodni osvobozeni, 
17, 26 November 1946, no. 271, p. 5. Gotz argues that it was precisely against the intelligentsia 
in Czechoslovakia that the occupiers targeted their hatred, and that the situation was the same 
elsewhere in Europe; he also suggests that ordinary people felt themselves to be united with the 
intelligentsia. 
24 ‘vbk.’ [Vaclav Behounek] points out that domestic novels have had to withstand the pressure 
of the censors weighing every word and sometimes altering the direction of writers (in Prace, 
2, 2 June 1946, no. 129, p. 6). 
25 See ‘vbk.’, ‘Cesky roman evropske kolaborace’ in Prace, 2, 10 November 1946, no. 259, p. 4. 
V 
26 ‘Z.S.’ [Z. Smid] adjudges Cizinec hleda byt, for example, to be cast too vaguely and unable to 
compete with novels which concern themselves with ‘a description of the real tragedy of the 
Second World War’; Hostovsky’s sentences are not ‘broken from hard rock’ but rather 
characterized by a smooth coalescence and diffused imprecision. See ‘Hostovskeho pokus o 
roman metafysicky’ in Lidova demokracie, 3, 5 August 1947, no. 180, p. 4. 
27 Michal Sedlon, for example, thinks the novel is a parable in which Hostovsky is already 
unveiling the signs of the new humanity. See Rude pravo, 10 July 1946, no. 156, p. 4. 
Frantisek Gotz follows a similar direction: he interprets the wartime works as a portrait of 
people who are broken by the times growing to a moral power. See ‘G’ on Listy and Ukryt in 
the review ‘Vzestup Egona Hostovskeho’ in Narodni osvobozeni, 17, 21 May 1946, no. 117, p. 
4. On the belief that Hostovsky is unveiling some kind of ‘new’ world, see also Frantisek 
Listopad, ‘Boj starymi zbranemi o novy svet’ in Mlada fronta, 2, 19 November 1946, p. 5. 
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some reviewers: he approaches Ukryt with the conviction that readers will be curious to 
know whether Hostovsky’s ‘stay abroad’ has had any effect on his mode of thinking, but is 
relieved to discover that Hostovsky’s roots are firmly established in ‘native soil’. Jakubuv 
goes as far as to interpret the novel as a representation of the situation in which Czech man 
finds himself: ‘he has been led down a blind alley, and, alone, without foreign help, must 
contemplate the path to the source of humanity’.28 If we remember that the protagonist has, 
by his own confession, led himself down this blind alley, and that his existence depends on 
foreign help (he is, after all, being concealed and fed by a Frenchman), what the review 
may intimate is a lingering sense of betrayal of the Czechs by the West in the Munich 
Agreement; moreover, there may be some intimation of concern about Hostovsky’s 
‘foreign’ or ‘native’ orientation in the East-West cultural tug-of-war and of the critic 
trying to ascertain whether Hostovsky has indeed remained faithful to his Czechness. 
The reclamation of Hostovsky as Czech must also be placed against the broader context 
of the post-war reconstruction of national identity: the desire to return to a ‘normal’ state 
of affairs and to restore some sense of national identity depended in some part on the 
symbolic recovery of integrity through the physical return of those individuals who had 
been in exile. That notional integrity was, however, irrevocably shattered, and in the case 
of Hostovsky what has generally been accepted by critics as a second exile after the 
Communist take-over in 1948 was in fact a continuation of his first exile: Hostovsky’s so- 
called return was never wholehearted.29 Hostovsky experienced the war period as a barrage 
from all sides. As a Jew, he was the subject of a German campaign in occupied Bohemia 
against his ‘Jewish-Masonic’ books, and he gathered from his sister that someone who had 
once been a guest in their house had spearheaded the campaign.30 He was accused by the 
Americans of being a Bolshevik and by the Soviets of being a Fascist.31 After the end of 
the war Hostovsky had sent an amicable letter to his former friend, the writer Vladimir 
Neff, only to discover from somebody else that Neff had broken all contact with 
Hostovsky and considered him ‘a villain who had betrayed his own family’.32 It is not 
surprising that after experiencing such a series of accusations and counter-accusations, 
Hostovsky, a fundamentally apolitical man, did not return to Czechoslovakia immediately 
in 1945. It may also be true that it suited the Czechoslovak authorities to allow Hostovsky 
to remain in America for propagandistic reasons. 
In any case, Hostovsky’s lingering concern with his public reputation is the subtext of 
much of his correspondence of this period: in a letter to Trager of 22 May 1946 he writes: 
‘Of course I don’t know how I am regarded today and whether it’s fitting. I have in Prague 
all kinds of well-meaning chaps who readily take care of my defamation. Neff so excels in 
that regard that I have already felt tempted to submit an accusation of slander immediately 
after my return. But, anyway, the devil take him!’33 Clear also, however, from Hostovsky’s 
28 See Lidova demokracie, 2, 2 June 1946, no. 128, p. 4. Compare Evzen Jiricek’s review of 
Ukryt, in Akord, 13, 1946-7, no. 1, pp. 35-37, in which even the Normandy countryside is 
transmuted into the Czech homeland. 
s/ 
29 Vaclav Cemy writes of Hostovsky’s return to Prague in 1946 that he came back to 
Czechoslovakia only to secure himself a post in Norway: Cemy, Pameti III: 1945-1972, Brno, 
1992, p. 179. Cemy also reports how Hostovsky was assisted in gaining his post as cultural 
attache in Scandinavia by Jan Masaryk (ibid., p. 198). 
30 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 30 November 1945: Hostovsky mentions 
correspondence with his sister from the period 1941—42 in which she informed him of these 
facts. 
31 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 27 April 1946. 
32 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 3 January 1946. 
33 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 22 May 1946. 
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correspondence of this period is his sense of being emotionally blackmailed by his friends 
to return to Czechoslovakia, and even perhaps his fear that his absence was being 
attributed to political reasons.34 He writes, on 6 November 1945, that 
I want to return and have never doubted that I 1 could'. [...] Political and economic events at 
home are in no way keeping me in America. I am more loyal to today’s government than are 
those newcomers who declare their loyalty with bombastic speeches and articles.35 I am not 
courting any title or any position and am not afraid in the slightest of how difficult it will be 
in the beginning. Only people who are very naive imagine that the whole of my exile was a 
paradise. Neither I nor my second wife have any remaining blood relatives. Only a handful of 
friends have remained. We miss most of them more than they miss us. And, with regard to 
my friends, some of them have not changed in their relationship with me. Others have. It 
appears to them that I have forsaken my family, that I have become americanized, and I don’t 
know what else. That is all lies. As far as my most intimate family matters go, I have an 
entirely clear conscience. And that goes for my relationship to my homeland too. Indeed, I 
had lots of difficulties abroad precisely because everywhere I defended my interest in my 
homeland and the rights of people back home in everything, and I didn’t conceal the fact that 
I could suddenly myself be tainted back home by exercising my free will. 
Today the war is past. I have the right now to think a little about myself. I am abroad, no 
longer in exile, and home is no longer a dream, but above all people. Those people have 
different worries from former emigres. But if to some friends, out of sheer friendship, it 
matters to have me amongst them soon, they shouldn’t have to make the issue of return 
difficult for me by their gauche reproaches and doubts about me.36 
Hostovsky’s perhaps hypersensitive self-justification and explicit statements of 
patriotism in this letter are, most likely, a response to the climate of incrimination and 
retribution which characterized the post-war period. The letter also demonstrates, however, 
Hostovsky’s acute awareness of a gulf between him and his friends, and one might suggest 
that from this point onwards this sense of separation and his wartime experiences were to 
intensify Hostovsky’s fictional portrayal of disintegration. The disjunction between the 
worries of ‘people at home’ and those of ‘former emigres’ and the exploitation of guilt in 
this relationship form the basis, for example, of Hostovsky’s short story ‘Navrat’ (Return), 
published in the 1948 collection, Osameli burici (Lonely Rebels). ‘Navrat’ is a study in 
insularity and guilt. The Jewish protagonist, the civil servant Alex Braun, refuses to 
recount his wartime experiences to his old schoolfriend when he returns to Czechoslovakia 
to look for his brother because he would prefer to avoid what happens to most ‘half¬ 
foreigners’ in these situations: ‘we argue with people from home about who had been 
through more, for in that way we can sometimes apologize for the fact that we are pleased 
34 Some teaching material for secondary schools even mentions the fact that, when the Second 
World War ended, it was surprising that Hostovsky did not hurry to return to his homeland (see 
Jin Svoboda, Spisovatel Egon Hostovsky [Tematicka jednotka pro stredni skoly]. Ostrava, 
1992, p. 6). 
35 On 16 October 1945 Hostovsky writes to Josef Trager that he needs to stay in America to fulfil 
various obligations he has undertaken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that T am needed 
here more than at home and more depends on that than on my feelings. Anyway those are 
“mixed” in view of my complicated personal history. Politically, today’s Czechoslovak 
government is far more to my liking than any which the Republic ever had. Everywhere in 
government are people who know what they want. I think that they have already had splendid 
results. [...] I fear only one thing, and that relates rather to the role of intellectuals than of the 
government: that in the anti-German battle (which of course must be unrelenting) they didn’t 
hide people to whom admittedly Germanness mattered, but Fascism or quasi-Fascism not at all.’ 
36 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 6 November 1945. 
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to have remained alive’.37 The outsider’s perspective of the returnee serves as a device to 
expound the social changes precipitated by the war. Not only is there social breakdown in 
the form of the atomization of the little town community — Alex and Mikulas encounter 
no one on their walk to find a pub because people have got used to sitting at home — but 
also instances of personal collapse (Mikulas’s wife seems to have suffered a nervous 
breakdown) and, predominantly, communicative breakdown: most of the characters are 
driven by the need to talk, not listen, to be understood, not to understand. The uneasy 
tension of ‘Navrat’ is located in the forced amiability of the characters and the manner in 
which they attempt to conceal their alienation from one another. 
The disintegration of society as a consequence of war was a theme Hostovsky had 
already treated in the 1920s, but his works after the Second World War are more sharply 
parabolic, counterpoising anomie with a quasi-spiritual search for an irredeemable unity. 
Hostovsky’s first work after the end of the Second World War, the novel Cizinec hleda byt 
(A Stranger Looks for a Flat, 1947), had already been completed before he eventually 
returned to Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1947. The novel signals a movement into a 
more complex and ambiguous binary plane of narration, in this instance through the figure 
of the bloud (the ingenu). The critic and novelist Daniela Hodrova has identified among 
the characteristics of this sub-genre the nomadic protagonist’s ‘difference’, manifest as 
madness or foreignness; his displacement from another time or place or even world, so that 
he may sometimes act as conveyor of a chthonic motif in the text; his immanent difference 
from others; his habitation of attics or hotel rooms; his witnessing of intimate events — 
sometimes his instrumental role in action as a kind of agent provocateur:; and his existence 
on the boundary between two worlds, whether this world and another, or the human and 
the animal.38 Hodrova argues that, in some cases, the figure embodies the fragmented 
world, as well as often being the representative of a degenerated mythic consciousness: 
‘the ingenu comes from outside with the desire to restore the expelled myth inside and 
together with that restore himself, and to vault over the ravine between Nature and city, art 
and life, the esoteric and the empirical’.39 The Myshkin-like Marek embodies all these 
characteristics: he is described by one character as different from Americans, but different 
also from other refugees, and by another as different from other mortals; he is described as 
being outside earthly time because he knows that he is dying; the action concerns his 
search for a room in which to work; he carries a heavy black case with him, which one 
might consider a chthonic motif (the case as coffin); he talks to himself and occasionally 
greets questions with silence (Hodrova identifies a deep tradition of silence or of inability 
to speak as one form of mythic or sacred speech); he is associated with the animal world 
through his being befriended by a dog; and he involuntarily causes disruption in every 
household he enters. Moreover, Marek often plays witness to other’s intimacies, and his 
role as an observer frequently overlaps with the third-person narration so that we are 
forced to interpret the action through his reading of it. Hostovsky’s inclusion of Marek’s 
perspective in the narration has the effect of emphasizing his difference, for he appears as 
an alien concentratedly trying to learn the rules of human behaviour and thus an unwitting 
exposer of the lack of real communication between characters. 
Hostovsky’s text at every point simultaneously evokes and parodies the sacred. The 
reader is led by the narrator to believe that Marek is one of God’s messengers on earth (he 
bears the name of an Evangelist) entrusted to discover if people are capable of attaining 
real peace; the woman by whom he is being enticed, the narrator seduces the reader into 
37 Egon Hostovsky, Osameli burici, Brno, 1948, p. 144. 
38 See her article 'Dostojevskeho Idiot v tradici romanu o bloudovi’ in Slavia, 50, 1981, 1, pp. 
30-38. 
39 Ibid., p. 32. 
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believing, is Death (again the chthonic motif and Marek’s role as a bridge between two 
worlds), and yet Death communicates with Marek by means of a telephone, but the woman 
caller could be interpreted as either Marek’s mistress or the mother of his son.40 He 
describes his work as a fight against disease, which, on the sacred plane of narrative, 
represents his role as God’s envoy, and, on the prosaic plane, his search for a cure for high 
blood pressure. 
Marek’s attempt to vault over the ravine is, however, predictably doomed to failure: 
‘The messenger pronounced neither the much sought-after precept nor the magic spell. He 
uttered only a riddle.’41 The fact that no one but Marek can reach this other world (others 
are frustrated by the fact that they do not know the telephone number of the mysterious 
woman) is another variation on the fracture of the two worlds. Hostovsky’s binary 
approach to his subject matter in this novel leads him to a new structural composition in 
his post-war work in his treatment of the sacred and the profane. Furthermore, Marek’s 
realization that the individual cannot find peace and freedom without withdrawing from 
the world marks the beginning of Hostovsky’s conception of exile as the only viable 
alternative through which the protagonist can retain his individuality and integrity. 
Considering Hostovsky’s return to Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1947, one 
remembers how he had felt in America about growing apart from his friends, and his 
description of the culture of recrimination he found on his return to Prague must have 
appeared to him as a nevertheless shocking realization of his forebodings: he claims that 
people were full of bitterness towards their fellow men for all the humiliation and suffering 
they had experienced and that there were ‘too many vain attempts to find a common 
denominator for all the evil with which we had met’.42 In the light of Hostovsky’s concern 
in his wartime work with the paramountcy of individual responsibility, the 
‘collectivization’ of guilt which he comments upon here, and which was doubtless the 
product also of an increasingly socialist Czechoslovakia, can only have fuelled further his 
sense of a social crisis. 
Hostovsky’s return coincided with the strengthening and stifling hold of the Communist 
Party on domestic politics. Although Hostovsky was never a Communist, according to 
Antonin Mesfan the effects of Hostovsky’s failure to adopt a clear-cut political position 
during and after the war were twofold: following the Communist coup of 1948, dementis 
(who assumed the role of foreign minister after Jan Masaryk’s suicide) had no grounds on 
which to expel Hostovsky from his diplomatic post, and some writers thought Hostovsky a 
‘fellow-traveller’ of the Communists.43 The image of Hostovsky as a Communist sym¬ 
pathizer may in part have been generated by his role at the meeting of seventy-seven 
young Czech writers and other guests, brought together purportedly to create an agreement 
between two different artistic circles, at the manor house in Dobrfs (just outside Prague) 
between 13 and 17 March 1948. The meeting was, however, transformed into a political 
attraction in which the Communist writers were the political masters and the other writers 
40 Frantisek Gotz, while identifying that the novel concerns the inner fate of Man who has lost his 
home, nevertheless offers a wholly literal interpretation of the function of the woman in the 
novel. See ‘G.’ [Gotz], 'Romanova psychologie churaveho lidstvf in Narodni osvobozem, 18, 
22 May 1947, no. 119, p. 5. 
41 Egon Hostovsky, Cizinec hleda byt, Prague, 1947, p. 162. 
42 See Liehm, Generace, p. 380. See also in the same collection of interviews Jin Voskovec’s 
account of his return to Prague in the autumn of 1946, where he describes how difficult it was 
to get close to people and how the young seemed unnaturally restrained, as though everybody 
were trying to give nothing of themselves away (ibid., p. 426). 
43 Antonin Mesfan, ‘Egon Hostovsky jako politicky emigrant za valky a po roce 1948’ in Navrat 
Egona Hostovskeho, p. 41. 
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merely their guests.44 The attendees were greeted by telegrams from Klement Gottwald 
and the ideologue Zdenek Nejedly, the language of which (‘uncompromising propagators 
of socialist culture’, ‘cultural workers’) must have left no one in doubt that the function of 
the gathering was political rather than academic. The meeting was interrupted by news of 
the poet Ivan Blatny’s defection from Czechoslovakia while in London with a writers’ 
delegation: the poet was denounced in the Czech press by a declaration, allegedly prepared 
by Hostovsky (while he was planning his own departure from Czechoslovakia) and issued 
on behalf of the ‘Club of Young Writers’.45 Given what we know of Hostovsky, his 
distaste for politicking and how he suffered himself as the target of Jakobson’s 
nationalistically inspired campaign against him, not to mention the fact that Blatny had 
been one of Hostovsky’s friends in the inter-war period, the fact of his participation in the 
denunciation of Blatny is one of the most surprising to emerge from his biography, and 
furnishes yet another variation on the theme of betrayal in this period. According to 
Vesela-Nyklova, Hostovsky felt that he was acting on a matter of principle, since he 
allegedly said at the time: ‘Admittedly I am not a Communist, but I think that since Ivan 
Blatny was a member of the Party he should have behaved differently. What he did is 
betrayal.’46 If one interprets this statement as a sincere expression of Hostovsky’s views, 
then his principled objection to Blatny’s behaviour sits ill with Hostovsky’s support for the 
non-conformist outsider in his oeuvre (a support which intensifies in his post-war work). 
One might also imagine, however, that having been accused of treachery himself during 
the war, Hostovsky may have been taking extreme measures to demonstrate his loyalty to 
the nation and state — certainly he felt under enormous pressure to be sporting political 
colours of some kind.47 
Soon after this event (May of the same year), Hostovsky left for Norway to serve as a 
charge d’affaires, only to resign from his post in 1949 (his books were officially banned and 
he was expelled from the Union of Writers) and return to America. He had visited Prague in 
the interim only to realize that he could not contemplate returning: he reasoned that, even if 
he tried to overcome his objections to joining the Communist Party, he would never be 
genuinely accepted by the Party and would be made to feel guilty by those who suspected his 
motives. Although Hostovsky may initially have been optimistic about the prospects of the 
coalition government, the fiction of his second exile expresses disillusion with all political 
parties, whatever their hue, and he is quick to draw parallels between the behaviour of the 
nascent Communist regime and that of the wartime Nazi one and their instrumentalization of 
the individual. The individual’s integrity and authenticity are threatened by the conformist, 
alienating politics and culture (whether Socialist, democratic or capitalist) outside him: the 
decent individual has symbolically to exile himself from the world in order to remain vital. 
For Hostovsky, a writer prone to exploring crises of one kind or another, the war and its 
aftermath signified a rupture with any ideals and values which may once have existed. The 
characters of his post-war work are irrevocably shaped, distorted even, by their wartime 
experiences; action is partially structured around the ineluctable unfolding of a protagonist’s 
dark secret or torments from the Second World War. 
In Hostovsky’s 1951 novel Nezvestny (Missing), which is set against the background of 
the hostile political atmosphere leading up to and during the Communist take-over of 1948, 
betrayal of friends and acquaintances is the conscious modus operandi of members of the 
V 
44 See Cemy’s memoirs; another contributor to this volume, Michal Bauer, has also described the 
events as irrefutably socialist in orientation — see his extensive account of the proceedings in 
Tvar, 1998. 14 (2 September), passim. 
45 Vaclav Cemy, Pameti, vol. 4, Toronto, 1983, p. 201. 
46 See Milena Vesela-Nyklova, ‘Cizinec hleda domov’ in Navrat Egona Hostovskeho, p. 80. 
47 See Liehm, Generace, p. 378. 
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Party and of the agent of the American secret services; others, however, also betray their 
friends48 unwittingly through naivety about the vortex of political intrigues in which they 
are impotently trapped. Fates are monstrously connected so that the individual can have no 
reasonable foresight of the relationship between an action and its consequences. The title 
of the novel provokes the reader to question who or what is missing, so that one may 
interpret Nezvestny as an indictment of a society in which core values or ideals are absent. 
Although Hostovsky does allude to real historical figures, such as Gottwald and, more 
important, Jan Masaryk, he is less interested in the polemics of the events of February 
1948 than he is in their symptomatic expression of a profound moral crisis: the population 
of Prague, for example, is portrayed as an automatist collective dulled into a sick lethargy. 
Hostovsky treats Masaryk sympathetically in the novel as a wryly disillusioned moral and 
political outsider and mirrors therein aspects of his own relationship with Masaryk, which 
strengthened during the course of the war and especially just after it. Having complained to 
Masaryk (in November 1946) of living more wretchedly and in greater poverty than in the 
worst days of his exile, Hostovsky writes to Trager of a subsequent meeting in New York 
with Masaryk that: ‘1 told Masaryk that after my return I was going to leave the Civil 
Service and he did not allow me even the pleasure of trying to dissuade me but instead 
launched forth enthusiastically, “And there, Egon, you are absolutely right. What would 
you be doing in that shitty organization.’”49 According to the novelist Graham Greene, 
who was staying in a hotel in Prague during the Communist coup, Hostovsky was 
particularly upset by Masaryk’s alleged intention to leave the government: ‘One day the 
novelist Egon Hostovsky [...] came and sat on my bed [...] and told me how that afternoon 
Masaryk, the Minister, had said good-bye to his staff. He wept as he told the story and 
between us we finished my whisky. A few days later Masaryk was dead.’50 This account 
probably lends support to the argument that Jan Masaryk committed suicide. 
If Munich and the war had precipitated a personal crisis for Hostovsky in terms of his 
physical displacement from his home, then the transitional period under review here 
provoked in him a profounder sense of his spiritual displacement ‘at home’. The longed- 
for mythopoeic rustic idyll of his wartime work had dematerialized into Socialist political 
chicanery and was to disintegrate into the futile posturing of the Cold War. In Hostovsky’s 
post-war work, his exiled protagonists no longer seek to return home, but rather seek an 
elusive security within themselves in the knowledge that there is no turning back. 
48 The novel is also a study of friendship constructed around an intermediary, the 'missing’ 
journalist Pavel Krai, through whom all the representatives of different political viewpoints are 
connected in some way. Krai’s absence from the centre of action generates wide speculation on 
the nature of his character, and Hostovsky may be treating indirectly his own experience of 
false accusations and incriminations during the wartime and immediate post-war period. 
49 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovsky to Josef Trager, 23 November 1946. 
50 Graham Greene, Ways of Escape, London, 1980, p. 104. 
32 Warsaw in 1945-55: The Emergence of a 
New Chronotope 
WOJCIECH TOMASIK 
The Romantic Heritage 
As Katherine Clarke observes, the term ‘chronotope’ should not be restricted to talking 
about literature; it is more fruitful in a broader sense, indicating ‘the most basic 
characteristic of any cultural system in its assumptions about time and space.* 1 I follow 
Clarke in this chapter, using ‘chronotope’ alternately with the term ‘symbolic pattern’ 
(‘symbolic space and symbolic time’). 
Society lives not only in a physical environment and in historical time, but also in a 
symbolic space. The last is shaped concentrically, around a holy place, a grave. To indicate 
the holy place means to choose the national tradition. Choosing the holy place is followed 
by a certain interpretation and evaluation of the national past. The distinction between one 
or another grave is balanced by the acceptance of some version of national history, or by 
its rejection. Eventually, marking out the holy place always indicates the system of values 
the society has made its own. 
There is no doubt that Warsaw is the central point in the Polish symbolic space. Literary 
works and iconography demonstrate that the shape of that space was formed in 
Romanticism and has been preserved until now. The Romantic poet Edmund Wasilewski 
wrote in 1841: ‘Oh, for a graveyard, and Poland is one!’2 The special significance of 
Warsaw was bound to the fact that from the moment Poland had lost its independence the 
city was perceived as a central point of the national graveyard. It was understood as a place 
in which the bones of national heroes and martyrs had been buried. 
Warsaw occupies the centre of Polish symbolic space and in this respect it is 
homogeneous, everywhere saturated with holiness. In a broader Polish perspective, 
Warsaw has its own privileged area, excluded from the rest of the city and perceived as its 
symbolic centre. Warsaw’s graves occupy different places which cannot be mistaken. 
However, in the symbolic Warsaw space all significant graves are side by side. They are 
all the same national grave, with a unique monument towering over it, the Sigismund 
Column on Castle Square. 
The location of the Sigismund Column in the symbolic space of Warsaw was established 
by Juliusz Stowacki’s poem ‘Uspokojenie’ (The Calming Down). The work was written a 
few years after the quelling of the 1830 Uprising and had a prophetic meaning: 
‘Uspokojenie’ brought the image of a future, victorious uprising that would take place in 
Warsaw’s Old Town and the neighbourhood of Castle Square. The poem was not 
published during the poet’s lifetime, only reaching its public in 1861, shortly after the 
death of the participants in a nationalist demonstration. This demonstration, at the end of 
My research for this chapter was supported by the Polish Committee for Academic Research, grant 
no. 1 HOLC 00413. 
1 Katherine Clarke, 'Political History and Literary Chronotope: Some Soviet Case Studies’ in G. 
S. Morson (ed.). Literature and History, Theoretical Problems and Russian Case Studies, Palo 
Alto, CA, 1986, p. 231. 
2 In the anthology appended to Maria Janion, Reduta. Romantyczna poezja niepodleglosciowa, 
Cracow, 1979, p. 403. 
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February 1861, was a harbinger of the next National Uprising, that of 1863, which ended 
in defeat and new graves. From that moment the Sigismund Column became a monument 
commemorating the victims of two national uprisings. It became the national Floly Rood, 
on which Warsaw was crucified twice. The Slowacki poem became a source of inspiration 
for many generations of Polish poets. Among them were those who tried to express the 
experience of the Second World War. 
The symbolic space of Warsaw contains not only its Holy Rood, the instrument of 
national martyrdom, but also its Golgotha. The function of the Polish Golgotha was 
fulfilled by the Fortress of Warsaw, built by the Russian authorities after the putting down 
of the 1830 Uprising. From the beginning the Fortress did not have an exclusively military 
function. It was used as a prison; the courtyard and slope descending to the River Vistula 
became the area where executions took place. The space of national martyrdom covers the 
part of Warsaw extending from the Tazienki Palazzo in the south to the Fortress of 
Warsaw in the north. It is that centre Cyprian Norwid wrote about in his poem ‘Piesri od 
ziemi naszej’ (Song from Our Land, 1850), ‘Where the last gallows shines/my centre is — 
my capital city' ? 
As Janion points out, ‘a gallows-cross’ belongs among the most characteristic images of 
nineteenth-century Polish poetry. It was popularized by Romantic poets, who employed 
numerous variants, for example, an altar-gallows, a forest of crosses, or grass growing on 
the grave. The common feature of the images is the motif of Arcadia destroyed. A garden 
transformed into a desert or ruin indicates, in turn, the space that had initially belonged to 
civilization and had later been re-incorporated into Nature. The garden stands for a world 
devastated by a cosmic cataclysm. Paradoxical expressions like a ‘forest of gallows’ or ‘a 
stone garden’, which fuse Life and Death, transform Warsaw into a living creature, usually 
a human being. Destroying the city means the death of Warsaw as woman: ‘a mourning 
woman’, ‘old mother’, ‘mother of the people’ and so forth. Romantic poetry has left an 
important ideological component: the belief in the superiority of public matters to private. 
It has established the hierarchy where ‘the death of the city’ is more painful than the loss 
of one’s own home.3 4 
The Chronotope of Defeat 
During the Second World War and in the first post-war months Warsaw was again the 
central point, the cosmic axis, marked as a place where the national sacrum had been 
profaned. The image of the Sigismund Column, knocked to the pavement by an enemy 
tank, recalls the scene from the poem by Cyprian Norwid on Chopin’s smashed piano.5 
Wladyslaw Broniewski used the same artistic tools for indicating the centre of national 
space. In one image he mixes two Romantic motifs: ‘a cross-column’ and ‘a Warsaw pave¬ 
ment saturated with blood’ (T love/this piece of smashed land,/with each sigh, each sob’).6 
In the poetry from the war and the immediate post-war period the Romantic motifs of 
martyrdom and profaned Arcadia, of the garden abandoned, transformed into a graveyard, 
abound: ‘a small grave on a green’, ‘the graveyards on the green’, ‘a garland of watch- 
3 Ibid., p. 145. 
4 See ibid., pp. 439-30,and H. Zaworska, ‘Miasta szcz szcz^sliwe i miasta zburzone’, Odra, 7, 
1970. 
5 I refer here to K. Winkler’s ‘Pozdrowienie dla Kolumny Zygmunta’ (Greeting for the 
Sigismund Column) in S. Ziembicki (ed.) Warsawa twoje miasto. Antologia, Warsaw, 1951, 
p. 147. The allusion is to Norwid’s portrayal of the piano falling, ‘a coffin-like object’, from a 
window, and to the last line, where ‘The ideal has reached the pavement.’ 
6 Wladyslaw Broniewski, Mazowsze i inne wiersze, Warsaw, 1952, p. 42. 
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towers and gallows’, ‘the black gardens’. The tragedy of war is reinforced by 
personification. War-tom Warsaw becomes ‘a dolorous Mary’, ‘the Madonna of Mazovia’, 
‘the Job of Polish cities’. Warsaw is now the very opposite of a garden. It is a death-space, 
an area covered by ‘slag and ashes’, ‘the ruins of trees’, ‘a chain of smoky and bloody 
brick hills’, a chain of stumps ‘standing out in a desert of the dead city’. ‘The death of the 
city’ and the collective tragedy overshadow the misfortunes of individuals, whose houses 
have become ‘gravestones’. Few poets were able to question this order of values 
In the poetry of this era the national Golgotha and twice-crucified-city motifs return 
from Romanticism. The first martyrdom of the city took place in September 1939, the 
second five years later. The martyrdom of 1944, the Warsaw Uprising, is linked in social 
memory with the name of month, August, and with the numeral 63. Literary images of the 
‘twice-crucified-city’, found in the works of Broniewski, Jastrun and Antoni Slonimski, 
employ a vocabulary and ideology inherited from Romantic poetry. In physical space there 
are no repetitions. Each event has its own singular nature and may be only in some 
respects similar to those that took place earlier. On the other hand, because of the cyclical 
repetition of sacrifices and redemptions the centre of symbolic space is established. All the 
conspirators from the 1830-31 and 1863 uprisings were buried in the same symbolic 
grave, at the foot of the Sigismund Column, as the defenders of Warsaw from September 
1939 and the Home Army soldiers from August 1944. Here was ‘the national, holy grave’, 
where people, ‘ordinary, simple, not great’ would be buried, in 1939 and 1944.7 
I now take three examples. The texts differ from each other in genre, and were written 
for different reasons and in different situations. The first is a poem written in Jerusalem by 
Wladyslaw Broniewski, after he heard of the defeat of the Warsaw Uprising. By the title of 
the poem, ‘63’, the poet includes the events of 1944 into the time-space pattern shaped 
during Romanticism. Polish history is understood as a recurrence of defeats. The numeral 
of the title indicates the duration of Warsaw Uprising, sixty-three days, but also alludes to 
the year 1863. In August 1944 Warsaw repeated a sacrifice she had offered in January 
many years before. Furthermore, Broniewski’s ‘63’ could be taken as an adaptation of 
Mickiewicz’s mystical number 44, the numerological name of the future saviour of the 
nation (that is, 1944 should have fulfilled the Romantics’ 44, but it was another 63). 
My second example is taken from the article written in 1946 by Juliusz Kleiner 
concerning the original version of Slowacki’s ‘Uspokojenie’; he published this specialist 
literary historical paper in the popular weekly Odrodzenie (Revival), and gave it the title 
‘A Poem by SJowacki on the Warsaw Uprising’. Kleiner writes as if his subject-matter 
were a sacred message. Kleiner considers that the poem by Stowacki is of ‘uncanny 
present-day interest: as a prophetic poem on the Warsaw Uprising’.8 
My third example is Stefan Kisielewski’s short piece on Warsaw. The author spent the 
whole war in Warsaw, took part in the Uprising and thus experienced its defeat. In 1948, 
responding to an enquete organized by Kalendarz Warszawski, where respondents had to 
answer the question ‘Why just Warsaw?’, Kisielewski described his relationship with the 
city in a semi-religious manner: ‘I lived through the terrible, pathos-filled days, as a result 
of which Warsaw ceased to belong among the various cities of Poland and instead became 
a symbol of the whole Nation; the affairs of that city assumed a waft of eternity, and it 
bore on its wings the fate of the Nation.’ In the following, Kisielewski comes down to 
earth a little, to a degree adopts the perspective of a man in just one part of the city: 
‘Krakowskie Przedmiescie Street, Saski Square, the debris of the Old Town — these are 
not only an assemblage of ruined old tenement houses, palazzi, churches and monuments; 
These two phrases come from Antoni Slonimski’s ‘Mogila Nieznanego Mieszkanca 
Warszawy’, in Ziembicki (ed.), Warszawa, p. 122. 
Juliusz Kleiner, ‘Poemat Slowackiego o powstaniu warszawskim,’ Odrodzenie, 1946, 9. 
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they are a great battlefield, where each building was fought for; it is a Polish Pantheon, the 
most pathos-filled Polish landscape.’9 
The many attempts to fit the Second World War into the history pattern inherited from 
Romanticism lead me to label the post-war symbolic space of Warsaw a ‘chronotope of 
defeat’. This chronotope gives one an opportunity to find interpretations discordant with 
the conventional martyrdom image of Polish history, or contradicting it. Discussion on 
how one should understand the national past had begun in the nineteenth century, but the 
events of September 1939 and August 1944 increased the heat of this discussion, and gave 
the chronotope-of-defeat advocates and their opponents fresh arguments. A careful 
alteration of the national tradition was undertaken by the Communist authorities early on. 
At the beginning this process seemed not to blur the borders of the national sacrum, but 
seemed to sharpen their visibility. 
In the immediate post-war period the authorities tried to persuade Polish society that 
there was no contradiction between the Romantic tradition and the tradition the new state 
would build on. The ‘revived’ Poland promised fidelity to the values expressed by the 
chronotope of defeat. The first night of a new production of Slowacki’s Lilia Weneda, 
which inaugurated the post-war activity of the Polish Theatre, contained the first 
symptoms of the revalorization of Romantic tradition. The performance was received by 
the press with reservations. The idea of the drama was perceived as ‘martyrdom and 
pessimism’, something discordant with the new age, something that ignored the 
expectations of the new audience. The addressee of this performance, it was suggested, 
was that part of Polish society that retained a distance from the post-war ‘reality’, and 
‘indulged in dreams of defeat’. The first night was to celebrate the first anniversary of the 
liberation of Warsaw by the Red Army on 17 January 1945. From the immediate post-war 
period onwards ‘January’ gradually became the month to be associated with liberation 
rather than defeat. Step by step the ‘new’ January was to take over the symbolical function 
of the ‘old’ (January 1863). 
The events of 17 January 1945 were fixed in social memory by Warsaw monuments. 
The first new monument was devoted to ‘Polish-Soviet Brotherhood in Arms’. It was 
situated in the Praga district, on the right bank of the River Vistula, quite far from the 
borders of the ‘national centre’, and was unveiled in the autumn of 1945. The unveiling 
ceremony, which had been planned for 1 November, was postponed for a few days. This 
postponement made it possible to ignore one of the main components of the national 
calendar (All Saints’ Day). The symbolic functions of the Praga monument were to be 
taken over in 1946 by the Soviet Soldiers’ monument. The latter was designed to contain 
elements of the Romantic imagination and was destined to stand up near Lazienki Park. On 
21 December 1948 the comer stone of the Soviet Soldiers’ Cemetery-Mausoleum was 
placed at Zwirki and Wigury Street. On 9 May 1950 (so-called Victory Day) the garden¬ 
like cemetery became the necropolis of the Red Army.10 
Pre-war Warsaw monuments were also to contribute to the revision tasks of Polish 
history. In 1948 the Mickiewicz monument, one of many destroyed in the war, was to be 
reconstructed and set up in its old place, on Krakowski Przedmiescie Street. This 
restoration of one of the most valued Warsaw erections constituted at the same time a test 
for the reinterpretation of the Romantic heritage, a test of the authorities’ ability to take 
possession of part of it. The unveiling of the monument did not take place on 24 December 
1949 (on the 151th anniversary of the poet’s birth) but on 20 January 1950, the fifth 
anniversary of the Red Army crossing onto left-bank Warsaw. The Sigismund Column, 
9 Stefan Kisielewski, ‘Dlaczego wlasnie Warszawa,' Kalendarz Warszawski, 1948, p. 79. 
10 See S. Grzesiuk-Olszewska, Polska rzezba pomnikowa w latach 1945-1995, Warsaw, 1995, 
pp. 46-50. 
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destroyed by the Germans, also reappeared on Castle Square on a day belonging to new 
calendar. The unveiling ceremony took place on 22 July, 1949, that is on the day 
commemorating the proclamation of the Lublin Manifesto and celebrated as Revival Day. 
On the same day the Copernicus monument returned to the front of the Staszic Palazzo. 
Polish writers joined in the blurring of the national centre borders very early. The 
chronotope-of-defeat distortion was often made by the same people who, a few months 
earlier, had tried to intensify the sense of holy place in the Polish consciousness. 
Moreover, utterances confirming the borders of ‘the national grave’ were sometimes 
juxtaposed with utterances questioning the shape of the Romantic chronotope. Such 
utterances may be separated by a few months or, in extreme cases, by a few lines in one 
literary work. In Broniewski’s ‘Kolumna’, one reads not only words of adoration, but also 
passages polemicizing with the Polish pattern of the past (‘King Sigismund III was a bad 
king,/[...] It is doubtful that cranes flying to or from Poland had rested there’).11 The 
polemic with the chronotope of defeat is even more spectacular in the poem entitled 
‘Warszawa zgruzowstala’ (Warsaw Raised from the Rubble).12 In this poem ‘the bad 
King’ is no longer the most important person in Warsaw and the column bearing the royal 
statue is not the highest building in Warsaw. The cosmic axis, connecting Heaven and 
Earth, has been degraded. In the place formerly occupied by the King, looking over the 
national grave, a new person appears. This is ‘the Great Builder’, a powerful man, who, 
hammer and trowel in hand, ‘goes through the cities’. This titan rejects past martyrdom: 
‘Down with the tears on the ruins’, and repeating the gesture of Wyspiariski in the last 
section of his poem ‘Casimir the Great’. Broniewski’s Warsaw will be revived not by the 
forces that come from Heaven, but by the efforts of ‘the Great Builder’. 
One voice against the chronotope of defeat had an enormous impact, Stanisfaw 
Wygodzki’s ‘Plan’. Wygodzki wrote disturbing ‘hospital poems’, dedicated to his 
murdered relatives. As a former prisoner of Auschwitz, Oranienburg and Dachau, he 
appealed in 1950: ‘Down with comparisons! Down with analogies!/Leave the dead, the 
cells and the gas./Silence for the Birkenaus, silence for the graves./The steel and iron are 
necessary for the living.’13 The destruction of the grave-space left by the Romantics and 
confirmed during the war did not omit the national Golgotha. The Fortress was fixed in 
Polish consciousness, but in the war, and especially in the days of the 1944 Uprising, the 
most impressive image was the phoenix motif. In the Second World War Warsaw burned 
twice, first in September 1939, as a consequence of German air-raids, and for the second 
time after the Warsaw Uprising, when German troops started burning the remains of the 
demolished city. The fires spread through many districts of Warsaw, but symbolic 
significance was achieved only by the fires that had burned places in the national centre, 
the fires of the Royal Castle, the Krasinski Palazzo, Freta Street. The burning the Old 
Town imposed upon Poles a quest to find sense in this sacrifice and an analogy in the past. 
The events of the autumn of 1944 reminded them of the young conspirator Karol 
Levittoux, who in 1841 committed suicide in the Fortress of Warsaw by burning himself 
alive. Levittoux’s act became an interpretative pattern and gave the Poles consolation. 
Levittoux’s suicide was perceived as analogous to the fate of the phoenix renewed by fire. 
In post-Uprising Warsaw the words of Komel Ujejski (‘With the smokes of fires, with 
brother’s blood dust’)14 were restored their meaning, Polish revival in fire. The same idea 
was used by Roman Zmorski, who in ‘Modlitwa’ (The Prayer), a poem dedicated to 
11 Broniewski, Mazowsze, p. 42. 
12 Ibid., p. 30. The word zgruzowstala (raised from the rubble) is Broniewski’s neologism based 
on zmartwychwstala (raised from the dead). 
13 Stanislaw Wygodzki, Wiersze, Warsaw, 1950, p. 82. 
14 Komel Ujejski, ‘Choral’ in Janion, Reduta, p. 405. 
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Levittoux, wrote: ‘From the martyrs’ bones,/Sown for many years/May the freedom tree 
grow,/That will cast its shade all over the world!’15 
The Fortress of Warsaw has two symbolic meanings in the conventional literary 
portrayal of the national past. In the first, the Fortress is presented as a place of uprising 
and heroes’ martyrdom, such as those of Artur Zawisza, Levittoux, Romuald Traugutt and 
other Polish model men from 1863. In the symbolic Warsaw calendar the Fortress 
corresponds to November and January. The second meaning embodied in the Fortress of 
Warsaw is linked with other heroes, the Communists Hibner, Kniewski and Rutkowski. It 
corresponds to another month, August (that is, August 1925, when these three were shot on 
the Fortress slope). 
These two symbolic meanings are juxtaposed in Broniewski’s poem commemorating 
Zeromski’s death. The work was written before the end of November 1925 and in 
manuscript copies it has three titles, ‘The Rose’, ‘The Rose-Dual Voice’, ‘The Voices in 
the Night’.16 ‘The Chorus’, comprising poetical repetitions of Zeromski’s thoughts, 
employs images of ‘the bright house’, ‘the great force’ that would ‘rise from ashes’. By 
juxtaposing these images Broniewski shows a vision of the future, when social injuries 
would be redressed. This future is shaped like a rose, growing from ‘Okrzeja’s heart’. 
Zeromski’s death reminds Broniewski not only of Okrzeja’s execution that had taken place 
in the Fortress of Warsaw in July 1905, but also the executions of August 1925. 
The Chronotope of Revolution 
About five years after the war the chronotope of defeat, centred on the Sigismund Column, 
began to change and a new symbolic Warsaw space established its centre. The year 1950 
was made into a year of commemoration for events that had taken place in the Fortress of 
Warsaw. From this time, the symbolic function of the Fortress remained, but it began to be 
linked with other incidents and other graves. The place which for over a century had been 
an integral part of the chronotope of defeat became part of a new space-time pattern. The 
year 1950 gave the authorities the opportunity to keep alive the memory of people whose 
activities could legitimize the new People’s Poland. To commemorate the new heroes was 
to establish in the social consciousness the notion that the post-war order had not been 
imposed on the Poles, but was based on a national tradition stretching back into the remote 
past. One may describe the immediately post-war period in Poland as the gradual 
decomposing of the chronotope of defeat, or as the inventing of a new tradition. The 
authorities’ search for this tradition created the new symbolic pattern, the chronotope of 
revolution. Wladyslaw Broniewski, exploiting the Romantics’ imagery, wrote in his poem 
‘Cytadela’ (The Fortress): ‘In the Fortress there is the gallows-tree/ under glass. [...j/PPS 
men died there/and SDK.PL/ died there, decayed—/Their Goal remained. [...]/Montwill, 
Kasprzak, Baron, Okrzeja—/That is they on the many looms/Hope! /Spring!’17 
A similar text is used by Lewin in his ‘Pomniki’ (Monuments), which also attempts to 
destroy Romantic symbolic connotations: ‘The bones of warriors/Do not shine in 
vain,/When we built the friendship monument/For the Kasprzaks and the Okrzejas’.18 
Although two new monuments were erected in the five years after the war, Lewin did not 
15 In ibid., p. 315. Cyprian Norwid, who was against the plotting of revolutionaries, alludes to 
Levittoux’s death in his poem, ‘The Storm’; see George Gomori, Cyprian Norwid, New York, 
1974. 
16 See F. Lichodziejewska, Twdrczosc Wladysiawa Broniewskiego. Monograjia bibliograficzna, 
Warsaw, 1973. 
17 Broniewski, Mazowsze, p. 27. 
18 Leopold Lewin, ‘Pomniki’, Arkuszpoetycki, 5. 
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have any particular statue in mind. In the ‘new’ Fortress other graves belonged to the new 
chronotope. The victims of the 1905 revolution (S. Okrzeja, M. Kasprzak) and of the pre¬ 
war political repression (W. Baginski, W. Hibner, W. Kniewski, H. Rutkowski) became 
members of the new Polish Pantheon. 
The Warsaw chronotope of revolution was partly outlined by ‘living monuments’, a 
notion promoted in many literary works which juxtapose the old (dead) monuments, 
expressing defeat, and the new active Poles. For example, Dobrowolski juxtaposes the 
Sigismund Column and the scaffold, where ‘a bricklayer/stands with his two mates,/an old 
bricklayer stands and sings while he works’.19 Undoubtedly, the decree submitted in 
August 1950 by the Warsaw Committee of the PZPR joined in the process of ‘inventing’ 
the new Polish tradition. Through the decree on the commemoration of Hibner, Kniewski 
and Rutkowski’s death the ‘living monuments’ idea materialized. The planned mausoleum 
was to be a symbolic act of imposing the left-wing tradition on the old independence 
tradition and was to change the meaning of Warsaw’s August. To control the Fortress 
would mean to remove the old August from the national calendar (November 1830, 
January 1863, August 1944) and to create a new chronology (August 1925, July 1944, 
January 1945, May 1945). The mausoleum, not a single monument but a whole ensemble 
of park and monuments, had its symbolic function reinforced by literary works, portraying 
‘the people of Red Wola district’ and ‘the heroes stronger than death’.20 
On 22 July 1955 Warsaw received another building, another ‘living monument’, the 
Palace of Culture and Scholarship. In a Dobrowolski poem, the Palace was situated next to 
the Fortress of Warsaw (‘Where the blood on the pavement and the Fortress wall,/[...] 
where until yesterday,/there was no town, but a monument to death,/today the Palace’s 
brow rests on the cloud’).21 In fact, there is a couple of kilometres between those points in 
the physical space of Warsaw. 
Shortly after the opening of the Palace the plan of the new memorial ensemble was 
prepared. The aim of this project was to bind the chronotope of revolution to the ‘living 
monument’, and to manifest the superiority of life to death. In August 1955 the plan to 
transform the Fortress area into a municipal park was ready. It was but a component of the 
greater Communist Party design, to control the whole symbolic space that reaches from the 
Fortress of Warsaw to the Lazienki Palazzo, and includes the Grave of the Unknown 
Warrior under the arches of the Saski Palazzo. The plan was submitted as a decision of the 
Politburo concerning ‘the gradual transformation of the Fortress-of-Warsaw area into a 
Pantheon of Revolution’.22 
The draft of the decision is worth mentioning for at least three reasons. First, it shows the 
difficulty the new authorities were presented with by Warsaw’s symbolic shape. In the 
post-war ‘rebuilding’ of Warsaw the ideological presuppositions are evident. Often urban 
layout was a blend of architectural and ideological requirements. The Fortress-of-Warsaw 
rebuilding project, viewed from this standpoint, seems to be the best example of that blend. 
The suppression of utility by ideological obligations is found in earlier projects, such as the 
W-Z Thoroughfare, the MDM district or the Palace of Culture. However, the Fortress of 
19 Stanislaw R. Dobrowolski, ‘Warszawscy murarze’ in Dorbowolski, Poezje wybrane, Warsaw, 
1953, p. 68. 
20 I refer to two short stories important for this mythopoeia, J. Warmiriski’s ‘Ludzie czerwonej 
Wolf and J. Piorkowski’s ‘Silniejsi od smierci’. 
21 Stanislaw R. Dobrowolski, ‘Nowe epos’ in Drugi notatnik warszawski, Warsaw, 1955, p. 95. 
22 See Projekt Uchwafy Biura Politycznego KC PZPR w sprawie stopniowej przebudowy terenu 
Cytadeli warszawskiej na Panteon Rewolucji, TS, 1995. I am indebted to Dr M. Napiontkowa 
for drawing my attention to this little-known document (CA KC PZPR 237/XVIII-101). 
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Warsaw, transformed into a municipal park, would have been the most spectacular blend 
of architecture and ideology ever witnessed in post-war Poland.23 
Secondly, the Fortress-of-Warsaw rebuilding plan is important for chronological 
reasons. The draft of the 1955 decision helps us to understand that the Thaw was neither 
stable nor unidirectional. Moreover, by 1955 it seemed to be reversible. The events 
preceding the ‘Polish October’ demonstrated that the Party’s politics had been softened but 
the concessions made by the Party did not violate the principles of its doctrine. The plan 
for the rebuilding of the Fortress of Warsaw took shape when Warsaw was welcoming the 
participants of the Fifth International Festival of Youth and Students, and when Wazyk’s 
‘A Poem for Adults’ was published in the weekly Nowa Kultura.24 In September 1955, not 
long after the publication of Wazyk’s poem, Kazimierz Brandys’s short novel (Before 
Being Forgotten) appeared. A few days later an orthodox text was available, Stefan 
Zolkiewski’s article ‘Let Us Pay More Attention to Artistic Groups’, published in a Party 
monthly. These two formally different texts resembled each other in their optimistic 
message. The plan for the Fortress of Warsaw shows that the Party was using the 
transformed Fortress to try to restore a chronotope-of-revolution shape. 
Thirdly, the project displays an attempt at including Polish symbolic space in a broader 
symbolic pattern. The aim was to make post-war Warsaw a second holy place on which 
‘the Kremlin casts its light’ and where it is pleasant to listen to ‘Moscow’s singing birds’.25 
The Pantheon of Revolution was to contain four components: the Cemetery at the foot of 
the Execution Gate, the Polish Soldiers’ Monument, the Central Museum of Progress and 
the Revolutionary Traditions of the Polish Nation, and the Museum of the Tenth 
Blockhouse. The Pantheon designers pointed out that they had followed the conventions of 
Soviet memorial ensembles, such as the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum in Moscow and the Peter 
and Paul Fortress in Leningrad. It was argued that Poland remained behind the other 
Communist countries, since they ‘have their central museums and are about to prepare 
regional museums as well’.26 The slope descending to the river-bank was to be the Polish 
equivalent of the Kremlin Wall, close to the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum. The Cemetery was 
to hold the ashes of ‘eminent revolutionary men’. It was also planned as the burial-ground 
for ‘the leaders and the most notable men of People’s Poland’. The terrain below the 
Execution Gate was to be moulded into an amphitheatre, descending to the River Vistula. 
The realization of this plan would follow ‘the putting in order’ of the area close to the 
Execution Gate. To ‘put in order’ meant in turn to remove ‘the superfluous crosses which 
were erected only symbolically on the Fortress’s slopes’. 
The Polish Soldiers’ Monument was designed as a place where ‘homage could be paid to 
the memory of soldiers and partisans who had lost their life for People’s Poland’. The 
designers set great store by this part of the ensemble because it was intended ‘to replace 
the Grave of the Unknown Warrior’. To change the symbolic grave (that is, to translate it 
from Victory Square to the Fortress of Warsaw) would be to delete November 1918 from 
the national calendar and to give its function to July 1944 (the Lublin Manifesto). The 
municipal park was to be the frame of the whole memorial ensemble, which would be built 
on the Fortress of Warsaw. The axis of the park would be marked out by a ‘Men-of-Merit 
Avenue’ with ‘statues, busts or monuments devoted to the most meritorious fighters for 
23 See A. Aman, Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era. An Aspect of 
Cold War History, translated by R. and K. Tanner, Cambridge, MA, 1992, passim. 
24 Adam Wazyk’s ‘Poemat dla doroslych’ was a condemnation of the failure of the Communist 
regime. 
25 My quotations come from two poems in Arnold Slucki’s Ziemia jasnieje. Poezje, Warsaw, 
1950. 
26 Projekt Uchwafy, see note 22. 
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progress and the freedom of the homeland’. The Hibner-Kniewski-Rutkowski Mausoleum, 
having already existed for five years, was to be incorporated into the planned park. 
The Pantheon of Revolution was to be added to a series of buildings, expressing the 
pulse of the new life and delimiting in Warsaw an enclave of silence — a small part of the 
city where the calm flows ‘from the coffin-lid of centuries’.27 The northernmost element of 
the living monuments was the Warszawa steelworks, the southernmost the Soviet Soldiers’ 
Cemetery-Mausoleum. The other living monuments were, for example, the Dzierzynski 
Monument, the Palace of Culture and the Kasprzak monument in the Wola district. The 
right-bank area of Warsaw contains the other components of the chain: the concrete-plant 
in Zerari district, the Praga Monument of Polish-Soviet Brotherhood in Arms and the 
Tenth Anniversary Stadium. Inside the circle thus delimited, the national past was to be 
arrested. Only a part of it could be released. The Royal Castle, completely destroyed 
during the war but understood as an essential component of the national centre, had to wait 
to be restored. The Castle seemed to be closely tied to ‘nobiliary and imperialist Poland’. 
The ‘people’s’ tradition was strengthened by the restoration of the Old Town and by 
Mariensztat, a district close to the Old Town built for workers. The parliament’s decision 
of 1949 concerning reconstruction of the Royal Castle was left unrealized for more than 
twenty years. 
In spite of all the efforts of the Communists Warsaw was not cut off from its past. 
Concrete, steel and iron were defeated by the graves’ silence. The smoke coming from 
Warsaw’s steelworks was not able to cover the image of the Old Town burning after the 
defeat of the August Uprising. November 1918, present in Warsaw’s space as the Grave of 
the Unknown Warrior, was more durable than July 1944. 
Dobrowolski, ‘Znow rosnie wiersz’ in Drugi notatnik Warszawski, p. 52. 
33 Building the Organs of State Power: 
Soviet ‘Cadres’ and the Polish People’s 
Army, 1945-49 
Paul Latawski 
According to the hagiographers of People’s Poland, the Polish People’s Army (Ludowego 
Wojska Polskiego, LWP) was the brain-child of Polish Communists. Writing on the thirty- 
fifth anniversary of its birth in 1978, Major-General Jerzy Bordzitowski, reflected this 
official view in a celebratory article extolling the ‘Role of the Soviet Army in the 
formation of the People’s Polish Army and in the liberation of Poland’: ‘The Polish nation 
would need an army of a new type, one that could battle for the Polish nation and society 
[...]. Such an army, the Polish People’s Army, was able to come into being only under the 
ideological leadership of the Polish Communists on the territory of the natural ally of 
Poland, the Soviet Union’.* 1 For the Polish Communists seeking to gain power in Poland, 
the reality was different. One of their future organs of state power, the armed forces, was 
in fact a Soviet invention. The scale of dependency on the Soviet Union in building the 
Polish People’s Army is most powerfully demonstrated by the large-scale presence of 
Soviet officers in the LWP during the Second World War. Bordzdowski, who dutifully 
espoused the official line personified the gulf between the official line and the reality of 
the pervasive influence of Soviet officers on the wartime development of the LWP. He was 
a Soviet officer who entered the LWP in 1944 and remained in Polish service until his 
retirement in 1968.2 
The story of the role of Soviet officers in building the LWP during the Second World 
War had to a large extent already emerged in the historiography produced in Poland during 
the Communist period. Organizations such as the Military History Institute devoted 
considerable effort to examining the wartime development of the LWP and the 
‘brotherhood in arms’ with the Soviet Union.3 Given the number of Soviet officers 
seconded to the LWP between 1943 and 1945, avoiding discussion of this matter was 
impossible. Historical interpretation, however, often presented only a partial or 
inconsistent view of the numbers of serving Soviet officers.4 Their presence in large 
numbers was often justified in Communist historiography as necessary because of a 
The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
either Royal Military Academy Sandhurst or the Ministry of Defence. 
1 Jerzy Bordzilowski, ‘Rola Armii Radzieckiej w tworzeneniu ludowego Wojska Polskiego i w 
wyzwoleniu Polski’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 3 (July—September 1978), p. 35. See also 
Zbigniew Kumos, ‘Dzialalnosc wojskowa Komitetu Organizacyjnego ZPP w Zwi^zku 
Radzieckim’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 4 (October-December 1976), pp. 29-44. 
2 Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej w Wojsku Polskim 1943-1968, Warsaw, 
1995, p. 168. 
3 Benon Miskiewicz, Polska historiografia wojskowa, Poznan, 1996, p. 310. 
4 Ignacy Blum, ‘O skladzie socjalno-demograficznym Polskich Sil Zbrojnych w Zwi^zku 
Radzieckim Maj 1943—lipiec 1944’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 2 (April-June 1963), 
pp. 3-34, and Czestaw Grzelak, ‘Ksztalcenie kadr w Polskich Silach Zbrojnych w ZSRR Maj 
1943-lipiec 1944’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 1—2 (January—June 1985), pp. 316—47. 
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shortage of suitable Polish cadres to fill leadership positions, and on account of the wealth 
of experience they brought to the LWP.5 
Since the end of Communism in Poland, historians have been beginning to address 
formerly taboo subjects such as the numbers of Soviet officers who served in the Polish 
armed forces. Thanks to the detailed work of Edward Jan Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii 
Radzieckiej w Wojsku Polskim 1943-1968 (Officers of the Soviet Army in the Polish 
Armed Forces), we have a much clearer and more comprehensive picture of Soviet 
‘cadres’ in wartime Polish military service between 1943 and 1968.6 Nalepa fills in ‘blank 
spaces’ left over from the Communist period. His work, however, represents only one 
segment, albeit an important one, of developments in the post-war Polish People’s Army. 
The initial post-war period running from May 1945 to November 1949 was one of 
dramatic transition encompassing the violent birth and consolidation of the Polish People’s 
Republic (PRL). Nalepa has done much to quantify the presence of Soviet officers in the 
post-war LWP, but questions concerning their role and influence still remain. How did 
Soviet officers contribute to the building of the post-war Polish People’s Army and by 
extension to the consolidation of Communist power in Poland? Was the influence of these 
Soviet officers all-pervasive or did Polish officers with a more ‘national’ orientation, 
Communist or otherwise, play any significant countervailing role in the Polish armed 
forces? Only by addressing these questions can historical fact be separated from 
Communist legend on the condition and reliability of the Polish armed forces in the 
context of Polish domestic civil conflict and mounting East-West hostility in the 
international arena during the second half of the 1940s. 
Wartime Help with Cadres: Stalin’s Polish Army: 1943-1945 
The formation of the Kosciuszko infantry division in May 1943 marked the beginning of 
the Polish People’s Army. Nominally under the direction of the Union of Polish Patriots 
(Zwiqzek Patriotow Polskich, ZPP), a front organization for Polish Communists and pro- 
Moscow Poles, it was in fact a Soviet creation. 
Sent into action in October 1943 before completing its training, the Kosciuszko division 
lost about one-third of its strength at the Battle of Lenino. From a military point of view 
the battle was costly and pointless; from the point of view of Stalin and the Polish 
Communists it served an important political purpose in that it signalled an alternative to 
the London Polish govemment-in-exile and its armed forces.7 
From one division, the Polish forces under Soviet tutelage quickly expanded. Drawing in 
Polish prisoners of war and civilians on the territory of the Soviet Union, by August 1943 
the division grew into the First Polish Corps and by March 1944 the Soviet authorities 
agreed to the formation of the Polish Army in the USSR. Expanding the Polish forces in the 
Soviet Union was in theory a straightforward task, since there was a large pool of Polish 
manpower in the Soviet Union. The prisoners of war captured during the Soviet occupation 
of eastern Poland numbered around 230,000, to whom could be added males of military age 
5 For example, see Waclaw Jurgielewicz, ‘Pomoc Zwi^zku Radzieckiego w utworzeniu 
ludowego Wojska Polskiego’, Wojskowy rzeglqd historyczny, 1 (January-March 1972), 
pp. 111-12, and Kazimierz Kaczmarek, 'Wstawienie 2 armii WP Sierpien 1944 r.-styczeri 1945 
r. Cz. F, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 4 (October-December 1971), p. 40. 
6 Ibid. 
Czeslaw Grzelak, Henryk Stanczyk and Stefan Zwolinski, Bez mozliwosci wyboru: Wojsko 
Poliskim na froncie wschodnim 1943-1945, Warsaw, 1993, p. 162. 
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among Polish civilians on Soviet territory.8 The recruitment pool could be broken down 
into the following six categories: (1) Polish civilians from eastern Poland as well as refu¬ 
gees from other parts of the country deported to the interior of the Soviet Union in 1939- 
41; (2) Poles mobilized into the Soviet army serving in construction battalions and military 
units; (3) Poles freed by an amnesty from Soviet camps and prisons in 1941; (4) Soviet 
citizens of Polish ancestry, principally officers and NCOs; (5) Soviet officers (not of Polish 
ancestry) seconded to the Polish forces; and (6) Poles found among Wehrmacht prisoners of 
war.9 Missing from this list, however, was one vital category: trained Polish officers. 
The shortage of trained Polish officers was the direct result of Soviet policy. In 1939, 
approximately 11,000 Polish army officers fell into Soviet hands as prisoners of war. Over 
8,000 of these men were held at camps in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk and were 
executed on the order of the Soviet leadership in May 1940.10 The surviving 3,000 officers 
joined the Anders Polish army as a consequence of the rapprochement between the Soviet 
Union and the Polish govemment-in-exile in London. These remaining Polish officers left 
Soviet territory with the evacuation of the Anders Polish army to the Middle East in 1942. 
Only a handful of pro-Soviet officers from the pre-war Polish army chose to stay behind in 
the Soviet Union.* 11 The most prominent of these was Zygmunt Berling. The reasons for 
his pro-Soviet leaning were not readily apparent. Berling served in Pilsudski’s legions 
from November 1914, fought in the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 during which he earned a 
Silver Cross of the Order Virtuti Militari. In September 1939, he was arrested by the 
NKVD in Wilno (Vilnius) at which time he is alleged to have begun his co-operation with 
the Soviet authorities.12 Although he held a series of important military posts including 
deputy commander-in-chief of the Polish Army in 1944, his importance was more political 
than military. For propaganda reasons he provided a thin Polish veneer to a Soviet military 
construction. Berling and the clutch of Polish officers who placed themselves at the 
disposal of the Soviet authorities were not trusted. In particular, Berling’s outspoken views 
on drawing the post-war Polish-Soviet frontier further east than the Curzon Line drew 
unfavourable comment from his Soviet masters.13 The Soviet authorities tolerated their 
‘reactionary’ Polish officers largely for political reasons and because they had eliminated 
the alternatives previously available to them. 
The artificially created shortage of Polish officers necessitated the use of Red Army 
officers in the Polish forces organized in the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet officers 
in the Polish army according to the best estimates numbered in the period of May 1943 to 
8 Wojciech Materski (ed.), Z archiwow Sowieckich tom I: Polscy jehcy wojenni w ZSSR, 
Warsaw, 1992, p. 9. According to various estimates the number of civilians deported from 
eastern Poland in 1939 numbered between 1,250,000 and 1,600,000. Included in this population 
were males of military age. See Keith Sword, Deportation and Ejcile: Poles in the Soviet Union, 
1939-48, London, 1994, p. 27. 
9 The list presented here is a consolidation of the list appearing in Grzelak, ‘Ksztalcenie kadr w 
Polskich Silach Zbrojnych w ZSRR Maj 1943—lipiec 1944 r.’, p. 317. 
10 See note. Chief of NKVD, L. Beria, to J. Stalin, March 1940, in Ewa Wosik (ed.), Katyn: 
Dokumenty Ludobojstwa, Warsaw, 1992, pp. 35-39. 
11 See note, L. Beria to J. Stalin, 12 March 1942, in Wojciech Materski (ed.), Z archiwow 
Sowieckich tom II: Armia Polska w ZSRR 1941-1942, Warsaw, 1992, pp. 49—73. 
12 Grzelak, Stariczyk and Zwolinski, Bez mozliwosci wyboru, pp. 222-23. 
13 See report of the State Security Commissar, G. Zhukov, Political Bureau, All-Union 
Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Chief Political Administration, Red Army, Col. Gen. A. 
Shcherbakov, 16 February 1944, and a similar report from V. Sokorski, who served in the 
Polish Army in the USSR, to Shcherbakov, 16 April 1944, in Jozef Dawid and Aleksander 
Kochanski (eds), Polska-ZSRR struktury podleglosci: Dokumenty WKP(B) 1944-1949, 
Warsaw, 1995, pp. 34-35 and 52-55. 
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May 1945 between 16,800 and 19,700. In July 1943 they represented 66 per cent of 
officers in the Polish army in the Soviet Union; a year later they amounted to 64.4 per cent 
of total officers and at the conclusion of the war 45 per cent of all officers.14 Large 
numbers of junior and senior Soviet officers held positions at in the Polish army. The 
proportion of Soviet officers in the technical arms such as armoured forces, artillery, and 
signals was consistently very high (approximately 80 per cent) until the last months of the 
war. More Polish officers then began to occupy positions in these branches but the picture 
remained mixed since Soviet officers overwhelmingly filled positions in new branches like 
the air force and chemical warfare units.15 The Soviet domination of the command 
positions reflected the pattern in the technical branches. This was the most important 
source of Soviet influence. In the spring of 1944, 70 per cent of the command positions in 
the army were in the hands of Soviet officers. In such sensitive areas as military 
intelligence, the proportion of Soviet officers reached 100 per cent.16 
The employment of so many Soviet officers in what was supposed to be a Polish military 
organization was not a straightforward exercise. Although Communist historiography 
made much of the Polish ancestry of Soviet officers, one of the most fundamental 
problems was the inability of the vast majority of them to speak Polish. This created 
obvious command and control problems in front-line units that led the Soviet military 
command to issue a directive in September 1944 that only Soviet officers who could speak 
Polish could wear Polish uniforms. All others remained in Soviet uniforms and efforts 
were made to give them Polish language instruction.17 Apart from the practical difficulties 
of commanding troops in the field where two languages are in use, the Soviet officers were 
not very popular with Polish junior officers or with other ranks whose political sympathies 
could scarcely be described as pro-Soviet.18 
The numbers of Soviet officers began to fall in the Polish forces as the Red Army moved 
westwards. The advance across the river Bug and the liberation of Lublin Poland greatly 
increased the manpower pool available for mobilization. In 1944, under the authority of 
the National Home Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN) the Polish Communists 
ambitiously decreed the creation of the Second Polish Army and had plans to create a 
Third. They managed only the Second by the end of the war. So great were the shortages 
of Polish officers that many of those who were mobilized or pressed into service in 1944 
came from underground organizations including the Home Army, whose sympathies and 
politics linked them to the London govemment-in-exile.19 As the Soviet forces advanced 
into German territory late in the war another sizeable group of Polish officers became 
available. These were officers of the pre-war Polish army who had been in German 
prisoner-of-war camps since 1939. From the military point of view, the liberation of 
Poland eased the wartime shortage of Polish officers for service in the army and in theory 
meant that the Soviet officers seconded to the Polish armed forces could begin to go home. 
Soviet Officers in the Post-war Polish Army 1945-48 
The reconstruction of the Polish Army after the Second World War would have been a 
daunting task for any government. Six years of war and occupation had shattered the 
14 Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej, pp. 15—16. 
15 Ibid., p. 20. 
16 Ibid., pp. 21-22. 
17 Kaczmarek, ‘Wstawienie 2 armii WP\ pp. 40-41. 
18 Tadeusz Rawski, 'Praca polityczno-wychowawcza w 1 armii Wojska Polskiego w koricowym 
okresie wojny', Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 3 (July-September 1974), p. 56. 
19 Grzelak, Stanczyk and Zwoliriski, Bez mozliwosci xvyboru, pp. 110—11. 
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military infrastructure of the country. Barracks, training facilities and depots did not escape 
the destruction in Poland attendant on a brutal and prolonged occupation. The Saski 
Palazzo in Warsaw, for example, that had housed the Polish Ministry of Defence in the 
inter-war period had been reduced to rubble. Although the acquisition of former German 
military barracks in the ‘recovered’ western territories to some extent replaced damaged or 
lost facilities in territory ceded to the Soviet Union, rebuilding the Polish military 
infrastructure required considerable resources and time. All these military needs would 
have to be met in a society suffering from severe dislocation and civil conflict and by an 
economy that was scarcely functioning. 
In the context of these conditions, the manpower of the Polish armed forces was 
radically cut. In the closing phase of the war, the strength of the army had reached just 
under 340,OOO.20 Post-war plans formulated in the autumn of 1945 envisaged reducing 
manpower to about 180,000 making up twenty infantry divisions.21 The actual strength of 
the armed forces between 1945 and 1949 was lower than the planned level and stood 
around 150,000 men.22 In the years immediately following the war around 200,000 men 
were demobilized or transferred to the newly created Internal Security Corps (Korpus 
Bezpieczenstwa Wewn^trznego, KBW) and the Frontier Defence Force (Wojsko Ochrony 
Pograniczna, WOP).23 
With a greatly reduced peace-time strength, the wartime military problem of the shortage 
of Polish military officers became a problem that could be swiftly rectified. The 
demobilization meant that potentially fewer professional Polish officers would leave 
military service compared to their seconded Soviet counterparts and the large number of 
conscripts who had completed their wartime service. Reducing the army was one means of 
solving the military problem of the lack of experienced Polish military officers. Another 
means of ending the shortage of Polish officers was by making full use of all officers 
available. The pool of Polish military officers at the conclusion of the war was diverse and 
more than adequate from a military point of view to build the peace-time Polish army. 
From POW camps in Germany many thousands of Polish officers had been released. 
Special programmes were set up to screen these officers and short courses launched to 
improve their military skills.24 In addition to officers liberated from POW camps, 
thousands of soldiers from the Polish forces in the West returned to Poland. In 1947 these 
numbered over 33,000 and among them were over 2,100 officers.25 
The shortage of Polish officers, however, was not simply a military problem. The 
formation of the post-war officer corps was fundamentally a political issue since the Polish 
Communists and their Soviet masters sought to construct a new political order in Poland. 
20 Waclaw Jurgielewicz, 'Stan liczebny i organizacyjny ludowego Wojska Polskiego w 
przeddzien zakonczenia drugiej wojny swiatowej’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 2 (April- 
June 1967), p. 157. 
21 Jerzy Poksinski, ‘Kierownictwo partyjne silami zbrojnymf in Andrzej Paczkowski (ed.), 
Instytucje pahstwa totalitarnego Polska 1944-1956, Warsaw, 1994, p. 104. 
22 See ibid, p. 95, 'Army Strengths’, Military Review, 24, 1949 (November), p. 72, and Mikolaj 
Plikus (ed.), Mala kronika ludowego Wojska Polskiego 1943-1973, Warsaw, 1975, p. 253. 
23 Zdzislaw Stupor and Julian Kaczmarek, ‘W^lowe problemy sztuki wojennej ludowego Wojska 
Polskiego w latach 1942-1975’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 4 (November-December 
1975), p. 38. The KBW and WOP together amounted to 40,000-50,000 men. 
24 Between 1945 and 1949 the proportion of officers from the pre-war army ranged from 80 per 
cent to 9 per cent on the short-term improvement courses. See Tadeusz Konecki, 'Zawodowe 
szkolnictwo ludowego Wojska Polskiego w pierwszym powojennym dziesi^cioleciu. 
Organizacja i dydaktyka’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 2 (April-June 1974), p. 337. 
25 See Andrzej Paczkowski, Aparat bezpieczenstwa w latach 1944-1956: taktyka, strategia, 
metody. Cz^sc i Lata 1945-1947, Warsaw, 1994, p. 149. 
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As Wladyslaw Gomulka, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers’ 
Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR), recognized that ‘the army as such is a very 
important organ, part of the state apparatus, we will give very close attention to its 
affairs’.26 In May 1945 Gomulka indicated in a lengthy report to Moscow the scale of 
difficulties Polish Communists faced in building a politically reliable officer corps: 
I wish to say a few words about the Polish Army. We are also working in that area and we 
are expanding the Polish Army. We have a plan to expand the Polish Army to twenty 
divisions this year. But the greatest difficulty - is the officer corps. We do not have officers; 
we are very short particularly of senior officers. We are able to acquire quickly lower- and 
middle-level cadres, but we are unable to resolve the issue of senior officers in a short time. 
It will require years. Certainly we are unable to build the Polish Army in its entirety on the 
officer corps of the former [pre-war] Polish Army because, fundamentally, it is a reactionary 
corps [...]. Also, for example, the Red Army freed several thousand Polish officers from 
camps in Germany, held by the Germans since 1939, but we have very little use for them. 
We have vetted them and we are convinced that we are able to take 10 per cent, a maximum 
of 15 per cent of these people into the Army; the others were not desirable from the political 
point of view; they are a dangerous element; that is why we will not have them.27 
Gomulka’s thinking on how to build a new officer corps to serve ‘democratic Poland’ 
envisaged a long-term strategy to eliminate the last vestiges of the pre-war military 
leadership. Reliable workers and peasants were to be trained in officer schools to defend 
the interests of People’s Poland.28 Until the ‘cadres’ could be rebuilt the Polish army 
would still need experienced officers to be able to function. Communist suspicions about 
the political reliability of pre-war Polish officers and military necessity thus ensured the 
continuing presence of Soviet officers during the building of the post-war LWP. 
The numbers of Soviet officers seconded to the Polish Army fell dramatically after the 
war. With the large-scale reductions in strength initiated in the second half of 1945, there 
was no need to have so many officers. The percentage of Soviet officers serving in the 
Polish officer corps dropped to 24 per cent in 1946, 10 per cent in 1947, 7.5 per cent in 
1948 and 6.0 per cent in 1949.29 Although the departing Soviet officers were warmly 
thanked in a directive (rozkaz) issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in 
July 1945 suggesting that their work was completed in Poland, the fact was that not all of 
them were going home.30 There remained a strong Soviet presence in command and staff 
positions throughout the Polish army including the general staff and the central institutions 
of the Polish Ministry of Defence. In this respect, the role of the Soviet officer cadres 
changed little in the post-war period. Soviet officers left lower-level positions in line units 
and other organizations to be replaced in the overwhelming majority by Poles. 
While the overall percentage of Soviet officers serving in the Polish officer corps at 
more junior levels plummeted, the drop in command and staff positions was less 
pronounced. Table 1 indicates the number of Soviet officers in the Polish army with the 
rank of general and the percentage they formed of the total number of serving generals.31 It 
26 Report by Gomulka to the International Information Bureau, All-Union Communist Party 
(Bolsheviks), 10 May 1945, cited in Dawid and Kochariski (eds), Polska-ZSRR struktury 
podlegtosci, p. 113. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej, p. 150. 
30 Directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, 30 July 1945, in Wlodzimierz 
T. Kowalski (ed.), Dokumenty i materiafy do historii stosunkow Polsko-Radzieckich, vol. vm, 
styczeh 1944-grudzieh 1945, Warsaw, 1974, pp. 567-68. 
31 Table 1 based on data in Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej, p. 47. 
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is clear that in the period 1945 to 1948 senior Soviet officers continued to play a prominent 
role in the Polish army, though their numbers were reduced fairly fast. 
Table 1: Soviet Generals in the Polish Army 1945-48 
Soviet Generals 
Date Total no. of Generals (number) (%) 
11 Jun 45 69 60 87 
10 Oct 45 62 49 79 
6 May 46 55 40 73 
15 Apr 47 51 27 53 
31 Dec 47 58 22 38 
1 Jun 48 50 20 40 
31 Dec 48 53 16 30 
From the point of view of exercising influence over a large military organization, the 
role of colonels in command and staff officers in central institutions and major military 
units is important. The decline in the number of Soviet colonels serving in the Polish army 
was not nearly as rapid as among lower ranking officers between 1946 and 1948 as 
indicated in Table 2:32 
Table 2: Soviet Colonels in the Polish Army 1946-48 
Soviet Colonels 
Date Total no. of Colonels <%) 
5 Mar 46 206 100 
25 Jul 46 199 97 
1 Oct 46 156 76 
1 Jan 48 120 58 
The Soviet generals and colonels serving in the Polish army in the second half of the 
1940s could be found mostly in key positions. They were prominent in the central 
institutions of the Polish Ministry of Defence where they often headed departments and 
sections, in the central staffs at the military district level and in divisional and regimental 
staffs. In these posts Soviet officers continued to be represented in higher percentages 
relative to their overall percentage as part of the Polish officer corps. Table 3 gives 
aggregate numbers and percentages of Soviet officers in such posts.33 
Table 3: Soviet Officers in Command and Staff Posts 1947-49 
Date Total no. of Officers Soviet Officers 
(number)(percentage) 
1 Jan 47 1570 595 37.8 
1 Apr 48 1566 315 20.1 
1 Jan 49 1564 319 20.4 
32 Table 2 based on data in ibid., p. 48. 
33 Table 3 based on data in ibid., p. 51. 
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Conclusion 
The Soviet cadres serving in the Polish army clearly wielded considerable power. The 
rapid fall in the overall number of Soviet officers from wartime levels did not reduce 
significantly their authority in the Polish army given their continuing presence in command 
and staff posts. 
Soviet officers were not the only group to influence the reconstruction of the post-war 
Polish People’s Army. A considerable number of pre-war Polish officers re-entered the 
army and occupied a number of senior posts. While their presence in these posts can be 
explained by the pressing need for experienced officers to rebuild the army after the 
dislocation of war and occupation, they nevertheless represented different military practice 
and ideas from their Soviet counterparts. In the first few years after the war, 39 per cent of 
professional officers in the general staff were from the pre-war army with a quarter of 
them senior officers with staff experience and the remaining three-quarters junior officers 
(up to captain) in the pre-war army.34 The most prominent of these officers was Major- 
General Stefan Mossor, who became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Mossor played an 
important role in the direction and planning of operation ‘Wisla’ against Ukrainian 
nationalists in south-eastern Poland in 1947.35 Pre-war army officers also represented a 
significant proportion of the staff at military academies and schools. They were a 
prominent group at the newly created General Staff College and the first commandant and 
organizer of the Military Technical Academy was a pre-war officer.36 Although these pre¬ 
war officers would soon be systematically purged from the army, they clearly exercised 
some influence on the development of the Polish army in the immediate post-war years. 
Little is known about them except in the context of the oppression they subsequently 
suffered at the hands of the Communist regime.37 
Despite the fact that in the period of transition after the war the Polish officer corps had 
elements of diversity, it does not alter significantly the short and long-term impact of the 
Soviet officers in the Polish army. One of the most important and immediate functions of 
the Soviet cadre was to exercise control of the Polish army in support of the policy aims of 
the Soviet Union. Given the hostility felt towards the Soviet Union in the pre-war Polish 
army and among the population at large, the need for the presence of reliable Soviet 
officers was a necessity for Soviet policy in Poland. It is significant that the Polish army’s 
role in operations against internal groups opposing the Communist regime was limited. It 
offered substantial aid in terms of national reconstruction particularly in removing millions 
of land-mines and other military munitions and restored communications such as destroyed 
bridges.38 The Polish army aided the Communist authorities during the referendum of 1946 
and the parliamentary election of 1947 but its role was in supporting propaganda efforts 
34 Kazimierz Frontczak, ‘Rozwoj wladz naczelnych i instytucji wojskowych ludowego Wojska 
Polskiego w latach 1945-1947’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 3 (July-September 1973), 
p. 444. 
35 For a brief biography of Mossor see "Miscellanea Archiwalne’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 
4 (October-December 1973), pp. 249-50. On his role in operation Wisla, see Eugeniusz Misilo, 
"Polska polityka narodowosciowa wobec Ukraincow 1944-1947’ in Wojciech Wrzesiriski (ed.), 
Polska - Polacy — mniejszosci narodowe, Wroclaw, 1992, pp. 391-412. 
36 Ryszard Piotrowski, ‘Pierwszy komendant WAT’, Polska zbrojna, 20 February 1998, p. 28, 
and Aniela Uziemblo, ‘Akademia’, Polska zbrojna, 13 June 1997, pp. 28—29. 
37 Mossor and a number of other pre-war generals and colonels were arrested and imprisoned in 
the late 1940s: see Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej, p. 64. 
38 See Zygmunt Wojdalski, Wojsku spoleczehstwu 1944-1948, Warsaw, 1982. 
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and not in violent coercion.39 The only exception to the post-war pattern of keeping the 
army out of direct involvement in internal repression operations was the conflict with 
Ukrainian insurgents in south-east Poland.40 A number of Polish army units took part in 
operation ‘Wista’. Many of their rank and file consisted of Poles displaced from territories 
incorporated into the Soviet Union (western Ukraine) who could be relied upon completely 
in military operations.41 Given the obvious doubts the Communists harboured regarding 
the utility of the army in internal repression, the presence of the Soviet cadre provided a 
vital prop for a Polish Communist regime. Soviet officers ensured that the army would 
remain under control or neutral during the period of consolidating Communist power in 
Poland. Apart from the role they had in ensuring the reliability of the army, Soviet officers 
had an important role in laying the foundations of a Polish People’s Army modelled 
closely on the armed forces of the Soviet Union.42 The continuing post-war presence of 
Soviet cadre in senior military positions gave the Polish regime the time necessary to build 
a Polish officer corps capable of acting as a reliable organ of state power. 
39 Leszek Grot, ‘Dzialalnosc ochronno-propagandowa Wojska Polskiego w czasie referendum 
(30.6.46 r.) i wyborow do Sejmu RP (19.1.1947 r.)’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 2 (April- 
June 1974), pp. 173-200. 
40 Determining the number of army casualties in internal operations can be difficult. One article 
on the army’s role lumps together the statistics of army deaths on operations with that of the 
KBW. See Leszek Grot, ‘Dzialania ludowego Wojska Polskiego przeciwko zbrojnemu 
podziemiu w latach 1944—1947’, Wojskowy przeglqd historyczny, 3 (July-September 1973), 
p. 496. 
41 See: Misito, ‘Polska polityka narodowosciowa wobec Ukraincow 1944-1947’, p. 400. 
42 Nalepa, Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej, pp. 156—59. 
34 Jan Racek, Zdenek Nejedly and the 
Construction of Czech Music History after the 
Second World War 
Geoffrey Chew 
In around 1785, C. F. D. Schubart wrote: 
None of the provinces [ruled by Joseph II], perhaps none in the whole of Germany, outshines 
Bohemia in music [...]. Wind instruments in particular have been cultivated with such 
diligence that the Bohemians now surpass not only Italy, but also the rest of Germany [...]. 
The Bohemian chamber style is beyond argument the most beautiful in the world.1 
Schubart was not the only writer of his time to think thus;2 and in the following century, 
the exceptional musicality of the Bohemians (later interpreted as ‘Czechs’) became a well- 
known Romantic commonplace, which came in due course to influence the writing of 
history — and not merely music history. Accordingly, at the beginning of his general 
history of Czech music, Jan Racek pays tribute to it, in characteristic (even if less than 
ideally elegant) terms: ‘In Czech history music occupies a quite exceptional position, due 
not only to its particular creative and artistic nature, which is the product of the natural, 
healthy musicality of the whole of our popular national society, but also to its remarkable 
vocation as an agent of revival and generally in terms of cultural politics.’3 
Racek, like other modem Czech cultural historians, is using the commonplace here in 
order to fill in the gaps in a history of vernacular literature, and especially to span the 
allegedly silent period before the National Revival, and in so doing is allowing music to 
fulfil the political role of defining the nation. A closer look at the writing of music history 
in Bohemia and Moravia immediately after the Second World War will, I believe, 
demonstrate that cultural politics during that period required music to play precisely this 
role, among others that were imposed on it. 
The sentence quoted above is from the second edition of Racek’s history. It was a 
thorough revision of the first edition of 1949,4 to propound a new orthodoxy in Czech 
music history; and indeed the first edition had itself been claimed by Racek to be 
polemical. I shall be considering the revisions and their rationale, but it may be advisable 
first to sketch the pre-war development of Czech musical historiography. 
Although accounts of music and musicians in the Bohemian Lands, including 
Schubart’s, had been published well before the onset of the Czech National Revival, music 
1 Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, Ideen zu einer Asthetik der Tonkunst [c. 1785], 
posthumously ed. Ludwig Schubart, Vienna, 1806; quoted here according to Jurgen Mainka 
(ed.), Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart. Ideen zu einer Asthetik der Tonkunst, Leipzig, 
1977, p. 86. 
Of other eighteenth-century commentators on the musicality of the Bohemians, Charles Burney 
is probably the best known. See his account of his journey to Central Europe, gathering 
material for his general history of music, in Percy A. Scholes (ed.), An Eighteenth-Century 
Musical Tour in Central Europe and the Netherlands; being Dr. Charles Burney’s Account of 
his Musical Experiences, London and New York, 1959; however, the phrase ‘conservatory of 
Europe’, referring to Bohemia and often ascribed to Burney, seems to be unverifiable. 
3 Jan Racek, Ceska hudba od nejstarsich dob do pocatku 19. stoleti, 2nd edn, Prague, 1958, p. 9. 
4 Jan Racek, Ceska hudba od nejstarsich dob do pocatku 19. stoleti, Prague and Bmo, 1949. 
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history in Czech was essentially a product of that movement. The earliest continuous 
narrative synthesis of national music history to appear in Czech was a small volume 
published in 1891 by Josef Srb-Debrnov.5 Srb-Debmov constructed Czech music history 
in terms of four periods: vocal music up to the seventeenth century; instrumental music of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; music of the first half of the nineteenth century; 
and ‘music with national character’ {hudba s rdzem narodnim), of the second half of the 
nineteenth century. This periodization of history owes much to music historiography of the 
period in France and Germany, with 1600 interpreted in round terms as the date at which 
modem music is initiated by a supposed ‘monodic revolution’ in the Italy of Monteverdi 
and his contemporaries. But Srb-Debmov links this conventional framework with Czech 
history by conflating 1618, the date of the beginning of the Estates’ Uprising, with that of 
the monodic revolution. And in this, besides his identification of his friend Smetana’s 
Prodana nevesta (The Bartered Bride, 1866) as the decisive moment at which ‘music with 
a national character’ first appears in the Bohemian Lands, he provided a lasting legacy, 
which still influences Czech musical historiography. 
There is a clear link of continuity in particular between Srb-Debmov’s framework for 
the history of Czech music and that of all his successors, including Zdenek Nejedly, the 
single author who has most clearly influenced Czech musical historiography during the 
twentieth century. Nejedly, bom in Litomysl in 1878, went up to Prague University in 
1896, and read history under Jaroslav Goll and the sociologist T. G. Masaryk and 
aesthetics under Otakar Hostinsky. In 1908 he became professor of musicology at the 
University, and in the next half-century he wrote copiously on a variety of subjects. In 
1904 he had already published a brief history of Czech music, and he continued to publish 
on the music of the Hussite period in the decade before the First World War. 
Despite his breadth of learning, the interpretation of Czech history that he developed 
even as early as the first decade of the twentieth century was forceful and polemical; it 
remained essentially unchanged for the next thirty years—though the manner in which he 
expressed it changed after the Second World War. As he put it in 1914 in his Spor o smysl 
ceskych dejin (Controversy Concerning the Meaning of Czech History), Czech national 
history, when interpreted in terms of ‘scientific realism’, is a drama in three acts, namely 
the Hussite period, the post-White Mountain (1620) era, and the nineteenth-century revival 
of Czech culture.6 This scenario of two periods of national splendour separated by a period 
of national oppression, the ‘darkness’ of Jirasek’s mythopoeic novel of the same period,7 is 
theatrical, almost operatic. It conflated Srb-Debmov’s third and fourth periods, sharpening 
the latter’s polemical purpose and placing Smetana at centre stage in the denouement of 
the final act. And indeed much of Nejedly’s musicological energy went after the First 
World War into documenting this view of Smetana exhaustively (rather than altering it 
substantially), most notably in a biography of the composer. Eleven volumes were 
projected, but even the four that were completed and published remain a massive 
achievement.8 
Nejedly’s background and development have been well characterized by Jaroslav 
Stfitecky and Josef Hanzal in their introduction to an anthology of his writings.9 Nejedly 
5 Josef Srb-Debmov, Dejiny hudby v Cechach a na Morave, Prague, 1891. 
6 Zdenek Nejedly, Spor o smysl ceskych dejin: pokus o filosofii ceskych dejin, Prague, 1914. 
7 Alois Jirasek, Temno: historicky obraz [written 1912-14], Prague, 1915. 
8 Zdenek Nejedly, Bedrich Smetana, 4 vols, Prague, 1924-33. Another influence on Nejedly’s 
view of Smetana was provided by his teacher Hostinsky, in Otakar Hostinsky, Bedrich Smetana 
a jeho boj o moderni ceskou hudbu, Prague, 1901. 
9 Jaroslav Stfitecky and Josef Hanzal (eds), Zdenek Nejedly: Umeni stare a nove: vybor ze studil, 
Prague, 1978. 
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himself claimed to have been formed by the Litomysl environment of his heroes, Smetana 
and Jirasek, and to have read Palacky’s history of Bohemia before going up to university, 
so that he arrived in Prague with his historical ideas (and his cultural canon) ready-formed. 
But, as Stritecky and Hanzal point out, in his youth Nejedly was something of an outsider 
in the small-town atmosphere of Litomysl. His father, Roman Nejedly, was a kantor, one 
of the teacher-musicians typical of rural life in Bohemia in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, and Nejedly’s own interpretation of the activity of the cantors shows some 
ambivalence. He was contemptuous of their philistine attitudes and achievements even 
though regarding them as the guardians of the continuity of national culture during the 
period of greatest national oppression, because he was deeply sensitive in his own way to 
the values of high culture, judged from an essentially Romantic, idealist point of view.10 
From a historiographical point of view, the dialectical content that Nejedly places within 
his central, ‘dark’, period of Czech history, the period of these cantors, is of particular 
interest. In the secondary literature of the first half of the twentieth century, the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had almost always been dealt with purely in terms of 
composer or performer biographies, often drawing on the surviving autobiographical 
memoirs of cantors. Nejedly in the 1920s and 1930s himself used this tradition, sketching 
the art of the village cantors of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as something 
well known to Smetana — but he provides a new Marxist twist. While acknowledging that 
these cantors were usually engaged in providing music for local parish churches in order to 
provide an outstanding public spectacle, Nejedly goes on to suggest that 
our cantors, like our people in general, soon transformed this task of theirs into something 
quite different [...]. They turned the church into a theatre, or, better, a concert hall, where 
music was played not in order to heighten the splendour of the church, but rather to allow the 
people to hear something beautiful, and to allow the local musicians to play something 
beautiful.* 11 
So in Nejedly’s view they were essentially conducting a guerrilla campaign, as a class, 
for two centuries or more, whose success was independent of the artistic worth of their 
music. This campaign was articulating the class conflict that potentially occurs in every 
age and society, between the proletariat (represented by the cantors) and the higher social 
classes (represented by clergy and Church authorities). In this way their music is 
represented as the bearer of the essence of the nation through the period of ‘darkness’, with 
a dynamic that had inevitably to issue in the National Revival of the nineteenth century. 
The social significance of this music is authentic and excuses any artistic shortcomings it 
may have. And a reciprocal relationship is set up between Nejedly’s revolutionary hero, 
Smetana, and the cantors. He guarantees their credentials, since they are his equally 
revolutionary predecessors, and they are the representatives of the nation as he was later to 
be; on the other hand, they guarantee his credentials, since they set up the historical 
imperative to be fulfilled in him. Both are authentic, and together they provide the 
continuity of Czech national culture through the period of darkness. 
This extraordinary vision in later years continued to provide a pretext for the study of 
Baroque music by other Czech scholars. And it will already be clear that it permitted a 
wholly secular interpretation of the almost entirely sacred repertory of the Czech Baroque 
— in opposition to Roman Catholic and other possible religious interpretations, of which a 
well-known example is the interpretation of the Czech Baroque by Zdenek Kalista,12 that 
still seemed viable to some even after the Second World War. Nejedly referred his 
10 Ibid., pp. 7-10. 
11 Nejedly, Bedrich Smetana, ill (Praha a venkov), Prague, 1929, p. 410. 
12 Zdenek Kalista, Ceske baroko: studie, texty, poznamky, Prague, 1941. 
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understanding of Czech history, as driven by essentially secular and national, rather than 
religious, forces, to Golf13 This is of obvious relevance to the Baroque, but especially 
marked in the interpretation (as a revolutionary, national, essentially secular movement) 
that Nejedly placed upon the fifteenth-century Hussite movement, in the studies of Hussite 
song that he had been producing since the beginning of the century. And Nejedly’s 
interpretation of the Hussite movement, as well as his interpretation of the revolutionary 
significance of the cantors, became touchstones of historical orthodoxy in post-war 
Czechoslovakia. 
Nejedly spent the war years living in the Soviet Union with his family and teaching at 
Moscow University, and on his return to Czechoslovakia he was soon heavily involved in 
politics: he was appointed Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences in 1945 and again 
(after a couple of years as Minister of Social Welfare) between 1948 and 1953. (As the 
Moravian musicologist Gracian Cernusak observed diplomatically in the early 1950s, in 
his article on Nejedly in Grove’s Dictionary: ‘He has been honoured with many titles and 
distinctions as one of the most influential personalities in Czechoslovak public life. No 
wonder [...] his work as a musicologist has been entirely abandoned.’)14 It was during this 
time, however, that Nejedly returned to the theme of national history in his political tract 
Komuniste — dedici velikych tradic ceskeho naroda (The Communists, Heirs of the Great 
Traditions of the Czech Nation, 1946),15 now placing his historical views in the service of 
strident ideology, making little pretence of disinterested scholarship. In this work, he 
defends the thesis that Communists should, after the model provided by the Soviet Union, 
set high value on national culture, which can be understood only with reference to its 
revolutionary social meaning. The new, coercive rhetoric that he adopts makes a direct 
comparison with his earlier works problematic in some ways, even though he himself 
explicitly stresses the continuity between old and new: ‘I do not wish to expatiate on my 
own work towards the understanding and evaluation of Czech national tradition and 
culture, but it is certainly characteristic that it was a Communist who had to explain and 
demonstrate [in his Smetana monograph written decades earlier] the unique national 
significance of our most national artist, Bedrich Smetana, to our bourgeoisie.’16 And he 
returns to his neo-Revivalist idea of the three great period divisions of Czech history, now 
developing the theme of the class conflict that characterizes them, and their inevitability. 
And once again he interprets the music of the period preceding the National Revival as the 
means by which the people heroically, against all the odds, managed to preserve the 
continuity of national culture and to resist religion: ‘They constrained [the people] with 
intolerable statutory labour and also stuffed them full of the most disgusting superstitions, 
but they sang on and joyfully sang, so that they should not be overcome by despair — 90 
per cent of our national folk-songs are the product of this tragic period.’17 
The same themes, the continuity of secular Czech history and its revolutionary character, 
presented in similar rhetorical terms, were given even stronger political expression and 
significance in the speech that Nejedly delivered at the Eighth Congress of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1946, when he called on his comrades in rousing terms 
to proceed to victory, supported by the ‘unified, beautiful, democratic’ national tradition 
that stretched from the Hussites to Smetana, whose Ma vlast (My Country, c. 1872-79), at 
13 Stritecky and Hanzal (eds), Umeni stare a nove, p. 11 and passim: their Introduction includes a 
sound discussion of the intellectual currents surrounding Nejedly in Prague. 
14 Gracian Cernusak, ‘Nejedly’ in Eric Blom (ed.), Grove’s Dictionary of Music & Musicians, 5th 
edn, London, 1954, vol. 6, pp. 46-47. 
15 Zdenek Neiedly, Komuniste— dedici velikych tradic ceskeho naroda, 3rd edn, Prague, 1950. 
16 Ibid., p. 11. 
17 Ibid., p. 22. 
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the congress concert, was contradicting all the aspirations of the bourgeoisie.18 And at the 
Ninth Congress, once the Communists had gained power, he outlined a programme to 
propagate this vision in terms of education at every level.19 
After the war, the task of producing a synthesis of music history to support the new 
educational programme fell principally to Jan Racek, a teacher in Brno, who had been a 
pupil of Vladimir Helfert at the University of Brno. Helfert had in 1936 published a 
monograph on modem Czech music, written for a foreign readership.20 During the war he 
was imprisoned, and he died in 1945. Racek was a Czech musicologist of the old Positivist 
school, trained in the collection and evaluation of sources, and producing copious editions 
of old music and of Janacek’s letters. In these respects he was not totally unlike Nejedly. 
He had won his credentials by writing a dissertation on Smetana, in which the national 
vocation of the composer was stressed,21 by giving a successful series of lectures on 
medieval music, published in 1946,22 and by publishing a small but influential book 
suggesting a new periodization of Czech Baroque music.23 And he began, immediately 
after the war, to write for the Communist newspaper Rovnost. In short, of his generation he 
was the obvious choice to write a comprehensive history. This can be understood also if 
one thinks of the alternatives, such as Vaclav Cihak, who published a philosophy of music 
history in 1946:24 Cihak’s book, though based on a more interesting basic idea than 
Racek’s, relating music as it does to systems of philosophy, is less well organized, is over¬ 
complex for the polemical purposes that any history of music at that time would have had 
to fulfil, and does not map easily onto Nejedly’s historical vision. 
Racek published the first edition of his history, Ceska hudba, in 1949. It is not quite in 
all respects what one might expect from a comprehensive national history: it ends before 
the National Revival, well before Smetana. This limitation corresponded to Racek’s own 
interests and specializations. Furthermore, a monograph integrating the music history of 
the Czechs and the Slovaks might have seemed desirable for political reasons after the war 
(especially since Frantisek Zagiba had in 1943 produced a scholarly history of early music 
in Slovakia,25 which emphasizes the Germanic affinities of the culture of the area and 
dismisses the Slavonic ones, as one might expect in a book published in Slovakia at that 
date). Against this — and no doubt this was a decisive consideration in the minds of those 
who thought along the same lines as Nejedly — a thoroughly integrated Czech and Slovak 
18 Zdenek Nejedly, address to Eighth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in Snem 
budovatelu: Protokol VIII. radneho sjezdu Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska ve dnech 28 — 
31. brezna 1946, Prague, n.d. [c. 1948], pp. 73-75. 
19 Zdenek Nejedly, address to Ninth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in Protokol 
IX. radneho sjezdu Komunisticke stranv Ceskoslovenska v Praze 25.-29. kvetna 1949, Prague, 
1949, pp. 321-30. 
20 Vladimir Helfert, Geschichte der Musik in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik, Prague, 1936 
(2nd, partly revised, edn, 1938), and Histoire de la musique dans la Republique 
Tchecoslovaque, Prague, 1936. 
21 Published as Jan Racek, \ last a narod ve Smetanove hudebnim dramatu (Smetanova Ma vlast), 
Bmo, 1939, 2nd edn as Idea vlasti, naroda a slavy v dile Bedricha Smetany: skladby vokdlni a 
dramaticke, Prague, 1947. 
22 Jan Racek, Stredoveka hudba, Bmo, 1946. 
23 Jan Racek, Duch ceskeho hudebniho baroku: prispevek ke slohove a vyvojove problematice 
ceske hudby 17. a 18. stoletl, Bmo, 1940. For listings of further works by Racek, see Sbornik 
praci fdosoficke fakulty brnenske university, 14, 1965, F9, and Bibliografie profesoru Jana 
Racka, Bohumira Stedrone a Zdehka Blazka: K jejich jubilejnimu roku 1985, Bmo, 1986. 
24 Vaclav Cihak, Filosofie dejin hudby, Prague, 1946. 
Frantisek Zagiba, Dejiny slovenskej hudby od najstarsich cias az do reformacie, Bratislava, 
1943. 
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history of music would have been bound to dilute the significance of the great historical 
landmarks (the Hussite period, the Battle of the White Mountain) as fully national 
experiences. 
The chronological limitation is in some ways harder to understand. Racek excused it, but 
not entirely plausibly, by writing that he had intended the book as a supplement to 
Helfert’s book on modem music. However, the first edition is headed ‘Volume 1’, which 
suggests that Racek may originally have intended to extend the chronology, although it is 
not clear how this might have been done. If he had really planned to use, or revise, 
Helferf s monograph as his second volume, a supplement on the nineteenth century would 
have been necessary for comprehensive coverage.26 And there are other puzzling aspects 
of the book. For instance, in the preface to the second edition, he drops hints that the first 
edition had been intended as a polemic: ‘The stimulus to the origin [of the first edition] 
was the urgent need at that time, after the Second World War, to provide information for 
foreigners about Czech musical culture, and particularly to correct some mistaken and 
false conceptions of Western music scholars and critics concerning the stylistic substance 
of historical Czech music.’27 
Clearly the book — which only ever appeared in Czech — has never effectively 
provided foreigners with information about Czech music, though it is possible that it was 
intended as a counter-blast to Rosa Newmarch’s wartime monograph The Music of 
Czechoslovakia, and that Racek wished to criticize aspects of her book such as her stress 
on the Catholic fervour of the Czechs.28 It is also possible that Racek was thinking, at the 
end of the war. that the first edition of his book might be translated for export as Helfert’s 
had been in the 1930s; his interests were largely in Western European music, and indeed 
his first article was published in French.29 Nevertheless, failing any further explanation, the 
sentence is hard to take at face value. 
The omission of the modem period, however, also meant the avoidance of a potential 
clash with Nejedly’s views. Nejedly’s interpretation of Czech music after Smetana, though 
not crucial to his historiographical construction, was rather different from that of most 
other Czech scholars, and from those of the Brno circle in particular. Nejedly was cool 
towards the music of Dvorak and, especially, Janacek; in an extended review of Janacek’s 
Jeniifa, published in 1916 after its Prague premiere, he had already argued that Janacek 
was far less national a composer than Smetana, and that he had betrayed the nationalist 
cause.30 Indeed his construction of a trinity of modem Czech composers comprised 
Smetana, Fibich and Ostrcil; and Racek, since the 1930s a specialist in the music of 
Janacek as well as in early music, was largely responsible for popularizing the alternative 
trinity of Smetana, Dvorak and Janacek. 
26 Racek may still have intended, or hoped, to complete it in the 1950s: the limitation to ‘Volume 
V 
r is still included in the bibliography to Gracian Cemusak, ‘Racek, Jan’ in Blom (ed.). Grove’s 
Dictionary of Music & Musicians (see note 14 above), vol. 7, p. 4. 
27 Racek, Ceska hudba (1958 edn), p. 5. 
28 Rosa Newmarch, The Music of Czechoslovakia, London, 1942. The Foreword was written by 
Edvard Benes. 
29 Jan Racek, ‘Les Madrigaux a voix seule de Luzzasco Luzzaschi: Contribution a Lhistoire de 
Forigine du style de la monodie italienne’, Revue musicale, 13, 1932, pp. 11-23. 
30 Zdenek Nejedly, Leose Janacka Jeji pastorkyha, Prague, 1916. Coolness towards Janacek was 
shared in 1916 by Helfert, even though he was later to be thought of as having created a ‘true 
Moravian school’ of musicology; see Bibliografie profesoru Jana Racka... (see note 23 above), 
p. 5. And as for Dvorak, no notice need be taken of the persistent rumour that Nejedly was 
antipathetic to the composer because he had been rebuffed when he sought to marry Dvorak’s 
daughter. 
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Whatever the reason, the framework of the book remained as it was, effectively as a 
torso, and Racek chose, or was put under pressure, to leave it thus; it is evident that this 
framework was already serviceable for the new educational purposes that Nejedly had in 
mind. But there are clear signs that the 1949 edition of Racek’s book was not ideologically 
pure enough for the new situation. And indeed Racek had to be subjected to some re¬ 
education so that he could undertake the revisions, which (whatever he wrote in the 
preface to the new edition) are not simply a matter of removing traces of ephemeral 
polemics. 
There are traces of the official reaction to the first edition of Racek’s book in the 
comments made in a series of lectures at the Education Faculty of Prague University 
around 1949 by the musicologist Josef Plavec: these were mimeographed and published 
informally.31 Ostensibly the task was carried out as an act of pietas by a group of his 
students, who collated their notes from his lectures, and had him look them over before 
publication.32 One might suspect, however, that the real reason for the publication of this 
monograph was to alert all concerned to the dangers of ideological deviation and to 
provide authoritative interpretations of existing bibliography. It contains interesting and 
revealing annotations concerning most of the earlier literature; for example, Srb-Debmov 
is summarily dismissed (‘first book of its type, not scholarly, a haphazard collection of 
data without historical evaluation’), and Nejedly’s little book of 1904 is predictably 
praised as ‘the principal handbook for study’. Racek’s book is characterized by Plavec as a 
‘summary account with valuable pictorial supplements, although it adheres to Pekar’s 
conservative conception of Czech history, with a one-sided apologia for the Baroque era; it 
underestimates the revolutionary contribution of Hussitism and the original artistic 
creativity of the Czechs; it is necessary to read it critically’.33 The allusion to Pekar 
appears to be shorthand for Racek’s references to Hussite song as sacred monophony and 
his failure to be sufficiently critical of the Baroque Church.34 
Moreover, shortly afterwards, a large and heavily ideological account of Czech music 
history was published by Igor Belza in Moscow.35 Although the author knew Czech, this 
work must have depended on extensive information supplied by Czech contacts, no doubt 
including Nejedly, and seems to have been intended to set out the parameters within which 
music history was now to be written in Czechoslovakia. It outlines the whole sweep of 
Czech ‘classical music’ history from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, in the 
context of a general social and political history of the nation. Besides this it supplies a 
view, orthodox for the time, of the development of Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia. 
And it gives a canon of Czech ‘realist’ writers (in the socialist sense) who had contributed 
to this development, all of whom are said to have followed the ‘great, invincible ideas of 
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin’: Jiff Wolker, Stanislav Kostka Neumann, Josef Hora, 
Marie Majerova, Marie Pujmanova, Ivan Olbracht, Vladislav Vancura and Vitezslav 
Nezval (once the latter had been brought ‘honestly to realize his errors, break away from 
his reactionary tendency and join the ranks of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia’). 
Within this canon, the single musicologist mentioned is Nejedly: 
31 Josef Plavec, Dejiny ceske hudby, 2 vols, Prague, n.d. [c. 1950], 
32 Ibid., ii, p. 105. 
33 Ibid., I, p. 1. 
34 At the Second Congress of Czechoslovak Historians, 5 October 1947, the Marxists’ campaign 
to discredit the first-rate Positivist Pekar came to a head. A somewhat half-hearted attempt to 
find some good in Pekar is to be found in Jirina Popelova, Rozjimdni o ceskych dejinach, 
Prague, 1948. 
35 Igor Belza, Ocherki razvitiia cheshskoi muzykal'noi klassiki, Moscow and Leningrad, 1951. 
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The struggles of Czech musicians for an ideological, realist art in that period [the 1920s and 
subsequently], just as at present, were headed by Zdenek Nejedly. Here one ought to quote 
the words recently spoken about this prominent, erudite Communist by the President of the 
Czechoslovak People’s Democratic Republic, Klement Gottwald: 'Zdenek Nejedly entered 
the camp of the working class as a socialist, not in discord with the fact that he loved Jirasek 
and Smetana, in no disagreement with the fact that he was a guardian of our history and 
culture, but precisely because he loved Jirasek, Smetana, Nemcova, and preserved the 
heritage of the past; because he deeply understood the sense and logic of our history, and 
comprehended that the labouring class, together with all working people, should prove to be 
a new, fundamental strength of the nation, a preserver and continuer of all the very best that 
the nation had ever created.’ 
In these words are distinctly expressed the significance of the democratic tradition of the 
classical heritage for the formation of a progressive ideological attitude, for the construction 
of a new, socialist culture. Following the wise instructions of Lenin and Stalin, the Czech 
Communists have steadfastly and consistently preserved the classical heritage of the past 
from the destructive encroachments of bourgeois modernism and cosmopolitanism. And in 
this respect especially can be seen the great merits of Zdenek Nejedly, placing the pure 
springs of Smetana’s works in opposition to the cloudy torrents of the musical deformities of 
the West that were flooding over bourgeois Czechoslovakia. 
Boldly laying bare these deformities, Nejedly has consistently advocated the realist 
position of the great Czech masters, remaining loyal to the precepts of Smetana and Dvorak 
and educating a new generation of young composers.36 
Although not part of this prestigious group, Racek is mentioned by name during Belza’s 
discussion of Hussite hymns. Belza cites his monograph Stredoveka hudba, ostensibly 
deferring to his authority in order to dismiss the religious significance of this repertory: 
The contemporary Czech historian and musicologist, Jan Racek, in the course of his lectures 
about medieval music which were given at the Arts Faculty of the University of Bmo (Bmo, 
V 
1946) underlines the fact that Capek, in his short treatise dated 1417, speaks about the 
meaning of the hymn [‘Ktoz jsu bozi bojovnici’] for the support of the warrior spirit of the 
army, for the raising of the morale of the soldiers [...]. It is extremely important to note in 
connection with this that many Hussite songs went far beyond the limits of religious 
content.37 
Belza here appears to be praising Racek’s views; yet the passage might well have 
seemed just as alarming to Racek as Plavec’s negative criticism, emphasizing as it does 
that the arbiters of the new orthodoxy were still regarding his interpretation as 
insufficiently ‘Gollian’ in Nejedly’s sense. In fact Belza’s book illustrates the fact that 
attitudes and ideologies were hardening generally in the early 1950s; indeed this was true 
in the West as well as in Czechoslovakia, as is obvious from the riposte to Racek that 
appeared in West Germany in 1956, Rudolf Quoika’s Die Musik der Deutschen in Bohmen 
und Mahren?% Quoika completely sidelines the importance of the early seventeenth 
century as an historical boundary, and interprets both the hymn of the Hussite period and 
Smetana as local Czech outgrowths from an essentially German root. 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that Racek had to prove his reliability by writing a 
history of Russian music up to the October Revolution,39 despite the fact that he had never 
previously published in the area and was not to do so again. This obliged him to read a 
36 Ibid., pp. 499-500. 
37 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
38 Rudolf Quoika, Die Musik der Deutschen in Bohmen und Mahren, Berlin, 1956. 
39 Jan Racek, Ruska hudba od nejstarsich dob az po Velkou rijnovou revoluci, Prague, 1953. The 
book seems likely to have been written before the appearance of Belza’s monograph, since the 
Preface is dated 15 December 1951. 
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good deal of Soviet musicological literature (in his preface, he thanks Ludvik Kundera and 
Gracian Cemusak for helping him to find his way through it). The publisher’s blurb 
underlines the purpose which the book was intended to fulfil, both for its author and for its 
readers: 
In every branch of our daily life there is beneficially apparent an increasing co-operation 
with the greatest socialist country of the world, the Soviet Union. A thorough acquaintance 
with the Soviet Union has become a personal maxim for each of us [...]. For this reason, Dr 
Jan Racek’s book on Russian music is very timely. And it is also topical, because the 
musicologist Igor Belza has recently published in the Soviet Union his detailed account of 
the history of Czech music. 
All the above may make it easy to see why Racek found it necessary, subsequently in the 
1950s, to revise his monograph on Czech music history very thoroughly, to ensure its 
conformity with the current ideological requirements (which were in fact rather simple). 
Yet the layout and plan, even the sentence structure, of the book were substantially the 
same as they had been before; his method of revision, even for radical, ideological 
purposes, was a very conservative, cut-and-paste one — which might in any case have 
been inevitable, given the speed at which the task had to be accomplished. Each sentence 
of the book essentially remained in place, but was revised in detailed wording, with a 
systematic elimination of references to religion (even to the extent of frequent elimination 
of the word duchovni [spiritual] in reference to music), the addition at key points of the 
word ‘revolutionary’, the elimination of anything that might suggest discontinuity in the 
national tradition, and of any references to Germans and Germany other than as a foreign 
nation and country. 
Racek’s procedure in carrying out his revisions may be exemplified first by considering 
his account of the composer Jan Dismas Zelenka, in which his alterations are not very 
extensive. Zelenka was one of the most prominent composers of the post-White Mountain 
period, and the circumstances of his biography are rather more ambiguous than usual. Fie 
made his career ‘in exile’, according to the post-war Czech interpretation, writing church 
music for the Saxon court in Dresden. This court, unusually for German courts, was 
attestably in contact with Prague; Zelenka himself, like many other musicians from 
German courts even less in contact with Bohemia, is known to have visited Prague in 1723 
for the coronation festivities of that year; he had contacts with the Jesuits, and 
compositions with Czech texts are attributed to him. In his 1949 discussion of Zelenka, 
Racek is already constructing an image of Zelenka’s music as generally simpler in melodic 
character than other music from the German-speaking world, and by this token typically 
Czech. He ignores the fact that Zelenka is a composer of sacred music, and he is already 
suggesting that his work contributes towards Nejedly’s and Golfs vision of an unbroken 
line in Czech culture: 
An outstanding representative of Czech Baroque music in the late seventeenth century and 
the first half of the eighteenth is Jan Dismas Zelenka (1679-1745), bom at Lounovice in 
Bohemia [...]. 
The technical structure of his compositions resembles Bach’s polyphony, but his melodic 
style and some of his onomatopoeic and coloristic effects are simpler and more folk-like 
[prostsl a lidovejsi\ than Bach’s. In Zelenka’s works we may also observe a deliberate 
attempt at simplifying the musical expression. We can see that the rich polyphonic texture of 
German music of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries disagreed with the Czechs, even at 
this climactic period of Baroque music. Continually we encounter the tendency to simplify 
accepted models and to accommodate them to Czech musical thought. Here once again there 
is manifested a more conservative spirit, linked rather with folk tradition than with the 
assertive progressive traits of European music. This conservatism, stemming largely from the 
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domestic folk tradition, did not manifest itself only as a retrospective element, but above all 
as one that maintained the continuity of Czech musical thought in an unbroken line even in 
the difficult post-White Mountain times, when artistic musical creativity was almost 
eradicated for good in the Bohemian Lands. Therefore all the inadequacies that appear in the 
formal, architectonic and compositional simplicity of seventeenth-century Czech composers 
are again counterbalanced by a far more lively, expressive and fresh melodic inspiration and 
a multifaceted rhythmic richness. In these elements of Czech musical thought we must also 
seek for the independent features of Czech musical culture even in this stylistic period. We 
may easily find this basic feature of the stylistic essence of Czech Baroque music particularly 
in the work of Zelenka.40 
It is instructive to compare this with the later version. Sentence by sentence the two 
versions correspond, yet small details alter the sense in significant ways. In 1949 he wrote 
of ‘conservatism’ and ‘retrospective elements’ as being part of Zelenka’s equipment, and 
contrasts these with the ‘assertive, progressive’ traits of German and Italian music. But in 
1958 these purely musical judgements had become ideologically inadmissible, because 
conflated with their political equivalents. Accordingly they are deleted and replaced with 
the politically positive term ‘traditionalism’, meaning a healthy regard for the freshness 
and unpretentiousness lacking in the stuffy music of the Baroque, but one that remains 
open to the revolutionary potential of folk music. The suggestion in the earlier version that 
the continuity of Czech culture was under threat during the ‘darkness’ is deleted. And, a 
small but telling detail, ‘Lounovice’ in the earlier version becomes ‘Lounovice under 
Blanik’ in the later, with an implicit appeal to patriotism, symbolized by Blanik.41 
An outstanding representative of Czech music in the late seventeenth century and the first 
half of the eighteenth is indisputably Jan Dismas Zelenka (1679-1745), bom at Lounovice 
under Blanik [...]. 
The technical structure of his compositions resembles Bach’s polyphony and the Venetian 
school, but the melodic style and some of the onomatopoeic and richly developed coloristic 
effects are simpler and much more folk-like [prostsi a mnohem lidovejsi] than Bach’s. Hence 
in his compositions there can at times be heard a typically Czech, ardent, folk-like melody. 
Overall one can say that in Zelenka’s works we may observe a deliberate attempt at 
simplifying the musical expression, for Zelenka was closely linked with the Czech milieu 
and with Czech folk composition [...]. Also in Zelenka’s works we mat assert that the rich 
polyphonic texture of German music of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was foreign 
to the Czechs. Continually we encounter the tendency to simplify accepted models and to 
accommodate them to Czech musical thought. This Czech traditionalism, stemming largely 
from the domestic tradition of folk music, manifested itself as an agent that maintained the 
continuity of Czech musical thought in an unbroken line even in the difficult post-White 
Mountain times. The ostensible inadequacies of a technical nature that appear in the 
compositional simplicity of seventeenth-century Czech composers in the light of the 
developed compositional technique of world music are, on the contrary, balanced by a far 
more lively, expressive and fresh folk melodic style, a multifaceted rhythmic sense and a 
richness of tuneful invention. In these elements of Czech musical thought we must also seek 
the independent features of Czech musical culture even in this stylistic period 42 
This procedure is typical of most of Racek’s revisions. But a more radical approach was 
necessary in the section dealing with the hymns of the Hussite movement, as must already 
have been clear to Racek from Plavec’s criticisms. The Hussite movement was absolutely 
central to Nejedly’s historiography; his attitude to it in the 1940s and 1950s is epitomized 
40 Racek, Ceska hudba (1949 edn), pp. 92-93. 
41 In a modification of the Arthurian legend, an army of knights lay asleep inside the Blanik hill, 
waiting to defend Bohemia at its time of greatest need. 
42 Racek, Ceska hudba (1958 edn), pp. 110—11. 
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in the final remarks in the preface to the reissue of his study of Hussite hymn and song, 
which use it essentially as a pretext for topical agitprop: 
Only one thing more — the wish that in the future too, always and in everything, we should 
recognize and fulfil the heritage of the Hussite revolution, and that, following its footprints, 
we should learn also to be what it was. Lo, here too — it began with unpretentious song, and 
finally the song ‘Ktoz jsu bozi bojovnici’ thundered across all Europe. May we too be thus!43 
The Hussite hymn ‘Ktoz jsu bozi bojovnici’ (Those Who Are the Warriors of God) had 
been quoted for symbolic reasons by Smetana in the spirit of nineteenth-century 
nationalism; the medieval accounts of its use, echoing ancient sources that speak of the 
miraculous effects of music, refer to its power to neutralize the fighting spirit of the enemy 
in battle. For Stalinists in the 1940s and early 1950s it became a key historical moment in 
the definition of national self-awareness as, ironically, it had done for the Czecho-Slovak 
legionaries in Russia towards the end of the First World War. Belza provides a typically 
colourful version of its significance, together with an indication of the reason for its central 
importance within the historical construction now required of Czech music: 
This song, with an amazing power resounding later in the symphonic poem Tabor of 
Smetana and in other works by Czech classical composers, was sung not only by the warriors 
of Jan Zizka and Prokop the Great, but also by the Czech partisans and troops fighting 
against Hitler [...]. [It] may be characterized as a national anthem, a call to battle against the 
enemy. Such are many other hymns of the Taborites, prefiguring some of the features of the 
Futheran chorale, called by Engels, as is well known, the ‘Marseillaise of the sixteenth 
century’. We are perfectly justified in saying, for this reason, that in Bohemia was bom the 
‘Marseillaise of the fifteenth century’, for this title completely corresponds to the 
revolutionary feeling which is undoubtedly manifested in the Hussite songs.44 
Now Racek had referred already in his Stredoveka hudba to the political significance of 
this song. He had written there of the function of Hussite song as a manifestation of 
anonymous, folk resistance to ‘aggressive Germanic expansionism’, and had referred to its 
modem as well as its medieval significance. Although his account differs from Nejedly’s 
and Belza’s in its rhetoric, it does not do so significantly in substance: 
The Hussite hymn [...] was in essence a powerful anonymous manifestation of folk 
creativity, springing from the collective folk Hussite movement. Hence its amazing melodic 
power, projected particularly in polemical and belligerent songs, of which ‘Ktoz jsu bozi 
bojovnici’ (first half of the fifteenth century) became the most expressive manifestation of 
warlike ardour and the anthem of the Hussite soldiery [...]. Finally, [...] the song ‘Ktoz jsu 
bozi bojovnici’ became a directly political and national theme in modem Czech music 
(Smetana).45 
The passage dealing with Hussite song in the first edition of Ceskd hudba, three years 
later, draws on this passage: Racek used the same cut-and-paste method of revision that we 
have already seen in action in his work, altering the first two sentences above to refer to 
the repertory as ‘a manifestation of anonymous folk musicality, which sprang up from the 
collective Hussite movement as a powerful and devastating strength of simple, but by that 
token more magnificent, melodic invention’.46 The passage on the war songs, too, was 
43 Nejedly’s large-scale work on the history of Hussite hymn and song had first been published at 
the beginning of the century and was reissued at this time: Zdenek Nejedly, Dejiny husitskeho 
zpevu, 6 vols, Prague, 1954,1, p. 13. 
44 Belza, Ocherki razvitiia cheshskoi muzykal'noi klassiki, pp. 45^46. 
45 Racek, Stredoveka hudba, p. 7. 
46 Racek, Ceska hudba (1949 edn), p. 33. 
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directly based on a sentence from the earlier monograph, and mentions the ‘powerful and 
intimidating “Ktoz jsu, bozi bojovmci’” as ‘the most expressive phenomenon of belligerent 
enthusiasm and the anthem of the Hussite soldiery [...], from the point of view of form, 
[...] indisputably one of the technically most perfect songs that has come down to us from 
the Hussite period’.47 
This material was left more or less untouched in the later revision of Ceska hudba, even 
though the ‘underestimate [of] the revolutionary contribution of Hussitism and the original 
artistic creativity of the Czechs’ that Plavec had criticized clearly required extensive 
revisions. Instead, in his 1958 edition of the section on Hussite hymn and song, Racek 
adopted another strategy, which had many imitators in musicological monographs in 
Czechoslovakia in subsequent years. He still drew on his cut-and-paste method, but in a 
slightly different sense, by inserting new supplementary material in several additional 
paragraphs. Their ideological slant is more extreme than that of the musical discussion that 
frames them, but this slant is not allowed in this instance materially to affect the 
constructions offered in the previous version; one might almost describe the paragraphs as 
instant detachable ideology. 
The technique is worth observing in detail, and so the 1958 insertion into the discussion 
of Hussitism is reproduced below. The framing passages also found in the 1949 version are 
here shown in bold type, so that the method of revision is clear, although the exact wording 
of these passages in the earlier version is not reproduced here and differs in slight detail. 
Interpretative details that are either new to, or more strongly emphasized in, this version 
include the references to the ‘Hussite revolutionary movement’; the interpretation of 
Hussitism in terms of pan-Slav and pro-Russian sentiment; and the anti-German, patriotic, 
nationally self-aware and revolutionary sentiment: 
The strength of Czech creative thought was most powerfully manifested in the second 
period of its development, in the Hussite period, in the period of the Czech 
Reformation, when there takes place not only the greatest exertion of national awareness 
but also a great expansion of Czech folk creativity, which we may best observe in Czech 
folk sacred song. The Hussite revolutionary movement, which had far-reaching political 
consequences, met with a powerful reception and kindled numerous revolutionary 
movements in almost the whole of Central Europe. At the same time it is historically attested 
that the revolutionary Hussite movement attempted in the period of the first crisis of Czech 
feudalism to make links with the Slavonic East. The Hussites sent their people to Russia to 
find support there for their great reforming movement. So one may say that the 
consciousness of the Slav origin of the Czechs was powerfully reinforced in the Hussite 
period. At that time the Czechs counted themselves members of a great Slav family. This 
consciousness was also manifested publicly, in particular in the manifesto to the Czech 
regions in 1420. Finally, a fifteenth-century anonymous writer, in the Kratke sebranie z 
kronik ceskych k vystraze vernych Cechov, quite openly encourages the Czechs to engage in 
this Slav politics. 
The revolutionary Hussite movement also intervened substantially in Czech cultural life, 
because never previously in Czech history, and perhaps never afterwards, do we meet with as 
powerful a popular uprising as precisely in the Hussite era. For the Hussite movement, which 
was the first manifestation of the great revolutionary strength of the Czech people, shattered 
the foundations of secular as well as ecclesiastical feudal power. At that time Czech feudal 
society experienced a serious internal crisis under the pressure of a powerful military 
intervention. This great change in social and political relationships, of course, also had a 
significant influence on the formation of medieval Czech culture, and it is reflected in all 
Czech art of the time, thus naturally also in music. Art and culture become accessible to 
broad strata of the people. Czech language and literature develop, using realistic and satirical 
47 Racek, Ceska hudba (1958 edn), pp. 36-37. 
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subject-matter. The knowledge and use of the Scriptures become general. Even the great 
opponent of the Hussites, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II), after his visit to 
Tabor in 1451 recognized the high level of education of the Czech people of the time. 
Even if Czech medieval culture is an expression of medieval scholastic mysticism, above 
all the Hussite movement struck deeply into the dogma of the Roman Church and forced a 
confrontation between the two. Even the ruler ceased to be an absolute monarch as a 
consequence of the Hussite movement. This serious crisis of feudalism was the consequence 
not only of social conflicts in the outside world, but also of domestic conflict between the 
urban poor and the predominantly German patriciate. With this revolution we decisively 
anticipated the revolutions that took place only later in neighbouring states, and indeed a 
whole century later than in Bohemia. In this it is necessary to consider also the great 
historical significance of the revolutionary Hussite movement. The Hussite struggle was 
supported by powerful patriotic enthusiasm and by this means exerted a decisive influence on 
the further development of questions of nationality in the Bohemian Lands. Czech national 
self-consciousness was strengthened, which led also to an unprecedented reinforcement of 
Czech cultural self-reliance and linguistic purity. The struggle of the Czech people against 
secular and ecclesiastical feudalism, and also against social serfdom, lasted for almost the 
entire Middle Ages. The Hussite Wars, which were a patriotic war of the Czech peasants and 
people against the sovereign power of the hierarchy of the Holy Roman Emperor, the 
aristocracy and the German urban patriciate, rooted a revolutionary tradition in our nation 
which became the dominant motif of all the Czech struggles of liberation and of principled 
ideological action, and also in the field of culture. 
This principled action is manifested particularly clearly in music, and specifically in 
Hussite hymn and polemical, political song. Hence we may explain the otherwise surprising 
fact that at the time when European music concludes the great epoch of the ars nova and 
passes to the new stylistic area of Netherlandish polyphony, there is created in Bohemia 
under the powerful influence of the popular Hussite movement a new epoch of Hussite 
monophonic song: the Hussite sacred and polemical folk-song.48 
A substantially different vision of the period is provided in the interpolation; and yet the 
original text proceeds almost unchanged, with all its original assumptions and prejudices, 
once the interpolation is past. 
In summary, then, it may be said that the reconstruction of Czech music history along a 
particular type of Marxist lines was always very likely, given the dominance of Zdenek 
Nejedly in the field for a full generation before the Communists came to power after the 
war — a scholar and politician whose interpretations were forceful, politically serviceable, 
and scarcely avoidable by any scholar who wished to see findings in print. This 
reconstruction was put into effect in a process stretching over more than ten years after the 
war. During this time, Jan Racek (no doubt like others) gradually and increasingly placed 
himself at the disposal of an ideology whose rhetoric soon became more strident and 
triumphalist. The result was, most obviously, a music history with Nejedly’s own favourite 
Hussite period as a key turning point, interpreted in a way (again largely due to Nejedly) 
which places music at a central position within cultural history as a whole; this is the 
characteristic twentieth-century Czechoslovak re-interpretation of the Romantic 
commonplace, concerning the innate musicality of the Bohemians, which I cited at the 
beginning of this chapter. It was also a music history in which Nejedly’s central age of 
darkness received a good deal of attention, partly because of Nejedly’s own Marxist 
interpretation of that period and partly because Racek was a Baroque specialist. This 
development opened the way to more than one generation of intensive research into the 
Czech Baroque in music — something that has placed an indelible stamp on Czech 
musicology. 
48 Ibid., pp. 32-33. 
35 Reflections of Ideological Values in 
the Standard Concise Dictionary of 
Czech (1937-52) 
Tom Dickins 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of the ‘ideological’ implications and directions of four 
editions of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho (Dictionary of the Czech Language), spanning a period 
of fifteen years and embracing four radically different political systems, from the end of 
the Czechoslovak First Republic to the beginning of the Communist regime.1 The 
dictionaries in question, henceforth generally referred to as Vasa-Travnicek (1937), Vasa- 
Travnicek (1941), Vasa-Travnicek (1946) and Travnicek (1952), serve to illuminate a 
number of the prevailing linguistic referents relating to the cultural, socio-political and 
economic norms of the times. They also offer an insight into the existing (generally 
accepted or officially sanctioned) interpretations of the history of the Czech (and Slovak) 
people and provide an indication of the influences of state-controlled censorship and of 
self-censorship on the lexicographical process. 
I show to what extent and in what ways lexicography portrayed the past and sought to 
reflect (and perhaps even to modulate people’s perceptions of) the changing realities of the 
period. A supplementary objective is to illuminate the role played by the lexicographers 
themselves and to consider their motives and the influence they brought to bear on the 
character and emphases of the different editions of the dictionary. The chapter thus focuses 
on areas of vocabulary broadly connected with the country’s evolution, with abstract ideas 
and concepts, with ‘philosophical’ and artistic trends and with a wide range of social and 
linguistic phenomena determined by political developments. 
It is taken as axiomatic that all developed society is run according to a set of values and 
ideas that broadly constitute an ideology (or competing ideologies). Any study of 
ideological values will inevitably be tainted by the author’s own experiences and 
preconceptions and will always entail a degree of subjectivity. However, despite the 
difficulty of achieving an impartial analytical perspective, it is possible to make reasonably 
balanced deductions about the ideological implications of dictionary entries on the basis of 
detailed comparison with other editions of a dictionary and through reference to 
appropriate historical and political studies. It would also seem legitimate to include 
informed speculation, where circumstantial evidence and the influence of Vasa and 
Travnicek’s personal views strongly indicate a particular interpretation. 
This chapter does not seek to offer a definitive explanation of the term ‘ideology’ since, 
as Terry Eagleton observes in the opening line of his work, Ideology: An Introduction, 
‘Nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology’.2 The 
1 The dictionaries are: Pavel Vasa and Frantisek Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 1st edn, 
Prague, 1937, 2 vols, 1747 pp.; Pavel Vasa and Frantisek Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 
2nd edn, Prague, 1941, 1 vol., 1671 pp.; Pavel Vasa and Frantisek TravniCek, Slovnik jazyka 
ceskeho, 3rd edn, Prague, 1946, 1 vol., 1765 pp.; and Frantisek Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka 
ceskeho, 4th edn, Prague, 1952, 1 vol., 1801 pp. The print-runs for the 1937, 1941, 1946 and 
1952 editions of the dictionary were 20,000, 10,000, 10,000 and 50,750, respectively. 
2 Terry Eagleton, Ideology: An Introduction, London and New York, 1991, p. 1. 
359 
360 The Phoney Peace 
metalanguage employed in any explanation of ‘ideology’ will almost invariably include 
terminology whose meaning is in itself dependent on a series of unavoidably subjective 
cultural and socio-political presuppositions. Suffice it to say that any working definition 
should include at least some reference to the notion of ideas and values exerting a decisive 
influence on the character of a given society or on the judgements of an individual. This 
study will confine itself to the definitions proposed by three concise dictionaries: (1) (i) 
‘the system of ideas at the basis of an economic or political theory (Marxist ideology)', (ii) 
‘the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or individual (bourgeois ideology)’ (The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, Oxford, 1995), (2) ‘a body of ideas that 
reflects the beliefs of a nation, political system, class, etc.’ (Collins Concise Dictionary, 
Glasgow, 1995), and (3) (out of deference to the dictionary under discussion): ‘the science 
of ideas and of the “ideational” aspect of something, a series of conceptions, a way of 
thinking: Marxist, German [...] ideology’, (Slovnlkjazyka ceskeho, 1941, 1946 and 1952).3 
The second, third and fourth editions of Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho, revised by Travnicek, 
are broadly similar in terms of their overall content since they all draw heavily on the first 
edition of the dictionary. However, there are distinct ideological differences between the 
four editions (especially between the first and second editions, on the one hand, and 
between the third and fourth editions, on the other). The first edition of the dictionary has 
something of the character of an encyclopaedic dictionary (but without illustrations) and 
would appear to have been largely the work of Pavel Vasa.4 The second, third and fourth 
editions have more in common with traditional concise dictionaries. All four dictionaries 
include lexical innovation in an attempt both to ‘modernize’ language and to reflect 
changing socio-political and ideological values. Vasa-Travnicek (1941) illustrates the 
parameters of the Germans’ lexicographical tolerance in the Protectorate of Bohemia and 
Moravia, while Travnicek was able to demonstrate his commitment to Communism in 
1952 through a combination of selective omission, the introduction of new terminology 
and the re-definition of a number of existing entries (which was deemed to be sufficiently 
in keeping with the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to merit official 
approval).5 Whatever Travnicek’s personal convictions, he did not at any time engage in 
such excessive censorship or indulge in so much propagandizing as to impair seriously the 
merits of the first edition. 
VdSa-Travnicek (1937) was the first concise Czech-Czech dictionary available to the 
wider public, thus representing a major contribution to corpus planning and to the 
systematization of usage.6 Although it is now dated and includes numerous idiosyncrasies, 
it has arguably only ever been surpassed by Vasa-Travnicek (1946).7 When T. G. Masaryk 
3 The division of ideology into ‘Marxist’ and ‘bourgeois’ is helpful, but it tends to obscure the 
existence of alternative ideologies, such as Nazism (referred to in the definition suggested by 
Slovnik jazyka ceskeho). 
4 Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 1937, is replete with proper names and foreign terms and includes a 
great many references to the Habsburg Monarchy and the National Revival. The input of Pavel 
Vasa into Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 1952, was not officially recognized at the time and legal 
proceedings were taken out against Frantisek Travnicek in the 1960s to win de jure recognition 
of Vasa’s contribution. Reluctance to give official credit to Pavel Vasa, who was a committed 
Christian, might in part explain why there were no further editions of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho 
after 1952. 
5 Travnicek was awarded the Klement Gottwald State Prize in 1948, at least partly in recognition 
of his political services, and he was rector of Brno University from 1948 to 1959. 
6 The fact that the first edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho sold out within two years testifies to the 
level of popular demand for a concise dictionary. 
The successor to Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, edited by Josef Filipec and Frantisek Danes, Slovnik 
spisovne destiny pro skolu a verejnost, Prague, 1978, 799 pp., is somewhat more theoretical and 
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read of the forthcoming publication of Vasa-Travnicek (1937) he was unambiguous in his 
enthusiasm: ‘Today so many people preach about their love for the nation but, I ask you, 
what sort of unattractive and uneducated language do they use when they preach. They call 
it patriotism, and yet we do not even have a decent, practical dictionary of our own 
language. You have to speak Czech well before you can think well in Czech. A good 
dictionary of this sort will be of greater service to the nation than many of the so-called 
patriotic slogans’.* * * * * 8 
Masaryk was undoubtedly right to highlight the importance of Vasa-Travnicek (1937) in 
terms of standardizing lexical usage and increasing people’s range of vocabulary. 
However, a cautionary note needs to be added about the extent to which any dictionary can 
enhance conceptual awareness. Dictionaries exert a limited influence on the way in which 
an individual manipulates or interprets language. Dictionary definitions may arguably 
contribute in a small measure to the user’s perception of the world through reinforcing 
understanding of abstract meaning and by implying the relative status of an entry. 
Furthermore, dictionaries can help to develop and to extend the applications and semantic 
range of existing terminology and can even introduce new and unfamiliar terms to the user. 
However, since the function of dictionaries is primarily to reflect lexical change rather than 
to initiate it, they only make a minimal contribution to the task of re-educating the public 
and re-moulding national consciousness. 
Dictionaries have a symbolic significance which extends well beyond their practical 
impact on linguistic behaviour. They carry an unparalleled (if somewhat questionable) 
authority which legitimizes lexical innovation and they serve as the main arbiter in all 
forms of metalinguistic discussion. The Czech Communists understood the role played by 
language in mediating socio-political and economic change and thus appreciated the value 
of codifying the new linguistic norms which they regarded as a defining and irreversible 
feature of socialist life. Travnicek cites ‘the great Stalin’ in his (predictably doctrinaire) 
foreword to the 1952 edition: ‘The lexicon has changed in the sense that it has been 
supplemented by a considerable number of new words and phrases, which have arisen as a 
result of the emergence of new socialist production and the new state, new socialist 
culture, a new style of social life, a new morality, and finally as a result of a growth of 
technology and science. There has been a change in the meaning of a series of words and 
phrases which have assumed a new everlasting significance.’9 
This study begins with a general introduction to lexicography and terminology 
processing and then offers a detailed overview of the content of each of the dictionaries. 
The remainder of the text provides an analysis of a range of individual lexical items and 
phrases, which are sub-divided into four categories: (i) pre-1918 history and the 
development of the Czechoslovak state, (ii) politics and contemporaneous society, (iii) 
neologisms, loan-words and other attributed terms and definitions, and (iv) religion, 
philosophy and the arts. Ideologically motivated omissions are accorded a similar status to 
politically inspired re-definitions and some attention is paid to other seemingly deliberate 
omissions, to apparent oversights and to a variety of barely explicable anomalies. 
includes far more technical entries, but omits encyclopaedic references. For a useful brief 
summary of the main differences in approach, see David Short, Czechoslovakia, Oxford, Santa 
Barbara, CA and Denver, CO, 1986, p. 209. See also David Short’s comprehensive review of 
Slovnik spisovne destiny pro skolu a verejnost in the Slavonic and East European Review, 58, 
1980, l,pp. 106-08. 
8 Vasa and Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 1937, p. 1. 
9 Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 1952, pp. ix-x. 
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Comments on Lexicography and Terminology Processing 
Lexicographers have traditionally relied on a number of (mainly written) canonical 
sources, including other dictionaries, language journals, translations and literary works to 
define the content of a new dictionary. In this respect Vasa-Travnicek (1937) is typical. 
However, where a radical transition in society intervenes to disrupt the lexicographical 
process, dictionary writers may be obliged to re-define or omit existing terms and to 
extend the range of vocabulary available in order to conform with and to convey the new 
realities. Travnicek was faced with this situation on three separate occasions, in 1941, 1946 
and, most notably, in 1952. After the Communist take-over in 1948, Travnicek sought to 
re-write Slovnik jazyka ceskeho in the spirit of Stalinism, whilst simultaneously 
acknowledging the influence of the Czechs’ ‘bourgeois’ cultural and political heritage. 
Travnicek was clearly not responsible for determining the exact nature of the lexical 
changes but his interpretation of the new norms none the less contributed significantly to 
Czech language planning. 
Robert Cooper summarizes the options open to linguists charged with the task of lexical 
innovation, as follows: ‘When language planners choose to coin a new term rather than 
approve an existing one, they face two alternatives: (1) build the term from indigenous 
sources, either by (a) giving a new meaning to an existing word, (b) creating a term based 
on an indigenous root, or (c) translating a foreign term (creating a loan translation) or (2) 
borrow a word from a foreign language.’10 Travnicek (1952) includes a wide range of new 
terms based on indigenous sources and of Russian loan-words relating specifically to 
Soviet reality and to the political concepts of Marxism-Leninism. The user is made keenly 
aware of the new ‘socialist’ vocabulary, but is not necessarily fully apprised of all its 
implications. However good a dictionary may be, it can only shed limited light on new and 
unfamiliar concepts since the language used in dictionary definitions is inevitably 
somewhat self-referential and paraphrastic. 
Dictionaries are primarily a source of lexical information and much less a sociological or 
linguistic tool. While they might serve to extend speakers’ lexical range, they do not 
change or re-organize thought. As Ronald Wells points out, ‘Arguments that a dictionary 
“shapes” the language, and the corollary notions that a dictionary sets or preserves a 
standard of usage, are relics from an age that fervently yearned for a rational cosmic order’ 
— like the Marxist-Leninists.* 11 Dictionaries such as Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, which are not 
based on a statistically viable corpus, do not even necessarily reflect with any degree of 
accuracy the linguistic norms of the day. 
Semanticists and pragmaticists, in particular, have been keen to highlight the 
inaccuracies and the practical limitations of dictionary definitions. Saeed sums up the three 
major difficulties or ‘challenges’ associated with dictionary definitions as (i) the problem 
of circularity (the constraints imposed on the user by the linguistic system in which he or 
she operates), (ii) the question of exactness (establishing whether linguistic knowledge 
differs from general knowledge), and (iii) the role of context (the meaning of an utterance 
in a given situation).12 Since dictionaries deal largely in abstractions (indeterminate words 
or phrases removed from the sentence as a whole), they cannot offer a precise semantic 
analysis of a lexeme.13 Most dictionary entries suggest the potential meaning of a word or 
10 Robert L. Cooper, Language Planning and Social Change, New York, Port Chester, NY, 
Melbourne and Sydney, 1989, p. 151. 
11 Ronald A. Wells, Dictionaries and the Authoritarian Tradition, The Hague and Paris, 1973, 
p. 119. 
12 John I. Saeed, Semantics, Oxford, 1997, pp. 6-7. 
13 See Howard Jackson, Words and their Meaning, New York, 1988, p. 126. 
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phrase in the system of language and inevitably ignore contextual meaning and the force of 
the utterance (that is, the speaker’s intention).14 Naess has argued that dictionaries also 
avoid specific reference to the S-relation (semiotic relation) between the definiendum (the 
‘designation’) and the defmiens (the dictionary entry). In Naess’s terminology the S- 
relation is ‘the one usually referred to by saying that a designation “expresses” a concept’ 
(except where the definiendum is conceived of as a class of objects, rather than as a single 
concept, for example democracies as opposed to democracy)}5 
Despite the factors which suggest the limitations of lexicography as a means of defining 
language, the content, structure and methodology of dictionaries do matter. Dictionary 
writers are in a unique position to establish a hierarchy of lexical items and to highlight the 
significance of socio-political concepts and historical events. Of paramount importance are 
the lexicographers’ initial selection of entries, the wording and length of the definitions, 
the introduction of new definitions, the decision to attribute (or avoid attributing) a 
linguistic form or phrase to a public figure and the repetition of certain key terms. In the 
context of this study, the repeated references to (statni) prevrat v roce 1918 (the state coup 
in 1918, ‘the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic’) in Vasa-Travmcek (1937) and 
v tridni spolecnosti (in a class society) in Travnicek (1952) are especially significant.16 
Other devices which may be employed to suggest the socio-political direction of the 
dictionary and the status of the various entries include parenthetic qualifications, italics, 
inverted commas and the capitalization of initial letters. Much of the ‘ideological’ content 
of a dictionary resides in the detail. Dictionaries may not offer the scope of a textbook or a 
political pamphlet to re-interpret past and present realities, but unlike other publications 
they are a constant source of reference and users tend to trust them implicitly. 
All four editions of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho manifest a number of methods for defining 
lexical items, of which the most important are probably the combinations of synonym and 
description, analysis and description, and synonym and analysis. Sager identifies seven 
discrete types of dictionary definition: definition by (i) analysis, (ii) synonyms, (iii) 
paraphrase, (iv) synthesis (identify ing relations, or description), (v) implication (using the 
word in an explicative context), (vi) denotation (listing examples, by extension), and (vii) 
demonstration (ostensive definition).17 Vasa and Travnicek make quite extensive use of 
14 See, for example, Jenny Thomas, Aleaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics, 
London and New York, 1996, pp. 2-4, and V. N. Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language, translated by Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik, Cambridge, MA and London, 
1992, pp. 101-02. 
15 In cases where the definiendum is conceived as a class of objects, ‘The defmiens may be some 
properties, and the S-relation may accordingly be a relation between a class of objects and 
certain properties of all the objects of that class’. See Arne Naess and associates, Jens A. 
Christophersen and Kjell Kvalo, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity, Oslo and Oxford, 1956, 
pp. 30-32. 
16 Headwords, which are given in italics, appear in the order of the dictionary entries, where 
appropriate. Translations of headwords, if required, are given in brackets in roman and may be 
followed by the dictionary definitions in inverted commas. A definition in square brackets 
(within the round brackets) either denotes the use of round brackets in the original entry or my 
translation or clarification of a term where the Czech definition does not suggest an obvious 
equivalent or is unclear or where no explanation or description is offered in the original. 
Ellipses [...] are occasionally used to indicate the omission of a part of a definition which is not 
considered relevant in the context of this chapter. Where there is a loan-word from another 
language, the language appears in roman, followed by a colon. 
17 Juan C. Sager, A Practical Course in Terminology Processing, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 
PA, 1990, pp. 42-43. 
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definition by analysis, synonyms and synthesis and they also include paraphrase and 
implication, but they exclude altogether definition by denotation and demonstration. 
Naess has considered the problem of defining one of the terms referred to in this study, 
namely ‘democracy’, and has reached the conclusion that the analyst cannot avoid 
appearing as a participant in the ideological debate. He argues that there are three broad 
categories of definition for a term such as ‘democracy’: (i) ‘normative’ (regulating usage 
within a certain intended field of application), (ii) ‘descriptive’ (describing usage, past or 
present, within a certain class of situations or persons), (iii) ‘real’ (giving a condensed 
characterization covering all denotata of the term).18 The definitions suggested in the 
majority of dictionaries, including Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, tend to belong to the descriptive 
category. However, Travnicek (1952), in accordance with Zhdanov’s concept of 
‘revolutionary romanticism’, occasionally opts for a normative definition: instead of 
relying on an established precedent to determine meaning, he focuses on the future use or 
interpretation of a designation (on reality as it should be and not as it is). 
The differences between the methodological approaches of the four editions of Slovnik 
jazyka ceskeho are on the whole marginal and generally reflect established lexicographical 
conventions rather than a coherent policy determined by ideological precepts. Hence, this 
chapter avoids detailed discussion of the theory of terminology processing and, instead, 
concentrates on those characteristics which serve both to distinguish one edition from the 
others and to suggest some of the prevailing values of society from the mid-1930s to the 
early 1950s. 
Outline of the Content o/Slovnik jazyka ceskeho 
The first edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho (1937) has a strong cultural, literary and socio¬ 
political orientation, with a great many of the entries either referring or attributed to well- 
known Czech writers. Vasa and Travnicek point out in their Introduction that they had 
actually found it necessary to reduce the ‘cultural’ content originally planned and, in 
particular, the number of references to proper nouns (especially names).19 The dictionary 
nevertheless suggests a long-established tradition in which language is the most profound 
expression of the nation’s identity and, by extension, is a major justification for the 
creation of an independent state.20 Vasa-Travnicek (1937) includes numerous allusions to 
events in Czechoslovak history and tends to draw on examples relating to Czech realities 
(with comparatively little explicit reference to Slovakia). Not surprisingly, a special status 
is accorded to Masaryk and to the establishment of the Czechoslovak state in 1918, for 
example 28. rijen 1918 je meznikem v cs. dejinach (28 October 1918 is a turning-point in 
Czechoslovak history). The content suggests broad support for the (liberal democratic) 
values of the First Republic and implies a rejection of the Habsburg Monarchy through 
criticism of the upper classes and German hegemony, for example aristokracie (‘governing 
body [against the monarchy (sic) and democracy]’), demokracie (‘government of the 
18 Naess, Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity, pp. 26-27. 
19 Vasa and Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, 1937, p. v. 
20 Interestingly, Vaclav Havel implies in his play Vyrozumeni (The Memorandum, 1965) that 
totalitarianism reduces language to a form of non-communication which serves to undermine 
the concept of individual and national identity. The play centres on a memorandum written in 
an artificial (bureaucratic and ‘totalitarian’) language called ptydepe which proves to be a 
directive tor the dissolution of an entire programme called ptydepe. As Robert Pynsent has 
observed in Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality. 
London, New York and Budapest, 1994, p. 34, ‘Since identity must always be communicated 
before it can exist in any meaningful sense, and since the most common form of 
communication is verbal, ptydepe might be called an expression of non-identity.’ 
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people against the monarchy etc.’), nadpravi (precedence, ‘unjust claims by the Germans 
in old Austria’), lid (the people, ‘the non-aristocrats against the aristocracy’) and obecny 
lid (the common people, ‘ordinary people against the upper classes’).21 References to the 
First World War feature quite prominently, for example setnina Nazdar (‘Czech Company 
of the Foreign Legion during the Great War’) and cs. zahranicni odboj (za svetove vdlky) 
(Czech foreign resistance [during the Great War]). There are also several references, 
understandably rather non-committal in character, to the ‘German question’, for example 
anschluss (‘expression designating an attempt at or the possibility of annexing Austria to 
Germany’), hakenkrajc (German swastika, ‘symbol of the new German movement called 
hakenkrajclerstvF), narodnost (nationality, ‘nation, especially the part of a nation in a state 
where another nation has supremacy: the German “nation” in Czechoslovakia’) and Treti 
rise (Third Reich, ‘Germany under Hitler’). 
Much of the emphasis in the dictionary is on Czech ‘themes’, but it is not parochial. A 
significant number of the entries relate to foreign cultural, geographical and historical 
phenomena and the dictionary also includes dozens of loan-words and caiques (usually 
from German, French, English, Italian or Russian, and sometimes courtesy of the Czecho¬ 
slovak Legions). A high proportion of the ‘cultural’ allusions inevitably reflect the 
Czechs’ long-established links with Germany, for example ucil jsem se idiomu svych 
predku (o ponemcenem Cechovi) (I learnt the idiom of my forebears [about a germanized 
Czech]), kurs nemciny (a course in German), podreknouti se nemcinou (to slip into 
German, ‘to switch to the language of one’s forebears and divulge that it is more common 
than Czech’) and styky Cechii s Nemci (Czechs’ relations with the Germans). 
Although Czech-German relations had been problematic prior to 1918, Masaryk had 
consistently opposed the Slavophil tendencies of many of his compatriots and had rejected 
the notion of Russian authoritarianism as a bulwark against German imperialism. Jacques 
Rupnik, amongst others, has been at pains to stress the Western ‘bourgeois’ orientation of 
the Czechs in the First Republic: ‘Czechoslovakia was, between the wars, the most 
unabashedly middle-class society, looking westwards in terms both of trade and of 
culture’.22 This may be partially confirmed by English terms such as cash, Christian 
science, diehards (‘name of the extreme right wing of the British Conservative Party, 
derived from the military slogan “die hard!”’), hands off and homerule and by French 
phrases such as c’est la guerre (‘war is war’), Dieu et mon droit (‘God and my right, the 
slogan of British kings’), enfant terrible and fait accompli, none of which, incidentally, 
appears in later editions of the dictionary. 
However, Vasa-Travnlcek (1937) also includes innumerable references to the Czecho¬ 
slovak legionaries in Russia, for example legionari prosli celou Sibiri (the Czecho-Slovak 
legionaries made their way across the whole of Siberia), udychany (dobrovolnik) 
(‘volunteer who joined the Russian Legions only in 1918’) and upoceny / upocenec 
(‘volunteer who joined the Legions only at the time of their departure from Russia’) and 
several allusions to Soviet Communism, for example eser (plural eseri) (‘Russian Socialist 
Revolutionaries [now in emigration]’) and kulak (‘smallholders and enemies [sic] of the 
Soviets’). The definitions in entries relating to the Soviet Union are characterized by an 
understated neutrality and are as disengaged as to give virtually no intimation of the terror 
of Stalinism. By the mid-1930s the Czechs were again primarily preoccupied with the 
Germans and were little inclined to reflect on the shortcomings of lands populated largely 
by fellow Slavs. 
21 Until the First World War Masaryk had believed that it might still be possible to achieve a 
satisfactory compromise ensuring the Czechs autonomy within Austria; see, for example, J. W. 
Bruegel, Czechoslovakia Before Munich, Cambridge, 1973, p. 7. 
22 Jacques Rupnik, The Other Europe, London, 1989, p. 16. 
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Terms connected with philosophy, the arts and religion appear in large numbers in Vasa- 
Travnicek (1937). There are a great many references to the Christian faith, in particular 
expressions and quotations from the Bible. The compilers include several references to 
Judaism and to the changing perceptions of the Jews amongst German speakers in the mid- 
to late 1930s, for example asemitismus (‘movement with the aim of defending Christian 
people against Semitic influence; a more moderate form of antisemitism’) and Nearijec 
(Non-Aryan, ‘according to today’s conception often a Semite, Jew’). All four editions of 
Slovnik jazyka ceskeho are weak on definitions of a more theoretical nature (for example, 
linguistic, technological terminology). Furthermore, economic issues are not addressed in 
great detail in any edition of the dictionary, although reference is made to some of the most 
successful Czech and German firms, for example AEG, Agfa, Bafa and Vcela (1937, 1941 
and 1946 editions), and to a number of capitalist concepts, for example merkantilismus 
(‘economic view that precious metals, production and trade are the main source of 
prosperity’) and taylorismus (‘American work system [devised by the American engineer 
Taylor]’) (all editions). 
Vasa-Travnicek (1941) is important primarily for three reasons: (i) because the decision 
to publish the dictionary under the German Protectorate lent an official seal of legitimacy 
to the Czech language, (ii) because of the light which the dictionary sheds on the limits of 
cultural tolerance at this time, and (iii) because the dictionary largely defined the content 
of Vasa-Travnicek (1946) and strongly influenced Travnicek (1952). Vasa-Travnicek 
(1941) did not serve any overtly propagandistic purposes since it explicitly avoided 
allusions to the structures, concepts and slogans of Nazism and, indeed, contained hardly 
any entries which identified it as the product of the Occupation.23 
To Travnicek’s credit, he does not appear to have made too many unnecessary 
compromises with the censors in 1941. He was able to take advantage of the fact that 
Nazism was not underpinned by such a coherent or rigid ideology as, say, Soviet 
Communism. Vasa-Travnicek (1941) was the only edition of the dictionary to merit a 
review in any of the serious linguistic journals and the reviewer, Mathesius, chose to lay 
particular stress on the contribution made by dictionaries to the nation’s linguistic heritage. 
The review describes the dictionary as ‘a significant achievement for our language 
culture’, and praises both Vasa for the core material which he had gathered over a period 
of twenty years and Travnicek for his more recent involvement.24 
The German censors or their Czech lackeys seem to have taken the pragmatic view that, 
although a new edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho might not significantly help to further 
their cause, it would at least ‘set the record straight’ by deleting a number of potentially 
problematic entries from the first edition. The vast majority of references to famous people 
is thus removed (except where the names are used adjectivally or as part of an abstract 
noun), so too are numerous details which might be taken to represent Czechoslovak history 
as a process of liberation from the Germans. Vasa-Travnicek (1941) also seeks to 
minimize the extent of the links between the Czechs and the Russians by excluding 
specific reference to the Czecho-Slovak Legions and their role in the First World War. 
Although the second edition of the dictionary was completed by February 1941 (about four 
months before the German invasion of the USSR), it still conveys some of the prevailing 
anti-Soviet sentiments (which reflected Hitler’s own long-held hostility to the Soviet 
Union). Compare, for example, the definitions of bolsevik: (‘derived from ‘bolsij’ ' = 
greater; Bolsheviks was the name for the supporters of the former Russian Social- 
Democratic Party opposed to the Mensheviks, the minority’), Vasa-Travnicek (1937); 
23 There are no references to any Nazi terminology or to imposed social and political norms. 
24 Bohumil Mathesius, ‘Slovnik jazyka ceskeho’, Slovo a slovesnost, 7, 1941, p. 168. 
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(‘member of Russian extremist Communist Party; from ‘bolsij’ = greater, the majority’), 
Vasa-Travnicek (1941, 1946).25 
Vasa-Travnicek (1946) again omits nearly all reference to specific individuals and to 
their biographical details, and appears at least partially to acknowledge the validity of the 
reassessment of the past in Vasa-Travnicek (1941). There are very few references to the 
Czecho-Slovak legionaries and the First Republic is almost entirely ignored, thereby 
suggesting Travnicek’s personal rejection of the values and the legacy of the ‘bourgeois’ 
state. Amongst the most glaring omissions are references to Masaryk himself, such as 
masarykovsky duch (the spirit of Masaryk) and to the foundation of the state, for example 
washingtonska deklarace (Washington Declaration, ‘proclamation of Czechoslovak 
independence on 18/10/1918’) (the examples cited here are from the 1937 edition). 
It is possible that some of the omissions from the third edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho 
were simply oversights, since Travnicek must have been under considerable pressure to 
finish his revisions of the dictionary by the summer of 1946. However, there appears to be 
too consistent a pattern to the themes excluded from Vasa-Travnicek (1946) for it to be 
pure chance. Travnicek managed to find time to attribute sources for a wide range of new 
entries not acknowledged in the previous edition of the dictionary and he specifically 
highlights in his Foreword the importance and scope of the changes which he had been 
able to incorporate.26 It would seem very strange that terms relating to the period of 
German rule, such as hachovstina (‘Hacha’s policies, especially humiliating the weak’), 
henleinovec (‘supporter of the “Hitlerite” policies of Henlein’) and, indeed, nacismus 
(‘German National Socialism’), should take precedence over entries celebrating the 
creation of an independent Czechoslovak state, unless the selection of material was in 
some way ideologically motivated. On the face of it, post-war Czechoslovakia was a 
parliamentary democracy, but it had very strong socialist leanings and many people felt a 
profound sense of disillusion with the British and French for their complicity in the 
Munich Agreement, which paved the way for the Occupation.27 Those Czechs who had 
expressed pro-Russian sympathies in the First Republic felt that their views had been 
vindicated. 
25 It seems unlikely that Travnicek, who was known for his left-wing sympathies, would have 
described the Bolsheviks as 'extremist' had he not felt under an obligation to do so. The fact 
that the same definition is retained in Vasa-Travnicek (1946) would appear to have been an 
oversight rather than proof that Travnicek underwent a last-minute conversion to Soviet-style 
socialism in the late 1940s. 
26 Vasa-Travnicek (1946) contains all the entries attributed to public figures in Vasa-Travnicek 
(1941) and around thirty additional sources not included in the second edition of the dictionary. 
Amongst the names acknowledged in the 1946 edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, but not the 
1941 edition, are Pavel Eisner, Egon Hostovsky, Karel Hynek Macha, Vaclav Rezac and 
Edvard Valenta, of whom only Hostovsky appears in Vasa-Travnicek (1937). Public figures 
acknowledged by Vasa-Travnicek (1946) but omitted in the fourth edition of the dictionary 
include the economist K. Englis, the philosophers J. L. Fischer and Josef K. Kratochvil, the 
liberal politician and first prime minister Karel Kramar and the historian Frantisek Sembera. 
27 Only parties approved by the National Front (the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the Social 
Democratic Party, the National Socialist Party, the (Catholic) People’s Party, and the Slovak 
Communist Party [KSS], the Slovak Social Democratic (or Labour) Party [SSD], the Slovak 
Democratic Party [SDP] and the Slovak Freedom Party [SSS]) were allowed to put up 
candidates in the May 1946 elections. The Communists achieved 37.94 per cent of the total 
vote in Czechoslovakia, 40.7 per cent of the vote in Bohemia and Moravia, and 30.48 per cent 
in Slovakia. See, for example, Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luza (eds), A History of the 
Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948, Princeton, NJ, 1973, pp. 404-05. 
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After the Communist seizure of power in February 1948 Travnicek clearly found it 
expedient to persist with a number of the policies adopted in 1941 and 1946, such as the 
decision to omit any proper names relating to people. The inclusion of biographical 
information in Slovnik jazyka ceskeho (1952), especially where people were still living, 
would have posed editorial problems and may even have entailed an element of risk for the 
author. At the time of the publication of the fourth edition of the dictionary the highest 
ranks of the Communist Party, including the Deputy Prime Minister, Rudolf Slansky, were 
in the process of being purged. Of the list of public figures acknowledged as sources on 
pages XIII to XV of Travnicek (1952) none appears to have been a major victim of the 
purges, although Marie Svermova, wife of Jan Sverma, one of the leaders of the Slovak 
National Uprising in 1944, was expelled from the Party in 1951 and sentenced to life 
imprisonment in 1954.28 
The final edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho testifies both to the victory of Soviet-style 
socialism and, perhaps paradoxically, to the limitations of ideologically motivated 
lexicographical reforms, especially when they are based on existing editions of an 
established dictionary. Travnicek (1952) contains sufficient lexical innovation to identify it 
as the product of a radically different political system. Yet, in order to reflect more 
accurately the official interpretation of history and the imposed values of his day, 
Travnicek would have needed to abandon earlier editions of the dictionary altogether and 
embark on a new and ambitious scheme, more along the lines of Slovnik spisovneho jazyka 
ceskeho (Dictionary of the Czech Literary Language) (1960-71) or Slovnik spisovne 
destiny pro skolu a verejnost (Dictionary of Literary Czech for Schools and the General 
Public) (1978). 
In his Foreword to the dictionary Travnicek asks his users to decide for themselves how 
successfully he has demonstrated Stalin’s words that ‘language makes it possible to change 
a person’s views’.29 Any analysis of Travnicek (1952) would have to conclude that the 
author fails to produce a dictionary which embraces the new lexical norms enthusiastically 
enough to indicate an unequivocal commitment to the goal of re-interpreting reality. For all 
Travnicek’s omissions, attempted re-definitions and new entries, the 1952 edition of 
Slovnik jazyka ceskeho still owes far more to the earlier editions of the dictionary than it 
does to the engaged rhetoric and emotive cliches of Stalinism. 
Granted, there are a few purely propagandistic entries, such as slingovstina (‘the 
methods of work and conduct of Otto Sling, an enemy and betrayer of socialism’), 
titovstina (‘Tito’s policies in Yugoslavia in the service of imperialism’) and trumanovec 
(‘supporter of the imperialist policies of the American President Truman’). Travnicek 
likewise proposes a number of uncharacteristically crude and unscholarly definitions, for 
example mnichovak (‘person agreeing with the bourgeois policies of the First Republic, 
which led to Munich and to the extinction of the Czechoslovak Republic’), Panevropa = 
‘Vseevropa’ (pan-Europe, ‘imperialist struggles directed against the Soviet Union’) or 
sionismus (‘reactionary Jewish attempts to set up a bourgeois state in Palestine’). 
Furthermore, he clearly curries official favour by acknowledging eminent Communists 
such as Gottwald, Zapotocky and Stalin. Amongst the most striking ‘Gottwaldisms’ are 
28 For a comprehensive account of the show trials, see Jin Pelikan (ed.), The Czechoslovak 
Political Trials, 1950-1954, London, 1971. The leading ideologues acknowledged by 
Travnicek are Klement Gottwald (Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1929—53), 
Vaclav Kopecky (Minister of Information, 1945-53), Zdenek Nejedly (Minister of Education, 
Science and Art, 1948-53), Ladislav Stoll (Deputy Minister of Education, 1952-53), Jiri Taufer 
(Deputy Minister of Information, 1950-53) and Antonin Zapotocky (Minister President, 1948— 
53). 
29 Travnicek, Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, p. X. 
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dalekosahlost ([political] adventurism), kanonenfutr (cannon-fodder, ‘soldiers sacrificed 
for the class interests of the ruling exploitative class’), lihobaron (‘capitalist in the 
distilling business’) and pazravy americky imperialismus (voracious American imper¬ 
ialism), while quotations from and references to the Soviet leader include narod (nation, 
Stalin: ‘commonality of language and culture, and also territory and mental disposition, 
which has arisen historically, manifesting itself in commonality of culture’), praporecnik 
miru (standard-bearer of peace [about Stalin]) and preskok z jedne kvality do druhe (Stalin: 
a leap from one standard of quality to another). Nevertheless, however eye-catching these 
distortions and idiosyncrasies may be, they are not indicative of the tone or content of the 
dictionary as a whole. 
What is most noteworthy about Travnicek (1952) is not the degree of ideological confor¬ 
mity demonstrated, but the extent to which the dictionary appears to uphold many of the 
established norms of the First Republic. At a time when Christians were undergoing severe 
persecution Travnicek retained nearly all the religious references, including several which 
might have been regarded by the Communists as peripheral or ideologically unsound, such 
as desatek = deset Otcenasu (Ten Lord’s Prayers), kniha knih = bible (the book of books = 
the Bible), prisahati pri zivem Bohu (to swear by the living God), z mrtvych vstaly Kristus 
(Christ resurrected from the dead) and vteleni Pana Jezise (the Incarnation of Jesus). 
Similarly, he persisted with a great many foreign terms, including anomalous English 
phrases such as all right, five o’clock tea, lawn-tennis and selfmademan, and with most of 
the entries attributed to Masaryk, including obrazopocta (‘veneration of icons’) and odvoj 
(‘denouement, development’), which first appeared in Vasa-Travnicek (1946). He also 
retained numerous apparently anachronistic terms, such as kolcakovstina (‘the machin¬ 
ations of the Siberian [White] Army of Admiral Kolchak’) and kornilovec (‘volunteer, 
soldier in Kornilov’s Russian army during the First World War’ [Kornilov = co-founder of 
the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army]). Both these terms, together with the noun kereristina 
(‘conduct in the spirit of Kerenski, a toady of the bourgeoisie’), which is only found in the 
fourth edition, served primarily to condemn class treachery. 
The user of Travnicek (1952) is left with the distinct impression that Travnicek’s grasp 
of revolutionary detail was somewhat patchy and that his commitment to change was not 
matched by a willingness to subject the lexicographical process to the same ideological 
strictures that he theoretically endorsed for society at large. Several of the references 
suggest only partial familiarity with the Soviet line, for example bakuninismus (‘the 
revolutionary teachings of the Russian Bakunin’) and zoscenkovstina (‘direction of literary 
art in the spirit of the Soviet writer Zoshchenko, distorting Soviet reality’) —Bakunin had 
rejected Marxist solutions and Zoshchenko’s work had been roundly condemned by the 
Soviet cultural establishment in 1946. 
Pre-1918 History and the Development of the Czechoslovak State 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937) is replete with references to Czech history and especially to the 
emergence of a radical intellectual opposition in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. Understandably, particular importance is attached to the Allies’ recognition of 
the Czechoslovak National Council on 18 October 1918 and to the foundation of the 
independent Czechoslovak Republic ten days later. 
Several of the key figures of the National Revival are mentioned in Vasa-Travnicek 
(1937), for example Josef Dobrovsky (1753-1829) described by Masaryk as rytir ducha 
(knight of the spirit, ‘outstanding thinker and scholar’), Josef Jungmann (1773-1847) and 
Jan Kollar (1793-1852), but others who might have been expected to appear in the second 
volume are omitted (except as sources), for example Pavel Josef Safarik (1790—1861) and 
Frantisek Palacky (1798-1876). Vasa-Travnicek (1937) also includes entries relating to 
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important patriotic organizations founded from the 1860s to the 1890s, such as the Sokol 
(Falcon, ‘Sokol gymnastic organization; counterpoint to the German Turnverein’), Orel 
(Eagle, ‘Catholic gymnastic association’), Umelecka beseda (‘Guild of Arts, society in 
Prague’), Ustrednl matice skolska (Central Education Foundation, ‘association aimed at 
equipping and supporting Czech schools, as against Deutscher Schulverein’) or to their 
adherents, for example slavista (‘member of the Prague literary society Slavie in the 
1890s’). There are similarly references to journals and newspapers associated with 
nationalist aspirations, for example Cas (Time) and Rozhledy (Review). Both the 
progressive movement Repeal (Repeal Club, ‘Prague radical association of 1848’) and its 
adversaries, sedmasedesatnlk (a sixty-sevener, ‘one of the sixty-seven opponents of the 
Prague revolution in 1848; symbol of reaction’) merit inclusion, as does the invented 
grouping of young patriotic and socialist revolutionaries Omladina (‘Prague progressive 
movement of the 1890s’). Two of the more radical German groups are also mentioned 
indirectly: lasalak (‘member of a workers’ physical education association named after 
Ferdinand Lassalle’) and spartakovec (‘supporter of radical socialism in Germany’). The 
policy of German eastward expansion is likewise acknowledged: nemecky [German] 
Drang nach Osten (omitted in all subsequent editions). However, there is no space in 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937) for the vast majority of state institutions and organizations, such as 
the Reichsrat.30 
Many of the other phrases relating to Austria-Hungary do not suggest obvious 
ideological orientation, but their inclusion in Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho (1937) is significant 
since it testifies to the lexicographers’ enduring interest in this period of Czech national 
development. Typical are entries such as austrofil (‘supporter of Austria and its policies’), 
austroslavismus (‘Slav consciousness within the framework of the old Austrian Empire’), 
Mladocech (Young Czech, ‘name of Czech liberals before the [1918] coup’), and 
Starocech (Old Czech, ‘member of the Czech Conservative Party before the [1918] coup’). 
Expressions of a more light-hearted nature include cernozluty (black-yellow = ‘fabricated 
in an Austrian [kind of] way [pejorative]’) and trojchlup, trojchlupy Bismarck (three¬ 
haired Bismarck, ‘humorous; he was caricatured as having three hairs on his head’). 
The First World War and the subsequent formation of the Czecho-Slovak Legions in 
Russia, France and Italy also produced a rich source of new terms, such as Cervena vez 
(Red Tower, ‘hill in High Tatras, during the Great War = Viennese political prison’), 
Ctyrdohoda/pakt Ctyr (Four-Power Pact, ‘War alliance between Britain, France, Russia 
and Italy’), Ctyrspolek (Central Powers, ‘union of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey 
during the Great War’) and Ma(f)fle (‘secret Czechoslovak anti-Austrian association in the 
Great War’). Vasa-Travnicek (1937) includes reference both to the creation in 1916 of the 
first foreign military unit, Ceska druzina (Czech Corps, ‘the first detachment of the 
Czecho-Slovak Legions, the first regiment in the Russian army in the Great War’) and to 
the Siberian anabasis, sibirska anabase (‘the march of our “Russian” Legions through 
Siberia’). These entries, which were amongst the most enduring of the terms relating to the 
legionaries, were deemed to be of sufficient historical importance to be retained by 
Travnicek in 1946 and 1952. 
The first edition of Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho contains several more specific references to 
the legionaries who served in Russia and a surprising array of Russianisms which 
consequently found their way into the Czech language. The majority of these entries relate 
directly to military themes, for example bitva u Bachmace (Battle of Bakhmach, ‘famous 
from the Siberian anabasis’), Celjabinsk (Cheliabinsk, ‘town in Russia, famous from the 
30 The best general study of this period of Czech history is Elizabeth Wiskemann, Czechs and 
Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, London, 
Melbourne and Toronto, 1967. 
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history of the Russian legions’), cin (rank), denscik (military messenger), hodit pod kozirek 
(to throw under the peak of a military cap = ‘to pay homage (legionary [term])’), COL 
(Czecho-Slovak legionary community), nabor: u rus. legion. = ziskdvanl do legii (amongst 
legionaries in Russia = recruitment to the Legions), okop (= zakop) (trench), rozvedcik 
(‘member of reconnaissance patrol’), styk (‘bayonet’) and vzvod (‘military detachment’). 
However, there are also a number of Russian loan-words reflecting everyday usage and 
realities, for example morda (‘vulgar = mouth, gob’), odpravka (‘dispatching of trains’), 
otpusk (‘holiday’) and zulik (‘intrusive person, scoundrel’). Two even quainter Russian 
borrowings (albeit not specifically identified as ‘legionisms’) are charaso ([stressed on - 
io] ‘fine, good, well’) and pasol ([stressed on -sol] ‘shove off’). The Czecho-Slovak 
Legions in Russia were so well organized that they produced their own magazines, 
Cechoslovan (‘defunct journal of the Russian Czechs’) and Houpacky (Swings, ‘humorous 
and satirical journal of the Russian legionaries’), which are not referred to in TravnRek 
(1952).31 
Entries relating to Russian and Soviet history are fairly common in Vasa-Travnicek 
(1937) and are, generally speaking, neutral in tone. There are, however, a few exceptions, 
such as the references to cernosotenec (‘member of the Black Hundred = anti¬ 
revolutionary groups in Russia [active 1905-7], retrograde, reactionary’), which implied 
clear criticism of the excesses of tsarism, and to Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov (‘[bom 
1878] Russian revolutionary’ [purged in 1934 for Trotskyist sympathies]) or kadet (‘cadet, 
supporter of Milyukov’s [pro-Tsarist] Constitutional Democratic Party’). The 
organizations Crezvycajka (‘Commission in Soviet Russia for the elimination of anti¬ 
revolution’) and its immediate successor GPU (‘Soviet [State] Political Administration’) 
are also mentioned, as are such disparate terms as stachanovec (Stakhanovite, ‘worker in 
Russia achieving outstanding efficiency’) and Christos vokres ... voistinu voskres (Russian: 
Christ has risen ... he has risen indeed). 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937) is the only Czech-Czech dictionary so far published which seeks 
to do any justice to the foundation of the Czechoslovak state or to shed any real light on 
the First Republic.32 The crucial concept of (statni) prevrat (state coup) is repeated on 
numerous occasions and relates specifically in Vasa-Travnicek (1937 edition only) to the 
1918 overthrow. It also gives rise to the related adjectival forms doprevratovy (pre-1918 
overthrow), under the entry Prespurk (‘pre-[l 918] coup name of Bratislava’), and 
poprevratovy (‘post-1918 coup’), both as a separate entry and as the prepositional phrase 
po prevrate, for example under Nebojsa ([Slovak] ‘the name of a Czech loose-leaf journal 
after the 1918 coup’) and Masarykovo Athenaeum (Masaryk’s Athenaeum, ‘re-established 
for a time after the [1918] coup’) (also in the 1941 and 1946 editions, but without 
reference to the coup). 
References to Masaryk and to associations and concepts associated with his name are 
commonplace in Vasa-Travnicek (1937), for example Idealy humanitni (Masarykuv spis) 
(Humanitist Ideals [Masaryk’s work]) (also in the 1941 and 1946 editions), Masarykova 
akademie prace (Masaryk Work Academy), Masarykova letecka liga (Masaryk Flying 
League), ujasnit si sve nazory (oblibeny vyraz Masarykuv) (to clarify one’s thoughts [a 
31 Estimates of the numbers serving in the Legions generally vary from 40,000 to 60,000. For an 
authoritative account of the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia, see John Silverlight, The 
Victors ’ Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War, London, 1970. 
32 According to Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia’s Role in Soviet Strategy, Washington, DC, 1978, 
p. 3, the Czechoslovak Communist Party took a consistently negative stand towards the First 
Republic until 1935 when it applauded the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. The 
negative attitude was quickly re-asserted and was maintained after the Communist seizure of 
power in 1948. 
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favourite phrase of Masaryk’s]) (also in other editions, but without any mention of 
Masaryk) and Hrad (Prague Castle, ‘transferred meaning = President Masaryk, minister 
Benes and their closest circle’).33 Vasa-Travnicek (1937) captures Masaryk’s belief in the 
beneficial concept of the democratic state, which also informs later editions of Slovnik 
jazyka ceskeho; see, for example, loyalnost ke statu (loyalty to the state), and astatismus 
(‘opposition to the state establishment, statelessness, the opposite of etatisme [according to 
Masaryk]’). Both Masaryk and Benes took the view that the Czechs and Slovaks 
constituted a single Czechoslovak nation, as reflected in the terms Cechoslovak (‘ 1. today 
the official collective name for the Bohemians, Moravians, Silesians and Slovaks; before 
the Great War it also meant Czech; 2. in general a citizen of the Czechoslovak state, 
including Germans et al.’) and Cechoslovan (‘older name = Czech, Czechoslovak’) 
(omitted for obvious reasons in the 1941 edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho and re-defined 
in the 1952 edition as an ‘older concept’). 
Benes’s main concern was to safeguard Czechoslovak independence and national 
security and, for that reason, he placed great faith in the League of Nations, Spolecnost 
narodii, (a term only included in the 1937 edition of the dictionary) and in alliances such 
as Mala dohoda (Little Entente, ‘Czechoslovak-Yugoslav-Romanian alliance’ [1920-38]) 
(understandably omitted from the 1941 edition).34 Alliances also featured prominently in 
domestic politics. There were a series of coalitions suggesting a strong sense of common 
purpose, which is reflected in Vasa-Travnicek (1937), for example, ceske koalovane strany 
= sdruzene k podpore vlady (Czech coalition parties = affiliated in support of the 
government) (not referred to explicitly in later editions of the dictionary). The reference to 
Petka (‘the group of five representatives of the ruling parties’) is predictably confined to 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937) but, strangely, the notion rudozelena koalice vladni (Red-Green 
government coalition), based on the cooperation of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, 
the Czech National Socials, the Czech Agrarians and the Slovak parliamentary parties, is 
not mentioned until the 1941 edition. 
The most remarkable aspect of Vasa-Travnicek (1941) is how unexceptional and 
unexceptionable it is. The overwhelming majority of entries was spared from censorship, 
including most of the references to Austria-Hungary. However, the derogatory term 
kaizerismus (‘direction in German politics agreeing with Kaiser Wilhelm’), was deleted, as 
were virtually all allusions to the First World War. There is likewise no explicit reference 
to the Czecho-Slovak Legions, for example the Czech Corps or the Battle of Bakhmach. 
(Many of the legionaries had as a consequence of their anti-German sentiments had their 
pension rights removed in the Protectorate.) The definition of legie (‘voluntary forces’) is 
acceptable as far as it goes, but it gives no indication of the specific connotations of the 
term in a Czech context. The entry odboj (resistance, ‘rebellion, uprising, revolutionary 
activities’) is likewise no longer identified with the Legions, and several other phrases are 
similarly re-defined, for example udychany (dobrovolnik) (‘[a volunteer] who signs up 
very late’) (the obfuscation of the historical context and the use of the present tense of the 
verb suggest a universality of meaning which udychany did not originally connote). While 
most of the Russianisms associated with the legionaries are retained in Vasa-Travnicek 
33 For information on some of the more culturally and socially orientated organizations, see, for 
example, Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal (eds), Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises, 
1918-88, Basingstoke and London, 1989. 
34 For further details about Benes and the League of Nations see, for example, William V. 
Wallace, Czechoslovakia, London and Tonbridge, 1976, pp. 159-61. R. W. Seton-Watson, A 
History of the Czechs and Slovaks, London, New York and Melbourne, 1943, p. 339, defined 
the three aims of the Triple Entente as ‘to prevent Habsburg restoration, to prevent territorial 
revision in favour of Hungary, and to prevent the Anschluss of Austria to the Reich’. 
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(1941), their origins are not explained. No definition is proposed for Trojdohoda, (compare 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937): ‘pre-war Triple Entente between France, Russian and Britain’) or 
for ‘Four-Power Agreement’ or ‘Central Powers’, but, rather illogically, the dictionary 
does define Dohoda (Alliance, ‘Anglo-French-Russian confederacy’). The term Maf(j)ie is 
also included in Vasa-Travnicek (1941), but its transferred meaning (of Czech secret First 
World War association) is not acknowledged. 
The foundation of the First Republic was seen as a historical aberration by the Nazis and 
is therefore barely mentioned in Vasa-Travnicek (1941). Amongst the more striking 
omissions from the dictionary are ‘overthrow of the state’, ‘Washington Declaration’, 
Ceskoslovensko (Czechoslovakia), republika Ceskoslovenska 11 Ceskoslovenska republika 
(Czechoslovak Republic), Czechoslovak (Cechoslovan) (Czechoslovak), MNO = 
Ministerstvo narodni obrany (Ministry of Defence), ‘Little Entente’, Cechonemec (Czech- 
German, ‘German from the Bohemian Lands’) and all references to Masaryk (except as a 
source). The terms anschluss and rusko-ceskoslovensky, -cesky = tykajici se Ruska a 
Ceskoslovenska (Russian-Czechoslovak, -Czech = concerning Russia and Czechoslovakia) 
are also omitted. Entries relating to Russia and the Soviet Union are sometimes re-defined, 
for example ‘Bolshevik’, or deleted altogether, for example industrializace Ruska (the 
industrialization of Russia), ruda garda na Rusi (Red Guard in Russia), Rusko se 
evropeisuje (Russia is becoming europeanized, ‘Russia is adapting itself to the rest of 
Europe’), mensevik (Vasa-Travnicek (1937): ‘member of the minority of the former 
Russian Social Democratic Party’). However, terms which have no bearing on German 
realities or may suggest negative political phenomena, for example ‘Russian Socialist 
Revolutionary’ and ‘Commission in Soviet Russia for the elimination of counter¬ 
revolution’, are usually retained. 
Vasa-Travnicek (1946) adheres closely to the definitions given in the second edition of 
Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho, although it also contains numerous new entries and is ninety-four 
pages (or 5-63 per cent) longer. Once again the Czecho-Slovak Legions barely merit a 
direct mention, but this time it is not because of their opposition to Germany in the First 
World War but because they had been engaged in conflict with the Bolsheviks from May 
1918 to February 1920. The Czechs were now indebted to the Red Army for liberating 
most of them from Germany and Travnicek’s lexicographical discretion (or expedience?) 
was in tune with the official policy of promoting closer co-operation with the Soviet 
Union.35 Now that Czechoslovakia was finally rid of its historical foe, Travnicek was able 
to fill in again the missing details of the First World War alliances. He was also permitted 
to allude to the Occupation of Czechoslovakia and to the Second World War (although the 
entry svetova vdlka [World War] refers specifically to 1914-18). In addition to the terms 
arijec (‘a non-Semite, according to the German Nazi concept’), and other words based on 
Protectorate or German names, such as ‘Hitlerite’ and ‘Nazism’, Vasa-Travnicek (1946) 
includes a variety of new entries connected with the Second World War, for example 
germanisator (‘someone who germanizes’), gestapo (German: geheime Staatspolizei), 
koncentracnik (‘concentration camp prisoner’), koncentrak (‘concentration camp’), 
okupant (occupying force, ‘someone who occupies something [or another land]’) and 
povstaliste (‘location of uprising’). Needless to say, there is no reference to the German- 
Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. 
In post-war Czech society the Narodni fronta (Travnicek [1952]: National Front, 
‘confederation of political parties after the Second World War’), held an absolute 
35 Even Bene§ abandoned Masaryk’s pro-Western stance and conceived the notion of 
Czechoslovakia as a bridge between the east and west. He believed that good relations with 
Stalin and Soviet Russia would lessen the risk of a Communist take-over. 
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monopoly of power and the Communists were the largest single party.36 The Communists 
exercised control over the Ministries of Education and Information and therefore had 
greater access to printing facilities and materials than the other parties. According to Josef 
Kalvoda, the Communist-run or Communist-orientated periodicals initially enjoyed 
considerable preferential treatment: in May 1945 ‘five Communist-controlled dailies in 
Prague were given enough paper to publish 1,030,000 copies, while the dailies of the other 
parties of the National Front printed some 743,000 copies.’37 However, while individual 
journalists and authors may have found their freedom of speech restricted, there was no 
overt censorship of the press or of books in the Third Republic.38 
None of the changes implemented in Vasa-Travnicek (1946) was enforced by politicians, 
even though Travnicek may have felt under moral and psychological pressure to reflect 
popular sentiment. Travnicek was not obliged to continue to omit references to the First 
Republic and Masaryk which had been deleted from the previous edition of Slovnik jazyka 
ceskeho, such as ‘28 October 1918 is a turning-point in Czechoslovak history’, 
masarykovske slovo (a Masarykism) and ‘Masaryk’s Athenaeum'.39 That he chose to do so, 
therefore, can only be interpreted as a personal ideologically motivated decision. 
The period of left-wing quasi-democracy came to an abrupt end with the Communist 
take-over in 1948 and stricter censorship was effectively re-imposed. From the Communist 
perspective February 1948 was an infinitely more significant date than October 1918. It 
marked a new departure in Czechoslovak history and rendered everything which had 
preceded it subject to re-interpretation. Travnicek (1952) uses the term predunorovy (pre- 
February, ‘established, former, before February [in 1948]’), in much the same way as 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937) had used ‘pre-1918-coup’. Travnicek’s task of re-writing the 
historical aspects of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho in accordance with the dictates of the 
Communist regime was considerably facilitated by the fact that he had already deleted 
most of the references to the Czecho-Slovak Legions and the First Republic. However, he 
probably still had to make more substantive changes than he had done under the Nazis to 
satisfy the demands of the new order. 
In the fourth edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho Travnicek categorically dismissed all the 
previous attempts by reform-minded individuals and movements to change the structures 
of society, for example narodnik (Russian: ‘petty-bourgeois radical intellectual in the 
second half of the nineteenth century; enemy of Marxism’) and syndikalismus (‘bourgeois 
attempts at changing conditions of production’). Instead, he pinned his colours firmly to 
the mast of the new socialist system and indicated an unambiguously pro-Soviet stance. 
Travnicek (1952) includes, inter alia, a particularly striking new reference to the Russian 
Civil War: intervence (ctrnacti statu proti Sovetskemu Svazu) (intervention [of the fourteen 
states against the Soviet Union]). The only explicit references to the period 1918 to 1938 in 
Travnicek (1952) again assume contextual knowledge: agrarnik (‘supporter of the 
Agrarian Party [in the First Republic]’) and hradni politika (za 1. republiky) (Castle 
politics [in the First Republic]). Whereas both the time prior to the First Republic and the 
36 By March 1946 the Communists had built up a membership of over one million and they also 
had considerable influence in the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, whose membership 
had reached nearly two million by the end of 1946. See Paul E. Zinner, Communist Strategy> 
and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48, London, 1963, pp. 123-26 and 159—68. 
37 Josef Kalvoda, Czechoslovakia’s Role in Soviet Strategy, p. 205. 
38 This point is emphasized by William V. Wallace, Czechoslovakia, p. 257. 
39 Note that the old-fashioned, pejorative term at(h)encik (‘contributor to Masaryk’s Athenaeum 
on the Koniginhof and Griineberg Manuscripts’) is included in Travnicek (1952), as well as in 
the second and third editions of the dictionaries. 
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German Protectorate are treated as the ‘pre-history’ of the socialist state, the period 1918 
to 1938 is now almost assigned the status of‘non-history’. 
Travnicek (1952) includes all the references to the Occupation and the Second World 
War which were introduced in the third edition of the dictionary, such as ‘concentration 
camp prisoner’ and ‘supporter of the “Hitlerite” policies of Henlein’, and sometimes 
suggests a (not so subtle) shift in or extension of meaning, for example hachovstina (‘[the 
Protectorate president, Emil] Hacha’s politics, humiliating the weak, betraying the nation 
and state for the benefit of the bourgeoisie’). The fourth edition of the dictionary also adds 
several new entries relating to Nazism and the Protectorate, such as esesak (‘member of 
Hitler’s groups called ‘Sturmstaffel[n]’ [abbreviation SS]’)40, genocidium (genocide, ‘an 
act or conduct aimed at the eradication of nation, race or religious group’), hlinkovec 
(‘supporter of the policies of Andrej Hlinka before the Second World War’), il(l)egalnl 
(‘for example underground activity during the Occupation’), kolaborant (‘collaborator, 
generally with the enemy, with Nazism in the Second World War’), Mnichov (Munich, 
‘symbol of our national and state catastrophe in September 1938, caused by the 
bourgeoisie here and abroad, in the West’) and rasismus (racism, ‘programmatic Nazi 
doctrine about the inequality of races and about the superiority of the so-called Aryan races 
over others’). The most obvious new references to the immediate post-Nazi period are 
‘National Front’ and several phrases relating to the Marshall Plan (which Czechoslovakia 
rejected on Stalin’s insistence): marshallisovany stat (‘[a state] which has accepted the 
Marshall Plan, and is subordinate to it’), marshallisovati (‘to include [...] in the Marshall 
Plan, to exert influence [...] in the spirit of this plan’) and marshallista (‘a participant in 
the Marshall Plan, militarily orientated’).41 
References to the history of Soviet Communism are far less predictable. Most of the 
entries pose little, if any, difficulty, for example bolsevisovati (‘to give a Bolshevik 
character [to]’), (compare zburzoasneti [‘to take on a bourgeois character’]), komisar 
(commissar, ‘minister [formerly, in the Soviet Union]’), kulak (Russian: [redefined as] 
‘wealthy farmer who exploits small-scale farmers and is an enemy of collectivization, 
[known here as] zdruzstevnenT [not included as a dictionary entry]), leninska teorie 
poznanl (the Leninist theory of cognition), marx(ismus)-leninismus (‘developed (form of) 
Marxism, elaborated by Lenin’), partijnl (Russian: party [adj.]) and sovetisace 
(sovietization, ‘transferring, imparting a Soviet character [to]’). Several of the -isms are 
overtly negative in meaning, for example antisovetismus (anti-Sovietism) and trockismus 
(Trotskyism, ‘treacherous tendency in the Bolshevik party, whose main representative was 
Trotsky’).42 
Travnicek chose in the fourth edition to make reference to a number of organizations 
which the Communists had either closed down or had subordinated to the authority of the 
National Front, such as the ‘Sokol gymnastic organization’ and skauting (scouting) / skaut 
(scout, ‘member of pre-war youth organization, [also known in Czech as] junak'). 
Travnicek likewise does not appear to have been required by the censors to make many 
40 Travnicek means Schutzstaffel(n). He would appear to have confused SS with SA, 
Sturmabteilung(en) (Storm Troopers). 
41 For further details of the Marshall Plan, see, for example, Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia 
Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d’Etat, London, 1950, pp. 50-71, and Josef 
Korbel, The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia, Princeton, NJ, 1959. pp. 181-83. 
42 Wolf Moskovich, ‘Planned Language Change in Russia since 1917’ in Michael Kirkwood (ed.), 
Language Planning in the Soviet Union, Basingstoke and London, 1989, p. 94, notes that 
‘During Stalin’s rule, with its mass persecution of “enemies of the people”, words in -izm were 
ascribed a negative connotation: men’shevizm (Menshevism), uklonizm (deviationism), 
trotskizm (Trotskyism), egalitarizm (egalitarianism), freidizm (Freudism), and so on.’ 
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concessions over religion and nowhere does he seek to indicate the state’s commitment to 
atheism. Nor, indeed, does he cast any negative aspersions on the Czech and Slovak 
emigre communities or on the officially despised ‘Londoners’ (omitted from the 
dictionary), who served in Britain during the war, or the equally mistrusted former 
members of the International Brigade, interbrigada (‘voluntary brigade which fought on 
the side of the Spanish democrats for freedom before the Second World War’). 
Politics and Contemporaneous Society 
The First Republic largely took its ideological lead from T. G. Masaryk, whose personal 
authority ensured the success of his special brand of rather paternalistic patriotic 
‘democracy’. Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1938 was a thriving state, notwithstanding the 
government’s failure to deal adequately with the problems of social welfare or to address 
sufficiently seriously the legitimate grievances of both the Slovaks and the German 
minority. The pro-Western, ‘bourgeois’ orientation of the establishment is suggested in 
Vasa-Travnicek (1937) by the nature of some of the cultural, socio-political and economic 
references, for example pravice (the right, ‘in politics = moderate conservative direction, 
its supporters’), rotarian, lev, Ivice salonu ]| salonni lev, Ivice (lion of society, ‘someone 
who likes to mix in drawing-room circles’ [s/c]), vyssi (spolecenske vrstvy) (higher [social 
strata]), ‘higher placed, better-educated people’), zargon (slang, ‘speech of the lowest 
social classes’), anglo-ceskoslovenska banka (Anglo-Czechoslovak Bank), na dome je 
hypoteka (the house is mortgaged) and trust (‘industrial association, cartel’). However, the 
dictionary also includes reference to revolutionary political activists such as Breshko- 
Breshkovskaia, Ekaterina (‘[1844-1934] Russian revolutionary, known as the grandmother 
of the Russian revolution’) and to radical reform movements and ideologies, for example, 
chartismus (‘British working-class movement in the years 1836-1855’) and komunismus 
(Communism, ‘socialist direction proclaiming communal ownership of property and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat’).43 One particularly eye-catching entry, which perhaps 
suggests the dichotomy between establishment policy and the values of the left-leaning 
intellectual circles, is casopis rudne (the journal is inclining towards Communism). 
The second edition of Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho is much more circumspect in its treatment 
of German themes than Vasa-Travnicek (1937), especially where entries might imply or 
invite subjective responses to the occupying power. Amongst the most significant 
omissions from the dictionary are germanofd (‘lover of things German’), germanofob 
(‘enemy of things German’), germanomanie (‘unrestrained love for things German’), 
hitlerismus (‘Hitler’s political and social direction and in its spirit’) and hitlerovec (plural - 
ci) (Hitlerites, ‘Hitler’s supporters, German National Socialists’) (the definitions cited are 
from the first edition). Interestingly, Vasa-Travnicek (1937) devotes forty-five lines to 
entries under the lexeme German, whereas the second edition of the dictionary has only 
twenty-eight lines. Neither Vasa-Travnicek (1941) nor the later editions of the dictionary 
include reference to Reichsprotektor or to the Narodni sourucenstvi (National Partnership), 
which representatives of all political parties, except the Communists, were obliged to 
join.44 Vasa-Travnicek (1941) also omits a number of other entries relating to the 
Germans’ enemies and allies: antifasismus (anti-Fascism, ‘movement against Fascism’), 
cerna kosile (black shirt, ‘part of the Fascist uniform, transferred meaning = Fascist’) and 
43 As elsewhere (in all four editions of the dictionary), when dealing with socialism/Communism 
and/or the Soviet Union, the use of terminology is careless. ‘The dictatorship of the proletariat’ 
refers specifically to socialism. 
44 See Jaroslav Krejci, Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History, London and New 
York, 1990, pp. 157-58. 
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protifasista (anti-Fascist, ‘opponent of Fascism’), in Travnicek (1952), and zlute nebezpeci 
(yellow peril, ‘threat from yellow-skinned race’), in the 1946 and 1952 editions. More 
striking still is the inclusion for the first time in 1941 of cechofil (Czechophil, ‘a friend of 
the Czechs, inclined towards them’), kontraspionaz (counter-espionaige, ‘the overthrow 
and neutralization of espionage’) and kontrrozvedka (sic) (Russian: counter-intelligence, 
‘intelligence service against foreign intelligence’). The entry cechofil is evidence of 
Travnicek’s patriotic intent, while the other two phrases may suggest his increasing 
familiarity with the instruments used to suppress opposition. 
There is very little in the third edition of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho to identify it specifically 
with the post-war, pre-Communist period, except for the ‘historical’ references and the re- 
introduction of terms such as ‘Czechoslovakia’. One or two new entries imply greater 
awareness of the instruments of politicization and ‘socialization’, such as agitka 
(‘campaigning poem, slogans’), brigada (work team, ‘group of people, detachment, mainly 
[relating to] work’), propagandismus (‘making propaganda’) and ROH = Revolucni 
odborove hnuti (Revolutionary trade-union movement). The concept of kolektivisace 
(collectivization) is also mentioned for the first time, as is proletkult, although the 
definition, ‘proletarian culture, the promotion thereof’, does not give any real indication as 
to the character or policies of the organization.45 A few other new entries also reflect 
changing perceptions and realities, for example ceskozidovsky (adjective relating to a 
[nationally conscious] Jewish Czech), dvouletka = dvojletni plan (Two-year plan, 
‘economic, production’) and styky Cechii s Rusy (Czechs’ relations with the Russians), 
replacing ‘Czechs’ relations with the Germans’ (in the first two editions of the dictionary). 
However, Vasa-Travnicek (1946) was published too early for there to be any stronger 
suggestion of the broad Socialist platform of the National Front or of Benes’s policy of 
rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The only allusion to Stalin is purely incidental and 
again relates to the period of the war: katuska (Russian: katushka, “‘Stalin organ”, a 
cannon with several barrels’). 
Travnicek (1952) represents a radical departure from the previous edition of Slovnik 
jazyka ceskeho, even though it retains much of the character of the 1946 publication. In 
limiting the number and scope of his new entries and re-definitions, Travnicek is broadly 
pursuing a policy endorsed by Stalin with respect to Russian. Fransoise Thom points out 
that, unlike N. Ia. Marr, who believed in a kind of universal non-verbal, thought-based 
language, Stalin realized that the official ideology would be jeopardized if its essential 
emptiness or ‘nothingness’ were to be exposed by highlighting the precise nature of the 
linguistic innovation. ‘Stalin knew instinctively that he must at all costs conceal the 
esoteric change which was taking place in the Russian language. That is why he so often 
stressed that Russian had hardly changed since the Revolution, except for some new 
words’.46 It is perhaps also worth noting here how quickly Russian replaced German as the 
official first foreign language in Czechoslovakia; see, for example, the references to 
‘Russian course’, instead of ‘German course’, and mluviti zbezne rusky (to speak fluent 
Russian), instead of mluviti zbezne francouzsky (to speak fluent French), in all the earlier 
45 Proletkul't is defined by A. M. Prokhorov (principal editor), Bol'shoi entsiklopedicheskii 
slovar ’, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, 1997, p. 966, as ‘a cultural-educational and literary- 
artistic organization (1917-32) of proletarian initiative in various fields of art, particularly in 
literature and the theatre. The nihilistic denial of cultural heritage and the separatism of its 
leaders and ideologists (A. A. Bogdanov, V. F. Pletnev) inflicted great damage on the 
development of artistic culture’. Lenin considered Proletkul't too independent-minded and 
placed it under the direction of the Commissariat of Education. 
46 See Frangoise Thom, The Language of Soviet Communism, translated by Ken Connelly, 
London and Lexington, 1989, pp. 108-13. 
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editions of the dictionary. Predictably, however, Travnicek (1952) retains the phrase 
lamana nemcina (‘broken German’). 
The most common and manifest indication of change in Travnicek (1952) is the 
attribution of the phrase ‘in a class society’ to a wide range of socio-political and economic 
disparities which are ascribed to the class structure of capitalist democracy. Entries which 
merit this epithet include dav (mob, ‘in a class society = the lower classes’), obecny lid (the 
common people, ‘ordinary people against the upper classes [in a class society]’) and 
vysada (‘special right, privilege [in a class society]’). Occasionally the old order is 
juxtaposed with the new; see, for example individualismus (‘ 1. [in a class society] attempt 
to assert the importance, independence, rights of the individual against those of the whole 
2. [in socialist society] attempt of the individual to assert his/her skills in work for the 
[good of] the whole’). Elsewhere the terms ‘capitalist’ and ‘bourgeois’ are used as near 
synonyms for ‘class’: merkantilismus ([re-defined as] ‘a bourgeois economic view’), 
nobilita (‘nobility, prominent social class [in feudal and capitalist society]’), solidarita = 
solidarismus (solidarity, ‘programmatic doctrine rejecting the class struggle and 
proclaiming class solidarity; = socialism, Communism [in bourgeois scholarship, which 
deliberately omits the terms socialism and Communism]’) and mestska spolecenska 
spodina (urban social dregs, ‘the lowest classes [under capitalism]’). Other diverse 
references to capitalism are included under imperialismus (imperialism, ‘transferred 
meaning = imperiousness, striving for supremacy, expansionist politics, capitalism in the 
period of monopolies’), katorga (Russian: ‘hard forced labour, especially in the mines 
[under feudalism and capitalism]’) and reformismus (reformism, ‘attempts at reform, at 
correction; in the workers’ revolutionary movement, reactionary efforts to preserve the 
capitalist order’). Travnicek (1952) implies that negative social phenomena are so 
inextricably linked to the structures of class society that even miscreants may now be 
associated exclusively with the past, for example Pepik (‘young member of Prague low 
society before the Second World War’). 
In Czechoslovakia of the 1950s capitalism was synonymous with the systematic 
exploitation of the working class, as evidenced by Travnicek’s definition: kapitalismus 
(‘method of production where the means of production are in private ownership; the 
workforce is a commodity and creates surplus value which is appropriated by the owners 
of the means of production’). Within this framework there were no advantages to capitalist 
democracy over Communism. Michael Waller points out that ‘For the Marxist there is 
nothing transcendental about rights, liberty and democracy; the words themselves may 
have a long life, but what they mean will depend upon the dominant ideology at any given 
time, which will in turn depend upon the prevalent means of production.’47 
All economic and political powers were effectively under the control of the Communist 
Party in the 1950s, hence the special importance accorded in the fourth edition of the 
dictionary to the entries KSC (abbreviation = the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), 
KSS (abbreviation = the Communist Party of Slovakia), rodna KSC (Russian: our beloved 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) and stranickost vedy a umeni (the partisanship of 
science and art, ‘partiality to the truth, progress, the working class and the Communist 
Party which is the body responsible for progress and the truth and their propagator’).48 
Travnicek (1952) suggests the historical inevitability of the victory of Marxism-Leninism 
47 Michael Waller, The Language of Communism: A Commentary, London, Sydney and Toronto, 
1972, p. 107. 
48 Travnicek defines rodny in this context as mily, milovany (beloved, cherished). Larissa 
Ryazanova-Clarke and Terence Wade, The Russian Language Today, London and New York], 
1999, p. 95, quote a similar example: rodnoe sovetskoe praviteTstvo (beloved Soviet 
government). 
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and of the socialist economic revolution through the inclusion of the phrase neuchylna 
cesta k socialismu (the unswerving path to socialism). Anybody in opposition to the new 
order was deemed to be an enemy of the state or a traitor; see, for example, uchylkar 
(political deviationist, ‘person who deviates [from Marxism]’), introduced as an equivalent 
to the Russian word uklonist, byti v cizich sluzbach (to be in the service of another country) 
and mrva (Gottwald: ‘police informer, agent, nark; from Mrva, an undercover agent in the 
workers’ movement killed by a member of Omladina’). 
The official language of the early Communist period was replete with allusions to the 
need for vigilance and to the resolve of the Party to implement its policies and to root out 
the class enemies. Travnicek (1952) is at pains to stress the thoroughness of the regime’s 
methods of investigation: proverka = provereni; proveriti koho = dukladne prozkoumat 
jeho cinnost, nazory (vetting; to vet someone = to investigate thoroughly his/her activities 
and views). The dictionary further implies the determination of the Party by citing 
Gottwald’s reference to the resilience of the Bolsheviks: bolsevicka zakalka (Bolshevik 
steeling). 
Other anomalous entries which might be taken to indicate the changing values and 
structures of society include pravdovec (‘a reader of the Bolshevik Pravda before the First 
World War, a worker brought up in the revolutionary spirit’) and chozrascot (Russian: 
‘running an enterprise based on its own profitability’). Economic references with a 
negative resonance, such as krisova uroveh vydelku = jako za krise (Gottwald: crisis level 
of earnings = as in a crisis) and zmitati se v hospodarske krisi (to toss about in an economic 
crisis), are equally common and are clearly directed at the conditions prevailing under 
capitalism. 
Neologisms, Loan-words and Attributed Terms and Definitions 
Considerable attention has already been paid to the importance of lexical innovation and 
borrowed words in all four editions of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho. However, there is a small 
number of entries which have so far escaped reference, since they relate to the once 
enormous (but politically increasingly peripheral) Czech and Slovak emigre communities 
in America, dating back to 184 8.49 Vasa-Travnicek (1937) introduces a handful of 
delightfully unlikely neologisms such as hefr (heifer), horiapovati (‘to make haste, to 
hurry’), kolovetr (cultivator), kornhaskovati (‘to husk maize’), lunchovati (to have lunch) 
and spolecenskd konvence (social convention, ‘gathering’), all of which are included in the 
1941 and 1946 editions, and all of which, except for lunchovati, are omitted from 
Travnicek (1952).50 The significance of the omission of these incongruous Anglicisms 
from the final edition of the dictionary should not be overstated, but it may be seen as a 
further minor indication of the Communists’ anti-American world-view. The presence of a 
sizeable Czech community, largely hostile to Communism, in the country which more than 
any other had come to define the evils of capitalism was a source of some inconvenience to 
the authorities, not least because of the threat of further emigration. 
Vasa-Travnicek (1941) provided very few significant new foreign language entries, 
although the dictionary did introduce a number of Germanisms which had been 
overlooked, such as biedermeier (‘German culture in the post-Napoleonic period’) and 
halt! (‘wait, look out!’). Almost all the Germanisms in the third and fourth editions of the 
49 According to Thomas Capek, in his brief introduction ‘Czechoslovaks in the United States’ in 
Bohumil E. Mikula, Progressive Czech, Chicago, IL, 1936, pp. 33-35 (p. 34), the 1920 census 
reported 622,796 Czechs and 619,866 Slovaks. 
50 None of the terms has survived into the latest edition of Slovnik spisovne destiny pro skolu a 
verejnost or Slovnik spisovneho jazyka ceskeho. 
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dictionary, except those relating to the rise of Nazism and the Second World War, 
originally appeared in Vasa-Travnicek (1937). 
Travnicek (1952) is much more innovative when it comes to Russian loan-words. 
Amongst the new lexical items which reflect the changing economic and cultural realities 
are kadry (‘workers, functionaries’), kombajner (combine harvester driver), put’ovka 
(‘record of daily tasks and performances, and of work impediments’) and stengazeta (‘wall 
newspaper, written by hand or type-written’). The dictionary also re-defines the meaning 
of some of the better established Russianisms, for example belorucka (Russian: ‘a person 
with white hands who does not work, a bourgeois’); (compare the corresponding definition 
in Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘a person with white hands who does not work with his/her 
hands’). Travnicek likewise cites two of Lenin’s neologisms for the first time: chvostismus 
(tailism, [coined by Lenin] “‘standing in the tail, in the queue, behind”, opportunistic 
political direction, giving free rein to the lack of control of a movement’) and otzovismus 
(recallism, ‘opportunistic tendency in the Russian Social Democratic Party after the 1905 
revolution, demanding amongst other things the removal [otzyv] of the workers’ 
representatives from the Duma’).51 The decision to include the latter entry, which is not 
even attributed to Lenin, strikes the reader as somewhat odd in view of the historical 
specificity of the reference. Lenin’s name is evoked surprisingly rarely in Travnicek 
(1952), although he does appear again in the neutral example v knize je odkaz na Leninuv 
spis (there is a reference to Lenin’s work in the book). 
Stalin is mentioned rather more frequently than Lenin in Travnicek (1952), although the 
definition of stalinismus (‘Stalin’s contribution to Marxism’) does not suggest any clear 
differentiation from Leninism. The most notable lexical items re-defined by Stalin are 
nadstavba (superstructure, ‘in its ideological meaning, political, legal, religious, artistic 
and philosophical views of society and their corresponding political, legal and other 
institutions’), ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and zvrat (turn around, ‘sudden, pervasive change in 
development, linked to the overthrow of the existing power and the creation of a new 
power’). However, pride of place for re-definitions and neologisms in Travnicek (1952) 
goes to Gottwald, who adopted Lenin’s technique of coining terms directed at his 
adversaries and their activities. Amongst his more memorable contributions, not previously 
cited, are hitlerofilsky (‘inclined towards Hitler’), monopolista (‘monopolist capitalist’), 
profasisticky (‘favourable to, predisposed towards Fascism, striving for its realization’), 
pravo-agrarnicky (right-wing agrarian [adj.]), pucismus (‘inclination towards putsches’), 
revisionisovati (‘attempts to revise peace agreements and Marxism’), stagnovati (‘to 
stagnate, not to develop’), spiclik (‘transferred meaning = intelligence officer, informer, 
police agent, diminutive [pejorative]’) and velkoagrarnicky (large-scale agrarian [adj.]). 
Not only does Gottwald focus almost exclusively on negative phenomena but, like Lenin, 
he also shows a particular penchant for diminutives and other derivatives.52 Similarly 
negative in tone, but of a less overtly political nature, are neologisms attributed to 
Zapotocky, for example kravalisovat (proti komu) (‘to kick up a fuss [about someone]’), 
prozahalka (= prozahaleni) (‘lazing away’) and precitlivelec (= precitlively clovek) (over¬ 
sensitive person). Travnicek’s selection of lexical items illustrates graphically both his 
ability to demonstrate his personal loyalty to the leadership and also, perhaps more 
important, his perception that he needed to do so. It was not sufficient for someone in 
51 Moskovich, 'Planned Language Change in Russia since 1917’, p. 96, points out that 'Lenin 
introduced many new words ending in -izm: otzovizm (recallism), khvostizm (tailism [limitation 
of political aims to those intelligible to the backward masses]), ura-patriotizm (hurrah- 
patriotism), and so on.' See also note 42 and Ryazanova-Clarke and Wade, The Russian 
Language Today, p. 11. 
52 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Travnicek’s position merely to attest to his convictions in the Foreword; he actually had to 
re-affirm his devotion to the cause and its principal representatives through his choice of 
entries. 
In terms of cultural history, the phrases attributed to Masaryk are just as interesting as 
those identified with Stalin, Gottwald and Zapotocky. The decision by Travnicek in 1941 
to introduce new Masarykisms such as akcicka ([diminutive of akce] ‘conduct, activity’), 
barikadni boj (fighting on the barricades) and jinorodec (foreigner) suggests the 
limitations of censorship at this period and the extent to which the first president could still 
be recognized as a historical national figure. While it might be possible to construe some 
sort of ideological significance from Travnicek’s selection of these entries, their main 
significance lies simply in the fact that their inclusion was permitted. By way of 
comparison, it should be noted that the Communist authorities likewise allowed Travnicek 
to acknowledge Masaryk’s contribution in the 1952 edition; see, for examplQ,jinonarodnl 
(‘member of another nation’) and z kresfanskych cirkvi je nejkultictejsi pravoslavi (the 
most cultic of the Christian churches is the Orthodox).53 
Religion, Philosophy and the Arts 
Amongst the innumerable references to the Christian faith in Vasa-Travnicek (1937) are 
some which hint at the Czechs’ traditional anti-clerical stance, for example klerikalismus 
(clericalism, ‘originally = striving after priestly prerogatives, now = political Catholicism, 
attempt at political exertion of power by the Catholic Church, misuse of religion for 
political purposes’) (also in other editions of the dictionary). Strangely, Konias (‘a byword 
for censorship, annihilator, destroyer of books, and of culture [from the Jesuit Father 
Konias]’) is not mentioned until the second edition of the dictionary. In view of Hitler’s 
enthusiasm for burning books, this could be interpreted as an attempt by Travnicek to 
engage in covert criticism of the Nazi regime. The inclusion of religious terms in 
Travnicek (1952) is far less surprising, given the need for the appropriate lexicon in the 
promotion of atheism. Very few religious expressions are deliberately omitted from the 
fourth edition of the dictionary, although one exception is Biih je imanentnl prlcina sveta = 
neexistuje mimo svet (God is the immanent reason for the world = He does not exist 
outside the world). 
Travnicek (1952) includes most of the philosophical concepts and movements mentioned 
in the other editions of Slovnik jazyka ceskeho, but sometimes the entries are re-defined 
either to suggest the values and precepts of the new social order or simply to distance the 
user from any association with a particular -ism. Compare, for example, behaviorismus 
(Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘psychological trend in philosophy’; Travnicek (1952): 
‘American psychological trend’), freudismus (Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘instinctual 
psychology founded by Freud’; Travnicek (1952): ‘reactionary psychology founded by 
Freud’), kosmopolitismus (Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘world citizenship, spiritual movement 
taking the whole world as its homeland’; Travnicek (1952): ‘world citizenship, reactionary 
doctrine disclaiming allegiance to a certain nation, movement taking the whole world as its 
homeland’), nihilismus (Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘denial of positive values’; Travnicek 
(1952): ‘decadent movement denying everything’), pacifismus (Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘a 
movement striving for continuous peace’; Travnicek (1952): ‘a movement striving for 
continuous peace [under capitalism and those who serve it]’), subjektivismus (Vasa- 
Travnicek (1946): ‘view that knowledge is dependent on the subject; striving for personal 
happiness’; Travnicek (1952): ‘trend of idealistic philosophy, denying objective truth and 
53 Masaryk’s works were put on the Index in 1953, hence most of the terms attributed to him are 
omitted from later Czech-Czech dictionaries. 
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assuming that the outside world exists only in the mind of the observer; = bourgeois form 
of sociology maintaining that the development of society is driven by ideas and by 
outstanding individuals’) and universalismus (Vasa-Travnicek (1946): ‘ethical trend basing 
morality on society [the family, the nation...]’; Travnicek (1952): ‘bourgeois ethical trend 
basing morality on society [the family, the nation... ]’). It is noticeable that several of the 
definitions in Travnicek (1952) are more specific and apodictic than in the 1946 edition of 
the dictionary (which broadly reflects the norms of the earlier editions). 
The different emphases of the four editions of Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho are perhaps 
slightly better illustrated with respect to the arts, since the dividing line is not drawn 
exclusively between the pre- and post-1948 editions of the dictionary. There is at least one 
(rather uninformative) reference to an important German literary concept: asphaltliteratur 
(Vasa-Travnicek (1937, 1941): ‘literature not complying with the spirit of today’s 
Germany’; Travnicek (1946, 1952): ‘literature not complying with the spirit of Hitler’s 
Germany’).54 Vasa-Travnicek (1941) also introduces the terms bazarovstina (= bazarovsky 
duch, -ske smysleni) (Bazarov’s spirit, Bazarov’s views, ‘from Turgenev’s hero Bazarov in 
Fathers and Sons') and ceskocmska zed’ (Czech Chinese wall, ‘between the Czechs and the 
rest of the world, Czech cultural insularity’). It would probably be wrong to attach too 
much significance to these entries, although the latter does appear to reflect a lack of 
national self-confidence which could only have been exacerbated by the German 
occupation. 
Although all four dictionaries include references to a wide range of artistic terms, it is 
again Travnicek (1952) which engages in the most radical and unambiguous re¬ 
interpretation of existing entries (often involving the omission of pertinent details or the 
insertion of a qualifying phrase). Suffice it to mention davista (Vasa-Travnicek (1946): 
‘adherent of the DAV literary trend, of collectivism’; Travnicek (1952): ‘adherent of the 
Slovak political and nationalistic literary trend, named after the periodical Dav’), Devetsil 
(Vasa-Travnicek [1946]: ‘group of Czech artists and writers promoting Poetism, the 
collection of work published by them’; Travnicek [1952]: devetsilec ‘member of a group 
of Czech writers who published the collection Devetsil’), poetismus (Vasa-Travnicek 
[1946]: ‘attempt to produce pure poetry’; Travnicek ([1952]: ‘decadent attempt to produce 
pure poetry’), imaginismus (Vasa-Travnicek [1946]: ‘Russian poetic movement’; 
Travnicek [1952]: ‘petty-bourgeois Russian poetic movement’), ruralismus (Travnicek 
[1946]: ‘rusticity, fondness for the countryside, enthusiasm for it as an artistic movement’; 
Travnicek [1952]: ‘rusticity, fondness for the countryside, enthusiasm for it as an artistic 
movement [in the capitalist spirit]’) and surrealismus = nadrealismus (Vasa-Travnicek 
[1946]: ‘originally a French literary movement’; Vasa-Travnicek [1952]: ‘decadent literary 
movement’). 
Travnicek (1952) introduces considerably more new literary concepts than the second 
and third editions of the dictionary, of which the most important is socialisticky umelecky 
realismus (Socialist Artistic Realism, ‘art truthfully depicting reality’).55 Other entries 
54 Asphaltliteratur was a derogatory term used by the Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s for works 
which dealt with social problems and the unsavoury aspects of contemporary life, generally in 
an urban setting. Most of the works, such as Alfred Doblin’s Berlin Alexanderplatz (1929), 
employed the ‘Neue Sachlichkeif style. Asphaltliteratur was considered corruptive of the 
German 'Volkspsyche’ and works associated with the movement were banned after 1933. 
55 Zhdanov’s definition of Socialist Realism at the Congress of Soviet Writers, August 1934, 
referred to realism imbued with ‘revolutionary romanticism'. Socialist Realism was the guiding 
principle of all creative output in the early 1950s, and everyone connected with the artistic 
world was expected to conform to its dictates. Writers not endorsing Socialist Realism in the 
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cited for the first time also relate almost entirely to the influence of Soviet culture: 
kultprop (Russian:^ ‘acronym from kulturnl and propaganda, = Cultural and Propaganda 
Section of the KSC’), kultpropclk (‘member of Kultprop’), and rappovec (‘member of the 
Soviet [sic] Proletarian Writers’ Association called RAPP, Communist proclaiming his/her 
artistic views’). There are two striking references to the once enthusiastically pro- 
Communist Russian writer Vladimir Maiakovskii: pozemst’anstvl a rouhacstvl 
Majakovskeho (the earth-mindedness and blasphemous quality of Maiakovskii) and 
talmudista (‘in translations from Stalin and Maiakovskii = a person who does not make out 
the proper sense of something very well and simplifies it’). However, most Czechs would 
probably not have had a sufficient knowledge of Maiakovskii’s work to have understood 
the significance of the last two entries. The user is thus left wondering whether Travnicek 
was merely paying his compulsory due to Maiakovskii or whether he genuinely felt moved 
by the spirit of the time to acknowledge the (uncrowned) Russian poet laureate. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to shed light on an aspect of Czech cultural history which has 
hitherto been largely ignored by scholars. The ideological implications of Slovnlk jazyka 
ceskeho have been explained mainly in terms of the political structures of society and the 
established lexicographical norms, although the dictionary writers’ own world-views have 
also been borne in mind. Of the four editions of the dictionary, Vasa-Travnicek (1937) is 
of greatest historical significance since it was the first work of its type to be published. 
Vasa-Travnicek (1941) is of interest primarily for what it tells us about the limitations 
imposed on Czech lexicographical independence under the Protectorate. The 1946 edition 
of the dictionary is worthy of note both for its intrinsic merits and for the lexical changes 
which it introduced or consolidated (although regrettably its impact was minimal due to its 
very low print-run). The final edition, Travnicek (1952), is of critical importance because it 
is the first dictionary which attempted to reconcile Marxist ideology (in a Stalinist setting) 
with Czechoslovakia’s ‘bourgeois’ traditions and the concomitant linguistic norms. There 
is little indication in either the 1941 edition or the 1952 edition that they were written 
under extreme totalitarian regimes, thereby appearing to confirm Stalin’s suggestion that 
large-scale lexical innovation is not a necessary pre-condition for radical political 
transformation. 
The very lack of precision in dictionary definitions, which Chomsky has consistently 
highlighted, accords the lexicographer the opportunity to avoid engaging in polemical 
discussion about the broader implications of a particular entry.56 Someone consulting 
Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho for the first time is immediately struck by the apparently arbitrary 
nature of much of the content and is bound to reflect on more recent advances made in the 
use of statistically viable linguistic corpora. Ironically enough, however, had Travnicek 
drawn largely on official publications to determine the composition of the 1941 and 1952 
editions of the dictionary, the number of political cliches and other ideologically motivated 
phrases would have been substantially greater and the quality of the dictionaries would 
have been significantly impoverished. Slovnlk jazyka ceskeho would almost certainly have 
also included even more references to and acknowledgements of the leading ideologues 
and government or Party functionaries. Furthermore, Travnicek would have had an 
academically based justification for omitting many of the existing entries which related 
exclusively to the erstwhile bourgeois values and social structures. 
early 1950s either wrote for the drawer or abandoned their art altogether. The poet Konstantin 
Biebl (1898-1951), who was accused of‘dangerous formalism’, resorted to taking his own life. 
56 See Anna Wierzbicka, Semantics: Primes and Universals, Oxford and New York, 1996, p. 250. 
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For all the examples cited in this paper which can be interpreted as evidence of the 
influence of ideology on the content of Slovmk jazyka ceskeho, there are dozens more 
where the lemma or the designation remains fundamentally the same in all four editions of 
the dictionary. Whatever pressures may have been brought to bear on Travnicek and 
whatever external constraints may have been imposed on the editorial and production 
processes, the value of each of the dictionaries as a reference source remains largely 
undiminished. In none of the dictionaries is lexicographical integrity irredeemably 
sacrificed on the altar of political conformity, even if Travnicek (1952) does occasionally 
resort to purely formulaic epithets. While Travnicek was obliged to make some 
concessions to the censors in 1941 and 1952, there is no indication that he was motivated 
primarily by the desire to subordinate the functions and meaning of language to ideological 
precepts. 
36 Horses for Courses, or: Hitching Czech to the 
Soviet Bandwagon 
David Short 
The aim of this chapter is to trace, from evidence available above all in the main Czech 
language journal, Nase fee (NR), renowned for its history of purism, and to a lesser extent 
the specialist linguistic journal Slovo a slovesnost (SaS), the processes of the change of the 
Bohemian Lands from German Protectorate to Soviet satellite. It considers changes both in 
language use and in linguistic attitudes. 
All great shifts in the history of a society are reflected in language, including thinking 
about language. The quantity of material emanating from both linguists and the man on the 
Smichov tram in response to changes in Czech since 19891 is striking. The end of the 
Second World War was no less a turning-point, bringing with it the end of the nazified 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the re-unification of Czechoslovakia (less Ruthenia) 
and a potential political vacuum in the sense that the country might, theoretically, have 
become pro-Western, or pro-Soviet, or indeed somehow gone it alone. February 1948, 
however, sealed the country’s fate, and that meant the rapid sovietization of official, and 
even fairly informal discourse. One thinks of the many committed individuals for whom 
the address soudruh ‘comrade’ or the greeting Cest praci! ‘Honour to labour!’ became 
entirely normal, or the everyday colloquialisms Svaz (or the even more colloquial Sajuz) 
‘[Soviet] Union’ or esenbak ‘policeman’ (based on the abbreviation SNB for the police) 
used by anyone. These were features of the language reflecting the realia of an imposed 
regime, just as other features had been imprinted on language and its use during the war by 
the Germans, though these had been borne less readily, given that the Germans could never 
have enjoyed the measure of popular support accorded to the Russians as liberators. 
Language change and thinking about language in the period up to 1948 might be 
expected to be telling, as indeed it is. Three main strands may be identified: they might be 
described as settling accounts with the recent past, asserting the new present and 
signposting the future; the first two are more active, dynamic, the third passive and 
insidious as regards language change but dynamic in linguistic thought, at least in some 
quarters. Settling accounts with the past is active de-germanization, while signposting the 
future consists in sporadic proto-sovietization. All three strands come together in the first 
NR editorial after the liberation. I quote it in full. Expressions of the first and second 
strands are self-evident; I italicize those expressions which I take to be signposts to the 
future, since they are expressions which took on their own resonance after February 1948: 
After six years of unutterable persecution we can breathe freely again. The brutal power of 
Nazi Germany has disintegrated beneath the blows of the victorious Red Army and the troops 
of our Western allies. The Czech people will preserve into eternity its gratitude to our great 
liberators for having once and for all hammered our mortal enemy so that never again will he 
stifle us or arrest us on our path ofprogressive thought and free labour. 
We enter the new life with a profound sense of gratitude to and respect for all our martyrs 
and warriors, who gave their lives for our liberty. We perhaps all have among them someone 
1 See Edward Adderson: ‘Spontaneous and Non-Spontaneous Reactions to Changes in Czech 
since 1989’, MA dissertation. School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of 
London, 1997. 
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who was near and dear to us and whom we mourn in these great days. Glory and eternal 
remembrance to them all! 
Of the challenges awaiting us in our liberated motherland, not the least will be work on the 
further enhancement of our dear mother tongue, with the immediate priority of cleansing it of 
the filthy sediment left by those six terrible years of German despotism. 
Let us embark on new, joyous work with our new lease of life!2 
I begin with the linguistic assertivity of the present, which cannot be entirely divorced 
from attitudes to the recent past against which it is a direct reaction. 
What we are dealing with is a neo-Revivalist, protectionist trend, redolent of original 
Revival attitudes and often strident in its anti-Germanism. A relatively calm expression of 
it comes in a fairly late editorial in NR by Jin Haller, though similar ideas crop up time and 
again: 
At this time of general national peril, however, there was also an awakening of a strong sense 
of national awareness — no less strong perhaps than it was during our National Awakening 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. All of us, without distinction, recognized how 
unique, precious and irreplaceable our national language was and how irritably sensitive we 
actually were whenever it was interfered with or jeopardized.3 
The evolution of the language had been ‘badly held up by the baleful influence of the 
German martial overlordship, which had impinged on these practical domains [science, 
economics, bureaucracy and standards of public speaking at meetings and in the media] far 
more often and more violently than in the artistic sphere’.4 
This same article looks back to an earlier contribution in NR and argues that fears ‘lest 
this general and sincere interest in language might be no more than a sign of post¬ 
revolutionary fervour which would gradually wane as the days progressed’ had been 
unfounded. It is none the less striking that the volume of material in NR directly relevant to 
this chapter does actually decline annually between 1945 and 1948, rising again in 1949. 
However, in this 1947 paper Haller is still drawing equations such as ‘Czechness = purity’ 
and using metaphors such as that requiring of writers that they apply to their language the 
‘attentive and considerate’ love of a musician for his instrument. The earlier article to 
which Haller alludes5 is the corporate effort of all the editorial board of NR. It takes a 
broad look at the public-interest aspect of the defence of the language and contains many 
of the recurrent points made about the recent damage done to Czech by German; it is a 
textbook sample of its kind, with references to the language’s obranci ‘defenders’, to the 
link between the ‘spirit’ of the language and the spirit of the nation, to the role of writers as 
the vigilant vanguard of language use (followed by teachers, parents and journalists); it 
uses the inevitable metaphor of the garden to be cultivated, later expanded by reference to 
the ‘accursed thistles’ that have infested the ‘rich meadow of the beautiful Czech 
language’;6 it suggests the introduction of language overseers in editorial offices, radio 
2 [The editors], ‘Jsme svobodni!’, NR, 29, 1945, 2, p. 25. 
3 jh [= Jin Haller], ‘Do ctvrteho desitiletf, NR, 31, 1947, 1, pp. 1-3 (1). 
4 Haller is also the author of an earlier, less bleak, article in which he outlines the quite extensive 
work done in support of the language, in particularly difficult conditions after the closure of the 
Czech universities, by the Friends of the Czech Language (‘Kruh pratel ceskeho jazyka za 
valky’, NR, 29, 1945, 3-4, pp. 89-95). This is not the place to recount the work done, but 
Haller’s recalling it does fall within the 'defensive’ strand of thinking about language during 
the transition. 
5 'Cistota materskeho jazyka se stava verejnym zajmem’, NR, 29, 1945, 5-6, pp. 127-38. 
6 The historical overview of all — not just wartime — intrusions of German items into colloquial 
Czech merits closer study of its own, as does the remaining discussion of current lexical and 
syntactic shortcomings, pp. 133Tf. 
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stations and theatres.7 Because the article seeks to show the extent of the public interest in 
the issues, it quotes widely from both the central and provincial press. It is also interesting 
from the point of view of other sources and authorities quoted: Czech left-wing writers 
come as no surprise, but we also encounter the ‘young English left-wing poet Stephen 
Spender’ (p. 129) and V. I. Lenin (p. 137). Finally, like many contributions in this spirit 
and from the same source, the article ends with a rallying cry: ‘Let us complete the 
building of our new, free republic also in the sphere of the mother-tongue!’ This 
constitutes another hint of proto-sovietization of expression. 
A recurrent theme, and one that touches the individual most closely, is the handling and 
use of proper names (personal names, street names, the very name of the country), for ‘few 
things are so sensitive to change or disruption as the national character of names and titles. 
This was brought home to us best during the German occupation, when Nazi frenzy went 
so far that even our Czech surnames barely stood up in their Czech form.’8 Apart from 
references to the removal of German street names and the like, the article deals inter alia 
with: (i) the reinstatement of Ceskoslovensko (and so on) unhyphenated; (ii) the 
introduction of ndrod cesky and narod slovensky to replace ceskoslovensky narod, and with 
it the restriction of the word Czechoslovak to designation of citizenship (this was going 
against the view Benes still generally upheld during the war that there was one 
Czechoslovak nation); (iii) the rewriting of registers of births, marriages and deaths, which 
had been only in German during the Protectorate, the object being to standardize, and 
ultimately codify forms of Czech given names, and to obliterate occasional occurrences of 
female surnames in the form Novotny-ova\ (iv) the establishment of rules for when and 
only when it is appropriate to write names with the surname first — the ‘Hungarian order’ 
(a ‘banal ill’ observed by the author in expatriate journalism in particular, but also in the 
use of teenagers, in imitation of how their names figure in class registers; it is appropriate 
solely for the purpose of various alphabetized lists); (v) replacement of German 
conventions in the layout and signing of official correspondence; (vi) the beginnings of the 
spontaneous process whereby place-names containing the element ‘German’ were being 
altered (Nemecky > Havlickuv Brod; Nemecka > Orlicka Rybna, with others likely to 
follow); the author hopes that such local initiatives will avoid solutions ending in -ov, 
which is simply unimaginative; (vii) the return of most street names to their pre-1938 
form, with an appeal that new names should not be clumsy (like ulice 28. rljna [Street of 
28 October] or ulice II. pluku Straze svobody [Street of 2nd Guardian of Freedom 
Regiment], of which the latter were better rejected [it was, eventually] and the former 
simplified to ulice rijnova [advice ignored to this day]); several new names point in a 
Soviet direction (Sovetska, Rudoarmejska)', (viii) the ‘confusing’ usage whereby 
newspapers capitalize all the words in their title, instead of just the first;9 this is followed 
7 The article itself is followed (p. 139) by the text of a public notice issued by the council of 
Greater Zlin on its recently founded language advice centre and listing the numerous language- 
managerial activities for which it was to be responsible. It is fulsomely praised by the editors of 
NR, who further note that the patriotic gymnastic Sokol organization had been asked to include 
language culture in its various programmes, and that a similar idea would be put to the Union 
of Czech Youth (p. 140). 
8 Karel Erban: ‘Jmena a nazvy v nove republice’, NR, 29, 1945, 3-4, pp. 76-79. 
9 Erban is himself a little confused here, or the source of further confusion: his rebuke embraces 
Svobodne Slovo and Svobodne Noviny, which used capitals throughout, but mentions the 
‘erstwhile’ Lidove noviny (lower-case ‘n’), despite the fact that when published, Lidove Noviny 
was fully capitalized (as were Moderni Revue, Narodni Listy and others before the war). In 
other words, the general usage was clearly at variance with Pravidla ceskeho pravopisu, the 
standard handbook of orthography, which might therefore have been revised in favour of 
established practice. In the sequel the Erban line did assert itself. 
388 The Phoney Peace 
by a discussion of rules of capitalization generally, since current, haphazard practice at the 
whim of individual writers is often at variance with the rules as laid out in the 
orthographical handbook Pravidla ceskeho pravopisu, which itself needs refining, since it 
has nothing at all to say in some areas; (ix) the emotional, but under-motivated tendency in 
some quarters to write Nemec ‘German’ with lower-case n-;10 this is the most graphic 
single detail relating to a linguistic settling of accounts with the recent German past and is 
one of many addressed in the ensuing discussion in this chapter, first by the phonetician 
Bohuslav Hala.* 11 
Aspects of several of these issues re-arise throughout the period. An article by Josef 
Benes, ‘Jake ceske pfijmem si vybrati?’,12 places the bohemicization of surnames in the 
context of the National Revival (still uncompleted) and the ‘purification’ of names by the 
‘eradication of alien names, especially surnames’ after both world wars.13 He gives an 
account of the interchange of Czech and German names in Czech, German or ethnically 
mixed areas of the country, pointing out that the ‘language’ of a name meant nothing as 
regards the nationality of its bearer. The main concern is, however, that in the current rush 
to shed German (or German-sounding) surnames people should be mindful of such 
considerations as euphony or (possible) vulgarity; the ideal choice would the rare type of 
Czech surname, even a unique one, or a name lost by the extinction of some old family 
(p. 128). There had not previously been any major tradition of name-changing among the 
Czechs, though the spicier surnames widely encountered in Moravian Wallachia and 
certain names consisting of an elsewhere vulgar word had been changed. Also many Jews 
had, Benes alleges, adopted German surnames at the time of Munich in a vain attempt to 
avoid persecution. 
10 Pavel Tigrid identifies at least one such quarter: 'at the time, the spelling of “nemec” with a 
small “n” was used consistently in the National Social press’: Tigrid, Kapesni pruvodce 
inteligentni zeny po vlastnim osudu, Toronto, 1988, reprint, Prague, 1990, p. 205. An article by 
Josef Batelka, ‘Svoboda, lidstvi, mir’ in Evangelicky /calendar 1999, Prague, 1998, pp. 53-55, 
quotes a student’s ‘message from Sachsenhausen’ in verse, in which nemec is written with 
lower-case ‘n’. This wartime usage is footnoted by the editors in the following terms: ‘The 
poem was written in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Hence we have left the expression 
“nemec” with a small letter, as was the custom at the time for designating Nazi Germans as 
enemies. [...] The attempt to introduce the spelling of Germans with a small letter did not last 
long after the war ended’; the poem first appeared in print in Svet v obrazech (21 November 
1945), where it is attributed to Jin Batelka. I am grateful to Eva Znojilova of Brno for drawing 
my attention to this reference. The crude attitude attacked by Erban was that the Germans were 
animals, hence the lower-case ‘n’. Tigrid quotes a similar attitude, ‘from a 1945 pamphlet by 
my journalist colleague from Obzory, the weekly of the Catholic People’s Party’: ‘We have 
legitimate grounds for not viewing the Germans as people’; note, however, the capitalization. 
The post-war linguistic view remained that Germans were a nation, and so capital ‘N’ was 
alone appropriate. 
11 ‘Nekolik poznamek k Erbanovu clanku “Jmena a nazvy v nove republice’”, NR, 29, 1945, 7-8, 
pp. 177-80. Hala is much concerned by the phonological, phonetic and aesthetic aspects of new 
place, street and personal names. He also refers to nemec as the ‘currently regular spelling with 
a small n-' (but compare note 10, and proceeds to defend it as having a semantics different 
from Nemec. Moreover, to worry about such matters is, on Erban’s part, to waste time over 
trivia. Erban’s response (‘Odpoved' k Halovym poznamkam’, ibid., pp. 180-83) reiterates his 
previous view and does not advance the discussion any further. 
12 NR, 30, 1946, 4-5, pp. 78-86; ibid., 6-7, pp. 121-28. 
13 That this was neither a peculiarly Czech matter, nor purely of the time of writing, is 
illustrated by examples from inter-war Estonia, Hungary and the USA (ibid., pp. 78-9) and 
Poland-Lithuania (p. 81). 
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In an implied response to Benes’s article, Frantisek Patek writes that attention must also 
be paid to forenames.14 His aim is frankly political: ‘Some parents gave their children bom 
during the Occupation names such as Adolf, Bruno, Herta or Hilda; today their political 
thinking should be put to the test.’15 The real period gem in the context of surnames had 
come from a local, oddly purist initiative: ‘At one factory they wanted to bohemicize the 
noun stachanovec [stakhanovite] after the first local pioneer [of shock-work]. The new 
name (according to Nase Pojizeri of 9 August 1945) did not take on, because the pioneer 
of hard work in question was called Mekota [Softie].’16 
There was also a period interest in modes of address, with its own hints of sovietization. 
In a small piece concerned with the etiquette of address and journalistic licence,17 we leam 
when it is appropriate to address the president bratre presidente ‘Brother President’ 
(never) or pane presidente, bratre (doktore) Benesi ‘Mr President, Brother (Dr) Benes’ 
(the latter at meetings of the Sokol movement). On the other hand, we leam in what sounds 
like the spirit of non-sovietization why it is wrong of the pro-government press to refer to 
predseda vlady soudruh Fierlinger ‘Minister President, Comrade Fierlinger’, merely on 
the grounds that Fierlinger owed allegiance to a party in which ‘comrade’ was the normal 
address. The inference is that the pro-government press is kow-towing, in defiance of 
etiquette. The same piece reports that all members of the Czechoslovak armed forces used 
to address each other bratre ‘brother’, which at the time had been viewed as ‘democratic’, 
but which also harks back to the practice of the Czecho-Slovak legions. That is clearly no 
longer so. 
The orthographic handbook also came in for revision. Parallel de-germanization and 
proto-sovietization appeared in its 1946 edition, ‘largely unchanged from the 1941 
edition’. In a brief summary of the changes that were made, Emanuel Smetanka and 
Vladimir Smilauer reported,18 inter alia: the deletion of changes imposed by the erstwhile 
Office of the Reichsprotektor, including the capitalization of Vudce ‘Ftihrer’ and Rise 
‘Reich’; the re-insertion of items suppressed by the German censor, including 
Ceskoslovensko, Sokol, Zeyer [a Jewish writer]; the restoration of the spelling luteran 
‘Lutheran’ and its derivates; the inclusion for the first time of contemporary items ‘the 
spelling of which is sometimes uncertain’, including Revolucnl garda ‘Revolutionary 
Guard’, Ustredni rada odborii ‘Central Council of Trade Unions’, zavodni rada ‘works 
council’, mistni narodni vybor ‘local national committee’;19 these innovations were in all 
the satellite countries and are dealt with by Laszlo Peter in his chapter. 
Other new publications reviewed (generally favourably) in NR in this period include 
handbooks largely associated with the purity of the language, such as Antonin Opravil’s 
14 ‘Krestni jmena a pfijmenF, NR, 31, 1947, 5-6, pp. 118-19. 
15 Ibid., p. 118. 
16 Ibid., p. 119. 
17 Jiff Danhelka: ‘Oslovovani presidenta republiky’, NR, 30, 1946, 2-3, pp. 52-53. 
18 ‘Nove vydani Pravidel ceskeho pravopisu 1946’, NR, 30, 1946, 1, p. 7. The notice contains the 
assurance that the State Publishing House will in due course publish a detailed account of all 
such changes. An article by Bohuslav HavrUnek in SaS, ‘Zasady prazskeho lingvistickeho 
krouzku a nova kodifikace spisovne destiny’ (SaS, 10, 1947—48, 1, pp. 13-23), incorporates a 
critical survey of the changes, but against the background of the continuing differences between 
the scholars of the Prague Linguistic Circle and the formerly purist NR circle. It is free of any 
anti-geirmanism or embryonic sovietization. 
19 Mistni narodni vybor as the term for the lowest administrative unit of the ‘rule of the people’ 
was instituted in the ‘revolutionary period of 1945’: see ‘MNV’ in Karel TauS, Slovnik cizich 
slov, zkratek, novinarskych sifer, pseudonymu a casopisu pro ctenare novin, Blansko, 1946 
(hereafter Slovnik cizich slov, zkratek...), p. 422. The term survived until c. 1990. 
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Nikoli... nybrz... Kopa hfichu proti dobre matefstine20 (Not... But... Two-Score Sins 
against Good Mother Czech, 1945), chiefly aimed against germanisms. The hyperbolic, 
cloying language used in new book titles, while in part traditional, is positively endemic in 
this period, as in the case of the normally staid Frantisek Oberfalcer’s Krasna, cista, svata 
fed matef ska ([Our] Beautiful, Pure, Holy Mother-Tongue, 1945) or Pavel Eisner’s Bohyne 
ceka: traktat o destine (The Goddess Awaits: A Treatise on Czech, 1945). Vaclav 
Flajshans’s long article in NR, ‘Bohatstvi destiny’ (The Riches of Czech),21 is an attack on 
those who operate with such ‘fictions’ as that Czech has over one million words22 and an 
explanation of the principles behind the creation of the 200,000-entry Academy dictionary 
of Czech. One point relevant to the present chapter is the reference to that dictionary’s 
failure to include ‘such common words today as kolaborant, kolaborantsky, 
kolaborantstvf, that is, words to do with ‘collaboration’ with the German occupiers. 
The prevailing attitude to the recent political, and partly linguistic, pressures from 
Germany is conveyed in the 1947 editorial to NR. 
Even in recent years Nase fee has tried to work according to the principles on which it was 
founded and which have become its tradition. Not even the six brutal years of the German 
rule of terror managed to silence its voice completely,23 although there was little left about 
which it was permitted to write at all. After all, it was not even permitted to write that a 
germanism was an error or to quote examples from other Slavonic languages, and rather than 
give Slavonic names from German or German-occupied areas in the warped German form as 
required by a German regulation, we avoided such subjects for the time being.24 
At the period people are still recalling the ‘power’ of the language under the 
Protectorate, as attested by a letter to Svobodne noviny (10 February 1946) from Jaroslav 
P. Blazek, reproduced in NR.25 The letter is full of passionate rhetoric and exclamation 
marks and praises the skill of Czech teachers in communicating a message even in the 
presence of a member of the SS: if they said ‘bejvavalo’ (in the good old days things used 
to be), the students would understand ‘bude’ (things will be); many teachers had, however, 
suffered imprisonment for failing to control the class when the words Viidce zhynul, vudee 
zhynul! (The leader [thus Fiihrer] is dead) from K. H. Macha’s 1836 work Mdj (Spring) 
were read.26 
Probably the earliest clear sign of future sovietization came in the Kosice Government 
Programme, which first reckoned with the introduction of compulsory Russian in 
Czechoslovak schools. The 1945 volume of NR already carries its own indication of an 
20 This is one of a number of purist publications accorded a negative review in SaS: see Alois 
JedliCka, ‘Na okraj novych brush’, SaS, 10, 1947-48, 1, pp. 57—60. Jedlicka is barely kinder to 
a new school textbook of Czech from the Haller stable: see idem, ‘Strohe brusicstvi v ucebnici 
ceskeho jazyka’, ibid., 4, pp. 251-52. 
21 NR, 30, 1946, 1, pp. 1-4, and ibid., 2, pp. 25-33. 
Including items such as K. Adam and V. Jaros, Slovnik spravne destiny, which had recently 
appeared (date not stated) and allegedly contained 500,000 words, while, with ‘word’ properly 
defined, it actually contained only 40,000. 
23 This is an interesting point: NR was indeed published without interruption, while SaS, the more 
‘linguistic’ of the two main journals, was suspended in 1943. 
24 Haller, 'Do ctvrteho desitileti’ (see note 3 above), p. 1. 
25 ‘Z naseho tisku’, NR, 30, 1946, 1, pp. 16-17. 
26 No statistics are given for the number of teachers who suffered this fate. Post-1942 editions of 
Mdj had the offending words replaced by Pan nas zhynul (‘Our lord is dead’). 
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early interest in, or leaning towards, the Soviet Union.27 Apart from the hints already 
mentioned as incidental to some other feature of the articles quoted, this volume contains 
‘Voices from the USSR on the Mother-Tongue’28 (given precedence in its particular rubric 
over the article on the purity of Czech29), and Haller’s ‘Care for the Mother-Tongue in 
Soviet Schools and Czech Schools’ (also placed first in the same rubric of a later issue).30 
The former celebrates the memory of the Czech Marxist linguist Jan Frcek, who had 
brought Soviet views on language to Czech notice before the war and had, for that reason, 
been executed by the Germans. The ‘voices’ of the title are those of Lenin, Kalinin and 
Stalin, with allusions passim to Lenin’s wife and the writers Maksim Gor'kii and Mikhail 
Zoshchenko. The two main issues are the necessity that language be intelligible (hence the 
rash of loan-words in Russian should be wiped out or avoided as appropriate), and that the 
language’s purity and efficiency needs to be constantly overseen (‘fought for’). Since it is 
also the instrument by which policy is implemented, intelligibility has a major socio¬ 
political dimension; pompous Communist trade-unionists do no service to the cause if their 
speeches, larded with opaque loan-words, provoke such responses as: ‘Can’t understand a 
word he says; he must be a Bolshevik.’ The authors’ conclusion deserves quotation in 
extenso, for the information it gives on the political atmosphere of the period of transition 
(from socialism to socialism, as Michal Bauer puts it): 
Two crucial lessons follow from the report we have presented. The first is to recognize that, 
as attested by the dramatic development of the young Soviet culture, a standard language can 
flourish only if protected from the clumsiness and arbitrariness of individuals and if it is 
managed by a disciplined regard for purity,31 expediency and efficiency of expression. The 
second [...] is that the political and ideological leaders of the Soviet people, above all Lenin 
and Stalin, [...] found the time [...] to be the supreme guardians of the mother-tongue. In that 
respect they should be an example to the entire world and particularly to us.32 
This is evidence enough that the familiar slogan, Sovetsky svaz nas vzor (The Soviet 
Union — Our Model), commonly associated with the days of Communist rule in 
Czechoslovakia, goes right back to the moment of liberation, at least as far as NR is 
concerned. Reflection of the growing importance of Russian in schools is also found in 
SaS, in Borivoj Novak’s review article on new Russian textbooks.33 Its main function is to 
describe two major post-war Czech works, but it also mentions many minor publications of 
dubious quality which, like the textbooks, respond to the new opportunity ‘to show an 
uninhibited interest in Russian’ and whose first aim was to enable Czechs at large ‘to 
converse more or less well with Soviet soldiers’. One small pronunciation guide34 is much 
27 As far as SaS is concerned, evidence of a growth in Czech interest in things Russian after the 
war is revealed in the number of books on Russian topics reviewed; on the whole they do not 
concern language. 
28 ‘Hlasy z SSSR o materskem jazyce’ (hereafter ‘Hlasy z SSSR’), NR, 29, 1945, 5-6, pp. 121— 
27. 
29 See note 5. 
30 ‘Pece o matersky jazyk v sovetske skole a v ceske skole’ (hereafter ‘Pece o matersky jazyk’), 
NR, 29, 1945, 7-8, pp. 183-87. 
31 The idea of ‘language purity’, much in evidence among the NR circle, is one of the matters 
considered by Alois Jedlicka in ‘Otazky jazykove vychovy’, SaS, 10, 1947—48, 3, pp. 142-51. 
Like other articles in SaS it is apolitical and, as might be expected, takes the functional 
approach to language description, language policy and language teaching. Jedlicka has little 
time for the NR group. 
32 ‘Hlasy z SSSR’ (see note 27 above), pp. 126-27. 
33 ‘Nove ucebnice rustiny’, SaS, 10, 1947-48, 3, pp. 181-86. 
34 Ladislav Swirka and Franti§ek Travnicek, Ruska abeceda a vyslovnost. Brno, 1945, 16pp. 
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praised, despite the failure to correct some misprints in the appended Soviet national 
anthem. 
In his ‘Pece o matersky jazyk’, Haller quotes from a 1945 article in Pravda by People’s 
Commissar V. P. Potemkin, though he confines himself to the Commissar’s thoughts on 
mother-tongue teaching in schools ‘because in large measure they also apply to us’.35 The 
main problem in both the Soviet and Czech cases is ‘formalism’ — rote-learning without 
understanding; formalized instruction in grammar, but little study of language and its use. 
As the author points out, there is nothing new in the complaint; what matters here is that, 
again, the Soviet Union is held up as a model: ‘At Soviet secondary schools eight or nine 
lessons a week are devoted to language. It sounds almost grotesque when we recall that in 
the new [Czechoslovak] curriculum only four hours a week have been accorded to the 
mother-tongue, that is, fewer even than there used to be.’36 
The unsigned ‘Hlasy z SSSR’, also discusses the opposite pole of a Russian full of loan¬ 
words, namely the excessive penetration of colloquialisms, dialectisms and other non¬ 
standard features in speeches and the media. Lenin, Gor'kii and their ilk were equally 
against such degeneration of the language. According to the authors, the fact that it seems 
to be a concomitant feature of a people’s democracy is no fault of the working class who 
rise to positions of authority, and it goes hand in hand with another ill — an apparent 
pomposity arising from the lack of linguistic finesse. There is some evidence in NR of both 
these features of ‘proletarianization’ (if not actually sovietization) in post-war 
Czechoslovakia as well. In a marginal note by Vojtech Suk we read: 
The BBC, the glorious British Broadcasting Corporation (may the good Lord grant her long 
life; she gave us strength and refreshment during the war), looks after the English language 
and perfect diction; our radio has no such concerns. 1 sometimes hear addresses which carry 
shades of the slums; sometimes they use the pronunciation that was current seventy years 
ago. In a single morning programme I recently heard student and /corespondent (twice) — we 
really do not need this kind of thing.37 
And in another marginal note by ‘fpb’: ‘Since the revolution [May 1945] certain 
individuals who can barely put even a simple sentence together have entered state offices 
and [nationalized] companies. Such people are also appearing in places responsible for 
issuing press releases. And these are often written in a style for which a fourth-year high- 
school student would be failed.’38 The sample of officialese he then quotes strikes me as 
typical of the entire later (Communist) period, which suggests, again, that ‘newspeak’ 
began with the liberation rather than with the Communist take-over.39 The author’s 
35 ‘Pede o matersky jazyk’, p. 183. 
36 Ibid., p. 187. 
37 ‘Rozhlas a mluva’, NR, 29, 1945, 9-10, p. 215. On the same page Suk, not a linguist but an 
anthropologist and ethnologist at the Science Faculty of Bmo University from 1923 to 1949, 
has another marginal note, complaining this time of inappropriate linguistic innovation, namely 
the penetration, as a buzz-word, of nesvoboda ‘unfreedom’ to refer to the wartime period as the 
opposite of the new svoboda — a minor example of language innovation in a time of change. 
Suk argues that the word does not exist (is not in the dictionary), is too weak for the purposes 
intended, and should be replaced by the less mealy-mouthed poroba, ‘bondage’. 
38 ‘Neznalost ceskeho jazyka v statnich uradech’, NR, 31, 1947, 1, pp. 19-20. 
39 I quote the notice from the Cabinet Office in full: ‘The time for the receiving of previously 
unannounced visitors by desk-officers of the Cabinet Office has been set for Wednesday and 
Thursday from 9-13 hours. It is requested that unannounced visits not be exercised outside 
these times and that visits on visiting days be restricted to the minimum degree. For the purpose 
of expeditious handling of the objects of visits it is recommended that the Cabinet Office be 
advised of an intended personal visit in advance, with the accompaniment of written 
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conclusion is a patriotic appeal to the recent German practice as better than current 
conditions: ‘During the Occupation there had to be a German language expert in every 
office. Surely it should be possible to find someone expert in Czech at our ministries and 
in the Cabinet Office who would be capable of preventing our mother tongue from being 
so desecrated.’ 
An area of language perceived as relatively new and meriting comment is the 
proliferation of abbreviations and acronyms. Emil Vaclav Kopecky published at his own 
expense a dictionary of these items from a variety of ‘familiar languages’ (including 
wartime German).40 The emphasis is on items that have arisen ‘since the liberation’. 
Kopecky’s reviewer upbraids him for a number of omissions (and redundant inclusions), 
but it is clear from the examples discussed that some Soviet ‘internationalisms’ were 
already well established, and that, like some others (UNRRA, UNESCO), their origin had 
become ‘obfuscated’; they include sovchoz and kolchoz. The proliferation of such items 
was obviously of such magnitude that Kopecky promised subscribers to his book quarterly 
updates.41 
One period ‘internationalism’ not of Soviet provenance, but with Soviet connections, 
was ‘iron curtain’. Interestingly, it was possible for NR to write about zelezna opona as late 
as issue 4-5 of vol. 32 (1948), some time after ‘Victorious February’.42 Described as 
referring to ‘the airtight barrier between political blocs, specifically between the Eastern 
and Western Blocs’, it was ‘appearing almost daily in the press whence it had ‘penetrated 
the popular imagination and idiom’.43 
documentation on the matter, and that then a summons to attend discussion of the matter in 
person be awaited.’ Rather sensibly, the anonymous commentator for NR appends a stylistically 
more appropriate (and more lucid) version of the same message: ‘Previously unannounced 
visitors are received by desk-officers of the Cabinet Office only on Wednesdays and Thursdays 
between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. It is requested that unannounced visits be avoided outside these 
hours and that on visiting days they be kept to a minimum. The purpose of the visit will be 
achieved more speedily if the visitor gives notice in advance, submits written documentation 
and waits until he is invited to attend in person’ (ibid., p. 20). The point is also made, and 
illustrated, that the cumbersome style had already become the target of caricature. 
40 Vaclav Kopecky, Zmatek zkratek, private print (place and date of publication not stated), 
reviewed by L. Klimes in NR, 32, 1948, 1, pp. 11-12. 
41 It may be assumed that few, if any, such updates ever appeared. The post-1989 transition has 
bred a no less impressive range of acronyms and abbreviations, many native, but many more, 
and more opaque, emanating from Brussels. 
42 O. F. Babler: “‘Zelezna opona’”, NR, 32, 1948, 2-3, p. 60. 
43 The purpose of the article is to identify the source of the expression: one ‘St. Vincent 
Trowbridge’, who claims (Notes and Queries, 193, 1, 10 January 1948) that his use of it in the 
weekly Sunday Empire News on 21 October 1945 gives him authorial priority (though 
regrettably no copyright) over Winston Churchill, to whom it had already come to be attributed 
without question. In reality neither claimant had priority: while The Concise Oxford Dictionary 
of Quotations (Oxford and New York, 1981) cites Churchill’s 1946 address at Westminster 
College, Fulton, USA (‘An iron curtain has descended across the Continent’) as the best-known 
use of the expression, it notes: ‘The expression iron curtain had previously been applied by 
others to the Soviet Union or its sphere of influence, e.g. Ethel Snowden, Through Bolshevik 
Russia [1920]; Dr. Goebbels, Das Reich [25 Feb. 1945]; and by Churchill himself in a cable to 
President Truman [4 June 1945]’ (p. 71). Brewer’s Dictionary of Phrase and Fable (centenary 
edition, revised by Ivor H. Evans, 6th corrected impression, London, 1978), notes the 
popularization of the phrase by Churchill’s Fulton speech and mentions Ethel Snowden’s use, 
but also says ‘it was used previously in Germany by Count Schwerin von Krosigk on 2 May 
1945, and by Lord Conesford in February of that year [...] and the Queen of the Belgians, in 
1914, spoke of a bloody iron curtain between her and the Germans’, p. 572). 
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By 1949, NR is discussing linguistic matters that are very much a product of the new 
regime. Frantisek Danes discusses the new military terminology;44 a review of Vilem 
Pech’s then new dictionary of loan-words reveals that such sovietisms as stengazeta (wall 
newspaper) and katuse ([Second World War] rocket-launcher) are already part of modem 
Czech;45 a review of E. S. Istrina’s Norms of the Russian Language and Language Culture 
(Moscow and Leningrad, 1948) is spun out to the unusual length of six pages;46 Milos 
Dokulil, the leading Czech lexicologist, discusses the claims for a place in the language of 
the expressions lidovychova ‘education of the people’ (acceptable), lidovlada ‘people’s 
rule, democracy’ (acceptable at a pinch), and lidosprava ‘management by the people’ 
(unacceptable);47 the distinguished linguist Bohuslav Havranek describes the challenges 
faced by Czech linguistics under the Five-Year Plan, and signs off with the salutation: 
‘Hail to the linguistic five-year plan! Hail to our entire Czechoslovak five-year plan!’;48 
and Ctirad Bosak writes about Lenin and linguistics, concluding: 
Lenin himself also had a masterly command of language and expressed his brilliantly clear 
ideas with precision. The power of his arguments was invincible. It is to Lenin’s credit that 
language has been accorded the standing that it merits. Only in the Soviet Union has 
linguistics become a co-builder of the new life.49 
Answering a practical need arising in full force from the new regime, Havranek discusses 
the principles of transcribing Russian proper names into Czech. It is a serious piece of 
scholarship, based on contrastive phonology; it makes no reference to either Soviet 
linguistics or the talents of the linguist Lenin. Instead, the by then usual political 
requirement of such gestures is probably satisfied by the first chain of (non-problematic) 
examples: Lenin, Stalin, Leningrad, Pus kin, Lermontov, Tolstoj.50 
The generally apolitical tenth volume of SaS is the last of its kind. Volume 11 (1948— 
49), while seeking to remain objective, nevertheless catches up with the times. Evidence is 
in Ctirad Bosak’s ‘The Soviet campaign against linguistic idealism’,51 a report on ‘the 
victory of the materialist tendency of Michurin over Morganite idealism’ in biology and a 
discussion of analogously opposing trends in linguistics as discussed by Academician 
Meshchaninov and F. P. Filin (director of the Institute of the Russian Language) at a recent 
Soviet linguistics conference in Leningrad. Bosak is perhaps the first Czech to promote 
‘the new Marrian teaching, which is alone acceptable to Soviet linguists’ (p. 133).52 The 
44 ‘Novinky ve vojenskem nazvoslovf, NR, 33, 1949, 5—6, pp. 113-14. Unfortunately nothing is 
said regarding any newly appropriate modes of address across ranks. 
45 L. Jansky, ‘Vilem Pech: Velky slovnik cizich slov. Prague, Kvasnicka a Hampl, 1949, XII-809 
str.’, ibid., pp. 114-16. 
46 M. Held, ‘Ruska studie o otazkach jazykove normy a kultury’, ibid., 7-8, pp. 145-50. The 
review points out where Czech linguistics would differ in method and interpretation from this 
Soviet handbook, but also cites Czech Marxist linguists and refers to the Institute of the 
Russian Language, which had by this time been established in Prague. 
47 NR, 33, 1949, 3^1, pp. 58-62. 
48 ‘Cesky jazyk do pdiletky’, ibid., 1-2, pp. 6-7. Like much else, this article is a fine balancing 
act between the objectively academic and period sycophancy. In 1951 Havranek also published 
a small work on Stalin’s views on language; he was so respected and, indeed, loved that the 
editors of Slovnik ceskych spisovatelu (1964) omitted it from his bibliography. 
49 ‘Lenin a otazky jazyka’, ibid., pp. 8-9 (marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of Lenin’s death). 
50 ‘Psani ruskych jmen v ceStine’, ibid., 3-4, pp. 41-46. 
51 ‘Sovetsky nastup proti lingvistickemu idealismu’, SaS, 11, 1948-49, 2, pp. 132-35. 
Nikolai Iakovlevich Marr was the author of the theses which shaped Marxist-Leninist 
linguistics; his work was continued (‘successfully developed’) by Ivan Ivanovich 
Meshchaninov. (For more on Marr and Meshchaninov see the chapter by Nigel Gotteri.) The 
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bulk of the article consists of the Czech translation of a resolution adopted on 20 October, 
1948 by the Council of the Marr Institute of Language and Thought and the Leningrad 
Section of the Institute of the Russian Language of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. 
Amongst other things it contains fulsome praise for Lysenko, Lenin and Stalin, an attack 
on the ‘decadent culture of the bourgeois West’ and an onslaught against the ‘reactionary’ 
linguists who have allegedly taken control of university language departments, readers’ 
jobs at publishing houses, syllabus boards, the editorial board of Russkii yazyk v shkole 
(The Russian language in schools) and so forth, and have thus caused the flood of 
textbooks ‘written in an alien spirit’, and trained postgraduates or edited scholarly works in 
a spirit that is ‘inimical to progressive Soviet science’ (pp. 134-35). The second-hand use 
of Soviet sources in the sovietization of SaS includes a fairly long piece by 
Meshchaninov53 and a review article by Karel Horalek, ‘Ze sovetske fonologie’ (Some 
Soviet work on phonology),54 which is, however, politically unbiased, critical where 
criticism is due, and defensive of Soviet phonologists unfairly criticized at home. He also 
makes the point that it is in phonology that Western and Soviet scholars are least far apart. 
As was to become the pattern in the next four decades, Horalek ends on a positive note: 
‘[critics] must not forget that the products of Russian and Soviet phonology have won 
world-wide recognition’. The final item to be mentioned from this first sovietizing issue of 
SaS is a review of M. Cohen’s Linguistique et materialisme dialectique,55 which is 
criticized for its failure to refer to the research findings of Soviet linguists and is compared 
unfavourably to the analysis of the complex nature of language in Illusion and Reality by 
the ‘English Marxist Caudwell’.56 
The two main linguistic journals I have discussed are not the only type of published 
source to reveal what was happening to Czech language and society in the gap between the 
end of the war and February 1948. Another source would be the first volume of 
Czechoslovak Radio’s Jazykovy koutek (Language Comer).57 A work like Karel Taus’s 
Slovnik cizich slov, zktratek ... (Dictionary of Loan-words, Abbreviations ...)58 contains 
many a rich seam. While it lists, for example, hundreds of twentieth-century daily papers 
and other print media from all over the world,59 and the ciphers and pseudonyms of scores 
of Czech writers and journalists (many forgotten) of the previous 100 years, it also reveals 
coincidentally the extent to which street-names were already being changed (it gives 
apparent new-found enthusiasm for Marrism among the Czechs came a bit late in the day, 
given that Stalin himself was to attack Marr in Pravda in 1950. 
53 ‘Nove uceni o jazyku v SSSR v jeho soucasne vyvojove fazi’, SaS, 11, 1948^49, 1, pp. 1-7. 
54 SaS, 11, 1948-49, 2, pp. 166-69. 
55 Paris, 1948, reviewed by J. Ellis, ibid., p. 183. It is interesting to note that this review is 
apparently by a foreigner. 
56 That is, the poet and philosopher Christopher Caudwell (Christopher St. John Sprigg, 1903- 
37). The full title of the work mentioned is Illusion and Reality: A Study of the Sources of 
Poetry (London, 1946). 
57 B. Havranek, A. Jedlicka and F. Vahala (eds), Jazykovy koutek Ceskoslovenskeho rozhlasu: 
prvni vyber, Prague, 1949, 291pp. This consists of printed versions of short broadcasts on a 
wide range of linguistic themes and was intended for the general public. 
58 This is not a time-serving political handbook, but an objective record of the state of affairs. It 
contains many reflections of de-germanizing and proto-sovietizing, but also much information 
from ‘Allied’ and other sources. 
59 For Czechoslovak items, the annotations also include such details as when they stopped 
appearing on the outset of war, and when (if) publication restarted. For example, Anglicky 
zpravodaj (English Reporter) is recorded as pre-war only. 
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addresses for many Czech institutions);60 the new political terminology; period reactions 
against the war and Protectorate, revealed by, for example, the inclusion and definition of 
such loan-words as antinacismusbx and, surprisingly bacon;62 proto-sovietization of 
government, as revealed by, for example, the description of the structure of the Ministry of 
Information, beginning with Section I — information on the USSR;63 and a wide range of 
newly important Soviet terms.64 
If language really is the spirit of the nation as the NR school was proclaiming 
immediately after the war, then that spirit gradually became more and more Stalinized. We 
may not reject glib statements that language reflects the society that uses it. That ‘society’ 
consists of individuals, even in an anti-individualist, radically collectivist period. The 
linguists I have been discussing were all individuals individually responsible for their part 
in deepening the redness of the Czech spirit. 
In the 1990s, in another transition, I am not sure what colour the journalists, more than 
linguists, are turning the Czech spirit. I presume Eurocratic blue. The five-pointed star 
assures continuity. 
60 For example, the offices of Svobodne noviny are at Red Army Square, Bmo, and the printers of 
the Prague edition were in Stalin Blvd. Other names were also changing: in 1945 the Bmo 
National Theatre was renamed the Mahen Theatre after Jiff Mahen, the writer who, in May 
1939, committed suicide in protest at the German occupation (see ‘Jin Mahen’ in TauS, Slovnlk 
cizlch slov, zkratek [see note 19 above], p. 396-97). 
61 Ibid., p. 40: ‘Movement against German Hitlerite Nazism, movement against the regime of 
Hitler’s so-called Third Reich, which, through its imperialist hankerings, led the entire world 
into the boundless misery and suffering of the years 1939 to 1945, when anti-Nazism prevailed 
and liberated all the freedom-loving nations of Europe from the Nazi yoke.’ 
62 Ibid., p. 57: ‘(from English) — really salt pork, salt meat, denotes a special kind of Danish salt 
meat exported chiefly to England; during the war, after Denmark was attacked by German 
troops, stocks of this meat became German booty, put into circulation under regulations for the 
restricted supply of occupied territories.’ 
63 ‘ME, ibid., p. 414. 
64 Krasnaja zvezda, krasnoarmejec, Komsomol and numerous Russian words and acronyms based 
on Sovet, sov-, glav-, gos- etc. The density of such ‘novelties’ is highest in the Addenda, 
reflecting the accelerating rise in the sovietization of the language. 
37 Polish Linguistic Issues at the End of the 
Second World War: Unfinished Business, 
Jqzyk Polski 1939-45 
Nigel Gotteri 
This chapter examines issues reflected in the journal Jqzyk Polski, published in Cracow to 
this day under the aegis of the Society of Devotees of the Polish Language, which 
managed to resume publication promptly after the War. The last fascicle of the last pre-war 
volume of Jqzyk Polski is a treasure unfortunately not found in all bound library volumes. 
Volume 24 (1939) was not, in fact, completed until 1945. Issue 5, containing just the four 
pages 129-32, is dated March-April 1945. The issue begins with the words of the editor, 
Kazimierz Nitsch: ‘Renewing our work after five and a half years of the toughest captivity 
in our history we must first of all devote a few words to those of our active members and 
colleagues who are no longer with us, either fallen in battle or murdered, or who ultimately 
could not withstand the cruel conditions of life.’ There follows a list of nine linguists, with 
brief details of who they were and how they had died, and a promise of proper obituaries to 
come.1 Nitsch adds ‘One may also have serious doubts about a few other labourers in the 
field of Polish language, but we prefer to believe that they are alive and that we will 
benefit from further fruits of their research.’ These words look forward to at least the hope 
of business as before. 
Next, small items of unfinished linguistic business clear the decks for urgent and non¬ 
urgent issues to come: ‘Since we have so little space in this issue, too little for longer 
articles, we will use it for supplementary material on questions discussed recently in Jqzyk 
Polski, so as not to need to return to them later.’ There follows a note by Stanislaw 
Urbariczyk on the word ksiqzniczka ‘princess’. There are then a few lines from Nitsch 
about whether, when working into Polish, one translates na polski or na polskie; both 
expressions have precedents in Mickiewicz, the former suggesting Russian influence and 
the latter German, so neither is to be rejected. The section concludes with a short note on 
the etymology of oryl ‘raftsman’. 
A little space remains for the section devoted to administrative matters. The outbreak of 
war had found the fourth part of Volume 24 (1939) partly typeset. In the spring of 1940 
when Nitsch had returned from the concentration camp, this fourth part had been 
successfully completed and published, without the knowledge of the German authorities 
and with the fictitious date of July-September 1939. Since it was impossible to send copies 
out to members of the Society and to subscribers, they had been distributed as far as 
possible to friends. Anyone entitled to a copy who had not received one, or who had not 
received the fifth fascicle completing the volume, was now invited to apply to the Jqzyk 
Polski office, giving precise details not only of their present address but also of their pre¬ 
war address, and the method by which they had received copies before the War — in 
person, by post, or via a local group or representative. These people were promised the 
first normal post-war issue, in which new rates and methods of payment would be set out. 
Although it was not yet possible to foresee all the details of the re-activation of the Society 
of Devotees of the Polish Language and the journal J^zyk Polski, the editorial committee 
were convinced that it could be done, chiefly with the help of the Ministry of Education. 
1 See also Kazimierz Nitsch, Ze wspomnieh jgzykoznawcy, Warsaw, 1960. 
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The editorial committee for the number that straddled the war consisted of Zenon 
Klemensiewicz, Tadeusz Lehr-Spfawinski, Antonina Obr^bska-Jabloriska and Stanislaw 
Urbanczyk; they had lost one member, Henryk Oesterreicher, during the war. 
Before the number charmingly closes with five corrections to misprints in earlier 
numbers of the volume, there is a report of the last pre-war meeting of the Society which 
had taken place in the first half of 1939. Papers had been given by T. Estreicher, on the 
history of Polish chemical terminology, Nitsch, on whether there were Jewish influences in 
the Polish linguistic system, and K. Misson, on the improvement of Polish. Two 1945 
meetings are reported in the same item. Meeting 92 of the Cracow Circle of the Society, its 
first since the War, had taken place on 25 February 1945, and had been devoted to the ten 
active members of the Society who had died during the war. The next meeting on 8 March 
1945 had heard A. Kleczkowski discussing the origin of figiel ‘prank’. The General 
Meeting with the normal agenda was announced, and it would hear a paper by 
Klemensiewicz on enthusiasm for the language in the history of Polish. 
Speech Culture and Enthusiasm for the Language 
The first proper 1945 number of J^zyk Polski begins with the first part of Klemensiewicz’s 
paper.2 His topic might be seen as obvious, given the nature of the Society at whose 
meeting the paper would be given. However, the war years had made milosnictwo 
(enthusiasm, devotion, passion) for the language at best a luxury, and there was now both 
opportunity and urgency to return to the cultivation, preservation and renewal of the 
language. 
Surveying Polish speech culture work since the War, Markowski and Satkiewicz3 
discern two periods, of which the first (1945-70) continues the pre-war tradition of 
emphasizing grammatical and lexical correctness, homogeneity of norms, and the 
dissemination of good practice. Poland, reconstituted after the First World War, had had to 
concentrate on standardizing a language which had previously been taught differently (to 
the extent that it had been tolerated and taught at all) in three different ‘countries’. Even 
very soon after the Second World War, though, there were hints of what was to 
characterize the subsequent period; some variations within norms were considered 
admissible, and notions of speech culture were broadening to include more than mere 
correctness.4 
During the war, education had not been able to function normally, and much normal 
contact with the written-printed word was lost. Consequently, two principal means of 
maintaining norms and disseminating models had been unavailable, and general awareness 
of norms, and knowledge about language, had deteriorated. This was the case especially 
among younger people, whose education had been prevented or dislocated by the war, and 
whose language had been confronted only with local models and norms. On a simple map 
of Europe, Poland had shrunk and moved westwards, but its population underwent much 
more complex movements than such a map would suggest. The frequency and drastic 
2 Zenon Klemensiewicz, ‘Milosnictwo j^zyka w dziejach polszczyzny’, J^zyk Polski, 25, 1945, 
pp. 1—7; Zenon Klemensiewicz, W Kr^gu j^zyka literackiego i artystycznego, Warsaw, 1961. 
pp. 7-19. 
3 A. Markowski and H. Satkiewicz, ‘Kultura j^zyka w powojennej Polsce’ in Jan Miodek (ed.), 
O zagrozeniach i bogactwie polszczyzny. Forum Kultury Slow a Wroclaw 1995, Wroclaw, 1996, 
pp. 11-24. 
4 See also H. Kurkowska, ‘Proba charakterystyki socjolingwistycznej wspolczesnego j?zyka 
polskiego’ in Kurkowska (ed.), Wspolczesna polszczyna. Wybor zagadnien, Warsaw, 1981, 
pp. 7-46. 
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nature of post-war population movements brought socially and geographically distant 
language varieties into close contact with one another. The most obvious was the 
organized westwards transfer of population from the eastern Kresy under the guise of 
‘repatriation’, but alongside it there was an internal migration; individuals moved from 
country to town, and native Varsovians were scattered all over the country as result of the 
destruction of Warsaw. Especially in the ‘recovered territories’ in western Poland, these 
movements resulted in concentrations of people from widely differing social and 
geographical backgrounds, and with wide variations in their awareness or grasp of the 
common language (jqzyk ogolny). In this situation linguists saw it as important that they 
should help to integrate Poland linguistically, by promoting a consistent, homogeneous 
model of Polish. Stanislaw Szober’s dictionary, Slownik ortoepiczny, was published in 
1937, forming the fullest pre-war description of that model, and indeed remained the chief 
source of information on Polish linguistic norms until Slownik poprawnej polszczyzny 
PWN appeared in 1973. Later editions of his orthoepic dictionary were already retitled 
Slownik poprawnej polszczyzny (Dictionary of Correct Polish);5 Szober had died on 29 
August 1938. Widely used by editors, proof-readers and linguistic advisers, Szober’s 
dictionary still exerted a strong indirect influence on usage. Markowski and Satkiewicz 
suspect that it contributed much to the conservative and conservationist attitude to the 
language which still finds echoes today. Szober came from a conservative, ‘purist’ 
tradition,6 whose aim was to combat supposed impurities in the language, whether foreign 
borrowings and influences, or regionalisms, dialectalisms or colloquialisms. In the 
introduction to his dictionary, Szober refers to the linguistic usage of the educated classes 
and of the writers of the last hundred years as his basic criterion. While allowing 
archaisms, he showed little tolerance of common non-standard features. In Markowski and 
Satkiewicz’s view, this is clear even in the 1958 edition of the work, though the most 
glaring examples of this attitude had been removed by its editor Witold Doroszewski. 
Zenon Klemensiewicz and Witold Doroszewski, who had both begun their speech 
culture work before the war, saw it as their duty to foster knowledge about language and 
its social role. Like Jan Miodek today, they analysed processes operating within the 
language, including those that give rise to real or alleged errors. Far from limiting 
themselves to normative rulings, they tried to arouse public interest in and awareness of 
linguistic issues. After the war there was a clear market for advice on linguistic correctness 
— there was a new intelligentsia wishing to use the language efficiently, especially young 
people acquiring an accelerated education. Daily papers ran columns on language, and 
courses in language skills were mounted for teachers, journalists, publishing workers and 
employees of state institutions. Doroszewski’s radio programmes, in which he answered 
listeners’ written queries, had originally started in 1935 and began again in 1948, gaining 
huge popularity. (He presented them until his death in 1976.) Texts from the programme 
were published in a series of four entitled Rozmowy o j^zyku (Conversations about 
Language, 1948-54), and the programme subsequently spawned the three volumes of O 
kultur% slowa (Cultivating the Word, 1962, 1968, 1979). 
In the immediate post-war period, though, it was chiefly dictionaries and guides to 
spelling, pronunciation and inflection that furthered speech culture. Later years show a 
growing interest in the thinking on which recommendations were based, but in the early 
stage of linguistic uncertainties and occasional chaos, the overriding need was naturally for 
definite, straight, authoritative answers on matters of correctness. This did not altogether 
prevent linguists from reflecting on questions underlying the whole speech culture 
5 Stanislaw Szober, Slownik poprawnej polszczyzny, Warsaw, 1948 and 1958. 
6 Compare A. Kryriski, Jak nie nalezy mowic i pisac po polsku, Warsaw, 1920. 
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enterprise: Doroszewski’s Kryteria poprawnosci jqzykowej (Criteria of Language 
Correctness) appeared as early as 1950, and was preceded by two major discussions in 
Jqzyk Polski.1 
Urgent Business, Geographical Names 
The first issue of J^zyk Polski for 1945 turns next to the urgent issue of geographical 
names. Urbanczyk, referring to post-war developments in Polish language studies, writes 
that it was above all the study of names that was experiencing a golden age.* * * * 8 A good 
number of monographs on regional place names appeared at this time, as did studies on 
personal names, on word-formation in names, and proposed classifications of geographical 
and personal names. The intensity and urgency of interest in onomastics was in 1957 to 
lead to the appearance of a new specialized journal Onomastica, published in Wroclaw, 
with Witold Taszycki as its first general editor and Stanislaw Rospond as secretary of its 
first editorial board. The immediate onomastic question in the first issue of Jqzyk Polski for 
1945 is the geographical names of the river(s) and town Nysa. Taszycki, as his title 
‘Nazwa rzeczna i miejscowa Nysa' suggests, has decided in favour of Nysa.9 His opening 
sentences encapsulate the nature, topicality and urgency of such problems, even though the 
particular case might seem comparatively straightforward: ‘The name of the river which, 
together with the Oder, is to form the western border of Poland, bears in newspapers and 
periodicals, but also in various scholarly works, a name in three frequently-occurring 
forms: Nisa, Nissa and Nysa. And we may occasionally encounter a further form Nyssa.' 
Taszycki disposes of the double ‘s’ quickly as a purely orthographical imitation of the 
German Neisse, which suggests that the ‘s’ was not, at least in his view, pronounced long 
or double. The choice remained, then, between Nysa and Nisa. There was no current Polish 
name for the River Neisse or the town of Nysa. Historical sources, with their inconsistent 
orthography, were not adequate to provide a ruling, either; Taszycki cites a document 
(Liber fundationis episcopatus Wratislaviensis. Codex diplomaticus Silesiae XIV) which 
uses the forms Nysa, Nyssa, Nissa and Niza. Pfuhl’s Lusatian Dictionary of 1866 gives 
both Nisa and Nysa. Other Lusatian sources suggest a preference for Nysa. Jakub 
Parkoszowic’s treatise on orthography gives support for Nysa by distinguishing between 
the pronunciation of what would now be nyski ‘of (the) Nysa’ and what would now be 
niski ‘low’, which he would have acquired from Polish-speaking Silesians from the Nysa 
area living and studying in Cracow. The Polish form Nisa Taszycki sees as a later Polish 
version created on the basis of the German Neisse after contact with the original Polish 
version of the name had been lost. The pattern this followed would have corresponded 
with pairs like Meile — mila, Leine — lina, Speicher — spichrz; ‘This clearly shows that 
not only Nissa with double “s” but also Nisa with one “s” bears the imprint of German 
influence. This should be removed by giving the name back its original form.’ After this, 
Taszycki investigates the etymology of Nysa. 
The discussion of Nysa continued, in fact, to excite informed and uninformed passions, 
and was the minutest tip of an extremely large onomastic iceberg, which occupies much 
space in the post-war issues of Jqzyk Polski and elsewhere. That there was tension between 
the needs for discussion and urgency is shown by the fact that over 30,000 geographical 
J. Lande, ‘W sprawie polityki j^zykowej’, J^zyk Polski, 27, 1947, pp. 33-38; Zenon 
Klemensiewicz, ‘Poprawnosc i pedagogika j^zykowa’, Jqzyk Polski, 27, 1947, pp. 38^t6, 
reprinted in Stanislaw Urbanczyk (ed.), Polszczyzna piqkna i poprawna. Porady j^zykowe, 
Wroclaw, Warsaw and Cracow, 1966, pp. 11-24. 
8 Stanislaw Urbanczyk (ed.), Encyklopedia j^zyka polskiego, Wroclaw, 1992, p. 150. 
9 Witold Taszycki, ‘Nazwa rzeczna i miejscowa Nysa', J^zyk Polski, 25, 1945, pp. 7-11. 
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names were settled in the period 1946-51. Until that was achieved, it was not uncommon 
for railway, post and public administration respectively to be using three different names 
for the same place.10 
In 1945 three institutions, all of which had existed in Poland before the Second World 
r 
War, were interested in place-names. The first was the Instytut Sl^ski in Katowice, of 
which Roman Lutman was director before the war. Lutman was interested in place-naming 
straight after the war and inspired Taszycki’s interest. The next was the Instytut Zachodni 
in Poznan, under Mikotaj Rudnicki.* 11 Then there was the Instytut Mazurski, covering an 
area mainly in the Olsztyn Province but including Elk and two other areas of the Bialystok 
Province.12 After the war, the Commission on the Process of Establishing Place Names 
(Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowych), an advisory body of the Ministry of Public 
Administration, prepared material for discussion. There were two regional centres. In 
Cracow Taszycki was chairman, with the other members, Urbanczyk, Slawski, Halina 
Safarewiczowa, the historian W lady slaw Semkowicz and Zofia Kozlowska-Butkowa. The 
Polish Academy of Arts (Polska Akademia Umiej^tnosci, PAU) at the same time set up, 
under Nitsch, a Geographical Names Committee (Komitet Nazw Geograficznych). 
r 
Meanwhile in Poznan, there was a group led by Rudnicki, based on the Instytut Sl^ski. The 
commission overseeing this activity was led by the geographer S. Srokowski (till 1950), 
and had as its members Nitsch, Rudnicki, Taszycki and delegates of ministries; the 
historian Semkowicz (till 1949) and the linguist Stanislaw Rospond were deputy members. 
Experts whose evidence and advice were sought were the linguists Jan Safarewicz, 
Urbanczyk and the Germanist Ludwik Zabrocki, the geographers M. Klimaszewski 
(Cracow), A. Wrzosek (Poznan), K. Kolariczyk, then director of the Instytut Zachodni, and 
J. Leyding-Mielecki, director of the Instytut Mazurski in Olsztyn. The secretary of the 
commission was B. Ostrowski. The commission was concerned with all geographical 
names, names of towns, villages, rivers, hills and so on. The people responsible for the 
recommendations were careful, moderate, well-informed, scholarly people, working with 
enormous urgency. 
There were several methods of finding suitable Polish names for places in recovered 
territories: (i) old Polish and other Slavonic texts were searched for names; names that 
appeared to be germanized versions of Slavonic names were re-polonized; (ii) in the case 
of purely German names, it was often possible to reactivate an extinct Slavonic name from 
nearby; (iii) names were sometimes invented (chrzty ‘baptisms’), but in keeping with 
names and features in the area. Taszycki claims that there were few outright baptisms.13 
10 For some references see B. Siciriski, ‘Ustalanie polskich nazw miejscowosci na Ziemiach 
Zachodnich jako zlozony proces ksztaltowania si$ fragmentu normy j^zykowej (na przykladzie 
Dolnego Sl^ska)’ in Miodek (ed.), O zagrozeniach i bogactwie..., pp. 171-78. For a survey of 
onomastics in Poland, see S. Gala, ‘Onomastics in Poland: From the 19th-century beginning to 
the present’, Historiographia Linguistica, 25, 1998, 1-2, pp. 87-114. For an historian’s 
evaluation of some of the work, see E. Rymar, ‘Ocena ustalenia nazw miejscowych na obszarze 
dawniej Nowej Marchii przez Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowych w latach 1946-1949’, 
Onomastica, 30, 1985, pp. 51-68. For an illuminating conversation on this whole topic in 
March 1998 I am much indebted to Maria Malec of the Polish Academy of Arts in Cracow, 
who studied with some of the linguists involved. 
11 See F. Antkowski, [Bibliography of Mikolaj Rudnicki’s work up to 1959], Slavia Occidentals, 
20, 1960, pp. 19-27, and Z. Brocki, [Bibliography of Rudnicki’s work, 1960-74], Slavia 
Occidentalism 36, 1979, pp. 9-14. 
12 See also the pithy Introduction to Stanislaw Rospond, Slownik nazw geograficznych. Polski 
zachodniej i polnocnej. I: Polsko-niemiecki. II: Niemecko-polski, Warsaw, 1951. 
13 Witold Taszycki, ‘Przywrocenie sl^skim nazwom polskiej postaci’, fzyk Polski, 54, 1974, 
pp. 375-78. 
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Space permits only a few examples. Kasmannsburg, of which the Kas- was taken to be 
Slavonic in origin, became the Polish name Kosmowo. Roskaten (thus called in German 
since 1286) became Polish Rosochate, named after the lake. Kranichpfuhl, in which the 
-pfuhl was thought (erroneously, says Rymar) to be cognate with Polish pole, became 
iurawie Pole. The village Dobropole had been in German Doberpfuhl. Where the namers 
went astray, they can surely be forgiven. They were anxious not to be, and they were not, 
capricious or arbitrary, yet their task was extremely urgent. Further examples give the 
flavour of their decisions: Niedzwiedz for Barenbruch, as if reconstructing an earlier 
Slavonic name for which the German name might itself have been a translation; Sokulsko 
for Falkenstein, as the name Sokulsko was apparently already in use among Poles resettled 
there at the end of the war (Rymar states that the railway station was already called 
Sokofy)14; Grabowo was the name given to Buchholz, on the basis of the nearby 
Grabowsee (its German name); small settlements were occasionally given names based on 
larger places nearby, such as Rychnowek near Rychnow, Rowienko near Rowno; Kopin 
became the Polish name for German Hopfenberg on the basis of the nearby Koppensee (its 
German name). This reflected a desire to retain local colour. Lipie Gory became the Polish 
name for Mansfeld, at the foot of the Lindeberge (Lipiogory, now Lipinki); Czartowo 
became the Polish name for Grutzort, on the basis of the nearby Teufel-See. 
Some names were borrowed from other Slavonic areas entirely: Lasocin, Niesutow, and 
Niewierz came from the Mecklenburg area beyond the Oder. Some places in Pomerania 
were named after people: thus Fiirstenau became Bamimie and Marienhof became 
Warcistaw. Other inventions were based on the nature of the terrain, thus Czarnolesie 
(formerly in German Kesselgrund), Jezierzyska, Przywodzie, Zagajno. 
According to Maria Malec, the card indexes created at the time still exist, one in Instytut 
J^zyka Polskiego PAN in Cracow and one in Poznan — in the Main Library of the Adam 
Mickiewicz University in Poznan. 
Some Business as Usual 
There then follows in Jqzyk Polski 25 a vigorous piece by Nitsch on the need for some 
orthographical reform.15 Doroszewski, representing a devastated Warsaw, and 
subsequently more likely to be seen on the pages of Poradnik Jqzykowy, once it had 
resumed publication in late 1948, contributes a piece on the word zakopiahski (‘of 
Zakopane’).16 Two items by Nitsch on uncertainties in contemporary language deal with 
dac sobie rady, ‘manage, cope’, whose continued coexistence with dac sobie radq is later 
devoutly wished by Maria Dqbrowska,17 and the meaning of rodzehstwo ‘siblings’, which 
latter had been discussed before the war. It would be misleading to suggest that all the 
linguistic issues reflected in the pages of Jqzyk Polski were major or even urgent issues. 
There was, for example, a suggestion that a new, improved term for ‘syllable’ should be 
adopted — tchnionka, based on tchnienie ‘breath’.18 Maria Dfuska, then a phonetician, 
later a literature scholar, did not agree, as the very titles of her responses show:19 ‘It is 
never advisable to replace an unclear term with a defective one. [...] Tchnionka is a 
defective term, as it suggests that a syllable is something it in fact is not (because though 
14 Rymar, ‘Ocena ustalenia nazw...’ (see note 10 above), p. 58. 
15 Kazimierz Nitsch, ‘O nowqreform§ ortografii’, Jgzyk Polski, 25, 1945, pp. 11-23. 
16 Witold Doroszewski, 'Formazakopiahski’, Jqzyk Polski, 25, 1945, pp. 25—26. 
17 Maria Dqbrowska, ‘Od strony pisarza’, Jgzyk Polski, 25, 1945, pp. 87-91. 
18 J. R^czy, 'O tchnionce, zwanej dotqd sylabq czy zgloskq ’, Jqzyk Polski, 25, 1945, pp. 93-95. 
19 Maria Dluska, ‘Sylaba czyli zgloska, ale nie tchnionka’, Jqzyk Polski, 26, 1946, pp. 23—24, and 
‘Jeszcze o tchnionce, zwanej sylabq lub zgloska’, Jgzyk Polski, 26, 1946, pp. 56-57. 
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we do not yet exactly know what a syllable is, we do know what it is not). A term giving 
an erroneous connotation as to the nature of the phenomenon it names is pointless, 
however “appealing” it may be. This is why, as a phonetics specialist, I have to object to 
tchnionka’ .20 
Continuing Business, Polish Linguistics and Soviet Linguistics 
The first issue of Volume 27 (1947) of Jqzyk Polski begins with a paper by Kurylowicz on 
recent Russian linguistics.21 Kurylowicz illustrates the difficulties and dilemmas facing 
Polish linguists during and after the war. He had taken up the Chair of Indo-European 
Linguistics at the University in Lwow (Lemberg) in 1927, and it was in Lwow that he 
found himself living first under Soviet, then under German occupation, where he continued 
his work in the underground university. In his last year in Lwow, without regard for the 
possible consequences, as Kalkowska points out, he gave a lecture which criticized official 
Soviet linguistics based on the views of N. Ia. Marr.22 In fact, Kurylowicz not only gave a 
lecture, but he also published the article in Jqzyk Polski. If Kurylowicz was apparently 
heedless of possible repercussions, so too was at least one of his colleagues, Nitsch. Nitsch 
was invited to write a short article for the daily paper Wolnosc (Freedom) in 1947. For 
some reason it was not published, but it does appear in a small collection of Nitsch’s 
memoirs under the title ‘Polsko-rosyjskie stosunki j^zykoznawcze’ (Polish-Russian 
Linguistic Relations). Nitsch notes with satisfaction that a number of Russian linguists had 
contributed articles to Rocznik Slawistyczny (Annual of Slavonic Studies). After the First 
World War, however, links between Polish and Russian linguists were largely lost, partly 
because of the deatn during the war of Shakhmatov, after which Slavonic philology 
weakened in Russia, just as it was blossoming in Poland. Nitsch recalls that he made 
efforts to renew contacts with Russian linguists after the Second World War, ‘of which but 
a small piece of evidence is that I got Prof. J. Kurylowicz to write for Jqzyk Polski 
[January-February 1947 issue] an informative article entitled “Russian Linguistics of the 
Recent Period”, in which he discusses the general linguistic views of N. Ia. Marr and I. I. 
Meshchaninov. It is to be expected that direct contacts will be forged not only in linguistics 
but in all branches of knowledge.’23 As Polish inhabitants of Lwow were re-settled after 
the war, chiefly in Wroclaw, Kurylowicz and his family also went to Wroclaw for two 
years, during which Kurylowicz worked at the University there. He then accepted an 
invitation to Cracow, which was becoming the most important centre of linguistics in 
Poland. Kurylowicz’s activities were seriously curtailed in 1949-56, when English, 
German and comparative philology were not taught, and research was constricted. 
Persistent rumour has it that Kurylowicz was denounced. As far as I have been able to 
ascertain, he was not suspended from the University in Cracow, but he was not allowed to 
teach.24 
Nikolai Iakovlevich Marr (1865-1934) was a Russian linguist and archaeologist, a 
specialist in Caucasian languages, credited with adding significantly to our knowledge and 
20 Ibid., p. 57. 
21 Jerzy Kurylowicz, ‘J^zykoznawstwo rosyjskie ostatniej doby’, Jqzyk Polski, 27, 1947, pp. 1-7. 
See also A. Kalkowska’s review of the memorial volume for Kurylowicz edited by W. 
Smoczyriski, J^zyk Polski, 57, 1997, pp. 205-07. 
22 Ibid., p. 207. 
23 Nitsch, Ze Wspommien j^zykoznawcy, pp. 159-62 (162). 
24 For appreciations of Kurylowicz, see J. Rusek, ‘Jerzy Kurylowicz (26 August 1895-28 January 
1978)’, Historiographia Linguistica, 25, 1998, pp. 141^46; J. Safarewicz, ‘Jerzy Kurylowicz as 
an Indo-Europeanisf, ibid., pp. 147-52, and A. Heinz, ‘Jerzy Kurylowicz as a Theorist of 
Language’, ibid., pp. 153-60. 
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understanding of the structure and history of Caucasian languages. In the 1920s, wishing to 
give linguistics a Marxist slant, and looking for relationships between Caucasian languages 
and other languages, he had created a theory of the class nature of language and the stage- 
by-stage development of the world’s languages. He posited a single origin for languages, 
tracing the vocabulary of all languages back to four hypothetical elements: sal, ber, jon 
and ros. In his view, language, as an element of the superstructure of a socioeconomic 
system, changed with that system. Linguistic change also resulted from the mixing of 
languages. Marr divided languages into those of the primal period, which corresponded to 
the generic community — monosyllabic, isolating languages, and languages corresponding 
to nomadic societies — agglutinating languages. The third stage was represented by the 
remains of the Japhetic languages with the most archaic structures (Caucasian, Basque). 
Marr’s Japhetic theory was named after the Biblical Japheth, just as the Semitic and 
Chamitic languages were named after Shem and Ham, the brothers of Japheth. Class 
societies were linked with inflected languages, Semitic and Promethean (Indo-European). 
Marr called his views a new doctrine of language, while others called it simply Marrism. 
He and his followers adopted revolutionary terminology and were able to gain 
considerable political influence and greatly to restrict the activities of linguists with either 
a comparative or a Structuralist bent. Their stifling and isolating effect on Soviet 
linguistics was brought to an end by public discussion in Pravda (from June to August 
1950), in which Stalin himself took part (the Polish version of his article W sprawie 
marksismu w jqzykoznawstwie appeared in 1951). Stalin pointed out the pseudo-Marxist 
and extreme left-wing nature of the arguments put forward by Marr and his successors. 
In his Jqzyk Polski paper on Russian linguistics, Kurylowicz somewhat pointedly 
expresses approval for the work of Ivan Ivanovich Meshchaninov (1883-1967), a Russian 
linguist and archaeologist who specializes in the dead languages of the Caucasus and 
Central Asia. One of the leading supporters of Marr’s theory, he contributed to the 
development of the theory of syntactic categories, a syntactic typology of the world’s 
languages and the theory of the clause. Kurylowicz describes Meshchaninov as the greatest 
living Soviet linguist. He notes with satisfaction that though Meshchaninov was a Marrist, 
he did valuable linguistic work, having put the official doctrine somewhat in the 
background. First, he contributed a great deal to linguistic typology through his work on 
ergativity, which pushed linguistics in the direction indicated before the First World War 
by Hugo Schuchardt, August Fick and Christian Cornelius Uhlenbeck. In his work on the 
new doctrine of language25 morphological matters predominate over official doctrine. In 
his work on stage-by-stage development of word and sentence/clause,26 he is 
fundamentally concerned with clause structure in various types of language, an interest 
which also influenced research on ergative constructions. (In ergative languages the 
subject of intransitive clauses is expressed by the same case as the patient [undergoer] in 
transitive clauses.) While Kurylowicz is unsure of Meshchaninov’s threefold division of 
the clause into subject, predicate and object, he applauds the fact that Meshchaninov takes 
the clause as the basic linguistic phenomenon, in preference to the word. Finally, he 
warmly welcomes Meshchaninov’s recent book on clause elements and parts of speech,27 
to which Kurylowicz expects a positive response in Western linguistic literature: 
In Meshchaninov, Russian linguistics has found a representative who has turned it back in a 
purely scholarly direction, from being dislocated by extraneous considerations. From the 
25 Ivan I. Meshchaninov, Novoe uchenie o iazyke — stadial'naia tipologiia, Leningrad, 1936. 
26 Ivan I. Meshchaninov, Obshchee iazykoznanie. K probleme stadial'nosti v razvitii slova i 
predlozhenia, Leningrad, 1940. 
Ivan I. Meshchaninov, Chlenypredlozheniia i chasti rechi, Moscow and Leningrad, 1945. 
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chaotic picture presented by Soviet [Kurytowicz uses the word sowieckimi, rather than the 
preferred radzieckimi] publications of the most recent generation, in Meshchaninov there 
emerges the outline of a general linguistic theory built on morphological typology and the 
priority of the clause [zdanie in Polish, like predlozhenie in Russian, is used of both sentence 
and clause], able to take a prominent position alongside western European linguistics. 
For Jqzyk Polski, Marrism was later bidden farewell in an article by Tadeusz Lehr- 
Splawinski. Lehr-Splawinski regretted that Polish-Soviet collaboration had not been able 
to develop in linguistics as it had in other areas of learning, because of the hegemony of 
Marr’s pupils. He noted the vigorous linguistic discussion in Pravda inaugurated by the 
Georgian linguist Amol'd Stepanovich Chikobava and expressed approval of Stalin’s 
timely intervention: 
Stalin, while stressing that as a non-linguist he was not going in for linguistic technicalities, 
in the clear and sober manner characteristic of him has thrown light on the contentious issues 
from the standpoint of Marxist teaching, of which he is today without doubt the most 
authoritative exponent. His opinion, captured in the form of concise, terse answers to the four 
questions put to him, has dealt Marrism and the Marrists a downright crushing blow.28 
So language was not a superstructure on the economic-social infrastructure, nor was it 
the creation of a particular class. Language was a social phenomenon. At the end of his 
article, Lehr-Splawinski comments that the criticisms in Soviet journals for failing to 
acknowledge Marrism, levelled at papers published by Kurylowicz and himself, were now 
clearly unjustified. No doubt Lehr-Splawinski was delighted that, thanks to Stalin, Soviet 
linguists could now see that their Polish colleagues had been right all along. 
28 Tadeusz Lehr-Splawinski, ‘Przelom w j^zykoznawstwie radzieckim,’ Jqzyk Polski, 30, 1950, 
p. 169. 
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Lexicography of the 1950s 
Peter Sherwood 
The first monolingual dictionary of Hungarian was the six-volume work of Gergely 
Czuczor and Janos Fogarasi A magyar nyelv szotara (Dictionary of the Hungarian 
Language). Though the publication of this linguistic dinosaur between 1862 and 1874 
straddled the Ausgleich, it is a quintessential product of the nationalist sentiment flowing 
from the Enlightenment, compiled mainly in the 1840s and the early 1850s. While the 
following hundred years saw the publication of several substantial bilingual dictionaries, 
progress in monolingual lexicography was slow before the break-up of the Dual Monarchy 
because of the explosion of lexis in virtually every field, and later perhaps because of the 
problems of defining Hungary and ‘HungariannessL Even apparently bulky works, such as 
Jozsef Balassa’s two-volume A magyar nyelv szotara (1940), amount to little more than 
lists of words, thin on definitions and illustrative examples. A new, major monolingual 
dictionary was well overdue after the Second World War, and the totalitarian regime from 
1949 provided subsidized scholars with a subsidized framework for scholarship and peace 
— at a price — for them to work in. The price was an unending struggle between the Party7 
and the scholars, with the latter having to make many compromises each day in order to 
prevent less scrupulous servants of the former from taking their bread. 
A group of younger specialists first mooted an Academy Dictionary of Hungarian 
(ADH) at the beginning of 1949,1 and the work of collecting material began at once under 
the grammarian Denes Szabo. Work on the first two letters of the alphabet was well 
underway by the autumn of 1950, when the outstanding language scholar and English 
specialist Laszlo Orszagh (1907-84) took charge of a team drawn largely from the then 
newly-established institute of Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy, and eventually 
became chief editor of the ADH (Geza Barczi was co-editor). The preparation of a work on 
the scale we know now began only in late 1951 but was, perhaps surprisingly, substantially 
complete by the middle of the decade. The seven volumes appeared in reasonably rapid 
succession between 1959 and 1962. A brief account of the editing process and other 
aspects of the ADH can be found in Orszagh.2 Since 1989 the ADH has been considered 
from a sociolinguistic perspective by Kontra,3 while Czigany4 has drawn attention to the 
fate of key individual words of this period. 
However, the vast amount of information about the Hungarian language recorded in the 
ADH was exploited almost immediately — for purely linguistic purposes. The far-sighted 
1 L. Orszagh (ed.), A szotariras elmelete es gyakorlata a Magyar Nyelv Ertelmezo Szotaraban, 
Budapest, 1962, p. 119. 
2 Ibid., pp. 117-32. 
3 M. Kontra, ‘A Magyar Nyelv Ertelmezo Szotaranak ket kiadasa volf, Magyar Konyvszemle, 
110, 1994, pp. 433-34; idem, ‘Orszagh Laszlo eletmuvenek nehany tudomanytorteneti 
vonatkozasa’, Nyelvtudomanyi Kozlemenyek, 94 [1994-95], 1997, pp. 201-19; idem, ‘Political 
Censorship in the Defining Dictionary of Hungarian’, Solanus, new series, 11, 1997, pp. 41-50; 
idem, “'Stubborn as a Mule Calls for a Dialectical Representation”: On Undoing and Redoing 
Corpus Planning in Hungary’ in M. Clyne (ed.). Undoing and Redoing Corpus Planning, Berlin 
and New York, 1997, pp. 31-60. 
4 L. Czigany ‘Allamositott szavaink atviagitasa, avagy szotariroink diszkret baja’, Kortars, 43, 
1999, 7, pp. 1-32. 
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Ferenc Papp had all 58 000 head-words computer-coded by a team at the University of 
Debrecen and produced by 1967 the a tergo dictionary of Hungarian, A magyar nyelv 
szovegmutato szotara (1969), which, with its useful grammatical codes, has been vital to 
the empirical study of the grammar of an agglutinating language like Hungarian. Some of 
the other ADH codes or style labels are of particular interest for the study of Hungarian 
language and society, but were perforce neglected under Communism. Head-words 
labelled UJ (new) are listed a tergo on pp. 593-94 of Papp’s work. These are defined, by 
Jozsef Bencedy, as ‘words that have come into being in the last few decades or have 
become widespread during that time. These are chiefly words of socialist society and 
economic order, which have recently become assimilated [ujabban meghonosodott]. Here 
belong, too, those words which are today used in new senses.’5 Many head-words labelled 
SZOC E are listed by Komai.6 Bencedy’s definition is as follows: ‘SZOC E (= a 
szocializmus epitese elotti “before the building of socialism”). We have applied this label 
to words of bourgeois capitalist society. Of these many are still in use today, applied either 
to conditions obtaining in our motherland at the beginning of the century, or in discussing 
capitalist countries today.’ It is with the latter label that this paper is concerned; though the 
examination of both labels together would be even more rewarding, demands of space 
mean that a more detailed analysis of the label UJ must be left for another occasion. 
Unfortunately, the two published lists of words and senses labelled UJ and SZOC E are 
incomplete and so of limited use. The search programme used to produce these lists picked 
up SZOC E and UJ only if either of these was the first style code to the right of the head¬ 
word, and on the same line. The programme thus leaves out, first, words with more than 
one sense and with only one (or more) of these sense(s) labelled (that is, all items in the 
Appendix with a figure other than 0 in column B); second, head-words and senses with 
another style or range code preceding these two (for example, Komai’s list has reszvenyes 
‘shareholder’, but misses reszveny ‘share’ before it, and reszvenytarsasag ‘(joint stock) 
company’ after it, because in these cases the abbreviation for Economics, [Kozg], 
precedes)7; and, finally, longer head-words which push the codes mentioned into the next 
line (for example, szolgalegeny ‘servant, farmhand’). Kontra is aware of some of these 
problems, but not, perhaps, of their scale. This chapter makes accessible for the first time 
the entire stock of head-words and word-senses in the ADH marked with the code SZOC 
E: the Appendix lists some thousand items, about three times as many as Komai. 
Although the labels SZOC E and UJ are hardly ‘hard-core’ lexicographic labels and 
typically do not translate easily into style labels even in other monolingual dictionaries, 
they are in their own way chronological (as well as style) labels and must be seen in the 
context of the more traditional time-span labels which ADH also employs. The following, 
deliberately unpolished, glosses are translated from Orszagh,8 where the wording is again 
attributed to Bencedy. Words and senses may be marked as follows. ELAV(ULT) 
‘obsolete’; such words ‘disappeared from use by the mid-nineteenth century’; note how 
easily this label is conflated with SZOC E in less formal discussion.9 ELAVULOBAN 
‘obsolescent’ (‘increasingly rare, slowly being pushed to the periphery of the language of 
everyday life, for example, bajonett, arvahaz “orphanage”’). REG(I) ‘old/archaic’ (‘words 
or senses that are old or fairly old, which, although understood by a contemporary speaker 
without the need for further explanation, nevertheless live on only in the language of the 
5 Orszagh (ed.), A szotariras elmelete..., p. 54. 
6 A. Komai, ‘Szotari adatbazis az akademiai nagyszamitogepen’, Muhelymunkak a nyelveszet es 
tarstudomanyai korebol II, June 1986, pp. 68-71. 
7 Ibid., p. 70. 
8 Orszagh (ed.), A szotariras elmelete..., p. 54. 
9 For example, Czigany ‘Allamositott szavaink atvilagitasa’, p. 9. 
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older generation. Words labelled thus would today be replaced by other words. These are 
not to be confused with words typical of past historical periods [for example, aga, ban2], 
which continue to be unique labels for those particular contents’). The latter are usually 
marked TORT(ENELEM) ‘histor/’. 
The two codes SZOC E and UJ provide an interesting example of transition, labelling 
(respectively) items which it was thought would disappear with the triumph of socialism 
and items by which these would begin to be replaced in the new order. Kontra has 
discussed (with invaluable archival material) the nature of the censorship that plagued the 
ADH and shown how the censorship resulted in what he calls the second edition of the first 
two volumes of the ADH, some entry-words and example sentences in these having 
aroused ire within and without Hungary. Yet according to Orszagh ‘in the final phase of 
the work, after the draft manuscript was ready, it seemed necessary to have the manuscript 
of several hundred entries assessed from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist ideology by 
suitable people, so that their views might support the editors in the creation of the final 
text.’10 
The very careful language suggests that, although entries were no doubt scrutinized from 
the ideological point of view, in fact, from volume 111 onwards (when Orszagh took 
charge), only a selection was offered to the censors and even this selection was in a semi¬ 
ready state, the principles of the dictionary as a whole having been agreed well beforehand. 
It is likely that only the simple insertion of labels was possible. Thus it seems that, despite 
all the criticisms that have been levelled at the ADH, including what follows, and without 
going into the strongly didactic and now dated nature of some of its illustrative material 
(though see some comment on this below), in the case of these two labels we are dealing 
with opinions about concepts, rather than a serious distortion of the dictionary by them. 
This is one reason why the ADH has survived almost forty years as a valuable tool for 
those serious about using Hungarian. These opinions about the old and new orders can 
now be tested against experience at the end of a century which Hungary began as a part of 
a greater European unit; in this context, the transition of 1945-^19 needs to be set against 
the as yet unfinished re-transition that began in about 1989, and compared with the 
experience of neighbouring countries and peoples. 1 hope that the database below for 
SZOC E will focus attention on the other transition to which this volume is devoted, and 
also contribute to comparative work (such as that of M. Clyne on ‘East German’ and K. 
Janicki on Polish)* 11 on the lexicographical corpora of Central Europe in the twentieth 
century. 
A first look at the database suggests the following points, some of them tentative: 
(1) Head-words with senses labelled both SZOC E and UJ show how a number of terms 
from the pre-war regime were retained and redefined, an important point to bear in mind 
when discussing the terminology of the Communist regime. In the sea-change these 
implied an anchor that did not in fact exist. Examples include dllamiigyesz, bank 
deklasszalt. gyermeknap, tanarjelolt, kisgyules, leanyotthon, nyeresegreszesedes, 
partcsoport, szakvizsga (particularly clear examples underlined). 
(2) It is possible to document in detail the unremitting attack on private ownership and 
private gain. A special sense of dolgozik ‘to work’ is admitted as its sense 2, marked foleg 
SZOC E (mainly pre-socialist) ‘pursuing activity for one’s own gain’ with examples 
including ‘he works in the paper industry’; sense 3 is reserved for ‘activity in the interest 
of the community’. Similarly, iizletet vezet ‘runs a shop’ is split into (1) ‘runs the shop as 
10 Orszagh (ed.), A szotariras elmeletep. 124. 
11 K. Janicki 'Sociolinguistics in Poland: History and Prospects’ in J. Harlig and C. Pleh (eds), 
When East Meets West: Sociolinguistics in the Former Socialist Bloc, Berlin and New York, 
1995, pp. 165-84. 
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its manager’, and (2) ‘runs one’s own shop’, with the latter marked SZOC E. (Only some 8 
per cent of the items are verbs). While folyoszamla ‘current account’ or szamlatulajdonos 
‘account holder’ is SZOC E if run by an individual: a corporate referent is unmarked. 
Further work along these lines will reveal that sometimes a new sense is identified (instead 
of, say, a metaphorical extension of the old) largely to make a Communist point: vegperc 
‘dying moment(s)’ (a compound not listed in more recent dictionaries) is split into two 
senses, the second illustrated by a reakcids rendszer vegpercei ‘the dying days of 
reactionaries’. The semantic criteria here are transparently political rather than linguistic. 
(3) Adjectives, which form less than 10 per cent of the items in the SZOC E list, are also 
frequently assigned a distinctive sense when their referent noun is not favoured or 
desirable in the new society. The implication is that one will not find this quality attaching 
to a particular noun in the future, but the notion that one may wish to discuss the world 
outside Hungary seems not always to have occurred to the lexicographers. One sense of 
rongyos ‘ragged, bedraggled’ is marked SZOC E: ‘poor, penniless and therefore looked 
down on; miserable’. Likewise maganyos ‘lonely’, where a separate sense, 4, is SZOC E: 
‘in an exploitative society <a person> who fails to find his/her place and lacks company’. 
Vegyes ‘mixed, assorted’ is SZOC E and pejorative in sense 2: <as used by pompous 
people who isolate themselves from working folk:> an ad hoc group which includes those 
that the speaker regarded as being of lower standing them him/herself and whom — esp. if 
they were members of the working classes — (s)he looked down on or despised.’ Under 
socialism the saying ‘a poor man is dogged by poor luck’, is clearly inappropriate 
(szegeny). Szilard ‘stable’ is SZOC E with piac ‘market’ or tozsde ‘stock market’, but 
unmarked otherwise, even with reference to prices or money. On occasion one wonders at 
the vehemence of the lexicographer, as in Kontra’s find jotekony ‘charitable’: ‘SZOC E 
<in an exploitative society> [a well-to-do person or institution] giving donations to 
selected “poor folk” in a humiliating manner while using philanthropic and religious 
slogans to conceal the necessity for radical social change.’12 
(4) The nature of some of the inevitable inconsistencies is worth attention in that even 
some defining word might be non-SZOC E although the entry-word has this label. This 
further confirms that form (sound, register, connotation, etc.) plays a role in SZOC E 
labelling; it is not all a matter of content. Hazmester ‘concierge’ is SZOC E, for its 
connotations, but ‘defined’ as hdzfeliigyelo, which as an entry is marked Official. 
Bolsevista and szocialista, in the sense ‘Social Democrat’, are similarly SZOC E but 
defined by unmarked one-word definitions: bolsevik and szocialdemokrata, respectively. 
In other cases there is a kind of word-family discrepancy in marking: grof ‘count’, is 
marked History, while grofne and grofno ‘countess’ are both SZOC E; similarly, four 
‘aristocrat’ is also marked History, while the adjective fouri is SZOC E. On the other hand, 
all but one (pre-sixteenth century) sense of the entire word-family of bard ‘baron’ is SZOC 
E; one wonders if the lexicographers were here thinking of the large number of 
unhistorical (and often Jewish) barons created in the final decades of the Monarchy. As for 
fajvedo ‘pertaining to racial protection, racist’ unmarked and fajvedelem ‘racial protection, 
racism’ labelled SZOC E, perhaps there was more confidence about the policy, rather than 
its adherents, being swept away by the tide of history. 
(5) As this last example suggests, referents cannot be abolished by mere lexicographic 
fiat. From the automatic SZOC E accorded the cseled ‘servant, maid’ family of words, 
Kontra13 cites cseledszoba ‘servant’s room’ as a physical part of many flats and houses 
that will survive well into the twenty-first century despite the change in the social status of 
12 Kontra, ‘“Stubborn as a Mule”’, p. 36. 
13 Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
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its occupants. Nor has the ‘national minority’ sense of kisebbseg been abolished by 
‘socialism’. 
(6) In fact, the list should help identify areas of Hungarian life which have been 
particularly affected by the transition to Communism. Finance and Politics seem most 
important, with Politics being of widest interest. The codes in the list will, it is hoped, 
assist further analysis. Here I note only adjectives and verbs referring to the peoples that 
surround Hungary. Historic ones like rac ‘Serb’, tot ‘Slav (in historic Hungary, later) 
Slovak’ and olah ‘Wallachian, Romanian’14 were replaced under Communism by szerb, 
szlovak and roman, respectively. Interestingly, only rac and olah are marked SZOC E. The 
only other pejorative verb of the type elmagyaroslt ‘make Hungarian (often forcibly)’ is 
elcseheslt ‘make Czech’. Perhaps an important factor is the presence and proportion in 
inter-war Hungary of the peoples forming the three post-Trianon nations. 
(7) Finally, the words and senses marked SZOC E need to be taken together with many 
of the Communist illustrative sentences in ADH, which show with particular clarity how 
the ‘pre-socialist’ prescriptivism of Hungarian linguistics in many ways fitted in well with 
the socialist prescriptions of Stalinist Hungary. Just as the comment mainly in the plural 
following fuggonykarika ‘curtain-ring’ slides from the description of language into that of 
a conventional domestic tableau, so — more strikingly — does the definition of susogo 
massalhangzo ‘s(h)ibilant’ (5. v. susogo) reflect the cultural furnishings of the times rather 
than anything properly linguistic when it avers that such sounds occur ‘especially in 
connection with the Russian language’. 
14 On the last, see Peter Sherwood’s review of A magyar nyelv torteneti-etimologiai szotara 
1967—1973 in Slavonic and East European Review, 56, 1978, 2, p. 292. 
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Guide to Appendix: The label SZOC E in 
the Academy Dictionary of Hungarian (1959-62) 
column A: entry-word; longer entries are sometimes subdivided by Roman numerals I, II, 
etc., which are here added to the entry-word 
column B: sense(s); within each sense, finer distinctions are marked by lower-case a, b, 
c, d, etc. 
0: (SZOC E refers to) entire entry 
1: (SZOC E refers to) sense marked 1. in ADH; etc. 
columns CDE: spheres or domains in which entry-word or sense is found; given in the 
order found in ADH, with 0 marking location of SZOC E label 
B Banking C Economics 
D Public Administration E Commerce, Trade 
F Finance G Health 
H History I School, Education 
J Law K Military 
L Gaming M Agriculture 
P Politics Q Sport 
S Theatre T Science 
u Business V Religion 
w Media Y Railways 
column F: Style and usage labels 
1 metaphorical use (atv) 
2 colloquial usage (biz) 
3 official use (hiv) 
4 rustic (nep) 
5 rare (ritk) 
6 pejorative (rosszallo) 
7 journalese (sqjto) 
8 elevated usage (vat) 
9 mocking or sarcastic (guny) 
column G: Number of stems in entry-word (NB historically, and bound items, like fel- in 
felar, count also, but not simple co-verbs) 
column H: Word-class of entry (mainly) 
A adjective 
H noun (human) 
N noun (non-human) 
S salutation, form of address 
V verb 
X used when entry is found only as part of one or two set phrases 
r 
column I: translation/explanation, and sometimes comments. Bracketed [v. UJ id.] means 
at least two definitions, glossed SZOC E and UJ (new) respectively, in same entry: see 
text; [def!] marks notable or illuminating definitions; [eg!] indicates that the illustrative 
example is interesting. 
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Appendix: List of items in the Academy Dictionary of Hungarian (1959-62) marked 
SZOC E (pre-socialist). 
A B C D E F G H / 
adopenztar 0 0 3 N board of inland revenue 
adopres 0 0 6 2 N tax burden 
adotiszt 0 0 3 2 H revenue officer 
agitator 1 p 0 1 H propagandist 
agrarpart 0 p 0 2 N agrarian party 
agrarproletar 0 p 0 2 H agricultural labourer 
ajanlo 2 p 0 1 H sponsor (of applicant) 
alacsony 4bcd 0 16 1 A lowly (origin, rank) 
alairo 2 c 0 1 H subscriber (e.g. of bond) 
alazat 4 0 1 N in: ‘I beg to report’; else 
unmarked 
alazatos n J> 0 1 S in: ‘your humble servant’; 
else unmarked 
alispan 0 D 0 2 H elected head of varmegye 
aljegyzo 0 0 2 H county clerk; clerk of 
court 
alkusz 0 c 0 1 H broker 
alkuszdij 0 c 0 2 N brokerage, commission 
allamfoghaz 0 J 0 3 N state prison (lenient) 
allamkincstar 2 0 3 N state treasury 
allamkoltseges 0 0 2 X state-maintained (place, 
scholar) 
allamrendorseg 0 D 0 2 N state police 
allamsorsjatek 0 0 3 N state lottery 
allamsorsjegy 0 0 3 N state lottery ticket 
allamtudomany 0 T 0 2 N political science 
allamiigyesz 0 J 0 2 H 
r 
state prosecutor [v. UJ id.] 
allomany 3 D 0 1 X early retirement of pre- 
1952 civil servants 
alpolgarmester 0 D 0 3 H deputy mayor 
amerikazik 1 0 1 V go slow 
angolkisasszony 0 V 0 3 H Mary-Ward nun 
anyaghitel 2 0 2 N credit in the form of goods 
aratogazda 0 0 4 2 H leader of harvesting gang 
aratomunkas 0 0 2 H harvester 
aratosztrajk 0 0 2 N harvesters’ strike 
areses Oa E 0 2 N fall in prices, slump 
A 
arfolyam 
arja 
arlap 
arrombolas 
aruhitel 
arutozsde 
aruvalto 
arvapenz 
arvaszek 
arvaszeki 
arvaligy 
athozat 
azsiai 
baj tarsi 
balanya 
banda 
bandagazda 
bank 
bankar 
bankbetet 
bankfiu 
bankhaz 
bankkolcson 
bankopres 
banktoke 
bankuzsora 
bankiizlet 
bankvezer 
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B c D E F G H / 
la F 0 2 N price, quotation, exchange 
rate 
3 0 1 A ‘non-Jew in Fascist usage’ 
2 c 0 2 N daily commodities index 
0 E 0 2 N dumping, undercutting 
0 E B 0 
2 
N commodity credit 
0 E 0 2 N commodity (esp. com) 
exchange 
0 0 E 12 
j 
N trade bill of exchange 
0 0 2 N assets of the orphans’ 
court 
0 D 0 2 N orphans’ court 
0 D 0 2 A pertaining to above 
0 0 2 N matters pertaining to 
above. 
2 0 3 1 N amount brought forward 
[note: illustrative 
sentence contains date 
1958] 
2 0 53 1 X x allapotok barbarian 
conditions 
1 0 1 X x egyesiilet 
nationalist/racist 
. ! fraternity 
0 0 2 H lady sponsor of ball 
4 0 4 1 N team of agricultural 
workers 
0 0 4 2 H leader of such a team 
1 0 1 N [collects surplus capital; v 
i UJ id.] 
1 0 1 H banker 
0 B 0 2 N bank deposit 
0 0 26 2 H young, affluent banker 
0 0 2 N bank 
0 0 2 N bank loan 
Oa 0 4 2 N inflationary policies [reg] 
0 0 ! 2 N bank assets 
0 0 2 N banks’ usurious rates 
0 c 0 2 N deal; small bank premises 
0 0 2 H director of bank; banking 
mogul 
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A B C D E F G H / 
bankzarlat 0 c F 0 2 N closure of banks 
banyajog 2 J 0 2 N mining rights 
barca 7 0 1 N (prostitute’s) licence 
barcas 2 0 1 X x kurva licensed prostitute 
baro 1 0 1 H baron 
baroi 0 0 1 A baronial; a baron’s 
barone 1 0 2 H baroness [wife of baron] 
barono 0 0 2 H baroness [in own right] 
barosag 0 0 1 N barony 
becsiiletbirosag 0 0 2 N tribunal/court of honour 
behazasodik 2 0 1 V marry into [money, rich 
family] 
belista 0 0 2 N unemployed civil servants 
post-WWI 
belistas 0 0 2 H one on such a list 
belistaz 0 0 2 V put on such a list 
beltag 1 E 0 2 H partner, Lloyd’s-type 
‘name’ 
benosul 0 0 2 1 V = behazasodik 
bentkosztos 0 0 4 2 H live-in (employee); 
boarder (school) 
bercseples 0 M 0 2 N threshing by hired hand 
beresll 0 0 1 H hired hand (usu. for oxen) 
beresgazda 0 0 2 H head of hired hands 
bereslegeny 0 0 2 H young farm labourer 
berloll 1 0 1 H lessee of farm/factory, for 
profit 
beszegodik 0 0 4 1 V enter service, hire oneself 
out (farm) 
betegbiztositas 0 0 2 N private health insurance 
betet 7 E 0 1 N part of assets 
biroviselt 0 0 2 H ex-magistrate 
biztos 2 0 1 H policeman; detective 
biztositek 2a J 0 1 N deposit; guarantee 
bolsevista 0 p 0 1 H — bolsevik [which is 
unmarked] 
bordely 0 0 8 1 N bordello 
bordelyhaz 0 0 3 2 N id. 
bordelyos 0 0 2 1 H brothel madam/keeper 
borkereskedo 0 0 2 H wine merchant 
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A 
botosispan 
borze 
borzejatekos 
borzes 
borzeiigylet 
borzez 
borzianer 
bukas 
bukik 
bukott 
buktat 
cegbirosag 
cegjegyzek 
cegtars 
cegvezeto 
cimzetes 
civis 
cselak 
cseled 
cseledber 
cseledhaz 
cseledkonyv 
cseledlakas 
cseledlany 
cseledlepcso 
cselednyuzas 
cseledseg 
cseledsor 
cseledszerzo 
cseledszoba 
cselekvo 
csendestars 
csendor 
csendorors 
B c D E F G H / 
0 0 2 H farm overseer 
0 D 0 1 N stock exchange 
0 0 2 H player on the stock 
exchange 
0 0 2 H id. 
0 0 6 2 N deal, transaction [6: kisse] 
0 0 6 1 V play on the stock 
exchange [6: gyak] 
0 0 26 1 H = borzes 
5 E 0 1 1 N becoming insolvent 
9 E 0 1 V become insolvent 
6 E 0 1 1 A (state of being) insolvent 
7 E 0 5 1 V make insolvent 
0 E 0 2 N court of registration, 
Companies’ House 
0 E 0 2 N company register 
0 E 0 2 H partner in firm 
0 E 0 2 H manager 
0 0 1 A honorary (title) 
0 0 1 H old (Debrecen) family 
0 0 9 1 H Czech 
1 0 1 H (maid)servant 
1 0 2 N servant’s wages 
0 0 2 N servants ’/staff/farmhands ’ 
quarters 
0 0 2 N servant’s permit/licence 
0 0 2 N servants’/staff quarters 
0 0 2 H maid, serving girl 
0 0 2 N back stairs 
0 0 2 N exploitation of servants 
0 0 1 N the servant class 
0 0 2 N the fate of being a servant 
0 0 2 NHA staff agency 
0 0 2 N maid’s room [Kontra, 
‘“Stubborn as a Mule’”, 
pp. 46^47] 
3 J E 0 5 1 A available (assets) 
0 E 0 2 H sleeping partner 
1 0 2 H gendarme; military 
0 0 3 H gendarme post 
416 The Phoney Peace 
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csendorseg 0 0 2 N gendarmerie; military 
csendorsortuz 0 0 4 N volley fired by gendarmes 
csizmas 2 0 6 1 HA ‘uncivilized person’ 
csod 1 J E 1 N bankruptcy 
csodbirosag 0 J 0 2 N court of bankruptcy 
csodeljaras 0 J o 2 N winding up, liquidation 
csodper 0 J 0 2 N bankruptcy case 
csodtomeg 1 J 0 2 N bankrupt’s sequestered 
assets 
csodtomeggondnok 0 J 0 3 H liquidator, administrator 
csodtorveny 0 J 0 2 N law on bankruptcy 
deklasszalt 1 0 1 A declasse [v. UJ id.] 
demokrata 2 0 6 1 A not aristocratic or 
gentlemanly [6: gyak] 
demokratikus 2 0 6 1 A plebeian [6: gyak] 
demokratizal 2 0 1 V make available to the 
wider public 
demokratizalodik 2 0 1 V become available to the 
wider public 
diakszovetseg 2a 0 2 N students’ union [def.!] 
diakvezer 0 0 2 H student leader 
dijas 2 0 1 X clerk/trainee paid by the 
day 
dijbirkozo 0 0 2 H professional wrestler 
dijnok 0 0 1 H clerk paid by the day 
[dijnokoskodik 
unmarked] 
dijtalan 2 0 1 X unpaid trainee clerk 
direktrisz 0 0 58 1 H woman director 
diszdoktor 0 0 2 H doctor honoris causa 
[def!] 
diszkvalifikal 2 0 1 V rule out of order (social 
behaviour) 
diszmagyar 0 0 2 N nobles’ apparel 
disszidal 2 p 0 1 V leave political party [v. UJ 
id.] 
dividenda 0 F c 1 N dividend [diszkont, 
domping: unmarked] 
dohanyjovedek 0 E 0 2 N tobacco monopoly income 
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A B 
dolgozik 2 
dologhaz 0 
dontveny 0 
dontvenytar 0 
dugsegely 0 
egyes 5a 
egyesbiro 0 
egyke 2 
egykerendszer 0 
egykez 0 
egyoldalu 2 
elcsehesit 0 
elemi 4 
elemista 0 
elfogadoll 2 
elfogadvany 0 
elit 2 
ellenzek 1 
elmagyarosit 0 
elokelo 1 
eloljarosag 1 
elonev 1 
elszerez 1 
eltoloncol 0 
emleklap 3 
engedmeny 3 
erdekhazassag 0 
erdekszovetkezet 2 
ertekll lc 
erteklll 2 
ertekpapir Oa 
C D E F G H 
0 1 V 
J 0 2 N 
j 0 
: 
1 N 
J 0 2 N 
o 6 2 N 
I 0 1 N 
J 0 2 H 
0 1 N 
0 2 N 
E 0 1 N 
0 2 X 
o 1 V 
0 1 X 
0 1 H 
E B J 1 H 
E B J 1 N 
0 1 A 
P 0 1 N 
0 1 V 
0 1 A 
o 2 N 
0 2 X 
0 1 V 
jo 1 V 
IK 0 2 N 
E 0 1 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 N 
F 0 1 N 
F 0 1 N 
E 0 2 N 
profit for oneself [def! v. 
UJ id.] [uniquely: foleg 
szoc e] 
workhouse 
important court 
ruling/decision 
the Law Reports 
shady discretionary 
payments 
top mark 
judge ordinary 
only-chiidism 
the institution of having 
only one child 
monopoly trading 
‘unilateral note’ (duelling) 
bohemicize [def!] 
primary school 
child at junior school 
consignee, payee, drawee 
acceptance form 
high-class 
(the) opposition 
magy arize 
distinguished socially 
[def!] 
magistracy 
noble’s forename/prefix 
secure employment for 
staff 
transport, deport 
certificate 
discount [diszkont 
unmarked] 
marriage of convenience 
[eg!] 
cartel 
nominal value of banknote 
the banknote itself 
share 
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ertekpapir-lizlet 0 E 0 3 N dealing in shares 
ertekpiac 0 E 0 2 N share market 
ertektozsde 0 E 0 2 N share exchange 
eskiidt 1 0 1 H juror; deputy 
ev 4c 0 1 N ‘financial year’ 
evjaradek 0 0 2 N annuity 
exportceg 0 E 0 2 N exporter (firm) 
fajmagyar 0 0 2 H racially pure Magyar 
fajrokon 2 0 2 N racially kin people 
fajvedelem 0 P 0 2 N racial protection [fajvedo 
unmarked] 
farkaskolyok 2 0 2 H cub (scout) 
fegyhaz 0 J 0 2 N penitentiary 
fegyhazbiintetes 0 J 0 2 N punishment in a 
penitentiary 
felar 0 E F 0 2 N surcharge, premium 
felhajt 7 E 0 1 V force/drive up (prices) 
felingyenes 0 I 0 2 AH reduced-/half-cost 
felleptet 4 0 1 V sponsor candidate 
felmegy 6b F 0 1 V rise (shares) 
felproletar 0 0 2 H (factory) worker with own 
plot 
felsoll 3a 0 2 1 N V-VIII secondary school 
[v. UJ id.] 
feliigyeloll Oa 0 1 H administrator (of assets) 
felver 7 0 1 1 V =felhajt 
felver 3 0 2 2 H ‘half-Jew(ish)’ 
fenseges 1 0 1 S addressing royalty [felseg 
unmarked] 
fezor 0 0 6 1 H wheeler-dealer 
fiatalur 0 0 2 S young man (form of 
address) 
filiale 0 0 7 1 N branch 
filmcsillag 0 s 0 2 H film-star 
filozofia 2a I 0 1 N psychology/logic 
(secondary school) 
filozofiai 2 I 0 1 A pertaining to above 
fizetescsokkentes 0 0 2 N pay cut \fizetesemeles 
unmarked] 
fizetestelen 0 0 1 A unsalaried 
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fogadalom 2a 0 1 N oath of office (lower- 
grade) 
fogadonap 2 0 2 N at-home day 
fogadoora 2 0 2 N hours (of opening) 
fogdmeg 1 o' 29 2 H cop 
foghaz 1 J 0 2 H detention centre, prison 
folyoszamla Oa E 0 2 N individual's current 
account 
5b E 0 1 N turnover 
forgat 7a F 0 1 V endorse 
forgatmany 0 F 0 1 N endorsed paper 
forgatmanyos 0 F 0 1 A endorsee 
forgatmanyoz 0 F 0 1 V endorse 
forgatoll 1 F 0 1 H endorsee 
fobiro 1 0 2 2 H district judge 
fohivatalnok 0 0 2 H top civil servant 
foigazgato 1 I 0 2 H district school 
administrator 
fomtezo 2 M 0 2 H top agricultural engineer 
foispan 0 D 0 2 H head of county 
administration 
fojegyzo 0 D 0 2 H deputy to above 
fokapitany 3 D H 2 X ‘chief constable’ 
fokapitanysag 0 0 2 N office of the chief 
constable 
fokortes 0 P 0 2 H chief lobbyist 
foldbirtokos 0 0 2 H landowner 
fbldesur 0 0 2 H land-owning magnate 
fomeltosagu 0 0 2 S (Your) Grace 
fopolgarmester 0 0 3 H mayor of Budapest 
foszolgabiro 0 D 3 H district judge 
fotanacsos 0 0 2 H counsellor 
fouri 1 0 1 A aristocratic [four, marked 
Tort]. 
fougyesz 2 0 2 
H 
public prosecutor 
frakcio 2 0 1 N faction [v. UJ id.] 
fiirdos 1 1 1 H bathhouse-/spa-owner 
gabonaber 0 0 2 N payment in kind in 
agricultural work 
gabonapiac 1 0 
i 
2 N grain market 
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A B 
gamiszallo 0 
gazdaiflu 0 
gazdakor 0 
gazdalegeny 0 
gazdatiszt 0 
gepresz 2 
gimnazium 1 
grofne 0 
grofno 0 
griindol 0 
gyampenz 0 
gyariparos 0 
gyartulajdonos 0 
gyermekmenhely 0 
gyermekmunka 1 
gyermeknap 2 
gyermekszoba 2 
habilital 0 
hadaprod 0 
hadaprodiskola 0 
hadaprodjelolt 0 
hadaprod-ormester 0 
hadimilliomos 0 
haditorvenyszek 0 
hadseregszallito 0 
hajdu 2 
harmas 4a 
haszonresz 1 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 2 N 
0 1 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
C 0 2 1 V 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 3 N 
C 0 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 1 2 N 
0 1 V 
K T 0 2 H 
K T 0 3 N 
K T 0 3 H 
K 0 4 H 
0 2 H 
K 0 3 N 
0 3 NHA 
0 1 H 
I 0 1 N 
C 0 2 N 
I 
hotel of dubious repute 
[cf. butik\ 
young farmer 
farmers’ club 
farmer’s son 
farm manager 
threshing machine 
owner’s share of crop 
r 
secondary school [v. UJ 
id.] 
countess [grof marked 
Tort] 
countess (in her own right) 
establish [6: neha] [def!] 
money held in trust for 
those in care 
industrialist, factory 
owner 
factory owner [= gyaros 
but unmarked] 
children’s refuge/shelter 
child labour 
Day of the Child [v. UJ 
id.] 
Kinderstube, manners 
sich habilitieren 
cadet 
cadet school 
trainee cadet 
commissioned cadet 
[before 1945] 
war profiteer [First World 
War only] 
military court, court 
martial 
army supplier 
[=hadiszalUto reg\ 
bailiff 
good/satisfactory (mark) 
share of the profits 
The Label Pre-socialist in Hungarian Lexicography 421 
A B 
haszonreszesedes 1 
hataridougylet 0 
hatirat 1 
haz 8 
hazassagkozvetites 1 
hazassagkozvetito 1 
hazbirtok 0 
hazfeloszlatas 0 
hazgondnok 1 
hazi 1 c 
hazicseled 0 
haziezred 0 
hazikisasszony 2 
haziszolga 0 
haziur 0 
hazmester 1 
haznagy 2 
hazparancsnok 0 
hazszabaly 0 
hecclap 0 
hegybiro 1 
hegykozseg 0 
helyettes 2 
helyszerzo 0 
hentesinas 0 
henteslegeny 0 
hentesseged 0 
herceg 1 
3 
hercegi 0 
hercegno 0 
C D E F G H 
C 0 2 N 
E 0 3 N 
F 0 2 N 
0 1 1 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 HN 
0 2 N 
P 0 2 N 
0 2 H 
G 0 
1 
2 1 H 
1 
0 2 H 
K 0 2 N 
0 3 H 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
P 0 2 N 
0 2 2 N 
D 0 2 H 
D 0 2 N 
0 1 HA 
|° 2 HNA 
1° 
i 
■ 2 H 
1° 
• 
2 H 
0 2 H 
0 1 H 
1° 1 H 
0 1 A 
0 
I 
2 H 
/ 
receiving a share of the 
profits 
deal on fixtures market 
=forgatmany 
‘(lower) House of 
Parliament’ 
marriage broking 
marriage broker 
house [as property] 
end of parliamentary 
session 
concierge 
jc terhes ‘pregnant woman 
working in hospital to 
pay for own 
confinement’ 
servant 
local regiment 
belle of the ball 
servant (male) 
landlord, house owner 
=hazfeliigyeld, which is 
hiv. 
sergeant-at-arms 
air-raid warden (Second 
World War) 
standing orders 
scandal-sheet, rag 
[newspaper] 
leader of wine-growers 
wine-growing community 
‘acting, deputy’ 
(house-)staff agency 
butcher’s lad 
young butcher 
butcher’s assistant 
prince (of blood royal) 
‘in certain monarchies...’ 
princely, prince’s 
princess 
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A B 
hercegseg 0 
hirdet 2 
hitelintezet 0 
hivatalszolga 0 
holabda-rendszer 2 
huligan lb 
huncutsag 2 
husiparos 0 
illemtanar 0 
illetmenyhivatal 0 
immunis 2 
immunitas 3 
impresszario 0 
inas 1 
2 
inasiskola 0 
ingatlaniroda 0 
ingyenhely 0 
injekcioz 2 
insegado 0 
insegmunka 0 
insegsegely 0 
intellektualis 4 
intelligencia 2 
intezo 2 
intezveny 3 
intezvenyez 0 
intezvenyezett 0 
iparbaro 0 
ipariskola 0 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
0 1 N 
0 1 V 
F B 0 2 N 
0 2 H 
E 0 3 N 
P 0 1 H 
0 - X 
0 3 2 H 
0 5 2 H 
0 2 N 
P 0 1 A 
P 0 1 N 
0 1 H 
0 1 H 
0 1 H 
0 2 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 15 1 V 
0 3 2 N 
0 3 2 N 
0 3 2 N 
0 1 X 
0 1 H 
M 0 1 H 
E 0 1 N 
E 0 1 V 
E 0 1 H 
0 76 2 H 
0 2 N 
I 
principality, princedom 
‘arverest, 
versenytargyalast x 
credit bank [announce 
(auction, bid)] 
office junior [v. UJ: 
hivatalseged] 
pyramid-selling 
vandal [v. UJ id.] 
villainy [‘apolitika uri x, 
az urak x-a’] 
meat trader [but husipar 
unmarked] 
teacher of deportment 
salary office 
enjoying diplomatic 
immunity 
diplomatic immunity 
impresario 
trade/craft 
apprentice/assistant 
valet 
school for professional 
training 
estate agent 
free place 
pump money into sthg 
poor tax 
relief (work) 
relief, aid 
‘serious fraud (office)’ 
[before 1949] 
village administrators, 
intelligentsia 
bailiff, steward 
banker’s draft 
draft 
drawee 
industrial magnate [6: 
gyak] 
vocational school 
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iparkamara 0 
iparmagnas 0 
iparosinas 0 
iparostanulo 0 
iparrajziskola 0 
ipartestiilet 0 
iroda 1 a 
irodaigazgato 0 
ismetloiskola 0 
ispan 1 
istallomester 2a 
istallotulajdonos 0 
itelotabla 0 
jatekengedely 1 
jatekklub 0 
javitointezet 0 
jegylll 3a 
jegyIV Oa 
jegyez 2 
jegyzo 3 
jegyzoseg 3 
jelleg 3 
jo 4 
jobb 4 
jogakademia 0 
joggyakomok 1 
joszagigzagato 0 
jotekony 1 
jotekonykodik 0 
jotekonysag 1 
kabinetalakitas 1 
kabinetiroda 0 
C D E F G H 
0 2 N 
0 1 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 3 2 H 
0 3 N 
0 2 N 
0 1 N 
0 3 2 H 
I 2 N 
0 1 H 
0 2 H 
Q 0 2 H 
J 0 2 N 
S/ 0 2 N 
L 
0 2 N 
0 2 N 
CFO 1 N 
K 0 N 
P E 0 1 V 
0 | 1 H 
0 1 N 
0 3 1 N 
0 1 A 
P 0 1 N 
I1 0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 1 A 
0 1 H 
0 1 N 
P 0 2 N 
0 2 N 
chamber of industry 
industrial magnate 
industrial apprentice 
industrial trainee 
technical school 
industrial association 
office in professions [def!] 
(public) office manager 
domestic/agricultural 
school 
estate steward [the official 
is 2. Tort] 
stable manager on large 
estate 
stable owner 
board/court of appeal 
theatre or gaming licence 
casino, gaming club [def!] 
borstal, detention centre 
banknote 
military note, dispatch 
be quoted on stock 
exchange; vouch for 
parish/town clerk [pre- 
1949] 
county office, town hall 
dm es x ‘name and title’ 
[occ. tref] 
‘belonging to the upper 
strata’ [def!] 
the right (in parliament) 
law school 
trainee lawyer 
estate manager 
charitable [def!] 
give regularly to charity 
support of charities 
forming of the cabinet 
cabinet office 
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A B 
kabinetkerdes 0 
kadet 1 
kakastollas 1 
kamara 2 
kamat-rabszolgasag 0 
kapitany 6 
kardbojt 2 
kardcsorteto 1 
kardparbaj 0 
karpaszomany 0 
karpaszomanyos 0 
kaszino 1 
kaszinotag 0 
kaszimo 0 
kasznar 0 
kasszanap 0 
kaszt 2 
katalogus 2 
katonaiskola 0 
katonasdi 2 
kaucid 0 
kegydij 0 
kegydij as 0 
kegyelmes 3 
kegyur 0 
kejelges 2 
kejno 0 
kekharisnya 0 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
P 0 2 N 
0 1 H 
0 2 XH 
0 1 N 
0 7 3 N 
0 1 H 
K 0 2 N 
0 2 AH 
0 2 N 
K 0 2 N 
K 0 2 AH 
0 1 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 H 
0 1 H 
F 0 2 N 
0 16 1 N 
I 0 1 N 
0 2 2 N 
0 9 1 N 
0 1 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 1 S 
J V 0 2 H 
0 3 1 N 
0 3 2 H 
0 6 2 H 
I 
cabinet matter 
cadet [but kadetiskola 
only Tort.] 
jc (kalap) gendarmefs 
cock-feather hat) 
chamber, guild 
(professions’) 
interest-bondage 
(police) captain 
sword-knot (as symbol of 
officer caste) 
sabre-rattling 
sword duel 
officer’s pips 
army officer [pre-1945] 
(building of) gentlemen’s 
club 
member of gentlemen’s 
club 
woman at till, checkout 
girl 
estate manager (above 
ispan in rank) 
payday 
caste, ‘closed reactionary 
group’ 
register 
school for sons of army 
officers 
playing at soldiers in 
Horthy’s army 
bail 
discretionary pension 
discretionary pensioner 
address to ruler, nobility, 
people 
patron, advowee 
titkos x unlicensed 
soliciting 
prostitute [def!] 
bluestocking [def!] 
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kenyszeregyezseg 0 E 0 2 N settling with one’s debtors 
kenyszerkolcson 0 0 2 N compulsory loan to state 
[defl] 
kenyszermunka 1 J 0 2 N forced labour 
keny szemyugdij az 0 0 3 2 V forced early retirement 
kepviselo-testulet 0 D 0 3 N county or community 
council 
kereskedelmi 5 I 0 1 AN trade/commercial school 
kereskedelmista 0 I 0 2 1 H student at trade school 
keresztanya 2 0 7 2 H woman who launches 
ships 
kerteszseged 0 0 2 H under-gardener 
kicenzuraz 0 0 1 V censor [cf. Kontra, 
‘Orszagh Laszlo’, p. 45] 
kifutoll 1 0 1 H office boy/girl, gofer 
kihallgatas 4 0 1 N audience 
kihivoll 1 0 1 H challenge to a duel 
kihuz 0 0 1 1 V x-za vkinek a laba alol a 
foldet deprive s.o. of 
their living on the land 
kijaroll 2 0 6 1 H fixer 
kikot 3 K 0 1 V army punishment: tie to 
column/tree 
kilok 3 0 12 1 V throw out of job 
kimeno II 2 0 1 N time off 
kimenonap 0 0 2 N day off 
kincstari la F 0 2 A x jegy/utalvany treasury 
bond 
kisasszony lb 
2 
2 
3 o
 
o
 
o
 
o
 
2 
2 
2 
2 
H 
S 
A 
H 
a town miss 
Miss 
telefonos x telephonist 
(woman) etc. 
young lady of the house 
[taj] 
kisberes 0 0 2 H young lad working on 
farm 
kisbiro 1 0 2 H town crier 
kisebbseg 2a P 0 i 1 N minority 
kisebbsegi 2 P 0 1 A minority 
kisember 0 0 7 2 H the man in the street 
kisgazda 1 0 2 H smallholder, small farmer 
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kisgyules 2 
kiskocsi 3 
kiskoru 2 
kiskozseg 0 
kistajgerol 0 
kistokes 0 
kollekcio Oa 
komencio 0 
komencios 0 
komoma 0 
komomyik 0 
kondicio 3 
konkurrencia Ob 
konvencio 3 
konzorcium 0 
kormanyalakitas 0 
kormanyfotanacsos 0 
kormanykepviselo 2 
kormanylap 0 
kormanylista 2 
kormanynyilatkozat 0 
kormanypart 0 
kormanysajto 0 
kormanytanacs 2 
kormanytanacsos 0 
kormanyzoll 3 
koronabirtok 0 
koronajaradek 0 
koronaiigyesz 0 
kortes 0 
kortesfogas 0 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
D 0 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 15 2 A 
D 0 2 N 
0 2 1 V 
0 2 H 
E 1 N 
0 4 1 N 
0 4 1 A 
0 1 H 
0 1 H 
0 1 N 
E 0 1 N 
M 0 1 N 
C 0 1 N 
P 0 2 N 
0 2 H 
P 0 5 3 H 
0 2 N 
0 2 N 
P 0 7 2 N 
P 0 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 1 H 
0 2 N 
C 0 2 N 
J 0 2 H 
0 1 H 
0 2 N 
I 
r 
local meeting [v. UJ id.] 
small carriage 
people not ready for self- 
government [def!] 
parish council 
winkle tenant out by 
raising rent 
entrepreneur 
(salesman’s) 
range/samples 
payment in kind to farm 
workers 
pertaining to above 
lady’s maid 
(head) butler 
terms of trade 
competition (among 
tradesmen only) 
agreed annual payment in 
kind 
consortium 
formation of a government 
state counsellor [ 1922-^44] 
government MP 
government paper 
government slate 
government statement 
govern ing/ government 
party 
government press 
council/authority named 
by government 
member of above 
governor [bank, body, 
religious order] 
crown property 
crown rent 
crown counsel 
canvasser 
canvasser’s trick 
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korteshadjarat 0 0 1 3 N intensive campaigning, 
electioneering 
korteskedes o 0 1 N canvassing, campaigning 
korteskedik 0 0 1 V ibid. 
koszt 4 0 1 1 N x-ba ad/helyez(penzt) lend 
short-term 
kosztkamat 0 0 2 N (usu. very high) short-term 
interest 
kosztoltat 2 F 0 1 V =kosztba ad/helyez 
kosztpenz 2 F 0 2 N -kosztkamat 
koszttizlet 0 B 0 2 N borrowing short-term at 
high rates 
konyves 3 E 0 1 A account (customer); ‘szoc, 
biz e’! 
konyvesll 0 Q o 1 H bookie 
konyvkiadoll 0 0 2 H publisher (person); firm 
unmarked 
konyvszakerto 0 F 0 2 H hites x qualified 
accountant [to 1950] 
konyviigynok 0 0 2 H door-to-door bookseller 
korjegyzo 0 D 0 2 H district notary 
korjegyzoseg 0 D 0 2 N office of above 
kotes 12b 
14 
E 0 
E 0 
1 
1 
N 
N 
deal (on stock exchange) 
block of shares 
kozalapitvany 0 0 3 2 N public 
endowment/foundation 
kozepbirtok 0 0 3 2 N land between 50 and 500 
morgen 
kozepbirtokos 0 0 3 2 H owner of above 
kozeposztaly 1 0 2 N middle class [def!] 
kozgyam 0 0 3 2 H public trustee, orphans’ 
court 
kozhivatalnok 0 0 2 H civil servant 
kozjog 0 J 0 2 N constitutional law 
kozrendor 0 0 2 H (police) constable 
kozseghaza 0 0 2 N parish hall 
kozsegtanacs 0 0 2 N parish council 
kozszerzemeny 0 J 0 2 N couple’s joint asset 
kOztisztviselo 0 
! 
0 2 H =kdzhivatalnok 
kulcsar 1 0 1 H steward, pantryman 
kulturegyesulet 0 0 2 N educational organization 
428 
A B 
kultusz 4 
kultuszminiszter 0 
kultuszminiszterium 0 
kultusztarca 0 
kupec 1 
kupon Oa 
kurator 1 
kuria 2 
kuriai 0 
kurzus 2 
klildonc 3 
kiildveny 0 
klilonbozeti 3 
kiiltag 2 
kiilterulet 0 
kvesztor 0 
kvesztura 0 
lakaj 1 
lany 4 
lapbizomanyos 0 
laptulajdonos 0 
latifundium 0 
lazadas 2 
leanyintezet 2 
leanykereskedelem 0 
leanykereskedo 0 
leanyotthon 1 
leanyvallalat 0 
lelenchaz 0 
lelenciigy 0 
leszerzodtet 0 
letort 3 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
0 2 1 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 N 
• 
0 2 N 
0 6 1 H 
CFO 5 1 N 
0 1 H 
0 1 N 
0 1 A 
B E 0 1 N 
K 0 1 H 
0 1 N 
E 0 1 A 
E 0 2 H 
0 2 N 
0 1 H 
0 1 N 
0 1 H 
0 2 1 H 
W 0 2 H 
W 0 2 H 
0 7 1 N 
0 1 N 
C B 0 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 N 
C B E 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 3 2 N 
Q o 1 V 
0 1 1 A 
I 
the Ministry of Culture 
Minister of Culture [not 
hiv] 
the Ministry of Culture 
[not hiv] 
the cultural portfolio [not 
hiv] 
knacker 
coupon, warrant 
curator 
High/Supreme Court [until 
1949] 
pertaining to above 
rate, price 
batman 
discounted bill (of 
exchange) 
x iigylet option/time deal 
sleeping/silent partner 
outskirts [=kiiltelek: kisse 
vaf] 
bursar 
bursar’s office 
liveried servant 
maid 
newspaper wholesaler 
newspaper owner, 
magnate 
great estate 
(up)rising [def!] 
branch, affiliate 
white slavery 
white slaver 
girls’ hostel/home [v. UJ 
id.] 
subsidiary, sister company 
foundlings’ home 
policy on foundlings 
sign up (sportsman only) 
x ber starvation wages 
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levente 2 0 1 H pre-army military 
organization 
3 0 2 1 N member of above [under 
Horthy] 
leventeoktato 0 0 2 H teacher of such members 
levezetes 6a 0 15 1 N family tree 
liberias 0 0 1 A liveried 
lokupec 0 0 26 2 H knacker [6: gyak]. 
lovagias 2 0 1 A chivalrous 
ludovikas 0 0 1 H officer trained at Ludovika 
pre-1945 
maga2I lb 0 1 S within family [‘affected 
use’] 
2 0 i S you [‘condescending’] 
maganalkalmazott 0 0 2 H non-state employee 
maganbank 0 0 2 N private bank [maganceg 
unmarked] 
magandetektiv 0 0 2 H private detective 
maganhivatalnok 0 0 2 H non-state employee 
maganiskola 0 0 2 N private school 
maganjog 0 J 0 2 N civil law 
maganlatogatas 0 0 7 2 N private call 
magannyomozo 0 0 2 NH private detective 
magantisztviselo 0 0 2 H non-state employee 
magantitkar 0 0 2 H private secretary 
magantoke 0 c 0 2 N private capital/assets 
maganyos 4 0 1 H isolated in exploitative 
society [def!] 
magyar 5a 0 1 X x betegseg tuberculosis 
magyarosit 1 0 1 V magyarize [def!] 
majoros 1 0 1 H tenant-farmer 
marhakereskedo 0 0 2 H cattle-dealer 
masodelnok 2 0 2 H second-ranking j udge 
megbizott II Oa 0 1 H second (in duel) 
megfoghato la 0 1 A x vagyon tangible assets 
megov 4 E 0 5 1 V =megovatol 
megovas 2 E 0 5 1 N protesting of a bill 
megovatol 0 J E 0 1 V protest a bill 
megpeticional 0 p 0 1 V challenge 
430 The Phoney Peace 
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megterhel 5 0 1 1 V burden (with excessive tax 
only) 
megyegyules 2 0 2 N county assembly [not hiv] 
megyehaza 0 0 2 N county hall 
meltosag 3 0 1 NS honour/eminence/dignity 
meltosagos 2 0 1 S honourable/eminent 
menedekhely 2 0 2 N ejjeli x night shelter, doss- 
house 
menedzsel 0 E 0 1 V manage, run 
menedzser 1 0 1 H manager 
meneskar 0 K 0 2 N army horse-training 
establishment 
menhely 2/3 0 2 N children’s/adults’ refuge 
mentoegyesulet 0 0 2 N first- 
aiders’/ambulancemen’s 
league 
mezei 4/5 0 2 1 H non-Budapest 
MPs/students 
mezorendori 0 J 0 2 X x kihagas agricultural 
offence/crime 
mintacsomag 0 E 0 2 N sample box 
mintakollekcio 0 E 0 2 N samples, range 
munkaado 0 0 2 H employer 
munkamegsziintetes 2 0 5 2 N strike 
munkanelkUli 0 0 2 H unemployed (person) 
[defl] 
munkanelkiiliseg 0 0 2 N unemployment 
munkapiac 0 C 0 2 N the job market 
munkasbiztositas 0 0 2 N insuring workers 
munkasbiztosito 0 0 2 H pertaining to, or the 
institution above 
munkascsapat 3 Q 0 2 N gang, crew 
munkasegylet 0 0 2 N workers’ 
league/association 
munkasellenes 0 0 2 A anti-worker 
munkaseloadas 0 0 2 N lecture for workers 
munkaskerdes 0 0 2 N the worker question [def!] 
munkaskizaras 0 0 2 N lock-out 
munkaskor 0 0 2 N workers’ circle 
munkaslap 0 0 2 N workers’ paper 
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munkasnyuzo 0 0 2 AH exploiter/exploiting of 
workers [def!] 
munkassztrajk 0 0 2 N workers’ strike 
munkaszolgalat 0 K 0 2 N forced labour 
munkaszolgalatos 0 K 0 2 AH person taken for forced 
labour 
munkatabor 0 0 2 N military camp for students 
[def!] 
nadragos 1 0 1 A city (person) 
nagyberlo 0 0 2 H major agricultural 
leaseholder 
nagybirtok 0 0 2 N land above 500 morgen 
[pre-1945] 
nagybirtokos 0 0 2 H owner of above 
nagyiparos 0 0 2 H major industrialist, mogul 
nagykapitalista 0 0 2 AH capitalist, plutocrat 
nagykereskedo 0 0 2 H wholesaler 
nagykozseg 0 D 0 2 N large village as 
administrative unit 
nagymeltosagu 0 0 2 S most excellent, 
honourable 
nagysag 5 0 1 1 S (your) honour/grace 
nagysaga 0 0 2 1 s m’lady 
nagysagos 2 0 3 1 s your honour/grace [def.] 
nagyvago 1 0 2 H wholesale butcher 
nagyvilag 1 0 8 2 N high society [def!] 
nagyvilagi 0 0 8 2 A pertaining to above 
napidijas 0 0 2 H day-labourer 
neger 2 0 1 1 H deviller [argo\ 
negyesll 4 I 0 1 N grade 4 at school 
nemzetgazdasag 0 c 0 7 2 N the country’s economy 
nemzetvedelmi la p K 0 3 2 X war propaganda machine 
[Second World War] 
2 0 3 2 A Horthy, 
counterrevolutionary 
nepkonyha 0 0 2 N soup-kitchen [def!] 
nepkor 0 0 2 N women’s/people’s 
institute 
nevhazassag 0 0 2 N marriage of convenience 
noegylet 0 0 2 N women’s institute/league 
nyeresegreszesedes 2 0 2 N profit-sharing [v. UJ id.] 
432 The Phoney Peace 
A B C D E F G H / 
nyugdijalap 1 0 2 N pension fund 
obligo 1 E F 0 1 N liability 
okkazio 2 E 0 1 N bargain 
olah 0 0 1 H Romanian [def!] 
olahsag 0 0 1 N the Romanians 
oradijas 2 0 I 0 2 H hourly-paid (person) 
orszagzaszlo 0 0 2 N permanently displayed 
state flag [def!] 
orvosegyetem 1 0 2 N medical faculty/university 
osztalek 1 c F 0 1 N dividend 
osztaly 5b 0 1 N civil service rank 
8 0 1 N class in lottery 
osztalyfonok 1 0 2 H head of department in civil 
service 
ovas 3 J E 0 1 N protest 
ovaslevel o J E 0 2 N letter of protest 
ovatol 0 E J 0 1 V lodge a protest 
ovatolas 0 J E 0 1 N lodging of a protest 
ofelsege 0 0 3 2 S His/Her Majesty 
ofensege 0 0 3 2 s His/Her Highness/Majesty 
omeltosaga 0 0 2 s his/her honour/grace 
onagymeltosaga 0 0 3 s id. 
onagysaga 1/2 0 3 2 s his/her excellency 
[nagysagos] 
onallosul 1 0 2 V set up on one’s own [def!] 
onkentes I/II 3/2 K 0 2 AH volunteer 
oregberes 0 0 4 2 H gaffer 
oregbiro 0 0 4 2 H immediate past judge in 
village 
oregdiak 1 0 5 2 H eternal student 
osjogasz 0 I 0 9 2 H eternal law student 
oskereszteny 2 p 0 2 H pure Christian [‘Fascist 
use’] 
oskutatas 0 0 2 N search for noble or non- 
Jew ancestors 
osproba 0 0 2 N proof of noble ancestry 
osszeferhetetlenseg 2 J 0 1 N irreconcilable conflict of 
interest [v. UJ id.] 
otos 4 I 0 1 N 
r 
bottom mark [v. UJ id.] 
paholy 3 0 1 N lodge (Freemasons’) 
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A B 
palota 2a 
panama 1 0 
panamazas 0 
panamazik 0 
panamista 0 
papir 4 
parades 1 a 
paraszt 3 
8 
parasztnyuzo 0 
parasztsag 3 
parbaj 0 
parbaj duh 0 
parbajhos 0 
parbaj kepes 0 
parbaj kodex 0 
parbaj ozik 0 
parbaj seged 0 
parbaj vetseg 0 
parkett-tancos 0 
partcsoport 2 
partharc 0 
partkassza 0 
partkozi 0 
partvillongas 0 
parvenu 0 
pasas 3 
penztar 6 
penziigyigazgato 0 
penziigyigazgatosag 0 
peticio 1 
peticion&l 1 
pillango 4 
pisztoly 2 
C D E F G H 
0 1 N 
0 1 N 
0 1 N 
0 1 V 
0 1 H 
CO
 
o
 
2 1 N 
0 1 X 
0 6 1 H 
0 1 H 
0 6 2 A 
0 6 1 N 
0 2 N 
0 3 N 
0 69 3 H 
i 
0 3 A 
0 3 N 
0 2 V 
0 3 H 
0 3 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 N 
0 
2 N 
0 2 N 
P 0 2 A 
0 8 2 N 
0 68 1 H 
0 2 1 H 
0 2 N 
0 
i 
2 H 
0 
2 N 
P 0 1 N 
P 0 1 V 
0 1 N 
0 1 1 N 
/ 
big residence of city rich 
[def!] 
(large-scale) fraud 
carrying out of above 
carries out above 
fraudster 
securities 
x kocsis/lo carriage 
driver/horse 
peasant [as insult/joke] 
policeman [argo] 
harrassing the peasantry 
act of insulting/vulgar 
behaviour 
duel 
duelling mania 
duelling bravo [6: gyak] 
able to duel 
duelling rules 
take part in a duel 
[one of duellers’] 
second[s] 
break the law by duelling 
gigolo 
parties in alliance [v. UJ 
id.] 
struggle between parties 
bourgeois party’s coffers 
[def!] 
inter-party 
party strife 
upstart 
punter (prostitute’s) 
friendly society 
financial manager 
district financial office 
challenge to election result 
issue challenge to above 
prostitute (‘euphemistic’) 
duel with pistols 
434 
A B 
plebejus 3 
plebsz 2 
plutokracia 0 
plutokrata 0 
polgar 4 
polgari 2 
polgari II 0 
polgarista 0 
polgarmester 0 
polgarorseg 0 
poliklinika 0 
postamester 1 
potado 0 
pragmatika 0 
premium 0 
probaszolgalat la 
prokurista 0 
prolongal la 
prostitualt 1 
protekcio 1 
protekcios 0 
protezsal 0 
provokacio 3 
provokal 3 
pucer 0 
piispokseg 3 
rabatt 0 
rac 0 
radiotarsasag 0 
rangosztaly 0 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
0 j 5 1 A 
0 6 1 H 
0 7 1 N 
0 7 1 H 
I 0 1 X 
0 1 A 
0 1 N 
0 1 H 
D 0 2 H 
0 2 N 
G 0 1 N 
0 2 H 
0 2 N 
0 X 
E 0 1 N 
K 0 2 N 
E 0 1 H 
E i 1 v 
0 3 1 H 
0 6 1 N 
0 6 1 AH 
0 1 V 
0 1 N 
0 1 V 
K 0 2 1 H 
0 1 N 
E 0 1 N 
0 1 HA 
0 2 N 
0 2 N 
I 
intellectual involved with 
the people 
the plebs 
plutocracy 
plutocrat 
egyetemi x university 
student 
x iskola higher elementary 
school 
= x iskola 
child at polgari 
mayor 
territorial army, civil 
defence corps 
outpatients’ clinic [def!] 
postmaster 
supplementary tax, surtax 
szolgalati x civil servants’ 
rules 
r 
bonus [v. UJ id.] 
trial period (for soldiers) 
authorized signatory 
renew (a bill) 
prostitute 
patronage, influence 
s.o. who knows the right 
people 
use one’s influence on 
s.o.’s behalf 
grounds for duel 
provoke a duel 
orderly 
the bishopric as property- 
owner 
rebate, discount 
(esp. Hungarian) Serb 
[pre-Second World War] 
[cf. tot unmarked [def!]] 
radio broadcasting 
company 
rank 
A 
rangsor 
ratenyerel 
rendelet 
rendki villi 
rendorbiro 
rendorkapitanysag 
rendortisztviselo 
reszletosztaly 
reszletiizlet 
reszveny 
reszvenyes 
reszvenytarsasag 
revizios 
rombol 
rongyos 
sajtofonok 
sas 
seged 
segedfogalmazo 
segedjegyzo 
segedlevel 
segedtiszt 
segelydijas 
segelyegyesiilet 
sommas 
sorfozo II 
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B C D E F 
1/2 0 
2 jO 16 
3 E F 0 
4 11 0 
o j„ ! 
0 0 
G H 
2 N 
1 V 
1 N 
I 
2 A 
2 H 
2 N 
0 0 
/ 
rank(ing) in society/office 
clamp down on [def!] 
vki x-ere [bill payable] to 
s.o. 
lacking full university 
status [-rendes\ 
stipendiary magistrate 
police headquarters [not 
hiv] 
civil servant in police 
force 
0 E 0 
0 0 
0 CO 
0 0 
0 CO 
0 P 0 
3a E 0 
2a 0 
0 P 0 
3 !° 
1 0 
3 0 
0 DO 
0 DO 
0 0 
3 0 
0 0 
0 0 
2 J 0 
la 0 
5 
2 N 
2 N 
1 N 
1 A 
2 H 
12 1 H 
1 H 
1 H 
2 H 
2 H 
2 N 
2 H 
3 2 H 
2 N 
! 1 X 
2 H 
hire purchase department 
hire purchase shop 
share(s) 
having share(s), share 
owning 
(joint stock) company 
revisionist (revizid, 
revizionista, 
revizionizmus [all 
unmarked]) 
xarakat flood the market 
[all unmarked] 
poor, bedraggled [def!] 
press chief [cf. UJ 
sajtdfelelos] 
member of party 
symbolized by eagle 
(semi-)skilled labourer [to 
1952] 
duellist’s second 
assistant drafter of texts 
assistant notary 
journeyman’s certificate 
bailiff’s assistant 
person on supplementary 
benefit 
benevolent society 
[segelydij unmarked] 
x eljaras, itelet, kereset 
summary 
brewery owner (only) 
436 
A B 
spekulans 0 
suszterinas 0 
slillyed 7 
szabotal 2 
szakosztaly Ob 
szaktanacs 2 
szakvizsga 4 
szallodas 0 
szamadas 2 
szamado 1 
szamarletra 0 
szamgyakomok 0 
szamlabelyeg 0 
szamlatulajdonos 0 
szamszek 0 
szamtarto 0 
szanal 1 
2 
szanatorium 1 a 
szegenyll 0 
szegenyado 0 
szegenygondozo 0 
szegenyhaz 0 
szegenyjog 0 
szegenynegyed 0 
szegenysegi 0 
szegenyszag 0 
szegenyugy 0 
szegodes 2 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
0 6 1 A 
0 6 2 H 
0 1 1 V 
0 1 V 
J 0 2 N 
J 0 2 N 
D 0 2 N 
0 1 H 
E 0 1 X 
M K 0 1 AH 
0 9 2 N 
0 3 2 H 
E 0 2 N 
E F 0 2 H 
0 2 N 
0 2 H 
F E 0 1 V 
0 2 1 V 
0 
1 N 
0 
1 X 
0 2 2 N 
0 5 2 H 
0 2 N 
J 0 2 N 
0 2 N 
1° 1 X 
0 6 2 N 
0 3 2 N 
0 
4 1 N 
I 
speculative [spekulal, - 
acid unmarked] 
apprentice cobbler [suszter 
unmarked 6 only] 
sink (low), decline [def!]. 
sabotage [def!] 
department, section [law] 
council [law] 
r 
higher examination [v. UJ 
id.] 
hotel owner, hotelier 
tegye x-ba tudositas 
szerint/nelkiil 
quartermaster/accountant 
automatic progression, 
Buggins’s turn 
trainee accountant 
receipt stamp 
account-holder (person) 
[v. UJ id.] 
(Budapest) court of 
accounts 
estate bookkeeper 
rescue financially 
sack, or cut pay 
palatial private hospital 
jc embernek a szerencseje 
is x 
a x (ember) t az ag is huzza 
poor tax 
social security officer 
poorhouse 
legal aid for poor 
inner city, poor part of 
town 
x jog, bizonyitvany 
certificate of means test 
smell of poverty 
poor relief [def ] 
signing on, hiring oneself 
out [reg] 
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szegodik 3 0 4 1 V 
szegodmeny 
0 
0 3 1 N 
szegodmenyes 0 0 3 1 A 
szegodtet 0 0 j 1 V 
szelvenyiv 0 c F 0 2 N 
szeminarium 0 I 0 1 X 
szemlelo 2 K 0 1 H 
szenior 1 I 0 1 H 
szentel lc 0 1 X 
szentesit 1 0 1 1 V 
szenvedo 6 E J 0 5 1 X 
szeretetadomany 0 0 
1 
2 N 
szeretetcsomag 1 0 2 N 
szeretethaz 0 0 2 N 
szfera 2bc 0 1 X 
szilard 3a F 0 1 1 A 
szobalany 1 0 2 H 
szoci 0 0 269 1 H 
szocialista 2 0 1 HA 
szolgabiro 1 D 0 2 H 
szolgal 1 0 1 V 
szolgalattetel la 0 2 N 
szolgalegeny 0 0 2 H 
szolgalo 1 0 1 A 
szolid 4 E 0 1 A 
szoros 5 E 0 1 X 
sziiksegmunka 0 0 2 N 
tablabiro 2 0 2 H 
tabori 3 K V 1 X 
talon 3 B 0 1 1 N 
tanacselnok 2 J 0 2 H 
/ 
signs on, hires oneself out 
lreg] 
contract relating to above 
pertaining to contract 
hire [person], take on 
(temporarily) 
sheet of coupons 
jogi x private law school 
army inspector 
group leader 
zaszlot x consecrate flag 
sanctify, sanction 
x vagyon unrealisable 
assets; debts 
charitable gift, donation 
charitable parcel 
hospice, asylum 
a magasabb -ak ‘ruling 
class’ [def!] 
x piac/tozsde\ 
arak/ft/penz/valuta 
[unmarked stable] 
chambermaid 
Social Democrat[6: gyak] 
r 
Social Democrat [v. UJ 
id.] 
magistrate 
serve, be a/s.o.’s servant 
service, duty 
serving lad 
serving [noun unmarked] 
not financially risky 
x szamla cash only 
compulsory labour 
appeal court judge 
x lelkesz/pap army 
chaplain 
talon, stock 
r 
chair of court panel [v. UJ 
id.] 
438 The Phoney Peace 
A E c D E F G H / 
tanacsjegyzo 0 0 2 H council secretary 
tanacsnok 0 0 1 H alderman, councillor 
tanarjelolt 1 0 2 H graduate not yet qualified 
[v. UJ id.] [to teach] 
tanarkepzo 0 0 2 N teacher training college 
tancmester 2 0 2 H owner of dance school 
tanfelugyelo 0 1 0 2 H teaching inspector 
tanfeliigyeloseg 0 I 0 2 N Board of Education 
tanoncev 0 0 2 N year of apprenticeship 
tanoncido 0 0 2 N time of apprenticeship; 
one’s articles 
tanonciskola 0 0 2 N apprentice training school 
tantiem 1 c 0 1 N dividend 
tantigy 0 I 0 3 2 N education 
taniigyi 0 I 0 3 2 A pertaining to educational 
matters 
tanyasll 1 0 1 H lowly farm employee 
tars 2 0 1 H (business) partner 
tarsadalomtudomany 3 T 2 N social studies (as 
university subject) 
tarsalkodono 0 0 2 H lady companion 
tarsasag lb 0 8 1 N ax high society [8: kisse] 
3a J E 0 1 N (limited, etc.) company 
tarsasagbeli 0 0 8 1 A pertaining to tarsasag lb, 3a 
tarsasagi 4 K 0 1 AN civvies; civilian dress 
tartalektoke 0 C 0 2 N reserves 
tavhazassag 0 0 2 N proxy marriage (in Second 
World War) 
tekintetes 0 0 1 S honourable, your honour 
termeloszovetkezet 2 0 2 N agricultural co-operative 
[v. UJ id.] 
termenytozsde 0 c 0 
2 
N com (etc.) exchange 
testor 0 0 2 H bodyguard, guardsman 
testorseg 0 0 2 N the (body)guard 
tisztelet 3 0 1 S alazatos x-em my humble 
respects 
tiszti 5 0 1 X x foorvos/fougyesz chief 
medical/legal officer 
tisztiszolga 0 0 2 H batman [pre-1945] 
tisztiiigyesz 0 0 2 H county attorney 
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A B 
tisztujitas 2 
tisztujito 0 
titkos 5 
tolonchaz 0 
tolonckocsi 0 
toloncol 0 
topan2 0 
toke2 3 
tokeado 0 
tokeeros 0 
tokepenz 0 
tokeszegeny 0 
tokeszukseglet 0 
tomeg 5 
tomegnyomor 0 
torpebirtok 0 
torvenybiro 0 
torvenycikk 0 
torvenyereju 1 
torvenyesit 2 
torvenyhatosag 0 
torvenyhatosagi 0 
torvenyhozo Oa 
torvenynap 3 
torvenyszek 1 
torvenyszeki 0 
torvenytelen 2 
torvenytelenft 0 
tozsde 0 
tozsdejatek 0 
tozsdelovag 0 
C D E F G H 
0 2 N 
0 2 A 
0 1 X 
o' 2 N 
0 2 N 
0 1 V 
K 0 1 N 
F 0 1 N 
E 0 
i 
2 N 
E 0 2 A 
0 2 N 
E 0 2 A 
E 0 2 N 
0 1 H 
0 2 N 
M 0 2 N 
jo 2 H 
| 
J 0 2 N 
J 0 2 A 
J 0 1 V 
D 0 2 N 
D 0 2 A 
J 0 2 X 
J 0 2 N 
J 0 2 N 
J 0 2 A 
0 1 X 
0 1 V 
C 0 1 N 
0 2 N 
0 9 2 N 
/ 
re-election of officers 
pertaining to above 
x kejelges unlicensed; x 
tandcsos privy councillor 
house of detention 
prison van 
move on, deport 
military cap ornament 
(large sum of) money 
earning interest 
tax on profitable 
investment 
with solid capital 
=toke2 
under-capitalized 
capital requirement 
the masses 
(condescending) [def!] 
mass poverty 
dwarf holding 
deputy chief magistrate 
(local) 
statute, act, article 
rechstkraftig 
have declared legitimate 
(an illegitimate child) 
local/municipal authority 
pertaining to above 
x hatalom joint legislative 
power of ruler and 
parliament 
assize day 
court of law, tribunal 
pertaining to above 
x gyermek illegitimate 
child 
declare illegitimate 
stock exchange 
speculation 
speculator 
440 The Phoney Peace 
A B C D E F G H I 
tozsdes 0 0 
1 
AH member of the stock 
exchange 
tdzsdetag 0 0 | 2 H id. 
tozsdeiigynok 0 0 2 H dealer 
tozsdezik 0 0 1 V play the market 
tuladoztatas 0 0 57 1 N over-taxation 
tulkinalat 0 E 0 1 N glut 
tulnepesedes 0 C 0 1 N overpopulation [def!] 
tulnepesseg 0 C 0 1 N overpopulation [def!] 
tultermeles 1 C 0 1 N overproduction 
ujgazdag 0 0 6 2 H nouveau riche 
ur 1 0 1 H member of ruling class 
2 0 1 S form of address to above 
uradalmi 0 0 1 A manorial 
uradalom 1 0 1 N manor, estate 
urasag 2 0 1 N lord, lord of the manor 
urasagi 0 0 1 A pertaining to above 
urasszony 3 0 2 S Mrs (on envelope) 
urholgy 0 0 8 2 S id. 
uri 1 0 1 A pertaining to ur [6 senses! 
urias 0 0 1 A characteristic of 
gentlemen 
uriasszony 0 0 2 H lady (of ruling classes) 
uriember 0 0 2 H gentleman 
urihaz 0 0 2 N country house etc. 
urilany 0 0 
2 
H young lady (of ruling 
classes) 
r • n 
urmo 0 0 2 H lady (of ruling classes) 
uriszoba 0 0 2 N gentleman’s room/study 
urleany 2 0 8 2 S Miss (on envelope) 
urlovas 0 0 2 H Gentleman (as opposed to 
Player) 
umo 0 0 2 H lady (of ruling classes) 
urvezeto 0 0 2 H gentleman owner-driver 
utazoll 3 E 0 1 H traveller, travelling 
salesman 
utcalany 0 0 2 H tramp, prostitute [def!] 
uzsoraber 0 0 2 N rock-bottom wages 
iigyesz 2 0 3 1 H civil servant acting in 
legal capacity 
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A B c D E F G H 
iilnok 2 D 0 1 X 
ulosztrajk 0 0 5 2 N 
tizletvezetoseg 0 
i 
Y 0 2 H 
vadtanacs 0 J 0 2 N 
vagyonado 0 0 3 2 N 
vagyonbukott 0 J 0 2 H 
vagyondezsma 0 0 2 N 
vagyonvaltsag 0 0 2 N 
vakancsos 0 0 1 H 
valtoll 1 J E c 1 N 
valtoadossag 0 F 0 2 N 
valtobelyeg 0 0 2 N 
valtocedula 2 0 4 2 N 
valtohamisitas 0 J 0 2 N 
valtohitel 0 F 0 2 N 
valtojog 0 J 0 2 N 
valtokezes 0 J F 0 2 H 
valtokezesseg 0 J F 0 2 N 
valtokolcson 0 F 0 2 N 
valtoleszamitolas 0 E F 0 2 N 
valtotarca 0 E C 0 2 N 
valtotorveny 0 J 0 2 N 
valtourlap 0 P 0 2 N 
vandortanito 1 0 2 H 
varosatya 0 0 2 2 H 
vedasszony 2 0 8 2 H 
vedett 3a M 0 1 X 
vedlevel 0 0 2 N 
vedoanya 1 0 3 2 H 
vedolevel 0 0 2 N 
vedoorizet 0 o 
1 
3 2 N 
/ 
arvaszeki x official 
dealing with orphans and 
the destitute 
sit-in 
regional railway 
management 
grand jury 
property tax 
bankrupt 
supertax on assets 
supertax on assets 
subsistence farmer also 
using common land 
bill of exchange, 
promissory note 
debt consisting of bills of 
exchange 
duty on bill of exchange 
bill used as currency early 
19th cent. 
forging of bills 
credit against a bill 
law relating to bills 
guarantor of bill 
guaranteeing of bill 
acceptance credit 
discounting of bills 
holdings, bills in hand 
Bills of Exchange Act 
blank bill 
peripatetic teacher 
town councillor, city 
father 
patroness 
jc birtok ring-fenced 
agricultural debtor 
safe-conduct, pass 
patroness of child 
protection league 
=vedlevel 
protective custody 
442 
A B 
vegeladas 0 
vegelbanas 0 
vegkiarusitas 0 
vegkielegites 0 
vegyes 2 
versenytargyalas 0 
vezet 6b 
vicehazmester 0 
vigeckedik 0 
virilista 0 
visszvalto 0 
vitez 4 
vitezi 1 
vizesnyolcas 2 
volontor 0 
zaloglevel 0 
zalogiizlet 1 
zarda 2 
zardanovendek 0 
zugbankar 0 
zugiskola 0 
zugsajto 0 
zugszallo 0 
zugtozsde 0 
zugiigylet 0 
zseller 2 
zsellerhaz 0 
zsellerkedik 2 
zsellersor 0 
zsiral 0 
zsiro 0 
zsiroforgalom 0 
zsurfiu 0 
The Phoney Peace 
C D E F G H 
E 0 2 N 
0 3 2 N 
E 0 2 N 
J 0 3 2 N 
0 6 1 A 
0 3 2 N 
0 1 X 
0 2 H 
0 29 1 V 
0 1 H 
E F 0 2 N 
0 1 S 
0 1 A 
0 129 2 H 
0 1 H 
B 0 2 N 
F 0 2 N 
0 1 N 
0 2 H 
0 9 2 H 
0 6 2 N 
0 7 2 N 
0 6 2 N 
C 0 2 N 
E 0 6 2 N 
0 1 H 
0 2 N 
0 1 V 
0 2 N 
B 0 1 V 
0 1 N 
B 0 2 N 
0 9 2 H 
I 
closing-down sale 
enforced premature 
retirement 
=vegeladas 
severance pay 
motley (crew) [def!] 
competitive bid(ding) 
iizletet x (a) manages 
business, unmarked; (b) 
has own business, 
marked 
deputy concierge [not hiv] 
be a traveller, salesman 
top taxpayer 
renewed bill of exchange 
title of nobility awarded 
by Horthy 
pertaining to above [‘or 
irocT ] 
hapless gofer 
unpaid trainee/worker 
mortgage bond, debenture 
security for loan 
[zalogiigylet unmarked] 
convent school(only) 
convent-educated girl 
shady banker/dealer 
unlicensed/shady school 
tabloid rag(s) 
cheap hotel 
unlicensed stock exchange 
shady deal 
serf, villein 
serf’s cottage 
live the life of a serf 
the life of a serf 
endorse (a bill) 
bank giro 
clearing system 
lounge lizard 
39 Between State and Nation: The Central Czech 
Amateur Theatre Association, 1945-48 
Andreas Beckmann 
Introduction 
In contrast to other Central and East European countries where Communist regimes were 
more less imposed on an unwilling population, the Czechoslovak Communists enjoyed 
remarkable popular support. In the first post-war elections in 1946 the Party came out 
easily ahead of its rival in the Bohemian Lands. Though its support among the Czech 
populace seemed to be ebbing a year later, there was little determined resistance and, 
indeed, a great deal of support for the Party when it finally took power in February 1948. 
How did the Communists manage to shed their recent past and become at least acceptable 
to so much of the Czech population? 
A number of historians have emphasized the conditions that existed at the end of the 
war.1 In important respects, 1945 did present a completely new starting point. The 
expulsion of the Germans, redistribution of land, a new, more populist political culture, 
and above all the changed geostrategic situation were all direct outcomes of the Second 
World War that the Communists used to maximum effect to build their power. But the 
slate was wiped only half clean. Indeed, much of the Party’s success was due to its 
remarkable ability to use what already existed for its own ends - to graft onto and bend 
existing traditions, structures and interests. To explain the success and popularity of the 
Communists after the war, we have to focus not only on what they built anew, but also 
how they managed, remarkably successfully, to rewrite much that already existed. This is 
especially clear in the case of the Ustredm matice divadelnich ochotniku ceskych 
(UMDOC) — the Central Czech Amateur Theatre Association. 
Though for various reasons the UMDOC has slipped through the cracks of Czech 
historiography and is little known even among historians of Czech theatre, it was due to its 
very size a significant cultural and social force, almost on a par even with the much better- 
known Sokol gymnastic association. By 1946 the organization included more than 3,000 
individual amateur theatre troupes with over 250,000 members in Bohemia, Moravia, and 
Silesia.2 In comparison, Sokol boasted one million members, though it must be pointed out 
that around half of these were children.3 A profile of the members of both organizations 
might look roughly similar: predominantly middle class, with clerks, state administrators, 
teachers, and small-business owners especially well-represented. Like Sokol, the UMDOC 
was painted brightly with the red and white of Czech nationalism. The UMDOC saw 
amateur theatre, as the Sokol saw physical training activities, as central to cultivating 
1 See Karel Kaplan, Nekrvava revoluce, Prague, 1993, and Jorg K. Hoensch, Geschichte der 
Tschechoslowaischen Republik, 1918-1978, 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1978. 
2 Josef Hudedek, ‘Nas vyvoj a vyboj’, Ceske lidove divadlo, 26, 1946, 8—9 (November). The best 
source of information regarding the UMDOC is the organization’s journal, which appeared 
under various names from 1918 through 1948: Ceskoslovenske divadlo (1918-39), Ceske 
divadlo (1939-45), Lidove divadlo (1945), Ceske lidove divadlo (1946-48). Another excellent 
source of general as well as more specific information are the organization’s detailed annual 
reports. For secondary sources see the as yet unpublished manuscript on amateur theatre in the 
Bohemian Lands, to be published by ARTAMA, Prague in 1998-99. 
3 Zora Dvorakova, T. G. Masaryk. Sokol a dnesek, Prague, 1991, p. 46. 
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Czech national consciousness and improving the nation. While Sokol sought to make 
Czechs physically more fit, the UMDOC saw its major work as raising the cultural level of 
the nation. The nationalism of both organizations translated into a strong antipathy towards 
the nation-less Communist Party throughout the inter-war period. In contrast to Sokol, 
though, which offered some of the more determined opposition to the Communist Party 
after the war, the UMDOC became almost bedfellows with the Communists between 1945 
and 1948. Explaining this difference in paths after the war requires going back to the 
UMDOC’s establishment in the latter half of the nineteenth century and examining the 
organization’s ambiguous relationship to political authority, and its place in Czech society 
over the decades. 
The History of the UMDOC 
The origins of the UMDOC at the laying of the foundation stone of the National Theatre in 
1868 provides the best example of the strong mix of culture and politics that remained 
central to the organization throughout its existence.4 The week of festivities surrounding 
the event, which attracted tens of thousands of Czechs and more than a few fellow Slavs, 
was by far the greatest display of Czech nationalism and the biggest party to take place in 
the Bohemian Lands in the nineteenth century.5 The completed theatre provided ultimate 
proof that the Czechs could match the Germans in cultural achievement — and thus, by 
clear extension, were fit to rule themselves. 
Along with others celebrating the establishment of this temple of the Czech nation, the 
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founders of the UMDOC saw a clear connection between cultural development and the 
achievement of political independence. Steeped in the ideas of Herder and nineteenth- 
century Romanticism, and with the cultural intelligentsia blazing the way of national 
development, it comes as little surprise that those assembled in Prague in 1868 considered 
culture to be the primary mark of a nation’s level of civilization. More than the size of its 
armies or the production of its factories, it was a nation’s achievement in theatre, literature, 
music, and art that determined its relative position on the world stage. 
The festivities organized around the establishment of the National Theatre suggest the 
significance of theatre to Czech culture and the national movement. In an age before 
television, theatre was — next to the local pub — perhaps the leading form of 
entertainment for Czechs living in urban and rural areas alike. But it was also the most 
prominent window display for showing off the cultural achievements of the nation. Alone 
among the arts, drama combined the contributions of the different muses, from the 
playwright’s text and accompanying music to the scenery and even theatre building, to 
create a powerful impact of sight, sound, and emotion. It was also public, requiring not 
only the presence of the actors on stage, but also of their audience in order to occur. And, 
unlike music, theatre was centrally concerned with language, the primary attribute of 
Czech nationality. Thus, the significance of drama for the Czech national movement went 
far beyond the actual material presented on stage. It served as an important focus — in 
time, space, as well as popular consciousness — for developing Czech society. Little 
wonder that, as the tide of national consciousness swelled, so many Czech communities 
4 L. Klosova, ‘Ochotnicke divadlo (1848-1886)’ in F. Cemy and L. Klosova (eds), Dejiny 
ceskeho divadla, III, Prague, 1977. For an overview of the UMDOC’s development see: 
FrantiSek Herman, Ustredni matice divadelniho ochotnictva ceskoslovenskeho, 1886-1926, 
Prague, 1926. 
5 For a good description of the celebration see Stanley B. Kimball, Czech Nationalism: A Study 
of the National Theatre Movement, 1845-83, Urbana, IL, 1964. 
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focused on building a proper theatre or in taking over a German one, nor that theatre was 
so often at the centre of political imbroglio. 
While established theatres like the National Theatre ascended the heights of artistic 
achievement for the glory of the Czech nation, they did so mainly for the edification of the 
urban elite, in contrast, the amateur theatre buffs organized in the UMDOC took on the 
task of bringing Czech national consciousness and culture to the broad masses in the nether 
reaches of the country. If the National Theatre and other so-called ‘stone theatres’ were 
stretching the point of the pyramid of Czech culture and the nation, then the UMDOC and 
its member troupes were building its base. The association of amateur theatre groups grew 
quickly, and by the end of the nineteenth century included the greater part of the amateur 
troupes playing in the Bohemian Lands. 
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The metaphor of a pyramid is apt for the way the UMDOC looked on culture and 
national development, ft assumes the existence of a clear standard of measurement, with 
‘high’ culture and ‘low’ culture, ‘good’ theatre and ‘bad’ theatre easily distinguishable. For 
the UMDOC, this standard remained remarkably constant. Even in the inter-war period, as 
an exuberant avant-garde innovated and experimented with new styles and approaches, the 
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UMDOC clung to realism and a rigid repertoire stacked with Czech national(ist) classics 
from the previous century. Works by Tyl or Jirasek always headed the list of plays 
recommended by the UMDOC to its member groups. Of the estimated 22,833 plays 
performed by amateur groups belonging to the UMDOC between 1923 and 1926, 19,970 
were by Czech authors, while most of the remaining 2,863 were by other Slavs.6 Modem 
V 
works by Capek, Konrad and Langer, for example, made up a strong contingent from the 
1920s onwards. Plays by Shakespeare featured prominently in repertoires before the First 
World War, included both as classics of world drama as well as a certain act of defiance 
against the Flabsburg authorities. Russian plays, especially classics by the likes of 
Chekhov, grew in number in the inter-war period and especially after 1945, inspired by a 
sense of Panslavism rather than an admiration for Soviet socialism. 
In addition to distributing lists of recommended plays, the UMDOC also cultivated 
Czech theatre by organizing regular courses and examinations for amateur actors, 
directors, and technicians, publishing guidebooks and a regular magazine. Especially from 
the 1920s, it also organized regional and even national amateur theatre competitions. Not 
surprisingly for an organization focused on strengthening Czech nationality, the UMDOC 
always devoted special attention to proper use of language and correct diction and 
pronunciation. Articles and guidebooks published by the organization, for example, urged 
their readers to avoid using words or sounds that might seem German.7 
The mission of ‘raising’ the Czech nation and Czech national culture that the UMDOC 
took upon its shoulders justified not only encouraging the development of ‘good’ culture, 
but also discouraging what it considered ‘bad’ culture. The organization periodically 
launched fierce attacks against what it called ‘trash’ and ‘kitsch’, for example, light 
comedies and operettas, ft was also not above exerting pressure to bring what it called 
‘wild’ troupes with dubious repertoires to heel. Building the pyramid of Czech culture 
demanded careful planning to avoid unnecessary waste in energy and resources. After 
1918, for example, the UMDOC urged the ‘rationalization’ of Czech theatre; this included 
bringing all amateur theatre under one central organization and uniting local troupes to cut 
down on wasteful competition. 
In short, the UMDOC took its work extremely seriously, ft is, however, impossible to 
gauge the full impact that the amateur groups organized in the UMDOC had on Czech 
6 [Anon.],‘Ceskoslovenske verejnosti!’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo 6, 1928, 11, p. 138. 
7 Cf. Ibid. 
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society, but some indication is provided by the numbers — in 1936, for example, some 
1,500 troupes that put on more than 8,000 plays and at least 32,000 performances8 — as 
well as by the enthusiasm and dedication evident in accounts of many of the amateur 
players. By the time the Czechs gained their independence, the UMDOC had come to 
consider itself a leading cultural force with a claim to respect from the political leaders of 
the newly independent nation. 
The establishment of an independent state considerably changed conditions in which the 
UMDOC was operating. The removal of the Czech-German conflict as a central issue 
opened Czech politics and culture to new influences, concerns and orientations. Amateur 
theatre followed the politicians in fracturing into a cacophony of competing interests and 
parties. By the end of the nineteenth century workers had begun dropping out of the theatre 
groups of the UMDOC to establish their own. In the wake of the Third International, these 
in turn divided into two main associations, one Communist and the other Social 
Democratic. Catholic amateur theatre groups were established within Orel (the Catholic 
competitor of Sokol), and Sokol members who had belonged to the UMDOC left the 
organization to establish their own drama groups within their parent organization. Though 
some of the more extreme right-wing parties established amateur groups as well, most of 
these enterprises were prevented by the censors. Other organizations, such as the Red 
Cross and Union of Firefighters, also became involved in amateur theatre, as both 
entertainment and a means of generating income. 
The loss of workers and youth reinforced the prevailing characteristics of the 
organization as predominantly middle class, middle-aged and conservative. Amidst the 
fracturing of Czech society, the UMDOC painted itself as above the fray, as devoted 
purely to artistic achievement in the interest of the nation as a whole.9 But as one Social 
Democratic critic remarked, the organization and the art it cultivated increasingly appeared 
as simply the expression of one of many partisan interests.10 Though the UMDOC 
remained the most significant organization in amateur theatre throughout the inter-war 
period, its position and brand of culture were increasingly questioned and undermined, and 
looked more and more partisan and outdated. With less need to cultivate national 
consciousness, the organization shifted its emphasis somewhat towards raising the cultural 
level of the Czech population. The slightly updated mission kept the organization at what it 
saw as the heart of the national interest, and justified the organization’s continuing efforts 
to control amateur companies and their repertoires. Frustration over the UMDOC’s 
conservatism provoked an increasing number of complaints and led to the secession of one 
of one of the organization’s leading members and several of the most dynamic amateur 
groups.* 11 
The proposal for a new Theatre Law that the UMDOC spent much of the 1920s and 
1930s trying to get passed reveals much about the issues and challenges that the 
organization was contending with.12 The fact that the organization appealed to law to deal 
with these problems, as well as the persistence with which it kept at it and the bitterness of 
the disappointment when these efforts proved futile, indicates the reception that the 
organization expected to get from the political authorities of the nation. 
8 [Anon.1,‘Pane presidente republiky!’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 16, 1938, 2, p. 27. 
9 See F. Flerman, ‘Nedomyslene dusledky’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 3, 1925, 8, p. 60. 
10 Cited in F. Herman, ‘Svuj k svemu — i v divadelnim ochotnictvP, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 11, 
1933, 16, p. 10. 
11 The organization suffered its greatest loss in 1925 when Vojtech Blahnik left the UMDOC over 
differences over dramatic style and established the more modem Tylova obec; see [Anon.] 
Prazsky okrsek Ustredni matice divadelniho ochotnictva, Prague, 1948, pp. 7—8. 
12 See H. Frank, 'Divadelni zakon?’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 9, 1931, 14, p. 93. 
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A central feature of the proposal worked out by the UMDOC in co-operation with the 
Masaryk Institute for Popular Education in the early 1920s was the abolition of all 
commercial ventures in theatre. Using an argument later wielded with great effect by the 
r ■v' 
Communist Party, the UMDOC argued that money polluted and distorted culture, debasing 
it to kitsch.13 To enable Czech theatre to develop and flourish, something of vital interest 
to the nation, it had to be freed of the tethers and distortions created by the need to fill the 
box-office till. Unfortunately for the UMDOC, ‘kitsch’ and ‘trash’ were extremely 
popular. Commercial ventures that were more than willing to cater to this demand 
provided major competition for amateur theatre groups with a more staid repertoire of 
Jirasek and Tyl. Thus, the proposed legislation would have ‘cleaned up’ what was put on 
stages — and also removed a major source of competition for amateur groups. 
The UMDOC proposal went farther than this. It also stipulated that in order to be 
engaged in the serious work of presenting plays, an organization could not be distracted by 
extraneous interests or activities. This included a great part of the organizations Involved in 
amateur theatre, including political parties but also organizations like Sokol or the Red 
Cross. As practically the only organization focused exclusively on cultivating the dramatic 
arts, the UMDOC could expect to reap a monopoly over amateur theatre from such a law. 
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As the sole representative of amateur theatre, the UMDOC also expected the legislation 
to put it on an equal footing with professional theatre. Relations between professional and 
amateur theatre had long been strained — not only because the established theatres tended 
to turn their noses down at the amateur stage, but also because the two were often in serious 
competition with one another for audiences. Repeated attempts to come to some agreement 
between the UMDOC and professional associations had always ended in frustration. 
The draft legislation also saw all theatres subordinated to state supervision, though the 
development of theatrical and artistic creativity, it was understood, would be completely 
free. The Achilles’ heel of this artistic freedom, and one that made the organization 
vulnerable two decades later, was that ‘permission to put on a theatrical performance 
should be given only if there is a guarantee of expert artistic direction’. To ensure that this 
was the case, the UMDOC recommended a ‘state theatrical commission’, ‘censorship 
commission’, and that district theatre commissions be established which would be attached 
to the Ministry of Culture. Finally, the UMDOC called for the creation of a special state 
theatre fund that would provide generous subsidies to support the cultivation of this area of 
culture that was of such vital importance to the national interest. 
Despite strong and persistent pressure from the UMDOC and some other groups, the 
Theatre Law stalled, remaining in government committees and bureaucrats’ desk drawers 
throughout the inter-war period. Commercial interests certainly played some role in this; 
but the fact that the law was not a priority for the government seems to have been more 
important.14 In other words, there was a huge gulf between the expectations of the 
UMDOC and reality. 
The revival of the German-Czech conflict at the end of the 1920s and its intensification 
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in the 1930s served to blow new wind into the sails of the UMDOC and raised the profile 
of the organization. With the increasing threat of Germany, the UMDOC saw a return to its 
13 Comments on the threat posed by commercialism appeared in Ceskoslovenske divadlo articles 
throughout the inter-war period. For example, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 11, 1933, 13, p. 198; 
‘Ceskoslovenske verejnosti!’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 6, 1928, 11, p. 138; ‘Proti divadelnimu 
braku (schvalena resoluce)’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 11, 1933, 14, p. 74. 
14 The draft legislation remained at the ministries and in committees throughout the inter-war 
period and never reached a government meeting let alone the floor of Parliament. Julius 
Mitlohner complained about the opposition of commercial interests to the theatre law: J. 
Mitlohner, ‘Namitky k divadelnimu zakonu’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 16, 1938, 7. 
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original mission. In articles, speeches, and at rallies the amateur theatre organization 
portrayed itself as manning the nation’s ramparts, supporting Czech national consciousness 
and Czech communities in the Sudeten border areas. For a competition to encourage the 
writing of serious pieces of drama depicting the life of Czechs living in the border areas, 
the UMDOC was sure to specify the manner of depiction: the plays should show the 
ordinary Czech folk {maly cesky clovek) defending itself against the Germanization 
attempts of the more powerful. In following this motif, playwrights were to emphasize the 
importance of Czech amateur theatre in reinforcing the Czechs in this struggle.15 One 
contributor to the UMDOC magazine Ceskoslovenske divadlo captured the significance of 
the German threat for the fortunes of the organization particularly well. After spending 
paragraphs complaining about a lack of respect for amateur theatre, a lack of national 
consciousness and a youth only interested in ‘senseless plays with songs’, he ended his 
article: ‘Czech culture, the Czech nation face a new and yet so old German danger; Czech 
amateur theatre must once again man the ramparts as it did a hundred years ago! Let us 
take up work again with joy, let us not be ashamed to admit that we are national, that we 
like our language and our Czech culture, let us be proud of our beautiful Czech tongue!’16 
External events helped the UMDOC in its aim to transform its annual festival of amateur 
theatre, the Jiraskuv Hronov, into a major celebration of Czech nationalism. The week- 
long event took place every August starting in 1931 in the town of Hronov and was 
dedicated to the nineteenth-century playwright Jirasek. Every year was devoted to a larger 
theme such as ‘Amateur Theatre in the Service of the Nation’ in 1930, or ‘The 
Borderlands’ in 1933. The theatrical performances — in which works by Jirasek naturally 
predominated — were interspersed with speeches, outings to surrounding points of 
historical and cultural interest, as well as a number of pious acts of patriotism, including 
the high point of the week, the pilgrimage to Jirasek’s grave. The UMDOC always sent out 
dozens of invitations to the nation’s leaders and took pains to attract national coverage by 
the press. The greatest coups in this respect came in 1933 and 1938. 
In 1933, the UMDOC was almost too successful in attracting the attention of the nation’s 
political leaders to the Jiraskuv Hronov celebration: coming just months after Hitler’s 
coming to power in Germany and devoted to the Czechs living in the Sudeten areas, the 
Jiraskuv Hronov that took place in August 1933 became a lightning rod that attracted 
especially representatives of the far right of the political spectrum.17 General Gajda, leader 
of the Czech Fascist party, appeared with eighty of his followers; denied admission to one 
of the performances, they caused a disturbance that almost closed down the whole festival. 
The keynote speeches of Senator Emil Hruby and Fischer — who, though scarcely more 
moderate than Gajda and his followers, were nevertheless given a rapturous welcome — 
were ultimately censored by Czechoslovak Radio for being too inflammatory, a move that 
predictably unleashed a string of protests in the right-wing media and prompted the 
National Democrats and others to publish the full texts of the speeches in their 
newspapers.18 
The Jiraskuv Hronov festivals that took place in 1937 and 1938 under the official 
patronage of President Benes and the premier, Hodza, respectively, were surrounded by 
much less controversy.19 Coming as German pressure on Czechoslovakia mounted, the 
15 [Anon.], ‘Dramaticka soutez nasich hranicafu’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo 6, 1928, 9, p. 21. 
16 [Anon.], ‘Kam s nimi?!’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 11, 1933, 16, p. 306. 
17 F. Herman, 'Jiraskuv Hronov 1933’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 11, 1933, 14, pp. 212-13. 
18 Narodni listy, 28 August 1933, p. 1 (the entire issue was devoted to the events at the Jiraskuv 
Hronov); Lidove listy, 29 August 1933, p. 6. 
19 [Anon.], ‘Dvacet let Ceskoslovenske republiky’, Ceskoslovenske divadlo, 16, 1938, 8, pp. 113 
and 122. 
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celebrations were grasped by the nation’s leadership as a way to rally the nation in a time 
of danger. In all three cases it was outside circumstances - the threat of Germany and the 
r V 
need to rally the nation — rather than the UMDOC’s own inherent importance that secured 
VIP attendance at these events. 
The UMDOC after the Second World War 
The UMDOC actually flourished under the German Protectorate. Despite suffering 
repression, heavy censorship, loss of members to labour-drafts, imprisonment and even 
execution, the total number of amateur groups belonging to the organization grew from 
1,740 in 1943 to 2,126 by the end of 1945.20 The organization returned to its roots. Theatre 
once again became a focus for national life, attracting greater audiences and volunteers, 
especially young people. Theatre, and especially amateur theatre, provided one of the few 
places where Czechs could assemble. This explained part of the organization’s gains, but 
not all, since the UMDOC also benefited from the misfortunes of its rivals. The 
associations of workers’ theatres as well as the Sokol and Orel were forbidden by the 
authorities; many of these troupes found refuge under the wings of the UMDOC.21 
Thus, the UMDOC emerged from the Second World War stronger than ever before and 
confident of its service to the nation in its time of need. It expected that this would duly 
translate into a better position in Czech society than the organization had enjoyed in the 
inter-war period. ‘In the most difficult times for the Czech nation, amateur theatre stood 
firmly in its positions and staunchly fulfilled the duties it had taken upon itself’ wrote the 
general secretary of the organization. ‘Today [the UMDOC] stands in the forefront of all 
cultural organizations, and I believe that the time is not far off when amateur theatre will 
take the position that its work has earned it and that it will be recognized as a part of 
national culture.’22 
Within the first few weeks after the end of the war, the UMDOC set about regrouping 
organizations around the country after the total ban on theatre of the last eight months of 
the war and scrambled to organize another Jiraskuv Hronov in August. Many of the district 
organizations reported difficulties especially due to loss of members, many of whom were 
drafted into military service or had moved to the border areas from which the Sudeten 
Germans were being expelled.23 
The central office also went about consolidating its control over the mass of member 
groups scattered around the country. The discipline on which the UMDOC prided itself 
clearly did not apply to all member troupes. The groups that the UMDOC leadership com¬ 
plained about were especially newer members of the organization, for whom the UMDOC 
was probably little more than a convenient umbrella under which to ride out the storm of 
German occupation. A mass of directives and work plans went out from the central office, 
and pressure was exerted on district organizations to bring ‘wild’ groups under control.24 
Besides the indifference of such groups to administrative matters, the UMDOC leadership 
was principally concerned about the plays that they were presenting. Both the central office 
and district authorities went to considerable lengths to assure that member and even non¬ 
member groups assembled their repertoires from the list of plays officially approved by the 
central office. 
20 [Anon.] Rocni zgrdva 1944-45, Prague, 1945, p. 14. 
21 Borivoj Srba, ‘Ceske ochotnicke divadelni hnuti v letech nacisticke okupace a druhe svetove 
valky 1939-1945’ (unpublished typescript), p. 45. 
22 Rocni zprava 1944-46, Prague, 1945, p. 5. 
23 Rocni zprava 1946, Prague, 1946: see reports of individual districts. 
24 Rocni zprava 1944-45, Prague, 1946, p. 10. 
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The rationale for this was the same as it had been in the past: the need to assure artistic 
quality and maintain cultural standards in the interest of edifying the Czech nation. A 
number of the district organizations managed to negotiate agreements with local officials 
in charge of overseeing culture that allowed the UMDOC to vet applications for plays to 
be performed, giving the organization effective control not only over its own member 
groups, but over amateur groups outside the UMDOC, too. Thanks to such an arrange¬ 
ment, the district office in Brno could report that ‘It seems that we have done more for the 
cleansing of amateur and theatrical repertoires than professional stages and Prague 
itself.’25 The district leadership’s heavy-handed methods, it had to admit, did not sit well 
with all members of the organization, and there were ‘signs of dissatisfaction in certain 
circles of our membership’. Still, it was clear to the leadership at least that only in this way 
would it be possible for amateur theatre to shake off its sense of inferiority and gain in 
importance (‘even if the audience does not wish it’).26 Member groups were also required 
to participate in regular district competitions so that ‘they [could] be ranked according to 
their quality among the other theatre groups in the district. This competition shows us 
where our mission is obstructed, where people are not working as they should be, and we 
can immediately act to raise the level where this is necessary.’27 
Post-war conditions were favourable to amateur theatre, and particularly to the UMDOC. 
The inter-war system had failed; the end of the war was accompanied by expectations of a 
new order that would avoid past mistakes. The general movement was towards a society 
that would be more popular, in which the masses would play a stronger role; that would be 
more united, less fractured among competing parties and interests; and in which the state 
would be more active, particularly in regulating the economy. In theatre, this translated to 
greater emphasis on playing for a more popular audience; creating a more unified, 
‘rationalized’ organization of theatre production; as well as a greater role for the state in 
supporting and regulating both professional and amateur stages. 
Under such conditions, general secretary Josef Hudecek could justifiably see amateur 
theatre ‘standing on the threshold of a new era’.28 The UMDOC now could lay special 
emphasis on its essential populism — theatre by the masses and for the masses. The shift 
in political scenery and national priorities in this regard finally gave the organization an 
advantage over established theatre that traditionally catered to smaller circles of theatre¬ 
goers with deeper pockets and a more rarefied sense of artistic appreciation. 
One UMDOC district official’s remark that ‘we are conscious of the fact that no one 
gives us anything and that we have to fight and struggle for everything’29 seems barely 
justified when looks at the wide range of organizations that gave the UMDOC seats and 
even chairs on their boards. The UMDOC gained representation in the Ministry of Culture 
and Education’s theatre committee; the cultural commission of the URO, the controlling 
body of the massive national trades-union organization; the theatre and culture committees 
of a large number of state organs, including, for example, the Provincial and District 
National Committees, the Masaryk Institute of Popular Education, the Circle of Friends of 
the Czech Language and the Association of Friends of Lusatia. 
Calls for greater unity and ‘rationalization’ echoed what the UMDOC had been saying 
throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The UMDOC now threw itself with enthusiasm into the 
25 Rocni zprava 1946, p. 28. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., p. 23. 
28 Rocni zprava 1944-45, p. 6. 
29 Ibid., pp. 23-24. 
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efforts to merge the various amateur theatre organizations into a united whole.30 A 
special relationship was quickly worked out with the UMDOC’s Slovak counterpart, the 
Ustredie slovenskych ochotnickych divadiel, which was then consummated with the 
participation of a number of Slovak amateur theatre groups at the Jiraskuv Hronov 
celebration in August. The UMDOC had an extra advantage in its efforts to unite amateur 
theatre since the German occupation had already made the first steps in this direction with 
the incorporation into the UMDOC of a number of other troupes. Representatives of the 
various organizations involved in amateur theatre — including both the Communist and 
Socialist workers’ theatre associations, the Union of Czech Firefighters, the Czech Youth 
Association, and the cultural department of the Ministry of Defence — met and created the 
Central Committee of Czech Amateur Theatre. The committee did not get very far in 
actually bringing about a union of Czech theatre. Within the first few weeks after the end of 
the war, representatives of the UMDOC and the Svaz delnickeho divadelniho ochotnictva 
ceskoslovenskeho (DDOC) — the Communist-dominated workers’ theatre association — 
had met and the latter agreed not to re-establish itself and to leave its groups within the 
UMDOC. Talks with Sokol, on the other hand, which had quickly re-established itself at 
the end of the war, eventually foundered. After some promising one-on-one negotiations 
between the two organizations, relations were broken off over recriminations that Sokol 
was urging its former members to leave the UMDOC and return to Sokol. Despite the 
strong support of the Communist Minister of Education Zdenek Nejedly, talks broke down 
and attempts to unite amateur theatre remained frustrated until after February 1948.31 
r v 
Typically enough, the UMDOC was quick to find a role for itself in the broader tasks 
facing the nation, and to try to ingratiate itself among the political leadership. It firmly 
aligned itself behind the new government and gave its full support to the Kosice 
Programme. With characteristic drama, the UMDOC pledged itself to serve the nation: 
‘We will not show our love for the nation in words, speech, but in active deeds: with all 
our might we will work to raise the cultural level of the broad masses, that is, to raise our 
nation to be among the most cultured nations on earth!’32 The organization expected that 
its past and present dedication to the nation would finally find recognition among the 
political leaders. 
It did, though from an unexpected quarter. Despite constant solicitations from the 
UMDOC, support from President Benes and the National Social Party — the party that, 
given its background, membership and programme might have seemed closest to the 
amateur theatre organization — remained lukewarm to indifferent. The UMDOC was 
bitterly disappointed in 1946 when President Benes did not serve as honorary patron of the 
Jiraskuv Hronov festival and anniversary celebration. ‘Our request was not even sent on by 
the Office of the President for the reason that the UMDOC was not an organization of 
national significance’, the organization’s general secretary reported indignantly.33 
It was the Communist Party — avoided by the UMDOC like the plague up to the Second 
World War — that after 1945 proved the most ardent supporter of the amateur theatre 
organization. At the UMDOC’s anniversary celebrations later the same year, the president 
was once again unable to accept personally amateur theatre’s ‘love, devotion, and 
gratitude’ because of his busy schedule. But the speech made by the Communist Minister 
of Information Kopecky, expressing his admiration and appreciation for the organization 
and all manner of support, more than made up for this disappointment. It was, remarked 
30 Josef Hudecek, ‘Sjednoceni ochotnictva’, Ceske lidove divadlo, 25, 1945, 9 (August), pp. 12- 
13. 
31 [Anon.], ‘COS’, Ceske lidove divadlo, 27, 1947, 6 (June), pp. 79-80. 
32 Rocnizprava 1946, p. 26. 
33 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Felix Buril, the general secretary of the organization, ‘the first time that the UMDOC 
received official recognition, in public and in a manner befitting the organization’s 
importance from the lips of a government representative’. Kopecky’s National Social 
colleague, the Minister of Education Jaroslav Stransky, it was expressly noted, failed to 
attend.34 
Kopecky’s words of support for the UMDOC were not hollow. Indeed, his party must 
have been instrumental in gaining the organization representation in so many organizations 
after the war, especially the Central Trades Union Organization and so many of the district 
committees. Through Zdenek Nejedly, the Party provided the greatest encouragement for 
attempts to unite amateur theatre in a single organization. 
The proposal for a new theatre law worked out by Nejedly in 1945 even exceeded the 
wants-list assembled by the UMDOC in the 1920s; besides turning into formal law the ban 
on commercial interests already passed by presidential decree, the proposal counted on a 
single unified organization of amateur and professional theatre as well as state funding 
across the board. The Communist Party mobilized its forces in the halls of government, 
through the trades unions, in factories and in the theatres themselves to pressure for 
passage of the law, but had to wait till after the 1948 coup to have the bill rubber-stamped 
by parliament. 
The greatest obstruction to passing the bill — and perhaps the greatest thorn in the side 
of the UMDOC — seems to have come from Jaroslav Stransky, leader of the National 
Social Party. As Minister of Culture and Education from 1946 to 1948, Stransky was a 
fiscal conservative who was loath to stretch the public purse too much in support of culture 
and unwilling to restrict the variety of interests catered for in the stage productions. An 
alternative proposal for the theatre law that Stransky tabled on taking over the ministry met 
none of the UMDOC’s expectations.35 Intense pressure from the Communists forced the 
minister to rework the proposal, but Stransky managed to block the new bill in committees 
until after February 1948. 
The support the Communist Party gave to the UMDOC paid off handsomely. Up until 
their assumption of power in February 1948, the Czechoslovak Communists pursued a 
cultural policy that was substantially in agreement with that of the UMDOC. Association 
with the UMDOC provided the Communists one more proof that the Party was indeed 
reformed, acceptable, and had the best interests of the nation at heart. The amateur theatre 
organization not only fitted well with the Party’s requirements for popular culture, but also 
had a similarly rigid and narrow view of art that centred on realistic performances of 
warmed-up classics and conventional nationalism. Thanks to resurgent Panslavism, the 
UMDOC was still amenable to incorporating a number of Russian works into its 
repertoires. Tractor stations, collective farms, and other hallmarks of Socialist Realism, 
however, did not really become mandatory features of the Czech stage until after the 
Communist take-over. The repertoires that the UMDOC brought to all comers of the 
Bohemian Lands fanned the Czech nationalism which the Czech Communists used to 
billow their sails. Equally important, the amateur group also provided an effective means 
of assuring that other messages and forms of drama were kept off the stage, and that 
independent groups were reined in. Finally, the UMDOC proved an enthusiastic supporter 
34 Ibid., p. 9. For Kopecky’s speech see ‘Zavazna slova’, Ceske lidove divadlo, 26, 1946, 8—9 
(November), pp. 119-21. 
35 FrantiSek Smazik, ‘Na okraj divadelnlho zakona’, Lidove divadlo, 25, 1945, 3 (October), 
pp. 34-35; ‘Divadelni zakon’, Ceske lidove divadlo, 27, 1947, 2 (February), pp. 17-18. Also 
Kulturnipolitika, 5 (5 November 1945), p. 1. 
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of a number of the Party’s initiatives, including the first Two-Year Plan and the ‘Art for 
the People’ movement.36 
One naturally asks whether the Communist Party after 1945 did not control the UMDOC 
directly, as was the case with a number of other organizations. In the available records of 
the UMDOC as well as of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, there is no indication of 
any successful Communist infiltration or take-over, or even the attempt to do so. The Party 
archives reveal just how concerned the Communist leadership was about Sokol, and 
document some of the measures taken against the organization, yet scarcely any mention is 
made of the UMDOC. In fact, the leadership of the UMDOC remained constant. Though 
Party members certainly played a greater role in the UMDOC than they had before the 
war, their numbers and influence apparently remained limited. Even after the war, and 
after the incorporation of other groups, the UMDOC remained solidly middle-class. 
Indeed, the character of the organization — its rhetoric, style, actions, and mission — 
remained remarkably constant from the latter part of the nineteenth century through 1948. 
The Communist Party did not need to control the UMDOC because the organization was 
easily convinced by the Communists that they were both marching down the same path to 
the same future for the nation. One UMDOC leader could reasonably and sincerely remark 
that ‘With happiness we see that for all of sixty years we have been striding towards the 
order that is being bom, and thus without difficulty we join the front ranks towards a new, 
free life.’37 
It soon, too late, became clear that the Communist order was far different from that the 
amateur players aspired to. Following the February coup, the UMDOC suddenly had the 
opportunity to experience the control from above that it had applied to ‘wild’ troupes in the 
past. The Jiraskuv FIronov of 1948 was met with the first broadsides against the 
UMDOC’s ‘bourgeois’ repertoire, which was out of step with the new era; this was 
followed by the first forced resignations from the organization. By 1950 the UMDOC’s 
Gleichschaltung into a state amateur theatre organization was complete. 
Conclusion 
A fundamental question in looking at the UMDOC in the period up to February 1948 is 
how it was possible for the organization to be so easily won over by the Communist Party. 
Past and future experience showed all too clearly that the Communists had a very different 
vision of theatre, politics, and the development of the Czech nation. Even at the time there 
were enough unsettling indications of this, like reports of the ‘Socialist Realism’ that 
Zhdanov was calling for in the Soviet Union and the measures taken against Anna 
Akhmatova and the Leningrad journals. 
Vital in squaring this circle for the UMDOC was nationalism. In the Bohemian Lands, 
perhaps more than anywhere else in Central and Eastern Europe, the Communists managed 
with a remarkable degree of credibility to don the mantle of Czech nationalism and pose as 
a staunch defender of the nation’s interests. The poor fit was helped by the experience of 
the war and Russian liberation, but also by the bitter disappointment of Munich. 
Nationalism is important, but probably not enough to explain the close relations between 
the UMDOC and Communists after the Second World War. After all, Sokol, though 
similarly nationalist, remained largely immune to the Party’s siren call. Despite all that 
separated them, what the UMDOC and the Communists did share, and what brought them 
36 The ‘Art for the People’ movement in many ways fitted perfectly with the UMDOC’s 
programme and interests. Cf. ‘Vsenarodni vyznam Umeni lidu’, Ceske lidove divadlo, 27, 
1947, 9 (October), unpaginated insert. 
37 Rocnizprava 1946, p. 20. 
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together, was a common vision of the ‘political use of culture’ — that is, that high culture 
should be politically didactic and centrally administered. Both organizations thought that 
theatre should teach people how to be citizens in the post-war world. What helped gloss 
over the deeply different conceptions of that world and helped seal the relationship 
r v 
between the two was the willingness of the Communists to concede the UMDOC so many 
of the privileges it craved, and had demanded of the inter-war government. The 
development of the UMDOC from its origins around the foundation stone of the National 
Theatre in 1868 gave the organization a claim to national leadership and the 
acknowledgement and support of this special position by the political authorities. This 
attitude and expectation (would ‘complex’ be too strong a word?) goes farthest in 
explaining why the amateur players in the UMDOC, like many others in Czech theatre, 
were so amenable to the Communist Party between 1945 and 1948. 
The UMDOC probably presents an extreme example. Few other organizations moved so 
far, from opposition to co-operation, in their relationship with the Communists. But the 
case of the amateur theatre organizations is therefore all the more indicative of the way the 
Party managed to build bridges to existing interests and traditions. Looking at the period 
1945-48 through the prism of power politics has made us focus on conflict and differences 
and overlook the interests people and organizations shared — genuinely or merely 
apparently — with the Communist Party. 
40 Anxiety in the Early Works of Dominik 
Tatarka 
Kathleen Hayes 
In the article ‘Neznama tvar’ (The Unknown Face, 1940), Dominik Tatarka (1913-89) 
writes of the ‘dangers’ of Realism and Naturalism: ‘The epoch of literary Realism and 
Naturalism, in so far as it was a reflection of philosophical Positivism, was not only 
unfaithful in world literature, but also dangerous. It is well-known how severely this art 
was judged and condemned as entirely materialistic and experimental because it sacrificed 
form for content, emotion for sensation, the ideal for reality, because it did not shrink from 
bad taste, vulgarity or even cruelty.’1 In the same essay, Tatarka appears to argue against 
Realism when he writes that: ‘the reality of art is truer and more real than the truth of 
Nature and history because only a limited person does not see that the most “real” person 
is he who is unreal, who wants to realize himself according to his own conception and 
faith, at the price of tragic effort and labour.’2 In the essay ‘O duchovnu orientaciu v 
slovenskej beletrii’ (On Spiritual Orientation in Slovak belles-lettres), also published in 
1940, Tatarka rejects the utilitarian conception of art: ‘The utilitarian view of literature has 
not suited and does not suit literary creation.’3 He believes that the aim of belles-lettres is 
‘rather to allow one to experience a segment of the reality of the senses and of the heart, 
than to judge and measure it with a moralist and politically opportune rule’.4 This 
conception of art is manifest in his early works published during the Second World War, 
but can hardly be reconciled with his post-war novel Farskd republika (The Parish 
Republic, 1948). One can find clues, however, to the apparently radical change in 
Tatarka’s aesthetics in his essays from 1940. In them he also writes that the problems of 
form which writers must tackle change with the changing spirit of the times; that creative 
power is manifest in the posing of a problem and its resolution.5 He also writes that a work 
of the spirit, that is, a work of art, is more truthful and real to him than Nature, because the 
work of art is a correction, an improvement and a shaping of Nature: ‘The creation of the 
spirit, which imposes meaning on natural events, is constantly taking place within and 
around the individual.’6 Such a statement appears to justify the propagation of an 
ideological message in Farskd republika. 
I shall consider changes in Tatarka’s prose in the period following the war. To do so, I 
must go back earlier than 1945. Tatarka’s first book, a collection of short stories, was 
published under the title V uzkosti hladania in Bratislava in 1942.7 The title, ‘In the 
anxiety of seeking’, introduces the, perhaps banal, theme of a search for the meaning of 
1 Dominik Tatarka in Petra Bombikova (ed.), Kultura ako obcovanie, Bratislava, 1996, pp. 9-10. 
2 Ibid., p. 10. 
3 Tatarka, ‘O duchovnu orientaciu v slovenskej beletrii’ in Bombikova (ed), Kultura ako 
obcovanie, p. 14. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid., p. 16. 
6 Ibid., p. 15. 
7 Jozef Bzoch notes that one of the paradoxes of the wartime Slovak state was that Catholic, 
Lutheran, Communist, nationalist and other writers were permitted to publish alongside one 
another. A further paradox, he writes, is that this tolerance did not recur until after 1989. Jozef 
Bzoch, ‘Nacrt dejin slovenske literatury 1945-1990’, Dagmar Persticka and Lea Prerostova 
(eds), Dominik Tatarka a ti druzi, Brno, 1991, pp. 13-26 (14). 
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existence, and this theme is constant in all the stories. It also constitutes the dominant 
theme in Tatarka’s next two book publications, the novel Panna Zazracnica (The 
Miraculous Maiden, 1944), and Farska republika. The object of Tatarka’s attention 
remains consistent over this period. The author of Farska republika is still recognizable as 
the author of the earlier works. Indeed, he makes use of the same motifs, for example, the 
motif of the mother who betrays her beloved son.8 The changes in the works cannot be 
explained as a move from concentration on the life of the psyche to concentration on 
external events, since the author’s concern with both mental and material existence is 
evident in his later works, too. Nor can the changes in his writing be explained simply as 
the development of a writer from a stage of experimentation to a distinctive stylistic 
maturity. Demon suhlasu (The Demon of Consent/Conformity), first published in the 
periodical Kulturny zivot in 1956, manifests a continuing interest in narrative 
experimentation. The text is narrated from the point of view of a character whose skull has 
been split open.9 
In the end, the changes in Tatarka’s early works can be explained by the rather banal 
hypothesis that the author finds, at least temporarily, certainty in his search for existential 
meaning.10 He finds that meaning in the Communist struggle on behalf of the working 
class.* 11 His first two works are pervaded by an atmosphere of anxiety, frustration and 
despair; these ‘intermediate’ states of mind of the characters find their reflection in a prose 
replete with paradoxes, veils, confusion and mystery. The reader is sometimes as lost as 
the characters, unable to determine what is meant to be dream and what is meant to be 
reality’, what takes place in the characters’ heads and what actually happens. The reader is 
taken into a nightmare landscape in which events follow a strange, unpredictable course, 
and this nightmare overwhelms the traces of the everyday. The devices the author uses to 
obscure the text and unsettle the reader are also expressions of the themes he treats. 
In Farska republika, by contrast, certainty has been attained, and this certainty is 
manifest in the transparent quality of the prose. The narrative follows a more or less 
straightforward, chronological line, shifting in time and place only when the focus moves 
from the experience of one character to another. The author does concentrate on both the 
inner life of the main characters and the external circumstances in which they find 
themselves, but there is no confusion about what is ‘real’ and what imagined. There is little 
confusion in point-of-view; the third-person narrator almost always indicates who is the 
8 In ‘Kohutik v agonii’, Tatarka presents a mother who feels responsible for the death of her son. 
See ‘Kohutik v agonii’ (1946), Prutene kresla. Rozhovory bez konca, Bratislava, 1967, 
pp. 139-81. For the same motif, see also Tatarka’s short story ‘Posol prichadza’, V uzkosti 
hl’adania, Turdiansky sv. Martin, 1942, p. 103; and Dominik Tatarka, Farska republika [1948], 
Bratislava, 1963, pp. 201-07. 
9 Tatarka himself, though a Communist, claims to have suffered under Stalinism. He writes of 
Demon: ‘Perhaps it was the first satire of its kind in Czechoslovakia directed at people who 
hide their own cowardice behind general acquiescence with everything and everyone, satire 
directed at people who have given up thinking with their own minds and try to think with some 
imagined collective brain...’. See Antonin J. Liehm, Generace, Prague, 1990, p. 158. 
10 For an analysis of the appeal of the Communist ideology for intellectuals in Eastern Europe 
after the Second World War, see Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (1953). 
11 For a statement of Tatarka’s support for the Communist Party and his adoption of a different 
understanding of the role of art, see: Dominik Tatarka, ‘Manifest socialistickeho humanizmu’ 
(1948), Proti demonom. Vyber stati o literature a vytvarnictve, Bratislava, 1968, pp. 99-101. 
He states here that his views were influenced by his experience of the Slovak Fascist state and 
the National Uprising in 1944. Tatarka was expelled from the Communist Party in 1970 and 
became one of the most important figures of Slovak dissent. He was one of the first Slovaks to 
sign Charter 77. See Dominik Tatarka a ti druzi, pp. 139-40. 
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subject of thoughts expressed. The characters themselves are also two-dimensional; some 
critics distinguish between the unambiguous portraits of the Communist underground 
activist Lycko, and the greedy, opportunist officer of the Fascist Hlinka Guard Minar, on 
the one hand, and the more detailed depictions of the central characters on the other. This 
distinction is not, however, completely accurate. The writer assigns a moral status to all the 
characters in Farska republika. If the moral status of a complex character, such as that of 
the American-Slovak John Menkina, seems ambiguous and thus threatens to undermine the 
simple scheme the author has established, the author violates the parameters of the 
character, and portrays him acting in an appropriate but implausible manner. In the early 
works, the characters dominate the text; the internal conflicts they suffer and their states of 
mind dominate the story. In fact, sometimes the story dribbles away, lost in the morass of 
the characters’ anxiety. Morality is also important in the early works, but the reader is left 
to make judgements on the basis of the characters’ self-assessments; final judgements are 
problematized.12 In Farska republika the characters are subservient to the story, which 
serves to illustrate an ideological certainty; the characters are sometimes uncooperative 
and so must be forced to play their assigned roles. Thus, ironically, Tatarka violates the 
‘integrity’ and ‘freedom’ of his characters in the same manner that the authoritarian 
clerical state which he criticizes violates the population over which it has control. It would 
be wrong to suggest, however, that Tatarka’s prose here ever descends to the flatness 
characteristic of a lackey of the Communist regime, as his Prvy a druhy uder (First and 
Second Blow, 1950) does. 
I consider Tatarka’s early works in chronological order, concentrating on the theme of 
anxiety. The first short story in V uzkosti hl’adania, ‘Podvojna rozpravka’ (A two-sided 
tale), manifests the author’s interest in narrative experimentation and favourite themes of 
Decadent writers of the Fin de siecle. At the opening of the brief short story, the third- 
person narrator relates that a frightened woman stops a young man in front of a house with 
a wooden balcony. She appeals to him to come and comfort a girl who is dying, all alone 
in this town which is not her home. The girl had once appealed to him, but then he had 
forgotten her. Out of decency, the confused young man acquiesces; at the girl’s insistence, 
he agrees to tell her a story to distract her from thoughts of death. There we find a 
reference to the title of the collection; anxiety here is existential anxiety: ‘Out of 
compassion for the girl, and from a social fear of death, he eagerly set to inventing words 
and an implausible story in order to free himself and the girl from the anxious awareness 
that they were in the presence of death.’13 
With the young man’s narration, the short story moves into the realm of the fairy-tale or 
exemplum. This tale, which starts as a digression, takes over the story, and sets the tone for 
the rest of the collection. It is an allegory of life in the present. A fowler who lived long 
ago, ‘in a time which did not fly, but hung and weighed heavy like a burden, somewhere 
far away in the seventy-seventh land, where sand flowed and water lay in dunes, but it 
might also be here’.14 The comparison between the land of the fairy-tale and the wartime 
Slovak state is further expressed by the descriptions of the countryside through which the 
fowler travels, devastated by marching soldiers, a dead land, wasted by war and covered in 
debris and corpses.15 Here, however, the landscape also constitutes a paysage de Tame. 
The comparison between inner and outer devastation recurs throughout the collection. The 
motif of time and existence as a burden also recurs throughout the work, as does the motif 
of the world turned upside-down. The fowler wanders over the land; he is unable to lure 
12 This approach to moral judgement is evident also in ‘Kohutik v agonii’. 
13 Dominik Tatarka, ‘Podvojna rozpravka’, V uzkosti hl’adania, pp. 7—8. 
14 Ibid., p. 8. 
15 Ibid., p. 9. 
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birds into his snares. Three times he is in despair, at the point of dying of hunger. Three 
times he whistles in great longing and each time a bird answers his call. It is a strange bird, 
whose feathers seem to change colours. Each time the bird settles in his trap, but begs the 
fowler to spare its life. The first time, the bird claims to be love, but the fowler swears that 
he does not know what love is when he is hungry. He tries to kill the bird, but it escapes. 
The next time it appears, the bird claims to be pain. Again, the fowler tries to kill it, but the 
bird escapes. The third time it appears, the bird claims to be life, and again the fowler 
swears he will kill it. The characters depicted in this collection sometimes follow the 
pattern of the fowler; they are at the point of starvation; they long for some kind of 
redemption, and yet when it appears to them, they threaten to destroy it. Sometimes they 
are rather like the bird, unsettled and threatened. 
The short story concludes with a device characteristic of the collection as a whole: one 
narrative level insinuates itself into another. The girl realizes that the young man is Death 
itself, and her heart bursts in horror. 
The key themes and motifs of the first short story reappear in the title story of the 
collection. Here, the narrator lies in a hospital, recovering from an accident; the story 
consists of the preamble to this accident. Like the girl in the first story, the narrator is 
suffering from an illness, but his suffering is more spiritual than physical. He addresses his 
friend, to whom the story is told: ‘I am threatened by nothingness. 1 have to struggle more 
vigorously for the existence of things and people than 1 do for the recovery of my own 
organism. I think a lot about people I met in my life so that 1 won’t suffocate on emptiness 
[...] Out of necessity I bring you to life. I shape you so that you will really live for me, so 
that you will populate my empty space.’16 This passage also reveals the layers of narration 
with which the author plays: the narrator relates a story of what happened to him, but 
creates characters, too. The narrator also seeks the meaning of the events that he relates; 
the meaning that the world gives to external events is nonsensical, and this lack of sense 
creates anxiety. The activity of the artist is thus an attempt to escape anxiety through the 
creation of meaning.17 
The artificial quality of the text is heightened through the use of the motif of the portrait, 
borrowed from Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891). The short story is 
addressed to a painter who had once made a portrait of the narrator. The narrator, when he 
travels abroad, leaves this portrait in the care of a family with whom he is acquainted in his 
home town. When he returns home, he finds that the father has abandoned the family, and 
that in the meantime the wife, Marta, has fallen in love with the figure in the portrait. The 
portrait has a symbolic function similar to that in Dorian Gray:; the narrator states: Tt was 
an expression of my youth and beauty in the past’.18 In the present, the narrator is no 
longer worthy of the image in the portrait;19 he has become jaded and filled with disgust at 
the world. He has lost his beauty. Marta, like the bird in the first story, may offer the 
narrator a chance of redemption from his spiritual desert. The bird, one recalls, reappeared 
as love, as pain and as life. Like the bird, Marta makes three significant appearances in the 
narrator’s life: the first time, when he returns from abroad, she offers him her love, which 
he rejects, choosing instead to indulge his lust with another, more sensual and simple, 
woman. The narrator comments: ‘through her efforts I learned that my own simplicity is 
my most abundant source of pleasure’.20 In rejecting Marta, the narrator becomes less 
16 Tatarka, ‘V uzkosti hl’adania’, V uzkosti hl’adania, p. 23. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., p. 24. 
19 He comments: ‘A vague distress overwhelmed me, as if I didn’t measure up to my own 
portrait.’ Ibid., p. 27. 
Ibid., p. 32. 20 
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attractive, at least according to Marta, who tells him: ‘Where are your eyes, moist with 
enthusiasm? There is ash in them. Where is your strong man’s smile? Instead of that you 
have a wrinkle of fatigue around your mouth and a grimace on your lips. [...] You have 
killed my love, killed yourself. You have disfigured your own face.’21 To avenge herself, 
Marta destroys the portrait. 
The second time Marta appears as the embodiment of pain. She visits the narrator, who 
has gone to the mountains to purify his body and soul. She has become pregnant by 
another man whom she does not love. She wants to have an abortion because the foetus 
was not conceived in a love union, and because she is afraid that the authorities will take 
away her first child. The narrator says of her: ‘This woman was now nothing more than a 
piece of flesh, a piece of densely woven nerve fabric, suffering terribly from the very act of 
perception, for whom even pain was hardly dignified.’22 She asks the narrator to 
accompany her to the doctor’s surgery, because the doctor requires that her partner be 
present, in case anything should happen to her. The interpretation of Marta as a bird caught 
in a trap is further suggested by the description of the callous doctor’s medical instruments: 
‘Forceps of the most diverse shapes, small forceps and ones with long jaws, both straight 
and in the form of claws, tweezers, scissors, scalpels, more forceps, some kind of awl and 
a hoop, all shining and cold in the blue lights, all placed in order on the cloth.’23 It appears 
that the narrator misses this second opportunity that Marta offers him. When he visits her 
once after the operation, she suggests that they go for a swim in the river Vah. She appears 
to the narrator as a mermaid.24 After their swim, Marta tells the narrator that he again 
appears beautiful to her, as he was in the portrait. The narrator rebuffs her with a cynical 
comment and the opportunity of the moment is lost.25 
The third time, Marta reappears in the narrator’s lodgings in Prague. The narrator 
compares her to a bird and comments: T avoided making any sudden gestures, saying 
anything that would scare her away. You see, she had travelled from far away and settled 
here for a moment as if by a miracle.’26 She is searching for her husband, who has never 
returned home; thus, the title of the short story refers to an activity on the level of the plot, 
as well as to the narrator’s metaphysical anxiety. From a newspaper clipping which the 
narrator includes in the story, one learns that Marta was killed by a car as she ran across 
the street, believing that she had seen her husband in a crowd of people. The narrator was 
injured as he ran after her. The reader learns that she had been chasing an illusion; her 
husband had not actually been present at that place on that day. Fler death had no meaning. 
The reader has the impression that the narrator remains, like the fowler, in a wasteland 
after the death of life. There appears to be no condemnation of the narrator other than that 
which he expresses himself. He is aware of his own powerlessness, despair and moral 
weakness. The author does not condemn him from a standpoint of morality existing 
outside the text. The narrator suffers from the lack of moral order in his world, and it is this 
chaos, and the despair he suffers on account of it, that the short story portrays. 
The title of Tatarka’s second book, Panna Zazracnica, refers to one of the characters, 
Anabella. She has something in common with the bird with changing feathers, described in 
‘Podvojna rozpravka’; she is frequently described as having come from far away,27 and she 
21 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
22 Ibid., p. 36. 
23 Ibid., p. 38. 
24 Ibid., p. 42. 
25 Ibid., p. 43. 
26 Ibid., p. 44. 
27 See, for example, Dominik Tatarka, Panna Zazracnica, Turciansky sv. Martin, n.d. [1944], 
p. 18. 
460 The Phoney Peace 
appears in the setting of the novel as if she were a supernatural creature blown there by 
chance. She is above all foreign to the environment depicted. Like the bird, her nature 
appears to change: for the other characters, she is love, hope, mystical knowledge, 
inspiration, life itself.28 
Anabella is what she is for the other characters; her actual existence as a person in the 
setting of the novel is always in doubt. For the most part, the story is told by a third-person 
narrator; however, the narrator concentrates alternately on the mental experiences of 
various characters, including Anabella. The central character is the painter Tristan, the 
dominant personality in a group of young male artists living in a city in the Slovak state. 
The narrator describes their fascination with Anabella, who is drawn into their midst 
through the agency of Tristan. She forms relationships with all of them and acts as their 
muse. Tristan, however, insists that Anabella does not exist; she is his creation.29 He had 
invented her as a character in order to amuse his friends. She then seemed to take on a life 
of her own. In maintaining this ambiguity between Anabella’s ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ status, 
the narrator blurs the line between reality and the imaginative world. Each of the artists 
conceives of Anabella according to his own nature and needs.30 The narrator states that all 
of them, however, long for Anabella as they do for the world beyond the borders of the 
Slovak state, in which they are trapped.31 Thus she fascinates them as a possibility of 
escape. By providing them with inspiration for their art, she represents escape through the 
imagination, through the internal world. 
Although there are few references to the wartime state, it is ever-present in the 
atmosphere of the novel. One of the narrator’s friends tells a story about Tristan sitting for 
hours on a rubbish dump; when the friend asks what he is doing there, Tristan answers 
T’m distilling horror and dread.’32 This is one of the functions of art described in the novel 
and may also summarize the artistic project of the author himself. The narrator describes 
Tristan’s visit to the railway station late at night, a favourite motif of Tatarka’s. He 
describes the soldiers, workers, tramps, children and villagers sleeping in the concourse. 
Tristan is fascinated by the scene: the contrast of the cold architecture and the groups of 
diminutive, pale, tired people. The whole atmosphere stimulates him and he makes 
sketches of the scene. The narrator’s comment draws attention to the function of art, with 
reference to Tristan’s sketches: ‘He distilled here his horror, as they used to say.’33 
It is in the railway station that Tristan first sees Anabella, dressed in black, with a little 
black suitcase, sitting in a comer by herself. As well as representing the nebulous hopes of 
the artists, Anabella may also represent the Jews of Slovakia, many of whom had already 
been deported to camps at the time the novel was published.34 Like the Jews, Anabella is 
dislocated and set apart from society; she is cut off from her past and has no clear future. 
She has no relatives. According to Tristan, Anabella had told him that she was seeking 
28 One of the characters describes her as a bird: the dove that brought the sign of hope to Noah. 
Ibid., p. 63. 
29 Ibid., p. 42. 
30 See, for example, ibid., p. 63. 
31 ‘Because in the twilight of the Republic they still had the possibility of seeing the wide world, 
and now they were imprisoned here; they longed for her as they did for the wide world.’ Ibid., 
pp. 75-76. 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
33 Ibid., pp. 13-14. 
34 On the fate of the Jews of Slovakia, see, for example: Erich Kulka, ‘The Annihilation of 
Czechoslovak Jewry’, The Jews of Czechoslovakia, vol. Ill, Philadelphia and New York, 1984, 
pp. 262-328. 
Anxiety in the Work of Dominih Tatarka 461 
death in their town; and that she had no reason to live when all her loved ones were dead.35 
Anabella states that her mother and father had died a terrible and violent death.36 She feels 
that she comes closer to them through her own experience of death, when her sculptor 
friend makes a death mask of her face. If Anabella is intended to represent the Jews, 
through her the narrator depicts the Jews as betrayed by the community, just as Anabella 
eventually leaves the city, disillusioned by the artists’ lack of trust in her. At any rate, she 
has knowledge of horror and death which the other characters lack. She herself states that 
she is fleeing from death and some vague horror.37 Escape through obsession with 
Anabella does not constitute a perfect escape, as she reminds the artists of death and fear. 
Anabella is also associated with patterns of imagery related to water. Legends about her 
first spread because Tristan recounts that he had jumped headfirst into a river for her sake, 
not because he had wanted to kill himself, but, as the reader learns, because he had seen 
her under the water.38 It is implied that she lives in the world of mystery, of the spirit and 
of the imagination; but also perhaps, that she comes from the underworld like the 
enchanted maiden Janko dies for in the Slovak Romantic Janko Kraf’s poem. The artists’ 
fascination with her is a fascination with death and with life, hope and the imagination. 
Tristan states that he would suffocate if she disappeared; he can breathe the air only 
through her, in her presence.39 This prefigures the comment by Tomas Menkina in Far ska 
republika that all decent people in the Slovak state are like fish out of water. Anabella 
constitutes an element which makes life tolerable for the artists. Tristan maintains that she 
never satisfies entirely, like life itself. If she represents life, it is life which is constantly 
threatened by violence, horror and death. 
Anxiety is the dominant motif in Farska republika and most characters are assigned a 
value according to their response to anxiety. Set during the first years of the wartime 
Slovak state, the Slovaks are depicted as ridden with anxiety. The non-Jewish Slovaks are 
anxious, according to the narrator, because they fear the power of the Germans to which 
they have tied themselves. It goes without saying that the Jews in the state are anxious. 
But not everyone is: those proletarians who remain alive are not anxious because they 
are determined to fight for their future. Likewise the Communists have conquered anxiety 
with Reason. The novel concentrates on the fate of two main characters: the uncle, John 
Menkina, and his nephew, Tomas Menkina. They represent the Slovak people, and the 
options they choose in their escape from anxiety constitute the options available to the 
Slovaks in general. While the characters are casting about for some certainty, the narrator 
has already attained that redemption from fear, and the text is determined by this certainty; 
the narrative is straightforward Realism.40 The text itself may be interpreted as manifesting 
the author’s escape from the uncertainty of narrative experimentation to the safe realm of 
Realism; at any rate, the transparent nature of the text mirrors his secure world view.41 
The novel begins with the return of the uncle, John Menkina, to his hometown in 
Slovakia, Zilina. He has been in America for the past twenty-six years and has visited only 
occasionally. He is an American citizen, but he longs to put down roots and re-establish 
35 Ibid., p. 32. 
36 Ibid., pp. 115, 118. 
37 Ibid., p. 41. 
38 Ibid., p. 30. 
39 Ibid., p. 47. 
40 The term ‘Realism’ is used here in the sense defined by Stem; a mode of writing premised on 
the view that there is one reality in the world and that this view is not in need of proof. J. 
P. Stem, On Realism, London and Boston, 1973, pp. 52-54. 
41 See Tatarka’s statement in ‘The aim of art cannot be the production of illusions [...] it can only 
be the activating of the human being.’ pp. 99-100. 
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himself in the community, making a home with his sister-in-law Margitka and his nephew 
Tomas. John returns when the Slovak state has just been created and the Poles have seized 
land which was part of former Slovak territory. Anxiety colours his first impressions on 
returning home; the narrator describes his reactions to the people he sees sleeping in the 
railway station: ‘He could not move even a step from the door with his luggage. While he 
stood there, straddling a group of sleeping people, an insect crawled over his body. 
Anxiety reached for his throat. The sight of the men in the depth of sleep gave him the 
feeling that everything was moving, moving somewhere, crawling somewhere like an 
insect over a corpse growing cold.’42 John Menkina finds that the villa which he had built 
for himself years before, and which he had rented out to a Jewish doctor, has been 
occupied by the Hlinka Guard officer Minar. A former petty clerk, Minar typifies the 
ruthless, money-grabbing individual who has improved his economic and social status 
through exploiting the misery of the Jews.43 The author consistently attacks those who 
have profited during the war in the Fascist state. Menkina turns to a Jewish lawyer for 
advice on how to retrieve his property, but the lawyer, like all Jews portrayed in the novel, 
expresses despair, and tells Menkina that his situation is hopeless and that he might as well 
give up.44 The uncle at first appears to accept his status as an outsider in a corrupt society; 
locals avoid him because he is ‘an American’. He lives as a tenant in his former house, 
subservient to those who have confiscated his property. Yet he maintains his dignity and 
refuses to accept charity from his new ‘landlords’. Eventually, however, the uncle’s 
complexity is sacrificed for the sake of the schematic symmetry of the novel. The author 
wishes to depict the gap between the generations, to contrast the corruption of the 
bourgeois elders with the enthusiasm of the young Communists. Moreover, he wishes to 
contrast the influence of the capitalist United States with that of the socialist Soviet Union. 
Thus he depicts the uncle as succumbing to the desire for comfort and security; the uncle 
buys a hotel which has been ‘aryanized’ at a cheap price and settles down to the life of a 
property owner. Indeed, the despicable Minar, who had ousted John Menkina from his own 
property, helps the uncle buy the hotel. The uncle’s decision seems in violation of his 
character as it has been presented to the reader in the first few chapters of the novel. The 
uncle’s total moral collapse is presented through his acceptance of Minar: ‘Mr Minar is a 
decent person [...] he is a good Slovak soul’;45 and through his acceptance of the Slovak 
state as a good thing.46 The hotel itself, patronized by local, as well as German and Polish 
officials, symbolizes the rotten society: ‘The old hotel, the Klappholz Hotel, in itself a 
terrible burden, is also burdened down with a hundred-year-old past, with all possible sins 
of the townsfolk.’47 That the uncle’s decision to pursue material security at the expense of 
his fellow citizens and in violation of moral standards is intended to represent one path 
pursued by Slovaks, as well as natural capitalist immorality, in their flight from fear and 
insecurity, is made clear in the nephew’s condemnation of his uncle: 
I thought that you were a saint, a strange Slovak saint [...]. I saw in you all the Slovak 
Menkinas. And I believed. The Menkinas really do know how to survive on nothing, on 
feeling. You once said that in America people live on dollars and that here at home, in the 
country, we live on mercy. That’s how you lived. You knew how to live with a pure heart 
even as a caretaker in your own house. When I saw you walk down the street I believed that 
the little nation of Menkinas did not want to have anything to do with the filth going on 
42 Tatarka, Farska republika, p. 7. 
43 Ibid., p. 57. 
44 ‘Or give in. Give in Mr Menkina.’ Ibid., p. 20. 
45 Ibid., p. 255. 
46 ‘We can be glad that we have our own Slovak state.’ Ibid., p. 256. 
47 Ibid., p. 268. 
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around it. I believed that this little nation would preserve its innocence, except for the biggest 
ravenous ravens. [...] The Germans took over the factories, the Menkinas were satisfied with 
the offer of aryanization. You try to persuade yourself, my uncle, that you aryanized out of 
goodness, indeed out of love. But where did your virtue lead you? What goodness? Stupidity, 
stupid trust. The devil knows it’s false. It’s a black blank mind, that is what it is. You don’t 
know and don’t want to know about corruption in your own house. You only serve drinks 
and rake in money in a Christian fashion. Just as the Jewish publicans served drinks and 
made money.48 
One notes the nephew’s anti-Jewish sentiment, retained despite his hatred of the Fascist 
state. 
The fate of this nephew (Tomas Menkina), the other main character, represents the other 
option open to Slovaks. At the beginning of the novel, Tomas is alienated from himself 
and from his surroundings. He despises himself for having taken part as a soldier in the 
German invasion of Poland.49 He harbours hatred and disgust for the nationalist 
propaganda of the new Slovak state. He believes that the Slovaks are enslaved, just like the 
Poles.50 Tomas’s frustration is intensified in that he cannot ignore what is going on around 
him; as a schoolmaster, he is obliged to educate his pupils in the ‘national’ and ‘Christian’ 
spirit of the day,51 and his nausea brings him to a state close to despair. His frame of mind 
is characteristic of the young generation of teachers with whom he works. The narrator 
comments of Tomas’s colleagues: 
They all unconsciously breathed in the atmosphere of those years. They were all poisoned. 
These young people were asked to perform a great task: to raise the young in a Christian and 
national spirit. At the same time, naturally, it was assumed that they agreed with this spirit of 
intolerance and violence. All the worse for those who did not agree with it. They served the 
state for a meagre wage like venal women.52 
It is in this state of all-consuming loathing, self-loathing and anxiety that the character 
comes to believe in socialism as the one hope for the future. 
Tomas turns to Communist ideology because it appears to offer answers. In his state of 
powerlessness, he fantasizes about a Communist hero who suffers no doubts, knows how 
he should act.53 The character who embodies this certainty is Pavol Lycko, a member of 
the underground Central Committee of the Communist Party. At first, Tomas’s enthusiasm 
for Communists is based on his admiration for the adventurous Lycko. However, when 
Toma§ is arrested on the suspicion that he is involved in the production of Communist 
leaflets, he gains a more solid appreciation for the ideology. During his interrogations in 
prison, he learns the contents of the leaflets, which he has never seen himself, from 
remarks made by his tormentor. He learns that the Communists argue that the Germans 
must lose the war. The Communist author of the leaflets offers a way out of a hopeless 
situation: ‘The writer of the pamphlet turned against the apocalyptic horror of the world 
with a daring idea. He broke down the uncertain, but thus all the more oppressive, burden 
of the awareness of life with reason; in reason he sought a weapon against it; he changed it 
into an economic reality; he defended himself with statistic; he did not submit or give up. 
He believed, but with a rational belief. And he fought.’54 Tomas’s experience in prison 
48 Ibid., pp. 257-58. 
49 Ibid., p. 32. 
50 Ibid., p. 37. 
51 Ibid., p. 131. 
52 Ibid., p. 59. 
53 Ibid., p. 105. 
54 Ibid., p. 225. 
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causes him to think more about Communism. The false accusation made against him, that 
he is a Communist activist, is made true. In prison, he also learns what it means to be part 
of a collective of those who suffer and are persecuted by the regime. Needless to say, the 
impact of imprisonment on a person’s spirit appears to be rather idealized; the narrator 
states: ‘In prison, they strip a person of his personal cares and teach him to think in a more 
broad-minded manner.’55 
For Tomas, the character through whom the narrator appears to speak, workers and 
Communists are identified with hope, energy, determination.56 This determination is 
personified, for example, by Lycko’s working-class mother. At the funeral of the 
dispossessed proletarian Paulinka Husaricka, Lyckova makes a speech in which she 
affirms that the working-class will not abandon its battle against poverty and against its 
oppressors (the Germans, and by implication, capitalist exploiters) until it attains victory.57 
Those who are disaffected, but not Communist, are mere shells of human beings and have 
no future. This attitude is personified by the character Lasut, Tomas’s one-time friend, 
turned traitor. The narrator expresses Tomas’s view when he states: ‘Lasut was sour 
because he only smelled of Communism. If he were a Communist, he wouldn’t be sour.’58 
One might note that Lasut is described as being ‘one-quarter Jewish’, and that Tomas 
Menkina regards this mixture of blood as an explanation of the ‘vague, but exhausting 
languour’ which he has always sensed in Lasut.59 Of course, this can be understood as 
merely deriving from Lasut’s fear for his own skin. But it does suggest an identification of 
Jews with anxiety, and they are repeatedly portrayed in the novel as a people without a 
future.60 Only those who do not suffer from anxiety have a future: the Communists. 
55 Ibid., p. 243. 
56 This character is based, to some extent, on Tatarka’s own experience as a teacher during the 
war. See Persticka and Prerostova (eds), Dominik Tatarka a ti druzi, p. 143. 
57 Farska republika, p. 185. 
58 Ibid., p. 216. 
59 Ibid., p. 107.The phrase reflects a conventional antisemitic perception of Jews as suffering from 
the ills of modem civilization. On stereotypes of the Jews, see: Sander Gilman, The Jew's 
Body, New York and London, 1991. 
60 See, for example, Farska republika, pp. 134, 238. 
41 The Path towards Socialist Realism in 
Czechoslovakia, 1945-48 
Tim Beasley-Murray 
There is no doubt that each regime has its own writing, the 
history of which remains to be written.1 
This chapter traces the pre-history of Socialist Realism in Czech and Slovak literature by 
examining writers’ attempts to find a new form of writing fit for a socialist world. My 
argument is based on the assumption that the tendency towards Socialist Realism in 
Czechoslovakia has its own literary, philosophical and historical grounds.2 This view 
contradicts Western or post-Communist critics who see the move towards Socialist 
Realism as the ‘lifeless appropriation of Soviet models’3 and the embracing of ‘a pre¬ 
fabricated theory of art, proclaimed at the Moscow Writers’ Congress of 1934 by 
Zhdanov.’4 It also contradicts Czech and Slovak Communist critics who see this move as 
the unproblematic expression of historical inevitability.5 Particularly, in the case of the 
former, I suggest that certain factors which helped to lead towards Socialist Realism exist 
well before the imposition of any party-line. Moreover, if not entirely new in the 
immediately post-war period,6 these factors are strengthened and the perception of them 
acquires a greater urgency in the years 1945-48. I also point to factors in the literary, 
linguistic and philosophical consciousness of Socialist Realism already evident in its pre¬ 
history, which contributed to making possible its collusion with and participation in the 
1 Roland Barthes, Le Degre zero de l ’ecriture, Paris, 1972. Page references are to Susan Sontag 
(ed.), A Roland Barthes Reader, London, 1993, pp. 31-61 (42). 
2 One way of understanding the interplay of forces which lead literature in the direction of 
Socialist Realism is to put the problem in the terms of Czech Structuralism. Developments 
immanent to literature provide an impetus towards Socialist Realism. There are also 
developments in other spheres — historical, philosophical, linguistic and political — which, 
when translated into the literary sphere, manifest themselves as further determinations of this 
direction. The metamorphosis of Czech Structuralism from its origins in Russian Formalism, 
uninterested in questions of extra-literary reality, to a method which considers itself to be in 
harmony with the doctrine of orthodox Stalinism is itself also a case of this kind. The causes of 
this metamorphosis were both internal and external to the immanent development of 
Structuralism. Moreover, I am convinced that an analysis of this metamorphosis, for which the 
years 1945-51 were a decisive phase, would throw light on the questions which this chapter 
raises. In 1951, following the publication of writing on linguistics bearing Stalin’s name. 
Structuralism succumbed to an infertile Stalinist orthodoxy. The volumes of the Prague 
Linguistic Circle’s journal, Slovo a slovesnost, document this development fully. 
3 Lubomir Machala and Eduard Petru (eds). Panorama ceske literatury, Prague, 1994, pp. 310- 
11. 
4 Alfred French, Czech Writers and Politics, 1945-1969, Boulder, CO, 1982, p. 31. 
5 Thus, for example, Josef Hrabak, Dusan Jerabek and Zdenka Ticha, Pruvodce po dejinach 
ceske literatury, Prague, 1976. Pruvodce describes the way in which ‘the engagement of social 
literary creation expanded, and all progressive prose writers came to grips with this problem.’ 
(p. 498) A similar rhetoric of inevitability is employed by histories of Slovak literature. See 
Stanislav Smatlak, Dejiny slovenskej literatury, Bratislava, 1988, pp. 538-66. 
6 A reaction against Modernism and the excesses of the historical Avant-garde is, for example, a 
feature of Neue Sachlichkeit in inter-war Germany. 
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violence and repression of the Stalinist state. To make this case, I examine three works. 
Two appeared in 1945 in the first months after the end of the Second World War. One was 
written by Peter Karvas (bom 1920), a Slovak Communist journalist and writer, the other 
by Jarmila Svata (1903-63), a Czech writer. My third text is a speech by the Czech 
Communist ideologue, Ladislav Stoll (1902-81), delivered a month after the Communist 
Party take-over of 1948. 
The Failure of Literature — Jarmila Svata 
Svata’s work appears neither Socialist nor Realist. Although the text at issue, Milenci SS- 
smrti (The Lovers of SS-death)7 , shows a general left-orientation, this manifests itself 
more as enthusiasm for the Red Army as liberators and sentimental attachment to Russian 
folk-songs than as a genuine ideological position. Indeed, the ideological position which 
underpins Svata’s text is a crude Czech and Panslav nationalism which expresses itself in 
an unpleasant racism.8 Likewise, the text does not conform to prescriptive Marxist 
aesthetics. Svata had been associated with the inter-war group of Avant-garde artists, 
Devetsil. A cousin of Devetsil’s main theorist, Karel Teige, she had been the group’s only 
exponent of Poetist dance, working with E. F. Burian in the Osvobozene divadlo 
(Liberated Theatre), before turning to literature after her marriage in the early 1930s. 
Milenci SS-smrti displays a sensibility which is rooted in those Avant-garde aesthetics. 
Nevertheless, Svata’s text displays a literary and moral consciousness similar to that of the 
Karvas text, which throws light on the grounds for the emergence of Socialist Realism in 
post-war Czechoslovakia. Milenci SS-smrti does this primarily by revealing a literary 
consciousness which accepts its own impotence in the face of‘history’ and hence calls for 
a new form of writing.9 
Writing of the First World War, Walter Benjamin had analysed the effect of the shock 
experience of war on the capacity to narrate. 
With the World War a process began to become apparent which has not halted since then. 
Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent 
— not richer but poorer in communicable experience? What ten years later was poured out in 
the flood of war books was anything but experience that goes from mouth to mouth. And 
there was nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been contradicted more 
thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, 
bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power.10 
In Benjamin’s terms: experience (Erlebnis) had made narratable experience (Erfahrung) 
impossible. There is no doubt that in Svata a similar crisis of narration manifests itself. It is 
7 Jarmila Svata, Milenci SS-smrti (The Lovers of SS Death), Prague, 1945. 
8 Svata’s venomous treatment of the Germans, if understandable, shows the same essentialist, 
biologically based racism of which she accuses the Germans themselves. For an extreme 
example of this, see Eva Klenova, Tve deti, Evropo, Prague, 1947. Svata’s racism is borne out 
in the following comment: "all this happened in Europe in the years 1938-45, not in the Middle 
Ages, not even in the unexplored parts of Africa, and the order came from a white man, a 
German, a doctor!’ Svata, Milenci SS-smrti, p. 51. This form of racism, in the name of a false 
European universalism, which consists in lament and shock that the horrors of the war should 
have taken place in civilized Europe rather than brutal and primitive Africa, is common in the 
period. See, for example, Zdenek Nemecek, Evropska /cantilena, Brno, 1945. 
9 A recurrent theme of the text is the general complicity of Western culture in the horrors of the 
war. Svata expresses this with her repeated reminders of Germany’s claim to be the nation of 
culture par excellence. 
10 Walter Benjamin, translated by Harry Zohn, “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Work of 
Nikolai Leskov,’ in Illuminations, London, 1992, pp. 83-107 (83^1). 
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difficult to compare the impact of the two wars. The Second World War and the period 
preceding it, however, served perhaps only to increase the effect that Benjamin describes. 
This increase is manifested in phenomena such as the effect of totalitarian methods of 
propaganda and control, planned genocide, the impact of war on entire civilian populations 
in occupation, Blitzkrieg, the carpet-bombing of cities, and a war that was truly global. 
These phenomena had an impact alien to those who knew only the First World War.11 
Svata’s text, written in response to these circumstances, expresses a sense of the 
impossibility of narration. 
Svata’s Milenci SS-smrti portrays life in the concentration camp, Mauthausen, in the 
years 1943-5, based on the account of a former prisoner, Vaclav Vaclavik. Like other 
writers of the time,12 Svata clearly felt compelled to take part in the process of 
documenting the horrors of the German concentration camps.13 This concern is expressed 
in the dedication: ‘to those who did not see and thus do not want to believe or who forget 
too quickly.’ If the reader expects, however, that the text will adopt the sober, pared-down, 
ostentatiously non-literary style that one normally associates with the serious business of 
documenting such phenomena, these expectations are soon confounded. 
Svata writes the text in the vivid present. On the one hand, this tense portrays the 
narrated events of Mauthausen not as objective historical events but from the point of view 
of the ephemeral subjective consciousness. On the other, this point of view confers on the 
text the authority of personal witness.14 A similar ambiguity results from the highly 
emotional, at times almost Expressionist tone of much of the text. Svata’s style mixes 
different registers and techniques, the juxtaposition of which results in ambiguity rather 
than documentary authority. Lyrical, descriptive and rhetorical passages, bordering on 
melodrama, and references to art and literature clash with the bare statement of brutality, 
the listing of the names of SS guards or the documenting of simple statistics. I give one 
passage to exemplify this: 
Move, move, move! [...] The motif of the wooden clogs dully squelches along the muddy 
path [...]. The wooden clogs of the damned go down the 186 stone steps into the abyss of the 
Mauthausen mine [...]. There are dreams from which one violently awakens [...] with the 
feeling of being abandoned, lost between Heaven and Earth, of metaphysical anxiety. One 
would not be able to recount the confused sequence of their images; happily it has been lost 
somewhere in the unconscious; all one knows, however, is that [...] one has witnessed and 
11 Benjamin’s essay, written in 1936, keeps — as does all his work — one eye on the present. The 
impact of Fascism and the shadow of a war which Benjamin was keenly aware of but did not 
live to see in its full horror are implicitly present in this essay. 
12 Milenci SS-smrti appeared as part of a wave of texts dedicated to reporting the horrors of the 
concentration camps — almost exclusively from the viewpoint of Czech political prisoners. As 
the following title, typical of these texts in general, indicates, these texts share Svata’s sense of 
moral outrage and responsibility to document and inform: for example, R. Blank, Mrtvy se 
vratil: politicly vezeh cislo 34880, svedek nacistickych vrazd zaluje (The Dead Returned: 
Political Prisoner no. 34880, Witness of Nazi Murders, Makes His Accusation), Prague, 1945. 
See Derek Paton’s chapter in this volume. 
13 That the text was not a passing preoccupation for Svata is clear since in 1946 she published a 
play based on the material of Milenci SS-smrti: Jarmila Svata (with Vaclav Vaclavik), 
Nenapravitelni, Prague, 1946. 
14 Jorge Semprun’s memoir of Buchenwald, Literature or Life, also employs the vivid present. In 
this case, the theme of ambiguity between the subjective and objective — between literature 
and life, in a sense — is consciously developed. The vivid present is one way of developing this 
since it blurs the distinction between Erzdhlzeit and erzahlte Zeit. See Jorge Semprun, 
Literature or Life, translated by Linda Coverdale, New York, 1997. 
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participated in events passing beyond the normal order of human actions, that the 
impressions and experiences of them hovered on the dark borders of madness. 
[What is this?] The Egypt of the Pharaohs come to life? A drawing by Dore come to life? 
A monstrous dream? One hopes so, certainly, after all, this can’t be reality! Prisoner no. 
28907, this is reality! Know, before it’s too late, that this is an April morning of 1943, and 
what you see is German Fascism hard at work wiping out its prisoners [...]. For the second 
time today truth and dream are becoming far too dangerously confused.15 
Svata strives to document. Details such as the number of steps down to the mine and her 
habitual use of the prisoner’s number demonstrate this. The devices she uses, however, are 
literary: the repeated metonymic reference to the prisoners by means of their clogs, a 
device which is laid bare by the use of ‘motif; the shift in narrative point of view which 
allows the digression on dreams; the rhetorical questions, dialogized monologue which 
centres on a comparison of Mauthausen with the work of an artist and a biblical story. 
What is important here, however, is the underlying theme of the inability of narrative and 
literary form to convey the experience of the camps. The shock experience of Mauthausen 
explodes traditional form, and it is only through explicit negative reference to art and 
narrative or through disjointed use of literary techniques that Svata is able to express her 
own narrative failure. If one takes Svata’s own image of the experience of the camp as 
something repressed into the unconscious, her text becomes the site of near hysterical 
activity, where fragments of what once made sense are thrown together in a fashion which 
seems beyond the author’s conscious control, in a desire to express the sense of the 
senseless. In so doing, whether conscious of it or not, Svata also demonstrates the 
‘impossibility’ of narrative and the shattered nature of literary language. 
Such a text produces unease and paradox: 
Chroniclers of 1938-1945 Europe, remember all this! And reject all deceitful books and 
dramas and sketches and narrations, full of all sorts of nonsense about human heroism, 
written like documents or in the desire for literary glory by those whose only experience of 
the period was the empty rustling of paper on desks! Reject them, because truth does not 
wear the smart costume of deceitful feelings, for its bloody lips do not speak literary slogans 
about humanity; it does not narrate impotent cock-and-bull stories about the heroism of 
comradeship... Reject them, for bloody truth and nothing but bloody truth will drive the 
guilty to justice.16 
The reader knows that Svata’s text is written on the basis of another’s testimony. Thus 
the appeal to the chroniclers, repeated throughout the text, is misplaced. Svata stands in the 
position of just such a chronicler. Furthermore, her text is exactly what she advises future 
writers to reject — an attempt at document, written by someone who did not live through 
the camps, loaded with ‘literary slogans,’ and concerned with the heroism of comradeship. 
In this sense, Svata cannot claim to speak with the bloody lips of truth. For all that, Svata’s 
text does not seem to wear a smart costume of deceit; rather it wears the bloodied rags of 
the consciousness of failure. Furthermore, it displays the sense that, as a narrative form, it 
is doomed to disappear with the coming of a new writing which, Svata presciently implies, 
will be concerned with judgement. Svata herself does not attempt this form of writing. For 
her it is in the future, making her own text a curious intermediate form. To see a writer at 
work, trying to build a coherent new world out of the ruins of the old, I turn to Peter 
KarvaS. 
15 Svata, Milenci SS-smrti, pp. 28-29. 
16 Ibid., pp. 68-69. 
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Towards Socialist Realism 
(l) Literature and Reality— Karvas 
Most (The Bridge)17, by Peter Karvas, is a collection of essays written from a Communist 
point of view for Slovak newspapers. Its style largely conforms to the conventions of 
narrative journalism. One of these essays, ‘The Mass Production of Charity,’ describes the 
problem of reintegrating former partisans into society and satisfying their material needs. It 
begins as follows: ‘And a man came down from the mountains [/prisiel clovek z hor]. This 
is not the beginning of a fashionable Realist novel but a reality which is, after all, not in the 
least extraordinary today.’18 
Because the reader reads the essay from the page of the newspaper or in a collection of 
essays, she or he will be aware that this cannot be the beginning of a novel. But this first 
sentence contains other elements which compel Karvas to point out that this is no novel. 
First among these are the aesthetic qualities of the rhythm of the sentence. It is an iambic 
tetrameter, strongly marked as such by the placing of the monosyllable ‘i’ at the beginning 
of the line, a common device in the writing of verse. This poetic quality points away from 
the documentary towards literature. The initial ‘i’ is also the initial ‘and’ of the Bible and 
fairy tales. Second, the non-specific nouns in the sentence — a man, the mountains — lend 
the statement a universal and symbolic quality. One might read the man as standing for all 
men. The mountains might be viewed as a symbol for the wilderness. There are 
associations with the return of Moses from Sinai with the law. These suggestions would 
serve the ideological purpose of the author. The partisan, like Moses, could be seen as a 
prophet bringing commandments for a new era. The crucial aspect of the opening sentence 
is the fact that it bears the mark of the novel: that is, the preterite. 
Roland Barthes argues that the preterite, or in French, the passe simple, performs a 
crucial function: 
The function of the preterite is no longer that of a tense. The function it plays is to reduce 
reality to a point of time, and to abstract, from the depth of a multiplicity of experiences, a 
pure verbal act [...] directed towards a logical link with other acts [...]: it aims at 
maintaining a hierarchy in the realm of acts [...] it calls for a sequence of events, that is for 
an intelligible narrative. This is why it is the ideal instrument for every construction of a 
world; it is the unreal time of cosmogonies, myths, History and Novels. It presupposes a 
world which is constructed, elaborated, self-sufficient, reduced to sufficient lines, and not 
one which has been sent sprawling before us, for us to take or leave.19 
Although the preterite as a grammatical category does not exist in Slovak, the aesthetic 
quality of Karvas’s opening sentence, strengthened by its monumentality and its echoes of 
the Bible and fairy-tale, is that of a novel’s preterite. This quality in the first sentence is so 
powerful that it demands the disclaimer of the second sentence. As a result of the preterite 
form, the opening sentence acquires a weightiness, a naturalness; it begins to order reality. 
Given the political import of the material at hand, it entirely suits Karvas’s purpose that 
this should be the case; after all, it is only right that the return of the partisan from the 
mountains should be presented as a natural step in an ordered and necessary chain of 
events. The defeat of the Germans and the victory of socialism metonymically gain an aura 
of inevitability. Barthes argues that the bourgeoisie could present its own power as natural 
and thus necessary partially as a result of the naturalizing force of its dominant Realist 
17 Peter Karvas, Most: vybor z novinarskej cinnosti z revolucnych cias (The Bridge; A Selection 
of Journalistic Activity from Revolutionary Times), Bratislava, 1945. 
18 Ibid., p. 57. 
19 Barthes, Le Degre zero de l ’ecriture, pp. 45-46. 
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discourse: ‘It was thanks [to the techniques of Realism] that the triumphant Bourgeoisie of 
the last century was able to look upon its values as universal and to carry over to sections 
of society which were absolutely heterogeneous to it all the names which were parts of its 
ethos.’20 Since revolutionary socialism seeks to show that it is itself the natural and 
inevitable result of history, socialist writing is also obliged to employ a mode of expression 
which presents a world fashioned in its own image, one which is ordered, universal and 
natural. The techniques of what was previously ‘bourgeois’ Realism must be adapted to the 
socialist cause. This necessity is not merely a question of accessibility to the workers or of 
cultural policy. It is a philosophical necessity. 
If it is true that the techniques of Realism authenticate and order the world in a way 
which suits Karvas’s purpose, one must ask why the second sentence denies the novel-like 
qualities of the first, why the text establishes an explicit and exclusive opposition between 
two distinct phenomena: on the one hand, the techniques of Realism and the claims of 
Realism to provide direct access to reality, and on the other hand, reality itself. The answer 
lies in the two-fold nature of the discourse of the Realist novel. Barthes puts it as follows: 
[The preterite] is a lie made manifest [...]. It creates a content credible, yet flaunted as an 
illusion; it is the ultimate term of a formal dialectics which clothes an unreal fact in the garb 
first of a truth then of a lie denounced as such [...]. [It gives] to the imaginary the formal 
guarantee of the real, but while preserving in the sign the ambiguity of a double object at 
once believable and false. The task of writing in the novel is to put the mask in place and at 
the same time to point it out.21 
It is this that unsettles Karvas. Realist discourse may order and naturalize a view of the 
world as real, yet it also highlights its own moment of illusion. Karvas is suggesting that 
the task of Socialist writing must be to harness the mimetic and ordering powers of 
Realism, whilst denouncing its quality of illusion. 
This task is a serious, if naive, attempt to politicize writing. The German Romantics had 
ascribed to art a radical, political message. Yet if, as Schiller argued in On the Aesthetic 
Education Of Man (1794), art had provided the individual with the utopian promise of a 
future wholeness which the division of human activity had destroyed,22 the increasing 
autonomy of the institution of art in bourgeois society had neutralized the radical potential 
of this promise. The bourgeois institution of art became an affirmative counterpart to the 
mechanisms of alienation and oppression of bourgeois society. As Herbert Marcuse writes 
in the essay, ‘On the Affirmative Character of Culture’: ‘The decisive characteristic [of 
culture in bourgeois society] is the assertion of a universally obligatory, externally better 
and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially 
different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet unrealisable by 
every individual for himself “from within” without any transformation of the state of 
fact.’23 As a result, the affirmative character of culture contains both a ‘remembrance of 
20 Ibid., p. 48. 
21 Ibid., p. 47-8. 
22 Schiller expresses this idea with economy and wit in the following passage: ‘It must therefore 
be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers involves the sacrifice of wholeness. Or rather, 
however much the law of nature tends in that direction, it must be open to us to restore by 
means of a higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed’ [so 
mu6 es bei uns stehen, diese Totalitat in unserer Natur, welche die Kunst zerstort hat, durch 
eine hohere Kunst wieder herzustellen]. Friedrich Schiller, translated by Elizabeth M. 
Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, Oxford, 1967, Sixth 
Letter, p. 42. 
23 Herbert Marcuse, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, Negations; Essays in Critical Theory, 
London, 1988, p. 120. 
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what could be’ and a ‘justification of the established form of existence.’24 Bourgeois 
society is happy to allow the ‘remembrance of what could be’ to exist only as potential. 
Hence, it preserves in art the distance from practice which keeps art at the level of illusion. 
Socialist writing, however, must make the promise real. This demands that the utopian 
quality of art be presented not as a possible future but as the real tind necessary future. The 
distance and illusion of art must be eliminated.25 
Karvas makes use of literary techniques to present the real whilst simultaneously 
denouncing such techniques as giving a false view of the world — as in the opening of 
‘The Mass Production of Charity.’ The attempt, however, to divorce the truth content of art 
from its character as illusion fails. One cannot use the mask and not point to it. From a 
different perspective, Karvas fails as a result of the contradiction which is inherent in the 
task which he sets himself. How can one write a new reality into being? 
(2) Language and Reality— Karvas and Stoll 
At the heart of Most lies a concern with the semiotic nature of language. This concern is 
apparent in ‘New Life.’ This essay opens with an attack on the slogan, ‘A New Life,’ as 
merely that, a slogan rather than a reality: ‘There is no doubt; we are beginning a new life. 
We hear it at every step; every newspaper tells us about it and every public speaker talks 
about it.’ Language and material reality, however, are at odds: ‘And you go about in 
yesterday’s suit on yesterday’s pavement; you sleep in yesterday’s bed, under yesterday’s 
ceiling; you talk to yesterday’s people about yesterday’s things. Suddenly you begin to feel 
that you are as much a part of the old life as the new. You start having doubts about the 
new life and you have a strong suspicion that it is just a matter of an empty phrase.’26 The 
phrase does not correspond to reality. Karvas argues that we are stuck in an abyss which is 
not merely that of transition from one government to another; this is also the abyss which 
gapes between sign and referent. The question remains: ‘isn’t there a deeper, more 
penetrating and more essential difference between the old and the new life than between 
the signs of the old regime and the signs of the new?’27 Signs are not to be trusted. The 
difference between the old and new regimes must be realized and overcome not merely at 
the level of sign but at the level of the real. In Husserl’s terminology: the bracketing of the 
referential world is a political problem. The task of socialist writing is to make of semiotic 
material and reality a complete and natural union.28 
24 Ibid., p. 98. 
25 Here, Socialist Realism comes close to its anathema, the historical Avant-garde. In the view of 
Burger, the historical Avant-garde also attempts to break down the barrier between life and art, 
by launching an assault on the institution of art, in order to release the liberating power of art. 
Ultimately both attempts fail. What distinguishes the two failures is that the historical Avant- 
garde, on the one hand, leads to a paradoxical aestheticism and hence to the impotent 
domination of art over everyday life; Socialist Realism, on the other, leads to an equally 
paradoxical death of what was originally seen as art’s power in ideological stagnation and the 
stultifying domination of political life over art. Nevertheless, the two movements share far 
more than is immediately apparent. Thus for example, in both the theme of the ‘new man’ is 
important; both are characterized by the belief that art can help bring about a new reality. 
Moreover, in post-war Czechoslovakia, it would be surprising if aspects of the spirit of the 
inter-war Avant-garde — still alive if weak — did not have an influence in some fashion on 
texts ostensibly written in the spirit of Stalinism. See Peter Burger, Theory of the Avant-garde, 
translated by Michael Shaw, Manchester, 1994. 
26 Karvas, Most, p. 48. 
27 Ibid., p. 48. 
28 The relationship between language and reality is of particular importance for Socialist writing. 
There is no doubt, however, that a sense that language and literary style need bringing back 
down to earth, as close as possible to the objective world of facts, is common to writers of 
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The literary strategy which Karvas adopts is a fusion of abstract and concrete 
terminology. ‘One cannot step into the New Life as if into a taxi. One cannot start the New 
Life like a stroll or a cabaret number. One cannot obtain a New Life like a new umbrella or 
a new driving licence.’29 For Karvas, however, the capitalist model of exchange implicit in 
this quotation is not sufficient. Karvas seeks a materialist form of language. New Life must 
be created through work. Material must refashion language. New Life, he writes, will be 
the work of your hands and your heart. Still an ambivalence remains: ‘it is in our power to 
create this world around us, to dig it out of the earth, to conjure it up out of working 
hours.’ Karvas may exhort the reader to dig the new world out of the earth, but he himself 
conjures it up with a linguistic sleight of hand. Finally, he falls back on paradox to 
synthesize new life, reality and language. ‘Lips should speak less. Hands, brains and hearts 
have the word. In yesterday’s suit, under yesterday’s ceiling.’30 The word is made 
concrete, and hands, brains and hearts are given voice. 
Karvas’s text displays a resistance towards the arbitrary nature of semiotic material. As 
Barthes argues in his essays on Brecht,31 bourgeois Realism seeks to deny the arbitrary 
nature of semiotic material, running the sign together with the referent. This is crucial to 
the bourgeoisie since it presents the world of the bourgeoisie as natural. The exploitation 
of the arbitrary nature of signification, as effected for example by the historical Avant- 
garde, reveals the cultural and not the natural aspect of meaning. It reminds the bourgeoisie 
that it, too, is cultural, a result of history rather than of nature. Socialist writing cannot 
afford to consider the open-ended nature of signification. It must present a world which is 
unequivocal, necessary and natural.32 In post-war Czechoslovakia, the sense that socialist 
writing must be hostile towards the arbitrary nature of signification is indicated in a 
different form by Ladislav Stoll, in his 1948 speech, tellingly entitled ‘Face to Face with 
Reality.’33 
various political persuasions throughout Europe in this period. There is a number of reasons for 
this trend: first, it is a purely literary reaction against Modernism, second, a rejection of 
Modernism on the grounds that its claims to a social and political radicalism had been proved 
false, and hence that Modernism itself had been complicit in the horrors of Nazism and the 
world war, and third, a perception that language had been corrupted and manipulated by the use 
of propaganda — by regimes of all descriptions — and in the squabbling of political factions. 
For evidence of this last point, see George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four or ‘Politics and the 
English Language’ (1946) in Inside the Whale and Other Essays, London, 1960, pp. 143-57. 
The rise to hegemonic prominence of Existentialism with its emphasis on the virtues of 
Camus’s clarte and luddite and Sartre’s bonne foi is also part of this general trend. 
29 Karvas, Most, p. 48. 
30 Ibid., p. 49. 
31 See, for example, Roland Barthes, ‘Les Taches de la critique brechtienne,’ in Essais critiques, 
Paris, 1964, pp 84—89, particularly p. 88. 
32 This situation sheds further light on the uneasy relationship between the literary and the non¬ 
literary in KarvaS’s text. As Paul de Man remarks: ‘the statement about language, that sign and 
meaning can never coincide, is what is precisely taken for granted in the language we call 
literary. Literature, unlike everyday language, begins on the far side of this knowledge; it is the 
only form of language free from the fallacy of unmediated expression.’ If this is true, then 
literature — the naming of nothingness, as de Man refers to it — in its laying bare of the 
impossibility of making sign and meaning coincide, functions as a permanent bad conscience of 
a discourse such as Stalinism which lays claim to the unmediated expression of truth. Paul de 
Man, ‘Criticism and Crisis,’ in Blindness and Insight, London, 1983, pp. 3-19 (17). 
33 Ladislav Stoll, ‘Skutecnosti tvari v tvar,’ in Umeni a ideologicky boj I (1945-1959), Prague, 
1972, pp. 71-104. This was an influential speech. The occasion was a discussion in Prague of 
the problems of contemporary culture. Other speakers were the Minister-President, Element 
Gottwald, Vaclav Kopecky, the Minister of Information, and Zdenek Nejedly, former Minister 
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Stoll quotes the critic, F. X. Saida (1867-1937): ‘The [worker’s and peasant’s] serious 
and honest relationship to manual work is clearly the key which opens and makes 
accessible the secrets of artistic creation.’34 Following this assertion, Stoll analyses how 
the worker perceives the world as opposed to the bourgeois. I quote the passage in full: 
The first, the worker’s relation towards the world is essentially sensuous, ardent, graphic and 
creative. The second [the bourgeois] relation is cold, cynical and financially speculative. Let 
us take note of the way in which, for example, the metalworker looks at a piece of metal, the 
potter at a piece of clay, the carpenter at a plank of ash from whose plane curls a beautiful, 
fragrant spiral of woodshaving. This is a relation in which, in Marx’s words, material smiles 
with poetic radiance on man. Saida was right. This is the relation which also produces the 
secrets of artistic creation [...]. The money man, however, looks at the object in an utterly 
different fashion. He sees in the object merely the commodity, its abstract imprint, a fetish. 
Such a man does not care what he buys and sells, whether the metal is copper or iron, the 
plank pine or ash. In such a man, rich, beautiful creative life is extinguished; his brain begins 
to swell at the expense of the heart and passions; and an abstract and speculative point of 
view kills in him the beautiful, human, creative potential, not only in relation to the world of 
objects, but also in relation to people, to women, to children, to Nature, to the nation and to 
works of art.35 
There are conclusions here to be drawn for a political philosophy of language and 
literature which remain implicit in Stoll’s speech. What does the potter see when he looks 
at a piece of clay? In Marxist terms: he sees in it the use-value of the pot, a value which is 
determined by and inseparable from the material properties of the clay. In formal terms: he 
sees in it the image of the pot which he wishes to create. This mental image is also 
determined by the material properties of the clay at hand. The bourgeois, however, sees in 
the clay an expression of exchange-value. It is the nature of an economy based on 
exchange that the amount of exchange-value represented by the clay could just as well be 
represented by a quantity of linen or any other commodity.36 The relation between the clay 
and the image of the quantity of exchange-value which the bourgeois sees in it, is, then, in 
one sense, arbitrary.37 
The artist views the world and forms an image of the world in verbal-ideological 
material. It follows that if, on the one hand, she or he is a bourgeois consciousness, 
dominated by the categories of commodity form and reification, the image that she or he 
produces will exist in alienated, abstract and partially arbitrary relation to the world from 
which it is drawn. Such a view will result in a distance between vision and reality, image 
and meaning, sign and referent.38 This will manifest itself in a language that shows its 
of Education. Tristan Tzara and Louis Aragon also took part. The proceedings were collected in 
M. Kouril (ed.), Sjezd narodni kultury, Prague, 1948. Stoll’s paper subsequently came out 
separately and in English, French, German and Spanish translations. 
34 F. X. Saida, Foreword to the fourth edition of his ideological novel, Loutky i delnici bozi quoted 
in Stoll, p. 75. 
v r 1 
35 Stoll, Umeni a ideologicky boj, p. 78. 
36 See Karl Marx, Capital, I [1867], reprint, London, 1988, pp. 125-77. 
37 In another sense, the relation is determined by the amount of labour-time required to extract the 
amount of clay at hand understood in relation to the total sum of social labour. 
38 Stoll does not elaborate on the implications of his words. He does, however, hint at these issues 
in the following passage: ‘From the beginning capitalist social organization was essentially an 
inhospitable territory for art. In it, artists experience an insoluble discrepancy between their 
vision and reality.’ (p 81) Lukacs argues that the feeling of a chasm between vision and reality, 
between subject and object, can be attributed to the effects of commodification and reification 
on all areas of activity in capitalism. This argument would fit better in Stoll’s argument and 
would follow logically from his comments. See Georg Lukacs, History and Class 
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awareness of a distanced, abstract and arbitrary relationship to the reality of which it 
speaks. The proletarian writing consciousness, on the other hand, will create an image 
determined by the object with which it works. Vision and reality, image and meaning, sign 
and referent will present themselves as a necessary continuum. This will manifest itself in 
a language which highlights its concrete nature, claims unmediated access to the referential 
world, and suppresses the polyvalence and the arbitrary moments of its semiotic nature.39 
Stoll suggests that such a relationship to reality can be established from the standpoint of 
the consciousness of the worker. He presents this consciousness as a historical and natural 
constant and hence as a present source from which a healthier mentality can be drawn. In 
support of his claim he quotes Marx: 
The labour process [...] is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values. It is an 
appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. It is the universal 
condition for the metabolic interaction between man and Nature, the everlasting Nature- 
imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore independent of every form of that 
existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which human beings live.40 
V 
This is a questionable use of Marx’s authority. Stoll tears this passage out of the context 
of Marx’s argument that, far from being unchanging, the labour process is subject to 
developments in the mode of production. Although the labour process is still directed 
towards the production of use-values — since without use-values there can be no 
exchange-values — what distinguishes advanced capitalism is precisely the fact that the 
entire mode of production is geared towards the production of exchange-values. The 
worker is not exempt from the effect of the rule of commodity exchange on consciousness. 
On the contrary, the worker suffers most of all insofar as he himself is commodified as a 
source of labour.41 The worker whose relationship with reality Stoll praises so highly is by 
no means the industrial worker of developed capitalism, and Stoll shows himself a poor 
Marxist by suggesting so. Stoll’s worker is, if anything, an idealized image of the artisan of 
pre-capitalist times.42 
V 
It follows that what Stoll designates the source of an unmediated relationship with 
reality, the worker who is not alienated from the objective world, has been lost with the 
development of capitalism. One might speculate that Socialism may eventually bring into 
Consciousness, London, 1990. One can arrive at the characterization of bourgeois literary 
consciousness by following Lukacs’s suggestion that the problem of commodities must be 
considered as the structural problem of all phenomena in capitalist society, including language 
— a phenomenon that Lukacs entirely fails to take into account. It would follow that capitalism 
knows a language that exhibits the characteristics of reification, and a literature — the self- 
consciousness of language — that exhibits its consciousness of its own reification. 
39 For more on the relationship between signification and commodity form, see Feruccio Rossi- 
Landi, Linguistics and Economics, The Hague, 1977, and Paul Thibault, Re-reading Saussure: 
The Dynamics of Signs in Social Life, London, 1997, pp. 187-207. 
40 Stoll, Umeni a ideologicky boj I (1945-1969), p. 76. Marx, Capital, 1, p. 290. 
41 Here Stoll diverges from the thought of Lukacs with which otherwise the speech shares points 
in common. Lukacs argues that the total reification and dehumanization of the worker in 
capitalism makes it possible for a proletariat which has come to consciousness to become both 
the subject and object of the historical process. This realization would give the proletariat the 
power both to understand history and to change it. Whilst Lukacs’s solution is often criticized, 
• • V 
it is more sophisticated and defensible than Stoll’s undialectical faith in a proletariat immune to 
the forces of history. See Lukacs, ‘Reification and the Class Consciousness of the Proletariat’ 
in History and Class Consciousness, especially pp. 178-82. 
42 Stoll’s position, then, is fundamentally one of Romantic anti-capitalism — a standpoint which 
Stoll attacks in his speech (p. 81) and which is certainly not the orthodox Marxist position he 
strives to adopt. 
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being a new relationship between subjects and their world which would correspond to the 
notional pre-capitalist harmonious relationship between humanity and the world. This, 
however, will not happen as fast as Stoll implies. The optimism of the following statement 
is misplaced — on the basis of the Marxist terms with which it seeks to operate: ‘from the 
moment that the working class appeared on the scene of history [...] for the artist the 
insoluble contradiction between vision and reality fell away.’ If Stoll is wrong here, truly 
Socialist writing must once again adopt the tense which has historically been natural to it: 
the future. Certainly, the task of creating socialist writing cannot be achieved by rhetoric 
like Stoll’s. 
(3) Towards Violence 
Stoll’s optimism, however, hides something more sinister. The continuation of the 
statement above reads as follows: ‘From that moment, and especially from the moment of 
the emergence of the Socialist state, the poet’s vision of society is recognized by 
government; it works in harmony not only with the desires of the broad masses of the 
people but also with the goal of the Socialist state of a higher and happier stage of the 
development of society.’43 The suggestion of coercion lurks visibly. In the eyes of cultural 
politicians and long-term Stalinists such as Stoll, Socialist writing in the future tense would 
not be enough. It would have to be forced into the present.44 
V 
Karvas’s concerns are similar to Stoll’s. In Most, language and semiotic phenomena are 
condemned as indicators of a superficial and artificial existence, one that is idealist not 
materialist, bourgeois not Socialist. This, too, leads to a position which advocates 
judgement and violence. In an essay on political badges [odznaky], Karvas points to the 
ease with which these can be changed with each new regime. In other words: Karvas 
explicitly refers to the arbitrary nature of signification. In this ‘era of badges’, Karvas 
would prefer people to wear them ‘next to their hearts, on their bare, bleeding chest.’45 
Likewise, in ‘The Most Reliable Establishment of Identity,’ he argues that identity 
documents do not identify the morality of the document holder. In an essay which more or 
less demands a police state and a thought police, Karvas yearns for a moral X-ray machine 
which would not only see through the superficial to the real, but would also be able to 
judge it. 
Any utterance which contains a claim to absolute truth can become condemnation. As 
Barthes writes: ‘In the Stalinist world, in which definition, that is to say, the separation 
between Good and Evil, becomes the sole content of all language, there are no more words 
without values attached to them, so that finally the function of writing is to cut out one 
stage of a process: there is no more lapse of time between naming and judging, and the 
closed character of language is perfected.'46 Karvas’s preoccupation with the instability of 
meaning and the inability of signs to provide truth aids him in his Stalinist condemnation. 
A tone of insidious threat permeates the essays. In ‘On Doubters’ he writes: ‘if anyone 
does not want to come to terms with the victory of Truth, he should enter a monastery or 
shoot himself. If anyone does not want to come to terms with the victory of Truth, he 
should get to know the secret police intimately.’ It is not only counter-revolutionaries and 
Fascists who fall into this category, but anyone who has any doubts at all about the 
establishment of people’s democracy. ‘Doubts are not a touching expression of concern 
about public affairs. They are direct proof that not long ago these doubters stood in the 
v r 
43 Stoll, Umeni a ideologicky boj, p. 83. 
44 For Stoll’s activity in the imposition of a repressive party line in cultural affairs, see French, 
Czech Writers and Politics, 1945-69, pp. 73-76. 
45 Karvas, Most, p. 92. 
46 Barthes, Le Degre zero de l 'ecriture, p. 41. 
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opposite camp.’47 This Stalinist position is, on the one hand, a matter of political 
expediency. On the other, it arises from a certain understanding of the relationship between 
language and reality, sign and referent. 
Although Svata is keen to condemn the Germans and the brutality of the camps, her 
ideology — the Czech and Panslav nationalism of an earlier era48 — is too close to the 
racism of Fascism to speak coherently. It is part of a world now in ruins. Her language is 
insufficient to close the gap between naming and judgement. Hence, she calls for a new 
form in which the chroniclers of the future will bring those responsible to justice. Stoll and 
Karvas, however, are confident that they speak for the spirit of history, and thus that they 
can, like Socialist Realism, name and judge reality in one blow. 
47 Karvas, Most, p. 82. 
48 But a nationalism that will be exploited by the Communists of the people’s republic. See 
Papousek’s and Bombikova’s chapters in this volume. 
42 1948: From Socialism to Socialism: Czech 
Literature and the Party 
Michal Bauer 
One of the notions that have long lain heavy on Czech literary history is the illusion that 
Czech literature enjoyed normal ‘democratic’ development during the Third Republic, 
1945-48. The tendency is to overlook or brush aside individual cases of undemocratic 
procedures and to point to the broad range of authors publishing and the large number of 
books published. Literary historians frequently invoke the idea that writers had now re¬ 
created a continuity with the state literature had been in before the Munich Agreement and 
the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. They claim that nothing changed until the Communist 
take-over of February 1948. 
In fact, the changes began to take place on liberation, in May 1945. 1948 represented a 
year of transition from one type of socialism to another, or from several ideas of what 
socialism was to the realization of a single idea. In general terms, one may state that it 
represented a transition from notions of ‘humanist socialism’ to the realization of Stalinist 
socialism. 
Attacks on Roman Catholic writers were launched straightaway, in May 1945. At first it 
looked as if the debates about ‘Catholic literature’ that ensued were simply part of the 
debates about the role of literature as a whole which informed the period. In some 
periodicals much was written about the cultural orientation of the liberated Czechoslovak 
Republic, whether it should turn to the East or the West, or indeed in both directions, a 
view apparently held by Vaclav Cemy;1 naturally, many Czech writers and critics were 
wary of any orientation to the West, given the fact that Britain and France had signed the 
Munich Agreement.2 Much was also written about ‘trash literature’ (the publication of 
inexpensive paperback popular novels had resumed), about a crisis of culture (a theme of 
Masaryk and the philosopher Radi in the First Republic) and problems with the selling of 
books, about artistic freedom (there were polemics about the work of Paul Valery, 
instigated by Cemy’s essay).3 Much was written about the awarding of the title National 
Artist, both in general terms (whether it made any sense; concerns that the awarding of 
such a title was an import from the USSR) and in particular to whom it should or should 
not be awarded and why.4 
The debate about Roman Catholic writers turned out to be more sinister than the other 
debates. It began in the first few weeks after the liberation with defamation; Catholic 
writers were accused of collaboration. These attacks were led by the Communist press 
1 See Vaclav Cemy, ‘Mezi Vychodem a Zapadem’, Kriticky mesicnik, 6, 1945, pp. 69-74. But 
see also Peter Bugge’s chapter in this volume. 
2 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Jeste jednou: mezi Vychodem a Zapadem (K problematice socialisticke kultury 
u nas, 1)’, Kriticky mesicnik 6, 1945, pp. 141-45. This was the beginning of a series of eight 
articles about Socialist culture that continued into 1946. 
3 Vaclav Cemy, ‘Basnik Paul Valery’, Kriticky mesicnik 6, 1945, pp. 217-27. 
4 The most important contributors to the polemics that arose around this title were Frantisek 
Kovama and Vaclav Cemy in Kriticky mesicnik and Bohuslav Brouk, Kamil Bednar, Miroslav 
Rutte, Jan Korinek and once more Frantisek Kovama in Svobodny zitrek. The only writer to be 
awarded the title without there being disputes in newspapers and periodicals was the poet Josef 
Hora. His award was, however, posthumous. 
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(Tvorba, Rude pravo, Kulturni politka).5 The Communists started this onslaught because, 
with rare exceptions, ageing and middle-aged Christian writers refused to have anything to 
do with socialism. In fact, Communists had started their attacks in the 1930s; now they 
simply became extreme. It is as if they were taking revenge on the Church for their own 
martyrs, particularly Julius Fucik.6 
The attacks concentrated on the elite among Christian writers,7 on their periodicals (Rad, 
Akord, Vysehrad), and also on periodicals linked with the People’s Party (Obzory, Vyvoj), 
and their editors. The Communist Minister of Information, Vaclav Kopecky, began trying 
to ban Roman Catholic periodicals in December 1945, and continued his campaign 
throughout 1946, and in 1947. The Soviet ambassador, V. A. Zorin, also tried to interfere 
with their publication in February 1947, and some were confiscated in May 1947. The 
Communists were particularly keen on using political means to get rid of writers who had 
denied the possibility of salvation by the Soviets and Communism at the end of the 1930s,8 
and had instead turned to Czech spiritual traditions and to national self-analysis. Whether 
or not any of them actually collaborated with the Germans has never been investigated. 
The so-called Cleansing Commission of the Syndicate of Czech Writers came to no firm 
decisions on the matter. This Commission, led by Vaclav Cemy, functioned in the second 
half of 1945. It claimed that it had no political authority, only artistic, and so its 
conclusions would affect only membership of the Syndicate and openings for publication, 
that it constituted an internal organization of the literary community and had no links with 
law-enforcement agencies.9 None the less it is evident from the archives of the Syndicate 
that particularly law-enforcement agencies were interested in the Commission’s findings 
and that they received any information they requested.10 
On 29 May 1945, in his speech to cultural functionaries, the Communist Minister of 
Education, Zdenek Nejedly, spoke of ‘a ruthless scrutiny of art and scholarship’, of the 
need ‘to fight evil without regard to person. The cause of the nation and the Republic 
comes before everything!’11 Fie called for works of art directed at the broad masses, a 
culture in which the artist must learn from the people (that is, the working class); writers 
should go into factories and villages and learn to ‘to recognize reality’. When Nejedly and 
5 Among the authors of attacks on Roman Catholic intellectuals were Vaclav Behounek, K. J. 
Benes, Jan Pilar and Jin Taufer. Amongst the labels attached to Catholic writers were 
‘collaborators’, ‘vermin’, ‘evangelists of Fascism’, ‘Czech Hitlerites’, ‘disciples of Goebbels’ 
and ‘spokesmen of Hitlerite anti-Bolshevism’. 
6 The Communist underground activist, Julius Fucik, was executed by the Germans in 1943. He 
became a Communist cult figure, especially after the mildly censored publication of his 
Reportaz psana na opratce (Report Written in the Noose, 1945). The cult reached hysterical 
proportions after the Communist take-over. Innumerable portraits of him appeared in literature, 
film, as well as sculptures and paintings. He became the official model for Czechoslovak youth, 
as a fighter against Nazism and an admirer of the USSR. Milan Kundera got caught up in this 
hysteria and produced a panegyric to Fucik, a narrative lyric poem, Posledni maj, Prague, 1955, 
issued in an even more ideologically sound 2nd edn in 1961, and 3rd edn, 1963. 
Jan Cep, Jakub Demi, Jaroslav Durych, Bedrich Fucik, Vaclav Rene and Jan Zahradnicek. 
8 The most conspicuous of these was Jan Zahradnicek’s ‘Plac koruny svatovaclavske’, Obnova, 
2, 1939, 41, pp. Iff., which subsequently appeared as a New Year’s greeting from the 
publishing house Akord in 1939. Latest edition in Jan Zahradnicek, Dilo, 4 vols, ill, Prague, 
1995, pp. 194-97. 
9 Vaclav Cemy, Pameti III (1945-72), Bmo, 1992, pp. 54ff. 
10 Uncatalogued, unnumbered deposit of the Syndicate of Czech Writers, held by the Museum of 
National Literature (Pamatnik narodniho pisemnictvi), Prague, hereafter PNP. 
11 This speech was first printed three years later in 1948, in the revived Communist periodical 
Var, 1, pp. 5-21. It thus opened the periodical’s Stalinist era. 
Czech Literature, the Party, and 1948 479 
others spoke of a ‘new art’, they meant the imitation of Soviet art and demonstrations of 
the merits of Socialist Realism. Indeed, this aesthetic norm became as it were a legal norm. 
Many artists, especially Christians, were condemned to many years’ imprisonment on the 
basis of their works. Their verse was read out in court (as was the case with Josef Palivec), 
that verse declared hostile to the people, and thus the poet himself became an ‘enemy of 
the people’. 
Nejedly’s speech from May 1945 opened a whole series of analogous speeches, labelled 
programmatic or theoretical, and these speeches laid down the rules which eventually all 
writers would be meant to abide by. The Party used particularly Kopecky, Nejedly, 
Ladislav Stoll and Taufer to formulate the basic principles that were then enunciated at 
meetings of Communist writers, and at Party congresses. It was not difficult to find writers 
willing to join in the fun. One of these, formerly the liveliest of the poets of the inter-war 
Avant-garde, was Vitezslav Nezval who, in February 1949 applied to give a speech at a 
writers’ congress; he was informed he should discuss his speech with Communist Party 
officials.12 After February 1948, nothing happened in the writers’ organization that had not 
been approved by the Central Committee of the Party beforehand. 
February 1948 may have changed the intensity of the pressure on writers, but the trend 
had been there before. The writers’ organization had made its attitude to the senior 
members of the Communist Party clear before 1948; for example, in October 1947 it 
invited such as Gottwald and Kopecky to meetings with writers, where the subject of 
discussion was Czech writers’ sojourns in the USSR. On the day after the Communist 
putsch, on 26 February 1948, the Syndicate of Czech Writers sent a letter of congratulation 
to the new Gottwald government, expressed support for its policy towards the arts and 
proclaimed its loyal ‘participation in the socialist construction of the Republic’.13 
At least before February 1948, there had been some possibility of expressing political 
thoughts without the cliches, even though the path to Socialism was clearly mapped out for 
the writers. In June 1946 at the Congress of Czech Writers, the president of the Syndicate, 
Frantisek Flalas, spoke of how it was necessary for literature to demonstrate to the readers 
how ‘the moral greatness of Socialism wins the battle for justice’14 and of how it was 
necessary to synchronize art with the process of democratizating and socializing society.15 
In their public resolution the writers avowed their desire to become builders of a Socialist 
society. In his speech President Benes emphasized, in words that often repeated thoughts 
expressed by Vaclav Cemy in Kriticky mesicnik, that artistic freedom was necessary, but 
that it was only a part of human freedom.16 
In March 1949, the path to socialism was confirmed at the congress of the Union of 
Czechoslovak Writers, whose president was Jan Drda. Here there were no more words 
about artistic freedom; instead it was stressed that the writers’ task was to be ‘standard- 
bearers of our path to Socialist morrows’,17 active builders of Socialism, people with a 
thorough knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. The statutes of the Union of Czechoslovak 
Writers ran as follows: 
The mission and task of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers are: 
12 PNP deposits, see note 10 above. 
13 Ibid. 
14 See Jan Kopecky (ed.), Uctovani a vyhledy. Sbornik prvniho sjezdu ceskych spisovatelu, 
Prague, 1948, p. 14. 
15 Ibid., pp. 265-66. 
16 Ibid., pp. 17-27. Also printed in Kriticky mesicnik, 7, 1946, pp. 269-77. 
17 Oldrich Krystofek and Jan Noha (eds), Od slov k ciniim. Sjezd ceskoslovenskych spisovatelu 4- 
6. brezna 1949, Prague, 1949, p. 173. 
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1. To stimulate writers’ creative participation in the building of Socialism in our 
fatherland; to facilitate the conditions for such participation; to build up immediate and 
continuous contacts between writers and Socialism-building workers in factories, in the 
fields and in other places of work; through discussions, indoctrination, through the Union’s 
press and by other means to turn writers’ attention to all the concrete questions and political 
tasks which are put before us by our people’s democratic system, so that, through their civil 
judgement, political education, and profound knowledge of working people and their 
environment, writers become fitted to create new works that faithfully and truly portray 
reality in its revolutionary evolution, works that actively participate in the Socialism-building 
efforts of our nation. 
2. To find and educate writers among workers, agricultural labourers and other strata of the 
work-force through continuous support of literary creativity in the broadest ranks of the 
working classes [...]; to participate in the activities of workers’, agricultural labourers’ and 
Komsomol literary circles; to communicate the artistic experience of qualified writers and 
critics to young and beginning authors. 
3. To implement creative co-operation between Czech and Slovak literature through a 
systematic mutual exchange of the experience of writers and critics from both fraternal 
nations. To make close working contact with the literatures of other Slav nations and other 
people’s democratic states and to strengthen bonds of solidarity with progressive writers all 
over the world. But in particular to give prominence to the glorious example of mighty 
Soviet literature, devoted as it is to the people and loved by the people, and to adopt its new 
artistic principles. 
4. To make writers familiar with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of which 
it is uniquely possible to construct an ideationally clear picture of the world; make them 
familiar with the history of the working-class movement, with the international significance 
of the victory of Socialism in the USSR. Through this education to strengthen in writers their 
progressive patriotism, coupled with politically conscious internationalism, and rejecting 
bourgeois nationalism as strongly as false cosmopolitanism. 
In fulfilling these tasks we shall approach the ideal of a literature, socialist in content and 
national in form, and we shall successfully overcome the residual values of the decadent, 
self-serving formalism that hinders the progressive evolution of our literatures.18 
The Union of Czechoslovak Writers grew out of the Syndicate of Czech Writers at the 
beginning of 1949. A day after the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, a so- 
called Action Committee19 began its work within the Syndicate together with an 
Investigation Commission. The task of both the Committee and the Commission was to 
expel all authors who, according to the views of the new political leadership of the state, 
were not suited to being builders of Socialism. Two lists were drawn up, one counting 
writers who could remain in the Syndicate, the other those who were to be expelled. A first 
wave of expulsions took place in February, March and April 1948, and a second in March 
and April 1949, when the expulsions took on gigantic dimensions. That was so because, 
among other things, a fairly large number of Czech writers had escaped abroad. 
This was the atmosphere that faced young writers. A considerable number of these 
professed allegiance to the official norm, Socialist Realism. The ruling class (‘the 
vanguard of the working-class’) offered many bribes to young authors and most of them 
submitted. These bribes consisted in early acknowledgement of their literary importance; 
18 Ibid., pp. 173-74. 
19 The members of the Action Committee were Vaclav Behounek, K. J. BeneS, Jan Drda, 
Vladislav HaSkovec, Bohuslav Havranek, Adolf Hoffmeister, Vaclav Lacina, Marie Majerova. 
Jin Maranek, VojtSch Mixa, Jan Mukarovsky, Vitezslav Nezval, Karel Novy, Vladimir 
Prochazka, Marie Pujmanova, Vaclav Rezac and Jin Taufer. The activities of the Committee 
and the Commission have never been written about. I have based my material solely on the 
PNP deposits for the Syndicate and the Union (see note 10 above). 
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many were soon awarded State Prizes; their poems were included in school readers; 
relative to their age, they were appointed early to high positions (editors-in-chief of 
periodicals, chief commissioning editors of publishing houses and so forth); their works 
appeared one after another with large print-runs; or they assumed senior political 
functions. The best known of such writers still alive in the 1990s were Jaromir Horec, 
V 
Milan Jungmann, Pavel Kohout, Milan Kundera, A. J. Liehm and Karel Siktanc, all of 
whom became dissidents after the Soviet occupation of 1968. There were dozens of others. 
On the other hand, dozens of real poets’ and fiction-writers’ works were removed from 
libraries and destroyed; they themselves were often arrested and imprisoned and, in a few 
cases, executed. These writers were, so to speak, replaced not only by the young 
enthusiasts, but also, to a large degree, by ‘new artists’, usually shop-floor workers. In the 
second half of 1949 a campaign was run called ‘Workers for Literature’; 750 people 
applied with examples of their work. Many of them were subsequently ‘indoctrinated’ in 
the art of creative writing. 
The Communists also tried to teach readers the norm of Socialist Realism. Another 
intensive campaign was organized for readers, the Fucik Badge Project. This campaign 
started in 1950 and was directed mainly at young people, secondary-school pupils, 
undergraduates, national servicemen. To earn the Fucik Badge these young people had to 
read prescribed texts (mainly by Communist and ‘progressive’ Czech authors, and, 
naturally, by Soviet authors), watch several Soviet and Czech films and then undertake an 
oral examination before a special board. Analogous to the Fucik Badge was the Jirasek 
Campaign,20 which was one of the first cultural efforts of the ‘first worker president’, 
Klement Gottwald, in 1948 (Benes had resigned in June). A collected works of Jirasek was 
published, which was intended to support the rejection of the Catholic conception of Czech 
history and, to a degree, to replace academic historiography. Jirasek’s novels were also 
used to support Nejedly’s view that the building of socialism was founded on the innate 
revolutionary nature of the Czech people which had first manifested itself in the Hussite 
Wars (or, as they were called, Hussite revolution). 
Between 1945 and 1947 the majority of prominent writers agreed on the path to 
Socialism for the Czechs. Their understanding of the concept, however, varied 
enormously. For example, in his Zivot s hvezdou (Life with a Star), written during the 
transition period but published in 1949, Jiri Weil, demonstrated a link between 
Existentialism and socialism: identifying with the collective of workers was the way of 
escaping existential secluded hopelessness. Existentialism was, of course, a bete noire of 
the Marxist-Leninists. Some of the younger Catholic writers also felt an affinity to 
Socialism, as is clear from the papers delivered at a meeting of young writers in March 
1948. Some writers called themselves Socialists, but not Marxists, like, for example, the 
V 
essayist and theorist Jindrich Chalupecky. Vaclav Cemy also called himself a Socialist. All 
this comported with the left-wing nature of the First Republic, and the fact that T. G. 
Masaryk was invoked in the period of transition by writers of virtually all political 
persuasions. 
Where, however, there was conflict was in the various camps’ views of artistic freedom. 
The representatives of ‘synthetic realism’ (Jin Hajek, Jan Kloboucnfk, Sergej Machonin, 
Ivan Skala, Michal Sedlon, Jan Stem, and sometimes Pavel Kohout) maintained that the 
freedom of the artist was subordinate to politics; they declared that it was necessary ‘to 
20 Alois Jirasek (1851-1930), though from a literary historical point of view most important for 
well-made social drama, was celebrated as a nationalist historical novelist. He was, with the 
composer Smetana, at the very centre of modem Czech culture for Zdenek Nejedly. See 
Geoffrey Chew’s chapter in this book. 
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limit freedom at a time when Socialism is under threat’.21 The Marxists at this meeting 
emphasized the duty of the artist to society, to the working classes, and the positive 
relationship of artists to socialist society and the common people. The absolute freedom of 
the artist was defended by Jiff Kolar, Chalupecky and Jan Grossman; but they also 
supported Socialism. Kolar, for example, said, ‘The more we believe in Socialism, the less 
damage will be done.’22 At the same meeting Horec spoke of the need to nationalize 
publishing houses and to plan artistic creativeness; works of art should be bespoke, and 
what Czech literature really lacked was an equivalent of Fadeev’s Molodaia gvardiia. 
Vaclav Cemy’s view on Socialism is at least a little better thought out, as we see 
particularly from his series of articles on Socialist culture.23 Here he writes of ‘socialist 
humanism’ and ‘the humanism of socialism’,24 and of the need to appreciate art primarily 
on the basis of quality; he believes the artist should be given the utmost freedom. He 
cannot conceive of Socialism without such freedom, in literature as in life. One only 
wonders what he really meant by freedom. To be sure, he was one of the most vociferous 
defenders of artistic freedom in the immediate post-war period, but in his argument he 
invokes Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and declares the Soviet Union to be a ‘model and 
exemplary moral support’.25 (In his favour, one may say, however, that he does not 
advocate blind imitation of the Soviets.) His party-line-toeing rejection of Gide’s Retour 
de I’U.R.S.S., pronounced at the Congress of Czech Writers on 17 June 1946, in which he 
defends the personality cult, is disquieting.26 
February 1948 resulted in re-evaluation, not only an imposition of artistic norms. For 
example, a poem ‘1. maj 1947’ (1 May 1947, published in Tvorba) by the doyen of 
Communist political and erotic verse, S. K. Neumann (he died at the end of June 1947 and 
so never saw his dreams fulfilled), launched an attack on President Truman. In 1947 it was 
considered an aberration, but in 1948 it became a sign-post of the ‘new’ poetry. Such 
changes were not usually sudden; on the whole, the Communist regime wore a democratic 
mask for a year or so. What was said, however, often did not mean the same thing to the 
speaker as it did to her or his audience. At the Congress of National Culture in April 1948, 
the ideologue Ladislav Stoll spoke of Socialist Realism as ‘factual humanism’ (realny 
humanismus) and praised the Neumann of ‘1. Maj 1947’ as ‘a valiant guardian of poetry 
and the interests of the Czech people’;27 he demanded a re-evaluation of art, and in 
particular the liquidation of trends like Existentialism and subjectivism. At the same 
congress Vaclav Kopecky invoked artistic freedom, but, on the other hand, spoke of an art 
that must serve the common people. In his speech he also gave a positive evaluation of 
theorists who only a few weeks later would be expelled from cultural life, Chalupecky and 
Karel Teige. In April they still counted as ‘excellent representatives of our fine-arts 
theory’.28 
21 A meeting of such writers in the Umelecka beseda held soon after the Communist take-over. A 
volume of the proceedings was prepared for publication, but never appeared, because much was 
said there that did not comport with the demands which the new rulers put on writers and 
critics. I have again used material from the PNP, the deposits for Umelecka beseda (see note 10 
above). 
22 In the record of the general discussion, ibid. 
23 See note 2 above. 
V 
24 Cemy, ‘Jeste jednou: mezi Vychodem aZapadem’, p. 144. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Reprinted as ‘Osobnost a kollektivum (K problematice socialisticke kultury u nas, 7)’, Kriticky 
mesicnik, 7, 1946, p. 278. 
27 Miroslav Kouril (ed.), Sjezd narodni kultury. Sbirka dokumentu, Prague, 1948, p. 80. 
28 Ibid., p. 128. 
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At the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in May 1949, 
Kopecky declared that ‘the writers’ front must be as broad as possible; all writers should 
be included’, but there was a fundamental condition that they should have a positive 
relationship to the common people, to the people’s democratic state and to socialism.29 Of 
those who now wielded power he said: 
We are re-evaluating anew [s/c] the fruits of Czech and Slovak literature; we are 
investigating the literary works written during the bourgeois era, and we are ensuring that we 
distribute among the people those works of national literature which can have a good 
educative impact, those which can benefit the intellectual renewal of the nation and which 
help our Socialist endeavours [...]. We put in the front rank writers of a Socialist orientation 
who are determined to lead Czechoslovak literature in the service of the working classes on 
their path to Socialism.30 
In other words, only Socialist Realist writers would be published. Kopecky’s definition of 
the norm is, however, somewhat vague: ‘The methodology of Socialist Realism is writing 
realist artistic works in the Socialist spirit.’31 What he means is that all writers should 
portray the life of the common people in accordance with the interests of the Communist 
Party. 
Kopecky excluded so-called ‘upadkove umenP (decadent art in the non-literary historical 
sense; the term used for the deprecation of art by Masaryk and Radi — and their disciples), 
by which he meant works exhibiting such bogey-trends as individualism, formalism, 
Existentialism or Decadence. In fact these concepts were used indiscriminately at the time, 
simply as designations of what was not Socialist Realism. We also come across as terms of 
abuse the Soviet-inspired ‘anti-realism’ and the Masaryk or Benes-inspired ‘anti¬ 
democratism’. Realism and Surrealism were allegedly the products of the ‘putrefaction of 
bourgeois culture’ and Sartre’s writing was labelled ‘an apology for the animal instincts in 
humanity’ (see Aleksandr Sobolev’s work on Lenin’s theory of reflection). 
In June 1949, the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, in the interests of assuring that 
recognized poets could be gathered into the cause of Socialist Realism, discussed the 
virtual penury of two poets, the ex-Communist Jaroslav Seifert and the Communist 
Vladimir Holan; the Union decided their works should be published to alleviate their 
poverty. Stoll had said that he would send reliable people to visit Holan in order to ‘tear 
him out of the clutches of the influence of Chalupecky’s group’.32 Analogously, as late as 
April 1950, the presidium of the Union’s Czech section defended Seifert against criticism 
in the Party weekly Tvorba levelled against his work, Pis eh o Viktor ce (Song about 
Viktorka, 1950), because ‘Czech culture should not frivolously get rid of writers of real 
quality and thus offer weapons to reactionaries.’33 
Ladislav Stoll appears to have been the vulgarest of vulgar Marxists in his 
pronouncements on the Stalinist party-line. His Tricet let bojii za ceskou socialistickou 
poesii (The Thirty-year Struggle for Czech Socialist Poetry, 1950) began as a lecture, but 
was published as a book three months later. He was particularly aggressive there about the 
by then deceased Frantisek Halas (who thus could not defend himself), but also those 
29 Vaclav Kopecky, Vedeni nepremozitelnym ucenim marxismu-leninismu vybudujeme 
socialismus v nasi vlasti. Refer at na IX. radnem sjezdu Komunisticke strany Ceskoslovenska v 
Praze dne 28. kvetna 1949, Prague, 1949, p. 41. 
30 Ibid., pp. 39—40. 
31 Ibid., p. 41. 
32 PNP deposit for the Union of Czechoslovak Writers (see note 10 above). 
33 Ibid. 
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whom he saw as influenced by Halas. If we compare the short-hand record of his lecture 
with the book, we find that the latter is far stronger.34 
The line taken by Stoll, Kopecky and Nejedly was to dominate Czech literary politics for 
a good ten years and then to enjoy a revival in the 1970s, and less clearly, the early 1980s. 
That revival also included the old chestnut, whether the true tradition of Czech poetry lay 
with Nezval or with Halas; the literary bureaucrats, naturally, adhered to Stoll’s view. Stoll 
had been director of the Academy’s Institute of Czech Literature from 1962 to 1968, but, 
at the age of seventy he regained that post in 1972 and remained in post until his death in 
1981. His own ‘struggle for socialist poetry’, thus, lasted from the 1920s to four of five 
years before it became finally clear that Socialism was doomed. 
34 Ibid. 
43 Czech Women Writers in Transition 
Robert B. Pynsent 
Introduction 
The Second World War saw a boom in Czech publishing,1 a boom in which women played 
a disproportionately large part. At the same time, fewer women writers than men were 
imprisoned or killed by the Germans. Nevertheless, the near Naturalist social novelist and 
antisemite, turned near pomographer, Anna Ziegloserova, and the Masarykian feminist 
essayist, F. F. Plaminkova, were executed by the Germans in 1942 during the reprisals for 
the assassination of Heydrich. The initially feeble anti-feminist, then pugnacious political 
journalist, Milena Jesenska, was arrested by the Gestapo in November 1939 and finally 
died in the Ravensbriick concentration camp in 1944. The actress, radio dramatist and 
author of one Bildungsroman2 where the heroine eventually discovers that the sexual is not 
always bad, Milena Balcarova, was arrested in November 1941 and died in the same camp 
in 1945. Towards the end of the 1950s, the Czechoslovak Communist Party decided the 
public needed a Moravian female Communist writer hero to complement the Bohemian 
male cult figure Julius Fucik; they chose the virulently anti-Christian and unswervingly 
pro-Stalin, but enormously courageous, Marie Kuderikova, who was arrested by the 
Gestapo in December 1941 and executed in Breslau in 1943. Her intimate prison journal 
was published in 1961.3 The vast majority of women who published during the war 
introduced patriotic motifs into their works, sometimes blatant, sometimes not. Historical 
novels, novels about adolescence, and novels about art or artists constituted the chief 
vehicles for this patriotism. Patriotism almost entirely replaced feminism, which had, 
generally speaking, been weakening as a literary ideology in Czech literature since the 
establishment of the republic in 1918. 
This chapter has two parts. First, I shall briefly demonstrate through a survey of a dozen 
or so writers that, normally, the term ‘transition’ is virtually useless as a literary historical 
characterization, especially for the 1945^18 period; it works as a purely historical label for 
a time when some writers did publish in the post-war period works written before or 
during the war while already writing work of a different idea content. Politicians were, 
however, using the term ‘transition’ and the impact of the constant repetition of the notion 
that the Czechs and Slovaks were now living in the transitional state of a ‘people’s 
democracy’ that would lead to Socialism is evident in some of the writers I treat.4 For 
some intellectuals May 1945 represented the chance to resume the First Republic, in a 
modified, better form, though for some it meant the chance to build something entirely 
new: there was no transition, simply a clear break. At the time, Communists regarded the 
building of socialism as having started with May 1945, not with the ‘Victorious February’, 
the coup of 1948. In her fourth collection of verse, Herma Svozilova, for example, 
1 See also Pavel Tigrid’s statement that ‘cultural life in the home country during the war was 
remarkably alive, even if in fetters’, Kapesni pruvodce inteligentni zeny po vlastnim osudu, 2nd 
edn, Prague, 1990, p. 204. 
2 Milena Balcarova, Muj pritel Giulio, Prague, 1945 (posthumously). 
3 Marie Kuderikova, Zlomky zivota. Listy z vezeni, 2nd edn, Prague, 1962. A third edition, which 
still failed to create the cult the Party desired appeared not long after the Soviet occupation 
(Prague, 1975). 
4 See for example, Jon Bloomfield, Passive Revolution. Politics and the Czechoslovak Working 
Class 1945-1948, London, 1979, pp. 80 and 155. 
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recounts the tale of a nearly sixty-year-old woman who had been wondrously transformed 
by 1945; after a life-time of charring, she is suddenly blessed with a job in a factory, and 
soon publishes an engage poem in a newspaper.5 The second part of this chapter will 
contradict the first part in that it demonstrates that the term ‘transition’ may be usefully 
employed in the analysis of a literary work. It treats, almost exclusively in political terms, 
for this chapter essentially restricts itself to politics in literature, a triology by Helena 
Dvorakova, Pad rodiny Bryknaru (The Fall of the Bryknar Family), whose first part was 
written during the German Protectorate, whose second part was written mainly during the 
Protectorate (about two-thirds), and whose third part was written between 1945 and 1948. 
It is probably unique in that its theme is economic and social change and transition in the 
nineteenth century and its ideological content registers the author’s political change and 
transition in the mid-twentieth century; the author appears to move from nationalism, to 
Marxism, and then to the notion of a Czech Sonderweg under the guidance of the ghost of 
the President-Liberator, T. G. Masaryk. 
I 
In order to ascertain the ideological change that took place in women writers’ work with 
the end of the war, I have to compare their post-war works with one or two of their 
wartime or pre-war works. I omit writers not attempting anything but Trivialliteratur (for 
example, Jirina Parmova or Anna-Marie Klosova), for such writing seems to have barely 
reacted to the ‘brutal peace’ in which ‘alongside the physical destruction were more 
intangible wounds [...] changing moral and mental perspectives changed individual 
behaviour, and thence society and politics’.61 divide my writers into four groups according 
to type of reaction to 1945. 
In the first group I put three writers who published books only up to the reprisals for the 
assassination of Heydrich and who were subsequently silent until after the war, Marie 
Majerova, Sonja Spalova and Vera Vasova. Majerova was a Communist, expelled from the 
Party in 1929 when it became Stalinist, but who always maintained her loyalty to 
Communist-Party socialism. During the Communist period in Czechoslovakia, it was said 
that there were only two Czech women writers, one a bitch, and one a lady. Majerova was 
the bitch.7 Before the First World War she wrote fiction concerned mainly with poor 
women or outcasts, and manifested contemporaneous feminist concerns. Between the 
wars, she wrote politically committed Realist works and an experimental socialist utopian 
novel. During the Second World War, she wrote an anti-idealist, didactic, stylistically 
anaemic novel, Robinsonka (Miss Crusoe, 1940), which became the most-read of her 
works because it remained a prescribed text for twelve-year-olds throughout the 
5 Herma Svozilova-Johnova, ‘ Ta basen konci slovy’, Tve nove Erase, Prague, 1949. Before this 
collection, she had published under her maiden name, Herma B. Svozilova; even though her 
well-heeled lawyer husband, Oldrich John (1907-61), had published her first and third 
collections at his own expense. John was a powerful man as chairman of the constitution 
committee of the constitutive National Assembly and perhaps she added his name to her nom 
de plume as a political statement. Svozilova’s poem reflects historical fact: ‘55,750 women 
joined industry in the first half of 1947 and 73 per cent of these had previously been engaged 
only in household or domestic work’, Bloomfield, Passive Revolution, p. 159. 
6 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, London and New York, 1998, 
p. 222. Mazower states that the most obvious of these changes was ‘the erosion of respect for 
property rights’. Another writer concludes that the Protectorate had broken the Czechs’ moral 
backbone anyway, and that the advent of people’s democracy simply encouraged the corruption 
of even more Czechs: Jan Stransky, East Wind Over Prague, London, 1950, p. 169 and passim. 
7 The lady was Marie Pujmanova. See below. 
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Communist period. Her chief literary achievement in the period of transition consisted in 
adapting in 1947 her lively 1914 novel about Parisian anarchists, Namesti Republiky (Place 
de la Republique), to suit Stalinist demands, whereby she omitted one of the main 
characters, Nad’a, because she was a Russian anarchist. Two years later (1949-50) she 
adapted what was probably her best structured and psychologically most complex novel, 
Nejkrasnejsl svet (The Most Beautiful World, 1923), whereby the beautiful young middle- 
class fighter for workers’ rights no longer dies at the end, but is about to recover in order to 
fight on for socialism. Compared with Majerova, Spalova made a minor contribution to the 
development of Czech literature; her collection of incandescent, quasi-Surrealist verse 
V 
inspired by erotic sadness, Cerny motyl (The Black Butterfly, 1926), promised something 
far more original than what was to come, fiction and fictionalized biographies with under¬ 
elaborated or indistinct themes and motivation. During the war, she published three works 
of patriotic fiction, the first two with strong anti-German undertones. The last of the three, 
Knize basniku (A Prince of Poets, 1940; as New Year greeting from the Prague Literary 
and Art Club for 1941), expresses the atmosphere of the times by presenting a study of the 
Romantic Karel Hynek Macha’s (1810-36) pessimism; furthermore, it concerns the poet’s 
death in a part of Bohemia at the time in the Reich. In the transition period, Spalova 
published a further two novels. In that it traces the life of a strong young female outsider, 
the first, Polyxena (1946), written 1941—43, is reminiscent of her pre-war feminist novel, 
Zena bez masky (A Woman Without a Mask, 1931). With its fusion of cosmopolitan 
adventure story and social and religious criticism, it trifles a debased form of the fm-de- 
siecle romance common in 1940s Trivialliteratur. Spalova claims that she wrote the 
second of these novels, Petruska a soudruzi (Petruska and the Comrades, 1947), between 
1935 and 1937. Kune asserts that the author had failed to find an adequate ‘artistic or 
ideological’ form for the problems she was treating.8 It is not clear whether she published 
the novel in an attempt to hop on the Communist bandwagon or as a warning to her readers 
about the true nature of Communists. The fact that she has bohemicized her Christian 
name to ‘Sona’ could suggest either. The novel traces the activities of a Prague Party cell 
in the 1930s. Whatever Spalova intended, the result constitutes a portrayal of the disunity 
and political failure of the Czechoslovak Communist Party before the war, condemns the 
Soviet Union’s abandonment of the International Brigade in Spain, and while trying to 
explain why Jews as outsiders naturally became members of the ‘party of the disinherited’, 
demonstrates that the Nazis were right about a Judaeo-Bolshevik plot threatening Western 
civilization; simultaneously the novel condemns forthrightly the Germans’ murdering of 
the Jews. Only those who love the soil, rural Communists, the Social Democrats, and 
possibly the true bourgeois idealist Communist femme fatale Helena, remain true to the 
socialist cause. Unlike other writers of the period, Spalova finds Communists quaintly 
romantic. Vasova, a Bohemian Brethren presbyter, was far from things Communist. Before 
the war, for example in the psychologically observant Realist short stories of the 
collection, Dcery Adamovy (Daughters of Adam, 1938), she concerns herself with man’s 
physical and mental oppression of women, indulges in some Protestant moralizing, and 
manifests some old-fashioned patriotic fear of Czech children being germanized in 
charitable institutions. Her wartime collection of verse, Balady a meditace (Ballads and 
Meditations, 1941), contains some devotional poems, but consists mainly of intimate and 
occasional pieces. In one poem, she boldly expresses the hope that no Czech will now 
betray his country.9 Her post-war collection of prose, Sluzebnice neuzitecna (A Useless 
Servant, 1947), begins with a series of sketches with Christan moral themes, but ends with 
8 Jaroslav Kune, Slovnik ceskych spisovatelu beletristu 1945-1956, Prague, 1957, p. 416. 
9 VSra Vasova, ‘Spolecenstvi stolu’, Balady a meditace, Prague, 1941, p. 9. 
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a gently political piece, an account of the male first-person narrator’s visit to north-west 
Germany in 1922. It constitutes a fictionalized discussion of the Germans’ sense of 
humiliation and frustration. For the period it interests us because it is not misoteutonic, 
except perhaps in the portrayal of the education of a little boy into barbaric belligerence or 
in the narrator’s ironic comment on the fact that the local Lutheran church is almost empty 
on Sundays probably because the German God had apparently abandoned the Germans. 
My second group comprises three authors, all considered mainstream, who published 
extensively during the war, but virtually ceased publishing belles-lettres for the period of 
transition or longer. Jarmila Glazarova published one of her three novels during the war, 
the half-ethnographic, half-feminist analysis of marriage as a prison, Advent (1939). Her 
Chuda pradlena (The Poor Spinner-Woman, 1940) comprises a series of ethnographic 
sketches of Beskyd Mountains life; except in style and in narratorial intrusions, this work 
comes far closer to reportage than to fiction. She also published one work for children, 
Zahradnlk Hejduk (Hejduk, the Gardener, 1944). She did not publish again until 1950, and 
from then on she devoted herself to travel and political journalism, and some stories for 
children. She clearly did not publish immediately after the war, not because of any 
emotional shock, but because she became an ardent politician; in 1946—48 she was cultural 
counsellor at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow. Anna Maria Tilschova began writing 
as the stylistically most sophisticated of the Czech Naturalists, but when the public could 
not accept such writing from a woman, especially in its expression of female sexual desire, 
she ceased publishing books for ten years and then began writing studies of social decay, 
first amongst the patriciate, then amongst the workers and Jews of Ostrava, and then 
amongst the provincial bourgeoisie. During the war, she first seems to be returning to a 
mystical version of T. G. Masaryk’s ‘humanistic’ personal religion with Tri krlze (Three 
Crosses, 1940), but then she proceeds to patriotism with the neo-Revivalist novel about the 
painter Josef Manes (1820-71), Orli hnlzdo (The Eyry, 1942). This novel is remarkable in 
that it contains antisemitic remarks about industrialists. Though antisemitism pervades 
Czech women’s literature before the war, it is virtually non-existent in ‘high’ literature 
during the war. (One exception is to be found in a brief paragraph in Olga Barenyiova’s 
first novel Janka [1941], but the same author treats Jews with little but compassion in Hra 
pro Danielu [A Play for Daniela, 1944], which also contains the first allusion in locally 
published Czech literature to the death camps.) One more, unnaturally optimistic, novel by 
Tilschova, Navrat (The Return, 1945), a grandiose, sentimental work about a surgeon 
falling in love with the daughter of a patient whose life he had saved, appeared just before 
the liberation, but after that she published nothing but a short study on the writer Bozena 
BeneSova, in 1948. Tilschova had ceased writing (apart from an unfinished novel, 
Babylon), though she remained revered by the new Establishment, because her time was 
past, and she clearly found socialism uninspiring. The third writer in the second group, 
Milada SouCkova, defected to the West after the Communist take-over while a member of 
the diplomatic corps. She began writing her sparse verse, her deconstructive short-stories 
and novels about writing in the 1930s. Her wartime collection of verse, Zluty soumrak 
(Yellow Dusk, 1942), consists of a series of verbal sculptures employing motifs mainly 
from Chinese poetry. Only rarely intimate, these stylized contemplations on friendship and 
the erotic, on Nature and on the essence of verse, aim at a distilled lyricism, probably to 
contrast with the grim, fear-laden drabness of the Occupation. Her fascination with the 
imagination of pubertal girls and the creativity of gossip, as well as her determination to be 
an author and not an authoress, expressed in Amor a Psyche (Cupid and Psyche, 1937), are 
still evident in her literary analytical collection of tales, Skola povldek (Story School, 
1943). The chief narrator of this collection is male; he dissects, sometimes parodies, 
sometimes pretends to imitate stories from various periods and movements. The most 
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radical artistically of her wartime works is the Shandyesque Bel canto (1944), on the most 
superficial level a parody of all those novels by such as Spalova and Barenyiova, but also 
writers of the Fin de siecle, about young women seeking independent success in life, 
especially on the stage, actually constitutes a story about a male narrator in search of 
characters, of plot, and of narrational rhetoric. The theme of Time matches the 
achronological nature of the novel, but also reflects the Time-consciousness that was as 
inherent in literature of the Second World War as it had been in Baroque and Decadent 
literature (and for the same reason: an awareness of impending or actual disaster). 
Barenyiova published a technically similar novel immediately before the end of the war, 
Roman (Novel, 1945). In the transition, Souckova brought out only one work, an essay on 
‘the death of the novel’ with a few playful fiction-like episodes, Fllava umelce (The Head 
of the Artist, 1946); the ‘narrator’ of this essay is male again. 
My third group comprises a selection of women writers who were publishing during the 
war and for whom the end of the war appeared to mark mainly a chance to express 
emotions and interpretations they had suppressed during the war, or to express shock at the 
conditions in concentration camps in particular. All these writers, with the exception of 
Helena Hodacova, manifest a major change in ideas, sometimes even in form and lexis in 
comparison with their wartime, sometimes also pre-war, works. The poet Ruzena Zizkova 
published many of her works together with her aesthete husband, Otokar Zizka.10 From her 
first collection, Bily akt (White Nude, 1937), to the end of the war, Zizkova manifests 
herself as primarily a somewhat mawkish sensualist whose sexual desire is usually 
decorative, though as the war continues she accrues ever more of Zizka’s belatedly 
Symbolist mystical qualities. Nevertheless, she joined literary resistance to the Germans in 
the first year of the war* 11 when she published, albeit in only seventy copies, her Rondely za 
TGM (Rondels in Memory of T. G. Masaryk, 1939), elegaic verse claiming that though the 
nation is now wreathed in sadness, its citizens threatened by the executioner’s axe, the 
people, together with Jan Masaryk, will continue to watch over the mother-country. In her 
contributions to the couple’s Psenice a hrozny (Wheat and Grapes, 1940), within her 
normal sensualist soil-worship, she also rejects large-scale capitalism (like Masaryk, and 
Czech nationalists, at least since the 1890s). One of the most common sub-genres of Czech 
poetry after the war was a verse diary of events from the Munich Agreement to the 
Liberation. The Zizkas’ apocalyptic version of this sub-genre, Valka (War, undated; 
1946?), aims primarily at an unmelodramatic evocation of cataclysm. The Germans are not 
mentioned by name, but, for example in Canto 6, celebrating the Prague Uprising, the 
Zizkas do bombastically call for revenge on them: ‘Go and murder/the swine of Sodom, 
the cursed brutes/who every day laid the metal of mines beneath you/And if you become 
tired remember Theresienstadt.’12 The Zizkas show no signs of converting to Communism, 
but they do call the Soviet Union ‘Comrade Rassija’,13 and it does appear time-serving 
when they point out that the Soviet Union is not only the saviour from Nazism, but also the 
provider of food. Their bombastic, barely comprehensible expression of love for Russia, 
however, sounds Panslavist rather than socialist (I do not forget Stalin’s talk of ‘Leninist 
10 Zizka is sometimes Otokar, sometimes Otakar on the title-pages of his works. In the copy of 
Arthur Breisky’s Strepy zrcadel he dedicated to his wife, he writes himself Otokar. 
11 Kune gives the publication date as 1937 in Slovnik soudobych ceskych spisovatelu. Krasne 
pisemnictvi v letech 1918-45, Prague, 1946, p. 964. The copy I use for this essay is, however, 
clearly dated September 1939; the publisher is F. J. Muller, Prague. It is no doubt significant 
that Kune omits the Zizkas altogether in his 1957 dictionary; he also omits Vasova (see note 8 
above). 
12 Ruzena and Otakar Zizka, Valka, Treble, n.d., p. 53. 
13 Ibid. 
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Panslavism’): ‘Oh, how we love you, land in which peace wakes/you through whom both 
muzhik and hero cut as with a sword/blow your muscular wind from corn-laden days/into 
our barking days.’14 The cycle ends with a condemnation of those who perceive the need 
for another war; that is also a period topos, but the Zizkas do not name the West. Marie 
Glabaznova, whose mysticizing verse comes closer to Zizka’s than Zizkova’s, has a less 
ordinary response. Gloom and anxiety, mitigated by motherhood and belief in an afterlife, 
pervade her own wartime collection, Riize z tmy (A Rose from the Darkness, 1944). 
Expressions of Roman Catholic piety mingle with Symbolist visualizations of hereditary 
memory, and the perception of the darling buds of May recalling death, or of autumn 
leaves resembling parched, cracked lips. Like the Zizkas’ Valka, Glabaznova’s first post¬ 
war collection, Sestra smrt (Sister Death, 1946), dedicated to the memory of the writer 
Vladislav Vancura, constitutes a lyrical diary of events from demobilization and Munich to 
shortly after liberation.15 The self-pity that occasionally seeped into Riize z tmy has become 
a personal sadness representative of the whole country’s and the blood and clay of her 
body have become the blood and clay of the country. She records a spirit of revolt in 
herself during the war, a spirit inspired by God, but, on the other hand, she returns to 1890s 
patriotic masochism (or to Polish messianism) when she conceives of the Czechs as the 
Christ of nations. Her expression of gratitude for Soviet liberation16 constitutes the 
emotionally most convincing in Czech literature. She meditates on the origins of the 
Russians’ horses as they ride victorious into Eastern Europe. 
The actress Eva Klenova’s inchoate first work, written mostly during the Occupation, 
but quickly finished off and published during the Prague Uprising, Harlekyn Zero 
(Harlequin Zero, 1945) is a verse tale about a pessimistic failed actor; after the Germans 
have closed Czech theatres some socialist underground group mounts an underground 
production, which is broken up by the Gestapo. She also published at about the same time 
a radical adaptation of a Lope de Vega play;17 here she follows a feminist line on male 
sexual behaviour towards women and on the protection of the human rights of prostitutes. 
In these works Klenova preaches some superficial vitalism. For the period of transition, 
her most important work is her disjointed, ill-constructed (most of the long narrative 
consists of the main character, Jan Novak’s, autobiography as related to a fellow prisoner, 
Pravda [Truth], in his delirious state after having been badly beaten by the Gestapo), racist 
psychological study of evil, Tve deti, Evropo! (Your Children, Europe, 1947). The racism 
does not concern the Jews, although the one Jewish character, a member of a Communist 
resistance group, proves too weak to conduct his duties; moral weakness constitutes one of 
the most frequent elements of nineteenth-century antisemitism to appear in Czech post-war 
antisemitism.18 Klenova’s racism concerns the Germans, tacitly represents the obverse of 
the reinvigorated Panslavism that followed the war. Jan Novak appears to typify the 
14 Ibid., p. 57. 
15 For no apparent reason, she omits events from 1943. The Germans’ execution of Vancura in 
1942 had been designed to break the Czechs’ morale; none of those who died in the war was so 
celebrated in post-war literature as Vancura until after the Communist take-over. In ‘Vladisiavu 
Vancurovi’, she characterizes the novelist as ‘lord of beauty and enchanter of the power and 
splendour of words’: Marie Glabaznova, Sestra smrt, Kromefiz, 1946, p. 34. 
16 I have not come across any woman writer expressing gratitude for the American liberation of 
the western part of Bohemia. 
17 El Castigo sin venganza: Eva Klenova, Soudce ... nikoh mstitel. Hra o trech dejstvich (sesti 
obrazech), Prague, 1945. 
18 In Kapesni priivodce Tigrid writes of post-war Czech antisemitism (p. 191), but also of 
antisemitism among Czechoslovak soldiers in the British Army (p. 99). Mazower writes of 
antisemitism intensifying all over continental Europe after 1945: see Dark Continent, p. 219. 
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apathetic Czech, in contrast to his activist sister. His cruelty to animals as a child is sadistic 
and that manifests itself later in his need for blood or at least the smell of burning flesh or 
fur when he copulates with his would-be girlfriend. He is red-haired like any decent villain 
(and many conventional German or Jewish villains in Czech literature from Romanticism 
onwards), lonely, selfish, ambitious and mendacious. The reader may at first feel disquiet 
at the fact that he has a John Smith of a Czech name, but soon we learn that he had been 
adopted, that his real name is the equally John-Smithian Hans Mayer; this explains not 
only his sadism and deceit, but also the fact that he learns German so easily and feels 
attracted to a young Nazi who suddenly joins his class at grammar school. With this novel 
Klenova self-consciously addresses the old nature-or-nurture argument and comes firmly 
down on the side of nature. Germans are naturally brutes and the concentration camp 
scenes Jan Novak sees in his delirium demonstrate that the murdering of the Jews and such 
as his sister constitutes a natural development of his own sadistic killing and maiming of 
animals. Although Klenova stereotypically praises socialism through the words of Jan’s 
adoptive father about the obliteration of class difference through a new world order 
governed by the workers, her emotions evince nationalism more than anything else; apart 
from in the racism or haematic nationalism behind the novel’s theme, Klenova’s national 
ideology manifests itself most clearly in the lengthy episode describing the Pragers’ 
reaction to T. G. Masaryk’s death. 
Where Klenova’s reaction to the war is hysterical, the older actress writer, and performer 
of avant-garde dance, Jarmila Svata’s, was one of shocked compassion. Neither writer is of 
essence party-political. Before and during the war, Svata was a satirical writer. Her 
pessimistic, jolly social caricature, Sedm kamarddu slecny Vivian (The Seven Friends of 
Miss Vivian, 1938), constitutes a picaresque prose morality play: an innocent, playful, 
beautiful girl is an admirable, healthy human being while she lives in a dream world where 
she acts out the role of a young English aristocrat — and the role of the ghost 
indispensable for any English castle. A hard-nosed, athletic newspaper reporter lures her 
into life, wherupon she makes the acquaintance of the Seven Deadly Sins — except that 
Gluttony is replaced by Luxury and Sloth by Mendacity. Her fall to the Seventh Sin, Lust, 
determines she should pursue the career of a film star, makes her hard, selfish and 
successful. In this sarcastic inverted fairy-tale, Svata satirizes primarily the Czech 
intelligensia, whom she considers vapid and effete. Her next novel, Petr zblaznil mesto 
(Petr Sent the Town Mad, 1944), satirizes the Czechs in general, from worker to rich man, 
from barmaid to civil servant. The anonymous provincial town where most of the action 
takes place constitutes a sarcastically conceived microcosm of Protectorate Bohemia. The 
only decent human being, apart from one little girl, is the zoo-keeper, Frantisek, who 
scarcely ever leaves the zoo to enter the Town, has arms like cudgels, not much brain, but 
an unstinting loyalty and love for the animals, particularly the lion, Petr. Petr escapes and 
spends a night in the Town and discovers that its inhabitants are selfish sybarites, most of 
them drunkards or cowards or both, and many of them are either frustrated, such as, for 
example, the spiritualists, or preoccupied with sex. The censors appear not to have noticed 
that Petr represents the Czech heraldic lion, that his cage no. 14 represents the day the first 
German troops entered rump Bohemia and Moravia (that is, one day before the Occupation 
began officially), and that the bus the lion mounts to enter the Town is the no. R III, that is, 
Third Reich. The chief refrain in the novel concerns the hooves of Time trotting through 
Petr’s night on the Town; it probably parodies contemporaneous literary Time- 
consciousness. She employs a variant on that refrain, however, in her next work, her 
shocked reaction to, and attempt at a literary rendering of, the memories of a Czech former 
Gestapo employee, Vaclav Vaclavfk’s, experiences as a political prisoner in Mauthausen 
and then in the slave-labour camps, Schlier and Linz III, Milenci SS-smrti (SS-Death’s 
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Lovers, 1945). She employs the refrain here as a belletrizing device in what is primarily a 
documentary work, and seemingly a work of propaganda demanding retribution on anyone 
who had ever served in the SS. Although her narrator refers to the work as notes 
(.zapisky)}9 and claims it constitutes a truthful account of one man’s war, it is actually a 
literary work with a suitably constructed beginning, middle and end, and with an heroic 
hero, a Yugoslav partisan who organizes the blowing-up of a secret-weapon plant, and 
even the soon-to-be obligatory wise Soviet officer. Apart from the odd scene like that of 
the Jewish male ballet-dancer performing his sensational danse macabre as the Germans 
command him before they shoot him, Svata has either tried too hard to reproduce in 
writing what she has heard from Vaclavik or she has been too impatient or too shocked to 
control her emotions enough to use her aesthetic skills. No Czech woman writer, except 
possibly Libuse Hanusova, changed as much as Svata at the end of the war. Still she 
possessed sufficient artistic awareness to endeavour to re-form and thus give more emotive 
power to her story; the result of this not entirely successful endeavour was her one play, 
based on part of Milenci SS-smti (pages 99-138), the three-act Nenapravitelni (The 
Incorrigibles, 1946). The novel contains tirades on the SS, on Germans’ natural 
imperialsim, on the evils of Nietzsche, on Czech police informers, and expressions of 
admiration for fellow Slavs, for Yugoslav moral stature, physical beauty and strength of 
will, for the Russians’ love of their country and its art, love of Stalin and for their role as 
saviours of Europe. The drama, though by virture of the genre more easily receptive to 
such tirades and though it transmits propaganda messages, lacks the stentorian 
sententiousness of the prose work. The stage-directions indicate that the impact of the play 
will rely a great deal on the background acoustic effects. The work still contains the ideally 
unperturbed Russian major, and the brave Yugoslav partisan officer, but it also contains 
another Slav type, a stereotypically undisciplined, well-nigh hysterical Pole. The main 
message of the play is that all Germans are dangerous, aggressive, bloodthirsty 
barbarians,20 a message similar to that of Klenova’s novel. 
Hodacova began as primarily a feminist writer during the war and remained one during 
the transition. Her first novel, Zitra uz neprijdu (From Tomorrow You Won’t See Me 
Again, 1942) concerns the baneful impact of early marriage on young bourgeoises. Not 
long after her honeymoon, the heroine, who had not even waited to do her matric, becomes 
anorexic, and has to have an abortion. Naturally, everything eventually ends happily with 
her determined to live her own life and to educate herself. This simple, racy novel 
manifests no patriotism, except perhaps allusively, in the Masarykian statement of the 
heroine’s best friend: ‘Life is work and love.’21 The poetry-writing heroine of Hodacova’s 
next novel, Eolova harfa (Aeolian Harp, 1943) does do her matric, and goes to university, 
marries and divorces. The feminism, concerning the empowerment of women, is stronger 
here than in the first novel. The author’s first post-war novel, Mrak (Dark Cloud, 1946), 
treating the sexual awakening of a young girl who discovers she was bom out of wedlock, 
might be understood as reacting to changing times on two very minor grounds. 
Contemporaneous Slavism may be reflected in the fact that the girl’s father is working at a 
19 Jarmila Svata, Milenci SS-smrti, Prague, 1945, p. 148. 
20 See especially Jarmila Svata, Nenapravitelni. Pribeh o 3 jednanich z nacistickeho tabora 
Attnang, Prague, 1946, pp. 73-74. Kune omits the prose and the dramatic work from his 
bibliography of Svata in his 1957 dictionary (see note 6 above). Theoretically that could have 
been because of the Tito partisan hero, but it is more likely that having as a narrator or dramatic 
character a Czech who had previously worked for the Gestapo was no longer acceptable. 
Furthermore, for all the praise of the Russian, and his love for Stalin, neither of these works is 
pro-Communist; Svata has not ‘understood’ that socialism has ‘necessarily’ defeated Fascism. 
21 Helena Hodacova, Zitra uz neprijdu, Prague, 1942, p. 225. 
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book on Slavonic dramaturgy (sic). Secondly, the fact that she, a bourgeoise, is attracted to 
a working-class boy who teaches her the meaning of Truth might, just, reflect the advent of 
socialism as the Establishment ideology. Both these aspects of the novel could, however, 
easily occur in pre-war works. Unlike any other of the women writers I consider in this 
chapter, Hodacova becomes a profounder writer in the transition, albeit in a work she 
claims to have writen in 1944, Tri doby (Three Ages, 1946). Tri doby consists of three 
tales of three generations so closely interwoven that they form a novel, albeit a novel with 
lacunae. On the one hand, it constitutes an old-fashioned Naturalist study of mental 
sickness; on the other, it is a subtle psychological study both of male tyranny and of female 
emancipation. Nothing in Tri doby reflects the war or the ‘brutal peace’. 
My fourth group of writers comprises those whose literary reaction to the end of the war 
was primarily political rather than emotional. Some of these turned or returned to 
Communist ideology, some to a ‘humanitist’ Masarykian road to socialism. Marie 
Pujmanova represents the chief example of a woman writer who returned to Communist 
writing during the transition. Before the war, after a distinctly feeble, incoherent attempt at 
prose of psychological analysis, Pujmanova published the stylistically and ideologically 
most sophisticated Czech Marxist-Leninist industrial novel of the pre-war period, hide na 
krizovatce (People at the Crossroads, 1937). Though the main story of this panoramic 
novel concerns a worker at the Bafa shoe factory who overcomes the bourgeois residual 
values implanted in him by his aspiring mother and becomes haematically class-conscious, 
Pujmanova shows most interest in the middle-class family of a Communist lawyer, who, in 
a not unMasarykian manner, regards the period between the wars as a ‘period of transition 
and preparation’;22 hence the title of the work. During the war, Pujmanova published her 
escapist study in child psychology, especially the psychology of anxiety, Predtucha (The 
Premonition, 1942). It was possible to interpret Majerova’s Robinsonka politically: the 
child’s loss of her mother representing the Czechs’ loss of independence, and her own 
learning to cope with life and, in the end, an ersatz mother representing the determination 
to build a new independence within constricted circumstances. Predtucha is more 
optimistic; the children here believe they have lost their parents in a train crash (the father 
is a linguistician and a purist), but it turns out that they have not, although the parents will 
remain abroad for a little: in other words, one might say, the Czechs’ independence will 
return. Following a convention of the Revivalist village novel, the chief danger arises from 
the mysterious outsider, come to deprive Jarmila of her virginity; she is saved by her fear 
for her parents’ safety and by her ultimate relief that they are hale abroad. Pujmanova’s 
first literary reaction to the end of the war was another of those lyric diaries of war and 
liberation, Radost i zal (Joy and Grief, 1945), which begins with a sarcastic condemnation 
of Neville Chamberlain and ends with a neo-Revivalist eulogy to the Czech language. Her 
dirge for Milena Jesenska is also neo-Revivalist in that she compares her death with that of 
the Protestant rebel scholar, Jessenius, executed on Old Town Square in 1621.23 Similarly 
to Glabaznova, Pujmanova besings Vancura for his exploitation of language, though here a 
socialist undercurrent, a call for engage art, enters: ‘Oh, Vladislav/Knight of the Czech 
22 Marie Pujmanova, Lide na krizovatce, 12th edn, Prague, 1948, p. 300. Czech writers began 
writing en masse of a given period as a transitional age in the 1890s, like other Europeans. The 
term or concept has been used for almost every period during the twentieth century except 
those of the two World Wars. One notes that the terms ‘the building of Socialism’ for the first 
fifteen years after the Second World War and 'Normalization’ for the 1970s, and sometimes the 
1980s, also implied transition. 
23 Jessenius (Jan Jesensky, 1566-1621). Milena’s aunt, the prolific author of verse, fiction and 
drama, Ruzena Jesenska (1863-1940), was convinced she was descended from that late 
Renaissance heliocentrist and translator of Savonarola. 
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language/temper our pens/temper our hearts.’24 Those who fight on the barricades in the 
Prague Uprising are avenging angels come down with their hand-grenades to rout the 
German evil. If she has not made it clear enough before, she nails her colours to the 
Communist mast in her love poem for the Red Army. Soviet soldiers arrive as a soterial 
wind from the East to create beauty out of death and destruction. Nevertheless 
Pujmanova’s avowal of allegiance to Stalinist Communism comes only with her first post¬ 
war work of fiction, the collective historical novel, Hra s ohnem (Playing with Fire, 1948), 
where she continues the saga begun in Lide na krizovatce and where the Communist 
lawyer shares the limelight with Georgi Dimitrov and a young schoolmistress, heiress to 
the Bat’a concern, who becomes a good Communist. Like Spalova in Petrusha a soudruzi, 
Pujmanova condemns the failure of German socialists, and like Svata, she appears to 
consider being a German almost a crime in itself. Of course, the Czech bourgeoisie, 
represented by Ro, tend to be weakling sybarites likely to collaborate with the Germans. 
No true Czech patriot can be anything but socialist. Pujmanova returns to Communism, but 
Svozilova turns to Communism for the first time after the war. Never anything but an inept 
poet, a change almost comparable with Svata’s takes place between the naively 
philosophising erotic verse of her first collection, published just before the war, Nedele 
(Sunday, 1938) and her second collection, her contribution to the sub-genre of the lyric 
diary of events from the Munich Agreement to the liberation, Kavalkada (The Cavalcade, 
1945). A tendency to sentimentalization still manifests itself, for example in her 
description of the anxiety inolved in listening to foreign wireless broadcasts, but so does a 
growing sarcasm in her mistrust of the West. Panslav elements recur; for example, she 
envisages Munich as having decided ‘to devastate the trusting Slav face’,25 and the 
Russians as a Slav body that had shed its blood for Europe, and had spent the twenty years 
between the wars usefully building socialism and arms factories for the salvation of the 
West, while the West had been dancing and getting drunk. The chief reason for the Czechs 
to be grateful to the Soviets is, however, that they had prevented Hitler from fulfilling his 
design to annihilate the Czechs. In one poem, Svozilova goes further than any other writer 
in 1945 in expressing in verse Party doctrine: she rebukes those broadcasting from abroad 
for calling on the Czechs to rebel, to indulge in futile bloodshed before a true revolution 
was possible.26 Svozilova’s next collection, Zazrak mljl nas (A Miracle Passes By, 1947) 
combines a sentimental view on childbirth with expressions of the need to fight for peace. 
Another writer to turn to Stalinist Communism after the war was Libuse Hanusova. If she 
is remembered for anything in her pre-war fiction it is for Anarchie srdci (The Anarchy of 
Hearts, 1929), an antisemitic feminist novel about the empowerment of women, which 
treats ‘new’ subjects like the discovery of a bourgeoise that she has married a homosexual 
or racketeering among officers behind the lines in the Great War. Her post-war novel, 
Nepovolanym vstup zakazan (No Entry Except on Business, 1948) concerns the first year 
of the Protectorate and the founding of Communist resistance groups. It also constitutes a 
defence of the Hitler-Stalin pact and interprets Stalin’s requisition of eastern Poland as an 
act of Panslav salvation. 
Those in the fourth group of writers who returned after the war to Masarykian thinking, 
all too conscious of the political power of the Communist Party, normally endeavoured to 
demonstrate that T. G. Masaryk’s or Benes’s path was the Czech path to socialism and that 
24 Marie Pujmanova, Radost i zal, Prague, 1945, p. 58. 
25 Herma J. Svozilova, Kavalkada, 2nd edn, Brno, 1947, p. 11. 
26 See ‘U radia’ in ibid., pp. 29-31. Svozilova is trying to follow the Party line and implicitly 
criticizes the West, and possibly the ‘earliness’ of the Prague Uprising. The transition-period 
jokes about broadcasts, however, actually made fun of what Radio Moscow had urged Czechs 
to undertake against the Germans. 
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this path did not seriously conflict with what the Communist Party claimed to desire. 
Naturally, such compromising views could and sometimes did transform Masaryk into a 
fellow-traveller. Milena Novakova’s pre-war semi-documentary nationalist novel, Ted 
nebo nikdy (Now or Never, 1936), apotheosizes Masaryk, Masaryk’s conception of the 
Hussite national tradition, and Czech resistance against Austria at home and abroad during 
the Great War. She frequently gives Masaryk the epithet he acquired in the 1880s, during 
the Battle of the (forged) Manuscripts, ‘pastyf’ (the pastor/shepherd). Most important for 
this chapter, Novakova emphasizes the delusive nature of Panslavism and the unreliability 
of Russian publications. After the war, she pursues the Masaryk cult through the erstwhile 
president’s American wife, Charlotte, who had been a member of the Social Democratic 
Party since 1905. In her emotional study, Verna socialistka Charlotta Garrigue 
Masarykova (The True Socialist, Charlotte Garrigue Masaryk, 1948), Novakova fuses 
Charlotte’s socialism with her patriotism; she had been the ‘mother of Czech liberation’ 
from the Habsburgs, ‘the Czechs’ teacher of social consciousness’,27 and had actively 
contributed to laying the foundations for the development of ‘a socialist system covering 
the whole world such as we [...] are bringing to fruition today’.28 Charlotte had persuaded 
Masaryk not to leave Prague in disgust at Czech responses to the Polna blood-libel trial 
and thus had preserved ‘this fighter for Truth, justice, rights, decency and universal values’ 
so that he could become the President-Liberator. It was also Charlotte who had set him on 
the path to develop ‘the old Czech tradition of militant humanism into socialist political 
consciousness’,29 and who had aided the political education of Benes by lending him 
books when he had been in hospital with a broken leg incurred in a soccer accident. Thus 
she had been instrumental in making Masaryk and Benes the creators of ‘democratic 
socialism’, and this democratic socialism and ‘national and spiritual freedom’ had been the 
Masaryks’ only goal, as it was now the only goal of Czechoslovakia reborn.30 
Hana Klenkova’s political path resembled Novakova’s, though she showed serious 
concern for the reasons why Czech society allowed itself to fall into that state of inertia 
which had allowed the Czechs to submit to the Munich Agreement. A trifle over- 
sentimental and over-didactic, her best known but not best-written novel, Slunecna Farma 
(Sunny Farm, 1939), recounts the life of a New York slum child who, after realizing that 
socialist activism was ineffective in improving the lot of the poor, becomes a 
housemistress in the reform-school of which she has herself once been an inmate. Nurture 
overcomes nature. She learns from a man who loves her but whom she will not accept 
because of her social vocation and her belief that a useful life must be based on Masaryk’s 
principles: ‘What decides a human being’s lot is not Good or Evil, but Truth. Naturally, 
martyrdom is not Truth. Joy in work, even small-scale work, but work growing from a love 
for everything living, closing its eyes to nothing and always believing in someting better 
— that is the truthful fulfilment of the life of a modem human being.’31 Klenkova’s far 
more sophisticated post-war novel, Regina Lorencova (1947), consists of a long 
confessional letter from the eponymous heroine to a journalist who had left for Paris on the 
day she had decided to become a good wife to her Lutheran priest husband; a lorry runs 
over the latter on that same day. Unusually for the transition, but like Hodacova’s Tri doby, 
this work has a strong feminist streak. On the one hand, the novel constitutes an essay on 
freedom, and on love; on the other, it meditates on why the Czechoslovak First Republic 
27 Milena Novakova, Verna socialistka Charlotta Garrigue Masarykova. K 25. vyroci jejiho 
skonu, Prague, 1948, p. 7. 
28 Ibid., p. 8. 
29 Ibid., pp. 14-15. 
30 Ibid., pp. 22 and 29. 
31 Hana Klenkova, Slunecna Farma, Prague, 1939, p. 298. 
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had failed as a democracy, and failed to fulfil Masaryk’s intentions and beliefs. In 
Klenkova’s view, all the signs of this failure are there by 1935, when the novel’s action 
ends. Regina’s own failings represent the failings of the First Republic: ‘I wanted freedom, 
but was not free in myself.’32 Following Masaryk, Klenkova inveighs against the 
immediately post-Great War fashion for leaving the Church, for would-be liberal anti¬ 
clericalism, against the large number of semi-educated among the Czech intellectual elite 
and against the influence of Herbartism in Czech schooling;33 she also attributes 
considerable influence to the Czech Fascists. Truly liberal Czechs realize by 1933 that, ‘we 
have made many mistakes [...]; we have still to re-educate the Czechs, to turn them away 
from their selfishness, mendacity and petty-mindedness towards civil conscientiousness, 
Truth and moral strength’.34 Only two parts of the story appear directly to reflect the 
author’s experience of German occupation, those episodes concerning the representatives 
of two groups Hitler intended to kill, homosexuals and Jews. She attacks First Republic 
prejudice towards the homosexuals and devotes many pages to explaining their lot to the 
reader and defending their usefulness to society (the homosexual Beda is a particularly 
successful businessman). Her conclusion is bold for the times, though a compromise: we 
have no right to condemn homosexuals, but we must have compassion for their 
abnormality. She maintains that First Republic society was antisemitic through and 
through, another bold statement for the times. Unwittingly, however, she stereotypes her 
Jewish character, Jarda (whose mother is actually Gentile, and so his Jewishness is of the 
mind), in much the same manner as Klenova in Tve deti, Evropo...! Jarda lacks moral fibre 
and when he can bear his ‘Jewishness’ no longer, he commits suicide. Furthermore, Jarda 
reads literature of the very sort that, at the turn of the century, Masaryk had condemned as 
morally corrosive, Baudelaire and Rimbaud. Klenkova also made a contribution to the 
Masaryk cult in a brief work from the same year as Regina Lorencova, Nas president (Our 
President, 1947), and she uses Benes in much the same way as Novakova had used 
Charlotte Masaryk. The work consists of nineteen letters from a mother to her young son 
in which she maintains she will explain the meaning of Benes’s term ‘people’s 
democracy’;35 she does nothing of the sort. Masaryk remains ‘our faith and hope and the 
meaning of our life, even though he is no longer among the living’, ‘our spiritual leader 
[...] who will never abandon us as long as we remain faithful to him’.36 When Benes had 
been elected to succeed Masaryk as president, ‘Unity prevailed over hatred and truth over 
lie. The Czechs had looked into their hearts and found Masaryk’s commandment: live 
morally, in purity and democratic unity.’37 At the same time, however, just in one 
statement at the end, Klenkova willy-nilly supports the Communist cause in praising 
Benes’s meeting with Stalin in November 1943 and the resultant pact. She thus implies 
that this pact accorded with Masaryk’s spiritual leadership. 
Finally, I take the perhaps idiosyncratic case of the actress writer, Olga Scheinpflugova. 
From among her pre-war novels one might mention the attempt at an avant-garde fairy¬ 
tale, Babiola (1930), about a French sea-side waif who through her intellect and sexual 
attractiveness achieves success in Paris as a writer, then actress, then singer, and who, once 
the whole world is at her feet, brings global peace. Probably her most widely read pre-war 
novel was, however, Balada z Karlina (A Ballad from Karlin, 1935), a pessimistic 
amalgam of late nineteenth-century Realism and the inter-war novel of psychological 
32 Hana Klenkova, Regina Lorencova, Prague, 1947, p. 13. See also p. 30. 
33 Ibid., pp. 93, 133, 171 and 246. 
34 Ibid., p. 383. 
35 Hana Klenkova, Nas president. Listy o zivote doktora Edvarda Benese, Prague, 1947, p. 7. 
36 Ibid., pp. 12 and 91-92. 
37 Ibid., p. 92. 
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analysis, about the state of anxiety in which a mangle-woman lives for twenty years after 
being banished from her rural home; this anxiety only increases when, on inheriting 
money, she is persuaded that, for the first time in her life, she should look for a man. Both 
novels have the lack or non-enjoyment of sexual intercourse as a subsidiary motif, and this 
motif becomes more important in her largest novel, which she spent a great deal of the war 
writing, the stylized autobiography, Cesky roman (A Czech Novel, 1946), whose title had 
been suggested to her by Masaryk. The novel sets out to represent an intimate account of 
her friendship with the allegedly asexual Karel Capek (1890-1938), a writer who had by 
this time become a symbol of Czechness among the bourgeoisie — although the great 
majority of Czech intellectuals before the war had rejected his cosy golden-mean views. In 
this novel, Capek suddenly loses his impotence on the advice of a Vienna doctor (sic), and 
enjoys a brief, happy marriage with Scheinpflugova, referred to in the third person simply 
as Olga throughout. The novel fuelled the already glimmering Capek cult, but, more 
important, it provided apparently intimate evidence in support of the cult of Masaryk as a 
man, and a thinker. Cesky roman also constitutes as assessment of Czech history from the 
middle of the Great War to 1945, within which Masaryk becomes the epitome of 
Czechness. Scheinpflugova has Capek state that ‘There cannot be anything more Czech 
than [Masaryk’s] life, evolution and destiny.’ Masaryk is the man who gave the Czechs 
‘national fame and freedom’ while remaining the ‘guardian of the world’s moral order’. He 
had taught Capek ‘how difficult and unrewarding the work of Truth and the service of 
justice was’,38 and his spirit had lived on somewhat melodramatically during the German 
occupation: ‘The rebelliousness of the Hussites and the nobility of Masaryk’s world-view, 
his consciousness of right and Truth hovered like an indestructible shield over the 
occupied country where arrogant, short-sighted tyrants were selling their souls to the 
devil.’39 Scheinpflugova makes no attempt at reconciling Masaryk with the Communists, 
omits, like all but Hanusova, the German-Soviet pact, but does manage to introduce some 
Slav feeling from the beginning, which justifies the nature of the welcome she gives Soviet 
liberation. Her mother, we learn, had believed in a united Slavdom under the leadership of 
the Russians, and she is herself offended by the Poles’ greedy desire for Moravian Silesia, 
whereby they ‘refused to listen to any Slav conscience they might have’. In contrast, the 
liberating Russians are ‘brothers by tongue and blood’ and have ‘healthy, broad Slav 
faces’.40 Cesky roman barely excels popular literature. The first of the two plays she wrote 
during the Occupation but could not publish, Guayana (Devil’s Island, 1945), concerns a 
miscarriage of justice. The theme of the play is actually the relationship between love and 
responsibility, but at the time it was interpreted as an allegory on the Czechs’ lot during the 
Protectorate; the French authorities who had wrongly imprisoned the main male character 
for murder were understood to represent the Germans. His wife’s love secures his release. 
The second play, Videla jsem Boha (I Saw God, 1945) is set during a particularly brutal 
dictatorship, which is clearly intended to stand for the Protectorate. Here the regime is 
toppled by personal, non-institutional Christian faith. No doubt Scheinpflugova intended to 
embody in her heroine a Masarykian form of Christianity, such as Tilschova presented in 
Tri krize (and before the war in her novel, Vykoupeni [Redemption, 1923]), but the 
heroine’s faith here more closely resembles that portrayed by Vasova in her short stories. 
Scheinpflugova’s somewhat wooden family-chronicle novel, Zluty diim (The Yellow 
House, 1947), constitutes a coming to terms with people’s democracy. She argues two 
ideological points. First, it is good if rich farmers lose their estates, since the proud lives 
they had enjoyed had actually been an unnatural prison; the Czechs are natural peasants, 
38 Olga Scheinpflugova, Cesky roman, Prague, 1946, pp. 316, 200 and 234. 
39 Ibid., p. 606. 
40 Ibid., pp. 502, 620 and 623. 
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plebeians, and people’s democracy will return rich farmers to their natural Czech state, 
relieve them of the false burdens of ‘family’ and inheritance. Secondly, people’s 
democracy represents a natural evolution towards a socialism of the sort the rural Czech 
had been striving for since 1848, a socialism which will destroy class hatred. Zluty diim 
conveys a National Social, by no means a Communist, message. 
II 
Before the war Helena Dvorakova could not decide how or what she wanted to write. For 
example, Mdmeni (Delusion, 1928), a novel about a honey-trap, where a disfigured Soviet 
agent saves a good Czech from Magyar machinations, combines a psychological study of 
lust with the attributes of a Boys’ Own Paper adventure-cum-detective story. Notably, 
given the way Dvorakova’s attitudes will progress, the honey set in the trap is Suzanne, a 
Hungarian Jew, who had once owned a sweet-shop and once worked as a night-club 
whore, and a Jew called Taussig is a Hungarian agent in the Czechoslovak Ministry of 
National Defence. In contrast to Mamem, her Veliky proud (The Great Current, 1932), 
constitutes a novel about maternal love and self-sacrifice and considers, in sometimes 
Naturalist detail, the variety of posible types of victimhood women may suffer in modem 
society. A woman’s altruism and maternal love for all humanity transforms a one-sided, 
fanatical male scientist into a complete human being. Dvorakova reached artistic maturity 
during the war with Doktorka Diana Holcova (Diana Holcova, PhD, 1941), where she has 
shed the influence of Trivialliteratur that had been rather too evident in her pre-war 
novels. This feminist novel of psychological analysis, set mostly in Rome and Prague, 
traces a young woman’s trials in love, then sexual intercourse, then abandonment by the 
father, then in lone motherhood, and her final decision to quit all the conventional pastimes 
and roles of women and to devote herslf to a career as an academic. Since Dvorakova 
makes Diana an historian, she gives herself ample opportunity to pass patriotic comments 
on the Czech past, a common method for asserting national cultural independence during 
the Occupation. 
Similar historicizing patriotism lies behind her choice to write a novel on the 
development of Liben, a largely farming village in the mid-nineteenth century, into a 
proletarian community by the 1890s and finally, at the very beginning of the twentieth 
century into a part of Greater Prague, Pad rodiny Bryknarii. The first volume, Na novy kvet 
(New Burgeoning, 1943), takes the reader from 1854 to the late 1860s. The imprecision of 
dates at the end of this volume allows her to omit the Austro-Prussian War; otherwise in 
her quest for historical verisimilitude she would have had to express or to have her 
characters express pro-Prussian sentiments; that might have resembled collaboration. The 
action of the second volume, Bilymi plameny (Through White Flames, autumn 1945), lasts 
from 1872 (though one inconsistent reference to the January 1868 demonstration against 
Dualism suggests 1869) to 1887, and of the third, Prapory nad mestem (Flags Over the 
City, 1948), from 1890 to 1901. It is pertinent to the subject of this chapter, to the theme of 
the triology itself, and to an understanding of the political reason for Dvorakova’s 
choosing the period she has that by the end she notes the similarity of that period to the 
time in which she is writing. The central character of Prapory nad mestem states that 1890 
is a moment of transition, from self-help and social romanticism to socialism, indeed to 
Marxist socialism.41 Although she tries to persuade her readers or reviewers in her 
afterword that the triology constituted Socialist Realism, in fact in tracing the development 
of socialist ideas in Liben, Prague, and to a degree in the whole of Austria and in France, 
41 Helena Dvorakova, Prapory nad mestem, Prague, 1948, pp. 38-39. Henceforth 1 shall refer to 
this novel as Part III and cite page numbers of quotations within the text. 
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she actually traces a Czech Sonderweg. She describes, first, the way the intellectuals, 
particularly from the old patriciate, take over the working-class movement from the 
workers and, secondly, how simultaneously the young Czech intellectuals of the 1890s 
believe in a socialism mitigated by Masaryk. In Part III, there are, we note, virtually no 
working-class characters of any significance, except Jarka Cabalka, who pops in and out 
on account of his devotion to the central character. 
Dvorakova maintains a Realist approach to her subject-matter and to her means of 
expression throughout. She has clearly studied Liben local history thoroughly and, in the 
first two volumes, she meticulously describes and explains local architectual, institutional 
and demographic developments and the impact national events have on the populace of 
Liben. When Liben ceases to be the permanent centre of attention in Part III, the only 
volume written entirely after the war, and the only volume where matters erotic dominate 
matters political, local or national, Dvorakova is rather too frequently careless. For 
example, she has Masaryk lead the Battle of the Manuscripts from the periodical Cas 
rather than Athenaeum; she has Samuel Smiles instead of John Stuart Mill as the author of 
The Subjection of Women; she has the dandy Arthur Breisky (1885-1910) coming down to 
Prague in the 1890s; naturally, he was too young to adopt his dandy style before the end of 
the first decade of the twentieth century. She maintains a Realist treatment of Time 
throughout. In Na novy kvet, however, more episodes take place simultaneously than in the 
other two volumes and she frequently employs a device whereby we do not learn how one 
episode ends until we are well into a subsequent or parallel episode. In the other volumes 
episodes tend to flow in a linear chronological sequence. Also in Na novy kvet she 
introduces a huge amount of information on landmarks, customs, traditions, fashions, 
historical events, clothing, tradesmens’ tools and so forth, but she suceeds in having the 
reader accept such information as Realist local colour, never appears didactic as, for 
example, Tilschova and Spalova do in their descriptions of nineteenth-century Prague. The 
vocabulary of this first volume is vast: period slang, colloquialisms in dialogue, technical 
terms and a large number of inventively formed or rare words, especially verbs. In her use 
of verbs and in her sparse imagery based almost entirely on similes, it is as if she had read 
some rule-book on Realist style. The vocabulary of Bilymi plameny is not as rich and 
perhaps the fact that in her afterword she acknowledges having drawn on Jan Neruda’s 
(1834-91) feuilletons for a period lexis indicates that she was aware of this. Her imagery 
remains, however, based on the simile. The use of similes diminishes in Part III, and here, 
although she still employs some period technical terminology, she no longer retains the 
archaisms that suffused Na novy kvet and were still in ample evidence in Bilymi plameny. 
The lexis of Part III is more or less standard for the 1940s. We may interpret this 
development in the narratoria! language of the trilogy as representing an attempt to reflect 
the development of literary linguistic self-confidence among the Czechs during the second 
half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, Dvorakova’s development of her lexis 
comports with the dominant moods of the three volumes, the first being rhapsodic, the 
second elegaic and the third that of a lyrical ballad. All this said, she has still taken more 
care with the first than the subsequent volumes; indeed, with the first Dvorakova is clearly 
endeavouring to lure the readers into believing that they are reading a text from the 1850s 
or 1860s: the language of expression becomes part of the would-be documentary nature of 
the novel. Dvorakova’s representation of psychological motivation develops roughly in 
accord with the development of the language. In Na novy kvet, with the exception of one 
powerful scene where we follow the mind of a woman crazed with terror for her husband’s 
safety during the great fire of Liben in 1863, the narrator builds up the psychologies of 
characters through percipient analyses of actions and reactions. This method is still evident 
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in Bilymi plameny, but here it begins to be replaced by interior monologue, which then 
becomes virtually the sole method of monitoring the movements of the mind in Part Ill. 
Linguistically then, stylistically if one will, the trilogy is Realist, as are the devices used 
to reproduce characters’ psychologies. The choice of two families, one might argue three, 
to represent social, political and economic developments is not associated with the period 
or mode of literature, though it is common in the Dickens, Balzac and even Galsworthy 
versions of Realism that have had an impact on Dvorakova’s writing. The plot is, however, 
essentially Romantic, and particularly in the first two volumes one is sometimes, 
somewhat incongruously, reminded of Gustav Pfleger-Moravsky (1833-75). The plot 
acquires ever greater Romantic qualities in Part III, where the main character has many 
characteristics of a Czech Decadent hero: he is the last of a long line, impoverished, 
flounders in a world of intellectual ideals, and falls in love with a femme who is literally 
fatale (called Suzanne like the spy in Mamenl). The core of the Romantic plot, however, 
lies not in this hopelessly hardliner Marxist’s love-life, nor in his idealist actions. It lies in 
the fact that the author has constructed her plot around the idea that the old Czech 
patriciate, petty nobles before the Counter-Reformation, should, first, represent the best in 
mid-century philanthropy, should then be ousted by industrialist parvenus, some of them 
sound, socially aware men (Kadlec and, younger, Vaclav Doubek), but most of them 
greedy and immoral (Kroupa, Pliva, Padevet); these patricians fail by deciding they should 
imitate the parvenus, because philanthropy and property speculation do not mix, but then 
realize that only through socialism can they assume their role as the leading forces in 
society. Employing such a Romantic outline plot in a Realist work might serve as a 
propaganda device: a demonstration that the old Czech traditions are best served today by 
the Marxists. If Dvorakova intended that, one could claim that her trilogy more or less 
demonstrates the Stalinist cultural ideologue, Zdenek Nejedly’s, view that in the Middle 
Ages, the Czech petty nobility represented a progressive political force analogous to that of 
the Czech proletariat in the twentieth century. A true Czech patriot, aware of the Czechs’ 
history, must be a Marxist today (in the 1940s). 
The central family of the trilogy is the Bryknars. Jan Bryknar is the main character of Na 
novy kvet and his son, Martin, of the other two novels. They are the patricians, former petty 
nobility. Jan also has a daughter, Zdenka, who retains her patrician social views until 
Martin’s death, when, after studying his library and his letters from a socialist friend in 
Paris, she becomes a convinced Marxist socialist. The second family is that of the poor 
tailor, Vaclav Doubek, who comes from the country and settles in Liben, and gradually 
builds up his business until he owns a factory and then a chain of factories with associated 
companies all over the Slav world. Doubek achieves his riches through industry, 
determination and good, honest business acumen. He has six children, but his wife, 
Gustynka, dies after bearing the last two, twin girls. The first three, Michal, Vilem and 
Berta, thus go through puberty without a moral education. Zdeftka suffers nothing of that, 
and Martin only passingly when their mother is sent to a madhouse: but they are patricians. 
Michal is a selfish sybarite who takes over two of his father’s factories and does well 
because, unlike his father, he grossly exploits his workers; because he is rich and 
handsome, he manages to marry into the nobility — but nobility with a German name — 
and has a son, Hubert. His wife’s family and soon his wife, too, despise him for his 
uncouth background and he is soon estranged from them and pursues sexual adventures 
with under-age girls. He it is who more or less accidently kills Martin with a hammer, 
because his Czech-Moroccan mistress loves him.Vilem is equally bad, an embezzler, 
fraudster and drunkard from his teens, then a bad actor, first in an itinerant troupe, then in 
Marseilles, then in a seedy music-hall and some suburban theatres; then he seems to live 
off card-sharping and, finally, already half deranged by his alcoholism, he appears to be 
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working as a police agent when he tries to shoot Martin Bryknar. Berta starts off badly, 
canoodling with one of her father’s proletarian employees, but Zdenka tactfully finds her a 
farmer husband to keep her out of trouble and she soon becomes well-nigh a caricature of 
the buxom, feracious peasant-woman. Eventually Zdenka Bryknarova agrees to marry 
Doubek, not because she responds to Doubek’s love and admiration of many years’ 
standing, but because — and such are the ways of the patriciate — she needs to save 
Martin from bankruptcy. For quite some time before the marriage, she had begun to take a 
quasi-matemal interest in Doubek’s fourth child, Jan with his Byronic limp. Within the 
Romantic plot structure, the reader must conclude that the fact that Zdenka had cultivated 
Jan’s intellectual abilities in childhood and inculcated her values in him resulted in his 
proving a proud defendant in the Omladina affair,42 his becoming a university teacher and, 
most important, his fervent adherence to Masaryk’s views. Jan becomes a close friend of 
Martin’s and Martin has the last word in their discussion on the relative values of 
Masarykism and Marxism. But where Dvorakova argues the Masaryk view cogently, she 
does not do the same for Marxism, thus does not actually intellectually support her 
patriotic vision of the Czech nobility re-assuming a leading role in society as Marxists. I 
would contend that this not so much constitutes a minor inconsistency in the novel as it 
reflects the state of mind of many Czech intellectuals in the 1940s transition, unable to 
decide between Masaryk and Marx and looking for a compromise between them. 
Furthermore, one might argue that in having the patrician Zdenka bring Jan up 
intellectually led to a way of thinking that diluted patrician Marxism into middle-class 
Masarykism. Zdenka also brings up Doubek’s twin daughters and, in the period mode, 
educates their bodies rather than their minds, although, to be sure, they do soon belong to 
the Liben young intellectual set that meets in Zdenka’s house. Mainly, however, she 
develops their talent for ‘classical’ dance of the Isadora Duncan brand. They end up 
happily, and propitiously, married in Vienna. 
The Doubek family represents the new bourgeoisie as the Bryknars represent the 
patriciate. Both families produce modem intellectuals in the second generation. To 
complete her scheme, Dvoratkova has a third family representing initially smallholders, 
but then the proletariat; this family, the Hlavaceks, produce an intellectual in the third 
generation. The lots of the Havaceks are intertwined with those of the Doubeks and 
Bryknars from the beginning. Doubek first encounters the smallholder Matej Hlavacek 
when he is walking to Prague and Matej is the first to give him board in Liben; eventually 
he marries Matej’s daughter. Meanwhile Jan Bryknar, whose wife had become frigid after 
the birth of Martin, over-confident, trusting seigneur that he is, has begun an adulterous 
relationship with the red-head, Marie Anna, wife of the spiteful, oleaginous, triangular¬ 
headed minor local government oficial with the possibly slightly germanized name, 
Krejczarek, and sister of the also red-haired fraudulent, scheming, embezzling surveyor- 
cum-property speculator, Ignac Kroupa. Kroupa and Krejczarek encourage Jan Bryknar to 
fulfil his dream and found a Liben savings bank to help the poor, to be president of the 
bank and take responsibility for its assets. Kroupa and his cronies set about defrauding the 
bank of its money; the fraud is discovered by a kind parvenu industrialist whose wisdom 
42 In September 1893, the authorities declared martial law in Prague in order to curb the activities 
of various ‘progressive’ youth organizations. In February 1894, what amounted to a show trial 
took place of young intellectuals and others which claimed to be trying representatives of a 
large organization called Omladina. Sixty-eight ‘members’ of the non-existent Omladina 
received prison sentences. One of the more prominent of those sentenced was the poet S. K. 
Neumann (1875-1947), who was first an anarchist and then a Communist; his seventieth 
birthday was much celebrated in Czech verse. Among women writers, Pujmanova includes a 
poem to him in her Radost i zal (see note 24 above). 
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and education have been greatly enhanced by twenty-seven years in America. Kroupa and 
Krejczarek blackmail Bryknar into covering the bank’s losses by threatening him with a 
suit for adultery when he threatens them with a suit for fraud. He pays by selling most of 
the shares in Zdenka’s dowry, and realizing that they could continue to blackmail him on 
account of Marie Anna, he shoots himself in the head. Kroupa also manages to persuade 
Matej Hlavacek to sell him most of his land. Eventually Matej realizes what a paultry sum 
Kroupa had paid him and is anyway depressed by no longer having his land to work; he 
also commits suicide. Neither patrician nor peasant is a match for the wiles of the new 
entrepreneur society. Matej’s son, the bricklayer Frantik, introduces Martin Bryknar to 
socialist ideas when he is still a student; at this stage (Na novy kvet), however much he 
likes Frantik, Martin condemns the working classes. Later, when Kroupa’s sons are 
ensuring they can drive Martin into bankruptcy on account of his failed enterprise to build 
three tenement blocks on land newly reclaimed from the river, and especially after he has 
been so shocked by conditions in the shanty town outside Liben, Na dedinkach (the impact 
of this visit on Martin is psychologically unconvincing), Martin becomes ever more 
interested in socialism. Frantik Hlavacek takes him to Social Democrat pubs and 
eventually to a secret meeting aboard a dredger. Finally, when Frantik is dying of 
tuberculosis contracted during his time as a political prisoner, he hands over his Party 
responsibilites to Martin. These family connections do not stop here. In the Liben young 
intellectuals’ club, watched over by Martin’s unmarried cousin Tyna in Zdenka’s house, 
Doubek’s twins become friends of Frantik’s step-nephew, an historical character with a 
fictional step-uncle, the Decadent poet, Karel Hlavacek (1874-98). Dvorakova creates 
these parallels and instinctive friendships between the Bryknars and the Hlavaceks in order 
to support her patriotic Romantic plot. 
She uses the figure of Karel Hlavacek to introduce another strand of fin-de-siecle Czech 
intellectual life, a strand that seemed to be as opposed to Masaryk as it was to Marxism. 
Before he appears in the club, Martin had once met him as a twelve-year-old boy by the 
swampy wasteland around Liben. This encounter alludes to Hlavacek’s Rimbaudesque 
portrayal of sensitive child outsiders embuing the poison of knowledge into their eyes 
beside a swamp in his cycle Mstiva kantilena (Cantilena of Revenge, 1898): 
He was not good-looking; indeed he was positively unsightly with his rather coarse features, 
blubbery lips and tall, gangling stature, all arms and legs. There was nothing attractive about 
this figure with his patched clothes and his sullen, unhappy face. Nevertherless there was 
something so strikingly individual about him that Martin suddenly put his hand on his 
shoulder and asked him who he was.43 
Dvorakova’s description of his writing verse in his head while in something like a trance is 
over-sentimental; on the other hand, her association of his verse with the unconscious and 
the paysage de Tame serves her aim as a novelist to represent something of the thought of 
the period: ‘[The dreaming young man] for a moment fixed his attention on the tangible, 
three-dimensional reality around him, and so awakened, cut himself off from his inner 
being; the landscape of his soul was extinguished. And the acoustics and form of his verse 
slipped away with his vision [...]. His lines withdrew, sank back into his unconscious’ (III, 
p. 59). Dvorakova’s interpretation of Hlavacek’s active membership of the Sokol patriotic 
gymnastics association, is that exercising in the Sokol gym, he never has ‘the terrifying, 
murderous feeling that I must somehow escape from life’ (III, p. 87); he declares that 
poetry is for him an ‘escape from petty, wretched, fettered everyday life into the realm of 
supreme freedom [...], into a liberty and beauty where 1 am master’ (III, p. 91). Dvorakova 
43 Helena Dvorakova, Bilymi plameny, Prague, 1945, p. 631. See Rimbaud’s ‘Les Poetes de sept 
ans\ 
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also, however, has Hlavacek interpret the Gueux of Mstiva kantilena in the way Marxist 
critics liked for almost a hundred years: the Gueux represented ‘tattered workers or day- 
labourers’ and he was a Gueux, ‘poor and sick’ (III, p. 92). 
She uses Part III to come to terms with Czech attitudes to outsiders of another kind, the 
Jews.44 She soon links the ‘Jewish Question’ with Masaryk, too. First, she introduces the 
wise, kind Liben Jewish doctor, Stein, somewhat stereotyped with his curly black hair, and 
given how he develops, she clearly employs the condescending pejorative ‘Zidadek’ 
hypocoristically (III, p. 7). In associating Czech antisemitism of the 1890s with bourgeois 
capitalist radical nationalism, she may be endeavouring to give a Marxist view or, more 
likely, may be embodying in an historical event her revulsion at the Germans’ systematic 
murder of the Jews, or even expressing a belief that Czech antisemitism was something of 
the distant past. She has Martin suggest that capitalists and landowners used antisemitism 
as a means of diverting the masses’ attention from the social question. At the same time, 
Martin says that, ‘yes, some Jews in this state do bear great guilt. For example, the vodka 
and brandy distillers in Slovakia, Galicia, Bukovina. But clearly to incite the unthinking 
mob against them is, in my view, vile’ (III, p. 271). He considers antisemitism perverted: 
as a result of the Hilsner ritual-murder trial, ‘For over six months now, rancour against the 
Jews, revulsion at them and a general lust for revenge have been smothering all other 
movements, tearing the masses down to a subhuman level because indirectly, through 
reading, they can satisfy their repressed proclivities and all sorts of monstrous passions’ 
(III, p. 274). He also suspects that the real grounds are economic: ‘The atmosphere in this 
country is positively sticky with envy and a perverted racial lust for revenge. For, in 
essence, the background to all this antisemitism is nothing more than non-Jews’ envy of 
the Jews’ greater initiative in commerce and their efficiency altogether’ (III, p. 283). 
Masaryk’s stand against the inane ritual-murder superstition had led to his being 
abandoned by Czechs of all sorts, ‘except perhaps the workers’ (III, p. 276). 
Thereby Dvorakova is actually using that part of the Masaryk cult that emphasized his 
closeness to the workers,45 rather than suggesting some lack of racism in the working 
classes as a Stalinist critic might have wished to imagine. She implies Masaryk’s contempt 
for jingoism and the worship of false national legends or qualities that jingoism involves in 
the venomous economically and sexually exploitative Michal Doubek’s reaction to 
Gebauer and Masaryk’s argument in the Battle of the Manuscripts: ‘Philosophers of 
national suicide... repulsive, downright repulsive! This sort of perversion could have only 
been cooked up in some sterile academic brain. Someone called these nihilists, that 
professor who came from Vienna to Prague, poisoners of wells’ (III, p. 12). Dvorakova’s 
view on which way the Czechs would like to go after the the post-war transition is clear 
from the following, which actually contains for the contemporary Czech reader also 
references to the ‘betrayal’ of the Social Democrats in the Great War and recent Stalinist 
obfuscation on the roles of nationalism and internationalism such as they knew from 
Zdenek Nejedly: 
‘We young people acknowledge in principle that socialism is right. It is no coincidence that 
during this year’s miners’ strike in Kladno Professor Masaryk travelled there to lecture to the 
44 Just as Souckova introduces Weininger’s Geschlecht und Charakter as the heroine of Bel 
canto's favourite reading matter as an anti-Nazi jibe (actually, Weininger was the only Jewish 
writer Hitler admired), so Dvorakova introduces Heine: Helena Dvorakova, Na novy kvet, 2nd 
edn, Prague, 1945, p. 294. 
45 Those who wished to emphasize this aspect frequently referred to the fact that Masaryk had 
done a blacksmith’s apprenticeship. 
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miners on the eight-hour working day in the Printers’ Club.46 He and the whole of our 
movement are working for a broader approach to socialism. 
‘On the other hand, however, we should like to create a different, our own, a pure Czech 
form of socialism resting on the humanist idea. That is where Michal is right: pursuing 
internationalism diverts the workers’ interest away from questions that concern the whole 
nation...’ 
‘That’s all very nice, my boy, somehow pure and honest’, said Martin, ‘but the fact 
remains that our party bases itself on the principles of scientific — you understand? — 
scientific socialism, that it does not exclude nationality, but is resorting to internationalism 
for temporary tactical reasons.’ (Ill, p. 77) 
Even after the ‘Victorious February’ a great many Czechs still did not believe the 
Masarykian cause was entirely lost. For example, in 1950 in Hranice a certain Josef 
Hladky published privately, ‘in the hope of a better future’, an anthology of twelve pre-war 
poems by twelve poets, including Zizkova, celebrating the life of T. G. Masaryk. 
Conclusion 
Dvorakova still believes, then, that once the Czechs have been through the fire of Marxist 
socialism, they will soon find their own natural path to Masarykian socialism. The 
majority of the women writers I have treated clearly hoped for that Masarykian path, 
considering this path, or something like it, the only path out of the post-war moral morass 
and atmosphere of fear. That is explicit in Dvorakova, Klenova (in spite of all her 
hysterical racism), Klenkova, Novakova and Scheinpflugova. Since pre-war Stalinism fails 
in Spalova, one may safely assume, she will feel no attraction to 1940s Communism 
whatsoever.47 That goes also for those writers with Christian or theosophical mystical 
leanings, Glabaznova, Vasova and Zizkova. Svata demonstrated there was little 
ideologically sound about her with her concentration-camp ideological novel and 
subsequent play. Hanusova disappeared from the literary scene, had perhaps been 
insensitive in writing about the Hitler-Stalin pact. Hodacova was writing outside politics, 
though she showed a faint sign of Masarykian ideology. Souckova defected. That leaves us 
just with Majerova, Glazarova, Pujmanova, Svozilova and Tilschova who by their actions 
or writing or both embraced Communism. That is a third of the writers I have considered. 
Historians of 1945-^48 in Czechoslovakia have usually concentrated on politics and 
economics to explain why Gottwald and his fellows organized the coup of February 1948: 
for example, the movement to the right within the Social Democratic Party; the Slovaks 
with their majority of Democratic Party voters; disquiet at Stalin’s forbidding Gottwald to 
become party to the Marshall Plan; the drought of 1947 and accompanying trade deficit 
incurred by the fulfilment of the Two-Year Plan and consequent discontent, especially 
among the rural population who had initially benefitted most from the Communist Party’s 
government leadership since 1945; a fear lest the number of Communist voters fell 
dramatically from the 1946 number in the elections planned for May 1948. 
The examples of the dozen or so women writers I have looked at suggest that a very 
large proportion of the Czech intelligentsia had no desire whatsoever for a Soviet-style 
socialist society in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, it may be important that these writers are 
women. In Czech politics also, two women took particularly strong stands against 
46 The Communist writer Majerova gives prominence to this episode in her chronicle of the 
industrialization of Kladno, based on one family, Sirena (The Siren, 1935) — another of those 
novels she modified in 1947, but she left the Masaryk episode in. 
47 Like HodaCova, Klenkova and Scheinpflugova, Spalova ceased publishing in 1948 and only 
began again during the Thaw at the end of the 1950s. 
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sovietization, the People’s Party Helena Kozeluhova48 and the National Social Milada 
Horakova. (The former later defected and the latter was executed.) For women, Red Army 
liberation meant mass raping, quite apart from the destruction of their homes by Soviet 
looting.49 It is, indeed, banal to conclude that, if the majority of the population had clearly 
felt favourable towards the Communists, Gottwald would not have had to engineer his 
coup. Nevertheless, it is perhaps useful to be able to demonstrate on the basis of belles- 
lettres that the coup was necessary if Stalinism was to rule safely. It did not matter to 
Gottwald that most members of the large Czech middle classes whom these women writers 
represented had little faith in Communist happy morrows. 
48 Kozeluhova also published her one novel during the transition period, Snezna romance (A 
Snow Romance, 1946). This somewhat cosy detective story includes mockery of the 
Decadents, like Klenkova’s novel. Here, however, the attack is directed not at the French, but at 
the Pole Przybyszewski and, indirectly, at Nietzsche. After she had escaped to Germany 
Kozeluhova was condemned to death in absentia. 
49 For a brief account of this, see Stransky, East Wind over Prague (see note 6 above), pp. 27-37. 
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